

---

# The Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 2008: The Impact of Governance

By:

**Mitchell A. Seligson**

**Abby Córdova**

**Margarita Corral**

**Juan Carlos Donoso**

**Brian Faughnan**

**Daniel Montalvo**

**Diana Orcés**

**Dominique Zephyr**

**General Editor of the Series  
Mitchell A. Seligson**



This study was possible thanks to the sponsorship given by the Democracy and Government Program of the United States Agency for International Development in Ecuador (USAID/Ecuador). The

opinions in this study belong to its authors and do not necessarily reflect the points of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

July 2008



## Table of contents

List of Figures .....	iv
List of Tables .....	vii
Executive Summary .....	ix
Presentation .....	xiii
Prologue: Background to the Study .....	xiv
<i>Acknowledgements</i> .....	xxi
<b>SECTION ONE: THEORY AND COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Preface: Context of democratic development in Ecuador and data description .....</b>	<b>3</b>
Political, Economic and Social Development Context in Ecuador.....	3
Ecuador’s Data Description .....	5
<b>Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>11</b>
Theoretical framework.....	11
<i>Theory</i> .....	11
<i>Working hypothesis</i> .....	12
Conclusion .....	24
<b>SECTION TWO: GOVERNANCE.....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Chapter II. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society</b>	
<b>Participation on the Support for Stable democracy .....</b>	<b>28</b>
Theoretical framework.....	28
How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?.....	30
Measuring civil society participation .....	30
Measuring Perceptions of the Local Government and Support for Decentralization .....	31
<i>Citizen Participation in Local Organizations of the Civil Society</i> .....	31
<i>Community Participation of Ecuadorians</i> .....	31
<i>Participation of Ecuadorians in Religious Organizations</i> .....	33
<i>Participation of Ecuadorians in Parent Association Meetings</i> .....	34
<i>Participation of Ecuadorians in Improvement Committees</i> .....	36
Citizen Participation in Local Governments .....	37
Trust in Local Government.....	40
Citizen Opinion about Decentralization.....	45
<i>Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Administrative Responsibilities</i> .....	50
<i>Predictors of Support for Decentralization of the Economic Resources</i> .....	54
Impact of Citizen Participation in Local Organizations of the Civil Society on Support for Stable Democracy .....	58
Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy .....	64
Conclusion .....	66
Appendix.....	68
<b>Chapter III. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>72</b>
Theoretical framework.....	72
How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy? ....	74

Public Opinion about the Role of the State on the National Economy.....	74
Government Economic Performance .....	75
<i>Measuring perception of government economic performance</i> .....	76
Economic Situation and its Impact on Specific Support in Ecuador .....	82
Impact of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy .....	86
Measuring attitudes regarding the role of the state on the Ecuadorian economy.....	89
Conclusion .....	92
Appendix.....	93
<b>Chapter IV. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>97</b>
Theoretical framework.....	97
How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy? .....	99
How do we Measure Crime Victimization? .....	99
Analysis of the Impact of Crime in Ecuador .....	99
<i>Crime Victimization across Time</i> .....	99
<i>Perception of Personal Security through Time</i> .....	100
Who tend to feel more insecure? .....	105
Impact of Victimization by Crime and Perception of Insecurity on Support for Stable Democracy ....	109
<i>Impact of Personal Security Perception</i> .....	110
Conclusion .....	112
Appendix.....	113
<b>Chapter V. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy .....</b>	<b>116</b>
Theoretical framework.....	116
How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?.....	117
The measurement of corruption .....	117
Corruption in Ecuador in Comparative Perspective.....	120
<i>Corruption Victimization</i> .....	120
<i>Corruption Perception</i> .....	122
Corruption in Ecuador: what else do the data from the AmericasBaometer tell us?.....	124
<i>Where is Bribery more likely to be Solicited ?</i> .....	125
<i>How Frequently are bribes Solicited?</i> .....	126
<i>Who is more likely to be victimized by corruption?</i> .....	127
Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy.....	132
Conclusion .....	135
Appendix.....	137
<b>Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy .....</b>	<b>142</b>
Theoretical framework.....	142
<i>The legitimacy/tolerance equation</i> .....	142
<i>System Support</i> .....	142
<i>The relation between System Support and Tolerance</i> .....	148
<i>Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy</i> .....	151
Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions .....	154
Other Opinions about Democracy.....	161
Conclusion .....	168
Appendix.....	169
<b>Chapter VII. Justice and the rule of Law in Ecuador .....</b>	<b>170</b>
Theoretical Framework.....	170
Measuring Legitimacy of the Judicial System in Ecuador .....	171
<i>Judicial System Legitimacy Index</i> .....	174



Factors that affect Judicial System Legitimacy.....	175
Legitimacy of the Administration of Justice System and Democracy in Ecuador .....	182
Conclusions.....	184
Appendix.....	185
<b>References.....</b>	<b>188</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>196</b>
Appendix I: Technical Description of the Sample Design .....	196
Appendix II: Letter of Informed Consent (IRB).....	223
Appendix III: Questionnaires (Spanish and Quichua).....	225

## List of Figures

Figure i-1. Democracy in Ecuador and in Latin America and the Caribbean.....	3
Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Ecuador and in Latin America and the Caribbean.....	5
Figure i-3. Sample Distribution by Region.....	6
Figure i-4. Sample Distribution by gender.....	7
Figure i-5. Sample Distribution by Age.....	8
Figure i-6. Sample Distribution by Level of Education.....	9
Figure II-1. Community Participation in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	32
Figure II-2. Participation in Meetings of Religious Organizations.....	34
Figure II-3. Participation in Parental Association Meetings.....	35
Figure II-4. Participation in meetings of improvement committees.....	37
Figure II-5. Participation in Municipal Meetings.....	39
Figure II-6. Demand-making on Municipal Governments.....	40
Figure II-7. Trust in the Local Government v. Trust in the National Government.....	41
Figure II-8. Trust in the Local Government in a Comparative Perspective.....	42
Figure II-9. Correlation between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Trust in the Local Government.....	43
Figure II-10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective.....	44
Figure II-11. Decentralize or Recentralize?.....	46
Figure II-12. Support for Administrative Decentralization in Comparative Perspective.....	47
Figure II-13. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective.....	49
Figure II-14. Predictors of Support for Administrative Responsibilities.....	50
Figure II-15. Impact of Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities.....	51
Figure II-16. The Impact of Participation in Municipal Meeting son Support for Administrative Decentralization.....	52
Figure II-17. The Impact of Trust in Support for Administrative Decentralization.....	53
Figure II-18. Impact of Age on Support for Administrative Decentralization.....	54
Figure II-19. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources.....	55
Figure II-20. The Impact of Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources.....	57
Figure II-21. The Impact of Trust on Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources.....	58
Figure II-22. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right to Participate.....	59
Figure II-23. The Impact of Participation in Improvement Committees on Support for the Right to Participate.....	60
Figure II-24. Impact of Local Civic Participation in the Belief of Institutional Political Legitimacy.....	61
Figure II-25. Impact of Participation in Religious Organizations of the Belief of Legitimacy of Political Institutions.....	62
Figure II-26. Impact of Civil Local Participation on Interpersonal Trust.....	63
Figure II-27. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust.....	64
Figure II-28. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Service in the Belief of Political Legitimacy.....	65
Figure II-29. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust.....	66
Figure III-1. The Economy as the Country’s Principal Problem.....	76
Figure III-2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	77
Figure III-3. Historic Perception of the Perception of the Government Economic Performance in Ecuador.....	78
Figure III-4. Predictors of the Government Economic Performance.....	80
Figure III-5. Impact of the personal economic situation perception on the perception of the government economic performance.....	81
Figure III-6. Impact of the national economic situation perception on the perception of the government economic performance.....	81
Figure III-7. Predictors of the Incumbent President (specific support).....	83
Figure III-8. Impact of Personal Economic Situation Perception on the Approval of the Incumbent President (Specific Support).....	84

Figure III-9. Impact of National Economic Situation Perception on Approval of the Incumbent President (Specific Support).....	85
Figure III-10. Impact of perception of government economic performance on support for participation.....	86
Figure III-11. The Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Political Legitimacy.....	87
Figure III-12. Impact of Perception of Government Economic performance on Interpersonal Trust.....	88
Figure III-13. Perception on the role of the state on the Ecuadorian economy, 2008.....	89
Figure III-14. Index of Support to the Statization of the Economy, 2008.....	90
Figure III-15. Predictors of Support for Economic Statization of the State.....	91
Figure IV-1. Crime Victimization in Ecuador: 2001-2008.....	100
Figure IV-2. Perception of Insecurity in Ecuador: 2001-2008.....	101
Figure IV-3. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime.....	102
Figure IV-4. Crime victimization by Size o City.....	103
Figure IV-5. Crime Victimization by Gender.....	104
Figure IV-6. Crime Victimization by Age.....	105
Figure IV-7. Ecuadorian Citizens that tend to feel more Insecure.....	106
Figure IV-8. Perception of Insecurity by Gender.....	107
Figure IV-9. Perception of Insecurity by Size of the City.....	108
Figure IV-10. Perception of Insecurity by Region.....	109
Figure IV-11. Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust.....	110
Figure IV-12. Impact of Insecurity Perception on Interpersonal Trust.....	111
Figure V-1. Percentage of the Population that has been Victimized by Corruption at least once in the last year by Country, data for 2006 and 2008.....	121
Figure V-2. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruptpion in Ecuador by year.....	122
Figure V-3. Corruption according to Perception by Country and Year, data for 2006 and 2008.....	123
Figure V-4. Evolution of Corruption in Ecuador according to Perception.....	124
Figure V-5. Sources of Corruption Victimization in Ecuador.....	125
Figure V-6. Total Number of Ways of Corruption Victimization.....	127
Gráfico V-7. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Ecuador.....	128
Figure V-8. Percentage of victims of corruption by level of education.....	129
Figure V-9. Percentage of victims of corruption by gender.....	130
Figure V-10. Percentage of Victims of Corruption by age.....	131
Figure V-11. Percentage of victims of corruption by number of children.....	131
Figure V-12. Impact of corruption victimization on the political legitimacy of institutions.....	133
Figure V-13. Impact of perception of corruption on legitimacy of political institutions.....	134
Figure V-14. Impact of Corruption Perception on Support for the right to Participate.....	135
Figure VI-1. Average of the Components of System Support, 2008.....	144
Figure VI-2. Ecuadorian System Support Index, 2001- 2008.....	145
Figure VI-3. Ecuadorian System Support Index by region, 2001- 2008.....	146
FigureVI-4. System support Index in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	147
Figure VI-5. High system Support and High Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	151
Figure VI-6. Predictors oh High System Support and High Tolerance, 2008.....	152
Figure VI-7. High system Support and High Tolerance by region, 2008.....	153
Figure VI-8. High system Support and high Tolerance according to the Evaluations of Government Economic Performance, 2008.....	154
Figure VI-9. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions, 2008.....	155
Figure VI-10. Trust in Administrative Institutions, 2001-2008.....	157
Figure VI-11. Trust in the Judicial Power Institutions, 2001-2008.....	158
Figure VI-12. Trust in Institutions of Representation, 2001-2008.....	159
Figure VI-13. Trust in Civil Institutiouons, 2001-2008.....	161
Figure VI-14. Preference for Democracy, 2008.....	162
Figure VI-15. Preference for Democracy, 2001-2008.....	163
Figure VI-16. Preference for Democracy in Comparative Perspective 2008.....	164
Figure VI-17. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy, 2008.....	165

## The Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 2008: The Impact of Governance

Figure VI-18. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy, 2001-2008.....	166
Figure VI-19. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	167
Figure VII-1. Institutional Trust in Ecuador.....	173
Figure VII-2. Trust in Institutions of the rule of law in Ecuador, 2006-2008.....	174
Figure VII-3. Judicial System Legitimacy Index in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008.....	175
Figure VII-4. Satisfaction with the Institutions of the Rule of law in Ecuador, 2006-2008.....	176
Figure VII-5. Corruption Victimization at the Courts, Ecuador 2001-2008.....	177
Figure VII-6. Factors that affect the Legitimacy of the System of Justice in Ecuador. Results from the Linear Regression.....	178
Figure VII-7. Effect of the perception of the Family's Economic Situation in the Legitimacy of the System of Justice, Ecuador 2008.....	179
Figure VII-8. Effect of Geographic location on Attitudes toward the System of Justice, Ecuador, 2008.....	180
Figure VII-9. Relation between Corruption and Legitimacy of the System of Justice, Ecuador 2008.....	181
Figure VII-10. Effect of Approval of the President's Administration on the Legitimacy of the Institutions of the Rule of Law, Ecuador 2008.....	181
Figure VII-11. Effect of Legitimacy of the Justice System on Interpersonal Trust, Ecuador 2008.....	183



## List of Tables

Table II-1. Comparative Table of the Explanatory Factors of Support for Decentralization.....	56
Table VI-1. Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support.....	148
Table VI-2. Empirical Relation between System Support and Tolerance in Ecuador, 2008 .....	149
Table VI-3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, 2001-2008 .....	150
Table VII-1. Questions used to Measure trust in Institutions of the rule of law .....	172
Table VII-2. Questions about Citizen Satisfaction with the dealings with the Institutions of Justice in Ecuador .....	176



## Executive Summary

In the Preface to this study, the readers will find a synopsis of the context of democracy development in Ecuador and a brief description of the data in the 2008 survey round. In the context of democracy development, we analyze the political context, the economic context, current social problems, and international political problems. The political context shows the state of democratic consolidation in Ecuador and its possible impact on the presidential electoral results of 2006. The economic context shows a brief summary of some macro indicators, both current and structural, of the Ecuadorian economy. The analysis of the current social problems focuses on the impact of adverse meteorological phenomena on society. Finally, in the Preface to this research we show a brief description of the data, taking into account its sample stratification, gender weights, age cohorts, and educational level of each case.

Chapter I shows the theoretical foundation of the hypothesis in our work, which indicates that support for stable democracy can be a function of both citizen perceptions and experiences with governance. The attitudes and opinions that define support for stable democracy are embedded in a multidimensional spectrum, the outcome of a long academic debate. These attitudes and opinions forming the dependent variable in this study, are: (i) Support for the *right to participate and citizen inclusiveness*; (ii) *Political legitimacy*, or the belief that the existent political institutions are the best for the system; (iii) *Interpersonal trust*, as one of the principal elements of social capital; and (iv) Support for *democracy per se* as the best system of government (the Churchillian vision of democracy). This thesis was similarly applied in each of the 22 countries in the Americas in which the 2008 round took place.<sup>1</sup> when conducting a comparative analysis of the political cultures in these countries with regards to our dependent variables, we found that Ecuador generally places low among the countries in the Americas. The variation moves from the seventh position among the countries with the least interpersonal trust, with an average of 54.2 out of 100 points to the second place between countries with the lowest institutional political legitimacy with an average of 31 out of 100.<sup>2</sup>

In Chapter II of the present study, we explore the independent variables that may determine support for stable democracy. Specifically, Chapter II studies the impact of local government performance and civil society participation on support for stable democracy. The focus of this chapter is based on four aspects of local politics considered fundamental for democratic stability in Ecuador. First, we analyze citizen participation, both in local organizations of civil society and in local governments. Second, we study citizen's trust in municipalities and its relationship with satisfaction with municipal services. Third, we explore several of the factors that exert influence on public opinion about state political decentralization. Finally, we explore the impact of citizen participation and satisfaction with municipal services on

---

<sup>1</sup> These countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States of America, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the 2008 Americas Barometer round of surveys took place days after the installation of the National Constitutional Assembly, whose fundamental objective is the transformation of the state institutional Framework and writing a new Constitution.

the support for stable democracy. With respect to citizen participation, we found a relatively high involvement of people in local organizations of civil society in comparison with more established democracies like Canada or the United States. In contrast, civic participation in local governments in Ecuador is the lowest in the entire hemisphere. It is precisely due to this low participation in local political institutions and the resulting apathy of citizens to press for public services that may be contributing to the democratic volatility in Ecuador. In order to encourage participation in local political institutions, both governments and international cooperation agencies have bet for decentralization as a means to bring the government closer to the people. However when questioning the supposed beneficiaries of this process of state reform, we found that 51 percent of Ecuadorians firmly support financial centralization of the state and an equal distribution of administrative responsibilities between national and local governments. Last, we found a direct and significant relationship between participation and political legitimacy, interpersonal trust and the right to participate.

In Chapter III of this report we analyze the impact of citizen perception of the government's economic performance on support for stable democracy. Moreover, we explore public opinion with respect to the role that the state should have in the Ecuadorian economy. The government's economic performance is measured through the citizen perception of progress made in the fight against poverty and unemployment as explained by an idiosyncratic variable (personal economic situation perception) and a sociotropic variable (national economic situation perception). These variables show, in turn, a positive impact on specific support (also known as current approval of the president). From a comparative perspective, Ecuador's position is about average with respect to citizens' opinions about the economic performance at the continental level, with a score of 43.4 out of 100 possible points. One of the most important findings in this chapter is that the perception of economic performance has a clear and significant impact on diffuse support (political legitimacy of institutions) and a not as clear negative impact on support for citizens' right to participate. This means that the people who positively evaluate the government efforts to fight poverty and unemployment manifest higher levels of political system legitimacy but less support for citizens' right to participate in public protests, community organizations, and electoral campaigns. Finally, in terms of the role of the state in the economy, we discovered that although Ecuadorians show less support for the statization of the economy than the majority of its continental neighbors, they tend to lean toward a statist policy.

In Chapter IV of this report we explore the impact of crime on support for stable democracy. Crime in this study is measured through delinquency victimization and insecurity perception in the individual's neighborhood. According to the 2008 survey, young people, men, and denizens of large cities are more likely to be victims of crime. Equally, those who reside in larger cities, especially women, tend to feel more insecure. Crime victimization in Ecuador is among the highest in Latin America (23 percent of Ecuadorians in 2008 reported to have been victimized), and it is a factor that acutely undermines interpersonal trust). The perception of insecurity produces a similar result---with an average of 45 points in 2008). Contrary to what we expected from the literature consulted, crime victimization and insecurity perception do not show a significative correlation with any of the other dimensions of support for stable democracy in

Ecuador. Nonetheless, crime and insecurity are indeed a problem in Ecuador and could be part of the reasons for the weak democratic consolidation in the country.

The fifth chapter studies the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy. The Americas Barometer data shows that 26 percent of the population has been victimized by corruption in 2008, and that, on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the people's belief corruption is "not at all generalized" and 100 "very generalized," citizens' perception about this phenomenon is 77 points. Even though these figures continue to be above the hemisphere's average, corruption, measured through these two instruments, has significantly decreased in comparison to the data of 2006. Nevertheless, this reduction has taken place in instances different from the principal sources of corruption in Ecuador: *the judiciary* and *the municipalities*. From the total number of people who reported to have carried out a transaction in the judiciary, 21 percent affirmed to have paid a bribe, figure similar to the one registered in 2006. Likewise, 17.2 percent of the individuals who carried out a transaction in the municipality reported to have bribed a municipal officer, increasing almost in 3% this type of victimization in comparison with 2006. These high levels of corruption in Ecuador cause two significant impacts on our measures of support for stable democracy. First, corruption demeans the quality of democratic governance and thus negatively affects the peoples' convictions regarding the political legitimacy of institutions. Second, citizen awareness of the noxious effects of corruption on governance promotes support for participation in the form of public protests, communal organization, and electoral campaigns, perhaps with the objective of combatting this deep-rooted social ill.

With the purpose of deepening knowledge about political legitimacy in Ecuador, this report includes in Chapter IV a study about the general effect of both political legitimacy and political tolerance as predictors of support for stable democracy. Political legitimacy is measured through a *system support index* created from the variables of respect for political institutions, belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, perception of protection of basic rights, support for the political system and pride in living in such a system. As mentioned previously, Ecuador is among the countries where citizens report the lowest level of system support (with 44 out of 100 points, above only Paraguay and Brazil). Political tolerance, on the other hand, is measured through the level of approval of whether citizens who speak negatively about the form of government should be allowed to vote, to participate in peaceful protests, to run for public office, and give public speeches. When combining the legitimacy and tolerance variables in the analysis of these attitudes, we found that the probability of expressing both high system support and high political tolerance depends fundamentally on the perception of the government's efficacy in fighting poverty and unemployment. Trust in Ecuadorian political institutions, in general terms, increased in 2008 compared to 2006. The institutions with the highest level of perceived political legitimacy are the Catholic Church, with an average of 67 out of 100 point in 2006 and 2008; the Armed Forces increased from 52.5 in 2006 to 57 in 2008; and trust in the national government surged from 21 out of 100 in 2006 to 53 in 2008.

Finally, to focus specifically on Ecuador's judiciary, we performed in Chapter VII a brief analysis about justice and the rule of law in Ecuador. Essentially, this chapter focuses on the measurement of trust in the judicial system, in the office of the Attorney General, the National

Police, the Supreme Court of Justice and the belief that Ecuadorian courts guarantee a fair trial. Although trust in institutions of judicial power, these institutions to have the lowest perception of legitimacy in Ecuador. There is no evidence that the increment in citizen trust in institutions which uphold and enforce the rule of law institutions is due to a substantial improvement in the services they offer to the people, nor is it based on a drastic reduction in the levels of corruption in the courts, as has been suggested in previous chapters. It is worth noting, however, that the data regarding the performance of the judicial system are scarce; thus, this should not be interpreted as an exhaustive evaluation of the judicial system in Ecuador. The increment in the legitimacy of the Ecuadorian judicial institutions may be due to reasons beyond the scope of this chapter, such as a greater efficacy of the Supreme Court in the resolution of cases; the efforts of the General Attorney's office to increase transparency; or the claims that the country is undergoing a de-politization of the judicial function. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the importance of citizen trust in the judicial system goes beyond the judicial scope and affects other aspects of democracy in a positive manner, especially interpersonal trust.

## Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*, developed under the framework of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt's Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez  
*AmericasBarometer* Grant Manager at USAID

## Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson  
Centennial Professor of Political Science  
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project  
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can be used not only to help advance the democratization agenda, but also to serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007, was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for



the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose strictures on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was the use of “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the lay reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression) so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the

---

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys; we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting<sup>2</sup> in complex samples. Design effect can also increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

---

<sup>2</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.








The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pre-tested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and later sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project:

Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	 
Guatemala	
El Salvador	 
Honduras	 
Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	 
Panama	

Andean/Southern cone Group	
Colombia	
Ecuador	
Peru	<p><i><b>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</b></i></p>
Bolivia	
Paraguay	
Chile	
Uruguay	
Brazil	
Venezuela	

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	
Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

## Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt’s Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
<b>Mexico, Central America, North America Group</b>	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> <li>● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala</li> <li>● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc.</li> <li>● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Andean/Southern Cone Group</b>	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.</li> <li>● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>● Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>● Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay</li> </ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile</li> </ul>
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo</li> </ul>
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia</li> </ul>
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois</li> <li>● Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Caribbean Group</b>	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee</li> <li>● Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies</li> <li>● Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2008



**SECTION ONE:**  
**THEORY AND**  
**COMPARISONS**  
**WITH OTHER**  
**COUNTRIES IN THE**  
**REGION**



# Preface: Context of democratic development in Ecuador and data description

## Political, Economic and Social Development Context in Ecuador

### Political Context

According to the “Freedom House Index”,<sup>1</sup> Ecuador is at the lowest level of civil liberties and political rights since its return to democracy in 1979. Recent events in Ecuador show stagnation in the democratic consolidation of Ecuador’s political system. Moreover, Figure i-1 shows that since 2001, Ecuador’s democracy index is below the Latin American and Caribbean indexes, a situation only seen during the military dictatorship.<sup>2</sup>




Figure i-1. Democracy in Ecuador and in Latin America and the Caribbean

According to the 2007 “Freedom House’s” country-report, the factors of Ecuadorian political democracy scoring lowest are (1) the effectiveness of the government’s accountability;

<sup>1</sup> The “Freedom House” surveys are conducted annually to monitor the changes that take place in political rights and civil liberties around the world. Based on this monitoring, countries are classified in three categories: Free, Partially Free and Not Free. In free countries, citizens enjoy a high degree of civil and political liberties. Partially free countries are characterized by some restrictions in their political rights and civil liberties, especially in contexts of corruption, weakness of the rule of law and ethnic conflicts or civil wars. In not free countries, the political process is closely controlled and basic liberties are denied. “Freedom House” indices have been largely used to measure democracy around the world. For more information, please visit the Web page [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

<sup>2</sup> The scale displayed on the X axis corresponds to the re-codified sum of the scores of “civil liberties” and “political rights” as constructed by Freedom House. This scale ranges from 1 (least democratic) to 13 (most democratic).

(2) protection against unjustified imprisonment, state terror and torture; (3) judicial independence; and (4) the application of anti-corruptions laws.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps these factors caused Ecuadoran citizens to push for a drastic change through the 2006 presidential elections, in which economist Rafael Correa from the “Alianza Pais” movement easily won the second round against Álvaro Noboa, a well known entrepreneur and founder of the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN). Correa won the presidential election through a political platform that focused principally on two elements: the decrepitude of the current Ecuadorian political system, managed by political parties with low legitimacy, and the re-establishment of the republic through a Constitutional Assembly charged of re-drafting the twentieth Ecuador’s Political Constitution in its history as a republic.

In January, 2007, days after taking office, President Correa called a national referendum to approve the installation of this Assembly, which was supposed to be plenipotentiary in order to “transform the state’s constitutional framework and to elaborate a new Constitution.” The government’s proposal was approved by nearly 80 percent of the population in April, 2007, and it was thus that a new election took place on September 30th, this time to elect the members of the National Constitutional Assembly. This election was dominated by “Acuerdo Pais,” obtaining 73 of the 130 possible seats in the Constitutional organ.<sup>4</sup> The Assembly began its work in November, 2007 and in July the 24<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the new text of the Constitution was delivered to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Within 45 days the Electoral Tribunal called for another referendum in which new Constitution should be approved or rejected at least by half of the voters plus one.<sup>5</sup> If the new Constitution is approved in January 2009, a new general electoral period will take place.

### **Economic Context**

During the last two years, the Ecuadorian economy has decelerated compared to the first years of adopting the U.S. dollar as the national currency. The variations of Ecuador’s GDP is displayed in Figure i-2. This deceleration is principally due to the inertia in the adjustment of the national production costs with international prices, exogenous shocks and private disinvestment. In terms of costs adjustment, during the first dollarization years, Ecuador had some advantage over its international competitors due to the low production costs, principally in terms of labor. This phenomenon occurred as result of the strong devaluation of the currency at the time of the conversion. Nevertheless, the benefits obtained from the devaluations have been decreasing in the medium run due to the co-integration of the national production costs with the international prices, which resulted in high inflation in the first years of the dollarization.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>See: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=175&section=87&ccrpage=37>. Web page consulted on June 20, 2008.

<sup>4</sup> For more information regarding the electoral outcomes in 2006 and 2008, see the Webpage of the National Electoral Tribunal [www.tse.gov.ec](http://www.tse.gov.ec)

<sup>5</sup> For further information about this matter, please see the Electoral Statute at [www.asambleaconstituyente.gov.ec](http://www.asambleaconstituyente.gov.ec)

<sup>6</sup> For more information about the rates of variation of production costs and inflation, see the ECLAC’s Webpage at [www.eclac.cl](http://www.eclac.cl)




Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Ecuador and in Latin America and the Caribbean

With respect to the exogenous shocks, the world in general and Ecuador in particular are going through an unusual inflationary process due to the high price of oil and its derivatives, the world’s food production crisis, and the fall of the U.S. dollar against other currencies.

**Current Social Problems and International Politics**

President Correa’s government has also faced problems beyond the electoral field. Winter weather in 2008 deeply affected coastal provinces forcing thousands of families to evacuate due to severe flooding and its consequences. Many families were sheltered in public elementary and high schools which delayed the beginning of classes in Ecuadorian coastal areas. Several weeks of intense rains caused significant economic losses in agriculture and livestock in these areas and a negative impact at the national level as well.

**Ecuador’s Data Description**

With the purpose of exploring the opinions, attitudes and behaviors of Ecuadorians with respect to their government and political system, the Americas Barometer has been conducting a series of national representative interviews since 2001. The current 2008 round thus corresponds to the fourth consecutive biennium of interviews. These interviews cover the entire non-

institutionalized population<sup>7</sup> of voting age who reside in continental Ecuador, that is, coastal areas, the highlands, and Amazonian regions.<sup>8</sup>

To ensure that the survey included the majority of the geographic zones, we proceeded to stratify the survey by region (coast, highlands and Amazonia) and by geographic zone (urban and rural). For this purpose, we designed six strata to carry out the interviews in order to avoid the risk of having over or under-represented samples as a result of a completely randomized survey. The composition of the strata is displayed in Figure i-3, shown below:




Figure i-3. Sample Distribution by Region

In addition to the survey stratification, we determined the percentage of the population to be interviewed in each of the geographic zones displayed in Figure i-3. This information was obtained from the distribution of the population reported in the 2001 national census. However, our sample was not proportionally stratified since the size of the Amazonian region would have been insufficient for an independent analysis.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, 95 percent of the respondents

<sup>7</sup> In other words, the interviews exclude people in military barracks, hospitals, prisons, etc.

<sup>8</sup> People who live in Galapagos were excluded from the survey design due to high costs and the limited size of its population.

