

OMB in its Management Role: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Executives¹

The Office of Management and Budget and its predecessor agencies have long sat at the nexus of executive management and policymaking in the United States federal government. While important research has been conducted on the history of the office and the role it plays in federal budgeting and policy making, very little systematic research has been conducted on how federal executives perceive OMB's influence in this role. This paper uses data from surveys of federal executives in 2007 and 2014 to describe OMB's interactions with federal agencies and how federal executives inside and outside OMB perceive the degree of OMB influence over policymaking in their agencies. The data reveal that OMB's reach into the executive establishment is wide but its influence varies. Among political actors, OMB trailed only political appointees in terms of influence over agency policy decisions. OMB is also one of the top 3 most influential agencies in interagency processes. The agencies that perceive OMB to be less influential tend to be independent agencies, agencies with agencies whose policy views differ from the administration, and agencies with reputations for skilled workforces. The paper concludes with the implications of these findings for the Trump Administration's efforts to elevate OMB's management role within the executive establishment.

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One of the defining features of the Trump presidency has been the chief executive's strained relationship with the departments and agencies of the government. The president has referred to the permanent government as part of the swamp and decried "deep state" resistance to his agenda.² He has publicly railed against government actors that have not carried out his orders and expressed frustration and surprise at instances where the bureaucracy has pursued policies at variance with his own views.

President Trump is learning what other presidents before him understood: to be successful presidents must effectively direct the activities of the executive establishment. The public holds presidents responsible for the actions of the departments and agencies of government even though presidents share authority with Congress and the courts. When a visible public problem emerges in national life, voters largely attribute to the president blame or credit (Neustadt 1960). This is particularly true when the problem exists in the bureaucracy. Presidents who want to fulfill their campaign promises should realize that unelected civil servants are central to this effort. This is true whether the goals are those of President Trump, such as limiting new regulations or ramping up immigration enforcement, or those of President Obama, including efforts to expand health care access or combat climate change.

² See Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman, and Charlie Savage, "Blaming the Deep State: Officials Accused of Wrongdoing Adopt Trump's Response," *New York Times*, December 18, 2018 (<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/deep-state-trump-classified-information.html>, accessed February 22, 2019); Evan Osnos, "Trump vs. the 'Deep State': How the Administration's loyalists are quietly reshaping American governance," *The New Yorker*, May 21, 2018 (<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state>, accessed December 31, 2018).

Presidents have adopted a number of strategies to secure control of the departments and agencies of government in order to define administration policy and ensure its effective implementation. The most prominent of these strategies are loosely defined as politicization and centralization (Krause and O'Connell 2016; Moe 1985). Presidents use the careful selection and strategic placement of political appointees to help them direct the departments and agencies of government (Pfiffner 1996; Weko 1995). They also bring important decisions into the White House orbit with the aid of robust staff agencies and effectively structured decision processes (Rudalevige 2002; West 2005). The principal continuing staff agency at the center of presidents' efforts is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This modestly sized unit in the Executive Office of the President manages the formulation of the president's budget and provides oversight of agency spending post-appropriations. It reviews agency regulatory actions, provides guidance on procurement and grants, and to varying degrees drives presidential management initiatives across the government.

OMB is central to the success of modern presidents and yet we have very little systematic understanding of how agencies perceive the agency and respond to its leadership. This is important since the president's policy priorities are often implemented through circulars and memoranda issued by OMB and budgets superintended by OMB staff. Do agencies implement OMB memoranda with alacrity or delay? Are some agencies better able to circumvent OMB's oversight than others? OMB is a central part of the policy process, responsible for soliciting feedback on proposed legislation and executive actions. It is also one of many units in the president's orbit with its own views and interests, which may conflict with the views and interests of other agencies. Is OMB likely to win or lose in these interagency fights?

This paper uses surveys of federal executives from 2007 and 2014 to describe OMB's interactions with federal agencies and how federal executives inside and outside OMB perceive the degree of OMB influence over policymaking in their agencies. The data suggest that OMB's reach

across the executive establishment is wide but its penetration varies. Among groups that compete for control of federal agencies, OMB trailed only political appointees in terms of influence over agency policy decisions. OMB is also one of the top 3 most influential agencies in interagency processes along with the National Security Council staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The agencies that perceive OMB to be less influential tend to be independent agencies, agencies whose policy views differ from the administration, and agencies with reputations for skilled workforces. The paper concludes with the implications of these findings for the Trump Administration's efforts to elevate OMB's management role.

Presidential Management and OMB

One of the key features of the policy process in the United States is the central role of government agencies. As the range and complexity of government work has grown, Congress has delegated increasing amounts of policy making authority to government agencies (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002). The locus of policymaking activity has partly shifted away from Congress to executive agencies (Lowi 1979). Key interests hold elected officials accountable for legislation and for the policies that emerge from the departments and agencies of government (Haeder and Yackee 2015; You 2017). The voting public largely holds presidents responsible for the state of national affairs, particularly as they relate to government agencies (Waterman et al. 2014). When some problem goes unresolved in public life or a scandal emerges in the bureaucracy, the public also holds presidents accountable.

The fundamental management challenge for any president and administration is that the administrative state is enormous and complex. The federal government employs more than 2.7 million civilians (including Postal Service) scattered throughout the United States and around the globe. Only 15 percent reside in the Washington, DC area. They work in 250 to 300 distinct agencies performing remarkably different tasks from protecting civil rights to landing planes to conducting

scientific research. Each agency implements a variety of agency-specific and government-wide policies enacted by Congress. Some agencies perform well and others poorly and some are very responsive to presidential direction and others are less so (O'Leary 2005; Richardson et al. 2018; Wilson 1989).

Presidents have sought to extend their influence over administrative agencies to ensure that the activities of agencies are consistent with their views and performing well (Aberbach 1990; Nathan 1975; Waterman 1989). They have increased the number and penetration of appointees and augmented and improved vetting processes in the White House (Lewis 2008; Thompson and Brown 1997; Weko 1995). They have also built capacity to review administrative policymaking centrally so that budgets, testimony, proposed regulations, and new executive orders are cleared prior to promotion (see, e.g., Acs and Cameron 2013; Rudalevige 2015; Wiseman 2009). Presidents have pursued reorganization plans and management agendas intended to rationalize administrative structure and management and to strengthen executive control (Arnold 1998).

