Econ 3600 International Trade

Introduction

- **1**. Syllabus highlights (why only highlights?)
- a. Exam times: Quiz #1 Wednesday Sept. 12; Exam #2 Monday Nov. 12
- **b**. Class procedures
 - i. Synchronize watches.
 - ii. Pay attention.
- 2. Intro
- a. Issues:
 - i. Trump!
 - A. "Buy American, hire American."
 - B. "American steel, aluminum."
 - C. Out of TPP, renegotiate NAFTA (https://nyti.ms/2uXVCox)
 - **D**. Tariff wars, trade deficits, currency manipulation, immigration.
 - ii. Who said this, and when?

"When you invest in education and health care and benefits for working Americans, it pays dividends throughout every level of our economy. . . . I think that if you polled many of the people in this room, most of us are strong free traders and most of us believe in markets. Bob [Rubin] and I have had a running debate now for about a year about how do we, in fact, deal with the losers in a globalized economy. There has been a tendency in the past for us to say, well, look, we have got to grow the pie, and we will retrain those who need retraining. But, in fact, we have never taken that side of the equation as seriously as we need to take it. . . . Just remember . . . [t] here are people in places like Decatur, Illinois, or Galesburg, Illinois, who have seen their jobs eliminated. They have lost their health care. They have lost their retirement security. . . . They believe that this may be the first generation in which their children do worse than they do."

b. Purview: interactions between economic units (people, firms,

gov'ts, orgs.) located in different sovereign nations

- Not Nations that "decide" to have trade def's, etc. but the decision-making entities within these nations, e.g., people, firms, gov'ts, orgs.
- ii. Why countries as line of demarcation?
 - **A**. Traditionally, factor mobility: "Protectionism for Liberals" by Robert Skidelsky, Aug 14, 2018, *Project Syndicate:*

"Experience ... shows," Ricardo wrote, "that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself, with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the emigration of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry to see weakened, induce most men of property to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own country, rather than seek a more advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations."

- **B**. "This prudential barrier to capital export fell as secure conditions emerged in more parts of the world. In our own time, the emigration of capital has led to the emigration of jobs, as technology transfer has made possible the reallocation of domestic production to foreign locations thus compounding the potential for job losses."
- C. Sovereign policies: among other things, in US, no barriers to interstate trade; only dollars as legal tender.
- **c**. Themes.
 - i. Pattern of trade
 - ii. Effects of trade, i.e., "Gains from trade"
- **d**. Basic reason for trade:
 - i. Proximate cause: differences in prices across locations (POW camp example; Seinfeld)
 - A. Goods and services
 - **B**. Trading current for future consumption.

- **ii**. Peeling the onion: what causes these different *autarkic* prices?
- e. Effects of trade:
 - Trade changes relative prices vis a vis their autarkic values
 - ii. We need a framework for thinking about how changes in relative prices affect individuals
- **3**. Is this class for you?
- a. Subject matter
- **b**. Approach: involves solving numerical (and more general) problems. See one, do one, teach one.
- c. The Bard of Baltimore, H. L. Mencken:
 - i. "For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong."
 - LAGNIAPPE ("a little extra;" for this class, it means not required or necessarily covered in class but perhaps useful, or sometimes just fun)
 - ii. Lagniappe: "Every normal man must be tempted, at times, to spit on his hands, hoist the black flag, and begin slitting throats."
 - **iii**. Lagniappe: "No one ever went broke underestimating the taste of the American public."
 - iv. Lagniappe: "On some great and glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their heart's desire at last, and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron."

LAGNIAPPE: Models

- 1. Definition: logical representation of a priori or theoretical knowledge economic analysis suggests is most relevant for treating a particular problem
 - 2. Elements:
 - a. Variables: exog and endog
 - **b**. Equations: logical structuring and representation of basic interrelationships ("systematic relationships")
 - i. Structural equations, structural model.