<sup>9</sup> For more information regarding the population proportionality by region, please see the 2006 version of this report at [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org).

were located in the urban-rural coastal areas and the highlands, thus ensuring specific confidence levels and error margins.




Figure i-4. Sample Distribution by gender

In addition to the stratification to ensure geographic representation, we weighted the samples in order to capture the demographic distribution of the population. In the case of gender, we ensured a distribution of 49 percent of men and 51 of women, as shown in the 2001 national census.<sup>10</sup> This distribution by gender is constant throughout the four biennia in our study, and is depicted in Figure i-4.

The sample distribution by age indicates that in 2008, more than 50 percent of the respondents are young adults, thus reflecting the distribution of the Ecuadorian population by age, which is mostly concentrated between 18 and 35 years of age. Figure i-5 displays the sample distribution by age cohorts. It is important to note that this distribution is not constant across time as in the case of gender. The timeframe shows that while the percentage of respondents in the 18 to 25 year range increases, the percentage of people between 36 and 45 decreases. One of the reasons for this change is the relatively high birth rate among Ecuadorians.

<sup>10</sup> This information is available at: [www.inec.gov.ec](http://www.inec.gov.ec)




Figure i-5. Sample Distribution by Age

Finally, the demographic distribution of the sample by education shows an increment in the percentage of individuals who reported higher levels of education with respect to 2001 and 2004. However, this percentage in 2008 is lower than the one found in 2006. It is worth mentioning that even though our data shows an increment in the percentage of individuals with more education, they do not show the qualitative evolution (or involution) of education in Ecuador. In other words, these data do not allow us to measure the quality of education *per se* and its impact on human capital. Results of the composition of our sample are displayed in Figure i-6.






Figure i-6. Sample Distribution by Level of Education

In an additional note and to conclude this preface, we note that the 3,000 interviews carried out during 2008 were possible thanks to the generous support from the Ecuador’s Mission of the U.S. Agency for International Development. CEDATOS (Gallup International) was in charge of the sampling direction. The research design and data analysis were carried out by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt University in the United States of America.



# Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework

### Theory

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world . How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. , studies of state breakdown and the recent work of Boix , Gerring and Acemoglu and Robinson . Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show.<sup>2</sup> Yet, generating national wealth is a major challenge in itself and is not a process that can take place over night. Can governments and international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy . Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in which specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is no substitute for country-level analysis so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasing attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems . Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

<sup>2</sup> This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

“performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*<sup>3</sup>).<sup>4</sup> Good governance may well be essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable; at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work--democracy may help produce better governance .

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House website), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries shows deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding . Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

### Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.<sup>5</sup> Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” . The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research

---

<sup>3</sup> Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

<sup>4</sup> According to the World Bank Daniel Kaufmann, "Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption," in *Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006*, ed. World Economic Forum (Washington: World Bank, 2006), 82.: “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

<sup>5</sup> We emphasize *support for* stable democracy, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly which forms of governance matter for which aspects of citizen support for stable democracy would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub-national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance. Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.<sup>7</sup> The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the

---

<sup>6</sup> Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (2005). or the direction of the causal arrows Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of the Causal Relationships," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994)..

<sup>7</sup> For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see Daniel Kaufmann, Arat Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Growth and Governance: A Reply," *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007), Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and Mechanisms," *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007), Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries," *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002), Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America," *World Development* 34, no. 2 (2006), Mitchell A. Seligson, "On the Measurement of Corruption," *APSA-CP* 13, no. 2 (2002)..

values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer, citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security . In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values . Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance .

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work :

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl , contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn<sup>8</sup>:

---

<sup>8</sup> We acknowledge that there may be others and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

### Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4)

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose. The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.<sup>9</sup> At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

---

<sup>9</sup> Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org) to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

### Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl’s classic work on democracy, the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. A recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions. In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:



- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation . In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.<sup>10</sup>

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

---

<sup>10</sup> Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7




Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

B. Support for **Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (d5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country sixth lowest in tolerance.




Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

### Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with stable democracies will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in Seligson (2006). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index<sup>11</sup> based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

- B14.** To what extent do you trust the national government?
- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B31.** To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court ?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
- B21.** To what extent do you trust the political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g., Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative was to control the scale for the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I-4 reflect the legitimacy of key political institutions, not the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, scores barely above 50 on the 0-100 scale. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies. The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

<sup>11</sup> This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.




Figure I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring of trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I.5. The average scores remain at the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S., whose administration at the time of the survey had very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings when the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

### Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust. At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption and performance of local and national governments. These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure I-6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.





**SECTION TWO:**  
**GOVERNANCE**



# Chapter II. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable democracy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For citizens who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the possible exception of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that determine in large measure the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, local governments have historically been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Daniel Montalvo, with the exception of certain parts of the theoretical framework.

with local problems . It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with government, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. Similarly, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite-centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies .

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing in the past decade to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as promoting civil society organizations at the grass roots level. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America .

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people .<sup>2</sup>

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness in the allocation of resources; it generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people; and it strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust . Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources, and stimulates local patronage . Other studies have shown both positive and negative results .What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does it influence their views on democracy ? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation is civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that active civil society existed only in advanced industrial democracies. This thinking was crystalized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba, 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies. Citizens have always played an active role in civil society, even in the dictatorships that prevailed in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations, and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil

---

<sup>2</sup> There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level: fiscal, political and administrative Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6/7 (2000), Hongbin Cai and Daniel Treisman, "State Corroding Federalism," *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (2002)..

society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy. The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work together and eventually come to trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society. It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life interact with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity. However, in recent works, it has been shown cross-nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple associations express higher levels of interpersonal trust.

## **How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?**

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions. Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

### **Measuring civil society participation**

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. These questions measure the level of community participation (CP5), participation in religious organizations (CP6), attendance at parents' meetings (CP7), and participation in improvement committees (CP8). In this study, we gathered information about citizen participation in civil society organizations through the following questions:

Now I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the respondent]							
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK		
<b>CP5.</b> Over the past year have you contributed or tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	1	2	3	4	8	CP5	
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6	
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7	
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8	

## Measuring Perceptions of the Local Government and Support for Decentralization

In this chapter, we focus on two variables to measure perceptions about local government: trust in the local government (**b32r**) and satisfaction with municipal services (**sg11r**). Regarding decentralization, we will focus in the following variables: Support for decentralization of the responsibilities of the national government (**lg12a**), and support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**). The questions used to gather perceptions of the local government and decentralization are shown below:

### Citizen Participation in Local Organizations of the Civil Society

In a detailed analysis of the factors that could explain community participation, we found not only variation between countries in the region, but also changes in time for the Ecuadorian case. Below we show both a comparative and an inter-temporal analysis of the four variables that are part of citizen participation in local civil society organizations: (1) community participation; (2) meetings of religious organizations; (3) parent’s meetings; y (4) participation in improvement committees.

### Community Participation of Ecuadorians

The empirical evidence obtained by the Americas Barometer shows that community participation of Ecuadorians is slightly above the average continental participation. As a result, these findings add to the criticism presented in Booth and Seligson (1978); Verba, et al. (1978); Seligson and Booth (1979); Almond and Verba (1980) to the conclusions put forward by

Almond and Verba (1963) in *The Civic Culture* that suggests that societies are more active in more consolidated democracies.




Figure II-1. Community Participation in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Although classified by “Freedom House” in 2008 as a “Partially Free” country, the data generated by our surveys put Ecuador in seventh place regarding community participation with



18.8 points of a total of 21 countries on the Continent<sup>3</sup> –almost above of the group of relatively more free democracies, such as the United States, Costa Rica and Uruguay-<sup>4</sup>

Figure II-1 shows the results of the answers to the question: “During the last 12 months have you contributed to the solution of a problem in your community or your neighborhood or colony? (CP5)”<sup>5</sup>. The 0 - 100 scale shown in the figure indicates the frequency with which individuals have participated in community matters, with Ecuador at 18.8. In this way, individuals who never contribute obtain a value of 0 on the scale, while those who participate at least once a week receive a value of 100.

It is interesting to note that six out of the first eleven countries in the community participation scale--including Ecuador--are precisely those classified as “Partly Free” by Freedom House in 2008.<sup>6</sup> These results suggest that a different process in the region may exist. The work advanced by Seligson and Booth, previously cited, shows that individuals whose participation is restricted at the national level of government tend to expand their participation at the community level. Consider the case of Haiti, which is located in second place on the participation scale. One might expect that due to the serious problems of democracy at the national level in this country, citizens would concentrate their energy at the communal apolitical level. Of course, there are other factors influencing this behavior that could exert influence, such as localist traditions, as in the case of Jamaica. As shown next, participation in local political institutions in Ecuador, such as the municipalities, shows a completely different pattern.

## Participation of Ecuadorians in Religious Organizations

Participation of Ecuadorians in religious organizations has shown an irregular pattern over time.<sup>7</sup> While in 2001, 52 percent of individuals participated in this kind of meetings at least once or twice a year, participation decreased in 2004 to only 47.5 percent. However, in 2006, Ecuadorian participation considerably increased to 73.2 percent, to then decrease to 62.1 percent in 2008. The time-series results can be compared in Figure II-2.

<sup>3</sup> The 2008 round of the Americas Barometer includes 22 countries; however, the question about community participation was not included in Canada due to the fact that in this country the interviews were conducted by phone. This limited the inclusion of certain questions.

<sup>4</sup> The “Freedom House” interviews are conducted annually to monitor changes in political rights and civil liberties throughout the world. Based upon this monitoring, countries are classified in three categories: Free, Partly Free and Not Free. In Free countries, citizens enjoy a high degree of civil and political liberties. Partly free countries are characterized by some restrictions in their political rights and civil liberties, especially in contexts of corruption, weakness of the rule of law, and ethnic conflicts or civil wars. In countries not free, the political process is closely controlled and Basic liberties are denied. The “Freedom House” indexes have been largely used to measure democracy in the world. For more information, visit: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

<sup>5</sup> Question CP5 was only asked in 2008 in Ecuador, for this reason, we do not show the inter-temporal variation of this variable.

<sup>6</sup> Countries classified as “Partly Free” in 2008 by Freedom House in the Americas are Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay.

<sup>7</sup> Even though there is a slight variation in the way the question was asked in 2001 and 2004 with respect to 2006 and 2008, we have decided to maintain the comparison due to the similarity of the questions. For more information, see the 2001, 2004 and 2006 questionnaires in [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org).




Figure II-2. Participation in Meetings of Religious Organizations

Figure II-2 also shows the position of participation of Ecuadorians in meetings of religious organizations in comparative perspective. In 2008, Ecuador is located among the seven countries with the highest level of participation in religious organizations. To determine the composition of the Ecuadorian population according to their beliefs, our surveys asked: What is your religion? 83.6 percent of the Ecuadorians reported being Catholics; 0.8 percent reported being Protestants, and 10.0 percent Evangelical or Pentecostal.<sup>8</sup> The percentage of citizens who reported not belonging to any religion is 5.4 percent. Finally, 0.2 percent of the individuals interviewed reported belonging to non-Christian religions.<sup>9</sup>

### Participation of Ecuadorians in Parent Association Meetings

The third component in our measure of civil participation is referred to attendance to parents' association meetings. Participation in this type of local organization has remained stable over time, contrasting in this way with the irregularity of participation in religious organizations previously discussed. The error bars in the time-series shown in Figure II-3 and corrected for the

<sup>8</sup> The “Evangelic or Pentecostal” categories involve the Mormon and Jehovah Witness denominations.

<sup>9</sup> Among non-Christian religions, we find Judaism, Islam, etc.

design effects demonstrate a 95 percent confidence interval that none of the changes is statistically significant.<sup>10</sup>

The average that shows that in 2008, 49.4 percent of the Ecuadorian population participate at least one or two times a year in meetings of parental associations varies considerably when we separate the population with children from those without. In the first group, 58.2 percent of the individuals with children reported participating at least once or twice a year in parental meetings. Interestingly, the group of people who reported not having children also participate in parental meetings (19.3 percent in 2008). This may be due to various factors, such as helping with the representation of children to the extended family or friends due to factors such as work, migration, or physical disability.




Figure II-3. Participation in Parental Association Meetings

In comparative perspective, Ecuadorians are close to the top of the list of participation in parental association meetings in the Americas. These findings are consistent with those of the community participation and participation in religious organizations meetings because those

<sup>10</sup> To verify whether the differences in the percentages among the percentages of participation in parental meetings are not statistically significant, we computed several confidence intervals for the means, adjusting the standard errors to the design effects. For the case of this variable, the confidence intervals cross each other over four years; thus, we conclude that the differences in the time-series are not statistically significant, with a 95 percent confidence level.

countries with the highest participation levels are precisely those that have been classified as “Partly Free” by Freedom House in 2008.<sup>11</sup> This does not occur, for example, with countries like Canada or the United States, which despite being among the most consolidated democracies in the Americas, show in turn the lowest level of participation in parental meetings in 2008. The work advanced by Robert Putnam regarding the decrease of social capital in the United States is most relevant to analyze these results. However, it is also shown that there are several myths about politics and democratization in Latin America, and the high levels of civic participation in the region, compared with those of North America, call into question the validity of those myths.

### **Participation of Ecuadorians in Improvement Committees**

The fourth and last component of our scale of local civil participation corresponds to participation in improvement committees. Similar to participation in parental meetings, but in contrast to participation in religious participations, Ecuadorian participation in improvement organizations has remained relatively stable over time. The data analysis shows a statistically significant difference only between 2001 and 2008. This means that we can conclude with a 95 percent level of confidence that citizen participation in these committees decreased in 2008 compared to 2001.<sup>12</sup> This significant drop of 21.3 percent in participation leads us to question whether this is due to the fact that individuals perceive an improvement in the public provision of goods, or if, on the contrary, this is due to reasons beyond this perception. This analysis will be further developed in the section about trust in the local government later in this chapter.

In comparative terms, 26.6 percent of Ecuadorians participated in improvement committees, locating the country below the regional average of 29.6 percent. Although the majority of countries with higher levels of participation in this type of organizations are included in the “Partly Free” category, the Canadian case in this variable is an exception. Canada reported one of the lowest levels of participation in parental meetings (above only the United States), in the case of participation in improvement committees, Canada reports the highest levels of participation on the entire continent. These results are depicted in Figure II-4.

In this section, we have described the dynamics of participation of Ecuadorians in local organizations of civil society in a historic and comparative manner in the cases where the information was available. Specifically, we found that participation among Ecuadorians in religious organizations has both increased and decreased during the four biennia available in this study. By contrast, participation in parental organization meetings has remained stable over time. In the case of citizen participation in improvement meetings, there has been a considerable decrease in participation among Ecuadorians in 2008 with respect to 2001.

---

<sup>11</sup> Possible reasons of this high civil participation at the local level are explained in the conclusion of this chapter.

<sup>12</sup> The statistical analysis adjusted for the design effects suggests that the only difference statistically significant occurs when we compare the means of 2001 and 2008, at the .05 level.




Figure II-4. Participation in meetings of improvement committees

Even though in Ecuador’s case citizen participation in local organizations of civil society has been relatively high in 2008 with respect to the rest of countries in the region, it is worth asking if this trend is the same in participation in local government. In the next section we analyze citizen participation in municipal meetings and demand-making on local governments.

## Citizen Participation in Local Governments

Data obtained by the Americas Barometer show that the percentage of Ecuadorians who participate in municipal meetings is much lower than the percentage who participate in organizations of the civil society. Thus, when we asked “Have you participated in an open municipal meeting during the last 12 months?” 94.3 percent of Ecuadorians in 2008 responded that they had not. Figure II-5 shows the decreasing trend in participation of Ecuadorians in municipal meetings throughout time.

In the last seven years, local government participation decreased approximately 47 percent. Although the percentage in 2008 shows a slight increment in municipal participation with respect to 2006, the difference between these two years is not statistically significant.<sup>13</sup> What are the factors that have contributed to this dramatic drop in participation in the local

<sup>13</sup> When comparing the confidence intervals for the 2006 and 2008 data, we found that they cross each other, thus we can conclude with 95 percent certainty that the difference is not statistically significant.

government? One could expect that the political turbulence in this new millennium has generated citizen discontent with public affairs. As will be described, despite the relatively high levels of trust in local governments, participation of Ecuadorians in municipal meetings and demand-making on municipal governments has decreased in the last years.

Figure II-5 shows not only the decline in the levels of participation in the local government, but also the low levels of participation among Ecuadorians in comparison to other individuals in the Americas. As a result, Ecuador is among the countries with the lowest participation in local governments, above only Panama. However, if we take into account the confidence intervals of the levels of participation, we find that the difference of participation between Panama and Ecuador is not statistically significant. Hence, these two countries share the last place in the levels of participation in the local government in the Americas.

It is worth noting, however, that the diverse Constitutional designs may include mechanisms that incentivize or disincentivize citizen participation in the local governments. In other words, if the institutional structure of the local government restricts citizen participation in municipal meetings in certain countries, and, on the other hand, this type of participation is wide-open in other countries, the conclusions we reach may be forced. Additionally, decentralization levels may also explain the degree of citizen participation in municipal meetings.<sup>14</sup> This is why we need to be especially careful in analyzing the comparisons among local governments.

An additional way to measure citizen participation corresponds to the level of demand-making on municipal governments. As mentioned before, this variable should also be carefully compared among countries because the percentages of individuals who make demands on the municipalities are related to the levels of state decentralization.

---

<sup>14</sup> Decentralization levels are related to institutional structures that go beyond the scope of this study, so we do not analyze them here. For more information regarding the levels of decentralization, see: Montalvo (2008): *Decentralize or Centralize Challenges for Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean*, in *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the Americas Barometer 2006 – 2007*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson.




Figure II-5. Participation in Municipal Meetings

Results depicted in Figure II-6 show that demand-making on the local government in Ecuador decreased approximately a 45 percent between 2001 and 2008. To obtain these results we asked: “Have you sought help or made a request to a municipal official in the last 12 months?” There has been a general decreasing trend during the four biennia that this question has been asked.

When comparing countries, we found that Ecuador is the sixth nation with the lowest percentage of demand-making on local governments. Nevertheless, when examining the confidence intervals, the difference between the sixth and the last is not statistically significant, indicating that Ecuador shares the last place with the five other countries. These results are also depicted in Figure II-6




Figure II-6. Demand-making on Municipal Governments

In this section we have analyzed three negative facts of citizen participation in local governments. First, citizen participation in municipal meetings and citizen demand-making on municipal governments is very low. Second, in addition to being low, citizen participation has decreased in the last seven years. Finally, Ecuador is located, in comparative terms, in the lowest places of municipal participation in the Americas.

Despite low Ecuadorian participation in local governments, the data from the Americas Barometer show a trust level close to the regional average and high levels of satisfaction with municipal services. The next section analyzes in detail the Ecuadorian public opinion about their local governments.

## Trust in Local Government

Results from the LAPOP surveys in Ecuador show that trust in local governments has remained historically stable. This is why, when we make comparisons in the time-series, we conclude that the differences in the levels of trust in the four biennia in this study are not statistically significant.<sup>15</sup> When we asked: “To what extent do you trust your municipal government?” and then transformed the answers to a scale from 0 to 100, the average trust of Ecuadorian in their local governments between 2001 and 2008 was 48.8 points.

<sup>15</sup>The confidence interval for this analysis is 95 percent, adjusted for the design effects.






Figure II-7. Trust in the Local Government v. Trust in the National Government

The comparison in the levels of trust in the local government versus the national government show interesting contrasts. Unlike the local government, the levels of trust in the national government show a relatively high variation over time. While the values for 2001 and 2004 did not vary significantly, in 2006 trust in the national government declined to approximately 30 percent, or nearly one half of the trust in local governments. Notwithstanding, in 2008, trust in national governments surged, placing it above the traditionally high trust in the local government.<sup>16</sup> Results of the degrees of trust in the two levels of government studied in this section are depicted in Figure II-7. As discussed in several chapters in this report, public opinion regarding several instances of the national government has improved considerably since the inauguration of the current government administration.

<sup>16</sup> The differences between local and national governments is statistically significant at 5 percent. This means that on average, Ecuadorians trust their national government slightly more than their municipalities.




Figure II-8. Trust in the Local Government in a Comparative Perspective

From a comparative perspective, trust in local governments in Ecuador is below the 50.0 point regional mean in 2008--similar to Costa Rica and the United States. Figure II-8 shows that the Dominican Republic is the country in the region located at the top of the trust scale, while Haiti is located at the bottom. The variation in the levels of trust between the local governments in the Americas and between the national and local governments calls into question the possible factors influencing public opinion. The analysis of political trust is imperative because as mentioned in the theoretical section in this chapter, it is related to the support for stable democracy.




Figure II-9. Correlation between Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Trust in the Local Government

Some scholars argue that trust in institutions is related perceptions of their performance. This is why in democratic systems, as well as in democratizing systems, individuals who are dissatisfied with past and present government performances express little institutional trust. Should it be necessary, then, to keep individuals satisfied with their institutions to increase the levels of trust necessary to consolidate a stable democracy? To verify this hypothesis we asked: “Would you say that municipal services are: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?” After converting the variable to a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 means “very bad” and 100 means “very good,” we conducted a statistical correlation with our “trust in government” variable, using our time-series.

This statistical exploration shows that in Ecuador exists a correlation between satisfaction with municipal services and trust in the local government. This correlation is positive in the four biennia in this study; that is, when individual satisfaction with the municipal services increases, trust in this level of government increases as well. Results are depicted in Figure II-9.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> To be able to determine with more certainty whether or not this correlation is spurious, it is necessary to fit a statistical regression controlling for the possible effects on other variables. In the appendix to this chapter we show several regressions using “satisfaction with municipal services” as the independent variable. Results are shown later in this chapter.




Figure II-10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective

Where is Ecuador with respect to the rest of the countries in the region, in terms of satisfaction with municipal services? Figure II-10 shows that there is a rather favorable perception among Ecuadorians regarding the services supplied by the local governments, in comparison to the rest of the countries in the Americas. Specifically, Ecuador is in third place regarding satisfaction, below only Brazil and the Dominican Republic. It is worth noting that, as previously discussed; the institutional structure of the local governments in each country can influence the public opinion with respect to the local government performance. For this reason one could expect variations in satisfaction with municipal services not only across countries, but also within them.

In Ecuador, for instance, one could expect that larger municipalities with a greater capacity to generate their own resources through fiscal revenues would be capable of providing more and better services than small municipalities, which are largely financed by the state's general budget. However, self-management capacity and satisfaction with local services are not necessarily positively correlated. Paying more taxes, having greater access to information and having a higher level of education,<sup>18</sup> may make individuals more aware of municipal responsibilities and their own rights as citizens. In other words, satisfaction with municipal services may be less distorted at the urban level and than the rural level.

Citizen satisfaction with local services and trust in municipalities play a preponderant role in the attitudes towards state decentralization. In another study of the Americas Barometer we found that a positive perception of provision of municipal services increases the probability of citizens support for state decentralization.<sup>19</sup> In the next section we study the decentralization process in Ecuador from the public opinion perspective.

## Citizen Opinion about Decentralization

What is decentralization? This term has been largely debated in diverse academic areas and by politicians world-wide. Even though there is no unique definition regarding this process of state reform, there is a general consensus regarding to some of the key components of this dynamic. In this study we define state decentralization as the transfer of political, administrative and fiscal power from national instances to intermediate and local instances of government. This definition of course is not perfect, but from the empirical view we decided to use a minimal measurable definition.<sup>20</sup>

If, on the other hand, the transfer occurs from the local and intermediate levels of government to the national government, we refer to this as state recentralization. In the four biennia of this study we asked: "In your opinion, should the municipality be given more responsibilities and money or should the national government have more responsibilities and provide more services? (1) More to the municipal government (2) The national government should have more responsibilities and provide services (3) Don't change anything [Don't read] (4) More to the municipality if it provides better service [Don't read] (8) Doesn't know." After recoding the answers, we gave a 100 value to those who responded "more to the municipal government," 0 to those who responded "More to the national government," and a 'missing' value to answers 3 and 4.<sup>21</sup> The answer to these questions are depicted in Figure II-11.

<sup>18</sup> The data from the surveys shows that the number of years approved in schools is 11 in urban areas and 9 in rural areas.

<sup>19</sup> Montalvo, Daniel (2008) "¿Descentralizar o centralizar? Desafíos para la reforma estatal y la democracia en América Latina y el Caribe " in *Desafíos para la democracia en Latinoamérica y el Caribe: evidencia desde el Barómetro de la Américas 2006 – 2007* edited by Mitchell A. Seligson."

<sup>20</sup> Several components remain out of this definition, such as delegation, devolution and deconcentration. These subjects will be not analyzed here because they go beyond the scope of this study.

<sup>21</sup> This decision was made because these two alternatives are not presented to the respondent and as a result its value does not surpass the 12 percent in the four rounds of this study.




Figure II-11. Decentralize or Recentralize?

Citizen perception of the process of reform of the state discussed in this chapter shows at least two important findings. First, public opinion leaned toward decentralization during 2001 and 2004; however, opinions were approximately half and half during 2006 and 2008.<sup>22</sup> Second, despite the large increase in trust in the national government in 2008 with respect to 2006, indicators show that in statistical terms, support for recentralization did not increase with respect to 2006.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> In 2001 and 2004, the percentage of individuals who supported decentralization was 58.3 and 59.0 respectively. Conversely, in 2006 and 2008, the same support was 50.8 and 49.3 percent respectively.

<sup>23</sup> The confidence intervals for the means of 50.8 and 49.3 percent cross each other, thus we conclude that the difference is not significant at the .05 level.




Figure II-12. Support for Administrative Decentralization in Comparative Perspective

Before the 2008 round, however, we decided to adjust the question above and thus subdivided it in two questions to determine the level of citizen support for decentralization of administrative responsibilities and of economic resources.<sup>24</sup> The introduction of these two questions, which were devised to replace the previous one, was implemented with two purposes: a theoretical purpose and an empirical purpose. Theoretically, we decided to differentiate between the fiscal and administrative components of decentralization instead of having them in the same item. As will be seen later in this chapter, there is a significant difference between public opinion concerning administrative and fiscal decentralization. Empirically, the question

<sup>24</sup> The new questions were placed much before than the previous question, in order to avoid any potential bias due to the placement of the items.

was wordy and difficult to interpret. Moreover, the last two categories, which are not supposed to be read to interviewees, cause difficulties in the data analysis.

After asking: “Taking into account the public resources available in this country, who should assume more responsibilities?,” we created a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means “much more to the national government,” 25 means “something more to the national government,” 50 means “the same amount to the national government and the municipality,” 75 means “somewhat more to the municipality,” and 100 means “much more to the municipality.” In the specific case of this question, the average for Ecuadorians is 47.8 points out of 100, suggesting that they are inclined to support the idea that the national government should administer more responsibilities. Figure II-12 shows that support among Ecuadorians in 2008 to administrative decentralization is below the regional average (49.1 points), that is, the same amount for the national government and the municipality.

In percentage terms, 35.1 percent of Ecuadorians support administrative decentralization, 30.9 percent believe both levels of government should receive the same amount of responsibilities, while 34.0 percent support administrative decentralization.<sup>25</sup> As shown, this value is similar to the previous question, confirming in this way the perceptions of trust in the national government.

Support for state recentralization is more evident when we insert financial elements to this equation. Results to the question: “And taking into account the existing economic resources in the country: Who should administer more money?” show that, using the same scale used in the previous question, Ecuadorians place themselves in 40.3 points in the 0 to 100 scale; that is, they are more inclined toward the recentralization of resources than toward decentralizing them. Figure II-13 shows that Ecuador is the third country in the region in which citizens show more support for fiscal recentralization.<sup>26</sup>

In percentage terms, 44.36 percent of Ecuadorians support recentralization of economic resources; 30.39 believe that both the national government and the municipality should administer the same amount of money; only 25.25 percent support fiscal decentralization.

As previously mentioned, there is a strong difference between public opinion regarding administrative decentralization and fiscal decentralization. Even though Ecuadorians perceive that the administration of public services should be shared between the national government and the municipality, they believe that the national government should manage fiscal resources. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence that shows that in Ecuador, citizens express more trust in the national than the municipal governments.

---

<sup>25</sup> These percentages were obtained from the proportions corrected for design effects.

<sup>26</sup> It is worth noting that the question specifies decentralization of the “existent resources,” in this way we ensured that the respondent thinks of decentralization as a zero-sum game.






Figure II-13. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective

In order to establish with higher certainty some of the factors that determine support for decentralization, we fitted two multivariate regressions: the first contains predictors of support for decentralization of administrative responsibilities, and the second one contains predictors of support for fiscal decentralization. In both cases, we used as theoretical independent variables satisfaction with local services, participation in municipal meetings and citizen trust in both the national and local governments. Additionally, we included control variables, such as the level of education, sex, age, Wealth--measured as capital goods ownership--size of city, and dummy variables to control fixed effects.

## Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Administrative Responsibilities




Figure II-14. Predictors of Support for Administrative Responsibilities

Figure II-14 shows results of the first multivariate regression.<sup>27</sup> The horizontal error bar that does not cross the vertical line 0.0, shows that the relation between the independent variable that corresponds to that bar and the dependent variable--in this case support for decentralization of administrative responsibilities--is significant at the .05 level. If the horizontal error bar is to the left of the vertical bar 0.0 and does not intersect it, this means that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is negative. On the other hand, if the horizontal bar is at the right of the 0.0 vertical bar and does not cross the vertical line, this means that the relationship between variables is positive. The standardized coefficients of the multivariate regression are found in Appendix II-1.

