Web Appendix

Table 1 describes each of the new alliance categories I propose along with the specific conditions of each commitment obligating alliance members to assist one another, and the game form implied by each commitment.

Table 1. *Conditions for Rendering Military Assistance by Alliance Category.*

Category	Commitment Conditions: T obligated to assist only if . . .	Game Form Implied by Commitment
Unconditional Compellent	• none	• A and C form alliance. • A chooses whether to make coercive demand from B. • If A coerces, B chooses to concede or retaliate. • If B retaliates, T is obligated to assist A.
Conditional Compellent	• B does not concede demand	• A and C form alliance, which includes a demand targeting B backed by a threat to punish if B does not concede. • B chooses to accept or reject demand. • If B rejects, A chooses whether to punish. • If A punish, B chooses to concede or retaliate. • If B retaliates, C is obligated to assist A.
Active Deterrent	• A does not attempt to take more from B than its status quo allocation	• B and C form an alliance. • B chooses whether to attack A preemptively. • If B attacks, A chooses to concede or retaliate. • If A retaliates, C is obligated to assist B as long as B doesn't attempt to take more from A than its status quo allocation. • If B doesn't attack preemptively, A chooses whether to make a coercive demand from B. • B chooses to concede or retaliate. • If B retaliates, C is obligated to assist B as long as B doesn't attempt to take more from A than its status quo allocation.
Passive Deterrent	• B does not attempt to take more from A than its status quo allocation • A attacks	• B and C form an alliance. • A chooses whether to attack B. • If A attacks, B chooses to concede or retaliate. • If B retaliates, C is obligated to assist B as long as B doesn't attempt to take more from A than its status quo allocation.
Probabilistic Deterrent	• Causus foederis conditions are met • C chooses to intervene	• B and C form an alliance. • A chooses to make coercive demand from B. • If A coerces, B chooses to concede or retaliate. • If B retaliates, C is permitted by agreement to choose whether or not to intervene.

Table 2 lists and describes the outcome and control variables estimated in all the models. Explanatory variables come from the EUGene package (Bennett and Stam 2000). Parity is used to measure dyad capabilities ration, because the theoretical expectation is that states are most likely to experience conflict when the expected outcome of conflict is uncertain (Fearon 1995) and because a substantial empirical literature supports this explanation (e.g., Bremer 1992; Geller 1992, 1993; Kim 1991; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Moul 1988). The measure can be calculated from a measure of preponderance (initiator capabilities divided by the sum of capabilities in the dyad) as follows: subtract ½, take the absolute value of the result, and multiply by 2. This rescales the [0,1] preponderance measure onto a [0,1] scale where ½ is at 0 and extreme values are at 1. Subtracting one and taking the absolute value again reverses the scale.

Table 2. *Variable Concepts and Measurement.*

Variable Name	Concept	Measurement
Outcome Variables		
MID Initiation	Dispute Occurrence	Coded 1 if there was a MID initiated by state A against state B in the dyad year; 0 otherwise.
Violent MID Initiation	Trichotomous measure of violent dispute occurrence.	Coded 2 if state A initiated a MID in which it used force or engaged in war; 1 if state A initiated a MID in which it threatened to use force or displayed force; 0 if there was a MID but state A engaged in no military action or there was no MID.
Explanatory Variables		
Joint democracy	Joint Democracy	Coded 1 if both members of the dyad score > 6 on the dyad's polity score; 0 otherwise (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).
Contiguity	Direct Contiguity	Coded 1 if the dyad members either share a land or river border or are separated by less than 25 miles of water; 0 if they are separated by more than 25 miles of water.
Capabilities ratio	Power Parity	Scored on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 indicating total preponderance and 1 indicating total parity.
S-Score	Foreign Policy Similarity	Measured on continuous interval [-1,1] with 1 indicating similar revealed policy positions between dyad members and -1 being the most dissimilar (Signorino and Ritter 1999).
Peace Years	Peace year's duration	Years since last MID.

