The world in which we are now living, the modern world-system, had its origins in the sixteenth century. This world-system was then located in only a part of the globe, primarily in parts of Europe and the Americas. It expanded over time to cover the whole globe. It is and has always been a world-economy. It is and has always been a capitalist world-economy. We should begin by explaining what these two terms, world-economy and capitalism, denote. It will then be easier to appreciate the historical contours of the modern world-system – its origins, its geography, its temporal development, and its contemporary structural crisis.

What we mean by a world-economy (Braudel’s économie-monde) is a large geographic zone within which there is a division of labor and hence significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as well as flows of capital and labor. A defining feature of a world-economy is that it is not bounded by a unitary political structure. Rather, there are many political units inside the world-economy, loosely tied together in our modern world-system in an interstate system. And a world-economy contains many cultures and groups – practicing many religions, speaking many languages, differing in their everyday patterns. This does not mean that they do not evolve some common cultural patterns, what we shall be calling a geoculture. It does mean that neither political nor cultural homogeneity is to be expected or found in a world-economy. What unifies the structure most is the division of labor which is constituted within it.

Capitalism is not the mere existence of persons or firms producing for sale on the market with the intention of obtaining a profit. Such persons or firms have existed for
thousands of years all across the world. Nor is the existence of persons working for wages sufficient as a definition. Wage-labor has also been known for thousands of years. We are in a capitalist system only when the system gives priority to the *endless* accumulation of capital. Using such a definition, only the modern world-system has been a capitalist system. Endless accumulation is a quite simple concept: it means that people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate still more capital, a process that is continual and endless. If we say that a system “gives priority” to such endless accumulation, it means that there exist structural mechanisms by which those who act with other motivations are penalized in some way, and are eventually eliminated from the social scene, whereas those who act with the appropriate motivations are rewarded and, if successful, enriched.

A world-economy and a capitalist system go together. Since world-economies lack the unifying cement of an overall political structure or a homogeneous culture, what holds them together is the efficacy of the division of labor. And this efficacy is a function of the constantly expanding wealth that a capitalist system provides. Until modern times, the world-economies that had been constructed either fell apart or were transformed *manu militari* into world-empires. Historically, the only world-economy to have survived for a long time has been the modern world-system, and that is because the capitalist system took root and became consolidated as its defining feature.

Conversely, a capitalist system cannot exist within any framework except that of a world-economy. We shall see that a capitalist system requires a very special relationship between economic producers and the holders of political power. If the latter are too strong, as in a world-empire, their interests will override those of the economic producers, and the endless accumulation of capital will cease to be a priority. Capitalists need a large market (hence minisystems are too narrow for them) but they also need a multiplicity of states, so that they can gain the advantages of working with states but also can circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor of states friendly to their interests. Only the existence of a multiplicity of states within the overall division of labor assures this possibility.

A capitalist world-economy is a collection of many institutions, the combination of which accounts for its processes, and all of which are intertwined with each other. The basic institutions are the market, or rather the markets; the firms that compete in the markets; the multiple states, within an interstate system; the households; the classes; and the status-groups (to use Weber’s term, which some people in recent years have renamed the “identities”). They are all institutions that have been created within the framework of the capitalist world-economy. Of course, such institutions have some similarities to institutions that existed in prior historical systems to which we have given the same or similar names. But using the same name to describe institutions located in different historical systems quite often confuses rather than clarifies analysis. It is better to think of the set of institutions of the modern world-system as contextually specific to it.