- ii. Depictions
 - **A**. words, mathematical notation
 - B. Graphs
- iii. Parameters
- 3. Solving
- a. Canonical question
- **b**. Strategies
 - i. sub-models
 - ii. math
 - iii. Graphs
 - iv. Dimensionality

Need something as a break from all this theory stuff? Read about "Chicken Wars." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_tax

The Endowment Economy

Introduction

- 1. Purpose: develop simplest GE model that helps us understand some aspects of trade: pattern, effects.
 - a. Why general equilibrium?
 - Key insights are fundamentally GE (appeal to my authority)
 - ii. Analogy: electric cars, solar panels, recycling
 - **b**. Why two agents?
 - 2. Goals
 - **a**. Understand the determinants of AERP (interplay of tastes, resources)
 - **b**. Understand how price affects each individual's well-being.
 - 3. What is hard? Relative prices instead of nominal prices.

The model

- 1. POW camp, Halloween
- 2. Two sub-models: demand (consumer) and supply (simple)

- 3. For model as a whole:
- a. Exogenous: tastes (preferences), resources (endowments).
- **b**. Endogenous: quantities consumed, relative price, levels of well-being (on which of their l-curves individuals find themselves).

Strategy

- 1. Specific functional forms: (p. 59, "Why we use functional forms")
- **a**. Makes models and their implications more concrete, easier to remember.
- **b**. Makes it easy to discuss what is exogenous, what is endogenous, what it means to "solve" a model.
- 2. If you have read the text beforehand, these examples will be easier to follow.
- **3**. In this outline, mathematical steps are outlined; we go quickly, and they are there for you as needed by you. At a minimum, what you need to understand and appreciate is:
 - **a**. Behind every individual demand curve is an individual preference relationship.
 - **b**. Intersections of curves in diagrams represent pairs of numbers;
 - **c**. How the placement of curves in a the Cartesian (x, y) plane (and how they shift) reflects changes in variables that are not x or y
 - **d**. For the "A" and "B" students: How to derive individual and market (equivalently, aggregate) demand curves from a Cobb-Douglas utility function and from two specific no-income-effect utility functions that we will introduce.

Demand sub-model

- **1**. Endowments for each person
- a. Exogenous
- **b**. Notation (e.g., for two goods and two people: Andy, Bob)

$$\overline{C}_A, \overline{T}_A, \overline{C}_B, \overline{T}_B,$$

- 2. Budget constraints for Andy (Analogous expression for Bob):
- **a**. Equality of income and expenditure

$$P_C \overline{C}_A + P_T \overline{T}_A = P_C C_A + P_T T_A;$$

b. In graph-friendly form:

$$T_A = \overline{T}_A + p\overline{C}_A - pC_A$$

- c. $p \equiv \frac{P_C}{P_T}$ exogenous.
 - i. Reflects Opp. cost as Andy contemplates choosing different bundles of (C_A, T_A) .
 - ii. We consistently refer to it as the relative price of coffee.
- d. Homework 1 Part 1 (see one, do one, ...), in groups.

Assume two POW's, Andy (A) and Bob (B), each get (exogenous) endowments of one (1) unit of coffee and one (1) unit of tea per month. That is,

$$\overline{C}_A = 1; \ \overline{C}_B = 1;$$

 $\overline{T}_A = 1; \ \overline{T}_B = 1.$

Consider four different (exogenous to Andy and Bob) sets of *nominal* prices for coffee and tea:

Set 1.
$$(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$20/lb);$$

Set 2. $(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$10/lb);$
Set 3. $(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$5/lb);$
Set 4. $(P_C = \$20/lb, P_T = \$20/lb).$

(1) 5 points. Define the relative price of coffee as the units of tea that exchange for one unit of coffee. What is the relative price of coffee associated with each of the above sets of prices?

Answer:

(2) 5 points. Write the equation that describes all the ordered pairs of coffee and tea that could be consumed by Andy and Bob for each set of prices. That is, you are looking for a function of the form $T_i = f(C_i; P_C, P_T, \overline{C}_i, \overline{T}_i)$. Your equation must have consumption of tea $(T_i, i = A, B)$ as the only variable on the left-hand-side. Depict these four lines all in one *schematic* diagram, i.e., in a diagram with consumption of tea on the vertical axis and consumption of coffee on the horizontal axis in which all lines have slopes and vertical intercepts identified and all relative qualitative properties among the lines are correct.

