The Struggle(s) for Equality:
Civil Rights, Women's Rights, and Political Change

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American society and politics were transformed in the second half of the 20th century by the civil rights and women's rights movements. We examine the responses of ordinary Americans to these epochal changes, focusing specifically on the pivotal cohort of Americans who graduated from high school in 1965. For the most part, the Class of '65 accommodated themselves to the changing role of women; for example, the proportion preferring traditional gender roles declined from 22% in 1973 to just 6% in 1997. In contrast, their responses to the altered status of African Americans remained sharply divided, with substantial proportions expressing concern about blacks having "too much influence," opposing government aid to minorities, and even resisting federal involvement in school integration. We draw on survey data spanning three decades and semi-structured conversations with members of the Class of '65 (now in their early 70s) to explore the bases and texture of these contrasting responses.

The Struggle(s) for Equality:
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American society and politics were transformed in the second half of the 20th century by the civil rights and women's rights movements. These struggles for equality fundamentally altered the roles of African-Americans and women. They also raised issues and generated tensions that continue to reverberate in American politics decades later. How have ordinary Americans reacted to these historic developments? How have they reconciled commitments to equality in principle with reservations regarding concrete policies designed to promote equality in practice? And why have the politics of civil rights and women's rights played out so differently over the past half-century?

The historic success of the struggle for women's rights was eloquently described by *New York Times* columnist Gail Collins. "The feminist movement of the late twentieth century," she wrote (2009: 393),

> created a new United States in which women ran for president, fought for their country, argued before the Supreme Court, performed heart surgery, directed movies, and flew into space. … American women had shattered the ancient traditions that deprived them of independence and power and the right to have adventures of their own, and done it so thoroughly that few women under 30 had any real concept that things had ever been different.

Of course, as Collins (2009: 8) also wrote, "the transformation was imperfect and incomplete." As we will see, even some women who accept sexual equality as a matter of principle continue to feel that feminists "take it overboard" and "don't have to be quite so in-your-face about it anymore." Still, the old notion that "women's place is in the home" has largely died out.

The struggle for racial equality has been equally epochal, but even more "imperfect and incomplete." The civil rights movement of the 1950s and '60s seared the conscience of many white Americans, and the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to the dismantling of much of the infrastructure of systematic racial oppression that had blighted the former Confederacy for several decades. But in the aftermath of those dramatic advances, the focus of the civil rights movement "shifted from the moral imperatives that had garnered support from the nation's moderates—issues such as the right to vote and the right to a decent education—to issues whose moral rightness was not as readily apparent: jobs and housing discrimination, Johnson's war on poverty, and affirmative action" (Williams 1987: 287; MacLean 2006).

While the social and economic status of African-Americans has improved enormously over the past half-century, substantial racial disparities in life chances persist (Jones, Schmitt, and Wilson 2018). And politically, Americans continue to be "Divided by Color," as Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders (1996) put it in their classic study of "Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals." Racial gaps in public opinion on many issues dwarf those associated with sex, class, region, religion, and other social divides. Moreover, the civil rights struggle and its aftermath have played a significant role in reshaping the American party system. "Race was *the* great wedge issue in post-civil rights era American politics, with unpopular racially charged policies like busing to desegregate schools, affirmative action, and welfare splintering the Democratic Party's longstanding majority coalition" (Tesler 2016: 13; Valentino and Sears 2005).

Our analysis of these momentous developments is based on data from the Political Socialization Panel Study, an ambitious long-term study of political attitudes and behavior conducted by M. Kent Jennings in collaboration with Richard G. Niemi, Gregory B. Markus, and Laura Stoker.[2] The Jennings study began in 1965 with interviews of 1,669 high school seniors in 97 schools across the United States and one or both of each student's parents.[3] The students were reinterviewed in 1973, 1982, and 1997, providing an unprecedented record of political stability and change over more than three decades. Our analysis relies primarily upon the 935 respondents (56%) who participated in all four waves of the study.[4]

We supplement our understanding of the Jennings respondents' political lifetimes through in-depth interviews with a small subsample of those who participated in all four waves. So far we have interviewed 21 respondents. They are by no means a representative subsample. Our sampling has been driven primarily by a desire for variation on a wide variety of characteristics, as opposed to seeking out specific respondents who fit a particular profile.[5] We have sampled respondents primarily by

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[2] The data are publicly available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Jennings et al. 2005; Jennings 2007).

[3] This study design facilitated the investigators' goal of examining the impact of families and schools on the political socialization of adolescents (Jennings and Niemi 1974). However, a notable defect of the original sample for our purposes here is that it excluded people who left high school before the spring of their senior year—approximately 26% of this cohort. Thus, all of our findings reflect the experiences of the most educated (and, by extension, more affluent and politically interested) three-fourths of the cohort.

[4] Unsurprisingly, sample attrition over the four waves of the study was not entirely random. For example, students who were less interested in politics in 1965 were more likely to drop out of the sample by 1997. In order to minimize the impact of differential attrition on our conclusions we weighted the data to reflect as closely as possible the original distribution of key characteristics. The weighting scheme is described in the Appendix, and the resulting sample weights are reported in Table A1.

[5] Further interviews are underway, and they will be incorporated into subsequent versions of our analysis.

focusing on specific high schools, so that we can observe in depth how the attitudes and behaviors of people who graduated from the same high school have diverged (or not) over the course of their lives.[6] We have chosen these high schools on the basis of both convenience and characteristics of interest. To date our interviewees include people who attended a high school in the upper Midwest, two high schools located near a major city on the East coast (one a private boarding school with among the highest SES scores in the original sample, the other a public school), and two rural schools in southern states. As we have traveled to interview people from each of these schools we have tried to include additional participants in the study who live in the same areas, even if they graduated from other schools.

Our conversations with these people spanned a broad range of topics, including their upbringings, their socioeconomic status across their life course, major social and economic changes, their perceptions of the U.S. political parties and political system, and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, their reflections on the civil rights and women's rights movements.[7]

Obviously, focusing on a single cohort, however pivotal, ignores much that is important in the broader story of 20th-century America's "rights revolution." However, the analytical leverage provided by repeated observation of the shifting social and political attitudes of individuals over much of their lifetimes seems to us to make the Class of '65 well worth detailed examination.

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[6] Most of the 97 high schools in the original survey were represented by 15-20 students each. The number from each school who completed all four waves ranges from 2 to 16; the average is 9.6.

[7] For more information about our methods for conducting the interviews and analyzing the interview data, see *https://faculty.polisci.wisc.edu/kwalsh2/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/BC-Vietnam-25-March-20191-1.pdf*.

One question asked repeatedly in these surveys was about the role of women in American society:

> Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. (And other people have opinions somewhere in between.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you though much about this?

The solid line in Figure 1 tracks average responses to this question from 1973 to 1997, transposed from the original 7-point scale to one ranging from zero ("women's place is in the home") to 100 ("women should have an equal role with men"). In 1973, most Jennings respondents already placed themselves closer to the "equal role" end of the scale, with 31% choosing that endpoint (and only 9% choosing the "women's place is in the home" endpoint). However, the distribution of views gravitated even further in that direction between 1973 (when the respondents were in their mid-twenties) and 1982 (when they were in their mid-thirties); by 1982, almost half placed themselves at the "equal role" end of the scale and less than 3% said that "women's place is in the home." Between 1982 and 1997 the trend toward favoring equality continued, leaving 56% of respondents advocating an "equal role" for women and another 26% leaning in that direction. While support for women's equality was not universal—though less than 1% of respondents still said that "women's place is in the home," another 6% took less extreme positions on that side of the scale—the transformation of views was largely complete over the course of a single generation.

*** Figure 1 ***

Unfortunately, there was no equally broad question in the Jennings survey regarding the role of African-Americans. However, there were two repeated questions

touching on major policy issues of central importance in the civil rights struggle. One of these questions focused on school integration:

> Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to favor one side over the other?[8]

The other question asked more broadly about government assistance to blacks and other minority groups:

> Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. (And other people have opinions somewhere in between.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Figure 1 tracks the average responses of the Class of '65 to these questions over time; the responses are again rescaled to range from zero for the most conservative position to 100 for the most liberal position.

