

Ying Zheng
(January, 2018)

Email: ying.zheng.1@vanderbilt.edu
Cell phone: (01) 615-484-9182
<https://my.vanderbilt.edu/yingzheng/>

Vanderbilt University
VU Station B 351819
2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37235-1819

Education

- Ph.D. Economics, Vanderbilt University May 2018 (Expected)

Dissertation Title: “*Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions*”

References

Tong Li (Primary Advisor): tong.li@vanderbilt.edu, (01) 615-322-3582

Jingfeng Lu: ecsljf@nus.edu.sg, (65) 6516-6026

Dong-Hyuk Kim: donghyuk.kim@uq.edu.au, (61) 07-3365-6600

Placement Director

Mattias Polborn: mattias.polborn@vanderbilt.edu, (01) 615-875-8113

- M.A. Economics, Vanderbilt University May 2011
- M.A. Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore June 2007
- B.A. Economics, Xiamen University, China June 2005

Research Fields

- Primary: Empirical IO, Microeconomics
- Secondary: Econometrics, Corporate Finance

Teaching Experience

- **Instructor** Vanderbilt University, 2011
Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Evaluation: 4.0/5.0)
- **Teaching Assistant** Vanderbilt University
 - Doctoral courses: *Statistical Analysis* (2012, 2015); *Econometrics* (2012, 2013, 2015, 2016); *Microeconometrics* (2013); *Mathematical Economics* (2012, 2013); *Microeconomics* (2011, 2013)
 - Master courses: *Statistical Analysis* (2015, 2016); *Econometrics* (2016)
 - Undergraduate courses: *Economic Statistics / Intro to Econometrics* (2011, 2016, 2017); *Microeconomics* (2010, 2011)

Research Papers

“*How Costly to Sell A Company? A Structural Analysis of Takeover Auctions,*” with Dong-Hyuk Kim. [**Job Market Paper**]

To explain why sellers in takeover auctions limit bidders’ entry, we structurally measure two negative effects of inviting an additional bidder on the seller’s revenue: *information cost* and

operation cost. In particular, our auction model allows for bidders to discount their synergy values when their rivals obtain the confidential information – we refer to the induced revenue loss as the information cost. We establish the identification of the model primitives with unobserved heterogeneity, naturally arising from the confidential information. From a sample with 287 M&A deals of U.S. public companies, we find that the unobserved heterogeneity explains 75.3% of the variation of the value and bidders lower their values by 7.6% for each rival. We quantify the information cost and operation cost using counterfactual analysis, and discuss policy implications for the seller as well as regulatory and judiciary authorities.

Works in Progress

1. “*Optimal Shortlisting Rule with Entry Control by An Informed Seller.*”

This study is a theoretical extension of my job market paper of takeover auctions, where indicative bidding and shortlisting is a common practice. I first develop a two-stage auction model with entry control by an informed seller who observes bidders’ initial types (signals). Then I study how the seller, who has information valuable to the bidders, maximizes his expected profit by shortlisting potential bidders into the final-stage auction. The shortlisted bidders are asymmetric in their types (private valuation plus beliefs) because their private beliefs about the other shortlisted bidders rely on their private initial types. Except for takeover auctions, this model also describes many real-world auctions with a qualification stage, such as a real estate sale.

2. “*Optimal Auction Design with Selective Entry.*”

This paper studies the optimal auction design by a revenue-maximizing seller in a two-stage auction model with selective entry. Following Stegeman (1996) and Lu (2009), I consider the feasible semidirect mechanism with a symmetric threshold-entry. In order to implement the optimal entry threshold, we need to consider a generalized *virtual value*, which is non-monotone in general. To handle the non-monotonicity of the *generalized virtual value*, I use the ironing technique described in Myerson (1981) to obtain a monotone (ironed) virtual value. Then we select the optimal mechanism to maximize the (ironed) virtual value.

Publications

1. [Article] “*The Practice of Regional Economic Integration and Innovation for Economic Cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan,*” Southeast Academic Research, vol. 186.5, 2005. (in Chinese)
2. [Book Chapter] “*The U.S. Foreign Exchange Policies: An Overview,*” in Meibo Huang, ed. World Economy. Xiamen University Press, 2005. (in Chinese)
3. [Book Chapter Translation] *Advanced Asset Pricing Theory* by Chenghu Ma., Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2010

Other Research Experience

- Research Assistant** Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, 2014 - 2015
- Supervisor: Mark A. Cohen, Professor in Business and Law
 - Project: “*The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Firm and Country Competitiveness: A Meta-Analysis of the Porter Hypothesis,*” Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (forthcoming).

Honors and Fellowships

- Doctoral Fellowship, Vanderbilt University 2009 - 2016
- Lee Kong Chian Graduate Scholarship, Singapore Management University 2006 - 2007
- ICBC Scholarship for Outstanding Graduate, Xiamen University 2006
- University Scholarship for Outstanding Student, Xiamen University 2002 - 2005

Journal Refereeing

Journal of Financial Econometrics, Frontiers of Economics in China