OMB has been central to virtually all management efforts of modern presidents. The success of OMB in carrying in to effect the president's agenda varies by agency. OMB has a great deal of influence over some agencies such as bureaus within the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture and less influence over others including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve. For example, some agencies are insulated from OMB control by virtue of their statutory structure as independent commissions (Breger and Edles 2015; Selin 2015). These agencies are regularly omitted from centralized budgetary, testimony, and regulatory review. Other agencies compete with OMB for influence over policymaking and outcomes and some are powerful enough to resist directions from OMB (Long 1949; Rourke 1972). Indeed, in some cases, OMB is also one agency among many competing for power in interagency disagreements (Bressman and Vandenberg 2006).

To date, we know very little about how other agencies perceive OMB and which agencies perceive OMB as powerful and which do not and why. While there have been careful analyses of OMB history, the role of OMB in budgetary politics or regulatory review, few works examine how agencies perceive OMB's role in the policymaking process (Berman 1979; Dearborn 2018; Potter 2019; Tomkin 1998; Wiseman 2009).

Why Do Some Agencies Resist OMB?

Beyond agency structures designed to limit political influence, scholars identify a number of reasons why some agencies are more or less likely to be influenced by OMB. One prominent source of variation among agencies is whether their policy views are similar or dissimilar to those of the presidential administration. Immigration policy is a good example. President Obama directed the Department of Homeland Security to create the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program partly in response to resistance from front line workers to the president's immigration priorities (Kagan 2015). The president and his Secretary of Homeland Security had a difficult time getting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to adopt their priorities in immigration enforcement and the formalization of these priorities in DACA was the President's response. The unions for these agencies subsequently endorsed Donald Trump for president during the 2016 election. After his election, President Trump threatened to end DACA, publicly praised CBP and ICE workers, and worked to increase the agencies' budgets. These two presidents confronting ICE and CPB can expect different responsiveness to their policy priorities (Golden 2000; Resh 2015). More generally, agencies that share the president's views about policy are likely to do what the president prefers with little oversight. Other agencies may hold policy views that differ significantly from the new administration and require attentive direction to ensure they faithfully implement the president's policies.

Beyond policy, some agencies are harder for a new administration to influence because of technical or esoteric skills and reputations for competence (Crozier 1964; Hickson et. al 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Rourke 1972; Wilson 1989). Agencies with highly skilled workforces that work in complex policy domains such as the Centers for Disease Control or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are better able to connect proposed budgets and policies to potential outcomes than their often generalist overseers, and their informational advantage helps them in the budget and policymaking processes. Agencies with reputations for competence also invite political support from Congress and other stakeholders inside and outside the administration (see, e.g., Carpenter 2001, 2010). This provides agencies some additional influence in the competition for resources and influence since deciding against the agency may come with greater political costs.

Other factors scholars deem important include an agency's constituency and its positional centrality within larger components of the government. With respect to the importance of an agency's constituency, Rourke (1972, 241) notes that an agency that has a large number of influential supporters (and a small number of influential enemies) such as the Department of Veterans Affairs or the Department of Agriculture will tend to be powerful. Matthew Holden states that the condition of power is "a favorable balance of constituencies" (Holden 1966, 944). Agencies that can escape harmful political attacks and enjoy the support of powerful constituencies interested in the agency's wellbeing have a better political position (Freeman 1965; Hecl 1978).

One of the key factors in OMB's influence is not only their one-to-one relationship with an agency but also their unique role in the competition among agencies for resources and power. Competition among agencies for position, turf, and resources extends to all areas of government (see, e.g., Hargrove 1994; Hyman and Kovacic 2014; Kovacic 2012; O'Connell 2006; Wilson 1989). Law dictates that all agencies carry out mandates given by Congress and the president but law does not provide agencies the power necessary to implement these mandates (Long 1949; Moore 1995). The success of an agency depends upon its ability to control the definition of its tasks and secure the

resources and support necessary to implement the agency's mission. A significant amount of government work involves more than one agency, whether the work is providing feedback on proposed legislation or policy initiatives, conducting joint rulemaking, or pursuing other interagency goals (Bressman and Vandenberg 2006; Freeman and Rossi 2012).

OMB has an advantage in this larger competition among agencies because of its centrality and the key role it plays in providing resources and controlling agency planning and uncertainty. Within large organizations, the components that interact more with other parts of the organization (subunits which are pervasive), interact with parts of an organization in ways which are essential for those other parts to complete their tasks, and subunits which reduce uncertainty for other units will tend to be more powerful (Crozier 1964; Hickson et al. 1971, 218; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977, 5). OMB fits this description since it has influence over other agencies' essential functions, namely budget formulation, rulemaking, and setting overall policy in spending, procurement and management. It is pervasive in that it touches nearly every agency in the executive branch and it has a big influence on the level of uncertainty in agencies' planning via its control of budgets and procurements.

In sum, the existing scholarship suggests that OMB should be perceived as influential with agencies whose views depart from those of the president and agencies whose workforces are less skilled and whose tasks are easier to oversee and understand. OMB should have a more difficult time influencing agencies without large supportive constituencies. In addition, OMB should be perceived as relatively influential among agencies in interagency processes.

How Influential is OMB?

To evaluate OMB's position in the executive establishment we rely on survey data from the two Surveys on the Future of Government Service (Clinton et al. 2012; Richardson 2019). These surveys were academic surveys conducted by university researchers with the help of university, not-

for-profit, and government partners. We primarily use data from the 2014 survey but reference the 2007 survey where questions are comparable. The 2014 survey was an online and paper survey of 14,698 appointed and career federal executives from across the executive establishment.³ The survey targeted all components of the executive establishment that were headed by a Senate-confirmed appointee whose functions were not exclusively advisory (Lewis and Selin 2012). Scholarship agencies, regional agencies, and non-profits and cooperatives were also excluded. Within agencies the survey was sent to all political appointees⁴, all career members of the Senior Executive Service, U.S. based members of the Senior Foreign Service, and other high-level executives who ran programs and agencies.⁵ The response rate was 24 percent (3,551 respondents) and the survey included a number of questions about the backgrounds, experiences, and political views of federal

³ The survey sample was drawn from the *Federal Yellow Book* and the survey was implemented by the Princeton Survey Research Center. The response rate was 24 percent, 18 percent for appointees and 25 percent for career executives. Of the 3,551, 586 answered via paper survey and the remainder took the online version.

⁴ Specifically, the survey was sent to all Senate-confirmed, other presidential appointees not requiring Senate confirmation, non-career SES, and Schedule C appointees in the instrumentalities of the United States government described in this section.