The trends displayed in Figure 1 are not peculiar to the Jennings sample. The questions regarding the role of women and government aid to blacks and other minority groups have also been asked repeatedly since 1972 in national surveys conducted as part of the American National Election Studies project. In both cases, the shifts in opinion registered in those data are qualitatively similar—except that the Jennings respondents are consistently more liberal than the ANES's nationally representative samples—a reflection, perhaps, of their having come of age in the

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[8] In 1965 the question asked about "white and Negro children."

liberal 1960s, and of the exclusion from the Jennings sample of the least-educated one-fourth of the cohort, people who did not complete high school.[9]

The survey questions regarding women and blacks are, of course, not completely parallel. Nonetheless, the starkly contrasting trends in responses to these questions from the early 1970s to the late 1990s highlight how differently respondents understood and responded to the struggles for civil rights and women's rights (Jackman 1994). While the proposition that "women should have an equal role with men" became increasingly accepted, support for efforts to realize racial equality stalled or even eroded.

Our aim in this paper is to shed light on these contrasting trends. We do so in two ways: by examining how changing responses to these and other survey questions were related to other political attitudes and demographic characteristics over the successive waves of the Jennings survey, and by listening to the respondents describe in their own words how the civil rights movement and the changing role of women have affected their lives.

The Role of Women

In 1983, Virginia Sapiro published a book using the first two waves of data from the Jennings study to examine the relationship between women's private roles and their integration into politics. "This cohort," she noted, "was one of the first to take up its adult roles after the initial development of the Women's Liberation Movement, during one of the most important eras in the history of women" (Sapiro 1983: 63). At the time of the first wave of the study, Congress had just passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which made employment discrimination on the basis of gender illegal. In addition,

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[9] Trends in the ANES data are summarized in The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (*https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide/*).

"The Supreme Court was declaring in *Griswold V. Connecticut (1965)* that married women have a constitutional right to practice birth control. … By the time the second wave of interviews took place in 1973, the women's movement was firmly established, the Equal Rights Amendment had been proposed by Congress, and the ratification process had been set in motion." This cohort came of age while the women's movement gained steam, and experienced many of the major institutional changes in women's roles that resulted.

Our analysis of their responses to the women's movement begins with two items in the Jennings survey focusing on the role of women. One is the question tracked in Figure 1, which asked whether women should have "an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government." The other is a question about women's "influence in American life and politics," with responses coded to range from zero for "too little influence" to 100 for "too much influence." The balance of opinion on this question in each wave of the Jennings survey tilted firmly toward "too little influence," with the average response declining from 29.9 in 1973 to 25.3 in 1982, then increasing slightly to 26.4 in 1997.

There are some important similarities in the bases of attitudes toward women's role and women's influence. In both cases, non-whites, even more than women themselves, championed a greater role for women—perhaps because they were especially likely to see women's struggle for equality as a direct analog to the civil rights movement. In both cases, people raised in affluent environments (specifically, from high-SES high schools) were much more supportive of a greater role for women than those from more modest backgrounds. And in both cases, there was a good deal of fluidity in views about the role of women between 1973 and 1982, but much more stability thereafter, despite the 15-year gap between the 1982 and 1997 surveys. It is difficult to tell, from our data, whether this greater stability reflects the political

maturation of the Class of '65 through middle age or the crystallization of views about the role of women in the broader society after the upheavals of the 1960s and '70s.

One important development in attitudes about the role of women is revealed not by responses to these two questions considered separately, but by the relationship between them. In 1973 the correlation between responses to the two questions was .49; people who thought women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government were likely to say that women had too little influence in American life and politics, while those who had reservations about equality were likely to say that women had too much influence. By 1982 that correlation had declined to .32. (In 1997 it was .34.) In effect, growing consensus regarding the desirability of an equal role for women decoupled the issue of equality in principle from the issue of women's social and political influence.

This shift may reflect a decline in divisive rhetoric following the collapse of the effort to add an Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Mansbridge 1986). The 1973 Jennings survey measured respondents' views of the Women's Liberation Movement and one of its prominent leaders, Gloria Steinem, on a 100-point "feeling thermometer." The average rating for the Women's Liberation Movement was 53.9, only slightly higher than the neutral rating of 50; the average rating of Steinem was only 51.1. On the other hand, views about the appropriate role of women may simply have succumbed to the economic reality of steadily increasing female labor force participation, from 45% in 1973 to 53% in 1982 and 60% (nearly an all-time high, as it would turn out) in 1997. In any case, it became increasingly common even for people who harbored reservations about the influence of women to favor equality. In 1973, the average level of support for women having an equal role with men was 25.5 among people who thought women had too much influence and 54.1 among people who thought women had about the right amount of influence in American life and politics.

In 1982 the corresponding averages were 43.8 and 73.0. In 1997 they were 55.7 and 79.2.

Since most liberals were already favorable toward equal roles for women in the early 1970s, subsequent movement in that direction was concentrated among political conservatives.[10] Historian Nancy MacLean (2009: 38-39) noted that "even some conservative women took feminist stands" when it came to "open sexism," citing the example of President Reagan's UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Statistical analysis suggests that a 14-point increase in conservatism (corresponding to a one-point increase on the Jennings survey's 7-point ideological scale) in 1973 was associated with a 3.6-point increase in support for an equal role for women in 1982, other things being equal. A 14-point difference in conservative ideology in 1982 was associated with a further 3.0-point increase in support for an equal role for women in 1997.[11] With the passage of time, principled ideological opposition to equality for women became increasingly untenable.

Tellingly, however there is no comparable pattern of ideological change in views about women's influence. Even as political conservatives increasingly came to concede that women should have an equal role with men, they were able to maintain that women had about the right amount of influence in American society and politics, or even too much.[12]

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[10] Table 1, columns 1 and 2.

[11] The surprising differences implied by the statistical results reported in Table 1 are also evident in the raw data. Among people who selected conservative positions on the ideological scale in 1973, the average level of support for women having an equal role with men increased by 18 points, from 55.7 in 1973 to 73.9 in 1982; the corresponding increase among liberals was less than 5 points, from 81.7 to 86.5. Between 1982 and 1997, the average level of support for women having an equal role increased by almost 6 points among people who called themselves conservatives in 1982, but by just 1 point among people who called themselves liberals.

[12] Table 1, columns 3 and 4. We do observe a growing gender gap in views about women's influence (as noted by Jennings 2006 and Sapiro 1991, especially pages 18-19), and also a

The combination of conservative support for equality in principle with persistent ambivalence about the social and political role of women is illustrated by our conversations with two conservative women from different parts of the country, Susan Sorsby and Barbara Jones.[13] Sorsby grew up in a rural community in the Northeast and moved to a metropolitan area in the upper Midwest with her fiancée after college. She and her husband are devout evangelical Christians whose social lives revolve around their church and family. He moved to the Midwest to pursue a job in youth evangelical organizing and she spent decades working for a social service agency. She remarked repeatedly throughout our interview that she does not care about politics, but in each of the survey waves and in our conversation with her she consistently expressed Republican partisanship and conservative opinions—except with respect to women's roles.

Sorsby was a relative latecomer to full support for women's equality. Her responses to the question about women's role shifted from a "3" (one step toward equality from the midpoint of the 7-point scale) in 1973 and 1982 to a "1" (the most liberal response) in 1997. In our conversation, she reaffirmed her support for equal rights for women. When we asked how she feels about the changing role of women in society, she said,

> Yeah, you know I think it's basically for the good. Back you know, when I grew up, most women were housewives and it was just assumed that they were going to be housewives. You know, women have a lot to contribute. Women have skills, and talents, and abilities, and brains. You know, they have a lot to contribute. Why shut down half of society and say you can't participate? You know, which is sort of a waste of talent. A waste of ideas. A waste of whatever.

growing racial gap, with blacks moving much faster than whites between 1973 and 1982 toward believing that women have too little influence.

[13] We use pseudonyms throughout to protect respondents' confidentiality.

You know, putting women down is sort of silly. Let them be who they want to be and do what they want to.