Figure II-14 also shows that the coefficients of the variables satisfaction with local governments, participation in municipal meetings, trust in the municipal government, trust in the national government and age are not statistically significant. Regarding services provided by the municipality, we found that as participation decreases, support for decentralization decreases as well. The relationship between these two variables is depicted in Figure II-15. The Figure shows

<sup>27</sup> With the purpose of facilitating comparability between the predictive power of these variables, we standardize the coefficients of the variables.

that individuals who perceive that the local services are “very good” support administrative decentralization, while those who perceive that these services are only “good” tend to be impartial between administrative recentralization and decentralization. However, individuals who believe that the services are “neither good nor bad,” “bad,” or “very bad” express more support for administrative recentralization.




Figure II-15. Impact of Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities

The next statistically significant relation between variables is participation in municipal meetings. In this case, citizens who participated at least once or twice in the last twelve months in an open municipal meeting are inclined to favor decentralization of responsibilities. In contrast, those who have not participated in these meetings--the majority--prefer recentralization. These results are depicted in Figure II-16.




Figure II-16. The Impact of Participation in Municipal Meeting on Support for Administrative Decentralization

As previously described, trust is a fundamental factor in the processes of state reform. Results of our multivariate regression show the interrelation between trust and decentralization. Next, we analyzed two types of trust: (1) trust in the municipality, and (2) trust in the national government. When trust in municipalities increases, support for administrative decentralization increases as well. As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, trust in local government is closely linked to satisfaction with municipal services; thus, support for decentralization is linked to perception of municipal institutional performance. When trust in the national government increases, citizen support turns to administrative recentralization. An interesting difference that we found between these two types of confidence is that for support for decentralization to exist, trust in the municipality should be greater than 70 points. Conversely, for support for administrative recentralization to exist, trust in the national government should be greater than only 40 points. The results here discussed are depicted in Figure II-17.




Figure II-17. The Impact of Trust in Support for Administrative Decentralization

Finally, the only control variable that shows a statistically significant relationship with respect to support for administrative recentralization is age. Younger individuals express more support for administrative recentralization. This may be due to the fact that younger people are more attracted to the national level of government. This is an important phenomenon that should be taken in consideration by decentralization advocates because it may be expected that it is precisely young people who may become actors in state reforms in the present or in the future. Figure II-18 shows results of this relationship. In contrast, it can be inferred from the results shown here that older citizens prefer a shared responsibility between the national government and the municipality.

Once we have determined some of the factors that affect support for administrative decentralization, we proceed to explain those factors that explain support for fiscal decentralization.




Figure II-18. Impact of Age on Support for Administrative Decentralization

## Predictors of Support for Decentralization of the Economic Resources

In this section we show the results of the second multivariate regression that also includes standardized coefficients. It is worth noting that the variable of support for fiscal decentralization is measured with a proxy of decentralization of economic resources. Due to the fact that public municipal funds are derived from different sources, among them tax revenues and government transfers, we have decided to increase the financial spectrum to try to incorporate all of the economic resources available in the countries. Through this practice we intend to insert in the academic and political debate the necessary fundamentals to theoretically enlarge the economic component of decentralization because we believe that restricting it to the fiscal component limits the diversity of sources of revenue for municipal budgets.

When analyzing some of the factors that explain support for decentralization of economic resources, we found that the coefficients of the variables satisfaction with local services, trust in the municipal government and trust in the national government are statistically significant. Figure II-19 shows the results of the multivariate regression and the standardized coefficients are depicted the Appendix II-2. Similarly to the first regression, the horizontal bars that do not cross the vertical 0.0 line indicate a statistically significant relationship at the .05 level, while those that cross each other are not statistically significant.




Figure II-19. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

As seen in Figure II-19, there are several similarities between the explanatory factors of support for administrative and fiscal decentralization. Table II-1 shows a comparison of the explanatory factors of support for decentralization.

Table II-1. Comparative Table of the Explanatory Factors of Support for Decentralization

Variable	Administrative Responsibilities	Economic Resources
Satisfaction with local services	<i>Decentralization</i>	<i>Decentralization</i>
Participated in a municipal meeting	<i>Decentralization</i>	N.S
Trust in municipality	<i>Decentralization</i>	<i>Decentralizacion</i>
Trust in national government	<i>Recentralization</i>	<i>Recentralization</i>
Education	N.S.*	N.S
Female	N.S	N.S
Age	<i>Decentralization</i>	N.S
Wealth	N.S	N.S.
Size of City	N.S	N.S
Sierra	N.S	N.S
Cost	N.S	N.S
Constant	N.S	N.S
R-square	0.031	0.055
N. of cases	2716	2699

\* N.S. = Relación no significativa

It is worth noting that the only differences between the predictors of these two regressions are the lack of significance of the variables “participation in municipal meetings” and “age” in support for fiscal decentralization and the explanatory power of “trust in the national government” for the case of decentralization. The other significant factors have a similar correlation with the two components of decentralization studied in this chapter. In other words, people who have participated in a municipal meeting support administrative decentralization, while there is no statistical relationship of these people with respect to fiscal decentralization. Similarly, older people support administrative decentralization, while there is no statistical relationship between age and support for fiscal decentralization.






Figure II-20. The Impact of Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

Specifically regarding the dependent variable “Support for decentralization of the economic resources” we found that when satisfaction with municipal services increases, support for this component of decentralization grows. The relationship between these two variables is depicted in Figure II-20. The Figure also shows that individuals who perceive that local services are “very good” support decentralization of economic resources, while those who perceive that these services are “good,” “neither good nor bad,” “bad,” or “very bad,” express more support for fiscal recentralization. In this way we confirm that, with respect to decentralization of economic resources, satisfaction with municipal services has to be very high for Ecuadorians to support this type of decentralization.

Just as the case of support for administrative decentralization, trust in the municipality and trust in the national government show a statistically significant relationship with support for decentralization of economic resources. As trust in the municipality increases, support for recentralization of economic resources decreases. With regard to the national government, as trust increases support for recentralization increases as well.

An important finding in these two types of trust is that the spectrum of their variation is always located below 50 points on the scale of support for decentralization. This means that no matter how much Ecuadorians trust their municipal or national governments, they will always prefer that the latter receive more economic resources. Figure II-21 shows these results.




Figure II-21. The Impact of Trust on Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

So far we have analyzed citizen participation in local organizations of civil society, participation of individuals in local governments, the levels of trust in local governments and satisfaction with municipal services, as well as citizen support to administrative and financial decentralization of the state. But what influence, if any, do these factors have on support for stable democracy? The two final sections in this chapter study the impacts of the evaluations of the local government on support for stable democracy.

## Impact of Citizen Participation in Local Organizations of the Civil Society on Support for Stable Democracy

Based on the academic debate concerning citizen participation, in the theoretical section of this chapter we asked if participation in civil society organizations play any role in stable democracy. If Putnam (1993) and Paxton (2007) are right, we expect that local civic participation to be positively correlated with interpersonal trust. Moreover, we could expect that those who participate would be more willing to support the right to opposition and political tolerance. Lastly, based on the works of Seligson, Cordova and Macias (1995); Cordova and Seligson

(2001); and Booth and Seligson (forthcoming) we could expect that citizen participation extends institutional legitimacy and support for the idea of democracy.

In order to empirically verify whether these theses are related to the Ecuadorian reality, we conducted several multivariate regressions to determine the following phenomena: (1) The impact of local civic participation on support for the idea of democracy per se; (2) The impact of local civic participation in support for the right of opposition; (3) The impact of local civic participation on the belief of political legitimacy; (4) The impact of local civic participation on political tolerance; (5) The impact of local civic participation on interpersonal trust.




Figure II-22. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right to Participate

Each of these five regressions has three out of four theoretical variables of civil participation--participation in religious organizations, participation in parents' meetings, and participation in improvement committees--<sup>28</sup> and socio-economic demographic and political control variables. From the five regressions, three include at least one significant theoretically variable. These regressions are depicted on Appendix II-3.

The first multivariate regression that is composed of a significant variable of civil participation is the impact of local civic participation on support for the right of participation.

<sup>28</sup> Due to the fact that the variables "community participation" and "participation in improvement committees" show a relatively high correlation (0.45), we decided to exclude the former from our regressions in order to avoid multicollinearity.

Figure II-22 shows that of the three theoretical variables of community participation, only attendance to improvement meetings is statistically significant. This result is consistent with the one that Amber and Seligson found in Central America. These authors conclude that participation in local development committees has the most important impact on democratic values.

The direction of the relationship between variables is positive, suggesting that as participation in improvement meetings increases, support for the right to participate increases as well. This relationship is theoretically and empirically fundamental in first instance, corroborating to some extent the hypothesis that when individuals participate in this type of activity, their interaction helps them to increase their levels of acceptance of a system type with a wide political participation. Figure II-23 shows that people who participate once or twice a year in improvement committees are much more supportive of the right to participate than those who never participate.




Figure II-23. The Impact of Participation in Improvement Committees on Support for the Right to Participate

The above figure also suggests that the difference between supporters of the right to who participate once or twice a year and those who participate once or twice a month is minimal. This may indicate that if we want to promote the right to opposition through citizen participation, encouraging individuals to participate once or twice a year may be sufficient.

The next regression shows a statistically significant relationship is the impact of local civic participation on the belief of political legitimacy. In this case, the theoretical variable with explanatory power is participation in religious meetings. Results from the regression are depicted in the Appendix II-3. This finding corroborates the conclusions presented in the work of Seligson, Cordova and Macias (1995); Cordova and Seligson (2001); and Booth and Seligson (forthcoming); who suggest that citizen participation may extend institutional legitimacy.<sup>29</sup> Statistically significant levels are depicted in Figure II-24.




Figure II-24. Impact of Local Civic Participation in the Belief of Institutional Political Legitimacy

As depicted in Figure II-24, the relationship between participation in religious organizations and the belief on institutional political legitimacy is positive. This means that as participation in these types of organizations increases, political legitimacy increases as well. However, not all levels of participation in religious organizations have the same impact on the belief in state political institutions. As a result, those who do not participate in religious services in Ecuador express less belief in political legitimacy relative to those who do participate.

<sup>29</sup> The variables in the institutional political legitimacy index are: (1) trust in the national government; (2) trust in the judicial system; (3) trust in the Supreme Court of Justice; (4) trust in the congress (when it is in session?); and (5) trust in political parties. For more information, see chapter I in this report.

There is also variation among people who participate in meetings of religious organizations. Those who participate once or twice a year express a higher belief in institutional legitimacy followed by people who participate once or twice a month, and then by those who participate once a week.<sup>30</sup> The impact of participation in religious meetings on the belief of the legitimacy state political institutions is depicted in Figure II-25.




Figure II-25. Impact of Participation in Religious Organizations of the Belief of Legitimacy of Political Institutions

Lastly, results of the regression concerning the impact of local civic participation on interpersonal trust shows two relationships between statistically significant variables: (1) participation in religious organizations; (2) participation in improvement meetings. In both cases, the direction of the relationship is positive; that is, when citizen participation in organizations of the civil society increases, interpersonal trust increases as well.

These important findings suggest that the conclusions reached by Robert Putnam in Italy (1993) are also applicable in Ecuador. The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society organizations learn to work together, and eventually, to trust each other. Conversely, these

<sup>30</sup> In 2008, 37.9 percent of the individuals reported not participating in religious organizations, 10.9 percent reported participating once or twice a year, 21.2 participate once or twice a month, and finally, 30 percent participate at least once a week. These results are corrected for design effects.

results also appear to contradict, at least in Ecuador, the theory of Armony (2004) who suggests that the interaction among citizens may generate increasing unfriendliness.

Results of the regression of the impact of local civil participation on interpersonal trust are depicted in the Appendix II-3. Here, the significance of the variables “participation in religious organization meetings and participation in improvement meetings, are depicted in Figure II-26.




Figure II-26. Impact of Civil Local Participation on Interpersonal Trust

Both theoretical variables of civil participation, which show a statistically significant relationship with interpersonal trust, show a similar trend in the impact they produce. However, participation in religious organizations shows one peculiarity: people who report participating once or twice a year in meetings of this type of organization, show lower interpersonal trust than those who never participate. Figure II-27 shows that people who participate in improvement meetings once or twice a year, have a higher trust than those who do not participate. The marginal chance is even greater among people who report participating in improvement committees once or twice a month.




Figure II-27. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust

In this section we have shown that, just as several scholars suggest in citizen participation discussions, people who participate in religious organizations and improvement committees tend to show a greater level of approval of the right to participate. Moreover, citizen participation increases the belief in the political legitimacy of the state institutions and interpersonal trust.

On the other hand, we did not find that participation in parent organizations have any impact on the factors that we believe stimulate stable democracy. Neither did we find in Ecuador a relationship between our variables of civic participation in local organizations and support for the idea of democracy per se. Finally, community participation and political tolerance variables seem not to be related either. In the last section of this chapter we analyze whether the variables of stable democracy are related with satisfaction with local services.

## Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy

Like community participation, satisfaction with local services has been found to be a key component in the consolidation of a stable democracy. Several previous investigations conducted by the AmericasBarometer have demonstrated that satisfaction with local governments increases



both institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust (Seligson 1999b). To empirically verify these assertions, we conducted five regressions to estimate the impact of satisfaction with municipal services on support for the idea of democracy per se, support for the right to participate, the belief in political legitimacy, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust. Results from these five regressions are depicted in the Appendix II-4.<sup>31</sup>




Figure II-28. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Service in the Belief of Political Legitimacy

With regard to the impact of satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy, we found that our theoretical variable is significant in the regressions of political legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust. This corroborates the studies conducted by Seligson in this sense. As we show in other studies of the AmericasBarometer, as satisfaction with municipal services increases, the political legitimacy of institutions also increases. These results are illustrated in Figure II-28.

Equally, satisfaction with municipal services is positively correlated with interpersonal trust. This is, as satisfaction with municipal performance increases, trust among individuals tends to be higher as well. The relationship between these two variables is depicted in Figure II-29.

<sup>31</sup> The control variables used in these regressions are: president’s work approval, interest in politics, educational level, sex, age, age squared, wealth measured by capital goods ownership and region.




Figure II-29. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we focused on four aspects of local politics that we consider fundamental for stable democracy in Ecuador. First, we analyzed citizen participation, both in civil society local organizations and in local governments. Second, we studied trust in municipalities and its interrelation with satisfaction with municipal services. Third, we explored several of the factors that influence public opinion regarding state decentralization. Finally, we studied the impact of citizen participation and satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy.

With respect to citizen participation, we found a relatively high degree of involvement of people in local organizations of civil society in comparison to more established democracies, such as Canada or the United States. On the contrary, civic participation in local governments in Ecuador is the lowest in the Americas. These results suggest that Ecuadorians prefer to form civil society organizations to solve their problems, instead of petitioning local government, or participating in open municipal meetings to this effect. Thus, if Putnam (1993) is right, it is precisely this low participation in local political institutions and the consequent resignation of citizens to self-provide public services, that may influence democratic volatility in Ecuador.

Despite the current environment in Ecuador, it is still reasonable to ponder the citizen participation phenomenon in local governments through the implementation of public policies. Ecuadorians continue to show high levels of trust in the local government in comparison with the

rest of the countries in the region. However, these levels of satisfaction and trust have decreased over time. We could therefore speculate that if we do not act now, having citizens to participate in local institutions may be much more complex in an environment of dissatisfaction and distrust. Moreover, it is precisely individuals who make demands on the municipal government who show higher levels of trust, which in the last instance is related to democratic stability.

Trust is important not only for citizens to support a stable democracy; but also quintessential for the political legitimacy of the processes of state reform. Thus, there is some dissonance between the levels of trust in both the national and local governments in trying to determine support for either centralization or decentralization. Because of the relatively high level of trust that the national government compared to municipalities, Ecuadorians have shown in our surveys a decided support for the financial centralization of the state. Citizen support for centralization of economic resources is currently high enough that regardless the level of trust in the municipality, citizens will always prefer that the national government manage public resources.

This does not happen in the administrative arena. The citizenry expressed their wish for an equal division between the national and local governments of existing responsibilities in Ecuador (such as education, health, and infrastructure). This may be due to a positive correlation between participation in municipal meetings and administrative decentralization, but not financial. Hence, in a message to the promoters of administrative decentralization, we may suggest again that if they are searching for political legitimacy, citizen participation in municipal meetings seems to be fundamental in this process of state reform.

This crucial finding in our study suggests that lack of direct experience with local governments may lower support for the Ecuadorian system in comparison other countries.<sup>32</sup> Satisfaction with local services not only increases political legitimacy in the reform process; it also augments the legitimacy of state institutions. Moreover, our data have demonstrated that satisfaction with local services, along with participation in both improvement committees and religious organizations increases interpersonal trust, which is relatively low in Ecuador. Finally, participation in improvement committees increases support for the right to participate, which is also low in the country.<sup>33</sup> As mentioned throughout this research, system support, support for the right to participate and interpersonal trust, are three essential elements for the democratic stability of Ecuador and the Americas in general.

---

<sup>32</sup> For more information on legitimacy of the political institutions and Ecuadorian system support, please refer to chapter IV in this study.

<sup>33</sup> For more information on interpersonal trust and support for the right of opposition in comparative perspective, please refer to chapter I in this study.

## Appendix

### Appendix II-1. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Administrative Responsibilities

Variable	Coefficiente	t-estadística
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.065*	(2.53)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.058*	(2.50)
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.071*	(2.58)
Confianza en el gobierno nacional	-0.101*	(-3.55)
Educación	0.019	(0.63)
Mujer	-0.025	(-1.28)
Edad	0.048*	(2.14)
Riqueza	-0.005	(-0.17)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.022	(-0.61)
Sierra	0.056	(1.14)
Costa	0.098	(1.94)
Constante	0.017	(0.53)
R-cuadrado	0.031	
N. de casos	2716	

\* p<0.05

### Appendix II-2. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

Variable	Coefficiente	t-estadística
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.068*	(2.50)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.035	(1.33)
Confianza en el Gobierno Nacional	-0.169*	(-5.91)
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.088*	(3.49)
Educación	-0.008	(-0.32)
Mujer	-0.009	(-0.52)
Edad	0.014	(0.61)
Riqueza	-0.041	(-1.36)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.048	(-1.20)
Sierra	-0.037	(-0.65)
Costa	0.038	(0.64)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.17)
R-cuadrado	0.055	
N. de casos	2699	

\* p<0.05

**Appendix II-3. Impact of Citizen Participation in Local Organizations of the Civil Society on Support for Stable Democracy**

<b>Impacto de la participación cívica local en el apoyo al derecho de participación</b>		
Variable	Coefficiente	t-estadística
Organización religiosa	0.035	(1.09)
Asociación padres de familia	0.031	(1.21)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.059*	(2.20)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.057*	(-2.25)
Interés en la política	0.071*	(2.59)
Educación	0.047	(1.55)
Mujer	-0.015	(-0.69)
Edad	-0.012	(-0.10)
Std_q2sq	0.003	(0.02)
Riqueza	-0.039	(-1.25)
Percepción economía familiar	0.039	(1.31)
Tamaño del lugar	0.008	(0.19)
Costa	0.235*	(5.46)
Sierra	0.232*	(4.21)
Constante	0.040	(0.96)
R-cuadrado	0.026	
N. de casos	2785	

- $p < 0.05$

<b>Impacto de la participación cívica local en la creencia en la legitimidad política</b>		
Variable	Coefficiente	t-estadística
Organización religiosa	0.094*	(3.06)
Asociación padres de familia	0.036	(1.37)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.057	(1.97)
Interés en la política	0.099*	(4.06)
Educación	-0.057	(-1.61)
Mujer	0.004	(0.22)
Edad	-0.350*	(-3.09)
Std_q2sq	0.282*	(2.35)
Riqueza	0.038	(1.18)
Percepción economía familiar	0.094*	(3.08)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.012	(-0.27)
Costa	-0.074	(-1.29)
Sierra	-0.172*	(-3.12)
Constante	-0.015	(-0.39)
R-cuadrado	0.046	
N. de casos	2816	

\*  $p < 0.05$

Impacto de la participación cívica local en la confianza interpersonal		
Variable	Coefficiente	t-estadística
Organización religiosa	0.062*	(2.56)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.023	(-0.93)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.063*	(2.21)
Educación	0.038	(1.14)
Mujer	-0.064*	(-3.33)
Edad	-0.065	(-0.58)
Std. q2sq	0.117	(0.98)
Riqueza	-0.022	(-0.66)
Percepción economía familiar	0.096*	(3.52)
Tamaño del lugar	0.055	(1.76)
Costa	-0.039	(-0.58)
Sierra	-0.082	(-1.20)
Constante	-0.009	(-0.26)
R-cuadrado	0.030	
N. de casos	2835	

\* p<0.05

Appendix II-4. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services in Support for Stable Democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho A la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.003	(0.03)	-0.026	(0.04)	-0.007	(0.03)	0.131*	(0.02)	0.099*	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.081*	(0.03)	-0.067*	(0.03)	-0.097*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.015	(0.03)	0.070*	(0.03)	0.038	(0.02)	0.061*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.748*	(0.20)	0.372*	(0.18)	0.191	(0.18)	-0.232	(0.15)	0.189	(0.25)
Mujer	-4.389*	(1.02)	-0.716	(1.09)	-2.752*	(1.03)	0.193	(0.72)	-3.788*	(1.14)
Edad	0.299	(0.22)	0.066	(0.21)	0.157	(0.20)	-0.244	(0.13)	-0.085	(0.20)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.283	(0.54)	-0.695	(0.46)	-0.741	(0.47)	0.031	(0.34)	-0.498	(0.60)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.175	(1.14)	1.250	(0.99)	0.184	(0.68)	1.916*	(0.71)	3.369*	(1.00)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.455	(0.67)	0.137	(0.77)	-0.602	(0.68)	0.274	(0.56)	1.682*	(0.62)
Costa	9.027*	(2.37)	10.737*	(2.24)	3.886	(2.27)	-3.981	(2.02)	-3.233	(4.03)
Sierra	6.998*	(2.37)	11.895*	(3.17)	6.681*	(2.41)	-5.273*	(2.06)	-3.827	(4.16)
Constante	40.945*	(7.31)	50.565*	(7.03)	49.128*	(7.13)	31.665*	(4.40)	40.756*	(7.04)
R-cuadrado	0.036		0.020		0.018		0.051		0.026	
N. de casos	2715		2772		2746		2799		2817	

# Chapter III. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework

It has become commonplace in the field of democratic governance and in discussions about election outcomes to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates are voted out of office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and reducing unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion did not rise and fall according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions tended to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did opinions of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s three tier categorization of political support: political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (240) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Brian Faughnan and Daniel Montalvo



between either Easton's three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, negative economic outlooks and perceptions affected "peoples' feelings about their leaders and institutions" (2) and that if "the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions" (5). (Lipset and Schneider 1987, 5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat in doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton "offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies" (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society's economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation between a person's financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government. However, according to Dalton, "perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship when their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall" (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton's conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones: "the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous" (127) within the OECD nations.<sup>2</sup>

Turning now toward a government's economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions, which they say have been "fragmentary and inconsistent." In previous literature, the authors' preliminary conclusion is that a country's "level of economic development is less important than economic performance" (Power and Jamison 2005, 58); they caution, however, that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, citizens' individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system: those whose evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations are higher are more likely to support the political system than those whose perceptions are less favorable.

---

<sup>2</sup> International Organization of the 30 most industrialized countries.

Given the inconclusive results from previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter will use AmericasBarometer survey data to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

This chapter is divided in eight sections. After proposing the theoretical framework in the first section, the second section examines the potential effect of citizen perception on support for stable democracy. The third section examines public opinion about the economic performance of the government. Moreover, we will study the principal predictors of economic performance: perceptions of both the personal and national economic situations. The fourth section will focus on the impact of perception of economic performance of the government on support for stable democracy inside the country and diffuse support measured through perceptions of institutional political legitimacy. The fifth section will briefly investigate the impact of the principal predictors on the government's economic performance: the perception of the national and personal economic situations on the incumbent, or as Easton puts it, the specific support. In the sixth section we will discuss Ecuadorians' perception of the role that the government should have in the national economy. Additionally, we will explore the possible explanatory factors of public opinion regarding the role of the state. Finally, in the last section we will present the conclusions of the chapter.

## **How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?**

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance may have a stronger belief in democracy as the best system of government. It is less likely, however, that this perception affects their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who perceive the system to be performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital.

## **Public Opinion about the Role of the State on the National Economy**

Citizen perceptions about their economic situation and the national economic situation are not only important to determine support for democratic stability, but also they may be essential in the perceptions of the role of the state in the national economy. Thus, the second objective of this chapter is to analyze to what extent citizens favor or reject a greater intervention of the state in the national economy, and what are the factors that influence these attitudes. In order to perform these analyses we base our study in the work of Coleman (2001), cited in the Honduras report of 2008,<sup>3</sup> that indicates that, for example, age, political ideology and perception

---

<sup>3</sup> For more information regarding the Honduras report, please visit: [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)

of the personal economic situation determine support for privatizations or the statization of the provision of public services in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile.

The conclusions of Coleman show that in the countries previously mentioned, voting age citizens on the left of the political ideology scale who consider that their personal economic situation is difficult may be less inclined to favor privatization of public services. Additionally, a greater income level, more education, and belonging to Protestant religions, are associated with favorable attitudes for public services privatization.

## Government Economic Performance

Historically, Ecuadorians have felt that the economy is the principal problem affecting the country.<sup>4</sup> Thus, when we asked in 2008: “In your opinion, what is the most important problem in the country?” 62.7 percent believe that the economic problems are the most critical. This figure is almost three times higher than the second most critical problem, that according to 21.2 percent of the Ecuadorians is national politics. In comparison to results of the same question in 2006, there is an increment of more than three points in the opinion that the economy is the principal problem in the country. On the other hand, the percentage of Ecuadorians that believe that politics is the most critical problem decreased almost 9 points in the same period. These results are depicted in Figure III-1.<sup>5</sup>

These results may be due to various factors. First, even though there is a decreasing tendency, the last Survey of Living Conditions conducted by the National Institute for Statistics and Censuses (INEC), shows that 38.3 percent of the population live below the poverty line, as measured by the indirect method or consumption.<sup>6</sup> Another factor that may have a negative influence on public opinion of the national economy is the high indexes of inflation that, due to exogenous shocks and structural problems, may be producing an unusual increment in the consumer price index.<sup>7</sup> Annual inflation, as reported by INEC in February 2008, when the survey was conducted, was 5.1 percent. At this writing, the data for the annual inflation as of May 31, 2008 is 9.29 percent. If this inflationary tendency continues, double digit inflation could be expected, which relatively high for a dollarized economy.

Another important factor that may affect perceptions of the national economy is income inequality. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean – CEPAL- the GINI coefficient, which is measured by per capita income distribution, was 0.526 points at the national levels.<sup>8</sup> This is a high level but common in the Latin American region,

<sup>4</sup> For more information about the public opinion surveys conducted by the AmericasBarometer in Ecuador, please visit [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)

<sup>5</sup> The analytical framework of the five categories in figure VI-1, grouping all possible responses, is depicted in the Appendix of this chapter.

<sup>6</sup> For more information, visit [www.inec.gov.ec](http://www.inec.gov.ec). This page was consulted on June 27, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> In the prolog to this report we conduct a more detailed analysis of exogenous shocks and exacerbating inflation.

<sup>8</sup> The GINI scale goes from 0 to 1. As the value approaches to 1, inequality in this particular case is greater.

which, according to World Bank analysts, is characterized as one of the most unequal regions in the world.<sup>9</sup>




Figure III-1. The Economy as the Country's Principal Problem

Finally, the unemployment and underemployment rate are also macroeconomic indicators that may affect perceptions of the national economy. According to INEC, in February 2008, the unemployment rate in Ecuador was 7.37 points, the lowest in recent years. However, it is worth noting that since June 2007, there has been a change in the methodology of the employment survey that causes a break in the series; hence, the data is not comparable with past figures. In the case of underemployment, measured from the relationship between underemployment and the economically active population –PEA-, the rate of March 2008 falls in the 50.2 percentual points.

### Measuring perception of government economic performance

After a brief examination of the macroeconomic situation of the country, we decided to explore public opinion of the government's work with respect to two socio-economic factors previously shown, and then compare it to the citizen opinion in the rest of the countries in the Americas. To this effect, a new index (**econperf**) which stands for Perception of the Government's Economic Performance, was created by using the following questions:<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For more information visit: [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>10</sup> El Alpha de Cronbach para la creación de este índice en Ecuador es de 0,83 y de 0,82 para todo el Continente.

**N1.** To what extent would you say that the current government combats poverty?  
**N12.** To what extent would you say that the current government combats unemployment?




Figure III-2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective, 2008

In the 21 countries in this study, the average was 40.88 points on the 0 – 100 scale, where 0 means that citizens believe that the government does nothing to combat poverty and unemployment at all, and 100 means a lot. Just as depicted in Figure III-2, in comparative terms, the countries with the highest valuation in government economic performance is Uruguay, with 54.6 points. At the other extreme we find Paraguay with 14.4 points, placing it 13 points under Haiti, which shows 27.1 points. Ecuador is located in an average position with respect to citizen opinions of economic performance at the Americas level. Specifically, Ecuador is located

between Mexico and Venezuela. Ecuador's average is 43.4 in the 0-100 scale, based on the LAPOP index.

