

Errata

Benson, Brett. *Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

June 4, 2013

Page	Currently Reads	Should Read
40, Table 2.5, last line	First column, total number of 'Offensive Only' is 13	First column, total number of 'Offensive Only' is 14
40, Table 2.5, last line	Tenth column, total number of 'Total' is 287	Tenth column, total number of 'Total' is 288
108, third equation	$EU_c(war) = \lambda(p + \theta - c_2)(1 - \lambda)(\theta)$	$EU_c(war) = \lambda(p + \theta - c_B)(1 - \lambda)(\theta)$
114, last paragraph	$\delta = 0.55$, $\delta = 0.9$, and $c_A = 0.1$	$\delta = 0.55$, $\lambda = 0.9$, and $c_A = 0.1$
121, first equation	$EU_A(x_{BA} \theta^*) =$ $(\frac{p+r\mu-x_{BA}}{1-p})(1-p-r\mu-c_A)$ $+ (\frac{x_{BA}-r\mu}{1-p})(1-x_{BA})$	$EU_B(x_{BA} \theta^*) =$ $(\frac{x_{BA}-p-r\mu}{1-p})(p+r\mu-c_B)$ $+ (\frac{1-x_{BA}+r\mu}{1-p})(x_{BA})$
122, last paragraph	$\delta = 0.9$, $\lambda = 0.55$, and $c_A = c_B = 0.1$	$\delta = 0.55$, $\lambda = 0.9$, and $c_A = c_B = 0.1$
125, first paragraph	Also, if it is optimal to form no commitment when actions are observable, $Z=(0,0)$, then C will also select no commitment when actions are observable, $s=0$.	Also, if it is optimal to form no commitment when actions are observable, $Z=(0,0)$, then C will also select no commitment when actions are unobservable, $s=0$.
133, fourth paragraph	When actions are not observable, probabilistic and unconditional commitments are more likely to emerge than any conditional or pure conditional types of alliance commitments.	H4. When actions are not observable, probabilistic and unconditional commitments are more likely to emerge than any conditional or pure conditional types of alliance commitments.