However, Sorsby's support for equality in principle was alloyed with a concern that continued agitation by feminists might now be socially counterproductive:

You know, some of them take it overboard. You know, some of them take it a little too far. You know, the women's lib business, burn the bras, that kind of stuff. They were just trying to make their point. I think they made their point. Women have achieved a lot over the past 40, 50 years. Yeah, I think women should be allowed to do whatever and have whatever jobs they want. Some of them ... I think they made their point and they don't have to be quite so in-your-face about it anymore. That issue is sort of ... there are other issues now. So, yeah it's okay for women to have jobs and do stuff, why not?

When we talked with her in 2018, Sorsby was not a fan of Hillary Clinton (although she had given Clinton a mildly warm rating of 60 on the feeling thermometer in 1997). No doubt her antipathy is largely a reflection of partisanship. But some of what she had to say about Clinton resonated with her reservations about "in-your-face" feminists. When we asked, "How do you feel about Hilary Clinton? How did she make you feel?," she scrunched up her face in disgust and said,

Not good at all. Totally negative about her .... She was just too pushy, way too pushy. Greedy and grabby kind of thing. You know, 'This is mine. I deserve this.' Sort of greedy and grabby, 'I'm determined to have this no matter what.' She practically ruined her own health trying to campaign. You know, you read little things here and there. If you saw this video about 'Killary,' you'd never think the same way about her again. You know, some of these accusations. Probably most of them are true. You know, I think she has a lot of secrets in the closet. And if all this came out ... no, I don't have a good feeling about Hillary.

On the other side of the country we met a woman who resembled Susan Sorsby in combining evangelical conservatism with qualified support for women's rights. Barbara Jones grew up in the South and lives in a metropolitan area in her home state. She is a lifelong Republican, is born again, and said in our interview that "abortion is a killer." When we interviewed her in March 2019 she believed Donald Trump was doing a good job as president and thought that Richard Nixon was a good man who was the victim of bad choices made by the people around him.

Jones's support for women's equality was in some ways more tempered than Sorsby's. In all three waves of the Jennings survey (1973, 1982 and 1997) she consistently gave one of the two most conservative responses to the question about women's role. However, in describing to us the place of politics in her family when she was growing up, she spoke feelingly about the lesson she drew from the unequal balance of political influence between her father and mother:

> *Jones:* My Daddy was very political, very vocal. My Mother, all of her life until he died, the night before elections, he would sit down and write on a piece of paper how she was to vote. And she would go in the next morning and she would vote.

> *KJC:* Would she take it with her into the polling booth?

> *Jones:* Yeah, and she would vote. Never questioned his views. He was just right on everything, she was raised in that generation, the husband was just right on everything. And she idolized him, and that was her standing and she never discussed politics. But as a young child, I listened to my Daddy. And then as I got into junior high and high school, I was determined that nobody was ever going to tell me how to vote the way he told my Mother how to vote.

> *KJC:* Yeah. Tell me more, like you were just going to make up your own mind?

Jones: Oh, I was very determined [laughs]. I came out of my young childhood in my home as a very determined woman of being my own woman. I wasn't gonna be controlled in any way, and that meant politics the same.

KJC: Do you feel like you're able to do that across the course of your life, be your own woman?

Jones: Yeah, I really have… [My husband] is very easy going, he lets me voice whatever I wanna voice, and he does what he wants to do or we come to agreements. But I've never wavered with what I believed in politics.

Despite this personal insistence on "being my own woman," Jones expressed strong reservations about contemporary manifestations of feminism as she sees them, including women who "have used their sexuality to move up" and "men-haters" who have driven complaints about sexual abuse "out of control":

I never had a problem as to my womanhood. On TV when I watch it now, I'm disgusted with it. … There again, I think it's just been politicized too much. I think there are women that have abused, moving up, and have used their sexuality to move up into high positions, and that comes with their womanhood. And I think it has just become—I just don't think their thinking is right. I don't think women, as a whole, and yeah I know there's a lot of sexual abuse, but I'm sure there's male abuse in companies too that's just not reported because they're a male. Now I don't know that, but I just suspect that it's not just all that one sided. I just feel it's been rolled out of control by some women that maybe were damaged in early age into men-haters, and it has just materialized into hating men as a whole.

Both Barbara Jones and Susan Sorsby support women's equality in principle, but they are much less supportive of feminist activism. This differentiation seems to reflect, in part, their view that feminists have already "made their point," as Sorsby put it—that women's equality is already substantially achieved. It also seems to reflect their concern that women's demands for equality have escalated into demands for

special treatment, whether it is women in business who have "used their sexuality to move up into high positions" or Hillary Clinton's "greedy and grabby" quest for the highest political position in the land. As we will see, reservations of both these sorts loom even larger in Americans' thinking about racial equality.

The Role of Blacks

The interviews conducted in the first wave of the Jennings study began in March 1965, less than two weeks after "Bloody Sunday," the iconic civil rights protest in which peaceful marchers were attacked by police and state troopers in Selma, Alabama. A week after the march, in a dramatic speech to Congress and 70 million television viewers, President Lyndon Johnson used the ugly spectacle in Selma to push for action on sweeping voting rights legislation. "What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and state of America," Johnson said. "It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause too. Because it's not just Negroes, but really it's all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome" (Williams 1987: chapter 8; Johnson 1965).

In speeches at Ohio University and the University of Michigan the previous spring, Johnson had announced his intention to "build a Great Society … where no child will go unfed, and no youngster will go unschooled." White House staffers organized 14 task forces consisting primarily of government officials and academics to translate Johnson's Great Society into a legislative program. In 1965, the Johnson administration submitted 87 bills to Congress; 84 were passed and signed into law. They established the Job Corps, the Peace Corps, the Model Cities urban redevelopment program, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America), the Community Action Program, Head Start, and more. Many of these programs were aimed, directly or indirectly, at repairing "the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice" faced by African-Americans. The most

important legislation of all, characterized by the president himself as "one of the most monumental laws in the entire history of American freedom," was the Voting Rights Act signed into law that summer (Williams 1987: 285).

With these legislative underpinnings for racial progress in place, the central political question was whether and how the federal government would continue to push to make racial equality a reality. The urgency of the question was underlined less than a week after the signing ceremony for the Voting Rights Act, as deadly riots broke out in Watts, a brutally poor, heavily African-American neighborhood in Los Angeles. Over the next four years, violent insurrections in several of America's black ghettos helped catalyze conservative white opposition to the liberal civil rights agenda. As historian Jill Lepore (2018: 623) put it, "it looked as if rights had been answered with riots, as if the entire project of liberalism were collapsing in on itself."

While the riots subsided, conservative resistance to government activism in pursuit of racial equality did not. As we saw in Figure 1, the Class of '65's support for government assistance to blacks and other minorities declined significantly between 1973 and 1982, then remained roughly constant between 1982 and 1997. Statistical analysis of the bases of that support reveals a good deal of instability at the individual level, with just 40% of 1973 opinion persisting to 1982 and 54% of 1982 opinion persisting to 1997.[14] Unsurprisingly, non-whites were significantly more enthusiastic than whites were about government aid to minorities. However, non-whites' liberal views about the role of women were generally not reciprocated in women's views about government aid to minorities. Other things being equal, women were only slightly more likely than men to resist the conservative shift in attitudes about affirmative action on the basis of race.

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[14] Table 2, columns 1 and 2.

The decline in support for government aid to blacks was indeed a conservative shift in an ideological sense. The decline in support between 1973 and 1982 associated with a one-point difference on the 7-point scale of liberal-conservative ideology was substantial, 4.5 points. Moreover, the decline was specifically associated with political ideology rather than social conservatism; if anything, faith in the Bible partially offset the shift in support for government aid to minorities associated with conservative ideology. It is worth noting, however, that conservative ideology produced no further shift in views about aid to blacks between 1982 and 1997—a non-finding consistent with the leveling off of support for government aid evident in Figure 1.

