

Class 7

Feelings?

May 30, 2017

Housekeeping

Play, Gala dinner, Exam

7:30 at Globe: meet on river side at 7:05.

Menu choices for da Mario

Exam: 10:00-12:00. Bring paper and writing instrument. Possible topics: logic of collective action; strategic/tactical bombing (more today); bargaining failure (today); battle model and propensities for peace or war; paradox of civilization; analysis of Romeo and Juliet; basics from CBB (Prologue, Ch. 1).

R and J: what to look for (in no specific order): bargaining failure (watch the final scene); misperception (lark versus nightingale); Principle-agent problems? (duel between underlings); game theory with imperfect information (whether or not to kill themselves); information problems (letter from Friar).

Reflections on Normandy?

From Anthony Beever *D-Day*

- p.32: "they lacked sufficient concrete for bunkers ... because Hitler had given priority to massive U-boat shelters." Did the submariners/navy lobby for this?
- p. 35; "The Kriegsmarine had lost the battle of the Atlantic, but still believed a new generation (of U-boats could win the war...)"
- "Rommel was exasperated by Hitler's refusal to bring the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine under a centralized command ... Hitler preferred to maintain rival organizations which only he could control from the top..." " ... Goring's empire building..."
- p. 36: " fierce debate" Rommel: forward defense; Guderain, Geyr: panzers in reserve around Paris, ready to strike. Rommel knew Allies controlled the air.
- "Predictably, a bad compromise: neither R or Geyr had control-had to get H's approval.
- Your ideas?

Normandy/WWII

Casualties/perspective

U.S. Active Military Personnel (1939-1945)

Year	Army	Navy	Marines	Total
1939	189,839	125,202	19,432	334,473
1940	269,023	160,997	28,345	458,365
1941	1,462,315	284,427	54,359	1,801,101
1942	3,075,608	640,570	142,613	3,585,791
1943	6,994,472	1,741,750	308,523	9,044,745
1944	7,994,750	2,981,365	475,604	11,451,719
1945	8,267,958	3,380,817	474,680	12,123,445

D-Day Combatants

Country	# of Soldiers on D-Day	Percentage
*United States	95,000	34%
*Great Britain	60,000	21%
*Canada	20,000	7%
Germany	105,000	38%

- 2499 American D-Day fatalities and 1915 from the other Allied nations, a total of 4414 dead (new estimates www.dday.org)
- Older estimates: U.S.:1465 dead, 3184 wounded, 1928 missing and 26 captured. Of the total US figure, 2499 casualties were from the US airborne troops (238 of them being deaths). The casualties at Utah Beach were relatively light: 197, including 60 missing. However, the US 1st and 29th Divisions together suffered around 2000 casualties at Omaha Beach.
- Caen Museum figures: about 50 KIA on Utah, 300 on Sword, 1600 on Omaha.
- From internet (<https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/25/how-many-troops-died-on-d-day>): "2499 casualties were from the US airborne troops (238 of them being deaths)."

- (from internet) "Over 425,000 Allied and German troops were killed, wounded or went missing during the Battle of Normandy. This figure includes over 209,000 Allied casualties, with nearly 37,000 dead amongst the ground forces and a further 16,714 deaths amongst the Allied air forces. Of the Allied casualties, 83,045 were from 21st Army Group (British, Canadian and Polish ground forces), 125,847 from the US ground forces."

Causalities of World War II

Country	Tot. Deaths	% of Pre-war Pop.	Military Deaths	Civilian
USSR	20,600,000	10.4%	13,600,000	7,000,000
Germany	6,850,000	9.5%	3,250,000	3,600,000
France	810,000	1.9%	340,000	470,000
U. S.	500,000	0.4%	500,000	—
G.Britain	388,000	0.8%	326,000	62,000

Normandy and bombing: a review

Classification

The theory of strategic bombing— in either mode, precision or area— had been straightforward and attractive. In the memorable, quaint language of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), “strategic bombing bears the same relationship to tactical bombing as does the cow to the pail of milk. To deny immediate aid and comfort to the enemy, tactical considerations dictate upsetting the bucket. To ensure eventual starvation, the strategic move is to kill the cow.”

"Strategic bombing . . . is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which will most weaken the enemy by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war. Strategic bombing is ... the use of air power to strike at the very foundation of an enemy's war effort— **the production of war material, the economy as a whole, or the morale of the civilian population**— rather than as a direct attack on the enemy's army or navy. ...

Normandy and bombing: a review

Classification

" ... While **tactical air power** uses aircraft to aid the advance of forces on the ground or on the surface of the ocean, usually in cooperation with those forces, **strategic air power** usually works in relative independence of armies and navies."

Brauer, Jurgen; van Tuyll, Hubert. Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History (Kindle Locations 4371-4383). University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition.

Normandy and bombing: a review

Accuracy

- Vertical versus horizontal
- You saw the picture of Pont d Hoc! Why? (Monte Cassino, myriad other examples).
- Successes? Fixed, non-protected highways, railways. Ruled the air.