Answer: (parametric form first to easily check answers)

$$\overbrace{P_{T}T_{i} + P_{C}C_{i}}^{Exp} = \overbrace{P_{T}\overline{T}_{i} + P_{C}\overline{C}_{i}}^{Income};$$

$$P_{T}T_{i} = P_{T}\overline{T}_{i} + P_{C}\overline{C}_{i} - P_{C}C_{i};$$

$$T_{i} = \overline{T}_{i} + \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}}\overline{C}_{i} - \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}}C_{i}.$$

$$\overline{T}_{i} = \overline{C}_{i} = 1; T_{i} = 1 + \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}} \times 1 - \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}}C_{i};$$


$$T_{i} = 1 + \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}} - \frac{P_{C}}{P_{T}} \times C_{i}.$$


1.
$$(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$20/lb); T_i = \frac{3}{2} - \frac{1}{2}C_i$$

2.
$$(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$10/lb); T_i = 2 - C_i;$$

3.
$$(P_C = \$10/lb, P_T = \$5/lb); T_i = 3 - 2C_i.$$

4.
$$(P_C = \$20/lb, P_T = \$20/lb); T_i = 2 - C_i.$$






Slopes should be added by students: $-\frac{1}{2}$, -1, -2

End Class 2 (aspirational)

- 3. Tastes
- a. Exogenous
- **b**. Represented as a family of indifference curves, which can be represented as utility function.
- c. Classic example of intermediate micro:


$$U_A = (C_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}(T_A)^{\frac{1}{2}};$$
 U-function $(T_A)^{\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{U_A}{(C_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$ rearrange $\left[(T_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right]^2 = \left[\frac{U_A}{(C_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}}\right]^2$ fun w exp. $T_A = \frac{(U_A)^2}{C_A};$ useful form



$$U_A=1, U_A=\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}$$


d. A key component: marginal rate of substitution(-slope of IC)

$$\frac{dT_A}{dC_A} = -\frac{(U_A)^2}{(C_A)^2} = \frac{\left[(C_A)^{\frac{1}{2}} (T_A)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right]^2}{(C_A)^2} \\
= \frac{C_A T_A}{(C_A)^2} = \frac{T_A}{C_A}.$$



$$U_A=1, U_A=\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}$$

- ${f e}$. NB: why didn't we leave the MRS function with U_A in the rhs?
- f. Different tastes?



- **4**. Why MRS so important?
- a. Describes different tastes.
- **b**. NJT (rank-order) versus Interstate 65 (cardinal).
- 5. Three parametric examples
- a. Cobb-Douglas

$$U_{A} = (C_{A})^{\gamma_{A}}(T_{A})^{1-\gamma_{A}}; 0 < \gamma_{A} < 1. \qquad \qquad \text{U-fnctn}$$

$$\left[(T_{A})^{1-\gamma_{A}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}} = \left[\frac{U_{A}}{(C_{A})^{\gamma_{A}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}} = \frac{(U_{A})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}}}{(C_{A})^{\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}}}}; \qquad \text{rearrange}$$

$$\frac{dT_{A}}{dC_{A}} = -\left(\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}} \right) \left(\frac{(U_{A})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}}}{(C_{A})^{\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}}+1}} \right) \qquad \text{ruls diffr.}$$

$$= -\left(\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}} \right) \left(\frac{(C_{A})^{\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}}}(T_{A})^{1-\gamma_{A}}}{(C_{A})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}}} \right) \qquad \text{sb}$$

$$= -\left(\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}} \right) \left(\frac{(C_{A})^{\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}}}(T_{A})}{(C_{A})^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}}} \right) \qquad \text{smp}$$

$$= -\left(\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}} \right) \left((C_{A})^{\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}}-\frac{1}{1-\gamma_{A}}}(T_{A}) \right) \qquad \text{exprl}$$

$$= -\left(\frac{\gamma_{A}}{1-\gamma_{A}} \right) \left(\frac{T_{A}}{C_{A}} \right). \qquad \text{Miller Time!}$$