We also examined shifts in views about the political influence of blacks expressed in response to a question paralleling the one about the influence of women.[15] Overall, there was considerably more apprehension about the influence of blacks than of women. The average response on our 100-point scale was 42.0 in 1973, 41.2 in 1982, and 40.9 in 1997, indicating a persistent tension between concerns that they had too little influence and concerns that they had too *much* influence. The aggregate stability between 1973 and 1982 masks considerable movement of non-whites, women, southerners, and liberals toward the "too little influence" response and compensating movement of whites, men, non-southerners, and conservatives toward the "too much influence" response. Between 1982 and 1997 all of these shifts were more muted or even reversed, and the overall stability of individual-level responses was substantially greater (83% versus 57%). In effect, the structure of political attitudes regarding race in the aftermath of the civil rights era crystallized in the first 15 or 20 years following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the culmination of the movement's most successful phase.

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[15] Table 2, columns 3 and 4.

Perhaps the most urgent concrete policy issue of the civil rights era was school integration. Some of the most iconic civil rights clashes of the 1950s and '60s centered on the struggle to desegregate southern schools in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* striking down "separate but equal" black and white school systems (Bates 1962; Devlin 2018). As Figure 1 makes clear, the Class of '65 while still in high school were strongly supportive of government involvement in racial integration of schools. Even in the South, a slim majority (52%) of the high school seniors in the Jennings sample favored a government role, while an overwhelming 83% of the northern students did so.

However, by the time these students reached their mid-twenties in 1973, their support for the role of the federal government in school integration had eroded substantially. Our statistical analysis of shifts in views between 1965 and 1973 identifies two major factors in accounting for that erosion. The first is college education.[16] People who spent time in college between 1965 and 1973 were substantially more likely than those who did not to remain supportive of government involvement in school integration. They were also much more likely, in response to a separate question in the 1973 Jennings survey, to accept busing schoolchildren to achieve racial integration.[17]

While these differential shifts were substantial—3 or 4 points of additional support for school integration for every year of college—they were dwarfed by the difference in views between people who graduated from high school in the South and

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[16] Table 2, columns 3 and 4.

[17] "There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their neighborhoods. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?"

those who came from other parts of the country. As journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones put it,

> Many white Northerners initially applauded the Brown ruling, believing it was about time the South behaved when it came to its black citizens. But that support hinged largely on the belief that Brown v. Board of Education did not apply to them and their communities. When black activists in cities such as Chicago, Detroit and Dayton, Ohio, pushed to dismantle the de jure segregation that existed in their cities, white support for the integration mandate of Brown faded. [18]

In the South, public resistance to desegregation had mostly withered by the early 1970s as the proportion of black children attending predominantly white schools increased from just 2 percent in 1964 to nearly half in 1972. "After a very short period of serious court intervention and federal enforcement," Hannah-Jones wrote, "the South had gone from the most segregated region of the country for black children to the most integrated, which it remains 40-some years later."[19] Meanwhile, a 1971 Supreme Court decision, *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, endorsed busing as a means to desegregate schools. The Court's decision inspired a series of lawsuits and bitter political struggles over the imposition of busing programs to achieve racial integration in northern schools, most famously in Boston (Lukas 1985; Formisano 2004).

The migration of the school desegregation controversy from the South to the North was largely complete by the time of the second Jennings interview in 1973, and the result is evident in the massive regional reversal of views about school integration shown in Figure 2. Among people raised in the South, the average level of support for

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[18] Nikole Hannah-Jones, "It was Never About Busing." *New York Times*, July 12, 2019.

[19] *ibid.*

federally imposed school integration increased from 51.6 on our 100-point scale in 1965 to 62.7 in 1973. But in other parts of the country, where heated clashes over desegregation plans were proliferating, support for school integration plummeted from 82.6 in 1965 to 55.4 in 1973. Moreover, just as southern schools remained more racially integrated than those in other parts of the country for decades after the civil rights era, southerners in the Jennings survey continued to express greater enthusiasm for school integration than people from other parts of the country did—even in 1997, a quarter-century after the height of the northern busing controversies.

*** **Figure 2** ***

The regional difference in the timing of racial integration had a major impact on the life experiences of the Class of '65. Our in-depth interviews with southerners produced frequent reflections on the transition from the segregated schools of their youth. Whether they complained about the nature of the integration, commented on how peaceful it was, or observed that black community members "didn't want to integrate, either," the experience of going to school around the time of forced integration was a marker for their understanding of race in America that did not show up in our conversations with people raised in other parts of the country.

One southerner we talked with, Ron Sutton, recalled travelling to "cotton country" and seeing a sharecropper who picked cotton alongside his 11 kids. They each earned a dollar a day.

I've never seen people treated so bad as they were. … It was terrible. Blacks couldn't go in the grocery stores. They couldn't go in any of the markets. They had a window. They had to go around to the back and go up to that window to get what they wanted. I never seen anything like it, and it made an influence on me.

When we asked him if he thought things are different now, he said that integration was not handled well:

I don't think it was done properly. The change was not. It could have been a lot smoother and a lot better done. You take, like his kids were totally uneducated. He was uneducated. Probably he couldn't read. Of course, they did go to school. They had black schools for them to go to. But you can't take a totally uneducated person, take him off a farm somewhere and say, okay, now you gotta go make a living. That's a tough way to look at it.

Sutton's observations regarding the plight of African-Americans in the segregated South of his youth are perceptive and empathetic. Yet his emphasis on the failings of black schools seems to beg the question of how racial integration "could have been a lot smoother and a lot better done"—not to mention the question of what, if anything, should be done now to make up for lost time. In any case, his concerns about educational inequality seem to have ebbed with the end of legally mandated segregation. In 1965 he supported government involvement in school integration, but by 1973 he was ambivalent and by 1997 he was opposed. In response to additional questions in the 1997 Jennings survey, he said that racism was "somewhat of a problem" in American society, but that lack of educational opportunities was "not a reason at all" for the economic and social problems facing blacks.

Barbara Jones, the conservative evangelical woman raised in the South, remarked that her parents were very prejudiced but said she did not approve of the way black people were treated when she was growing up. She added that she and her husband believe that "they are the same as us," and have raised their children and grandchildren differently. However, her conservatism is manifested in her view that "we've overdone it" with respect to civil rights. "I think we've abused it, instead of just allowing the black and whites to learn to join together. There's been enough undercurrent to always irritate the blacks, just 'it wasn't right, it wasn't right.'" In her

view, the struggle for racial equality has evolved into a constant complaint of injustice on the part of blacks.

In contrast, Susan Sorsby, the conservative evangelical woman who grew up in the rural Northeast, talked about hardly noticing the civil rights movement. "Well, I probably knew next to nothing about it," she said, though she did bring up black and Puerto Rican migrant farmers living on her family's property. Her conservatism is manifested in disdaining any interest in the civil rights movement even today:

> So, as far as the civil rights movement and all this stuff. I mean, I read about all this stuff now and I just go, 'Ugh, I don't want to read about that.' … Not into that. I was not pushing for rights for these people, no definitely not. … We didn't have television either and you know, this was not a big to-do. Like in the schools and stuff, I don't remember talking about this in the schools.

Besides region of the country, two additional factors emerged in views about school integration between 1973 and 1982, significantly eroding previous patterns of support and opposition.[20] First, frequent church attenders became relatively more opposed to government involvement in school integration. This shift may have been spurred by new controversies regarding private religious schools and their impact on racial balance in public school systems. It does not seem to reflect general social conservatism; indeed, there is evidence of an off-setting shift toward favoring school integration among biblical fundamentalists. Second, and perhaps relatedly, Republicans (and probably ideological conservatives as well, though the statistical evidence on that point is less clear) became substantially more opposed to government involvement in school integration. While partisanship *per se* does not seem to have played a major role in shaping most attitudes and policy views toward women and

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[20] Table 3, column 3.

blacks, at this point the specific issue of school integration seems to have become bound up in broader partisan divisions.

Equality in Principle and in Practice: Going "Too Far"?

Susan Sorsby says that women should "be who they want to be and do what they want to do," but worries that some feminists "take it a little too far." Barbara Jones teaches her children and grandchildren that "they [African-Americans] are just like us," but thinks that "we've overdone it" with respect to civil rights. Comments like these about the role of women and blacks in contemporary America illustrate a familiar but profoundly important question: when and how far does commitment to the principle of equality translate into practical support for the policies and practices required to instantiate that ideal? As Douglas Rae and his colleagues (1981: 3) asked, "Can we imagine that the simple, formal idea of equality contains enough information, enough specificity, enough texture, to be capable of direct and consistent application to a concrete, complex world?"