In the specific case of Ecuador, what is the variation of the perception of the government economic performance in the four biennia in our studies?




Figure III-3. Historic Perception of the Perception of the Government Economic Performance in Ecuador

Figure III-3 shows a dramatic increment in the perception of Ecuadorians about the government's economic performance in 2008, with respect to 2001, 2004 and 2006. It is important to note that in January 2007., President Rafael Correa took office. Correa, who in spite of being considered an outsider by various analysts, won the presidency by a wide margin. The principal initiative of the incumbent is "Socialism of the XXI Century."<sup>11</sup> This policy is based on replacing the social market economic model, considered by the president as neo-liberal, by a system of "solidarity and social economy"<sup>12</sup>

In order to explore the factors that may have influenced the dramatic increase of the economic performance perception, we fitted several statistical regressions to better understand this phenomenon. To this effect, we based our presumptions in the theories proposed by Easton

<sup>11</sup> For more information, visit: [www.presidencia.gov.ec](http://www.presidencia.gov.ec)

<sup>12</sup> For more information, visit: [www.asambleaconstituyente.gov.ec](http://www.asambleaconstituyente.gov.ec)

(1975), Lipset and Schneider (1987) and Dalton (2004), which have been described in the theoretical framework of this chapter. Thus, we decided to include two theoretical independent variables about economic perception: a *sociotropic* variable that measures people’s perception of the national economy, and an *idiotropic* variable, that measures the personal economic perception. These variables were measured with the instrument shown below:

**SOCT1.** And now speaking about the economy... How would you rate the economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

**IDIO1.** How would you rate your economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

Of course, the direction of causality in the relationship between sociotropic and idiotropic variables and the government economic performance is not free from endogeneity (also known as circular reasoning). However, we assume that when evaluating the government’s economic performance, the individual rationally evaluates her economic situation and that of her country in order to form her perception of the work that government is doing. For instance, while in 2006 individuals rated the national economic situation at 28.2 out of 100 possible points, this rating increased to 42.2 points in 2008. Similarly, the evaluation of the personal economic situation increased from 45.9 points in 2006 to 50.7 in 2008, placing Ecuador as the fourth country in the Americas with the highest perception of the idiotropic variable, only after Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela.

In addition to these two theoretical variables, we decided to incorporate in our regressions control variables, such as education, sex, age, income level measured by capital goods ownership, size of city and dummy variables<sup>13</sup> for each country region.

Figure III-4 shows results of the multivariate regression. As the citizen rating of national and personal economic situations increases, the rating of the government’s economic performance increases as well.

<sup>13</sup> The purpose of these dummy variables is to control the effects that can arise as a result of other specific variables in each region and are not included in the model.




Figure III-4. Predictors of the Government Economic Performance

As depicted in the figure above, the two most significant variables in statistical and substantive terms are our two variables of economic perception. Between the two, the national economic situation perception has a more robust impact when explaining perceptions of government economic performance among Ecuadorian citizens. Figures III-5 and III-6 below show the linear relationship that exists between the national economic situation and the perception of the government economic performance as well as and the personal economic situation and the economic performance perception, respectively.






Figure III-5. Impact of the personal economic situation perception on the perception of the government economic performance




Figure III-6. Impact of the national economic situation perception on the perception of the government economic performance

Despite the positive relationship shown by the lines in Figures III-5 and III-6, their slopes suggest that the line corresponding to the national economic situation is steeper, indicating a more robust relationship in substantive terms. These results are consistent with Dalton's (2004) conclusions discussed in the theoretical framework in this chapter, where we commented that in the developed democratic countries, the tendency is that citizens take more into account the national economic situation than their personal situation when evaluating the government. Moreover, we also corroborate Schwarz-Blum's conclusions that indicate that personal economic situation perceptions have a significant impact and positive on opinions about the government economic performance.

As Ecuadorians possess more goods and/or as their wealth increases, perception of government economic performance becomes more negative. This important finding may be explored with more detail in future investigations in order to determine the causal factors of this correlation.

As discussed next, even though individual's wealth is negatively correlated with the government economic perception performance, we did not find any statistical relationship between the wealth variables and approval of President Correa.

## **Economic Situation and its Impact on Specific Support in Ecuador**

Using Dalton's terminology (2004), in the previous section we analyzed the effects of the economic perceptions of the specific support for the government. In this section, we examine the impact of economic perceptions on specific support for the government, using the variable president approval to measure this type of support. In contrast with the previous section, in addition to using the government economic performance to compare our conclusions with those of Dalton (2004) and his investigation about industrialized countries, we will also use perceptions of the national and personal economic situation, explained at the beginning of this chapter.




Figure III-7. Predictors of the Incumbent President (specific support)

Figure III-7 shows the results of the multivariate regression of the incumbent president's approval rating. In this regression we have included our isotropic variable (national economic perception), the idiotropic variable (national economic perception), diffuse support (government performance perception, in terms of poverty and unemployment reduction) and control variables (education level, sex, age, wealth, size of city, and dummy variables for the geographic region).

As previously mentioned for the case of the specific support to the president, the variable wealth measured by capital goods ownership is not significant. This may indicate that when analyzing the president's management in general, and not only the government political economy, there is no statistically significant relationship according to the level of wealth. This does not happen, however, with the effect of the variable of economic performance perception on the incumbent president's job approval rating. This relationship is potent, significant and positive. This suggests that people, who believe that the government does a lot to decrease unemployment and poverty, strongly approve the job that the incumbent president is doing.

Both sociotropic and idiotropic variables also show a statistically and positive relationship with specific support. In first instance, we show in Figure III-8 the linear relationship between perception of personal economic situation perception and job approval rating of the incumbent president. As shown in the figure below, the relationship is positive and

significant. As the opinions of the personal economic situation increase, the president's approval increases as well. This result is consistent with Schwarz-Blum's findings, in which, in contrast with the industrialized countries examined by Dalton, personal economic perceptions in Latin America significantly impact specific support.




Figure III-8. Impact of Personal Economic Situation Perception on the Approval of the Incumbent President (Specific Support)

It should be noted that we conducted our surveys between January and February, 2008, when the president's approval was 62 out of 100 possible points, placing President Correa among the best rated leaders in the Americas.<sup>14</sup> For this reason, even those who state that their personal economic situation is very bad give him 49 points.

In second instance, Figure III-9, shows that perceptions of the national economic situation show a greater impact in substantive terms on the incumbent president approval than the personal economic situation. As previously mentioned in this chapter, Dalton concludes that in developed countries, citizens are more prone to evaluate their incumbent governments using the national economic situation instead of the personal one. In Ecuador, we noted that citizens in

<sup>14</sup> According to the AmericasBarometer 2008 round those above President Correa are: President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia with 69,3 points; Presidente Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic with 62.8 points; President Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay, 62.7 puntos; President Óscar Arias of Costa Rica, 62.4 puntos; and President Luis Inacio da Silva of Brazil, 62.3 points.

fact base their evaluations of the president’s job performance on the national economy, but the conclusions of Schwarz-Blum are also validated in the sense that Ecuadorians use personal economic perceptions to evaluate the incumbent president’s performance.




Figure III-9. Impact of National Economic Situation Perception on Approval of the Incumbent President (Specific Support)

As with personal economic situation, individuals who believe that the national economic situation is bad give President Correa 50 points. However, people who think that the national economic situation is very good, strongly approve President Correa’s work, with 83 out of 100 possible points.

One possible reason that may explain the almost 50 points given to the president is that weak national and personal economic situations perceptions are often blamed on previous presidents. It is a fact that during the last 12 years none of the presidents was able to finish his term of office. Moreover, many economic policies take effect only in the medium term.

To measure the effect of the perception of the implementation of policies to reduce both poverty and unemployment on support for stable democracy, we fitted a series of multivariate regressions that will be shown next. The following section will focus specifically on the role that the government economic performance perception plays on support for stable democracy.

## Impact of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

The principal independent variable used to measure the impact on support for stable democracy is Ecuadorians' perception of the government economic performance; the dependent variables will be the five aspects of support for stable democracy, measured by the instrument of the AmericasBarometer 2008: (1) support for democracy, (2) right to participate, (3) political tolerance, (4) legitimacy of institutions, (5) interpersonal trust. Although only the statistically significant results will be presented, the tables with the complete results can be seen in the appendix to this chapter.




Figure III-10. Impact of perception of government economic performance on support for participation

Figure III-10 shows the first statistically significant relationship between government economic performance and support for stable democracy. Even though the relationship is not linear, it is evident that citizens with lower opinions of government economic performance also have more open attitudes with respect to the support for the right to participate in Ecuador. However, as opinions of the economic performance become more favorable, opinions about the right to participate nonetheless, in the third quarter, opinions about support for the right to participate increase again.

Although not demonstrated in the present chapter, the idea that citizens expressing high support for the right of opposition stemming from negative rating of the government’s economic performance also show low trust in the central government is not unreasonable. We thus can theorize that those who distrust the government and also have the worst opinions about the government’s economic performance are more prone to support the right of participation. What remains unclear is why support for the right of opposition increases in the last quarter; this finding requires more research.




Figure III-11. The Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Political Legitimacy

Another statistically significant relationship is government economic performance with institutional legitimacy, or in Easton’s (1975) term, diffuse support. Figure III-11 shows a clear and positive relationship between these two variables. We can observe that when perceptions of government economic performance increase, the political legitimacy of institutions increases as well. As mentioned in the theoretical section of this chapter, diffuse support goes beyond support for the incumbent government and its current leaders; it examines support for the system of government in the society.

The last significant impact identified in the AmericasBarometer 2008 round on support for stable democracy is the relationship between the government economic performance and interpersonal trust. As shown in Figure III-12, the relation between these two variables is positive, clear and significant. When positive perception of government economic performance increases, we also observe an increment in interpersonal trust.




Figure III-12. Impact of Perception of Government Economic performance on Interpersonal Trust

In this section we have identified that, from the four variables that define support for stable democracy, three of them have been catalogued as significant in the case of Ecuador: support for the right of opposition, political legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust.<sup>15</sup> Results in this section shows that perceptions of the government economic performance play a fundamental role in support for stable democracy. In the next section we analyze the opinion of Ecuadorians regarding the role that the state should have in the Ecuadorian economy.

<sup>15</sup> Para la tabla de coeficientes, véase el apéndice del presente capítulo.



## Measuring attitudes regarding the role of the state on the Ecuadorian economy

To measure the attitudes regarding the role that the state should have in the Ecuadorian economy, the AmericasBarometer survey included the following (ROS) series, which stands for “Role of the State” These questions, that measure support for state control of enterprises and industries, the generation of well-being and employment, and the reduction of income inequality are shown below:

**ROS1.** The government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**ROS2.** The governments, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with statement?

**ROS3.** The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating job. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**ROS4.** The government should implement **strong** policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The frequencies of the answers are depicted in Figure III-13 below. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means “completely disagree” and 100 means “completely agree.”




Figure III-13. Perception on the role of the state on the Ecuadorian economy, 2008

According to the figure above, Ecuadorians average 72 out of 100 possible points regarding the idea that the state should be responsible of the people’s well-being, the creation of

jobs, and inequality reduction. However, only 58 points were given to idea that the state, more than the private sector, should be the owner of enterprises and industries in the country.

In order to compare citizen perception in different countries in the Americas concerning the role of the state in the economy, we decided to create an index of support for statization with the four variables shown at the beginning of this section.<sup>16</sup> The comparative results of this index are shown in Figure III-14 below:




Figure III-14. Index of Support to the Statization of the Economy, 2008

As depicted in the figure results, Ecuador is located among the group of countries where there is less support for statization. However, this support of 68.5 points shows that Ecuadorians

<sup>16</sup>The Cronbach-Alpha for this index formation is .77

tend to agree with the statization of the economy. This may be due to factors such as the individual disappointment with the policies implemented in Latin America during the 1980s, especially those from the “Washington Consensus,” that in general suggest that the states should participate in the economy as normative actors. Another cause may be that Ecuadorians believe that the state, more than the private sector, may resolve their problems of poverty and inequality, as observed in Figure III-13.

To define the factors that could explain the support for the statization of the economy, we fitted a multivariate regression including the economic variables, political ideology, and socio-demographics. Results from this regression are depicted in figure III-15.




Figure III-15. Predictors of Support for Economic Statization of the State

Results from the multivariate regression show that those individuals who self-identify as right-wing on the ideology scale are less willing to support the statization of the national economy. This is, citizens who lean left think that the state, more than the private sector should own enterprises and industries, and it should combat poverty, unemployment and inequality.

The same direction of causality is found between the approval of the incumbent president and the role of the state in the national economy. In other words, those individuals show greater support for the job that the president is doing also think that the state, rather than the private sector, should play a fundamental role in the country’s economy. This relationship between

variables is the clearest and most significant among all relationships analyzed in this section. Finally, people with higher education and males tend to show greater support for the statization of the Ecuadorian economy.

An interesting result in this regression is having found that support for the statization of the economy is independent from sociotropic and idiotropic perceptions. This means that we did not find any statistical impact in the perception of the personal and national economy on support for economic statization.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter we noted that perceptions of the national and personal economic situation have a significant role not only in government economic performance, but also in the president's job approval rating (specific support) inside the country. In terms of diffuse support, this chapter also discovered that in Ecuador, the government's economic performance has a significant impact in several components of support for stable democracy, including political legitimacy of institutions discussed by Muller, Jackman and Seligson, cited at the beginning of this chapter.

Perceptions of government economic performance also have a significant impact on support for the right to participate. Individuals who believe that the incumbent government combats poverty and unemployment are less inclined to support the right to participate. However, this relationship appears to be non-linear and needs further research. Regarding interpersonal trust, as positive perception of the government's economic performance increases, trust also increases. From these findings, we can conclude that in Ecuador, perceptions of national and personal economies have an impact on both specific and diffuse support, as theorized by Easton and Schwarz-Blum respectively.

Finally, we discovered that, even though Ecuadorians are less supportive of statization of the economy than its continental neighbors, they agree more than they disagree with statist policies. The profile of Ecuadorians who support the idea that the government, rather than the private sector, should own the enterprises and industries, and should reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality is self-identified as left-wing, approves of the job that the president is doing, and has a higher level of education.

## Appendix

### Appendix III-1. Principal Problem of the Country according to its Citizens (A4) recoded in categories

<b>Principal problema del país de acuerdo a los ciudadanos (A4) recodificado en categorías</b>				
<b>Economía</b>	<b>Seguridad</b>	<b>Servicios Básicos</b>	<b>Política</b>	<b>Otros</b>
Crédito, falta de 09	Delincuencia, crimen (05)	Agua, falta de (19)	Conflicto armado 30	Desigualdad (58)
Desempleo/falta de empleo (03)	Pandillas (14)	Caminos/vías en mal estado 18	Corrupción 13	Desplazamiento forzado (32)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de (01)	Secuestro (31)	Educación, falta de, mala calidad (21)	Derechos humanos, violaciones de (56)	Discriminación (25)
Inflación, altos precios (02)	Seguridad (falta de) (27)	Electricidad, falta de (24)	Los políticos (59)	Drogadicción (11)
Pobreza (04)	Guerra contra terrorismo (17)	Salud, falta de servicio (22)	Mal gobierno (15)	Explosión demográfica (20)
Tierra para cultivar, falta de (07)	Terrorismo (33)	Transporte, problemas con el (60)		Medio ambiente (10)
Deuda Externa (26)	Violencia (57)	Vivienda (55)		Migración (16)
		Desnutrición (23)		Narcotráfico (12)
				Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorismo (65)
				Otro (70)

Appendix III-2. Perception of the Government Economic Performance

Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno		
	Coefficientes	t estadístico
Educación	-0.033	(-1.21)
Mujer	-0.021	(-1.15)
Edad	-0.043	(-1.86)
Riqueza	<b>-0.072*</b>	<b>(-2.40)</b>
Tamaño del lugar	0.016	(0.35)
Situación económica nacional	<b>0.197***</b>	<b>(7.55)</b>
Situación económica personal	<b>0.100***</b>	<b>(4.28)</b>
Sierra	-0.053	(-1.34)
Oriente	-0.024	(-0.79)
Constante	-0.009	(-0.25)
F	14.97	
N. de casos	2953	
* p<0.05 **p<.01 ***p<0.001		

Appendix III-3. Predictors of Support to the President (specific support)

Predictores del apoyo al presidente (apoyo específico)		
	Coefficientes	t estadístico
Desempeño económico del gobierno	<b>0.388***</b>	<b>18.33</b>
Educación	0.032	(1.38)
Mujer	-0.026	(-1.29)
Edad	-0.027	(1.23)
Riqueza	-0.033	(-1.30)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.044	(-1.73)
Situación económica nacional	<b>0.207***</b>	<b>(7.91)</b>
Situación económica personal	<b>0.059*</b>	<b>(2.29)</b>
Sierra	0.007	(0.30)
Oriente	-0.016	(-0.74)
Constante	-0.008	(-0.44)
F	56.61	
N. de casos	2925	
* p<0.05 **p<.01 ***p<0.001		

Appendix III-4. Impact of the perception of the government economic performance on support for stable democracy

El impacto de la percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico	-0.009	(0.03)	-0.086*	(0.03)	0.023	(0.03)	0.288*	(0.02)	0.075*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.083*	(0.04)	-0.021	(0.03)	-0.111*	(0.04)				
Interés en la política	0.017	(0.03)	0.071*	(0.03)	0.028	(0.02)	0.027	(0.02)		
Educación	0.748*	(0.20)	0.260	(0.19)	0.187	(0.18)	-0.112	(0.13)	0.285	(0.25)
Mujer	-4.352*	(1.00)	-0.908	(1.10)	-2.873*	(1.05)	0.579	(0.66)	-3.815*	(1.14)
Edad	0.289	(0.22)	0.099	(0.20)	0.144	(0.20)	-0.263*	(0.12)	-0.109	(0.20)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.215	(0.23)	-0.575	(0.45)	-0.498	(0.46)	0.616*	(0.27)	-0.371	(0.59)
Percepción Economía familiar	-0.170	(1.13)	1.486	(1.01)	0.108	(0.66)	1.173	(0.62)	3.405*	(1.01)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.513	(0.64)	-0.010	(0.73)	-0.775	(0.67)	0.138	(0.41)	1.475*	(0.59)
Región	-2.655	(1.62)	-1.352	(1.71)	1.113	(1.38)	-0.504	(0.97)	-0.077	(1.58)
Constante	53.451*	(6.55)	62.877*	(6.61)	52.153*	(6.00)	21.777*	(3.03)	38.983*	(5.15)
R-cuadrado	0.034		0.020		0.015		0.209		0.026	
N. de casos	2764		2827		2798		2856		2868	
* p<0.05										





# Chapter IV. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Furthermore, the UN/World Bank study stresses that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. This is because “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest.” The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it is difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Diana Orcés.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, persons who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if fatalities in car accidents were included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data, Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...”.

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data are seriously limited for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, family member reports of murder or other violent crimes is known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in addition, the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended); furthermore, there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if the outcome an assault is a homicide or injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims are often saved, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, crime levels increased largely due to the urban phenomenon of gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural crime did not see the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the crime in cities increasingly influenced national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America the same phenomenon has emerged in a number of countries. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys conducted in the capital city of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed regarding the incidence of corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban areas as opposed to rural areas.

## How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

## How do we Measure Crime Victimization?

In this chapter we concentrate in the following variables, allowing us comparing among countries:

**VIC1.** Now, changing the subject: Have you been victim of an act of delinquency in the last 12 months?

**AOJ11.** Speaking of the town/village where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

The main objective of this chapter is to show the levels of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity in Ecuador in order to establish their impact on support for stable democracy. This chapter begins with an analysis of Ecuadorians with higher probabilities of being victims of crime and who have a higher perception of insecurity. We conclude with an analysis of the effect of crime on support for stable democracy measured by victimization and the perception of insecurity.

## Analysis of the Impact of Crime in Ecuador

### Crime Victimization across Time

As depicted in Figure IV-1, crime victimization in Ecuador tends to fluctuate across time. These differences are not significant; however, noting that the confidence intervals cross each

other in all years, we conclude that the decrease of crime victimization in 2004 with respect to 2001 is not statistically significant, with a confidence level of 95 percent.




Figure IV-1. Crime Victimization in Ecuador: 2001-2008

Similarly, from 2004 to 2008, crime victimization has increased more than four percentage points. These results are statistically significant.

### Perception of Personal Security through Time

Figure IV-2 shows that the perception of insecurity in Ecuador has been stable over the last seven years with a decrease from 47 to 43 percent in 2001 with respect to 2004, increasing to 48 percent in 2006, and decreasing again in 2008. These differences are statistically significant. Similarly to crime victimization, perception of insecurity among Ecuadorian citizens has been constant since 2001, when LAPOP conducted its first round of interviews in Ecuador.




Figure IV-2. Perception of Insecurity in Ecuador: 2001-2008

To establish who are more likely to be victimized by crime in Ecuador, we used a probabilistic statistical model, that is, a logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is the proportion of crime victimization. In this case, the dependent variable takes on the value of one if the person was victimized and zero otherwise. In this model we incorporate the independent variables: education level, gender, wealth size of the city,<sup>2</sup> age and region. Results are depicted in Figure IV-3.<sup>3</sup>

In Figure IV-3 we observe that the vertical line over the zero value serves as reference to establish if the impact of each of the independent variables is positive or negative; at the same time it allows us to determine their statistical significance. The confidence interval that crosses the vertical line located in the middle of the figure, shows that the effects are statistically insignificant, while the confidence intervals that do not cross indicate the contrary. It is worth noting that the confidence intervals located to the right of the vertical line indicate a positive effect, while those in the left indicate a negative impact.

<sup>2</sup> This variable refers to the size of the city, where 1 refers to national capital (metropolitan area), 2 a large city, 3 a medium city, 4 a small city, and 5 a rural area.

<sup>3</sup> Complete results of the logistic regression are depicted in the Appendix IV-1.




Figure IV-3. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime

Specifically, Figure IV-3 shows that people who are less likely to be victimized by crime live in smaller cities and are older. Similarly, women are less likely to be victimized by crime than men. The rest of the variables are not statistically significant because it can be clearly observed that the confidence intervals cross the vertical line on the zero value.

Figure IV-4 shows that people who reside in rural areas are less likely to be victims of crime than those who live in large cities (27 percent). Equally, people who live in medium cities (22 percent) or the nation's capital (23 percent) are more likely to be victimized by crime in comparison to people who reside in rural areas. As expected, these results show that bigger cities tend to be more dangerous than smaller cities.




Figure IV-4. Crime victimization by Size o City

Figure IV-5 shows that women are less likely than men to be victimized by crime. Men have a probability of 26 percent in contrast to women who have a probability of 20 percent. These results suggest that men have a greater risk of being victimized by crime because they may be less careful than women are on the streets. It is probable that women feel more vulnerable and thus are more alert than men, decreasing the chances of being target of a crime. Another reason may be that delinquents attack men more often because delinquents may believe that men carry more money since due to the traditional perception in Ecuador that women work at home.




Figure IV-5. Crime Victimization by Gender

The relationship between crime victimization and the age of people is shown in Figure IV-6. As expected, the relationship is negative; that is, as Ecuadorians get older, the probability of being victim of a crime is smaller. In contrast, these results show that young people from ages 16 to 35 have the highest probability of being victims of crime, probably because they tend to be more daring than older adults and willing to participate in high-risk activities. It may be the case that young adults are the targets of crime because of their lack of experience and their lower awareness of danger.






Figure IV-6. Crime Victimization by Age

## Who tend to feel more insecure?

The statistical method used in this section is a linear regression because the dependent variable continues to take on higher values when perception of insecurity increases among Ecuadorians. In this model we incorporate as predictors: the education level, gender, wealth, size of city, age and region.




Figure IV-7. Ecuadorian Citizens that tend to feel more Insecure

As depicted in Figure IV-7, since the confidence interval for women does not cross the vertical line above and is located on the right-hand side, women feel more insecure than men. On the other hand, Ecuadorian citizens who reside in smaller cities and those who live in the Sierra compared to those who live at the Coastal region, the reference category, feel less secure. The figure show the confidence intervals of these variables located on the left-hand side of the vertical line. The rest of the variables are not statistically significant. In the next section we explore the relationship of these variables.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> To see the complete set of results of this analysis, please refer to Appendix IV-2 at the end of this chapter.




Figure IV-8. Perception of Insecurity by Gender

Figure IV-8 shows that women have a higher perception of insecurity than men. Men reported an average of 43 points in the perception of insecurity in a 0 -100 scale, while women shown an average of 48 points, a relatively higher figure. This result corroborates the previous finding that women are less likely to be victims of crime, possibly because thee have a higher perception of insecurity, and hence tend to be more alert and careful than men when going out .

The relationship of insecurity perception and city size is depicted in Figure IV-9. We observe that, on a 0 – 100 scale, the average of the insecurity level that Ecuadorian citizens perceive is 52 points in larger cities in comparison to 39 points in rural areas. This difference is statistically significant. Equally, the average of perception of insecurity is 41 points in medium-size cities and 46 points in the nation’s capital. As expected, as the size of the city increases, the perception of insecurity among Ecuadorian citizens increases as well.




Figure IV-9. Perception of Insecurity by Size of the City




Figure IV-10. Perception of Insecurity by Region

Finally, Figure IV-10 shows that people who reside at the Coastal region tend to feel significantly more insecure than those who live in the Highlands of the Amazonia, showing an average of 48 points on a 0-100 scale in comparison to 43 and 40 points respectively. These results show that the Coastal region has the highest degree of crime, and thus, there is a higher perception of insecurity in this region of the country.<sup>5</sup>

## Impact of Victimization by Crime and Perception of Insecurity on Support for Stable Democracy

In this section of the chapter we focus on the impact of crime victimization and insecurity perception on support for stable democracy. To achieve this objective, we devised statistical models that would allow us to determine the impact of crime on support for the idea of democracy per se, on support for the right to participate, support for political tolerance, the credibility of institutional political legitimacy, and interpersonal trust.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For more information about crime victimization in Ecuador visit: <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=64137>

<sup>6</sup> See statistical results of the impact of victimization by crime and insecurity perception in the Appendix IV-3 and IV-4 respectively, in the appendix at the end of this chapter.

## Impact of victimization by crime

Crime victimization has a negative effect on interpersonal trust, while it does not have any impact on the other components of support for stable democracy analyzed in this study. That is, the impact of crime victimization on support for stable democracy is not as severe as initially thought; these results imply that there may be other factors with a more pronounced effect, such as the case of corruption analyzed in Chapter V. The next section shows the relation between interpersonal trust and crime victimization.

Figure IV-11 shows that Ecuadorian citizens who have been victimized by crime express lower interpersonal trust than those who have not, showing an average of 51 points in the scale from 0 to 100 in comparison to 55 points. These results indicate that crime victims lose trust in others, decreasing support for stable democracy. However, since the effect is low, it may not be plausible to argue that crime victimization represents a risk for democracy in Ecuador. We continue with the impact of personal security perception on support for stable democracy.




Figure IV-11. Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust

## Impact of Personal Security Perception

The perception of insecurity has negative impact that is statistically significant only on interpersonal trust; it does not have any effect on the other variables that comprise support for

stable democracy. Contrary to crime victimization, the impact of insecurity perception has a pronounced impact on interpersonal trust.

Figure IV-12 shows that the relationship between insecurity perception and interpersonal trust is negative; as the perception of insecurity among Ecuadorians increases, interpersonal trust decreases. This indicates that a decrease in interpersonal trust due to the perception of insecurity may lead to unstable democracy.




Figure IV-12. Impact of Insecurity Perception on Interpersonal Trust

## Conclusion

The statistical analysis of the determinants of crime victimization in Ecuador in 2008 indicate that young adults, men, and denizens of Ecuador's larger cities are more likely to be victimized by crime. Similarly, those who reside in larger cities tend to feel more insecure. Additionally, the results show that women feel more insecure than men, showing that because they feel insecure, they are more alert and therefore less likely to be victimized by crime.

The most important finding of this chapter, however, is the negative impact of crime and fear of crime on interpersonal trust of Ecuadorians, suggesting that victims of acts of delinquency and as well as people who fear for their personal safety tend to lose trust in others. Nonetheless, the effect of crime is small, showing that crime does not have as severe an impact on stable democracy as originally thought. In other words, in spite of the high levels of crime victimization in Latin American countries, and in Ecuador in particular with more than 20 percent reporting having been victims of a crime, these results do not show a high risk for democracy. On the other hand, fear of crime has a strong impact on interpersonal trust (28 points in our 0-100 scale), showing that fear has a substantial impact on democracy.

We can say that crime is a serious problem in Ecuador because it produces fear, making it necessary that the government implement policies to reduce this problem in all the regions of the country. A heightened sense of safety among Ecuadorian citizens would strengthen their trust on each other, thus increasing the chances of stable democracy.