⁵ Among other career executives, the survey was sent to executives comparable to members of the SES in agencies without SES members, program and agency managers at the GS 14, 15 level with specific job functions as listed in the *Federal Yellow Book*.

executives, including questions about agency management and performance. The 2007 survey targeted a similar population but with a smaller sample.⁶

Competing for Influence

A number of different actors compete to influence the policy decisions of government agencies, including OMB but also political appointees, congressional committees, key interest groups, and others. We begin by comparing OMB's influence to these other actors. The survey asked respondents, "In general, how much influence do you think the following groups have over policy decisions in {your agency}? [A great deal, a good bit, some, little, none, Don't know]." The question then listed a number of actors, including:

- White House
- Office of Management and Budget
- Political appointees
- Senior civil servants
- Congressional committees
- Private sector or not-for-profit stakeholders (e.g., regulated parties, advocacy groups).
- Media
- Democrats in Congress
- Republicans in Congress
- Contractors

The ordering of the groups was randomized and the question was asked in grid format so that a comparison was implied.⁷

⁶ This on-line and paper survey was sent to 7,448 career and appointed federal administrators and program managers. The overall response rate was 33% and the sample was generally representative of the population of federal executives.

⁷ A respondent was shown either "Media" or "Contractors" with probability 0.5. "Media" or "Contractors" was listed last due to programming restrictions.


Figure 1 includes the average responses from *None* (0) to *A great deal* (4). Respondents reported that political appointees had the largest impact over policy decisions in their agencies. This is to be expected since appointees fill the top executive positions and many statutes delegate policy making authority to these positions or officials in statute. Respondents also reported that senior civil servants had a significant amount of influence over policy making in their agencies. This confirms that career executives not only implement policy, they also *make* policy. They play a key role in decisions involving budgets, rulemaking, enforcement, the distribution of grants and other decisions. Interestingly, federal executives reported that OMB was the *second* most influential group when it came to policy decisions in government agencies, ahead of the White House and congressional committees. This confirms the important role that OMB plays in presidential management of the executive branch.

More generally, federal executives report that the presidential administration, either through appointees, OMB, or the White House directly, had more influence on policymaking in their agency than Congress.⁸ Among discrete groups in Congress, agencies reported that the committees had more influence than the parties which is not surprising since agencies interact most directly with Congress via committees and their staffs. Federal executives reported that non-governmental actors such as outside stakeholders, the media, and government contractors had less influence on agency decisions on average.⁹

⁸ While both career executives and appointees report that the administration has more influence than Congress over policy making in their agencies, for career executives the gap is smaller.

⁹ Another way of examining the Figure 1 data is with the proportion responding *A good bit* or *A great deal*. The proportion of respondents answering this way are as follows: Political appointees (80%); OMB (67%); Senior Civil Servants (65%); White House (67%); Congressional committees (57%);

Figure 1. How Influential is OMB Relative to Other Political Actors?



Source: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2014

These overall averages mask significant variation from agency to agency. Respondents in independent commissions report less outside political influence in their decisions than executive agencies (i.e., both agencies that are part of executive departments and executive agencies that are not part of executive departments). They also report less White House, OMB, and congressional influence over agency decisions than respondents in executive agencies. In fact, independent commission executives report more congressional and stakeholder influence over agency decisions than either OMB or White House influence. Members of Congress and their staff may have more regular interaction with these agencies and this is reflected in the relative influence of the branches. Previous congressional efforts to limit presidential influence over these agencies appear to have been successful. Interestingly, however, respondents in independent commissions report *more* appointee influence than their counterparts in executive agencies. This finding suggests that appointment

Congressional Democrats (45%); Congressional Republicans (37%); Stakeholders (31%); Media (17%); Contractors (8%).

politics may be a more significant battleground for control in the independent commissions than executive agencies.

Interagency Power and Influence

The choices agencies make are determined not just by directions from elected officials or feedback from clients or stakeholders. In order for government to function, agencies must participate in an increasing number of interagency processes. The data provide insight into how agencies—including OMB—fare in interagency disputes. Who wins or loses when agencies disagree with one another? The 2014 survey instrument provided respondents the following text and question:

Government policy making often involves multiple agencies (e.g., commenting on proposed legislation, interagency task forces). When agencies participate in work that involves multiple agencies and diverse opinions, not all agencies operate on equal footing. Some have more influence than others.

In your experience, how influential are the following agencies in interactions involving multiple agencies?

After the text and question, respondents were provided a list of 5-8 agencies and a scale from 1 to 5.¹⁰ We populated each respondent's list of agencies based upon a combination of information provided by them and agencies we chose. We asked respondents to identify the three agencies that they work with the most. We included these agencies in their list, along with OMB and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).¹¹ On-line respondents were provided 3 additional agencies, other bureaus in their department (if they worked in a department) or independent agencies and executive

¹⁰ Each online respondent was provided 8 agencies to evaluate and each paper survey respondent was asked to rate 5 agencies.

¹¹ Because all executives deal with OMB and OPM, all respondents were asked to evaluate these agencies to make use of the scale comparable across respondents.


departments, all chosen at random.¹² The low end of the scale (i.e., 1) was labeled “Least influential” and the high end of the scale (i.e., 5) was labeled “Most influential.” Respondents could select values between 1 and 5 or “Don’t know.”

In Figure 2 we include estimates of agency influence derived from aggregating all the ratings and adjusting for differences among raters.¹³ The figure includes estimates of the influence of the fifteen most and fifteen least influential agencies sorted from highest to lowest (Appendix A includes the full set of estimates). The horizontal lines in the figure represent our uncertainty in the estimates of influence. Agencies with fewer ratings have more uncertainty as to their true influence. Several aspects of the rank ordering of agencies by influence are worth mentioning. First, OMB is listed among the most influential agencies. OMB is rated the third most influential agency in government out of 165 agencies. Only the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council Staff are rated as more influential. This is important evidence that executives working in other federal agencies perceive OMB to be very influential in interagency processes.

¹² Refer to the online appendix to Richardson et al. (2018) for details of how the list agencies that respondents could evaluate was assembled.

¹³ We use a Bayesian multi-rater item response model with informed priors to estimate agency influence (Richardson et al. 2018). The model allows each respondent to have a unique mapping from her perception of agency influence to her use of the scale from the survey. Because respondents who work with an agency should be best able to evaluate its influence, we use the perceptions of respondents who work with each agency to construct the prior distribution for agency influence. This specification weights the perceptions of these individuals more heavily than the perceptions of other respondents.

Figure 2. Fifteen Most and Fifteen Least Influential Agencies



Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% region of highest posterior density. Source: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2014.