Scholars of public opinion have addressed this question by attempting to measure people's allegiance to the principle of equality independent of particular applications, and then explore when and how that allegiance animates specific policy commitments. The 1997 wave of the Jennings survey included two items drawn from a battery used in the American National Election Studies to measure "egalitarianism" as a general value (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Bowers 1995). One of these items asked respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition that "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." The other tapped general resistance to egalitarianism: "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country."

These items make no explicit reference to civil rights, women's rights, or indeed any concrete example of "pushing equal rights." Nonetheless, they seem to capture with impressive precision reservations like those expressed by Susan Sorsby and

Barbara Jones about going "too far" in the pursuit of equality for women and blacks. And indeed, more than two decades before they spoke with us, Susan was one of the 13% of respondents in the 1997 Jennings survey who strongly agreed that "we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country"; Barbara was one of the 31% who somewhat agreed.

Attitudes about equality are certainly related to specific policy preferences. In their comprehensive analysis of public opinion regarding race and racial policy, Kinder and Sanders (1996: 147) found that "Whites who subscribe to egalitarian ideals tend to favor policies intended to narrow inequalities between the races. The effect of equality is especially noteworthy on school integration and fair employment, issues that exemplify the struggle to bring equal opportunity to life. Equality's imprint is also visible on federal obligations to blacks." Similarly, support for government aid to blacks in the 1997 Jennings data is just as strongly correlated with views about "pushing equal rights" (.43) and giving everyone "an equal chance" (.40) as with conservative ideology (.44) and party identification (.36).

The strong association between egalitarian values and policy preferences naturally leads us to wonder why people differ in their commitment to those values in the first place. Is a penchant for equality simply absorbed, more or less effectively, through a process of social learning along with the rest of the "American ethos" (McClosky and Zaller 1984)? Are reservations about "pushing equal rights" a product of conservative ideology (Smith 1999)? Kinder and Sanders (1996: 277) disarmingly acknowledged that "In the empirical study of political principles, the question of origins seldom comes up, and when it does, it is not taken very seriously." But it should be.

A key advantage of the Jennings study in this regard is that it provides an opportunity to trace the antecedents of egalitarianism not over a year or two, as Kinder and Sanders (1996: 278-279) could with the data available when they wrote, but over

decades. Our statistical analyses of support for egalitarian values in the Jennings data underline the importance of taking a long view. For example, they demonstrate that people who attended high school in more affluent surroundings were more committed to egalitarian values more than three decades later, even after allowing for the impact of college education, religiosity, partisanship, political ideology, and other factors.[21]

The long view also sheds surprisingly clear light on the "principled" nature of egalitarian values. Both measures of support for equality in the 1997 Jennings survey are strongly related to conservative ideology measured 15 years earlier, suggesting that they are part of a political outlook of considerable breadth and durability. However, those relationships disappear or even reverse once we take account of a more prosaic consideration: people's basic feelings about the primary protagonists in America's recent struggles over equality, blacks and feminists. This is especially true in the case of views about "pushing equal rights." Even after allowing for the impact of partisanship, ideology, religiosity, and a variety of important demographic factors, an additional 25 points of warmth (about one standard deviation) on a 100-point thermometer scale capturing feelings toward blacks (relative to whites) in 1982 reduced concerns about pushing equal rights in 1997 by 21 points.[22] An additional 25 points of warmth (again, about one standard deviation) toward the women's liberation movement in 1982 reduced concerns about pushing equal rights in 1997 by an additional 16 points.[23] These substantial differences, coupled with the apparent

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[21] Table 4.

[22] Table 4, column 4. Feeling thermometer ratings are distorted by the tendency of different respondents to interpret the thermometer scale in different ways (Brady 1985). In order to mitigate that distortion, we subtracted each respondent's rating of whites from her rating of blacks and analyzed the resulting *relative* rating of blacks.

[23] Pushing the search for the antecedents of egalitarian values even further back in time, statistical analyses paralleling those in Table 4 but with religiosity, ideology, partisanship, and group affect measured in 1973 rather than 1982 produce similar results. The estimated effects

irrelevance of conservative ideology once feelings toward blacks and the women's liberation movement are taken into account, imply that "egalitarianism" is, in the contemporary American context, much more about visceral group affect than it is about "the simple, formal idea of equality" explored by Rae and his colleagues.

Basic feelings toward African-Americans also loom large in accounting for people's understanding of the bases of racial inequality. The 1997 wave of the Jennings survey included a series of items tapping respondents' understanding of the "reasons for the economic and social problems that blacks face today."[24] Two of the proposed explanations were systemic factors—"past and present discrimination" and "lack of educational opportunities." The other two were individual factors—"lack of motivation and a willingness to work hard" and "lack of intelligence."[25] While the systemic explanations for the problems of blacks were most popular among the Jennings respondents (with average ratings of 78.6 for discrimination and 64.4 for lack of education on our 100-point scale), there was also substantial support for the notion that blacks' problems were due in part to a lack of motivation (56.7), and even appreciable support for the notion that blacks' problems stemmed from a lack of intelligence (29.1).

Statistical analyses of the bases of these judgments reveal the very different structure of systemic and individual explanations for racial inequality. Concerns about "lack of motivation" and "lack of intelligence" were substantially shaped by feelings

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of feelings toward blacks and the women's liberation movement on support for giving "everyone an equal chance" are .326 (with a standard error of .132) and .313 (with a standard error of .234) respectively. The estimated effects on concerns about "pushing equal rights" are .875 (with a standard error of .216) and .540 (with a standard error of .122).

[24] "I am going to read a list of things that people have mentioned as reasons for the economic and social problems that blacks face today. For each one, please tell me if you think it is a major reason for the problems blacks face, a minor reason, or not a reason at all."

[25] See Kam and Burge (2018) for a discussion of the differences between systemic and individual explanations for racial inequality.

toward blacks, even measured decades earlier. An average balance of racial affect in the 1982 Jennings survey—an 11-point preference for whites over blacks on the 100-point feeling thermometer—was associated with a 9-point increase in support for the notion that blacks lack motivation and a 7-point increase in support for the notion that blacks lack intelligence in 1997.[26] Of course, greater-than-average levels of pro-white racial affect translated into even greater support for individualistic explanations of racial inequality. The complex of prejudices that scholars sometimes refer to as "old-fashioned racism" (Mendelberg 2001; Tesler 2013) was by no means eradicated in the Class of '65, even three decades after the height of the civil rights movement.

Two other factors seem to have influenced respondents' willingness to endorse personal failings as important reasons for blacks' economic and social problems. One, not at all surprisingly, is college education: every additional year of college reduced the attraction of individualistic explanations for racial inequality by 3 or 4 points on our 100-point scale.[27] The other, remarkably, is race itself: after allowing for differences between whites and blacks in relative racial affect, education, and other characteristics, African-Americans were actually *more* likely to endorse the notion that blacks' problems were rooted in personal failings.

Almost as surprisingly, African-Americans were no more likely than whites with similar characteristics to blame racial inequality on discrimination (though they *were* more likely to blame lack of educational opportunities). More generally, systemic explanations for the position of blacks were more popular among women, people from high-SES high schools, and those with college educations than among men, people

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[26] Table 5, columns 1 and 2. Again, the estimated relationships are almost as strong when racial affect is measured in 1973 rather than in 1982.

[27] The strong negative relationship between education and support for individualistic explanations of racial inequality suggests that the level of support for such explanations may have been a good deal higher in the corresponding cohort of the American public as a whole than in the Jennings sample, which excluded people who did not finish high school.

from modest backgrounds, and those with no further schooling after high school. Conversely, people who expressed strong faith in the Bible and—probably—political conservatives were generally more reluctant to endorse systemic explanations for "the economic and social problems that blacks face today."[28]

Immigration as a Window on Racial Attitudes

One substantial challenge in understanding Americans' attitudes about race and about policies intended to promote racial equality is that many people are reticent about discussing race, especially with strangers. That was certainly true in our interviews. When we asked people to reflect on the civil rights era, some shared recollections or impressions that seemed to hint at misgivings, but none expressed explicit opposition to the legal and social changes of the era or volunteered views about blacks reminiscent of "old-fashioned racism."