## Appendix

Appendix IV-1. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime

	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.071	(1.14)
Mujer	-0.155*	(-3.36)
Edad	<b>-0.188*</b>	(-3.47)
Riqueza	0.131	(1.72)
Tamaño del lugar	<b>-0.181*</b>	(-3.09)
Sierra	0.022	(0.30)
Oriente	0.074	(1.15)
Constante	<b>-1.340*</b>	(-23.24)
F	8.96	
N. de casos	2980	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-2. Ecuadorian citizens who tend to feel more Insecure

	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>T</b>
Educación	-0.013	(-0.43)
Mujer	<b>0.088*</b>	(4.37)
Edad	-0.045	(-1.80)
Riqueza	-0.057	(-1.89)
Tamaño del lugar	<b>-0.171*</b>	(-5.71)
Sierra	<b>-0.064*</b>	(-2.30)
Oriente	-0.029	(-0.72)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.21)
R-cuadrado	0.039	
N. de casos	2979	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-3. Impact of crime Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por crimen	0.006	(0.02)	0.020	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)	<b>-0.044*</b>	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.077*	(0.03)	-0.073*	(0.03)	-0.099*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.019	(0.02)	0.068*	(0.03)	0.036	(0.02)	0.065*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.743*	(0.20)	0.343	(0.19)	0.196	(0.18)	-0.250	(0.15)	0.259	(0.25)
Mujer	-4.242*	(1.00)	-0.882	(1.09)	-3.000*	(1.06)	0.372	(0.70)	-4.048*	(1.12)
Edad	0.279	(0.22)	0.124	(0.21)	0.122	(0.20)	-0.327*	(0.13)	-0.095	(0.19)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.315	(0.54)	-0.678	(0.46)	-0.615	(0.44)	0.272	(0.34)	-0.352	(0.59)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.111	(1.11)	1.088	(0.97)	-0.149	(0.67)	2.240*	(0.71)	3.746*	(1.01)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.444	(0.66)	0.367	(0.73)	-0.503	(0.65)	-0.019	(0.57)	1.274*	(0.62)
Sierra	-1.748	(2.14)	1.074	(2.46)	2.950	(1.79)	-2.108	(1.49)	-1.170	(1.95)
Oriente	-8.916*	(2.37)	-11.369*	(2.16)	-4.144	(2.24)	3.920	(2.08)	3.731	(4.19)
Constante	50.542*	(6.34)	58.723*	(6.20)	53.760*	(6.08)	36.194*	(3.30)	43.685*	(4.77)
R-cuadrado	0.035		0.021		0.019		0.030		0.026	
N. de casos	2758		2821		2791		2853		2872	
* p<0.05										

Appendix IV-4. Impact of Insecurity Perception on Support for Stable Democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.036	(0.02)	-0.024	(0.03)	0.007	(0.02)	-0.020	(0.02)	<b>-0.288*</b>	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.077*	(0.03)	-0.074*	(0.03)	-0.097*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.023	(0.02)	0.073*	(0.03)	0.035	(0.02)	0.066*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.763*	(0.20)	0.347	(0.19)	0.210	(0.18)	-0.229	(0.15)	0.232	(0.22)
Mujer	-4.156*	(1.03)	-0.601	(1.09)	-2.807*	(1.05)	0.438	(0.71)	-2.425*	(1.09)
Edad	0.294	(0.21)	0.111	(0.20)	0.117	(0.19)	-0.315*	(0.13)	0.052	(0.19)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.328	(0.54)	-0.742	(0.47)	-0.673	(0.45)	0.256	(0.33)	-0.480	(0.55)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.230	(1.10)	1.210	(0.97)	0.036	(0.68)	2.107*	(0.71)	2.814*	(0.91)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.546	(0.64)	0.142	(0.75)	-0.532	(0.66)	-0.036	(0.56)	0.412	(0.58)
Sierra	-1.819	(2.09)	1.063	(2.44)	2.856	(1.81)	-2.068	(1.48)	-2.193	(1.78)
Oriente	-9.332*	(2.30)	-11.178*	(2.26)	-4.198	(2.33)	3.701	(2.13)	3.088	(3.84)
Constante	52.430*	(6.29)	61.054*	(6.49)	52.955*	(6.12)	36.907*	(3.42)	58.603*	(4.76)
R-cuadrado	0.037		0.021		0.019		0.030		0.100	
N. de casos	2762		2824		2796		2854		2872	
* p<0.05										



# Chapter V. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework<sup>2</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries. Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become much more commonplace.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance.

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November, 1998, the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and when multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Abby Córdova.

<sup>2</sup> This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”<sup>3</sup> Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

## How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using AmericasBarometer data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly. A larger, soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system.

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, we cannot really say much about variations, causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.<sup>4</sup> And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Victims’ belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy could diminish. It is far less likely, however, to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

## The measurement of corruption

The AmericasBarometer has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to

<sup>3</sup> USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance ([www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaid/indexpg.html](http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaid/indexpg.html)) February.

<sup>4</sup> The TI index is based mainly on preceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can determine where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has had a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The complete series of corruption victimization in the AmericasBarometer, which allows comparing between countries, is as follows:

	No	Yes	DK
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...			
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?		0	1
<b>EXC6.</b> During the past year did any public official ask you for a bribe?		0	1
<b>EXC11.</b> During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	9	0	1
<b>EXC13.</b> Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an inappropriate payment during the past year?	9	0	1
<b>EXC14.</b> During the past year, did you have any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe at the courts during the last year?	9	0	1
<b>EXC15.</b> Did you use the public health services during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	9	0	1
<b>EXC16.</b> Did you have a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	9	0	1

Additionally, the survey includes the following question of corruption perception among citizens:

**EXC7.** Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon? (8) DK/DR

The two principal objectives of this chapter are: (1) to show the levels of corruption in Ecuador contrasting measurement of victimization with measurement of corruption perception, and (2) to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy. This chapter is divided as it follows:

First, we show the level of victimization and perceptions of corruption in Ecuador in comparison with the rest of the countries included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer round by LAPOPnd analyze the changes in the corruption victimization index and perception of corruption index in Ecuador with respect to the previous survey (2006). Second, we analyze the state on corruption in Ecuador, according to the experiences reported by citizens. Specifically, we show

wheres the payment of bribes is more common, how frequently bribery occurs, and who are more likely to be victimized by corruption in Ecuador. Finally, we analyze the effect of corruption victimization and its perception on citizen support for stable democracy.

## **Corruption in Ecuador in Comparative Perspective**

In the previous AmericasBarometer Studies, we emphasized that Ecuador shows high levels of corruption in comparison with other countries in the region,<sup>5</sup> and data from other sources show that the level of corruption in Ecuador is relatively high when it is compared with corruption in other countries in the world. According to the latest data available from Transparency International about the perception of corruption in Ecuador, based on “national and international expert opinions,” Ecuador is in the third place among 32 countries in the Americas with the highest index of corruption perception, below only Venezuela and Haiti. Moreover, the Transparency International data show that Ecuador has a level of corruption, based on this index of perception, similar to some of the African countries, such as Kenya, Sierra Leona, Congo, and Zimbabwe, and similar to some ex-Soviet Union countries, such as Kyrgyzstan y Kazakhstan.<sup>6</sup>

The AmericasBarometer surveys allow for “bottom-up” study and measurement of corruption, that is, from opinions and experiences of citizens through representative surveys at the national level. As previously mentioned, in addition to measuring corruption using the question about “perception,” LAPOP has also developed a measure of “victimization” that allows for a closer view of the reality of corruption as an obstacle in the daily life of the people. The LAPOP victimization index is built from the questions of the series exc1-excl6 previously shown, and take on a value of “1” if the respondent reports having been victimized by corruption at least once in the last year. Results of the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey confirm that corruption is relatively high in Ecuador.

### **Corruption Victimization**

When we compare data from 2006 and 2008, we observe that Ecuador still remains among the ten countries with the highest percentage of people who have been victimized by corruption out of 21 countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys for the 2008 round with corruption victimization data. In fact, similar to 2006, the percentage of individuals victimized by corruption in Ecuador in 2008, 25.5 percent, is above the Latin American average of 19.7 percent.

---

<sup>5</sup> See the entire list of the studies referring to Ecuador at the LAPOP Webpage: [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)

<sup>6</sup> See data at [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) (page consulted in April, 2008).






Figure V-1. Percentage of the Population that has been Victimized by Corruption at least once in the last year by Country, data for 2006 and 2008

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of victims of corruption decreased between 2006 and 2008 in Ecuador. While in 2006, 31.9 percent of the respondents reported having been victimized by corruption, in 2008 that percentage is 25.5 percent. The question that arises is the following: Is this decrease statistically significant? Figure V-2 helps us to answer this question, because it compares the confidence intervals with these estimated values. The fact that the confidence intervals for the percentage of corruption victimization for 2006 and 2008 do not cross each other confirms that this difference is statistically significant,<sup>7</sup> and, as a result, there has been a significant decrease of corruption victimization in Ecuador over the last two years.

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix V-1.




Figure V-2. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption in Ecuador by year

## Corruption Perception

To measure corruption based on “perceptions” we use question exc7 of the AmericasBarometer. The original values were recoded on a scale of 0 – 100, where 0 represents the option “not generalized” and 100 “very generalized.” With respect to corruption perception in the eyes of the Ecuadorian population, we can observe that just as the case of corruption victimization, compared to the rest of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys for both 2006 and 2008, Ecuador is among the 10 countries with the highest average of corruption perception. In 2008, the level of corruption in Ecuador as measured by perception, was 76.6 points above the regional average of 73.5 points.

Figure V-3 shows that in 2006, Ecuador was the country with the highest average of corruption, as measured by “perception,” with 86 points. In 2008, however, like corruption victimization, there was a substantial drop in corruption perception, moving from 86 to 76.6 points.




Figure V-3. Corruption according to Perception by Country and Year, data for 2006 and 2008

Question exc7 allows us to compare corruption perception by year. Contrary to the victimization series, the wording of the question about perception has remained unchanged for all the years in which the AmericasBarometer has conducted national surveys in Ecuador; therefore, it is possible to analyze the behavior of perception in the four years since 2001. Figure V-4 shows the fluctuations of corruption measured by perception for the years 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008.

Figure V-4 shows that in 2006, Ecuador showed the highest level of perception of corruption. Moreover, it shows that corruption perception has remained high since 2001, despite the reduction in 2008. Are these changes in corruption perception statistically significant? The confidence intervals for the 2006 and 2008 bars confirm that the decline observed in corruption perception between these two years is statistically significant. The confidence intervals do not cross each other.<sup>8</sup> However, the perception of corruption in 2008 is similar to the 2001 level.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix V-2.




Figure V-4. Evolution of Corruption in Ecuador according to Perception

In sum, data from the AmericasBarometer about corruption in Ecuador shows significant advances in corruption reduction from 2006 to 2008, both in victimization and perception. Nonetheless, Ecuador still is one of the countries with high levels of corruption.

### Corruption in Ecuador: what else do the data from the AmericasBaometer tell us?

In this section we further explore corruption in Ecuador, using the following questions: 1) Where is bribery more likely to occur? 2) How frequently are bribes solicited? 3) Who are more likely to be victimized by corruption in Ecuador? To answer the first question we analyze the different components of the index of corruption victimization constructed by LAPOP, and also show the changes in the “sources” of corruption between 2006 and 2008. To answer the second question, we used the total index of victimization constructed by LAPOP, allowing us to determine not only if respondents have been victimized by corruption in the last year, but also how many times. To answer the third question, we implemented a multivariate statistical analysis to determine the characteristics of those who have a greater likelihood of being victimized by corruption.

### Where is Bribery more likely to be Solicited ?

Figure V-5 shows some of the “sources” of corruption in Ecuador for the years 2006 and 2008. The first thing we noticed is that people have a higher likelihood of being victimized by corruption when dealing with the courts. From the total number of people who said that they had had business with the courts, 21.6 percent reported having paid a bribe in 2008. The second public arena where Ecuadorians are asked to pay bribes is the municipality. In 2008, 17.2 percent of people who dealt with a municipal government reported having paid a bribe. As indicated in the LAPOP comparative report for 2006,<sup>9</sup> in Latin America corrupt acts are common in these two public venues, and Ecuador does not appear to be the exception.




Figure V-5. Sources of Corruption Victimization in Ecuador

Interestingly, Figure V-5 shows that although corruption according to victimization significantly contracted in 2008, this contraction appears not to have happened in the two principal venues of corruption in Ecuador; that is, in the courts and municipalities. Even though there was a small decrease in corruption in courts of 1.6 percent (from 23.2 to 21.6 percent),

<sup>9</sup> See Zéphyr, Dominique. (forthcoming). "La corrupción y su impacto sobre la estabilidad democrática en Latinoamérica." In *Desafíos para la democracia en Latinoamérica y el Caribe: evidencia desde el Barómetro de la Américas 2006* editad by Mitchell A. Seligson.

corruption in the municipalities increased, moving from 14.6 percent to 17.2 percent. This difference, notwithstanding, is not statistically significant. At the same time, it is clear that municipal corruption and corruption in the courts has not significantly decreased between 2006 and 2008, indicating that corruption has remained relatively high in the two sources of corruption in Ecuador when we compare 2006 data with that of 2008.

How, then, can we explain the reduction in corruption victimization in 2008? Figure V-5 shows that the principal factor in the lower level of corruption victimization at the national level in 2008 is the significant reduction of “bribes solicited by a public official.” Even though the percentage of people who reported that a “public official” requested a bribe in the last year dropped from 15.1 to 8.9 percent, this decrease in corruption appears not to have happened in the courts or the municipalities. Moreover, it is interesting that despite the decrease in the percentage of people victimized by corruption in 2008, the percentage of people who reported that a police officer had requested a bribe shows a slight increase, from 11.7 to 12.2 percent.

### **How Frequently are bribes Solicited?**

The measurement of corruption requires taking into account several of its dimensions. Just as other evils prevalent in Latin American and Caribbean countries, such as crime and poverty, it is important to know not only how much corruption there is and where it occurs, but also *how severe the corruption is*. For this purpose, LAPOP has created the total index of corruption victimization that reveals not only the percentage of individuals victimized by corruption, but also the number of ways used to solicit bribes. Figure V-6 shows the breakdown of percentages of people who were victimized by corruption in 2008, taking into account the number of ways used to request bribes during the last year.




Figure V-6. Total Number of Ways of Corruption Victimization

As shown in Figure V-6, the majority of Ecuadorians who were victims of corruption last year, were victimized in one way (16.2 percent). 5.8 and 3.4 percent were victimized in two and three ways, respectively. In Ecuador, the average frequency of victimization by corruption in the last year was “less than two ways” (1.55) among people who claimed to have been asked for an additional payment beyond that required by law.

### Who is more likely to be victimized by corruption?

Here, we analyze the characteristics of people who are more likely to be victimized by corruption. As emphasized by Seligson (2006), “corruption victimization is not uniform among the population where it occurs” (393). Seligson adds that “those who look for bribes know where to find full pockets,” and that those who are more likely to interact with public and private institutions are more exposed to be victims of corruption. Seligson (2006) also finds that men, wealthier people, inhabitants of urban regions, and young adults are more likely to be victims of corruption. Additionally, it is expected that people with children have more dealings with public and private entities, and thus are at higher risk of being victimized. In this section we explore the role that these characteristics play in the Ecuadorian context using LAPOP data for 2008.

In order to determine who are more likely to be victimized by corruption in Ecuador, we used a probabilistic multivariate statistical model (specifically a logistic regression), in which the

dependent variable was LAPOP’s victimization index, which takes on the value of one if the person reported having been victimized by corruption, and zero if not. In this model, we included the following variables as determinants of corruption: race, years of education, sex, wealth (measured as the sum of capital goods available in a home using the LAPOP “R” series), size of city, number of children and region. Results are shown in Figure V-7.<sup>10</sup>




Gráfico V-7. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Ecuador

In this Figure, the vertical line over the zero value serves as reference to determine whether the effect of each of the factors analyzed is positive or negative and statistically significant. Confidence intervals that do not cross the vertical line with a zero value can be considered statistically significant. For this reason, a confidence interval located at the right-hand side of the vertical line shows a positive effect on corruption victimization, and a confidence interval at the left-hand side indicates a negative effect. Figure V-7 shows that the level of education, sex (being female), age, and number of children, are significant factors that determine who has a greater probability of being victimized by corruption in Ecuador. Next, we graph the effect of each of these variables on corruption victimization.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix V-3 at the end of the chapter shows the complete results of the logistic regression.






Figure V-8. Percentage of victims of corruption by level of education

Figure V-8 shows that as the level of education increases among Ecuadorians, the probability of being victimized by crime increases as well. Among individuals who have a college education, 32 percent report having been victimized by corruption, while those with primary and secondary education, only 20.3 and 25.1 percent were victims, respectively, compared to 10 percent among those who have never attended school.




Figure V-9. Percentage of victims of corruption by gender

Results of the regression analysis also showed that women have a lower probability of being victimized by corruption than men. Figure V-9 shows that 28.7 percent of men were victims of corruption in the past year, while in the case of women this percentage was lower (22.4), yet still relatively high.

Figures V-10 and V-11 confirm the results found in previous studies. Adults in mid-ages and people with children are more likely to be victimized by corruption in Ecuador, which is explained by the higher probability of having contact with public and private institutions to have dealings.

A greater percentage of Ecuadorians in the age cohort of 26 and 35 years old were victims of corruption in the last year, specifically 30.2 percent. In contrast, only 24.2 percent of Ecuadorians between 18 and 25 years of age and older than 60 years, respectively, were victimized by corruption. On the other hand, Figure V-11 clearly shows that victimization by corruption is lower among people who have no children (21.5 percent), in comparison with those who reported having children (above 26 percent).




Figure V-10. Percentage of Victims of Corruption by age




Figure V-11. Percentage of victims of corruption by number of children

## Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy

In order to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, we estimated a regression model for each component of support for stable democracy included in this study. This is, we estimated a model to determine the impact of corruption on support for the idea of democracy per se, support for the right of participation, political tolerance, and belief in the political legitimacy of institutions, and social capital. For this reason, we estimated five regression models for each measure of corruption (victimization and perception), in other words, a total of 10 regressions.<sup>11</sup>

As theorized in the first chapter of this report and in the introduction of this chapter, we found that corruption, measured by either victimization or perception, has a statistically significant effect on important dimensions of support for stable democracy in Ecuador. However, as anticipated, corruption does not affect all the components of support for stable democracy analyzed in this report.

In Ecuador, corruption victimization has a significant negative effect on the political legitimacy of institutions. As show in Figure V-12, citizens who have had multiple experiences with corruption in the last year show lower support for the fundamental political institutions in Ecuador.<sup>12</sup> It is worth noting that results of the regression show that the negative effect of corruption victimization is statistically significant at the accepted standard levels ( $p > .05$ )

---

<sup>11</sup> See the statistical results of the impact of corruption victimization and perception in Appendix 4 and V-5, at the end of this chapter, respectively. The regression models take into account other variables that may have an effect as well on the dependent variables analyzed, or on a different component of support for democracy, or in different factors of support for democracy, among them, the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the people interviewed, the president's job approval rating, interest in politics, and place of residence, among others.

<sup>12</sup> The items that are part of the LAPOP index "political legitimacy of institutions" are: trust in the justice system, the supreme court of justice, political parties, congress, and government. For more information see chapter I in this study.




Figure V-12. Impact of corruption victimization on the political legitimacy of institutions

The negative effect of corruption on support for fundamental political institutions is also statistically significant when we measure perception of corruption ( $p < .05$ ). Those who perceive that corruption among public officials is a big problem for the country also express a lower level of trust in the fundamental institutions of the political regime. As shown in figure V-13 the difference in support for institutions among people who see corruption in public officials as “not generalized or not very generalized” and “somewhat generalized” show an average support lower to political institutions in Ecuador.




Figure V-13. Impact of perception of corruption on legitimacy of political institutions

Additionally, an unexpected, but not surprising result is that the perception of corruption as a big problem in the country leads to a greater support for right of participation. Citizens who think that corruption among public officials is very generalized, at the same time show a greater support for citizens to participate in legal activities to protest or to try to solve their common problems.<sup>13</sup> This result suggests that even the “right to participate” is an important dimension in democracy. As Dahl (1971) initially theorized, when the quality of democratic governance is questioned, support for the right to participate can lead citizens to confront political leaders and their institutions. In this sense, perception of high levels of corruption in Ecuador appears to translate in a greater approval for citizens to organize to make demands on both the national and local governments, perhaps to combat corruption. Figure V-14 shows that people who believe that corruption is pervasive in Ecuador average 63.2 points in support of the right to participate, while those who believe that corruption is not generalized or not very generalized, average 59.6 points for the right to participate.

<sup>13</sup> The LAPOP items in the “Support for the right of participation” index are related to the approval for people to participate in demonstrations allowed by law, in groups to solve the problems of their communities and in electoral campaigns of political parties. See chapter I in this study.




Figure V-14. Impact of Corruption Perception on Support for the right to Participate

## Conclusion

Results from the 2008 LAPOP surveys confirm that corruption is relatively high in Ecuador in comparison to other countries in the region. In fact, the percentage of victims of corruption at the level of perception of corruption in Ecuador is above the regional level, as it was in 2006. Nonetheless, the LAPOP 2008 surveys find that compared to 2006, corruption, measured either by victimization or perception, has significantly decreased. Even though this is good news for Ecuadorian democracy, it is important to indicate that the level of perception of corruption in Ecuador remains as high as the levels at the beginning and middle of this decade, a time when Ecuador had serious economic problems and political instability.

We also found that despite the decrease in the percentage of Ecuadorians victimized, corruption at the courts and municipalities, the two principal venues of corruption in Ecuador, have remained high. Thus, we conclude that the decrease registered in corruption victimization has taken place in other public venues. With respect to the total numbers of ways in which citizens were victimized, the majority reported having been victimized by one corrupt tactic in the last year.

The statistical analysis of the determinants of corruption in Ecuador in 2008 corroborated the results of previous studies: people with higher levels of education, men, and middle-aged people with children are more likely to be victimized by corruption.

With respect to the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, the results of this chapter show that corruption is a detriment of the quality of democratic governance and has a negative significant effect on citizen support for fundamental political institutions. Moreover, we found that perception that corruption among public officials is a generalized problem in Ecuador that increases citizen support for the “right of participation.” Thus, this chapter concludes that corruption represents a problem for democratic stability in Ecuador because it negatively affects the political attitudes of citizens regarding their trust in the political institutions. At the same time, corruption leads to greater support for the right of participation in the form of public protests, community organizations, and participation in electoral campaigns, all behaviors that may produce solutions to the problem.



## Appendix

### Appendix V-1

La siguiente tabla muestra los valores de los intervalos de confianza para el porcentaje de victimización por corrupción para el 2006 y el 2008. Se puede afirmar con un 95 por ciento de confianza que el valor real de la victimización por corrupción se encontraba entre 28.8 y 35 por ciento en el 2006 y entre 23 y 27.9 en el 2008. Esto constata que los intervalos no se cruzan, indicando que el cambio ha sido significativo entre estos dos años.

#### Appendix V-1. Corruption Victimization from LAPOP data

Victimización por Corrupción a partir de los datos de LAPOP					
Año	Porcentaje	Err. Est. Linealizado	[95% Intervalo de confianza]		Num. Obs
2006	31,9	1.5	28,8	35,0	2925
2008	25,5	1.2	23,0	27,9	3000

### Appendix V-2

La siguiente tabla muestra los valores de los intervalos de confianza para los puntajes de corrupción según la percepción para el 2006 y el 2008. Como se puede observar el estimado de la corrupción según la percepción se encontraba entre 84,7 y 87,3 puntos en el 2006 y entre 74,8 y 78,3 en el 2008. Esto sugiere que hubo una reducción estadísticamente significativa de la corrupción según la percepción entre estos dos años, ya que los intervalos no se cruzan entre si.

#### Appendix V-2. Corruption Perception in Ecuador base don LAPOP data

La corrupción en Ecuador según la percepción a partir de los datos de LAPOP					
Año	Porcentaje	Err. Est. Linealizado	[95% Intervalo de confianza]		Num. Obs
2006	86,0	0,7	84,7	87,3	2877
2008	76,6	0,9	74,8	78,3	2866

Appendix V-3. Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Determinantes de la victimización por corrupción		
	Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	
	Coefficientes	t estadístico
Blanca	-0.056	(-0.93)
Mestiza	-0.107	(-1.53)
Educación	<b>0.184*</b>	<b>(3.33)</b>
Mujer	<b>-0.170*</b>	<b>(-3.16)</b>
Edad	<b>-0.251*</b>	<b>(-3.15)</b>
Riqueza	0.035	(0.60)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.133	(-1.83)
Número de hijos	<b>0.211*</b>	<b>(2.93)</b>
Oriente	0.092	(1.77)
Sierra	0.068	(1.01)
Constante	-1.135*	(-17.15)
F	3.69	
N. de casos	2927	
* p<0.05		

Appendix V-4. Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy

El impacto de la victimización por corrupción en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
Variables independientes	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Total de maneras victimizado por corrupción en el año pasado	-1.667	(0.90)	-0.960	(0.73)	-0.029	(0.77)	<b>-1.207*</b>	<b>(0.51)</b>	0.004	(0.85)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.080*	(0.03)	-0.071*	(0.03)	-0.099*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.023	(0.02)	0.072*	(0.03)	0.034	(0.02)	0.068*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.784*	(0.20)	0.349	(0.19)	0.205	(0.18)	-0.223	(0.15)	0.242	(0.24)
Mujer	-4.578*	(1.05)	-0.914	(1.10)	-2.808*	(1.05)	0.147	(0.70)	-3.881*	(1.13)
Edad	0.314	(0.22)	0.124	(0.21)	0.135	(0.19)	-0.305*	(0.13)	-0.097	(0.20)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.256	(0.53)	-0.655	(0.46)	-0.650	(0.45)	0.328	(0.34)	-0.352	(0.60)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.284	(1.11)	1.179	(0.97)	0.020	(0.67)	2.042*	(0.70)	3.619*	(1.01)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.470	(0.66)	0.193	(0.73)	-0.563	(0.66)	-0.007	(0.57)	1.420*	(0.62)
Sierra	-1.564	(2.14)	1.146	(2.47)	2.836	(1.82)	-1.999	(1.48)	-1.199	(1.98)
Oriente	-8.872*	(2.36)	-10.981*	(2.25)	-4.017	(2.27)	3.862	(2.10)	3.635	(4.25)
Constante	50.277*	(6.18)	59.513*	(6.19)	53.115*	(5.98)	36.127*	(3.26)	42.607*	(4.73)
R-cuadrado	0.038		0.021		0.019		0.032		0.022	
N. de casos	2773		2836		2806		2868		2887	

\* p<0.05

Appendix V-5. Impact of Corruption Perception on Support for Stable Democracy

El impacto de la corrupción según la percepción en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de la corrupción	0.035	(0.03)	<b>0.056*</b>	<b>(0.02)</b>	0.021	(0.02)	<b>-0.061*</b>	<b>(0.02)</b>	0.029	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.092*	(0.03)	-0.066*	(0.03)	-0.103*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.015	(0.03)	0.073*	(0.03)	0.034	(0.02)	0.065*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.688*	(0.20)	0.334	(0.19)	0.166	(0.19)	-0.221	(0.15)	0.163	(0.25)
Mujer	-4.474*	(1.03)	-0.677	(1.13)	-2.763*	(1.07)	0.596	(0.74)	-3.309*	(1.13)
Edad	0.292	(0.22)	0.079	(0.21)	0.038	(0.20)	-0.344*	(0.13)	-0.080	(0.20)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.003*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.299	(0.56)	-0.789	(0.45)	-0.611	(0.46)	0.315	(0.33)	-0.303	(0.63)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.049	(1.11)	1.447	(1.00)	-0.095	(0.66)	2.114*	(0.74)	3.538*	(1.06)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.459	(0.67)	0.080	(0.76)	-0.777	(0.66)	0.112	(0.58)	1.247*	(0.62)
Sierra	-1.450	(2.17)	1.023	(2.51)	2.676	(1.83)	-2.298	(1.49)	-1.403	(1.99)
Oriente	-8.965*	(2.33)	-11.363*	(2.18)	-4.299	(2.19)	3.629	(1.97)	3.384	(4.22)
Constante	47.683*	(6.45)	55.991*	(6.15)	54.781*	(5.96)	40.304*	(3.44)	41.473*	(5.00)
R-cuadrado	0.037		0.025		0.020		0.038		0.020	
N. de casos	2686		2737		2710		2760		2766	

\* p<0.05



# Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical framework

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>2</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy for many aspects of democratic rule. In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are usually used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

## The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, as “system support” and tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be minority rights along with majority rule, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy. The framework shown in represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

## System Support

Before analyzing legitimacy and tolerance, we will examine the first component by itself. The element of political tolerance was discussed in a previous section in this report. As already mentioned, a democratic political system can not survive without support from the majority of its citizens. Part of this support is explained by the existence of political trust in the different elements that compose the political system from the citizenry. To analyze system support, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University has developed an index called “System Support.” This index intends to capture the level of global support that

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Margarita Corral.

<sup>2</sup> Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

citizens give their system of government, in light of the responses to the following five questions:

**B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Probe: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose the number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose the number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

**B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

**B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

**B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

**B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

These variables were measured on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 means “nothing” and 7 means “a lot.” However, for the analysis and the interpretation of the results, this scale was converted to a 0 to 100 scale for each of the five questions.

Figure VI-1 shows the average for each of the five components of the System Support Index for 2008 in Ecuador. The component that receives the most support among citizens is support for institutions of the country, which reaches 50.4 points on 0 to 100 scale. The component with the lowest score is the courts at 37 points. Between both extremes we find system support (48.7), pride in being Ecuadorian (44.1), and basic rights (41).