Table 3 provides a summary of the models estimated in the manuscript, the variables of interest in each model and their coding rules.

Table 3. *Alliance Typology Variable Concepts and Measurement.*

	Variable Name	Concept	Coding Rule
Model 1: Baseline	Initiator Alliance	Initiator has an external alliance.	Coded 1 if dyad initiator has at least one external compellent or deterrent type of alliance.
	Target Alliance	Target has an external alliance.	Coded 1 if dyad target has at least one external compellent or deterrent type of alliance.
Model 2: ATOP	ATOP Offensive	Initiator has an ATOP offensive alliance.	Coded 1 if dyad initiator has at least one ATOP offensive alliance; 0 otherwise
	ATOP Defensive	Target has an ATOP defensive alliance.	Coded 1 if dyad initiator has at least one ATOP defensive alliance; 0 otherwise.
Model 3: Deter-Compel	Compellent	Initiator has compellent alliance.	Coded 1 if initiator in dyad has at least one compellent alliance targeting target; 0 otherwise.
	Deterrent	Target has deterrent alliance.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one deterrent alliance targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
Model 4: Ally Power Status	Compellent	Same as previous model.	Same as previous model.
	Major Power Deterrent	Target has deterrent alliance with major power ally.	Coded 1 if target has at least one deterrent alliance with a major power ally targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
	Minor Power Deterrent	Target has deterrent alliance with minor power ally.	Coded 1 if target has at least one deterrent alliance but no such alliance is with a major power; 0 otherwise.
Model 5: New Categories	Unconditional Compellent	Initiator has unconditional compellent alliance.	Coded 1 if initiator in dyad has at least one unconditional compellent alliance targeting target; 0 otherwise.
	Conditional Compellent	Initiator has conditional compellent alliance.	Coded 1 if initiator in dyad has at least one conditional compellent alliance targeting target; 0 otherwise.
	Active Deterrent	Target has general deterrent alliance.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one conditional deterrent alliance with a major power targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
	Passive Deterrent	Target has conditional deterrent alliance.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one conditional deterrent alliance with a major power targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
	Probabilistic Deterrent	Target has probabilistic alliance.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has alliance targeting initiator that permits alliance members to escape intervention or to choose level of military commitment ex post; 0 otherwise.
Models 6-7: Violent-Non Violent Conflict, Target is Minor/Major Power	Unconditional Compellent	Same as previous model.	Same as previous model.
	Conditional Compellent	Same as previous model.	Same as previous model.
	Major Power Active Deterrent	Target has general deterrent alliance with major power ally.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one general deterrent alliance with a major power targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
	Minor Power Active Deterrent	Target has general deterrent alliance with minor power ally.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one general deterrent alliance targeting initiator but such alliance is with a major power; 0 otherwise.
	Major Power Reactive Deterrent	Target has with conditional deterrent alliance with major power ally.	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one conditional deterrent alliance with a major power targeting initiator; 0 otherwise.
	Minor Power Reactive Deterrent	Target has conditional deterrent alliance with minor power ally	Coded 1 if target in dyad has at least one conditional deterrent alliance targeting initiator but no such alliance is with a major power; 0 otherwise.
	Probabilistic Deterrent	Same as previous model.	Same as previous model.

Table 4 includes the marginal effects of the Models 1–5 reported in Table 4 in the article.

Table 4. *Marginal effects of alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes, 1816-2000. Novel dataset.*