However, our interviewees were more forthcoming in talking about another issue of considerable contemporary salience, immigration. The Jennings surveys did not contain any questions about immigration, and we did not bring up the issue in our in-depth interviews. This turned out to be fruitful, as it allowed us to observe whether and how respondents raised it on their own. We noticed that the people who talked about immigration were generally those who expressed more negative views of civil rights advances over their lifetimes.[29] Listening carefully to their concerns about immigrants—concerns touching on "otherness," security, and deservingness—and correlating them with hints of misgivings about civil rights advances seemed to us to

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[28] Table 4, columns 3 and 4.

[29] The most notable exception was a rather liberal white woman living in the South who mentioned the issue of immigration at the end of the interview to complain about her conservative brother's anti-immigrant views.

shed indirect light on the bases of their views about racial equality (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015: 70).

One telling pattern is that respondents who expressed concern about immigration consistently said, in response to a question drawn from Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler's (2018) work on worldviews, that the world is dangerous and that "our priority should be to protect ourselves."[30]

One of these people is Gloria Schulz, a woman living in the small industrial city in the upper Midwest where she grew up. She welcomed us into her cozy home, filled with memories of a happy life of family, doll collecting, and baseball and stock car racing fandom. Her parents were employees with the large local manufacturer and active with their labor union. She identified as a Democrat early in life, but that attachment weakened over time. In the summer of 2018 she thought that critics should give President Trump a break and let him do his job, that people should do more to get ahead on their own, and that it is "stupid" for President Obama's supporters to say, "I just voted for him because he was black."

Schulz told us how much less safe her community is now than when she was growing up. She said she and others regularly call the police when they see something suspicious. The thought of safety and the police led her to recall a police officer in her city who told her husband, "White people are racist. Black people cannot be racist." She expressed exasperation at this idea:

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[30] Following Hetherington and Weiler (2018: xi), we asked people to choose which of the following two views came closest to their own: "1. Our lives are threatened by terrorists, criminals and illegal immigrants and our priority should be to protect ourselves." Or "2. It's a big, beautiful world, mostly full of good people, and we must find a way to embrace each other and not allow ourselves to become isolated." The people who volunteered concern about immigration all chose the first option or were torn between the two options.

Go figure. It's like, they can do anything. They can call everyone the N word and all this, but as soon as you might say it in conversation, you're in trouble, and you heard that as a child. I heard that word and never thought much of it. We used to call Brazil nuts 'nigger toes.' Never thought anything of it.

Schulz's discomfort with changes in race relations popped up several times in our interview, though she told us she has had black friends all of her life. She wasn't involved in civil rights activism growing up—"You knew stuff was going on, but it wasn't here in our city." Although her parents brought her along on union picket lines and engaged in other forms of activism, her views about civil rights activists were distinctly negative:

> I don't like all that protesting no matter what it is. I don't like all the picketing and I think a lot of people from what I hear are hired to protest. They get paid for it, and if you're really concerned about something, then do something. Don't just go walk down the street with a sign. That's how I feel. Or get the right information. And thinking about protesting and all that, like I said, [the civil rights movement] didn't really affect us here, I don't think, personally. We just had our fun with our friends and all of that.

On the topic of immigration, Schulz insisted that people "do it legally," as her in-laws from Germany had. But then she added,

> I have worked with immigrants who came over here, I think legally, and one said to me, 'We come here because this is the land of the free. We get everything free'…. I could have, years ago, gone through welfare and everything with hardships, but I thought, 'No. I'm going to make it.' I did. If you want to do it, you can do it, and that's how I feel knowing that I did it, and I just feel people shouldn't think, 'Well, we'll get this free. We want this. We get it free,' and I hear so much of that now. With our food pantries, some of the people that go there shouldn't be going there, and then they sell stuff. They get it and they sell it out of the back of their van, and they've been found to be doing that, so when I hear things like that, that upsets me because I love to

help people if they're deserving, but I don't want to give it to people who just are not good people or they're going to turn around and abuse it or sell it or something.

Schulz did not explicitly connect the issue of immigration with race or the civil rights movement; but her antipathy toward free-loading immigrants and civil rights protestors seemed to reflect a similar wariness of others who do not seem to belong or who might not meet her standards of deservingness.

Another lifelong resident of the upper Midwest, Dennis Jansen, expressed reservations about both the civil rights movement and immigration. Jansen's father died when he was young, and he grew up the son of a single mom. He went on to have a successful career running a social service agency. He called himself a "compassionate conservative" and worried about the Democratic Party's move toward socialism. He valued the ability of people to get ahead on their own.

When we asked Jansen about the civil rights movement, he explained that when he was growing up there was an unwritten rule in his community that "no black person could be in town after sunset." He claimed that the civil rights movement "didn't really affect me," but recalled that when a group of students at a nearby university were engaged in civil rights protests, "A lot of my buddies were driving their vehicles around with guns in the car, or bats in the car to protect themselves should anything happen. I didn't. … Would I have jumped in? Probably, yeah at that point…. For the most part I've stayed away from a lot of controversial things." Nowadays, he thinks, "People have become more compassionate about [civil rights], almost too extremely compassionate…. I would have been more centrist, in the middle of the road kind of leaning to the right."

Later in the interview we asked Jansen about his hopes for the Trump presidency. After talking about trade policy and the federal investigation into the connection between Russia and Trump's presidential campaign, he said,

> I very much am for legal immigration. You know? [But] illegal immigration—I'm glad I don't live in California. It's ridiculous with the extent that … the far left that, that state has gotten to. Would I care if California left and became their own country? Not really.

Jansen assured us that he "see[s] both sides" of the immigration issue, noting that illegal immigrants "provide a lot of our labor … that Americans, white Americans don't wanna perform." But he concluded that Democrats only seek to extend citizenship to immigrants because doing so would benefit the Democratic Party at the polls.

Jansen, like Schulz, seems to view racism as a mostly-benign historical legacy. Blacks were expected to disappear by sundown, and friends drove around with guns and bats "to protect themselves," but the civil rights movement didn't really affect him. Schulz "never thought much of" people using "the N word" when she was growing up, and resents the fact that, now, "as soon as you might say it in conversation, you're in trouble." Immigration, on the other hand, seems to loom larger as a contemporary problem in both their minds, allowing "not good people" to abuse assistance and turning California into a "ridiculous," "far left" state. The connections between race and immigration are not explicit, but they are clear enough in, for example, the contrast Jansen draws between illegal immigrants and "Americans, white Americans" (Pérez 2016: chapter 5).

Conclusion: "Getting a Little Better Slowly"

Our analyses reveal a complex evolution of responses to the civil rights and women's rights movements in the Class of '65, a combination of growing support for

formal equality and continuing reservations about the efforts of activists and the federal government to translate formal equality into reality. On the whole, the push for women's rights succeeded more quickly and completely, not only in the growing embrace of equal roles charted in Figure 1, but also in the constant low level of concern—just 3 or 4% in each of the 1973, 1982, and 1997 surveys—about women having "too much influence in American life and politics." By comparison, the share of Jennings respondents saying that blacks had too much influence was much higher—and declined only very slowly, from 24% in 1973 to 22% in 1982 to 18% in 1997.

At many points in our investigation, the remarkable longitudinal reach of the Jennings data have allowed us to identify and interpret important shifts in public reactions to the historic 20th-century struggle(s) for equality. Our semi-structured interviews have provided an invaluable complement to the survey data, not only by carrying the story of political change forward to the present but also by shedding light on the meaning and significance of the survey responses. For example, the remarkably similar reservations we heard in our interviews regarding the efforts of feminists and civil rights activists significantly colored our interpretation of the contrasting trends in opinion regarding women's role and aid to blacks in the survey data, underlining the crucial distinction between support for equality in principle and support for the efforts of rights activists and the government to redress concrete inequalities. The survey data also helped us understand what we heard in our conversations, especially when it came to interpreting the dutiful expressions of support for equality and tempered expressions of resentment that often arise in face-to-face conversations with strangers regarding such socially sensitive topics as race and rights.