Let us start with markets, since these are normally considered the essential feature of a capitalist system. A market is both a concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs. How large and widespread any virtual market is depends on the
realistic alternatives that sellers and buyers have at a given time. In principle, in a
capitalist world-economy the virtual market exists in the world-economy as a whole.
But as we shall see, there are often interferences with these boundaries, creating nar-
rrower and more “protected” markets. There are of course separate virtual markets
for all commodities as well as for capital and different kinds of labor. But over time,
there can also be said to exist a single virtual world market for all the factors of pro-
duction combined, despite all the barriers that exist to its free functioning. One can
think of this complete virtual market as a magnet for all producers and buyers, whose
pull is a constant political factor in the decision-making of everyone – the states, the
firms, the households, the classes, and the status-groups (or identities). This complete
virtual world market is a reality in that it influences all decision making, but it never
functions fully and freely (that is, without interference). The totally free market
functions as an ideology, a myth, and a constraining influence, but never as a
day-to-day reality.

One of the reasons it is not a day-to-day reality is that a totally free market, were it
ever to exist, would make impossible the endless accumulation of capital. This may
seem a paradox because it is surely true that capitalism cannot function without mar-
kets, and it is also true that capitalists regularly say that they favor free markets. But
capitalists in fact need not totally free markets but rather markets that are only
partially free. The reason is clear. Suppose there really existed a world market in
which all the factors of production were totally free, as our textbooks in economics
usually define this – that is, one in which the factors flowed without restriction, in
which there were a very large number of buyers and a very large number of sellers,
and in which there was perfect information (meaning that all sellers and all buyers
knew the exact state of all costs of production). In such a perfect market, it would
always be possible for the buyers to bargain down the sellers to an absolutely minus-
cule level of profit (let us think of it as a penny), and this low level of profit would
make the capitalist game entirely uninteresting to producers, removing the basic
social underpinnings of such a system.

What sellers always prefer is a monopoly, for then they can create a relatively wide
margin between the costs of production and the sales price, and thus realize high
rates of profit. Of course, perfect monopolies are extremely difficult to create, and
rare, but quasi-monopolies are not. What one needs most of all is the support of the
machinery of a relatively strong state, one which can enforce a quasi-monopoly.
There are many ways of doing this. One of the most fundamental is the system of
patents which reserves rights in an “invention” for a specified number of years. This
is what basically makes “new” products the most expensive for consumers and the
most profitable for their producers. Of course, patents are often violated and in any
case they eventually expire, but by and large they protect a quasi-monopoly for a
time. Even so, production protected by patents usually remains only a quasi-monopoly,
since there may be other similar products on the market that are not covered by the
patent. This is why the normal situation for so-called leading products (that is, prod-
ucts that are both new and have an important share of the overall world market for
commodities) is an oligopoly rather than an absolute monopoly. Oligopolies are
however good enough to realize the desired high rate of profits, especially since the
various firms often collude to minimize price competition.
Patents are not the only way in which states can create quasi-monopolies. State restrictions on imports and exports (so-called protectionist measures) are another. State subsidies and tax benefits are a third. The ability of strong states to use their muscle to prevent weaker states from creating counter-protectionist measures is still another. The role of the states as large-scale buyers of certain products willing to pay excessive prices is still another. Finally, regulations which impose a burden on producers may be relatively easy to absorb by large producers but crippling to smaller producers, an asymmetry which results in the elimination of the smaller producers from the market and thus increases the degree of oligopoly. The modalities by which states interfere with the virtual market are so extensive that they constitute a fundamental factor in determining prices and profits. Without such interferences, the capitalist system could not thrive and therefore could not survive.

Nonetheless, there are two inbuilt anti-monopolistic features in a capitalist world-economy. First of all, one producer’s monopolistic advantage is another producer’s loss. The losers will of course struggle politically to remove the advantages of the winners. They can do this by political struggle within the states where the monopolistic producers are located, appealing to doctrines of a free market and offering support to political leaders inclined to end a particular monopolistic advantage. Or they do this by persuading other states to defy the world market monopoly by using their state power to sustain competitive producers. Both methods are used. Therefore, over time, every quasi-monopoly is undone by the entry of further producers into the market.