Second, among the most influential agencies are a number of agencies involved in foreign policy and national security as well as the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury. The presence of these agencies collectively may hint at one source of OMB esteem. One commonly identified cause of agency influence is an organization’s expertise or skills (Carpenter 2001, 2010; Crozier 1964; Hickson et. al 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Rourke 1972; Wilson 1989). The estimates for agencies involved in national security, intelligence, the macroeconomy, and law enforcement seem to confirm Rourke’s claim that organizations that have skills necessary for society’s survival will be more influential. In addition, national security and law enforcement agencies also have the ability to withhold information from other agencies, enhancing their power relative to other agencies. OMB’s own technical skills and its key role in budget forecasting, preparation, and apportionment may provide it some additional influence.

Third, among the top ranked agencies are a few other smaller agencies such as the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The OLC is the legal arbiter for the executive branch, rendering legal judgments in disputes among agencies. Hickson et al. (1971, 222) note that the parts of an organization that are more immediate, pervasive, and that control the uncertainty of other units will tend to be more powerful. OLC, like OMB, interacts with large numbers of other agencies and their determinations influence the planning and resources of other agencies (Crozier 1964; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977). Another pervasive agency, the OPM, is also rated in the top 25 based upon ratings by federal executives. OPM makes decisions about allocations in the Senior Executive Service and makes determinations about appointment authority and pay for new positions across the executive.

Interestingly, no clientele agencies are among the most influential agencies. For example, the Agricultural Marketing Service is one of the least influential agencies despite its mission to create domestic and international market opportunities for U.S. farmers. In addition, respondents rate some clientele agencies such as those serving railroad retirees, Native Americans, and veterans among the least influential (though not all in the bottom 15). Federal executives rate large service agencies such as the U.S. Postal Service and the Social Security Administration as lacking power. They are estimated to be in the bottom third of all agencies rated in influence. These estimates appear to contradict the claims of authors such as Rourke (1972) and Holden (1966) that agencies with strong constituencies will have influence. Perhaps the decline of strong and stable relationships between groups, agencies, and congressional committees (i.e., iron triangles) and the growth of groups representing a diverse set of interests has reduced the influence of constituency dominated agencies (Hecklo 1978). One other possibility is that our respondents do not often come into conflict with these agencies and therefore rate as slightly less influential simply for a lack of experience disagreeing with them in an interagency context.

Where is OMB Influential?


Federal executives perceive OMB as quite important and powerful relative to other political actors and agencies. With this big picture in mind, we turn our attention to explaining variation: which agencies' executives report that OMB has a lot of influence and which executives report little OMB influence and why? To explain variation we look to the factor suggested above, including structural features that insulate agencies from administration control, agency policy views, and aspects of agency workforce skills.

In Figure 3, we graph the average reported OMB influence by the degree of agency insulation from the president.¹⁴ Specifically, we include continuous measures of the degree of agency insulation from politics based upon the structural features of agencies on the x-axis and average agency reports of OMB influence on the y-axis. The figure includes two graphs based upon two different types of insulation from political influence: the independence of decision makers (e.g., fixed terms for appointees, party-balancing requirements) and the independence of agency policy decisions (e.g., exemption from OMB budgetary review, independent funding, etc.; Selin 2015). These measures are a convenient way of disentangling more insulated agencies from less insulated but we can also divide up agencies by whether they have specific structural features and compare them (see below). Agencies higher in the figure report that OMB is very influential in policy decisions in their agencies. Agencies lower in the figure report that OMB is less influential. Agencies to the left in the graphs are designed to be more amenable to executive control and those on the right are designed to be more insulated, either by rules related to who runs the agency or rules related to who gets to review agency policy decisions.

¹⁴ We included only those agencies for which we had 10 respondents and 30 potential respondents in the survey.

Among the agencies reporting the highest level of OMB influence in their agencies are the Employment and Training Administration (ETA), the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) and Administration for Children and Families (ACF). All of the executive departments report relatively high levels of OMB influence, with the Department of the Interior reporting the most and the Departments of Justice and Treasury the least. Not surprisingly, agencies that are not part of an executive department report the least OMB influence, including the Federal Reserve (FED), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The downward sloping regression line suggests that respondents in more insulated agencies report less average OMB influence, as we would expect.

Figure 3. OMB Influence by Agency Structural Independence, 2014?



Note: The figure includes agency average responses to the question “In general, how much influence do you think the following groups have over policy decisions in {your agency}? [A great deal, a good bit, some, little, none, Don’t know]” on the y-axis. It includes numerical estimates of two dimensions of agency insulation from Selin (2015) on the x-axis. Agencies listed include only those with at least 10 respondents and 30 potential respondents. Some labels omitted in cases where labels overlap. Source: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2014.

Executives working in these agencies may perceive less OMB influence in independent commissions because the leadership in such agencies is less responsive due to features such as their commission structure, bipartisan composition, or statutory fixed terms. Alternatively, the lack of

OMB leverage over agencies may be due to their exclusion from OMB budget and regulatory review. Agencies that depend upon OMB a lot for approval of budgets, regulations, or congressional testimony may need to defer to OMB more in interagency processes. In Table 1 we dig deeper. The table includes respondent answers to questions about OMB influence broken down by some of the more prominent features of independent agencies.¹⁵ Respondents in agencies with exemption from OMB review of budgets, regulations, and testimony report less OMB influence. Similarly, respondents in agencies with their own sources of funding outside the annual appropriations process and respondents in commissions with party balancing and “for cause” protections against removal report less OMB influence. The features leading respondents to report the least OMB influence include independent sources of funding and exemption from OIRA rulemaking review. Respondents working in agencies such as the U.S. Postal Service or the Tennessee Valley Authority that have other sources of funds or the independent regulatory commissions that do not require OMB approval of regulations are the least likely to report a good bit or great deal of OMB influence.

Table 1. How much influence do you think OMB has over policy decisions in your agency? (proportion selecting "A good bit" or "A great deal")

Insulating Mechanism	No	Yes
Exempt from OMB Budget Review	0.69	0.40
Exempt from OIRA Review of Rulemaking	0.71	0.24
Exempt from OMB Review of Testimony and Legislation	0.72	0.28
Independent Source of Funding	0.70	0.23
Explicit "For Cause" Protections	0.70	0.35
Party Balancing Requirements	0.71	0.36

¹⁵ Source: Lewis and Selin 2012. Specifically, we use Table 13 for OMB exemptions; Table 14, column 7 to code independent funding sources; Table 10, column 3 and Table 6 to code for-cause protections; and table 8 to code party balancing. We coded CFPB as having independent funding and for-cause protections since it is separate from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve in our data.