Other issues on air power

See what you want to see; careerism

- United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)
 - "a problematic document which epitomizes the problematic nature of strategic bombing as a concept. Thus, determining strategic bombing's true efficacy is inherently difficult if not impossible" (Review by Mike Hankin of *How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?: Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, By Gian P. Gentile).
 - "the Survey reports have taken on the aura of a document that contains the truth about strategic bombing in World War II. In fact, the Survey is a secondary source that interprets the past." The Survey is merely the analysis of the men who authored it. It is not in itself an objective source of facts and data, although many facts and data points are contained within the reports. Gentile argues that too often, this distinction is forgotten or ignored, yet remembering this is key to correctly understanding the Survey." (BR)
- "desire of senior AAF officers to use the Survey's results as a tool for creating a postwar independent air force"

- Bayeux Tapistry

- Burning/disabling boats?
- Friedman: "Commanders throughout history have been confronted with the problem (of getting men to fight) and have come up with a variety of ways to make it in the interest of their soldiers to fight and, if possible, in the interest of the enemy soldiers to run away. ... "burning your bridges behind you."
- Greed: 1066: "The Norman Conquest not only changed the legal and social structure of England, but also led to an almost total change in the people holding land and therefore power. William I left only two major English landowners (Thurkill of Arden and Colswein of Lincoln) in possession of their estates, giving the rest to his Norman and other followers." ... "Only one of 12 Earls remained English after four years." <https://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/123/123%209%20Norman%20>
- Leadership: William in the front.

- D-Day: Getting men to fight: Could soldiers shirk? Remember the pictures with men crouched behind the beach obstacles? SPR movie: the weenie translator/clerk hiding.

More on Normandy

- How is film footage obtained? Accuracy?
- Draftees versus enlistees? (BR1 vs 101st)
- SPR, B of B: investing in identity?
- Twin Towers and Normandy Beaches: how to honor sacrifice.
- B of Bros: Captain Sobel

Bargaining Failure

The conundrum

At the end of a conflict that uses up resources, all parties can look back and agree that reaching an agreement with the same outcome as what occurred would have saved the resources used up in fighting. Why not look forward and realize this at the beginning?

Bargaining Failure

Rationalist perspective

- Rational war: "When we refer to a rational action by an agent we require that action to maximize the expected payoff to that agent out of the available actions and relative to the agent's beliefs about the potential consequences of the actions. This does not necessarily require that the beliefs be accurate, nor that the payoffs of the individual agent correspond to what is best for the state or country that he or she might represent."
- Non-rational: Religion, revenge, ethnic cleansing. But ...

Bargaining Failure

Failures: JM on Crusades, Treaty of Westphalia

- "The important aspect of this from our perspective is that the crusades took place at least partly due to a lack of ability to credibly commit to abide by agreements, to the multiplicity of factions involved on multiple fronts, and due to situations with great frictions in communication and in gaining information (e.g., see Runciman (1951-4)). Thus, the crusades can be partly understood from rationalist perspective"
- "Thus, although the 30-year war involved religious motivations, the various factions were also motivated by territory, peace, and autonomy, and were eventually able to find a rather complicated agreement that was self-sustaining."
- Munich: "part of the understanding of the Second World War involves seeing why conflict was not avoided through concessions ... rationalist explanations can help. As ..., for example, the failure of the Munich Agreement was due to credible commitment problems, and would have failed even if ethnicity and insanity ... not in the picture."

Bargaining Failure

Reasons for failure: Jackson-Morelli, POCE

- 1 Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war: inconsistent expectations
- 2 A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability to credibly commit to abide by an agreement.
- 3 Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are feasible.
- 4 Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the populations that they represent. (Wag the Dog)
- 5 Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it.

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI

- Inability to distinguish strong from weak
- But, an incentive for strong to clarify it is strong. But problematic: "If it is really impossible to fully and credibly reveal information and such information is critical to predicting the outcome of a potential war, it can be that bargaining will fail and war must be expected with at least some probability."
- Sometimes, bluffs have to be called: SDP (Brito-Intriligator 1985)

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

- "Psychologists recognize that a nation's leaders tend to develop theories of warfare whereby the nation's success relies heavily on the factors perceived to be the ones in which it holds the greatest advantage over its opponent. As Blainey (1973, 40) explains:

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

- "In England the prediction that the war of 1914 would be short was based heavily on the economic arguments. England was the leading financial power: accordingly, if economic collapse was to come early in the war, it would hit England's enemies first and so lead to their surrender. In contrast, German leaders predicted that the war would be short because of the decisiveness of modern military technology: in that field, Germany was the recognized master and so could expect victory. Expectations of the outcome of the war had a strong, subjective, inarticulate streak."

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

- Such explanations encompass the common phenomenon that the vast majority of people regard themselves as good drivers. Although initially it appears impossible that most are better than average, when the speedy equate good driving with speed, the cautious regard good driving as careful driving, and the skillful liken keen handling to good driving, then it is easy to see that, via the use of differing perceived appropriate standards, each plausibly regards themselves as “above average.”