Quasi-monopolies are thus self-liquidating. But they last long enough (say thirty years) to ensure considerable accumulation of capital by those who control the quasi-monopolies. When a quasi-monopoly does cease to exist, the large accumulators of capital simply move their capital to new leading products or whole new leading industries. The result is a cycle of leading products. Leading products have moderately short lives, but they are constantly succeeded by other leading industries. Thus the game continues. As for the once-leading industries past their prime, they become more and more “competitive,” that is, less and less profitable. We see this pattern in action all the time.

Firms are the main actors in the market. Firms are normally the competitors of other firms operating in the same virtual market. They are also in conflict with those firms from whom they purchase inputs and those firms to which they sell their products. Fierce intercapitalist rivalry is the name of the game. And only the strongest and the most agile survive. One must remember that bankruptcy, or absorption by a more powerful firm, is the daily bread of capitalist enterprises. Not all capitalist entrepreneurs succeed in accumulating capital. Far from it. If they all succeeded, each would be likely to obtain very little capital. So, the repeated “failures” of firms not only weed out the weak competitors but are a condition sine qua non of the endless accumulation of capital. That is what explains the constant process of the concentration of capital.

To be sure, there is a downside to the growth of firms, either horizontally (in the same product), vertically (in the different steps in the chain of production), or what might be thought of as orthogonally (into other products not closely related). Size brings down costs through so-called economies of scale. But size adds costs of administration and coordination, and multiplies the risks of managerial inefficiencies. As a result of this contradiction, there has been a repeated zigzag process of firms
explaining globalization

Getting larger and then getting smaller. But it has not at all been a simple up-and-down cycle. Rather, worldwide there has been a secular increase in the size of firms, the whole historical process taking the form of a ratchet, two steps up then one step back, continuously. The size of firms also has direct political implications. Large size gives firms more political clout but also makes them more vulnerable to political assault – by their competitors, their employees, and their consumers. But here too the bottom line is an upward ratchet, toward more political influence over time.

The axial division of labor of a capitalist world-economy divides production into core-like products and peripheral products. Core-periphery is a relational concept. What we mean by core-periphery is the degree of profitability of the production processes. Since profitability is directly related to the degree of monopolization, what we essentially mean by core-like production processes is those that are controlled by quasi-monopolies. Peripheral processes are those that are truly competitive. When exchange occurs, competitive products are in a weak position and quasi-monopolized products are in a strong position. As a result, there is a constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of peripheral products to the producers of core-like products. This has been called unequal exchange.

To be sure, unequal exchange is not the only way of moving accumulated capital from politically weak regions to politically strong regions. There is also plunder, often used extensively during the early days of incorporating new regions into the world-economy (consider, for example, the conquistadores and gold in the Americas). But plunder is self-liquidating. It is a case of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. Still, since the consequences are middle-term and the advantages short-term, there still exists much plunder in the modern world-system, although we are often "scandalized" when we learn of it. When Enron goes bankrupt, after procedures that have moved enormous sums into the hands of a few managers, that is in fact plunder. When "privatizations" of erstwhile state property lead to its being garnered by mafia-like businessmen who quickly leave the country with destroyed enterprises in their wake, that is plunder. Self-liquidating, yes, but only after much damage has been done to the world's productive system, and indeed to the health of the capitalist world-economy.

Since quasi-monopolies depend on the patronage of strong states, they are largely located – juridically, physically, and in terms of ownership – within such states. There is therefore a geographical consequence of the core-peripheral relationship. Core-like processes tend to group themselves in a few states and to constitute the bulk of the production activity in such states. Peripheral processes tend to be scattered among a large number of states and to constitute the bulk of the production activity in these states. Thus, for shorthand purposes we can talk of core states and peripheral states, so long as we remember that we are really talking of a relationship between production processes. Some states have a near even mix of core-like and peripheral products. We may call them semiperipheral states. They have, as we shall see, special political properties. It is however not meaningful to speak of semiperipheral production processes.