Our account of political change in response to the "rights revolution" has emphasized the grudging accommodation of many white Americans to the advances of the civil rights movement, especially in comparison to those of the women's rights movement. But of course the people with the greatest stake in the struggle for racial

equality are black Americans. Thus, any account of political change in America since the 1960s will be impoverished if it ignores their perspectives.

Alas, in our interviews so far we have talked with just one black respondent.[31] Janet Albers grew up in the capital city of a southern state and has spent most of her life in the neighborhood where she was raised. She described to us some of her experiences with segregation, such as the segregated shopping districts in her city. She also touched on the psychological costs to black Americans of living through the struggles of the civil rights era. Recalling a protest event in her home state that left several young people dead, she said stoically, "That was sort of chaotic and that stuck with me a long time."

For Albers, the experience of living through the last years of the Jim Crow era and its wrenching end put America's long struggle for racial equality in a distinctly positive light. Looking back, she said "we've come a long ways." Politically, she feels that she is better represented these days than she was in 1965, and that her voice is heard now more than it was then. "I do. Definitely. They have more black politicians. At that time they didn't have a whole lot of them. But they have a lot of black politicians that I think understand what we've been through." Weighing the tumult of the civil rights era against the improvements in social and political life that came in its aftermath, she concluded, "It was sort of chaotic at first, but after everything sort of settled, things started to getting a little better slowly."

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[31] We have had more difficulty locating and recruiting the 64 blacks who participated in all four waves of the Jennings survey than their white counterparts. A higher proportion of the black respondents we have tried to locate have died since 1997, consistent with evidence of overall higher mortality rates for black Americans than whites in the United States (Rodriguez et al. 2015). Our own race (white) has likely also affected the willingness of black respondents to return our calls.

Appendix

Our analysis of the Jennings data relies primarily upon the 935 respondents (56% of the original 1,669) who participated in all four waves of the panel study. In order to minimize the effect of differential panel attrition on our conclusions, we have reweighted the data from four-wave survivors to approximate the joint distribution of race,[32] region,[33] sex, partisanship,[34] and political interest[35] in the original 1965 sample.[36] (Where the resulting cells were very sparse, we combined them for the purpose of constructing weights. This had the effect of substituting black females for missing black males, especially in the South.)

The resulting panel sample weights are reported in Table A1. They range from .756 for the respondents who were least likely to drop out of the sample (white southern females who were politically interested Republicans in 1965) to 2.214 for those who were most likely to drop out (blacks who were Republicans or Independents in 1965). However, most of the weights fall in a much narrower range, with 90% between .791

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[32] The 1965 survey classified respondents as "white," "Negro," or "other (including Mexican and Puerto Rican)."

[33] We distinguish southerners (those who reported growing up in the 11 states of the former Confederacy) from non-southerners.

[34] We classify respondents who reported being "closer" to the Democratic or Republican Party as partisans and those who reported identifying with some other party or being "apolitical" along with ("pure") Independents.

[35] We classify respondents based on whether they reported following politics and public affairs "most of the time" (41%), "some of the time" (42%), or "only now and then" or "hardly at all" (17%).

[36] The original sample was itself weighted to reflect differing selection probabilities for the 97 high schools in which Jennings' team conducted interviews. We employ those weights in characterizing the joint distribution of respondents.

and 1.605.[37]

*** Table A1 ***

The structure of the Jennings panel allows us to estimate the measurement reliability of many of the variables employed in our analysis, which in turn allows us to mitigate biases in regression parameter estimates stemming from measurement error by estimating errors-in-variables regression models (Achen 1983). We employ the measurement error model developed by Wiley and Wiley (1970), which exploits the repeated measurements of many of our key explanatory variables in 1973, 1982, and 1997 to estimate the measurement reliability of these indicators.[38] Table A2 reports the estimated magnitude of measurement error and the corresponding estimated reliabilities of these explanatory variables in 1965, 1973, and 1982.

*** Table A2 ***

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[37] In combination with the weights associated with high schools in the original Jennings sample, these panel weights produce overall weights ranging from .346 to 3.194. Here, too, most of the weights fall in a much narrower range, with 90% between .611 and 1.742.

[38] The key assumptions of the model are that "true" scores follow a first-order lag process (so 1997 true scores depend on 1982 true scores but not—directly—on 1973 true scores) and that measurement errors are random (uncorrelated with each other and with the true scores).

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Table 1: Attitudes toward Women, 1973-1997

Errors-in-variables regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	Women should have an equal role		Women have too much influence	
	(1) 1982	*(2)* 1997	*(3)* 1982	*(4)* 1997
Lagged opinion	.551 (.060)	.855 (.080)	.633 (.086)	.808 (.081)
Church attendance (lagged)	−.023 (.037)	.053 (.026)	.076 (.040)	.069 (.033)
Biblical faith (lagged)	−.166 (.064)	−.009 (.048)	−.011 (.070)	−.041 (.064)
Non-white	5.96 (2.99)	5.09 (2.21)	−11.60 (3.11)	−3.00 (3.20)
Female	1.78 (1.56)	−2.09 (1.21)	−4.22 (1.77)	−4.75 (1.78)
South (1965)	−4.36 (2.07)	2.64 (1.55)	−4.53 (2.22)	−.14 (2.16)
High school SES (1965)	1.76 (1.73)	4.35 (1.31)	−1.73 (1.82)	−1.33 (1.78)
College (years)	−.44 (.48)	−.05 (.36)	1.04 (.54)	.15 (.46)
Conservative ideology (lagged)	.252 (.135)	.208 (.110)	.071 (.131)	−.037 (.130)
Republican partisanship (lagged)	−.042 (.042)	−.130 (.043)	.004 (.044)	−.000 (.055)
Intercept	46.34 (8.73)	9.96 (10.84)	.60 (5.23)	9.75 (5.28)
Standard error of regression	22.6	17.2	24.2	23.7
Adjusted R^2	.29	.42	.23	.30
N	923	927	921	929

Table 2: Attitudes toward Blacks, 1973-1997

Errors-in-variables regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	Government should help minorities		Blacks have too much influence	
	(1) 1982	*(2)* 1997	*(3)* 1982	*(4)* 1997
Lagged opinion	.396 (.050)	.535 (.057)	.572 (.083)	.829 (.062)
Church attendance (lagged)	−.015 (.038)	−.062 (.030)	−.013 (.054)	−.008 (.038)
Biblical faith (lagged)	.112 (.065)	.025 (.055)	.071 (.094)	.088 (.072)
Non-white	14.80 (3.12)	8.59 (2.89)	−19.38 (4.99)	2.20 (4.16)
Female	1.10 (1.59)	1.46 (1.45)	−5.63 (2.25)	−2.68 (1.93)
South (1965)	−.82 (2.08)	−.37 (1.90)	−4.75 (3.09)	−1.69 (2.50)
High school SES (1965)	−.87 (1.72)	1.71 (1.57)	.58 (2.46)	4.58 (2.08)
College (years)	.92 (.47)	.59 (.42)	.49 (.65)	−1.00 (.52)
Conservative ideology (lagged)	−.318 (.121)	−.033 (.132)	.189 (.192)	−.230 (.151)
Republican partisanship (lagged)	−.003 (.041)	−.071 (.050)	.095 (.061)	.072 (.064)
Intercept	24.87 (6.86)	22.90 (6.86)	3.66 (6.77)	12.91 (6.14)
Standard error of regression	22.8	21.0	32.6	27.5
Adjusted R^2	.27	.31	.28	.41
N	908	927	912	929