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

- Bureaucratic politics can create similar biases (Allison 1999). Because the agencies reporting on military preparedness have their own agendas, their reporting tends to be biased in a manner designed to support their goals. For instance, before and during the initial phases of the FirstWorldWar, the French military adopted an offensive military doctrine grounded in élan, or an aggressive martial spirit (Snyder 1984). Such a doctrine provided the military with great freedom to structure the military to suit its goals. Although these goals presumably included national defense, the military might have other objectives, commonly including increasing its share of the budgetary pie (Allison 1999; Kier 1997; Posen 1984). Thus, even without any misperception on the part of the military, it may present biased information to civilian policy makers.
- Strategic bombing

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

Before the Seven Weeks War, both Austria and Prussia (among others) observed the devastating effect of firepower during the American Civil War. Although both sides saw the same evidence, they drew different conclusions (Luvaas 1959). The Prussians observed the devastating power of massed fire. So did the Austrians. Where they differed was in how they thought the development of the needle gun affected their relative strength. All of the European observers fit the information they gleaned from the American Civil War into their preexisting models of warfare.

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: inconsistent beliefs

- Given the lessons of the American Civil War, the Prussians felt emboldened by their widespread deployment of the needle gun. Although the Austrians also saw the power of concentrated fire, they felt that it flowed from highly disciplined and cohesive units, rather than the technological innovations of the needle gun. They believed that although the needle gun gave the individual soldier greater firepower, it undermined unit cohesion because soldiers would rapidly discharge all their ammunition and then retire to the rear (Wawro 1997). Although both arguments have intrinsic logic, the evidence of the SevenWeeksWar suggests that the improvement in firepower overwhelmed any loss in unit cohesion.
- Mickey Kantor: "people see what they want to see."

Bargaining Failure

Failures from AI: You crazy!

The idea common to these works is that even a small probability of being faced by an armed irrational foe can lead a rational country to arm to some level. In turn, this now means that either a foe who is irrational, or a foe who thinks that I might be irrational will be arming, and this then leads me to arm even more, and this feedback continues to build. Depending on the specifics of the payoffs to arming and potential conflict, it can be that the rational countries each arm to very high levels and are ready to attack first because of the fear that the other side may attack first.

Bargaining Failure

Failures: commitment problems

- Shelby Moats channels Hobbes: "I could just go and rob someone here in London-they don't have guns."
- Effectively there is nothing stopping someone from grabbing resources except fear of retaliation. Hobbes goes on to suggest that reasonable people can come to realize the inherent difficulties with anarchy and cede their rights to a Leviathan in order to live in peace. However, such social contracts do not generally appear in the international arena, and hence for an agreement to endure it has to be balanced in such a way as to be self-enforcing
- Treaty of Westphalia

Bargaining Failure

Failures: commitment problems

- Commitment not to attack: "A notable example of such a failure of appeasement due to a lack of commitment is the Munich Agreement of 1938, after which Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia despite the agreement."
- First-strike advantages: "A significant offensive advantage to war can lead war to be inevitable. As a simple illustration, imagine two evenly matched countries with an even split of resources and a cost to war. If war leads to an evenly matched outcome regardless of who attacks first or under what circumstances, then peace is self-enforcing. In contrast, if a country that strikes first gains a large advantage by doing so, and expects to gain resources with a high enough probability, then peace is destabilized. Each country would like to strike before the other, and also understands that the other also has an incentive to attack first, and so must react by expecting a war, and so war becomes inevitable."
- Offense vs defense

Bargaining Failure

Failures: commitment problems

- one country has a current arms advantage and worries that the other will catch up in the future and that the future situation will be unstable (possibly due to first-strike advantages, or some other considerations), and so wishes to attack while the balance is in their favor.
- Examples: US vs USSR in Truman, Ike
- "In summary, the pervasiveness of commitment problems comes from the lack of any external enforcement device in an international setting, and so any agreement is really only lasting if it is in the interest of all parties to continue to abide by it."

Bargaining Failure

Formal Model: physical impediments to bargaining

Crusades, MBS's ,Coase

Bargaining Failure

Agency problems

- Wag the Dog, Falklands, Von Reinhardt and "moral hazard"
- "The leader of a country might not face the same risks as the country's citizens, or it might be that the leader expects greater gains or glory from a war than the citizens."
- Hess and Orphanides

Bargaining Failure

Multilateral

- Two gang up on the other; Parliament as BOP
- Cold War the example that shows two is stable
- WWI: shifting alliances.

Bargaining Failure

Application: Triangulating Peace Model

- "The idea that incentives of aristocrats to go to war differ from that of democratic leaders is not new, and is well articulated by Kant (1795)."
- It is worth noting that the interactions between an executive's behavior and election prospects can be quite complicated. For example, going counter to the incentives to avoid conflict when facing reelection, there are also "wag the dog" sorts of situations, such as that described by Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001),"
- What makes a democracy?