While structure explains some of the variation and does so in expected ways, it does not explain all of the variation. Presidents have worried that agencies with long histories and reputations for skill or competence can use this to their advantage, either by cultivating outside political support or using their superior expertise to their advantage in discussions with OMB or the White House (Carpenter 2001, 2010; Gailmard and Patty 2013). Figure 4 presents summary graphs of the extent of OMB influence in agency policy decisions by agency ideology, agency workforce partisanship, workforce skill, and the uniqueness of agency workforce skills. The measures of ideology and skill come from the survey and were estimated using the same method employed to generate numerical estimates of influence (Richardson et al. 2018). Specifically, the survey asked respondents:

Ideology: Some agencies have policy views due to law, practice, culture, or tradition that can be characterized across Democratic and Republican administrations as liberal or conservative. This can be an important feature of the environment of public management in these agencies (which is why we ask about it). If you are willing, we would benefit from your assessment of the policy leanings of the following agencies to characterize this aspect of their management environment. As with other questions, you are free not to answer.

In your opinion, do the policy views of the following agencies tend to slant liberal, slant conservative, or neither consistently in both Democratic and Republican administrations?

Skill: In your view, how skilled are the workforces of the following agencies?

We then aggregated these ratings into numerical estimates of agency ideology and workforce skill.

The figure also includes a graph of average respondent partisanship by agency (Democrat [0] to

Republican [4]) and a graph that includes a measure of the uniqueness of agency workforce skills.

Specifically, the survey asked respondents, “What percentage of the expertise that you have acquired

in [your agency] can only be acquired by working in [your agency]?” The purpose of this question

was to tap into the uniqueness of the skills of agency employees. Could the agency get the skills they


needed on the open market for labor or could employees only get these skills by working in their

agency? If a significant portion of an agency’s expertise is specific to that agency and acquired by

working there, other actors are less likely to have that expertise and are more likely to defer to the

expertise of agency personnel.

Figure 4. OMB Influence by Agency Ideology, Partisanship, Workforce Skill, and Agency-specific Skills, 2014




Note: The figure includes agency average responses to the question “In general, how much influence do you think the following groups have over policy decisions in {your agency}?” [A great deal, a good bit, some, little, none, Don’t know]” on the y-axis. The figure in the left column include agency ideology and workforce skill estimates from Richardson et al. 2018. Some labels omitted in cases where labels overlap.

The results are instructive. First, there appears to be little relationship between agency ideology or partisanship and reports of OMB influence. There is slight evidence that more conservative/Republican agencies report a bit less OMB influence than liberal agencies but the effect is small. There is more evidence that agencies with reputations for highly skilled workforces report less OMB influence over policy decisions. Agencies with a reputation for skill may both be harder for OMB to monitor and given more deference by OMB and elected officials. Finally, there is a clear relationship between the uniqueness of an agency’s expertise and the reported influence of OMB. Respondents in agencies whose workforces are skilled and have expertise that is hard to acquire outside the agency are more likely to report less OMB influence.

The perspective of respondents is also influenced by their individual interactions with OMB. In Figure 5, we include information on perceptions of OMB influence by the job of the executive. The figure shows that federal executives involved in budgets, rulemaking, contracts and grants all

report more influence than executives who are not.¹⁶ This could reflect that the fact that executives who come in contact with OMB are more likely to understand how OMB is influential in their agency. Indeed, the respondents for whom OMB is pervasive are more likely to report a significant amount of OMB influence. This suggests that agencies whose day-to-day work does not involve rulemaking, procurement, or grants may perceive less OMB influence, both because employees deal with OMB less and because OMB has fewer levers of influence into agency decisions.

Figure 5. Perceptions of OMB Influence by Role of Executive, 2014



Data Source: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2014

In total, there are a host of agency-specific and respondent-specific factors that explain why some agencies perceive OMB as powerful and others do not. Of course, many of the agency-specific and individual factors correlate with one another (e.g., agency size and agency ideology) and disentangling the unique effect of these factors requires a multivariate approach. In Table 2 we

¹⁶ The survey includes 9 questions about the content of jobs. We focus here on 4 most closely related to the work of OMB.

regress responses to the question concerning OMB influence and the ratings of OMB influence on these factors and a number of controls. Specifically, we include the factors above¹⁷ as well as controls for the size of the agency¹⁸ and features of the respondents background such as whether they are an appointee (0,1; 0.16), whether the respondent works in Washington, DC (0,1; 0.76), the years the executive has worked for the federal government (Mean 23; SD 11.1).

A number of interesting results emerge. First, respondents working in conservative agencies and agencies with reputations for highly skilled workforces report less OMB influence over policy decisions in their agencies on average. A one unit change in ideology or workforce skill is estimated to reduce the probability that a person reports that OMB has a “great deal” of influence from 33% to 30%. Not surprisingly, if a respondent works in an independent commission, the estimated probability they report *a great deal* of OMB influence is estimated to decrease from 33% to 5%. These agencies are more likely to have independent revenue streams and be able to bypass OMB budgetary and regulatory review. Respondents that work in agencies with large budgets and large

¹⁷ We include estimates of agency ideology (Mean -0.02, SD 1.02, Min -1.9, Max 1.9) and workforce skill (Mean 0.07, SD 0.81, Min -2, Max 1.8) from Richardson et al. 2018. We also include an indicator for whether the respondent works in an independent regulatory commission (0,1; 0.09). As above we include a measure of respondent party identification (Mean 1.2, SD 1.5, Min 0, Max 4) and whether their job involves budget formulation/proposals (0,1; 0.72); developing notices of proposed rulemaking, summarizing related comments, writing final rules (0,1; 0.34); grants to state and local governments, other organizations, or individuals (0,1; 0.29); or procurement and contract management (0,1; 0.47).

¹⁸ We include both the natural log of 2014 budget (Mean \$756M; SD \$2.7B) and the number of employees (Mean 30,011; SD 67,126).

staffs are estimated to report more OMB influence, on average, although only the size of the budget is estimated precisely in the models below.¹⁹

Table 2. Regression Models of Respondent Perceptions of OMB Influence, 2014

Variable	OMB Influence in Agency		OMB Influence-- Interagency	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Agency Characteristics</i>				
Agency Ideology (L-C; -2, 2)	-0.09	0.05*	-0.03	0.04
Agency Skills (Least, Most; -2, 2)	-0.10	0.05*	-0.03	0.05
Independent Regulatory Commission(0,1)	-0.96	0.14**	-0.30	0.12**
Ln(2014 Agency Budget)	0.04	0.02*	-0.02	0.02
Ln(2014 Employment)	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>				
Political Appointee (0,1)	-0.03	0.14	-0.06	0.11
Salary (1-21, \$10,000 increments)	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02**
Party ID (D, R; 1, 5)	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.02**
Washington, DC (0,1)	0.00	0.08	0.16	0.07**
Years of Government Experience	0.00	0.003	0.00	0.003
Job involves budget (0,1)	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.07
Job involves rulemaking (0,1)	-0.12	0.06*	-0.06	0.06
Job involves grants(0,1)	0.15	0.09	0.10	0.06*
Job involves contracts (0,1)	0.14	0.07**	0.10	0.07
Constant			4.88	0.36**
N	1347		908	
X2, F (14 df)	188.30		4.12	

Note: **Significant at the 0.05; *significant at the 0.10 level in two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors clustered on bureau reported. Model 1 includes ordered probit estimates of responses to “In general, how much influence do you think the following groups [OMB] have over policy decisions in {your agency}? [A great deal, a good bit, some, little, none, Don’t know].” Cut point estimates from Model 1 omitted. Model 2 includes OLS estimates of ratings of OMB influence “ In your experience, how influential are the following agencies in interactions involving multiple agencies?” [1-Least influential; 5- Most influential].