Table 3: Views on School Integration, 1965-1997

Errors-in-variables regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	(1) Favor busing 1973	Favor school integration		
		(2) 1973	*(3)* 1982	*(4)* 1997
Lagged school integration opinion	.781 (.272)	1.122 (.438)	.605 (.100)	1.180 (.135)
Church attendance (lagged)	.065 (.051)	.102 (.086)	−.179 (.071)	.047 (.057)
Biblical faith (lagged)	−.145 (.081)	−.140 (.130)	.234 (.120)	.019 (.108)
Non-white	5.55 (8.12)	3.47 (13.40)	7.38 (6.09)	−1.32 (5.85)
Female	−4.09 (1.89)	−1.23 (3.08)	1.80 (2.79)	4.69 (2.89)
South (1965)	20.70 (9.25)	38.37 (14.55)	−3.07 (3.68)	2.28 (3.85)
High school SES (1965)	−1.52 (2.38)	.95 (3.98)	−3.97 (3.07)	2.97 (3.16)
College (years)	3.99 (.52)	3.50 (.87)	.18 (.33)	.72 (.82)
Conservative ideology (lagged)	---	---	−.197 (.219)	.454 (.266)
Republican partisanship (lagged)	.056 (.057)	.047 (.094)	−.170 (.075)	.023 (.097)
Intercept	−39.44 (26.98)	−39.86 (42.43)	19.69 (13.21)	−33.71 (16.78)
Standard error of regression	25.7	41.4	38.8	39.0
Adjusted R^2	.24	.16	.23	.34
N	931	874	850	818

Table 4: Egalitarianism, 1997

Errors-in-variables regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	Give everyone an equal chance		Gone too far in pushing equal rights	
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Church attendance (1982)	−.054 (.042)	−.062 (.043)	.027 (.041)	.009 (.039)
Biblical faith (1982)	−.004 (.080)	.074 (.084)	.160 (.078)	−.036 (.075)
Non-white	28.30 (3.94)	12.56 (6.99)	−29.74 (3.82)	3.49 (6.26)
Female	5.47 (2.12)	4.05 (2.22)	−10.49 (2.06)	−5.36 (1.99)
South (1965)	−2.75 (2.77)	−1.41 (2.77)	−.80 (2.69)	−2.98 (2.48)
High school SES (1965)	3.31 (2.30)	4.11 (2.30)	−2.36 (2.23)	−4.03 (2.06)
College (years)	.06 (.58)	−.74 (.64)	−2.63 (.56)	−.90 (.58)
Conservative ideology (1982)	−.268 (.161)	.073 (.255)	.495 (.157)	−.418 (.228)
Republican partisanship (1982)	−.086 (.071)	−.140 (.080)	.081 (.069)	.209 (.071)
Feelings toward blacks versus whites (1982)	---	.434 (.164)	---	−.850 (.147)
Feelings toward women's liberation movement (1982)	---	.174 (.118)	---	−.654 (.106)
Intercept	64.35 (6.83)	41.72 (16.37)	18.49 (6.63)	95.42 (14.66)
Standard error of regression	30.6	30.32	29.7	27.1
Adjusted R^2	.12	.14	.24	.37
N	933	933	933	933

Table 5: Explanations for Racial Inequality, 1997

Errors-in-variables regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	(1) Motivation	*(2)* Intelligence	*(3)* Discrimination	*(4)* Lack of education
Church attendance (1982)	.087 (.051)	−.010 (.048)	.026 (.043)	.030 (.052)
Biblical faith (1982)	−.077 (.096)	.051 (.091)	−.177 (.081)	−.216 (.097)
Non-white	18.70 (7.42)	20.81 (7.06)	1.21 (6.26)	12.99 (7.55)
Female	2.33 (2.47)	1.73 (2.33)	7.33 (2.08)	5.64 (2.50)
South (1965)	−2.59 (3.26)	−1.32 (3.07)	−.37 (2.74)	−2.72 (3.29)
High school SES (1965)	.24 (2.70)	−2.10 (2.56)	2.48 (2.29)	6.35 (2.74)
College (years)	−3.31 (.73)	−3.69 (.69)	1.37 (.61)	1.78 (.74)
Conservative ideology (1982)	−.056 (.223)	.050 (.212)	−.225 (.188)	−.198 (.228)
Republican partisanship (1982)	.103 (.087)	−.081 (.084)	−.004 (.074)	−.027 (.090)
Feelings toward blacks versus whites (1982)	−.876 (.179)	−.626 (.169)	.124 (.151)	.162 (.183)
Intercept	51.19 (8.49)	25.19 (8.00)	97.27 (7.19)	84.99 (8.62)
Standard error of regression	35.6	33.6	30.0	36.1
Adjusted R^2	.16	.13	.07	.08
N	925	927	928	932

Table A1: Sample Weights

Each cell shows the panel weight for respondents with the corresponding combination of characteristics (in italics), the percentage of the original 1965 sample (*N*=1,669), and the raw number of respondents who participated in all four panel waves (*N*=935).

Partisanship: Democrats; Independents (including other and apolitical); Republicans.
Follow politics: "most of the time"; "some of the time"; "only now and then" or "hardly at all."
Race: white; black; other. **Region**: non-South; South. **Sex**: male; female.

	Dems, Most	Dems, Some	Dems, Less	Inds, Most	Inds, Some	Inds, Less	Reps, Most	Reps, Some	Reps, Less	Total
White NonS Male	*1.035* 8.8% (78)	*.944* 7.1% (71)	*1.658* 3.5% (18)	*1.421* 2.6% (17)	*.876* 2.0% (22)	*1.332* 1.5% (9)	*.854* 6.1% (66)	*1.111* 5.9% (50)	*1.242* 1.9% (14)	*1.056* 39.5% (345)
White NonS Fem	*.908* 7.9% (75)	*.916* 9.4% (92)	*.981* 3.5% (32)	*1.064* 1.5% (13)	*.917* 2.0% (19)	*1.788* 1.0% (6)	*.816* 3.9% (44)	*.807* 5.5% (59)	*1.205* 1.5% (12)	*.916* 36.2% (352)
White South Male	*.761* 1.9% (26)	*.846* 2.1% (24)		*.964* 1.1% (13)			*.945* 1.0% (11)	*.858* 1.1% (12)		*.851* 7.2% (86)
White South Fem	*1.085* 1.3% (13)	*.791* 2.5% (31)		*.956* 1.3% (14)			*.756* 0.8% (10)	*1.083* 1.1% (11)		*.898* 7.1% (79)
Black NonS Male	*1.079* 1.4% (15)	*1.605* 2.2% (17)		*2.214* 1.6% (8)						*1.432* 2.2% (20)
Black NonS Fem										*1.329* 2.4% (20)
Black South Male	*1.374* 1.8% (11)	*1.940* 2.5% (13)								*3.364* 2.5% (7)
Black South Fem										*1.237* 2.3% (17)
Other NonS Male	*.773* 0.6% (9)									*.659* 0.1% (1)
Other NonS Fem										*.788* 0.6% (8)
Total	*.981* 23.3% (221)	*.945* 23.4% (233)	*1.307* 9.7% (69)	*1.262* 5.6% (42)	*.954* 5.4% (55)	*1.383* 3.2% (22)	*.845* 12.1% (134)	*.949* 13.4% (129)	*1.211* 3.9% (30)	1669 (935)

Table A2: Measurement Reliability Estimates

Estimates of measurement error and reliability based on Wiley and Wiley (1970) measurement error model.

	Measurement error [var(ε)]	Estimated reliability			N
		1965	1973	1982	
Church attendance	15.68 [245.84]	.684	.801	.831	915
Biblical faith	10.39 [108.05]	.717	.788	.790	876
Republican partisanship	10.45 [109.30]	.892	.866	.880	892
Conservative ideology	14.26 [203.48]	---	.539	.556	728
Women should have an equal role	19.45 [378.19]	---	.649	.471	900
Government should help minorities	14.85 [220.48]	---	.734	.690	868
School integration	34.09 [1162.23]	.232	.431	.404	724
Women have too much influence	20.37 [415.02]	---	.481	.451	773
Blacks have too much influence	26.26 [689.66]	---	.551	.529	755
Feelings toward blacks versus whites	13.47 [181.47]	.608	.506	.533	764
Feelings toward women's liberation movement	15.13 [228.86]	---	.558	.651	779

Figure 1: Diverging Views about Women and African-Americans

Average responses from Political Socialization Panel Study (1965, 1973, 1982, 1997).

Figure 2: Support for School Integration by Region

Average responses from Political Socialization Panel Study (1965, 1973, 1982, 1997).