- i. γ_A is a *parameter:* an exogenous number, e.g., .6
- **ii**. Any monotonic transformation represents same family of indifference curves:

$$U_A = \phi_A (C_A)^{\gamma_A} (T_A)^{1-\gamma_A};$$

$$U_A = \left[(C_A)^{\gamma_A} (T_A)^{1-\gamma_A} \right]^{\phi_A};$$


$$U_A = (C_A)^{\gamma_A} (T_A)^{1-\gamma_A} + \phi_A;$$

$$\frac{dT_A}{dC_A} = -\left(\frac{\gamma_A}{1-\gamma_A} \right) \left(\frac{T_A}{C_A} \right).$$

where ϕ_A is some number, any number whatsoever. (JBB says ...)

iii. Analogous specifications for Bob; example:

$$U_A = (C_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}(T_A)^{\frac{1}{2}}; U_B = (C_B)^{\frac{1}{3}}(T_B)^{\frac{2}{3}}$$



IA (Thin); IB (Thick)

END CLASS 3 (Aspirational)


b. No income effects on coffee with power function:

$$U_A = T_A + rac{\gamma_A}{\phi_A} (C_A)^{\phi_A}; \gamma_A > 0; \phi_A < 1;$$
 U fnctn
$$T_A = U_A - rac{\gamma_A}{\phi_A} (C_A)^{\phi_A};$$
 Rearrange
$$rac{dT_A}{dC_A} = -\gamma_A (C_A)^{\phi_A - 1}$$
 -MRS

- i. Again, γ_A and ϕ_A are *parameters*, e.g., $\gamma_A = .6$, $\phi_A = \frac{1}{2}$.
- ii. Useful when we want to abstract from complications of income effects.
- **iii**. Again, as always, any monotonic transformation represents same family of indifference curves.
- iv. If $\phi_i = 0$, we should write our preference function as


$$U_A = T_A + \gamma_A \ln C_A.$$

- v. Analogous specifications for Bob
- vi. Useful because it generates constant elasticity demand functions.
- vii. Picture:



$$\gamma = 1, (bl), \ \gamma = \frac{1}{2}(gr); \ \phi = \frac{1}{2}$$

viii. Picture with set of budget constraints (each with same slope, $-\frac{P_C}{P_T}$):



$$\gamma = 1, \ \phi = \frac{1}{2}$$

c. NIE with quadratic

$$U_A = T_A + \alpha_{0A}C_A - \frac{\alpha_A}{2}(C_A)^2 for C_A \le \frac{\alpha_{0A}}{\alpha_A}; \qquad \qquad \text{Ufnctn}$$

$$U_A = T_A + \frac{\alpha_{0A}^2}{2\alpha_A} for C_A \ge \frac{\alpha_{0A}}{\alpha_A}; \qquad \qquad \text{U-fnctn}$$


$$T_A = U_A - \alpha_{0A}C_A + \frac{\alpha_A}{2}(C_A)^2 for C_A \le \frac{\alpha_{0A}}{\alpha_A}; \qquad \qquad \text{rerrng}$$

$$\frac{dT_A}{dC_A} = -\alpha_{0A} + \alpha_A C_A. \qquad \qquad \text{-MRS}$$

i. Again, α_A and α_{0A} are parameters, e.g.,

$$U_A = \begin{cases} T_A + 10C_A - (C_A)^2 & \text{if } 0 \le C_A \le 5 \\ T_A + 25 & \text{if } C_A > 5 \end{cases}$$

- ii. Useful because it generates linear demand functions.
- iii. Picture with set of equal-slope BC's:



$$T = U - 10C_A + C_A^2$$
; $(\alpha_0 = 10, \alpha = 2)$

- 6. Most-preferred points (consumer equilibrium)
- a. Tangency condition

$$\frac{dT_i}{dC_i} = p;$$

$$-\frac{dT_i}{dC_i} = -\left(\frac{\gamma_i}{1 - \gamma_i}\right)\left(\frac{T_i}{C_i}\right) = p;$$

$$T_i = \frac{1 - \gamma_i}{\gamma_i}pC_i$$

b. BC:

$$T_i = \overline{T}_i + p\overline{C}_i - pC_i$$

c. Two equations, two unknowns (C_i, T_i) :