Since, as we have seen, quasi-monopolies exhaust themselves, what is a core-like process today will become a peripheral process tomorrow. The economic history of the modern world-system is replete with the shift, or downgrading, of products, first to semiperipheral countries, and then to peripheral ones. If circa 1800 the production of textiles was possibly the preeminent core-like production process, by 2000 it was
manifestly one of the least profitable peripheral production processes. In 1800 these
textiles were produced primarily in a very few countries (notably England and some
other countries of northwestern Europe); in 2000 textiles were produced in virtually
every part of the world-system, especially cheap textiles. The process has been
repeated with many other products. Think of steel, of automobiles, or even com-
puters. This kind of shift has no effect on the structure of the system itself. In 2000
there were other core-like processes (e.g., aircraft production or genetic engineering)
which were concentrated in a few countries. There have always been new core-like
processes to replace those which become more competitive and then move out of the
states in which they were originally located.

The role of each state is very different vis-à-vis productive processes depending on
the mix of core–peripheral processes within it. The strong states, which contain a dis-
proportionate share of core-like processes, tend to emphasize their role of protecting
the quasi-monopolies of the core-like processes. The very weak states, which contain
a disproportionate share of peripheral production processes, are usually unable to do
very much to affect the axial division of labor, and in effect are largely forced to accept
the lot that has been given them.

The semiperipheral states which have a relatively even mix of production processes
find themselves in the most difficult situation. Under pressure from core states and
putting pressure on peripheral states, their major concern is to keep themselves from
slipping into the periphery and to do what they can to advance themselves toward the
core. Neither is easy, and both require considerable state interference with the world
market. These semiperipheral states are the ones that put forward most aggressively
and most publicly so-called protectionist policies. They hope thereby to “protect”
their production processes from the competition of stronger firms outside, while try-
ing to improve the efficiency of the firms inside so as to compete better in the world
market. They are eager recipients of the relocation of erstwhile leading products,
which they define these days as achieving “economic development.” In this effort,
their competition comes not from the core states but from other semiperipheral
states, equally eager to be the recipients of relocation which cannot go to all the eager
aspirants simultaneously and to the same degree. In the beginning of the twenty-first
century, some obvious countries to be labeled semiperipheral are South Korea, Brazil,
and India – countries with strong enterprises that export products (for example steel,
automobiles, pharmaceuticals) to peripheral zones, but that also regularly relate to
core zones as importers of more “advanced” products.

The normal evolution of the leading industries – the slow dissolution of the quasi-
monopolies – is what accounts for the cyclical rhythms of the world-economy. A major
leading industry will be a major stimulus to the expansion of the world-economy and
will result in considerable accumulation of capital. But it also normally leads to more
extensive employment in the world-economy, higher wage-levels, and a general sense
of relative prosperity. As more and more firms enter the market of the erstwhile quasi-
monopoly, there will be “overproduction” (that is, too much production for the real
effective demand at a given time) and consequently increased price competition
(because of the demand squeeze), thus lowering the rates of profit. At some point, a
buildup of unsold products results, and consequently a slowdown in further production.
When this happens, we tend to see a reversal of the cyclical curve of the world-economy. We talk of stagnation or recession in the world-economy. Rates of unemployment rise worldwide. Producers seek to reduce costs in order to maintain their share of the world market. One of the mechanisms is relocation of the production processes to zones that have historically lower wages, that is, to semiperipheral countries. This shift puts pressure on the wage levels in the processes still remaining in core zones, and wages there tend to become lower as well. Effective demand which was at first lacking because of overproduction now becomes lacking because of a reduction in earnings of the consumers. In such a situation, not all producers necessarily lose out. There is obviously acutely increased competition among the diluted oligopoly that is now engaged in these production processes. They fight each other furiously, usually with the aid of their state machineries. Some states and some producers succeed in “exporting unemployment” from one core state to the others. Systemically, there is contraction, but certain core states and especially certain semiperipheral states may seem to be doing quite well. […]