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2 ATOP	Model 3 Compellent - Deterrent	Model 4 Ally Power Status	Model 5 New Categories
Joint Democracy (d)	**-0.0037**	**-0.0035**	**-0.0034**	**-0.0033**	**-0.0034**
	(0.0005)	**(0.0005)**	**(0.0005)**	**(0.0005)**	**(0.0006)**
Contiguity (d)	**0.0147**	**0.0148**	**0.0147**	**0.0148**	**0.0146**
	(0.0015)	**(0.0015)**	**(0.0015)**	**(0.0015)**	**(0.0015)**
Capabilities Ratio	**0.0063**	**0.0060**	**0.0062**	**0.0062**	**0.0063**
	(0.0009)	**(0.0009)**	**(0.0009)**	**(0.0009)**	**(0.0009)**
S-score	**-0.0045**	**-0.0042**	**-0.0046**	**-0.0047**	**-0.0048**
	(0.0007)	**(0.0008)**	**(0.0007)**	**(0.0007)**	**(0.0007)**
Initiator Alliance (d)	**0.0016**				
	(0.0005)				
Target Alliance (d)	**-0.0010**				
	(0.0005)				
ATOP Offensive (d)		**0.0073**			
		(0.0013)			
ATOP Defensive (d)		-0.0005			
		(0.0005)			
Compellent (d)			**0.0130**	**0.0128**	
			(0.0022)	**(0.0022)**	
Deterrent (d)			-0.0005		
			(0.0005)		
Major Power Deterrent (d)				-0.0010	
				(0.0006)	
Minor Power Deterrent (d)				0.0000	
				(0.0005)	
Unconditional Compellent (d)					**0.0157**
					(0.0026)
Conditional Compellent (d)					0.0023
					(0.0026)
Active Deterrent (d)					**0.0016**
					(0.0008)
Passive Deterrent (d)					**-0.0011**
					(0.0005)
Probabilistic Deterrent (d)					-0.0002
					(0.0006)
Xmfx_y	0.0064	0.0063	0.0063	0.0063	0.0063

Marginal effects calculated at means of independent variables; Standard errors in parentheses
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

Table 5 includes the marginal effects of Models 6–7 reported in Table 5 in the article.

Table 5. *Marginal Effects of multinomial logit estimates of compellent and deterrent alliances on the initiation of violent militarized interstate disputes when dyad target is a minor/major power, 1816-2000. Novel dataset.*

	Model 6 Minor Power Target		Model 6 Major Power Target	
	Nonviolent	Violent	Nonviolent	Violent
Joint Democracy (d)	**-0.0016**	**-0.0027**	-0.0003	-0.0017
	(0.0004)	**(0.0006)**	(0.0002)	(0.0005)
Contiguity (d)	**0.0049**	**0.0116**	**0.0027**	**0.0046**
	(0.0008)	**(0.0014)**	**(0.0008)**	**(0.0014)**
Capabilities Ratio	**0.0020**	**0.0032**	**0.0025**	**0.0039**
	(0.0006)	**(0.0010)**	**(0.0004)**	**(0.0007)**
S-score	**-0.0021**	**-0.0034**	**-0.0014**	**-0.0034**
	(0.0006)	**(0.0007)**	**(0.0003)**	**(0.0006)**
Unconditional Compellent (d)	0.0005	**0.0125**	0.0004	**0.0089**
	(0.0011)	**(0.0029)**	(0.0006)	**(0.0027)**
Conditional Compellent (d)	0.0008	0.0041	-0.0003	0.0004
	(0.0017)	(0.0043)	(0.0004)	(0.0011)
Major Power Active Deterrent (d)	**-0.0040**	-0.0027	0.0005	**0.0047**
	(0.0003)	(0.0013)	(0.0009)	**(0.0022)**
Minor Power Active Deterrent (d)	-0.0005	0.0001	0.0001	**0.0017**
	(0.0008)	(0.0010)	(0.0003)	**(0.0009)**
Major Power Passive Deterrent (d)	-0.0006	**-0.0020**	**-0.0006**	0.0005
	(0.0005)	**(0.0005)**	**(0.0002)**	(0.0006)
Minor Power Passive Deterrent (d)	-0.0003	-0.0005	0.0001	0.0007
	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)	(0.0007)
Probabilistic Deterrent (d)	**-0.0011**	-0.0004	0.0001	0.0006
	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0002)	(0.0005)
Xmfx_y	**0.0030**	**0.0051**	**0.0009**	**0.0027**

Marginal effects calculated at means of independent variables; Standard errors in parentheses
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

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