$$T_{i} = \frac{1 - \gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} pC_{i};$$

$$T_{i} = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i} - pC_{i}$$

generic statement

CD example

graph-friendly



BC(bl), TC(red)

d. Solution:

$$T_{i} = \frac{1 - \gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} pC_{i}; \qquad \qquad TC$$

$$T_{i} = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i} - pC_{i}; \qquad \qquad BC$$

$$T_{i} = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i} - pC_{i}; \qquad \qquad \text{subst.}$$

$$pC_{i} \left[\frac{1 - \gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} + 1 \right] = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}; \qquad \qquad \text{rearrange}$$

$$pC_{i} \left[\frac{1 - \gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} + \frac{\gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} \right] = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}; \qquad \qquad \text{rearrange}$$

$$pC_{i} \left[\frac{1 - \gamma_{i} + \gamma_{i}}{\gamma_{i}} \right] = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}; \qquad \qquad \text{rearrange}$$

$$pC_{i} = \gamma_{i} [\overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}]; \qquad \qquad \text{rearr gt exp shre}$$


$$C_{i}^{d} = \gamma_{i} \left[\frac{\overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}}{p} \right]; \qquad \qquad \text{Miller time!}$$

$$T_{i} = \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i} - pC_{i} \qquad \qquad \text{BC again}$$


$$= \overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i} - \gamma_{i} [\overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}] \qquad \qquad \text{sub}$$

$$T_{i}^{d} = (1 - \gamma_{i})[\overline{T}_{i} + p\overline{C}_{i}] \qquad \qquad \text{Tea time!}$$

e. Depiction



f. Ind. demand curve, function:



Aggregate or market demand curve:

i. Add up individual d-curves to create market demand curves, e.g.,

$$C^d \equiv C^d_A(p;\overline{C}_A,\overline{T}_A) + C^d_B(p;\overline{C}_B,\overline{T}_B)$$

- **ii**. This is a curve in coffee-*p* plane.
- **iii**. Usually assumed downward-sloping (an empirical assumption!)
- iv. In general, placement in plane depends on all four endowments.
- v. Example:

$$C^d = \frac{\gamma_A}{p} (\overline{T}_A + p\overline{C}_A) + \frac{\gamma_B}{p} (\overline{T}_B + p\overline{C}_B)$$

vi. With
$$\overline{T}_i = \overline{C}_i = 1$$
, $i = A, B$, $\gamma_A = \frac{1}{2}$, $\gamma_B = \frac{1}{4}$

$$C_A^d = \frac{1+p}{2p}; 2pC_A^d = 1+p; p(2C_A^d - 1) = 1; p = \frac{1}{2C_A^d - 1} = \frac{.5}{C_A^d - .5}$$

$$C_B^d = \frac{1+p}{4p}; 4pC_B^d = 1+p; p(4C_B^d - 1) = 1; p = \frac{1}{4C_B^d - 1} = \frac{.25}{C_B^d - .25}$$


$$C^d = \frac{.75}{p}(1+p).$$

vii. Inverse:

$$pC^{d} = .75 + .75p;$$

$$p(C^{d} - .75) = .75;$$

$$p = \frac{.75}{(C^{d} - .75)}$$



Supply sub-model

- 1. Simple: the benefit of the endowment economy specification
- 2. Market (aggregate) supply just the sum of individual endowments

$$C^S = \overline{C}_A + \overline{C}_B;$$
 $T^S = \overline{T}_A + \overline{T}_B.$

3. Coffee supply (inverse) is depicted as vertical line in coffee-p plane.

Equilibrium: solving the model

1. Equilibrium: demand equals supply

$$\overline{C}_A + \overline{C}_B = C_A^d(p; \overline{C}_A, \overline{T}_A) + C_B^d(p; \overline{C}_B, \overline{T}_B).$$