Figure VI-1. Average of the Components of System Support, 2008

Figure VI-1 shows the statistically significant differences among evaluations of the country's institutions, pride in being Ecuadorian, and trust in the courts.

Figure VI-2 shows the evolution of system support between 2001 and 2008. The average of Ecuadorian system support in 2001 was 39.5; it has increased to 44.4 points in 2008. The lowest level of system support was reached in 2006 when the average declined to 37.4 points on the 0 to 100 scale. Comparing each year to the previous one, we can observe that most of the changes in system support have been statistically significant, especially between 2006 and 2008, with an increase of 7 points, the greatest change in the entire period. Only the change between 2001 and 2004 is not statistically significant.






Figure VI-2. Ecuadorian System Support Index, 2001- 2008

Similarly, Figure VI-3 shows the evolution of the System Support Index between 2001 and 2008 by region. For this purpose, we take into account the three principal regions in Ecuador: Coast, Sierra and Amazonia. The data show slight differences among the three regions respect to support of its citizens to the political system. In general terms, the region that shows the lowest average support is the Sierra, with support levels of approximately 40 points. Additionally, the Sierra shows the lowest variation over time. The Coast, Sierra and Amazonia regions show similar averages, over 40 points, with the exception of 2006 when the Coast had a system support level of 35.2 points, the lowest level of the entire series. The changes in system support have been statistically significant only in Coast region, during the last three time periods. In 2008, it rose more than ten points in comparison to 2006.





Figure VI-3. Ecuadorian System Support Index by region, 2001- 2008

Finally, Figure VI-4 shows the level of system support in comparative perspective with the rest of the study countries in the Americas. When making a regional comparison, results were controlled for the president’s job approval rating in each of the countries, as explained at the beginning of this report; thus, the average for Ecuador in Figure VI-2 was adjusted to 42.3 points. In this sense, it can be observed Ecuador is among the countries with the lowest averages of the region, above only Brazil and Paraguay.



FigureVI-4. System support Index in Comparative Perspective, 2008

## The relation between System Support and Tolerance

We analyze next the interaction between System Support and Political Tolerance. The items used to create the index of “political tolerance” are the same as those we used previously to create the index of citizen support for the right of inclusion.

**Table VI-1. Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support**

Apoyo al Sistema (legitimidad)	Tolerancia	
	Alta	Baja
Alta	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
Baja	Democracia inestable	Democracia en riesgo

From the theoretical viewpoint, we analyze the interrelation between system support and tolerance, and for this purpose dichotomize both into “high” and “low”.<sup>3</sup> Table VI-1 shows the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. A review of each cell shows first that political systems populated largely by citizens who express high system support and high political tolerance are predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the premise that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under such conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and whose citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.

On the other hand, when system support is high but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule might be jeopardized. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is characterized in the lower two cells of Table VI.1, and is directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its

<sup>3</sup> Each of these scales ranges from 0 to 100, with 50 as the average point.

democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, when support is low and tolerance is high, is difficult to predict whether instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown is the predicted outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military, and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the public supports neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

Two caveats apply to this scheme. First, it must be taken into account that the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held, and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that in the long run, attitudes of both the elites and the public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, Seligson and Booth have shown that in Nicaragua, such incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens .

**Table VI-2. Empirical Relation between System Support and Tolerance in Ecuador, 2008**

Apoyo al Sistema (legitimidad)	Tolerancia	
	Alta	Baja
Alta	Democracia estable 15.1%	Estabilidad autoritaria 23.8%
Baja	Democracia inestable 25.5%	Democracia en riesgo 36.3%

Table VI-2 shows the results of how these variables interrelate in Ecuador in 2008. The category with the highest percentage corresponds to democracy at risk (36.3%), followed by authoritarian stability (23.8%). Unstable democracy reaches very similar percentages to those of authoritarian stability (25.5%). Finally, the cell with the lowest percentage corresponds to stable

democracy; that is, only 15.1% of the population expresses both high system support and high tolerance levels.

Table VI-3 shows the temporal evolution of the four categories between 2001 and 2008. The categories of authoritarian stability and democracy at risk show more changes in 2006 and 2008. While the first category increased from 15.2% to 23.1 percent, democracy at risk has decreased from 43.2% to 36.3%. Similarly, unstable democracy also shows a decrease to 25.5%, the lowest percentage of the entire period. In contrast, stable democracy in 2008 had highest value of the entire temporal series--15.1%. With respect to 2006, the percentage of people interviewed placing in the stable democracy cell increased 4%. In all cases one can observe that the major changes have occurred between 2006 and 2008.

Table VI-3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, 2001-2008

		Tolerancia							
		Alta				Baja			
Apoyo al Sistema (legitimidad)		Democracia estable				Estabilidad autoritaria			
		Alta		2001	2004	2006	2008	2001	2004
	13.3%		14.8%	11.9%	15.1%	15.5%	18.0%	15.2%	23.1%
Baja		Democracia inestable				Democracia en riesgo			
		2001	2004	2006	2008	2001	2004	2006	2008
		25.9%	26.8%	29.6%	25.5%	45.1%	40.2%	43.2%	36.3%

In order to have a different perspective of stable democracy in Ecuador, we have compared the percentage of people who report both high system support and a high level of political tolerance with the same percentages from the rest of the study countries in the Americas. Figure VI-5 shows the results of this comparison. In this case we can see that Ecuador is among the countries with the lowest levels of attitudes that favor a “stable democracy.” Only Haiti and Paraguay show levels below Ecuador’s.




Figure VI-5. High system Support and High Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2008

### Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy

Even though we have observed the different levels that Ecuadorians have reached with respect to the percentage of people who report both high support for the system and high tolerance, we are also interested in the reasons for these attitudes and why there are different responses among Ecuadorian citizens. In Figure VI-6 we show results from the logistic regression that was conducted to determine the factors that help to explain the attitudes that favor stable democracy<sup>4</sup>. The logistic regression model included the variables region, government economic performance, crime victimization, corruption victimization and the typical socio-economic variables of size of the city, wealth, age, gender, and education level. From all these

<sup>4</sup> To carry out this analysis we used a new dependent variable called the ‘bar2x2,’ which was generated from the data. This variable reflects the percentage of interviewees who expressed both high system support and high tolerance.

predictors, the only ones that were statistically significant are region and government economic performance, keeping the rest of the variables constant.

Residents of the Amazonia and Sierra areas tend to express lower levels of system support and tolerance compared to residents of the Coast. On the other hand, as the perception of governmental efficacy in the fight against poverty and unemployment increases, the likelihood that citizens support stable democracy increases as well; that is, the likelihood of both system support and tolerance are higher. The coefficients from the regression are depicted in Appendix VI-1.




Figure VI-6. Predictors of High System Support and High Tolerance, 2008

The following two figures show the interrelation between high system support and high tolerance and the resulting statistically significant variables from the analysis of the logistic regression. Figure VI-7 shows the differences that exist between the three regions considered and support for the attitudes that favor a stable democracy. Ecuadorians who reside in the Coastal area show significant differences with respect to the citizens the Sierra and Amazonia regions. Citizens in these two regions show a lower probability of both high system support and high tolerance attitudes.






Figure VI-7. High system Support and High Tolerance by region, 2008

The other variable showing statistical significance in the logistic regression analysis is citizen valuation of the government’s economic performance. As previously shown, this is an index composed by the valuation of the government in its fight against poverty and unemployment. Figure VI-8 depicts the relationship between attitudes that favor a stable democracy and the perception of the government’s economic performance. The line shows a positive relationship between both variables. As the perception of the efficacy of the government in fighting poverty and unemployment increases, the levels of system support and tolerance increase as well.




Figure VI-8. High system Support and high Tolerance according to the Evaluations of Government Economic Performance, 2008

## Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions

The various rounds of interviews conducted by the AmericasBarometer have followed the evolution of trust in a wide series of democratic institutions. In this section, we make a general comparison of the legitimacy of a series of institutions that were covered in the 2008 round. For this purpose we measure “trust” in each of key institutions using a 1 to 7 scale, later converted to the same 0 to 100 scale employed throughout this study.

Figure VI-9 depicts the levels of trust expressed by Ecuadorians in the most important institutions of the political system in 2008. In this sense, we could assert that Ecuadorian citizens show relatively low trust averages in their institutions. Only five institutions (The Catholic Church, the Armed Forces, the president, the National Government and the media) average above fifty points. In comparison to our other study countries, the executive power in Ecuador shows high levels of trust in 2008.

At intermediate levels of trust, we find institutions such as the Ombudsman, the national Constitutional Assembly, the Municipality, and other organizations of civil society such as NGOs and indigenous organizations. Also, institutions of the judicial system, such as the General Attorney’s office, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Supreme Court of Justice, do not reach a 40 point average.




Figure VI-9. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions, 2008

Finally, the low level of trust in key institutions of the democratic system, such as the political parties and the National Congress (when operated) is surprising. Both institutions show an average trust level of only 20 on the 0 to 100 scale.

In order to make a temporal comparison of trust in Ecuadorian institutions since 2001, these institutions have been classified in four groups according to their nature in the political system.

The first group, administrative institutions, contains all institutions related to the executive power in charge of the implementation of public policies at the national and local levels, as well as those related to enforcing public order. Among this first category of institutions we included

the National Government, the Armed Forces, the National Police, the Municipality, the Prefecture, and the Internal Revenue Service.

The levels of trust in this group of institutions from 2001 to 2008 are depicted in Figure VI-10. Throughout the years, in general terms, the levels of trust for each institution have maintained similar averages, with the exception of the national government, which moved from one of the least trusted institutions in 2006 to one of the most trusted among Ecuadorians in 2008. The average level of trust increased more than 30 points in the last two years.

The Armed Forces continues to be the institution with the highest trust level of the entire group; however, it has never exceeded the 62.8 points received in 2001.

With respect to 2006 all the administrative institutions experience an increase in the level of trust in 2008, except for the National Police, whose average trust decreased five points to 37.6; trust that situates this institution as the lowest in the group.

Trust decreased for all these administrative institutions in 2006, but in 2008 they recovered the levels of trust that they enjoyed in 2004, with the exception of a drop in trust for the National Police. The National Government reached its highest levels of the entire series in 2008.




Figure VI-10. Trust in Administrative Institutions, 2001-2008

The second group of institutions is formed by institutions of the judicial power; they include basic institutions of the Ecuadorian system of justice, such as the Office of the Attorney General, the Constitutional Tribunal, The Supreme Court and the Office of the Ombudsman. The evolution of trust in these institutions is depicted in Figure VI-11. From this group, the institution with the highest levels of trust during the entire process is the Office of the Ombudsman, the only one that came close to or exceeded averages of 50 points on the 0 to 100 scale. At the other extreme is the Supreme Court of Justice, the institution that is traditionally the least trusted. Its highest trust average is 33.9 points, reached in 2008, 10 points above its 2006 level.

Similar to administrative institutions, in 2008 the majority of judicial institutions showed increases in their level of trust with respect to 2006; the only exception was the Constitutional

Tribunal, whose trust decreased a point and a half, to an average of 37 points, the lowest level of trust in this organism in the entire period.




Figure VI-11. Trust in the Judicial Power Institutions, 2001-2008

The third group of institutions are related to representative processes due to their relationship with electoral processes or because there are instances of citizen representation. This group includes the National Congress, political parties and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. As depicted in Figure VI-12, this is the group of institutions with the lowest levels of trust since 2001.

From the institutions considered here, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the one with the highest degree of trust among citizens; in fact, it is the only one over 30 points on the 0 to 100 scale. Its highest level of trust of the entire series was reached in 2008, with an average of 39 points.

The National Congress and the political parties share similarly low levels of trust that never have gone above 30 points. Although the National Congress and political parties are two of the

most important institutions in every democratic system, those in Ecuador are two of the least prestigious institutions in the country.

As happened with the majority of institutions, in 2008 the levels of trust also increased with respect to 2006. The three institutions considered here showed an increment of about five points on the scale of institutional trust, close to the 2001 and 2004 levels.




Figure VI-12. Trust in Institutions of Representation, 2001-2008

It is important to note during the 2008 round, the National Constitutional Assembly was in session and rated at about 50 points, a relatively high level of trust. However, we also asked about trust in the National Congress in session before its permanent recess at the end of 2007 mandated by a provision from the Assembly.

The last group of institutions are organizations of civil character. These institutions that represent several sectors of civil society that in one way or another have a relationship with the state or that foster citizen participation in Ecuador's public or political spheres. These civil

institutions are the indigenous movements, labor unions, private entrepreneurs, media, the Catholic Church, and the Civic Commission against Corruption.

Figure VI-13 displays the evolution of citizen trust in this group of institutions. These institutions share the characteristic of not undergoing much change over time in terms of trust. The levels of trust remain more stable than in the case of administrative institutions, the judicial power, or representatives.

The two institutions with the highest levels of trust in this group are the Catholic Church, which has always inspired the highest level of trust since our original survey in 2001, and the media, both of which have always exceeded 50 points on the trust scale of 0 to 100. Nevertheless, trust in the media decreased by almost six points in 2008 in comparison to 2006.

In contrast, the two institutions of civil society that inspire the least trust among Ecuadorian citizens are private entrepreneurs and the worker organizations. In particular, the ratings of labor unions have never exceeded 40 point, and between 2006 and 2008 the level of trust dropped six points to 30.6, the lowest rating of the entire series.

The indigenous movements have maintained great stability over time with respect to the trust they receive from Ecuadorians, at about 45 points. With respect to the Civic Commission against Corruption, this institution has increased its levels of trust from 37 in 2001 to 45.4 in 2008, despite the levels of corruption reported by Transparency International.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> For more information, please see the Chapter II in this report.






Figure VI-13. Trust in Civil Institutions, 2001-2008

## Other Opinions about Democracy

Finally, in the last section in this chapter, we analyze citizen opinions about their preference for democracy over alternative forms of government and their level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. These two elements are analyzed first for 2008, then in a temporal perspective from 2001, and finally, in regional perspective, comparing Ecuador to other countries in the Americas.

An additional way to deepen our knowledge about the legitimacy that citizens may give to the democratic system is to determine the percentage of individuals who prefer democracy over other forms of government. As a result, Figure VI-14 shows the preferences of Ecuadorians with respect to the type of political system with which they agree with most. We found that 77.6% consider that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, as opposed to 12.9% who think that in some instances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. Nine and a half percent of respondents' view said that it did not matter to them whether the system was democratic or non-democratic.




Figure VI-14. Preference for Democracy, 2008

Figure VI-15 shows how the percentage of Ecuadorians in favor of democracy as the best form of government has increased over time. In 2001, only 64.1% were clearly in favor of democracy, while this percentage increased to 77.6% in 2008.




Figure VI-15. Preference for Democracy, 2001-2008

When we compare the percentages of advocates of democracy in the region, we observe in Figure VI-16 that Ecuador is in a high middle position, just with percentages similar to those in El Salvador, Honduras or Bolivia.




Figure VI-16. Preference for Democracy in Comparative Perspective 2008

Despite the finding that a preference for democracy may be fairly widespread among the Latin American population, it is possible that the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works may be more variable, as it is in Ecuador. In this sense, in 2008, 52.8% of the respondents said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the functioning of Ecuadorian democracy; 43.5% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied as observed in Figure VI-17.




Figure VI-17. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy, 2008

Figure VI-18 shows the levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Ecuador in 2004, 2006 and 2008. This past year we found that a high percentage of Ecuadorians is satisfied with the way democracy is working in Ecuador. This percentage reflects an increase of 16.6 points over 2006.. In 2004, only four in 10 Ecuadorians were very satisfied or satisfied.




Figure VI-18. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy, 2001-2008

Finally, Figure VI-19 shows the levels of satisfaction with democracy in the countries of the Americas studied in 2008. Data show that Ecuador is among the countries with the highest percentage of citizens who are satisfied with the way that their democracy functions, below Canada, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Venezuela, the United States, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Brazil.




Figure VI-19. Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2008.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the various aspects of democratic legitimacy in Ecuador. First, the data revealed how system support has increased with respect to 2006, despite the fact that it is still at one of the lowest levels in the Latin American region. A similar tendency is found when analyzing the interaction between system support and political tolerance. The attitudes that favor stable democracy have increased in Ecuador over time, yet they continue to be low in comparative perspective with other countries in the region. Analysis of these attitudes shows that the probability of having both high system support and high political tolerance depends upon perceptions of how the government combats poverty and unemployment. Additionally, Ecuadorians living in the Coast region are more likely to show attitudes that favor stable democracy.

Citizen trust in institutions, in general terms increased in 2008 with respect to 2006. The institutions that inspire the highest levels of trust are the Catholic Church, the Armed Forces, and the National Government, which has gained the most trust among Ecuadorians in the last two years. Moreover, the country's president is also one of the figures with the highest level of trust among Ecuadorians. At the other extreme, the National Congress and political parties continue to be the most distrusted institutions among the citizenry.

Finally, we also observe that the percentage of people who believe that democracy is the best possible form of government has increased, as well as the percentage of individuals who are satisfied with the functioning of democracy. This placed Ecuador in one of the highest rankings in the Latin American region.



## Appendix

Appendix VI-1. Support for Stable Democracy

<b>Apoyo a la democracia estable</b>		
	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	-0.059	(-0.78)
Mujer	-0.020	(-0.36)
Edad	0.029	(0.36)
Riqueza	0.112	(1.40)
Tamaño del lugar	0.044	(0.39)
Victimización por crimen	0.022	(0.34)
Victimización por corrupción	0.051	(0.83)
Desempeño económico del gobierno	0.211*	(2.18)
Sierra	-0.256*	(-2.52)
Oriente	-0.265*	(-2.16)
Constante	-1.819*	(-17.70)
F	2.48	
N. de casos	2893	
* p<0.05		

# Chapter VII. Justice and the rule of Law in Ecuador<sup>1</sup>

## Theoretical Framework

Administering justice is one of the principal functions of the state. In a society where citizens have given control of law enforcement to a central authority, it is important that such is exercised appropriately and with strict observation of pre-established norms. The responsibility of administering justice corresponds generally to the judicial system. If the judicial system functions in a democratic context, three requirements must be fulfilled in order to attain optimal performance: Free access to justice by citizens, efficiency of the judicial function in conflict resolution, and autonomy to act without interference from other public organs or private entities. If these conditions are not fulfilled, citizen trust in the capacity of the state to administer justice decays, decreasing the legitimacy of the judicial system.

The strength of the system of justice administration is without doubt a crucial factor in the democratic system. There are some who think that democratic consolidation cannot occur absent critical conditions, among which is the formation of a stable and autonomous system of justice that generates a feeling of security among the citizenry. A democratic regime with a weak judicial system may be unable to generate the necessary generalized support toward the institutions in charge of ensuring the rule of law. Hoslton and Caldeira observe that the concept of citizenship, crucial in a democratic system, includes at least a notion of justice, legality, access and universality. When the majority of the population perceives that their system of justice is weak and inefficient, a sense of “incomplete citizenship” may arise, decreasing, as a result, the commitment between the democratic system and the people.

The strength of the judicial system is evaluated upon three elements. The first is related to the free access of the citizenry to justice. Free access implies at least two things: First, there should be a physical presence of the judicial institution in all territorial jurisdictions. This means that the offices of the judicial system should be adequately distributed according to the population density throughout the territories of the state. Second, the costs of judicial business and services should be reasonable enough to be able to be used according to needs and convenience. Once free access to justice is in place, mechanisms must be devised for justice to be efficient. An efficient judicial system should comply with two basic conditions: The first, is the speedy dispatch of cases within the terms established by law. The second is the system’s capacity to enforce the sentences established by the judges. The third aspect under which the judicial power can be evaluated is the autonomy that the judiciary should have with respect to the executive and the legislative branches, and the independence that it should enjoy to freely rule

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Juan Carlos Donoso.

against them and without fear of retaliation. It is important to make a theoretical distinction between the terms “autonomy” and “independence.” The former is the attribute that allows the judicial branch to build its own institutional structure. The term “independence” in contrast, is based on the conflict resolution principle by an impartial third party. An independent judicial system can make decisions freely, based on law and facts, without taking in to account third party preferences.

Finally, we would like address the relationship between justice administration and the rule of law. One of the most used terms when we refer to a democratic system is the “rule of law.” The temporal relationship between the rule of law and democracy is parallel to the old quandary about the chicken and the egg. Some argue that the creation of a democratic state is not possible without the previous establishment of the rule of law. Others counter that the rule of law is not necessary for the creation of democracy, but a consequence of it. This is a argument for which a solution is unlikely. What is then, the rule of law? Although most of the population has the notion that the rule of law is linked to the capacity of the system to enforce the law with efficacy and equity, a clear, concise and conclusive definition of ‘the rule of law’ is almost impossible, due to the multidimensionality of a concept like this. From the institutional point of view, the entities in charge of establishing and sustaining the rule of law are closely linked to the judicial function. The judges, courts, and the general attorney are responsible for creating an environment of judicial security for citizens. We should not forget, however, the role of the police as an institution is to protect and serve the citizens. In spite of being under the control of the executive branch, the work of the police is closely linked to the system of justice administration and is thus included in the present analysis.

## Measuring Legitimacy of the Judicial System in Ecuador

In the previous section we mentioned some of the basic aspects that should be taken into consideration in conducting an effective evaluation of justice administration in the country. This chapter is based on citizen attitudes and opinions toward the judicial system and the institutions in charge of upholding the rule of law. This means that the data shown below cannot be considered an exhaustive analysis of the judicial function because for this type of analysis it would be necessary to examine the level of independence of the Supreme Court of Justice and the number of cases resolved by the courts of first, second and third instances respectively, among other things. The data shown in this section are related to the legitimacy given by the citizens of Ecuador to, the institutions that represent justice and the rule of law.. To this effect, we have developed a battery of questions that measures citizen trust in various institutions, as shown in the following table.

Table VII-1. Questions used to Measure trust in Institutions of the rule of law

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Probe: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose the number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose the number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B15.** To what extent do you trust the Public Ministry?
- B18.** To what extent do you trust the National Police?
- B31.** To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court ?

In 2008 the trend is maintained, as depicted in Figure VII-1. The figure shows ratings between 0 and 100 that citizens gave to several public and private institutions. If one sees the five institutions in Table VII-1, it becomes apparent that none of them has a score greater than 40; that is, they do not even reach the average on the scale. It is also worrisome that trust in legal and rule of law institutions is only slightly greater than trust in the National Congress or political parties.

Results depicted in the figure show the current reality of these institutions in Ecuador. The Attorney's office has been under scrutiny in recent months, especially due to its role in cases of various individuals accused of being involved in the Ecuadorian bank crises at the end of the 1990s. The performance of the National Police has also been questioned due to the perceived increase of the criminal acts in recent months. The Supreme Court case is very peculiar. This is an institution that is still trying to solidify itself after its restructure in 2005. Even though the selection process of the new court was public and transparent, in 2006 Ecuadorians were still not convinced that the institution was free from political influence.<sup>2</sup> Almost three years after its installation, the new court is not seen as strong enough to a dependable institution for citizens.

<sup>2</sup> See "Auditoría de la Democracia" 2006, Ecuador, chapter VI.




Figure VII-1. Institutional Trust in Ecuador

At first glance, the results may seem discouraging. However, not everything is negative. A temporal analysis of the trust levels in these institutions shows that, except for the National, trust in courts and in the justice system has substantially improved since 2006, as depicted in Figure VII-2. Most impressive on the graph is substantial increase in trust of the Supreme Court of Justice, the General Attorney’s office and the Ecuadorian judicial system in general. The increase in trust of Ecuadorians in these institutions may indicate that the efforts to improve their images in the eyes of Ecuadorian citizens are slowly showing the hoped-for results; this will be analyzed in more detail later in this chapter. On the other hand, the decrease in the trust levels of the citizens of the National Police, due in part to the factors previously mentioned, is disappointing.




Figure VII-2. Trust in Institutions of the rule of law in Ecuador, 2006-2008

### Judicial System Legitimacy Index

In order to facilitate the analysis of the institutional variables of the rule of law in Ecuador, we have created an index of legitimacy of the system of justice, based on the five questions shown in Table VII-1. It is worth noting that a reliability analysis gave an Alpha coefficient of .89, suggesting that all variables in this index are sufficiently congruent in theoretical terms to group them in a single construct. It is also important to note that even though the National Police is the only institution that showed a decrease in the levels of citizen trust, an individual analysis of each variable revealed that all variables behave equally when we cross them with other control variables; thus it is coherent for them to form part of this index.

Figure VII-3 shows the level of trust of Ecuadorians on their system of justice, compared to the rest of the countries in this study. Even though the figure shows Ecuador as one of the countries with the lowest levels of trust in the rule of law institutions, it is worth mentioning that it is higher compared to the present with the data obtained in 2006.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See “Desafíos a la Democracia en América Latina y el Caribe: Evidencias del Barómetro de las Américas 2006-2007”, [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org)




Figure VII-3. Judicial System Legitimacy Index in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008

## Factors that affect Judicial System Legitimacy


The previous section suggests that despite low levels of legitimacy of the institutions of the rule of law in Ecuador, in the eyes of the citizens, especially when compared to other political institutions and institutions of representation, trust has increased during the last two years. What are the most important factors driving this increment? The first possible explanation is a possible improvement of the services offered by these institutions to the citizenry, reflected in the satisfaction of the users. For this purpose, we have created a battery of questions intended

to measure the reaction of users with respect to the treatment received in some institutions of justice.

**Table VII-2. Questions about Citizen Satisfaction with the dealings with the Institutions of Justice in Ecuador**

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy insatisfecho, algo insatisfecho, algo satisfecho, o muy satisfecho?  
**ST1.** La Policía  
**ST2.** Los Juzgados  
**ST3.** La Fiscalía

Table VII-4 shows the results to these questions, with the recoded scale from 0 to 100. It can be observed that between 2006 and 2008 there is a slight increase in the levels of satisfaction of the users, but in neither case does it exceed the 50 point-level. This means that the majority of the citizens that had dealings with these institutions were dissatisfied. It can also be observed that the difference between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant, suggesting that the services supplied by these institutions have not improved, at least not in the eyes of the citizens that had dealings with them.



**Figure VII-4. Satisfaction with the Institutions of the Rule of law in Ecuador, 2006-2008**

Another possible explanation for the increment that Ecuadorians report in terms of trust in the institutions of the rule of law may be in the decrease in corruption. According to LAPOP



studies, bribes in courts are the greatest instances of corruption.<sup>4</sup> It may be plausible, therefore, that a reduction in corruption in the courts may result in the increase of trust in the institutions of justice. Figure VIII-5 shows the percentage of people who had to pay a bribe in the courts from 2001 to 2008. The figure indicates that in a seven year period there has been a decrease in the levels of corruption at the courts although it is still high. In 2008, almost one in five Ecuadorians who had business with the courts reported having paid a bribe solicited by employees. It can also be observed that the difference between 2006 and 2008 is minimal and not statistically significant, suggesting that there has not been an important reduction in corruption at the courts.




Figure VII-5. Corruption Victimization at the Courts, Ecuador 2001-2008.

As shown previously, the indicators of judicial system performance are not responsible for the increase in trust of the institutions of the rule of law. This does not mean, however, that there are not other indicators or structural variables, unmeasured in this report, such as the efficacy or independence of the judicial system, that are partly responsible for the increase of trust reported by Ecuadorians.

To discover the factors that exerted influence in the increment, we have fitted a linear regression model as shown in Figure VII-6. This model contains socio-demographic variables, such as sex, geographic location, age education, and personal wealth. There are also other

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter V, Figure V-5 on this report.

variables that measure perceptions and experiences, such as the perception of the generalization of corruption in the public sector, the personal experiences such as corruption victimization, current president’s approval rating, and perception of the family economic situation.




Figure VII-6. Factors that affect the Legitimacy of the System of Justice in Ecuador. Results from the Linear Regression

Results from the regression show that only some variables affect the legitimacy of the system of justice in Ecuador. The first has something to do with the perception of the family’s economic situation. Figure VII-7 depicts the relation between that variable and the legitimacy of the system of justice. People who answered that their family’s monthly income is either insufficient or it is enough but still difficult to cover basic needs, report lower levels of trust in the institutions of the rule of law than those who consider that their monthly income is enough to cover their basic needs. Even though this variable is statistically significant, the substantive difference between one another is not large.

Geographic location of people also affects their attitudes toward the institutions of the rule of law. For this regression model we have considered e geographic regions as territorial divisions, except for Galapagos, where the survey was not conducted. Then, we created binary variables for each of the regions and left the Coast as reference because it is the most populated region in Ecuador. Results show that people who reside in the Amazonia tend to be more trustful of the institutions of the rule of law than those who live in the Coastal area. The difference

between people residing on the Coast and on the Sierra is not statistically significant; however, there is tendency of the people of the latter to report lower levels of trust in the institutions of the rule of law with respect to the former, as depicted in Figure VII-8. One of the reasons behind this difference is a lower degree of corruption at the courts reported in the Amazonia, in contrast to the other regions where corruption is more common. Another possible cause is the accumulation of cases. It is possible that in the Amazonia, which is the least populated region in continental Ecuador cases dispatched with more efficacy and thus do not accumulate as much.