The coefficient estimates suggest that executives involved with budgets, contracts, and grants believe OMB to be more influential although the estimates are not always estimated precisely enough to be distinguishable from zero with a high degree of confidence. Interestingly, those

¹⁹ In other analyses, agencies with larger numbers of discrete budget accounts reported more OMB influence and agencies without their own lines in the budget reported less OMB influence.

respondents whose job involves developing notices of proposed rulemaking, summarizing related comments, or writing final rules report less OMB influence than other executives without these responsibilities. It is possible that those executives involved in the details of rulemaking possess have policy expertise that makes OMB staff more deferential.


With regard to perceptions of OMB interagency influence, respondents that work in independent commissions are also less likely to believe OMB is very influential in interagency processes. Interestingly, conservative respondents and respondents with higher salaries (i.e., higher in the hierarchy) rate OMB as less influential while those working in Washington, DC rate OMB as more influential. It is possible that conservative executives higher in the hierarchy may be better able to see ways that Obama's OMB did not get its way in interagency fights. Those executives outside Washington, DC may also not be able to perceive the ways that OMB influences interagency processes, particularly those centered in Washington.

Changes in OMB Influence Between 2007 and 2014

Of course, factors specific to the Obama Administration rather than features of the agency or respondent may be the cause of perceptions in 2014. Fortunately, the 2007 survey asked the same question about OMB influence, allowing us to compare perceptions in 2007 with those in 2014 for a subset of agencies. These perceptions look relatively stable over time. Figure 6 includes agency average responses to the question "How much influence do you think OMB has over policy decision in your agency?" in 2007 (x-axis) and 2014 (y-axis). If there was no change in the perceptions of OMB influence, all of the agencies would line up along the 45-degree line in the figure. The figure illustrates some of the familiar patterns with the independent commissions reporting less OMB influence. Interestingly, there are a number of agencies that report significantly more influence in 2007 than 2014, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Bush Administration paid significant attention to foreign aid, food safety, and drug approvals and this may help explain

higher levels of OMB influence. In 2014, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Army, and the National Science Foundation reported an uptick in OMB influence. OPM was the subject of substantial negative media attention due to retirement backlogs and a major breach of personnel information. The Army was at the center of President Obama’s surge strategy in Afghanistan. These factors may have contributed to increased attention to these agencies during the Obama Administration.

Figure 6. Respondent Perceptions of OMB Influence, 2007 and 2014




Source: Survey on the Future of Government Service 2007, 2014

Note: Some labels omitted in cases where labels overlap.

Given the higher values of some relatively conservative agencies in 2014 (e.g., Army) and some relatively liberal agencies in 2007 (e.g., the U.S. Agency for International Development -- USAID, Department of Labor--DOL, Environmental Protection Agency--EPA), this raises the natural question whether OMB directed more attention to agencies in these administrations based upon their political leanings. In Figure 7, we graph the difference in the average reported OMB influence over agency policy decisions (2014 vs. 2007) by agency ideology, from liberal to conservative. Positive values represent an increase in reported OMB influence in 2014 and negative

values indicate less OMB influence. We fit a locally weighted regression line to the data to help divine patterns. The results reveal that, comparing 2007 to 2014, OMB influence went down slightly overall. OMB influence appeared to decrease more for liberal agencies on average. It went up slightly for conservative agencies although we cannot distinguish the estimate increase from no change at all. This evidence is suggestive that during the Obama Administration OMB may have taken a different approach than the Bush Administration, as least as it relates to specific liberal and conservative agencies. While the Obama Administration had more influence over conservative agencies than the Bush Administration, conservative agencies still reported marginally less influence by the Obama OMB than more liberal agencies. Other factors influence the change in OMB influence, including scandal and presidential priority, but agency policy leanings may play a role as well.

Figure 7. Change in Perceptions of OMB Influence by Agency Ideology, 2007 and 2014



Overall, the data reveal that federal executives believe OMB is quite influential, both in their own agencies and in interagency processes. Among groups that compete for control of the executive

branch, OMB trailed only political appointees in terms of actors that are influential in agency decisions. OMB is also one of the top 3 most influential agencies in processes involving multiple agencies. The agencies that perceive OMB to be less influential tend to be independent agencies, insulated from OMB influence by design. Agencies with reputations for skilled workforces report modestly less OMB influence as do agencies with differing policy views than the presidential administration. Federal executives report broad OMB influence but influence that goes deeper in some agencies than in others.

Conclusion

Like presidents before him, President Trump's OMB has been at the center of his policy making and management goals. OMB has crafted the president's budget proposals, superintended his efforts to limit the promulgation of new regulations, and rolled out the administration's management agenda. OMB has also directed the president's efforts to cut the federal workforce and reorganize the executive branch.

Despite the importance of the agency to the president, it is not clear how responsive agencies have been to OMB's leadership, from adhering to OMB's role vetting agency budget documents prior to rollout to embracing the president's management agenda.²⁰ Some of responses to OMB's actions are likely influenced by the leadership choices of the administration itself (Bernhard et al. 2018). Others, however, are driven by longer term forces that existed prior to the Trump Administration. Some agencies provide less access to OMB by design. Others have reputations for skill or expertise. Still others are small enough to avoid much OMB oversight.

²⁰ Charles S. Clark, "OMB Reminds Agencies that it Vets Documents Before Roll-Outs," *Government Executive*, February 27, 2019 (<https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/02/omb-reminds-agencies-it-vets-documents-roll-outs/155178/>, accessed March 4, 2019).

An effective OMB is an important part of any president's efforts to direct the activities of the departments and agencies of government. Presidents would be well advised to take great care to select qualified appointees to run OMB and be attentive to its health and effectiveness. Notable in this administration is the President's decision to double hat two of his key appointees. Two of OMB's top appointees have taken other important management jobs in the administration while remaining in their jobs in OMB (i.e., White House Chief of Staff, Director of the Office of Personnel Management). This is both a credit to them but also a worrisome sign regarding the President's own understanding of OMB's historic role.