- **2**. This is one equation with 1 endogenous variable–p–and 4 exog.variables.
- **3**. Supply only depends on *sum* of coffee endowments, demand on all of individual endowments.
 - **4**. Solve for p_a :

$$\overline{C}_{A} + \overline{C}_{B} = \underbrace{\frac{C^{d}}{\gamma_{A}}(\overline{T}_{A} + p\overline{C}_{A}) + \frac{\gamma_{B}}{p}(\overline{T}_{B} + p\overline{C}_{B})}_{C^{d}};$$

$$p(\overline{C}_{A} + \overline{C}_{B}) = \gamma_{A}\overline{T}_{A} + \gamma_{A}p\overline{C}_{A} + \gamma_{B}\overline{T}_{B} + \gamma_{B}p\overline{C}_{B};$$

$$p(\overline{C}_{A}[1 - \gamma_{A}] + \overline{C}_{B}[1 - \gamma_{B}]) = \gamma_{A}\overline{T}_{A} + \gamma_{B}\overline{T}_{B};$$

$$p_{a} = \frac{(\gamma_{A}\overline{T}_{A} + \gamma_{B}\overline{T}_{B})}{(\overline{C}_{A}(1 - \gamma_{A}) + \overline{C}_{B}(1 - \gamma_{B}))}$$

5. Sub p_a back into individual demand functions to get equilibrium C_i^d , T_i^d . Remember from Tea Time!

$$T_i^d = (1 - \gamma_i) [\overline{T}_i + p\overline{C}_i]$$

- **6**. Example: $\overline{T}_i = \overline{C}_i = 1$, i = A, B, $\gamma_A = \frac{1}{2}$, $\gamma_B = \frac{1}{4}$
- **a**. p_a

$$\frac{.75}{p}(1+p) = 2;$$

$$2p = (1+p)(.75);$$

$$p(2-.75) = .75$$

$$p_a = \frac{.75}{(1.25)} = \frac{3}{5}.$$

b. Substitute the AERP value of p into individual demand curves to determine equilibrium consumptions of each individual.

$$C_A^d = \frac{\gamma_A \overline{T}_A (\overline{C}_A + \overline{C}_B) + \gamma_A \gamma_B (\overline{T}_B \overline{C}_A - \overline{T}_A \overline{C}_B)}{(\gamma_A \overline{T}_A + \gamma_B \overline{T}_B)}$$

c. Substitute this value of p and C_i^d into BC or TC to obtain equilibrium quantity of other good consumed for each individual.

$$\begin{split} T_A^d &= (1 - \gamma_A)(\overline{T}_A + p\overline{C}_A) \\ &= (1 - \gamma_A)\frac{\overline{T}_A(\overline{C}_A + \overline{C}_B) + \gamma_B(\overline{T}_B\overline{C}_A - \overline{T}_A\overline{C}_B)}{(\overline{C}_A(1 - \gamma_A) + \overline{C}_B(1 - \gamma_B))}. \end{split}$$

d. Levels of well-being (cardinal):

$$U_A = (C_A^d)^{\gamma} (T_A^d)^{1-\gamma}$$
$$\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{.25} (\frac{6}{5})^{.75} = 1.036$$

e. Example:

$$\overline{T}_{i} = \overline{C}_{i} = 1, i = A, B, \gamma_{A} = \frac{1}{2}, \gamma_{B} = \frac{1}{4};$$

$$p_{a} = \frac{3}{5}; C_{A} = 1\frac{1}{3}, T_{A} = \frac{4}{5}, C_{B} = \frac{2}{3}, T_{B} = \frac{6}{5};$$

$$U_{A} = \left(\frac{8}{6}\right)^{.5} \left(\frac{4}{5}\right)^{.5} = 1.0328;$$


$$U_{B} = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{.25} \left(\frac{6}{5}\right)^{.75} = 1.036.$$


$$\left(\frac{8}{6}\right)^{.5} \left(\frac{4}{5}\right)^{.5} = 1.0328$$

f. Compare with no trade:

$$U_A = 1; U_B = 1.$$

- **g**. Question: True or false: compared with not being able to trade with each other, Bob benefitted more than Andy from their joint trading ability.
- h. Graphs usually informative.
- 7. The diagrams:





- . Depiction vs solution (analytic) vs solution (in actual economies): EB (on board, in book).
- . Walras Law: *if* the market for coffee is in equilibrium, *then* the market for tea must also be in equilibrium. (p. 115-116 CD)

End class 4