Figure VII-7. Effect of the perception of the Family’s Economic Situation in the Legitimacy of the System of Justice, Ecuador 2008

Corruption is one of the most common factors affecting the attitudes of Ecuadorians. Both corruption perception and corruption victimization create feelings of distrust for the institutions of the rule of law that erode their legitimacy. Figure VII-9 depicts the effects that corruption victimization has on the legitimacy of the Ecuadorian system of justice. The relationship is very clear. Results of the linear regression suggest that individuals who think that corruption in the public sector is very generalized show less trust in the institutions of the rule of law than those who perceive the public sector as “not corrupt” or “not very corrupt.” The same directionality, however more notorious, exists when we measure corruption victimization and its effect on the system of justice. The figure shows that people who have been victimized by four or more forms of corruption, for example, in the courts, public hospitals, and even in their own jobs, tend to trust much less in the institutions of the rule of law than those who have been

victimized to a lesser degree or who have not experienced any act of corruption during the last year.




Figure VII-8. Effect of Geographic location on Attitudes toward the System of Justice, Ecuador, 2008

Perhaps the most important variable is approval of the job that the president is doing. Figure VIII-10 shows the relationship between the president’s job approval rating and legitimacy of the judicial system in Ecuador. The difference among people who think that President Correa’s administration is very poor and those who think it is very good is notable, with more than 10 points between each other.

What the figure shows is the reflection of the support for the presidential administration to other instance, suggesting kind of a positive externality. In this case, citizens who trust in President Correa’s administration also trust the system of justice administration, even though it is not institutionally located in the executive branch, and even when the indicators of judicial system performance are not encouraging and have not shown a tangible improvement in the last two years.



Figure VII-9. Relation between Corruption and Legitimacy of the System of Justice, Ecuador 2008




Figure VII-10. Effect of Approval of the President's Administration on the Legitimacy of the Institutions of the Rule of Law, Ecuador 2008

## Legitimacy of the Administration of Justice System and Democracy in Ecuador

The last section in this chapter purports to describe the effect that the trust in institutions of the rule of law can have on the various aspects of democracy in Ecuador. This report shows in its initial chapters a complete description of various aspects that interact in such a complex concept as that of democracy. Appendix VII-2 at the end of this chapter shows the results of four models of linear regression that were conducted to determine the effect that legitimacy of the system of justice administration has on various aspects of democracy, such as the respect for the right of opposition, support for democracy as the best system of government, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust. All these models contain socio-demographic control variables and the attitudes and perceptions of citizens with respect to political and economic matters.

Results from the regressions demonstrate the importance that legitimacy of the institutions of the rule of law have on democracy. Even though the legitimacy index of justice administration is not statistically significant in all models, it is important to note its positive effect on all aspects of democracy. That is, as citizens gain trust in the institutions that administer justice in the state, support for the idea that democracy is the best system of government increases, as well as political tolerance and respect for the right of opposition. The most tangible effect of the legitimacy of the system of justice in Ecuador, as shown in Figure VII-11, is its effect on interpersonal trust. Trust among members of the same street, neighborhood, and colony is essential for democracy because it creates tolerance, understanding, promotes participation and increases social capital, as well as trust in the system of conflict resolution and in the capacity of the state to offer security and administer justice generates feelings of security of confidence with those around us.




Figure VII-11. Effect of Legitimacy of the Justice System on Interpersonal Trust, Ecuador 2008

## Conclusions

This brief chapter has covered the subject of justice administration in Ecuador. Even though there has been an increment in trust among Ecuadorian towards their judicial institutions, these institutions are still among the public entities with low levels of legitimacy in Ecuador. We have not found evidence that the increase in the levels of trust of citizens towards the institutions of the rule of law is due to a substantial improvement of the services offered to the citizenry, nor due to a drastic reduction in the levels of corruption at the courts. Support for the current presidential administration, on the other hand, has been the variable with the greatest influence on individual trust on judicial institutions and on the police.

We reiterate that because the results of our extensive survey are a reflection of various aspects of life in democracy, the data about the functioning of the judicial system should not be considered an exhaustive evaluation of justice administration in Ecuador. Neither can we ignore the possibility that the increment of the legitimacy of the institutions of the judicial system is due to reasons not shown here, such as a greater efficacy of the Supreme Court in the resolution of causes, the efforts of the attorney general's office to be transparent its management, or the assertions that we live in a de-politization of the judicial function.

Finally, we have demonstrated that the importance of citizen trust in their system of justice administration goes beyond the judicial arena and affects other aspects of democracy in positive way, especially interpersonal trust.



## Appendix

Appendix VII-1. Factors that affect the Legitimacy of the System of Justice in Ecuador. Results of the Linear Regression.

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>Error Estándar</b>
Victimización por crimen	-0.018	(-0.78)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.206*	(7.27)
Total de maneras de ser victimizado en año pasado	-0.059*	(-2.55)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.078*	(-3.28)
¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-0.046	(-1.69)
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-0.042	(-1.55)
Sierra	-0.058	(-1.65)
Oriente	0.069*	(2.02)
Riqueza	0.043	(1.48)
Mujer	0.001	(0.04)
Percepción economía familiar	0.090*	(3.27)
Constante	-0.018	(-0.56)
R-cuadrado	0.072	
N. de casos	2726	
*p<0.05		

Appendix VII-2. Effects of the Legitimacy of the Justice Administration System on Support for Democracy, Support for the Right of Participation, Political Tolerance and Interpersonal Trust

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la participación		Tolerancia Política		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Error Est.	Coef.	Error Est.	Coef.	Error Est.	Coef.	Error Est.
Indice de legitimidad del sistema de justicia	0.002	(0.05)	0.012	(0.04)	-0.025	(0.03)	0.137*	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.076*	(0.03)	-0.074*	(0.03)	-0.090*	(0.03)		
Interés en la política	0.016	(0.03)	0.061*	(0.03)	0.029	(0.02)		
Educación	0.759*	(0.20)	0.311	(0.19)	0.171	(0.18)	0.276	(0.25)
Mujer	-4.502*	(1.00)	-0.826	(1.07)	-2.774*	(1.02)	-4.055*	(1.14)
Edad	0.249	(0.22)	0.095	(0.20)	0.154	(0.20)	-0.120	(0.19)
q2sq	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)
Riqueza	-0.366	(0.52)	-0.568	(0.49)	-0.459	(0.47)	-0.447	(0.58)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.440	(1.09)	1.179	(1.01)	0.332	(0.64)	3.103*	(1.03)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.726	(0.63)	-0.130	(0.73)	-0.726	(0.66)	1.425*	(0.59)
Constante	52.000*	(6.52)	60.821*	(6.50)	53.555*	(5.91)	38.712*	(5.16)
R-cuadrado	0.031		0.012		0.014		0.029	
N. de casos	2743		2805		2780		2838	
*p<0.05								



## References

- Abramson, Paul y Ada Finifter. "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978." *American Political Science Review* 25 (1981): 297-307.
- Acemoglu, Daron y James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Abramson, Paul, and Ada Finifter. "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978." *American Political Science Review* 25 (1981): 297-307.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Aghón, Gabriel, Francisco Alburquerque, and Patricia Cortés. *Desarrollo Económico Local Y Descentralización En América Latina: Un Análisis Comparativo*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL 2001.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- , eds. *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston Little Brown, 1980.
- Armony, Ariel. *The Dubious Link : Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Azpuru, Dinorah, Steve Finkel, Aníbal Pérez Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the U.S. Been Doing?" *Journal of Democracy* 19 (2008): 150-59.
- Bardhan, Pranab. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16, no. 4 (2002): 20.
- Barr, Robert. "Parties, Legitimacy and the Motivations for Reform: Devolution and Concentration in Latin America." (2001): 27.
- Becker, David. "Latin America: Beyond Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 2 (1999): 138-51.
- Boix, Carles. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Bollen, Kenneth A., and Robert W. Jackman. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (1986): 567-91.
- Bollen, Kenneth A., and Pamela Paxton. "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 58-86.
- Booth, John A., and Patricia Bayer Richard. "Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization in Central America." *Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998): 780-800.
- Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Cultura Política Y Democratización: Vías Alternas En Nicaragua Y Costa Rica." In *Transiciones a La Democracia En Europa Y América Latina*, edited by Carlos E. Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas and Javier Hurtado, 628-81. México: FLACSO - Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991.
- . *The Legitimacy Puzzle: Political Support and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
- . "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica." In *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, edited by Larry Diamond, 107-38. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
- . "Political Legitimacy and Participation in Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping." *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (2005): 537-50.
- , eds. *Citizen and State: Political Participation in Latin America*. 2 vols. Vol. I. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.

- Brashear, Lydia. "Judicial Independence: Often Cited, Rarely Understood." *Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues* 15 (2006): 129-61.
- Bratton, Michael, and Eric C. C. Chang. "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (2006): 1059-83.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Bunce, Valerie. "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6/7 (2000): 32.
- Cai, Hongbin, and Daniel Treisman. "State Corroding Federalism." *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (2002): 819-43.
- Camp, Roderic Ai, Kenneth M. Coleman, and Charles L. Davis. "Public Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico." Portland, Oregon, 2000.
- Cappelletti, Mauro. "Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility." In *Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by S. Shetreet and J. Deschenes. Dordrecht: martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985.
- Carothers, Thomas. *Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.
- Carrión, Fernando. *La Descentralización En Ecuador: Opciones Comparadas*. Quito: FLACSO, 2007.
- Cleary, Matthew R., and Susan Carol Stokes. *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism : Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust ; V. 11*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.
- Collier, David, Fernando Hidalgo, and Andra Maciuceanu. "Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 3 (2006): 211-46.
- Coppedge, Michael, Angel Alvarez, and Claudia Maldonado. "Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness." *Journal of Politics* (forthcoming).
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Participación Ciudadana En Los Gobiernos Locales En América Central." In *Participación Ciudadana Y Desarrollo Local En Centroamérica*, edited by Ricardo Córdova Macías and Leslie Quiñónez Basagoitia, 307-24. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, 2003.
- Córdova, Ricardo M., and Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local Y Descentralización: I. Centroamérica*. San Salvador: FLASCO, 2001.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Dalton, Russell J. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices : The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- . *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Daughters, Robert, and Leslie Harper. "Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms." In *The State of State Reform in Latin America*, edited by Eduardo Lora, 87 - 121. Washington: Stanford University Press, 2007.

- Dodson, Michael, and Donald W. Jackson. "Horizontal Accountability and the Rule of Law in Central America." In *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Doig, Alan, and Stephanie McIvor. "Corruption and Its Control in the Developmental Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature." *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1999): 657-76.
- Doig, Alan, and Robin Theobald, eds. *Corruption and Democratization*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Easton, David. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-57.
- . *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley, 1965.
- Edwards, Bob, and Michael W. Foley. "Social Capital, Civil Society, and Contemporary Democracy." *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (March/April) (1997).
- Falletti, Tulia. "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 327-46.
- Finkel, S.E., C. Sabatini, and G. Bevis. "Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic,." *World Development* 28 (2000): 1851-74.
- Finkel, Steven E, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003." *World Politics* 59 (2007): 404-39.
- Finot, Iván. *Descentralización En América Latina: Teoría Y Práctica, Gestión Pública*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2001.
- Fiss, Owen. "The Limits of Judicial Independence." *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 25 (1993).
- Gargarella, Roberto. "Judicial Power and Three Conceptions of Impartiality." In *Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary*, edited by Irwin Stosky. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
- Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno. "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective." *World Politics* 57 (2005): 323-64.
- Gibson, James L. "Challenges to the Impartiality of the State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and 'New Style' Judicial Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 59-75.
- . "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): 51-69.
- Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence. "Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory With a Survey-Based Experiment." *Political Research Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2005): 187-201.
- Gilley, Bruce. "The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries " *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 499-525.
- . *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming.
- Goertz, Gary. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (2005): 87-106.
- Hardin, Russell. "Do We Want Trust in Government?" In *Democracy and Trust*, edited by Mark E. Warren, 22-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

- Hawkins, Kirk A, and David R. Hansen. "Dependent Civil Society: The Círculos Bolivarianos in Venezuela." *Latin American Research Review* 41, no. 1 (2006): 102-32.
- Hayen, Goran, and Michael Bratton, eds. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.
- Helliwell, John F., and Robert D. Putnam. "Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy." In *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, edited by Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, 253-68. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2000.
- Herreros, Francisco, and Henar Criado. "The State and the Development of Social Trust." *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 1 (2008): 53-71.
- Hetherington, Marc J. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 791-808.
- . *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Hiskey, Jon, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 (2003): 64-88.
- Holmberg, Soren. "Down and Down We Go: Political Trust in Sweden." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, edited by Pippa Norris editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Holston, James, and Teresa Caldeira. "Democracy, Law and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship." In *The Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, edited by Felipe Aguero. Coral Gables: North-South Press, 1998.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- . "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203-30.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Kaufmann, Daniel. "Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption." In *Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006*, edited by World Economic Forum. Washington: World Bank, 2006.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. "Governance Matters Vi: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006." Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2007.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Arat Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. "Growth and Governance: A Reply." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007): 555-62.
- Kurtz, Marcus J., and Andrew Schrank. "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and Mechanisms." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007): 538-54.
- Larkins, Christopher. "Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis." *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 44, no. 4 (1996): 605-26.

- Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza, and Ana Maria Menendez. "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?" *Economic Development and Social Change* 50, no. 3 (2002): 509-39.
- Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Expanded ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- . *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. 1981 (expanded edition) ed. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and William Schneider. "The Confidence Gap During the Reagan Years, 1981-1987." *Political Science Quarterly* 102, no. 1 (1987): 1-23.
- Mattes, Robert, and Michael Bratton. "Learning About Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 192-217.
- Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. "Five Years after the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, edited by Pippa Norris, 78-99. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Moore Jr., Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966.
- Muller, Edward N., Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (1982): 240-64.
- Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of the Causal Relationships." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 635-54.
- Nickson, R. Andrew. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- Norris, Pippa, ed. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Nye, Jr. Joseph. "The Decline of Confidence in Government." In *Why People Don't Trust Government*, edited by Jr. Joseph Nye, 1-18. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994): 55-69.
- . "The Judiciary and the Rule of Law." *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 1 (2000).
- O'Neill, Kathleen. *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- O'Neill, Kathleen. "Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy." *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 9 (2003): 24.
- Otake, Hideo. "Political Mistrust and Party Dealignment in Japan." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Paxton, Pamela. "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model across 31 Countries." *Social Forces* 86, no. 1 (2007): 47-76.
- . "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment." *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (1999): 88-127.
- . "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." *American Sociological Review* 67 (2002): 254-77.
- Pharr, Susan J. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*,



- edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000b.
- Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam, eds. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000a.
- Power, Timothy J. and Jamison, Giselle D "Desconfianza Política Na América Latina." *OPINIÃO PÚBLICA* 11, no. 1 (2005): 64-93.
- Prillaman, William. *The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America: Declining Confidence in the Rule of Law*. Westport: Praeger, 2000.
- Pritchett, Lant, and Daniel Kaufmann. "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects." *Finance and Development* (1998).
- Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996): 39-55.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Democracies in Flux : The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- . *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Richard, Patricia Bayer, and John A. Booth. "Civil Society and Democratic Transition." In *Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America*, edited by Thomas W. Walker and Ariel C. Armony. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000.
- Rios-Figueroa, Julio. "Judicial Independence: Definition, Measurement and Its Effects on Corruption: An Analysis of Latin America." Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, 2006.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Rose, Richard., and Doh Chull Shin. "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001): 331-54.
- Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M. Uslaner. "All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust." *World Politics* 58, no. 1 (2005): 41-72.
- Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism : The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006.
- Schedler, Andreas, Larry Jay Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. *The Self-Restraining State : Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
- Schwarz-Blum, Vivian. "Economic Performance and Support for the System: Economic Challenges for Latin American Democracies." In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the Americasbarometer 2006 (Forthcoming)*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson, 2008.

- Selee, Andrew. "Exploring the Link between Decentralization and Democratic Governance." In *Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America*, edited by Andrew Selee Joseph Tulchin, 35. Washington, 2004.
- Seligson, Amber L. "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999): 342-52.
- Seligson, Mitchell. "Auditoria De La Democracia: Ecuador 2004." edited by CEDATOS. Quito, 2004.
- . "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 408-33.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. "Democracy on Ice: The Multiple Paradoxes of Guatemala's Peace Process." In *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, edited by Francis Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, 202-31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- . "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002): 408-33.
- . *La Cultura Política De La Democracia Boliviana, Así Piensan Los Bolivianos*, # 60. La Paz, Bolivia: Encuestas y Estudios, 1999.
- . "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* 34, no. 2 (2006): 381-404.
- . *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-up Study*. Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1999.
- . "Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion." Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1997.
- . "On the Measurement of Corruption." *APSA-CP* 13, no. 2 (2002): 5-6, 30.
- . "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000).
- Seligson, Mitchell A., and John A. Booth. "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica." *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 777-92.
- , eds. *Politics and the Poor: Political Participation in Latin America*. 2 vols. Vol. II. New York Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., and Ricardo Córdova Macías. "El Salvador: Entre Guerra Y La Paz, Una Cultura Política En Transición." San Salvador: IDELA and FundaUngo, 1995.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., Steven E. Finkel, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. "Exporting Democracy: Does It Work?" In *Exporting Democracy*, edited by Zoltan Barnay and Robert E. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., José R. López-Cáliz, and Lorena Alcázar. "Does Local Accountability Work? Tracing Leakages' in the Peruvian 'Vaso De Leche' Program " In *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America: New Research on an Old Problem*, edited by Charles Blake and Steve Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., and Edward N. Muller. "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983." *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (1987): 301-26.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Treisman, Daniel. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics*, no. 3 (2000): 399-458.
- . "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action or Continuity." *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 22.

- . "Fiscal Decentralization, Governance, and Economic Performance: A Reconsideration." *Economics and Politics* 18, no. 2 (2006): 219-35.
- Treisman, Daniel, and Hongbin Cai. "Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization and Public Policy." *American Economic Review* 95, no. 3 (2005): 817-30.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. *Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean*. New York, 2007.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Study*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Verner, Joel G. "The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin America: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16, no. 2 (1984): 463-506.
- You, Jong-Sung. "A Study of Corruption, Inequality and Social Trust: Why Inequality and Corruption Inhibit Development." Harvard University, 2006.

## Appendix

### Appendix I: Technical Description of the Sample Design

#### CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA ECUADOR 2008 DESCRIPCIÓN TÉCNICA DE LA MUESTRA

DISEÑO DE LA MUESTRA, TRABAJO DE CAMPO Y ELABORACIÓN DE ARCHIVOS  
EVENTOS QUE RESALTAN EL BUEN DESARROLLO DE LA ENCUESTA Y SUGERENCIAS  
PARA FUTUROS ESTUDIOS

Por: A. Polibio Córdova, Ph.D.

Presidente Ejecutivo de CEDATOS / GALLUP International

La Universidad de Pittsburgh, en 2001, por encargo de USAID /Ecuador realizó una cuidadosa evaluación de las instituciones ecuatorianas dedicadas a la investigación de mercados y de opinión pública a fin de contratar los trabajos relacionados con el estudio "Auditoría de la Democracia". Estos trabajos consistían en el diseño de la muestra, trabajo de campo, validación de la información, ingreso y procesamiento de datos, elaboración de archivos, revisión y edición final del estudio, impresión y difusión a través de seminarios académicos y presentaciones a líderes y dirigentes, medios de comunicación y población en general. De esta evaluación resultó seleccionada CEDATOS / GALLUP International como la firma con mayor formación profesional, experiencia e infraestructura de investigación del país. La experiencia de este primer estudio fue altamente satisfactoria, por lo cual los auspiciantes volvieron a confiar a CEDATOS / GALLUP International la realización de iguales trabajos para el segundo y tercer estudio de la serie "Auditoría de Democracia" que se hicieron en los primeros meses de 2004, 2006 y 2008. Vale mencionar que los procedimientos de muestreo y los estudios Ecuador 2001 y 2004 fueron una referencia de primera mano para el estudio sobre Cultura Política realizado en los países de Centro América, México y Colombia durante el primer semestre de 2004 y luego, en 2006 y 2007, en Chile, Perú y varios países del Caribe. Estos estudios se realizaron bajo la dirección científica del Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson y la dirección general de investigación por muestreo del autor de este artículo.

#### I. Diseño de la Muestra

##### 1. UNIVERSO

El universo de la encuesta contempló una cobertura nacional, en las tres regiones: Sierra, Costa y Amazonía (excepto la región insular de Galápagos) y por áreas urbana y rural. En el año 2001 se amplió a áreas especiales de las provincias fronterizas en las cuales se realizó una encuesta independiente, con similares instrumentos de investigación.

##### 2. POBLACIÓN

Las unidades objeto del estudio están constituidas por la población civil no institucional; se excluyó la población residente en hospitales, orfanatos, colegios, cuarteles, etc., sin embargo, los hogares particulares localizados en estos lugares si se incluyen en la población de muestra.

### 3. UNIDAD DE OBSERVACIÓN - UNIDAD FINAL DE SELECCIÓN

Como el estudio contiene tópicos no solo referidos a la persona (adulto de 18 años o más, en capacidad de votar, que hable español o quichua, pero no otro idioma monolingüe), sino también al jefe de hogar y sus miembros, la **unidad estadística de observación utilizada es el hogar**, en el cual se selecciona a un adulto.

Todo hogar habita una vivienda la misma que puede ser compartida con otros hogares. La vivienda es una unidad de fácil identificación en el terreno, con relativa permanencia en el tiempo, característica que la habilita para ser considerada como la **unidad final de selección**, que se escoge en una manzana en las áreas urbanas, o en un segmento "amanzanado" en las áreas rurales (cabeceras parroquiales).

### 4. EL MÉTODO DE MUESTREO

El método de muestreo es el procedimiento mediante el cual se determina el tamaño de la muestra, la conformación de dominios de estudio, la definición de etapas de selección de las unidades de muestreo, las estimaciones poblacionales a partir de los datos muestrales y el cálculo de los errores implícitos de estas estimaciones.<sup>1</sup>

Para la selección de métodos de muestreo se tuvo en cuenta las siguientes consideraciones:

a) Obtener muestras representativas para los siguientes niveles, estratos y dominios de estudio.

- Total del país
- Estratos de primera etapa:
  - 1. Sierra
  - 2. Costa
  - 3. Oriente
- Estratos de segunda etapa:
  - 1. Área urbana
  - 2. Área rural
- Dominios de estudio:
  - 1. Quito
  - 2. Guayaquil
  - 3. Ciudades con 100 mil o más habitantes, inclusión forzosa
  - 4. Ciudades con 25 mil a 100 mil habitantes
  - 5. Ciudades con menos de 25 mil habitantes.
  - 6. Parroquias rurales<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> CÓRDOVA, P.: "Introducción a la Investigación por Muestreo". Edit. DGEA/México, 1972. Con presentación por Leslie Kish y M. Seligson, Edición 2.006. Ecuador.

<sup>2</sup> Para el tratamiento de áreas rurales, se consideró en el diseño las cabeceras parroquiales (centros poblados) con vivienda "amanzanada" o con la conformación de "segmentos" asimilables a manzanas, cuando la vivienda del centro poblado no estaba estructurado en tales unidades físicas.

- b) Efectuar cálculos de los errores de muestreo que corresponden a estas estimaciones.
- c) Facilitar la operatividad de la encuesta
- d) Afijación óptima que permita un equilibrio razonable entre presupuesto, tamaño de la muestra y nivel de precisión de los resultados.
- e) Utilizar el mejor y más actualizado marco de muestreo disponible para cada ciudad (censos, cartografía, y listados actualizados de vivienda).

A partir de estos antecedentes, el método utilizado corresponde a un sistema de muestreo probabilístico en todas sus etapas, estratificado, multietápico, por conglomerados, con selección aleatoria de unidades en cada etapa e incluye la selección final del adulto a ser entrevistado dentro del hogar de muestra.

El muestreo es estratificado por regiones (Costa, Sierra y Oriente) y áreas (urbana y rural) y es multietápico por cuanto parte de la selección de Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM, cantones); seguido de Unidades Secundarias en cada UPM conformadas por sectores censales; luego Unidades de Tercera Etapa, (manzanas o segmentos) y Unidades Finales de Muestreo (UFM) conformadas en conglomerados de tamaño 6 a 8 en áreas urbanas y 10 a 12 en áreas rurales. En cada unidad de vivienda de estos conglomerados se selecciona a un solo hogar como Unidad de Observación y luego se selecciona y entrevista como Unidad Final de Estudio a uno y solo a un adulto en edad de votar, mediante un proceso aleatorio (Sistema Kish / Córdova).<sup>3</sup> En los estudios de 2004, 2006 y 2008, se utilizó un sistema de cuotas para seleccionar al adulto en cada hogar seleccionado probabilísticamente; estas cuotas consideraron categorías por sexo y tres grupos de edad en cada uno. Como norma de selección probabilística, no se admite sustitución ni reemplazo de las unidades seleccionadas. (Ver procedimiento pertinente más adelante).

La muestra considera la asignación de tamaños que aseguran la consistencia, suficiencia y eficiencia muestral para cada estrato y en el ámbito agregado total. Al interior del estrato la muestra es autoponderada, pero requiere ponderación para agregación de estratos (Sierra, Costa y Oriente) dado el tamaño menor de la región oriental. En cada estrato la selección de la muestra se realiza con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño de cada dominio.

El diseño permite calcular oportunamente y mediante procesos versátiles y sencillos, resultados por estratos, dominios y agregados de toda la población para las principales variables y características socio-demográficas consideradas en el estudio.<sup>4 5</sup> Adicionalmente y con el objeto de hacer más precisa la comparación entre los estudios de 2001, 2004, 2006 y 2008 se mantuvieron las unidades de selección hasta la etapa previa a la unidad final.

---

<sup>3</sup> CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

<sup>4</sup> KISH, L.: "Survey Sampling": John Wiley & Sons. 1965.

<sup>5</sup> RAJ, D.: "Sampling Theory". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Caps. 4-5 traen extensa aplicación de estos métodos de selección.

## 5. MARCO MUESTRAL

El marco de muestreo está constituido por el inventario cartográfico y el listado de viviendas por ciudad y parroquia de muestra obtenidos de la información del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda de 2001, con actualizaciones cartográficas y nuevos recuentos de edificaciones y viviendas efectuados por CEDATOS al año 2008.

La conformación de los marcos muestrales por ciudad cubrió las siguientes etapas:

1. Actualización de la cartografía con información obtenida en instituciones públicas y privadas que desarrollan programas de vivienda y mediante verificación en el terreno de los límites cartográficos de las ciudades, levantamiento de mapas de las áreas con nuevos desarrollos, a fin de registrar la creación o eliminación de manzanas y segmentos rurales.
2. Recuento de edificaciones, viviendas y población residente por edades, elaborando listados con las direcciones e identificación de las viviendas por manzanas, para todas las secciones cartográficas de muestra en cada ciudad y parroquia seleccionadas. Este es un trabajo que ha venido realizando CEDATOS por más de 33 años de investigación directa en áreas urbanas y rurales.

## 6. TAMAÑO DE LA MUESTRA

Para la determinación del tamaño de muestra se parte de los siguientes criterios: se utiliza un procedimiento de muestreo por conglomerados finales de un tamaño 6 a 8 en áreas urbanas y 10 a 12 en áreas rurales. Esta última es la variable explicativa del diseño y la función de la variabilidad<sup>6</sup>. El efecto de diseño resultante del muestreo de conglomerados (DEF) se estima en 1.022, en promedio, para el caso de tres estratos, con tamaños de conglomerados de 6 a 12.

---

<sup>6</sup> Ver: KISH, L.: "Statistical Design For Research".- John Wiley. 1987. Tratamiento de efecto de diseño, Caps. 2 y 7 y "Survey Sampling" Caps 2 y 11.

El ajuste del tamaño de la muestra a partir de un muestreo simple aleatorio, ajustado por conglomerados, viene dado por:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ(DEF)}{n}}$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ (DEF)}{E^2}$$

Donde:

E = Banda de error probable (+/- 0.05)

P = Porcentaje de población con un atributo dado del 50%.

Q = (1-P) Porcentaje de la población sin el atributo considerado en P. Q= 50%.

DEF = Efecto de Diseño. Relación de varianzas del diseño de muestreo utilizado, por conglomerados, respecto a un muestreo simple aleatorio. Este valor fluctúa entre 1.0 y 2.0, tendiendo a ser menor conforme es menor el tamaño del conglomerado y la real varianza de la muestra estratificada.<sup>7</sup> Hay una directa compensación entre el aumento en la varianza real por efecto del muestreo por conglomerados con la disminución de la varianza real por estratificación con asignación de tamaños proporcionales al tamaño del estrato. Con esta base y a partir de tablas de DEF, se estimó para el presente diseño un DEF= 1.022.<sup>8</sup> para regiones Costa y Sierra y DEF= 1.011 para región Oriente.

Z = Valor de la distribución normal. Para un nivel del 95% de confianza, este valor es 1.965.

n = Tamaño de muestra

## 7. CÁLCULOS DE TAMAÑOS POR ESTRATOS, DOMINIOS, UPM Y PUNTOS DE MUESTRA

El diseño de muestra consideró asignación de unidades de selección para las 21 provincias del país, si bien la muestra no es suficiente para representar a la provincia respectiva, pero sí a los estratos Costa, Sierra y Oriente. A partir de la primera etapa que constituye la selección de Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM), estos se categorizan en población urbana y rural para la asignación de tamaños con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño. En la región Oriente se consideró las divisiones Oriente Norte y Oriente Sur.