There are limits to what even an effective OMB can do by design. The data reveal some interesting patterns that suggest presidents should choose different strategies for control for different agencies. For example, presidents should attempt to influence independent, highly skilled, and more ideological agencies with carefully selected appointees to head those agencies rather than relying on centralized control. Indeed, the most influential actors in independent agencies were the appointees. It is, thus, surprising that President Trump has been slow to name appointees to a number of vacant positions in independent agencies.

It is also interesting that OMB is perceived as more influential than OPM given longstanding tension between these two agencies regarding management. President Trump's FY2020 budget includes a proposal to split up OPM, moving parts to the General Services Administration. This would further place OMB at the center of presidential management of the executive. One factor influencing this proposal is OPM's relatively low esteem in government. OPM is one of the *lowest* rated agencies in perceptions of workforce skill (i.e, bottom 10) among all agencies. Federal executives report OPM to be influential but also low skilled. If the current trend toward increased OMB responsibility continues, this raises the stakes for understanding where OMB can be influential and where it is limited.

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
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
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Appendix A. Agency Influence Scores



Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% region of highest posterior density.



Note: Horizontal lines denote 95% region of highest posterior density.

Table A.1: Estimates of Agency Influence

Agency	Agency Influence Estimate	Standard Deviation	95% Lower Bound	95% Upper Bound
Administration for Children and Families (HHS)	-0.45	0.19	-0.84	-0.07
Administrative Conference of the United States	-0.84	0.28	-1.42	-0.28
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA)	-1.57	0.32	-2.23	-0.98
Agricultural Research Service (USDA)	-0.61	0.22	-1.07	-0.19
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA)	0.07	0.23	-0.38	0.52
Arms Control and International Security (STAT)	1.09	0.26	0.59	1.60
Broadcasting Board of Governors	-1.52	0.71	-3.00	-0.14
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (DOJ)	-0.19	0.22	-0.65	0.21
Bureau of Consular Affairs (STAT)	0.79	0.28	0.24	1.34
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (STAT)	0.89	0.31	0.27	1.49
Bureau of Economic Analysis (COM)	0.37	0.35	-0.31	1.06
Bureau of Engraving and Printing (TREAS)	0.50	0.98	-1.53	2.39
Bureau of Indian Affairs (DOI)	-0.91	0.26	-1.44	-0.41
Bureau of Int. Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (STAT)	0.70	0.19	0.31	1.06
Bureau of Labor Statistics (DOL)	0.22	0.24	-0.25	0.69
Bureau of Land Management (DOI)	-0.28	0.14	-0.57	-0.01
Bureau of Prisons (DOJ)	-0.45	0.31	-1.11	0.11
Bureau of Reclamation (DOI)	-0.79	0.21	-1.20	-0.40
Bureau of the Fiscal Service (TREAS)	1.13	0.23	0.66	1.58
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS)	0.65	0.11	0.42	0.87
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS)	0.96	0.11	0.74	1.19
Central Intelligence Agency	1.90	0.22	1.48	2.32
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (STAT)	-0.11	0.28	-0.66	0.43
Coast Guard (DHS)	0.31	0.21	-0.11	0.71
Commodity Futures Trading Commission	-1.09	0.23	-1.54	-0.65
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau	-0.67	0.22	-1.05	-0.18
Consumer Product Safety Commission	-0.87	0.27	-1.44	-0.37
Corporation for National and Community Service	-1.61	0.35	-2.30	-0.87
Council of Economic Advisers	0.67	0.27	0.14	1.22
Council on Environmental Quality	1.11	0.20	0.73	1.50
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD)	0.33	0.35	-0.38	1.02
Defense Commissary Agency (DOD)	-1.31	0.42	-2.12	-0.46
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DOD)	-0.39	0.25	-0.90	0.11
Defense Contract Management Agency (DOD)	-0.37	0.31	-0.96	0.24
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DOD)	0.05	0.25	-0.46	0.54
Defense Health Agency (DOD)	-0.16	0.31	-0.78	0.42
Department of Agriculture	0.50	0.13	0.24	0.76
Department of Commerce	-0.02	0.14	-0.30	0.24
Department of Defense	2.10	0.09	1.92	2.29
Department of Education	0.15	0.21	-0.29	0.56

Department of Energy	0.22	0.15	-0.08	0.51
Department of Health and Human Services	1.06	0.11	0.84	1.28
Department of Homeland Security	0.94	0.10	0.75	1.13
Department of Housing and Urban Development	-0.14	0.16	-0.45	0.17
Department of Justice	1.90	0.08	1.74	2.07
Department of Labor	0.18	0.15	-0.12	0.47
Department of State	1.44	0.11	1.23	1.66
Department of the Air Force (DOD)	0.84	0.14	0.55	1.12
Department of the Army (DOD)	0.90	0.14	0.63	1.17
Department of the Interior	0.20	0.13	-0.05	0.45
Department of the Navy (DOD)	0.59	0.18	0.23	0.94
Department of the Treasury	1.54	0.12	1.31	1.77
Department of Transportation	0.38	0.16	0.06	0.69
Department of Veterans Affairs	-0.03	0.17	-0.37	0.30
Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)	0.01	0.24	-0.46	0.46
Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment (STAT)	0.86	0.25	0.36	1.35
Employment and Training Administration (DOL)	-0.45	0.22	-0.88	-0.03
Energy Information Administration (DOE)	-0.72	0.25	-1.20	-0.21
Environmental Protection Agency	0.54	0.14	0.25	0.82
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	0.11	0.20	-0.27	0.49
Executive Office for United States Attorneys (DOJ)	1.07	0.20	0.68	1.48
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.	-0.71	0.29	-1.25	-0.11
Farm Credit Administration	-1.33	0.29	-1.92	-0.76
Farm Service Agency (USDA)	-0.40	0.25	-0.88	0.10
Federal Aviation Administration (DOT)	0.18	0.23	-0.29	0.63
Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)	1.50	0.18	1.15	1.85
Federal Communications Commission	-0.70	0.21	-1.10	-0.27
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation	0.37	0.24	-0.10	0.87
Federal Election Commission	-1.11	0.62	-2.34	0.16
Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)	0.57	0.15	0.27	0.87
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (DOE)	-0.14	0.37	-0.88	0.61
Federal Highway Administration (DOT)	-0.17	0.27	-0.70	0.36
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation	-1.78	0.49	-2.82	-0.85
Federal Housing Administration (HUD)	0.72	0.25	0.21	1.20
Federal Housing Finance Agency	-0.09	0.39	-0.84	0.71
Federal Labor Relations Authority	0.23	0.36	-0.48	0.93
Federal Maritime Commission	-1.44	1.08	-3.48	1.00
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	-1.40	0.37	-2.13	-0.66
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (DOT)	-0.65	0.35	-1.40	0.00
Federal National Mortgage Association	-2.08	0.68	-3.59	-0.85
Federal Trade Commission	-0.78	0.34	-1.46	-0.12
Federal Transit Administration (DOT)	-1.54	0.49	-2.46	-0.55
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (TREAS)	-0.01	0.33	-0.69	0.63
Food and Drug Administration (HHS)	0.79	0.12	0.54	1.02

Food and Nutrition Service (USDA)	-0.21	0.35	-0.90	0.47
Food Safety and Inspection Service (USDA)	0.14	0.19	-0.24	0.53
Forest Service (USDA)	-0.66	0.17	-1.00	-0.34
General Services Administration	0.80	0.12	0.56	1.03
Government National Mortgage Association (HUD)	0.46	0.41	-0.35	1.29
Health Resources and Services Administration (HHS)	-0.39	0.16	-0.71	-0.07
Indian Health Service (HHS)	-1.26	0.21	-1.67	-0.86
Institute of Education Sciences (ED)	-0.44	0.22	-0.87	0.00
Internal Revenue Service (TREAS)	0.16	0.18	-0.20	0.52
International Trade Administration (COM)	-0.29	0.28	-0.86	0.25
Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)	1.85	0.23	1.40	2.30
Legal Services Corporation	-1.49	0.44	-2.27	-0.50
Merit Systems Protection Board	-0.15	0.29	-0.71	0.44
Millennium Challenge Corporation	-1.56	0.63	-2.84	-0.26
Mine Safety and Health Administration (DOL)	-0.80	0.43	-1.64	0.05
Missile Defense Agency (DOD)	0.32	0.38	-0.45	1.06
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	0.08	0.29	-0.50	0.64
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA)	-1.45	0.29	-2.02	-0.88
National Archives and Records Administration	0.15	0.31	-0.45	0.77
National Cemetery Administration (VA)	-1.32	0.41	-2.11	-0.51
National Credit Union Administration	-1.35	0.24	-1.86	-0.93
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities	-1.37	0.30	-1.92	-0.73
National Guard Bureau (DOD)	0.07	0.57	-1.08	1.21
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (DOT)	-0.61	0.29	-1.16	-0.03
National Institute of Standards and Technology (COM)	0.62	0.24	0.16	1.12
National Institutes of Health (HHS)	1.05	0.13	0.80	1.31
National Labor Relations Board	-0.08	0.39	-0.85	0.69
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)	0.75	0.30	0.16	1.34
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (COM)	0.13	0.15	-0.18	0.42
National Park Service (DOI)	-0.01	0.23	-0.46	0.44
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK)	-1.55	0.31	-2.15	-0.96
National Science Foundation	0.16	0.16	-0.15	0.47
National Security Staff	2.90	0.11	2.68	3.12
National Transportation Safety Board	-0.65	0.43	-1.50	0.18
Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA)	-0.08	0.16	-0.39	0.24
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	0.19	0.27	-0.34	0.71
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL)	0.20	0.23	-0.23	0.66
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE)	-0.37	0.52	-1.38	0.72
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (ED)	-0.71	0.27	-1.33	-0.27
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (DOE)	-0.86	0.27	-1.41	-0.31
Office of Environmental Management (DOE)	-0.70	0.17	-1.04	-0.36
Office of Federal Student Aid (ED)	-0.08	0.50	-1.07	0.92
Office of Fossil Energy (DOE)	-0.68	0.23	-1.11	-0.18
Office of Government Ethics	0.65	0.25	0.14	1.13

Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ)	1.82	0.15	1.53	2.11
Office of Management and Budget	2.21	0.06	2.10	2.32
Office of National Drug Control Policy	-0.17	0.32	-0.80	0.47
Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE)	-0.87	0.30	-1.55	-0.37
Office of Personnel Management	1.02	0.06	0.91	1.13
Office of Postsecondary Education (ED)	-0.62	0.45	-1.54	0.23
Office of Science (DOE)	-0.17	0.21	-0.60	0.25
Office of Science and Technology Policy	0.87	0.15	0.59	1.16
Office of Special Counsel	0.13	0.29	-0.45	0.71
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (TREAS)	0.67	0.28	0.14	1.26
Office of the Director of National Intelligence	1.43	0.20	1.04	1.84
Office of the Secretary of Defense (DOD)	2.23	0.12	1.99	2.47
Office of the United States Trade Representative	1.60	0.22	1.17	2.05
Overseas Private Investment Corporation	-1.71	0.48	-2.69	-0.77
Peace Corps	-0.83	0.44	-1.74	0.00
Political Affairs (STAT)	1.90	0.29	1.31	2.45
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (STAT)	0.00	0.27	-0.50	0.54
Railroad Retirement Board	-1.90	1.22	-4.47	0.24
Rural Housing Service (USDA)	-0.34	0.38	-1.08	0.43
Secret Service (DHS)	0.22	0.40	-0.57	1.02
Securities and Exchange Commission	0.22	0.36	-0.48	0.92
Small Business Administration	0.20	0.25	-0.29	0.68
Social Security Administration	-0.50	0.20	-0.89	-0.12
Tennessee Valley Authority	-1.35	0.29	-1.91	-0.75
The Federal Reserve	1.94	0.28	1.40	2.49
Transportation Security Administration (DHS)	-0.52	0.42	-1.36	0.30
U.S. Census Bureau (COM)	0.43	0.22	-0.01	0.86
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (DOI)	0.57	0.15	0.26	0.87
U.S. Geological Survey (DOI)	-0.19	0.18	-0.56	0.16
U.S. Mint (TREAS)	-0.66	1.60	-4.07	2.59
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (COM)	-0.04	0.44	-0.94	0.83
United States Agency for International Development	-0.03	0.17	-0.37	0.31
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)	0.05	0.29	-0.51	0.62
United States Customs and Border Protection (DHS)	0.99	0.17	0.66	1.32
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)	0.13	0.26	-0.40	0.63
United States International Trade Commission	-0.82	0.34	-1.52	-0.16
United States Postal Service	-0.87	0.29	-1.45	-0.29
Veterans Benefits Administration (VA)	-0.13	0.21	-0.54	0.26
Veterans Health Administration (VA)	0.30	0.23	-0.16	0.75
Wage and Hour Division (DOL)	-0.51	0.27	-1.05	0.02