<sup>7</sup> FRANKEL, M. "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". ISR; The University of Michigan. 1971.

<sup>8</sup> FRANKEL, M: Op. Cit. Tablas de DEF y discusión.



En total la muestra está constituida por 423 puntos de muestra: 291 urbanos y 132 rurales, distribuidos en 61 cantones de las 23 provincias continentales.

Los agregados de los tamaños (nh), producen tamaños (nd) por dominio (1. Quito, 2. Guayaquil, 3. ciudades de 100 mil y más habitantes, como inclusión forzosa, probabilidad 1; 4. ciudades de 25 a 100 mil habitantes; 5. ciudades de menos de 25 mil habitantes, y 6. parroquias rurales) suficientes para estimaciones de resultados totales y desagregados por grupos de edad y otras variables sociodemográficas.<sup>9</sup>

$$nd = \sum_h n_{hd}$$

## 8. TAMAÑOS DE MUESTRA, NIVELES DE CONFIANZA Y MÁRGENES DE ERROR

El nivel de confianza previsto para toda la muestra nacional fue del 95% ( $Z_{.95} = 1.965$ ) con un margen de error +/- 2%, asumiendo una proporción 50/50 ( $P = 0.50$ ;  $Q = 1 - P$ ); Para variables dicotómicas, en el peor de los casos. Se asume un DEF de 1.022 por el sistema de muestreo por conglomerados para las regiones sierra y costa y de 1.011 para la región oriental, donde se tuvo estratificación interna en zona norte y sur.

Con este antecedente, los márgenes de error probable por estratos para un muestreo simple aleatorio y el muestreo por conglomerados efectivamente utilizado, son los siguientes:

### TAMAÑOS DE MUESTRA Y MÁRGENES DE ERROR

Nivel de confianza del 95%

Estratos	muestra	Tamaño de M. S. A.	Margen de error (%) M.P.C.
<b>REGIONES</b>			
Sierra	1 186	2.90	2.97
Costa	1 322	2.70	2.79
Oriente	492	4.49	4.54
<b>POR ÁREAS</b>			
Urbana	1 855	2.30	2.38
Rural	1 145	2.90	2.99
<b>TOTAL PAÍS</b>	<b>3000</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>1.86</b>

<sup>9</sup> GUENTHER, W.: "Introducción a la Inferencia Estadística". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Caps. 3-5, para ejercicios sobre estas aplicaciones.

## 9. AJUSTE POR NO COBERTURA

Para asegurar la eficiencia, suficiencia y precisión de la muestra se adoptó un sistema de muestreo con "**Ajuste por no cobertura**", el cual garantiza la ejecución de la muestra con los tamaños estimados como mínimos dentro de los niveles de confianza y de error máximo permisible.<sup>10</sup> Adicionalmente el sistema asegura la eliminación de sesgos (bías) resultantes de la sustitución o reemplazo de unidades que no pueden ser objeto de entrevista. Este sistema presupone un costo importante para CEDATOS, pero garantiza la calidad de la información. El método es posible por el conocimiento que tiene la organización de la "No cobertura" observada en estudios similares en los ámbitos nacional, urbano y rural.

El sistema consiste en aplicar a los tamaños de muestra (n) estimados para cada estrato, dominio y UPM un factor de no cobertura (t), con lo cual se calcula el tamaño operativo final de selección (n\*), dado por:

$$n^* = (1 + t) n$$

t = Tasa de no entrevista. Esta tasa considera situaciones de no cobertura (no entrevista, rechazos, viviendas desocupadas, ausencia del adulto, o imposibilidad de entrevistarlos después de la 3ª visita, además de otros posibles eventos) Según la experiencia de CEDATOS e información disponible proveniente de sus estudios, la tasa (t) es diversa por provincia, región, tamaño de la ciudad, nivel socio económico del hogar, área urbana o rural, etc.

**n\* = Tamaño final de muestra a seleccionarse:  $n^* = (1 + t) n$**

La tasa t promedio para la muestra nacional fue de 0.18, con lo cual:

$$n^* = (1 + 0.18) 3000 = 3.540 \text{ adultos a ser entrevistados.}$$

*El tamaño realmente obtenido al final de la encuesta fue de 3.000 adultos, número previsto para la muestra nacional. Por estratos y por áreas urbanas y rurales, la muestra se cumplió óptimamente.*

## 10. PERSONAL QUE TRABAJÓ EN ESTA ENCUESTA

CEDATOS puso todo su esfuerzo para que esta investigación se cumpla con éxito. Se cumplieron los tamaños esperados, sin tener que recurrir a ponderaciones posteriores por tamaños incompletos, lo cual introduce errores considerables de muestreo y ajenos al muestreo; los niveles de confianza y márgenes de error que están dentro o más allá de lo esperado, tienen

---

<sup>10</sup> CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

una garantía adicional de suficiencia de la muestra en cuestión de tamaños y de calidad de la encuesta.

CEDATOS asignó a esta investigación un total de 254 personas que se clasifican como sigue:

Cuadro No. 2  
PERSONAL ASIGNADO POR CEDATOS AL ESTUDIO  
"AUDITORÍA DE LA DEMOCRACIA 2008"

FUNCIONES	Total personas
1. Coordinadores de campo	20
2. Supervisores de campo	40
3. Entrevistadores	120
4. Entrevistadores bilingües quichua / español	3
5. Supervisores bilingües quichua / español	1
4. Validadores de información en campo	15
5. Crítico / codificadores	20
6. Digitadores para ingreso de datos	15
7. Validadores de ingreso de datos	4
<b>TOTAL EN CAMPO Y DIGITACIÓN</b>	<b>238</b>
8. Personal directivo y profesional	12
9. Personal administrativo	4
<b>TOTAL DE RECURSOS HUMANOS</b>	<b>254</b>

## 11. UNIVERSO, POBLACION TOTAL, POR REGIONES (COSTA, SIERRA Y ORIENTE), POR AREAS URBANA Y RURAL Y POR DOMINIOS DE ESTUDIO.

ECUADOR: POBLACION TOTAL, AÑO 2008

Miles de habitantes

	Total República	SIERRA	COSTA	ORIENTE
	13,582	6,111	6,808	662
Urbano	8,766	3,614	4,871	281
Rural	4,816	2,497	1,936	381

Distribución porcentual (%)

	Total República	SIERRA	COSTA	ORIENTE
Total	100%	45.0%	50.1%	4.9%
Urbano	100%	41.2%	55.6%	3.2%
	64.5%	59.1%	71.5%	42.4%
Rural	100%	51.8%	40.2%	7.9%
	35.5%	40.9%	28.4%	57.6%

ESTRATOS SIERRA Y COSTA

Miles de habitantes

	Total Sierra Y Costa	SIERRA	COSTA
Total	12,919	6,111	6,808
Urbano	8,485	3,614	4,871
Rural	4,433	2,497	1,936

Distribución Porcentual (%)

	Total República	SIERRA	COSTA
Total	100%	47.3%	52.7%
Urbano	100%	42.6%	57.4%
	65.7%	59.1%	71.5%
Rural	100%	56.3%	43.7%
	34.3%	40.9%	28.4%

Fuente: INEC. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.

Elaboración: CEDATOS. Departamento de Operaciones

SIERRA  
URBANO

Ciudades de 100 Mil y más Habitantes

PROVINCIA	CIUDAD	POBLACION	%	MUESTRA	UPM	Puntos de Muestra
PICHINCHA	Quito	1,559,295	55.8%	303	12	45
PICHINCHA	Sto. Doming	222,663	8.0%	43	2	7
IMBABURA	Ibarra	140,095	5.0%	27	1	5
TUNGURAHUA	Ambato	200,641	7.2%	39	1	6
CHIMBORAZO	Riobamba	67,260	6.0%	32	1	4
AZUAY	Cuenca	359,730	12.9%	70	2	9
LOJA	Loja	143,382	5.1%	28	1	4
			100%			
TOTAL 100 mil +		2,793,066	77.3%	542	20	80
RESTO SIERRA URBANO						
(25 mil a 100 mil Hab.)		405,713	11.2%	78	5	12
RESTO SIERRA URBANO						
(Menos de 25 mil Hab.)		415,280	11.5%	81	12	12
TOTAL SIERRA urbano		3,614,059	100%	701	37	104
RURAL						
EN CANTONES CON						
+ DE 100 MIL		742,644	29.7%	144	20	15
RESTO SIERRA RURAL						
(25 mil a 100 mil Hab.)		1,041,188	41.7%	202	5	1
RESTO SIERRA RURAL						
(Menos de 25 mil Hab.)		713,651	28.6%	139	12	26
TOTAL SIERRA RURAL		2,497,483	100%	485	37	62
TOTAL MUESTRA SIERRA				1,186	37	166

COSTA

URBANO

Ciudades de 100 Mil y más Habitantes

PROVINCIA	CIUDAD	POBLACION	%	MUESTRA	UPM	Puntos de Muestra
GUAYAS	Guayaquil	2194442	62.0%	426	15	65
GUAYAS	Milagro	125368	3.5%	24	1	4
GUAYAS	Durán	192909	5.4%	37	1	6
ESMERALDAS	Esmeraldas	115468	3.3%	22	1	3
MANABI	Portoviejo	229089	6.5%	45	1	7
MANABI	Manta	202698	5.7%	39	1	6
LOS RIOS	Quevedo	137665	3.9%	27	1	4
LOS RIOS	Babahoyo	106196	3.0%	21	1	3
EL ORO	Machala	236589	6.7%	46	2	7
			100%			
TOTAL 100 MIL +		3,540,424	72.7%	687	24	105

RESTO COSTA URBANO

(25 mil a 100 mil Hab.) 807,118 16.6% 157 10 30

RESTO COSTA URBANO

(Menos de 25 mil Hab.) 523,893 10.8% 101 8 17

TOTAL COSTA urbano 4,871,435 100% 945 42 152

RURAL

RESTO COSTA RURAL

(25 mil a 100 mil Hab.) 1,219,916 66.0% 249 10 27

RESTO COSTA RURAL

(Menos de 25 mil Hab.) 629,430 34.0% 128 8 16

TOTAL COSTA RURAL 1,849,346 100% 377 18 43

TOTAL MUESTRA COSTA 1,322 42 195

TOTAL SIERRA Y COSTA

URBANO 1646 79 256

RURAL 862 79 105

TOTAL 2508 79 361

## 12. TAMAÑOS Y DISTRIBUCION DE LA MUESTRA POR ESTRATOS.

### RESUMEN GENERAL

#### CEDATOS / GALLUP INTERNACIONAL

#### TAMAÑOS DE MUESTRA Y DISTRIBUCION POR ESTRATOS

	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL
SIERRA	Total	Total	Total
+ de 100 mil	542	144	686
25 a 100 mil	78	202	280
- 25 mil	81	139	220
Total Sierra	701	485	1186

COSTA			
+ de 100 mil	687		687
25 a 100 mil	156	249	405
- 25 mil	102	128	230
Total Costa	945	377	1322

Total Sierra y Costa	1646	862	2508
----------------------	------	-----	------

	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL
ORIENTE	Total	Total	Total
ZONA NORTE	113	161	274
ZONA SUR	96	122	218
Total Oriente	209	283	492

TOTAL	1855	1145	3000
-------	------	------	------

### RESUMEN GENERAL

TOTAL PAIS POR REGIONES	MUESTRA	UPM	Puntos de muestra
SIERRA	1186	37	166
COSTA	1322	42	195
ORIENTE	492	10	62
TOTAL	3000	89	423

#### POR AREAS

URBANO	1855	89	291
RURAL	1145	89	132

■ **Cultura política de la democracia en Ecuador, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad**

TOTAL                      3000                      89                      423



CIUDADES Y PARROQUIAS  
ENCUESTA NACIONAL: SELECCIÓN DE LA MUESTRA

ENCUESTA NACIONAL: S13. SELECCIÓN DE LA MUESTRA POR ESTRATOS Y AREAS  
ELECCIÓN DE LA MUESTRA

1. POR ESTRATOS (REGIONES COSTA, SIERRA Y ORIENTE)
2. POR AREAS ( URBANA Y RURAL)
3. POR UPM (PSU's)
4. POR CANTONES, PROBABILIDAD PROPORCIONADA AL TAMAÑO (pps)
5. PUNTOS DE MUESTRA Y TAMAÑOS FINALES, PROBABILIDAD PROPORCIONADA AL TAMAÑO (pps)

SIERRA

SELECCIÓN (100 Mil o Más Hab.)

PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano Parroquia Rural		UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar TOTAL	
	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural		
1. Imbabura	Ibarra	La Esperanza	1	5	2	27	19	46	33	23	56	
2. Pichincha	Quito	Puembo	15	1	45	4	303	38	341	370	46	
3. Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	Alluriquin	2	1	7	2	43	21	64	52	26	
4. Tungurahua	Ambato	Quizapincha	2	1	6	2	39	19	58	48	23	
5. Chimborazo	Riobamba	Cubijiles	2	1	4	2	32	15	47	39	18	
6. Azuay	Cuenca	San Joaquín	3	1	9	2	70	21	91	85	26	
7. Loja	Loja	Taquil	1	1	4	1	28	11	39	34	13	
TOTAL					80	15	542	144	686	661	176	837

RESTO SIERRA

SELECCIÓN (De 25 a 100 Mil Hab.)

PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano Parroquia Rural		UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar TOTAL	
	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural		
8. Imbabura	Otavalo	San Pablo	1	73.4/125.4	2	4	12	36	48	15	44	
9. Pichincha	Rumiñahui	Cotogchoa	1	74.4/125.4	2	4	11	42	53	13	51	
10. Cotopaxi	Latacunga	Belisario Que	1	116.7/125.4	4	4	24	37	61	29	45	
11. Bolívar	Cuaranda	Guanujo	1	73.1/125.4	2	4	15	40	55	18	49	
12. Cañar	Azogues	Cojitambo	1	67.8/125.4	2	5	16	47	63	20	57	
TOTAL					12	21	78	202	280	95	246	341

RESTO SIERRA

SELECCIÓN (Menos de 25 Mil Hab.)

PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano Parroquia Rural		UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar TOTAL	
	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural		
13	Carchi	Montúfar	La Paz	1	32.6/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17
14	Imbabura	Cotacachi	Imantag	1	36.2/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10
15	Pichincha	Mejía	Tandapi	1	60.6/125.4	1	3	7	19	26	9	23
16	Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	Canchagua	1	15.8/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10
17	Tungurahua	Baños	Lligua	1	17.2/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17
18	Chimborazo	Guano	San Gerardo	1	40.5/125.4	1	2	6	13	19	7	16
19	Chimborazo	Guamote	Palmira	1	33.9/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17
20	Cañar	Biblián	Turupamba	1	23.8/125.4	1	2	7	9	16	9	11
21	Azuay	Santa Isabel	Abdón Calder	1	21.3/125.4	1	3	7	16	23	9	20
22	Azuay	Chordeleg	San Martín de I	1	9.9/125.4	1	2	5	8	13	6	10
23	Loja	Calvas	El Lucero	1	31.0/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10
24	Loja	Catamayo	San Pedro de	1	24.5/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10

## Cultura política de la democracia en Ecuador, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad

TOTAL 12 26 81 139 220 99 170 268

### COSTA

#### SELECCIÓN (100 Mil o Más Hab.)

	PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano	Parroquia Rural	UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar
					Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	
25	Guayas	Guayaquil	15	1	65		426		426	520		520
26	Guayas	Milagro	1	1	4		24		24	29		29
27	Guayas	Durán	1	1	6		37		37	45		45
28	Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	1	1	3		22		22	27		27
29	Manabí	Portoviejo	1	1	7		45		45	55		55
30	Manabí	Manta	1	1	6		39		39	48		48
31	Los Ríos	Quevedo	1	1	4		27		27	33		33
32	Los Ríos	Babahoyo	2	1	3		21		21	26		26
33	El Oro	Machala	2	1	7		46		46	56		56
			TOTAL		105	0	687	0	687	838	0	838

### RESTO COSTA

#### SELECCIÓN (De 25 a 100 Mil Hab.)

	PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano	Parroquia Rural	UPM	Probabilidad de Selección	Puntos de Muestra	TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar			
								Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	
34	Esmeraldas	Quinindé	La Unión	1	93.4/152.6	3	3	15	29	44	18	35	54
35	Manabí	Jipijapa	América	1	98.1/152.6	3	3	15	29	44	18	35	54
36	Manabí	Sucre	San vicente	1	100.5/152.6	3	3	15	30	45	18	37	55
37	Manabí	Chone	Canuto	1	126.2/152.6	3	3	18	27	45	22	33	55
38	Guayas	Daute	Limalpa	1	88.4/152.6	3	3	15	31	46	18	38	56
39	Guayas	Santa Elena	Atahualpa	1	104.8/152.6	3	3	17	27	44	21	33	54
40	Guayas	El Empalme	El Rosario	1	65.9/152.6	3	3	15	30	45	18	37	55
41	Los Ríos	Ventanas	Zapotal	1	72.8/152.6	3	2	15	16	31	18	20	38
42	El Oro	Huaquillas	Hualtao	1	41.8/152.6	3	2	15	15	30	18	18	37
43	El Oro	Santa Rosa	La Avanzada	1	65.1/152.6	3	2	17	15	32	21	18	39
			TOTAL		30	27	157	249	406	191	304	495	

### RESTO COSTA

#### SELECCIÓN (Menos de 25 Mil Hab.)

	PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano	Parroquia Rural	UPM	Probabilidad de Selección	Puntos de Muestra	TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar			
								Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	
44	Esmeraldas	Atacames	Tonchigue	1	22.8/152.6	3	2	17	18	35	21	22	43
45	Manabí	Bolívar	Quiroga	1	43.1/152.6	3	2	17	15	32	21	18	39
46	Manabí	Rocafuerte	Resbalón	1	29.2/152.6	3	2	17	15	32	21	18	39
47	Guayas	Colimes	General Vernaza	1	21.6/152.6	1	2	8	17	25	10	21	30
48	Guayas	Yaguachi	Virgen de Fátima	1	56.0/152.6	1	2	8	17	25	10	21	30
49	Los Ríos	Urdaneta	Ricaurte	1	28.1/152.6	1	2	8	16	24	10	20	29
50	Los Ríos	Buena Fe	Patricia Pilar	1	34.1/152.6	2	2	9	15	24	11	18	29
51	El Oro	El Guabo	Borbones	1	41.4/328.3	3	2	17	15	32	21	18	39
			TOTAL		17	16	101	128	229	123	156	279	

### ORIENTE (ZONA NORTE)

#### SELECCIÓN (De 25 a 100 Mil Hab.)

	PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano	Parroquia Rural	UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar	
					Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural		
52	Sucumbios	Lago Agrio	El Eno	1	65.5/60.9	6	5	36	51	87	44	62	106
53	Napo	Tena	Puerto Misahu	1	56.9/60.9	4	3	24	33	57	29	40	70
54	Orellana	Orellana	San Luis	1	32.7/60.9	4	3	22	33	55	27	40	67
			TOTAL		14	11	82	117	199	100	143	243	

SELECCIÓN (Menos de 25 Mil Hab.)

	PROVINCIA	Cantón urbano	Parroquia Rural		UPM	Probabilidad de Selección		Puntos de Muestra		TOTAL	Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar TOTAL
						Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural		Urbano	Rural	
55	Scumbios	Cascales	Sevilla	1	16.3/60.9	3	2	16	22	38	20	27	46
56	Napo	Quijos	Cosanga	1	6.7/60.9	3	2	15	22	37	18	27	45
TOTAL						6	4	31	44	75	38	54	91

ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)

SELECCIÓN (De 25 a 100 Mil Hab.)

57	Pastaza	Pastaza	10 de Agosto	1	49.6/60.9	4	2	24	21	45	29	26	55
58	Morona	Morona	Rio Blanco	1	67.6/60.9	2	1	14	11	25	17	13	30
TOTAL						6	3	38	32	70	46	39	85

RESTO DE ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)

SELECCIÓN (Menos de 25 Mil Hab.)

59	Morona	Sucúa	Huambí	1	19.6/60.9	3	3	17	30	47	21	37	57
60	Zamora	Zamora	Timbara	1	41.9/60.9	4	3	27	31	58	33	38	71
61	Zamora	Zumbí	Paquisha	1	6.6/60.9	2	3	14	29	43	17	35	52
TOTAL						9	9	58	90	148	71	110	180

RESUMEN GENERAL

POR REGIONES		Número de Cantones		PUNTOS DE MUESTRA			TAMAÑO DE MUESTRA		TAMAÑO A SELECCIONAR
		URBANO	RURAL	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL
SIERRA	24	104	62	701	485	1186	855	591	1446
COSTA	27	152	43	945	377	1322	1,152	460	1612
ORIENTE	10	35	27	209	283	492	255	345	600
TOTAL	61	291	132	1855	1145	3000	2262	1396	3659
POR AREAS	61	291	132	1855	1145	3000	2262	1396	3659

14. MAPA DEL ECUADOR. UBICACIÓN GEOGRÁFICA DE LA MUESTRA.

**ECUADOR**  
**CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: ECUADOR 2008**  
**Distribución Geográfica de la Muestra**



Elaboración: CEDATOS - GALLUP International Ecuador

15. DETALLES DEL DISEÑO: FRACCIONES DE MUESTREO

Para la determinación de las fracciones de muestreo (f) se consideran las distintas etapas de selección <sup>1</sup>

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

<sup>1</sup> CÓRDOVA, P.: Op. Cit. También "Metodología de la Encuesta Nacional de hogares". Edit. DANE, Colombia, 1972-1984.

- $f_i$  = Fracción de muestreo de la etapa i.
- $n_i$  = Tamaño de muestra para etapa i
- $N_i$  = Total de viviendas en etapa i

Para cada etapa de selección la fracción resultante será:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (etapas 1, 2, 3 y 4)}$$

Donde:

- $f_1$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 1: UPM
- $f_2$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 2: sectores
- $f_3$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 3: (manzanas o segmentos)
- $f_4$  = Probabilidad de selección del conglomerado dentro de la manzana o segmento

Dado que se toman conglomerados de h viviendas por manzana de muestra, la fracción se convierte en:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVM}$$

Donde:

TVM = es el número total de viviendas en la manzana o segmento

La fracción global de muestreo (probabilidad de selección dentro de cada UPM) debe cumplir la condición:

$$PU = \frac{TVS}{TVU} \times \frac{TVM}{TVS} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVM}$$

- TVU = Total de viviendas en la UPM
- TVS = No. de viviendas en el sector
- TVM = No. de viviendas en la manzana
- NH = No. de hogares en las h viviendas del conglomerado seleccionado
- h = h Hogares a seleccionar en cada conglomerado y 1 persona en cada uno de estos hogares

### Probabilidad final de selección

La probabilidad final de selección del conglomerado (g) está dada por:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_s}{T_T} \times \frac{T_m}{T_s} \times \frac{T_g}{T_m} = \frac{T_g}{T_T} = \frac{1}{T_T}$$

Donde:

$T_T$  = Número total de viviendas en la ciudad (UPM)

$T_s$  = Número de viviendas del sector

$T_m$  = Número de viviendas en la manzana seleccionada

$T_g$  = Número de conglomerados de h viviendas por manzana

En general, la probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado cualquiera en la ciudad o área rural c estará dada por:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{n_c}{N_c} = f_c$$

Donde:

$P_c$  = Probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado de h viviendas en la ciudad c.

$T_{Mc}$  = Número de manzanas a seleccionar en la ciudad y en estas a h viviendas finales

$T_{Tc}$  = Total de viviendas en la ciudad

$n_c$  = Tamaño de la muestra ciudad c

$N_c$  = Tamaño de la población área c

$f_c$  = Fracción global de muestreo por ciudad c (UPM)

## 16. PROCEDIMIENTOS DE ESTIMACIÓN A PARTIR DE LA MUESTRA

Los resultados de la muestra deben ser tratados a nivel de cada UPM para producir estimaciones de totales poblacionales<sup>2</sup>. El factor de restitución a ser aplicado a cada UPM seleccionado se define como el producto de:

- a) Peso básico (F). El peso básico es igual al "intervalo de selección" del UPM.
- b) Ajuste de cobertura por no respuesta: ( $R_{hj}$ ). El ajuste de no respuesta se calcula para cada manzana (conglomerado) y se aplica a cada hogar entrevistado (con entrevista completa) dentro del conglomerado.

<sup>2</sup> KAJ, D.: Op. Cit. Cap. 9, métodos de cálculo de errores para diversos tipos de muestreo. CÓRDOVA P.: Op. cit.

c) Este resulta de dividir el número de hogares seleccionados encontrados y efectivamente encuestados (con entrevista completa) en la manzana. El factor final de restitución ( $W_{hj}$ ) a ser aplicado a cada manzana es el producto de los dos anteriores.<sup>3</sup> Revisar La estimación del total para una característica X de la población, está dada por:

$$d) \quad X' = \sum_{h=1}^d \sum_{j=1}^{n_h} X_{hj} W_{hj}$$

$$W_{hj} = (F) \cdot (R_{hj})$$

Donde:

h = 1,2, ..... unidades de dominio h

j = 1, 2,..... manzanas seleccionadas para la muestra en la ciudad h.

$n_h$  = Número total de manzanas en la muestra de la ciudad h.

$W_{hj}$  = Factor de restitución de la manzana j en la ciudad hj

X = Estadística X para la manzana j de la ciudad h.

$$X = \sum_{k=j}^{T_{hj}} X_{hjk}$$

$X_{hjk}$  = Estadística X para el hogar k, la manzana j, de la ciudad h.

k = 1,2,..... hogares con entrevista completa en la manzana j de la ciudad h

$T_{hj}$  = Total de hogares con entrevista completa en la manzana j de la ciudad h

F = Peso básico

$R_{hj}$  = Factor de ajuste de cobertura por no respuesta de la manzana j en la ciudad h.

El anterior procedimiento restituye la información de la muestra al marco de donde provino. Como este marco puede tener sus deficiencias o imperfecciones, es conveniente llevar los resultados muestrales a un estimador independiente de población, como es una proyección de población. El factor correspondiente será:

$$L = \frac{\text{Población proyectada a la fecha de la encuesta}}{\text{Población restituida al marco}}$$

La estimación del total de la población será finalmente:

$$X = X' \cdot L$$

<sup>3</sup> DANE: op. cit. CÓRDOVA P.: Op. cit.

## 17. PRECISIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS Y NIVELES DE CONFIANZA

Las características poblacionales son estimaciones que se calculan a partir de los elementos que incluye la muestra. Esta estimación depende del diseño de la muestra y de la combinación particular de los elementos que resultan seleccionados.

Como las estimaciones están basadas en una muestra probabilística, las estadísticas pueden contener dos clases de errores.

- a) Errores ajenos al muestreo, resultantes de los procedimientos de observación, entrevista, trabajo de campo, procesamiento, digitación, que no pueden ser perfectos. Estos errores son comunes a toda investigación estadística.
- b) Errores debidos al muestreo, que pueden estimarse cuando el procesamiento es probabilístico y que resultan porque se investiga una fracción de la población total. De esta manera la muestra seleccionada es una de las combinaciones de  $N$  elementos tomados en grupos de  $n$ , en un proceso aleatorio. La variación de los resultados debido al azar que habría dado estas  $NCn$  muestras<sup>4</sup>, determinan el error de muestreo.
- c) Interesa principalmente el cálculo de errores de muestreo debido tanto a su importancia teórica como a su aplicación. Su importancia reside en el hecho de que su reconocimiento permite estimar el valor real de una estadística entre los límites de un intervalo de confianza. La desviación estándar de la distribución de muestreo de una estimación se llama error estándar y es la raíz de la varianza de esta distribución. Para el cálculo de la varianza de una tasa, razón, o proporción ( $r$ ) en muestreo de conglomerados, se utiliza la siguiente fórmula<sup>5</sup>  
$$\frac{r(1-r)}{n}$$
<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Número de combinaciones de  $N$  elementos tomados en grupos de  $n$ .

<sup>5</sup> La varianza de un estimador de toda, se obtiene del producto  $X$  var ( $r$ ).

<sup>6</sup> KISH, L.: Op. cit. 1965. Cap. 6. Op. cit. 1987. Cap. 4. CORDOVA, P. Op. cit.



$$\text{Var}(r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[ \text{var}(y) + r \text{vr}(x) - 2 \text{cov}(x,y) \right]$$

Donde:

$$r_x = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^a y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^a x_i} = \frac{y}{x}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, a$$

- a = Total de segmentos o conglomerados en la muestra
- y<sub>i</sub> = Suma de los valores de la variable y en el i-ésimo conglomerado
- x<sub>i</sub> = Suma de los valores de la variable x en el i-ésimo conglomerado
- y = Suma total de los valores de la variable y, en la muestra
- x = Suma total de los valores de la variable x, en la muestra

Para efectos de cálculo, la fórmula se puede abreviar como sigue:

$$\text{Var}(r) = \left[ \frac{1}{x^2} \cdot \frac{a}{a-1} \right] Z_i^2$$

Donde:

$$Z_i = (y_i - rx_i)$$

El Error Estándar (ES) de r es:

$$\text{E.S.}(r) = \sqrt{\text{var}(r)}$$

Y el coeficiente de variación en términos de porcentaje:

$$\text{C.V.}(r) = \frac{\text{E.S.}(r)}{r} \times 100$$

De acuerdo al diseño de muestra, como se anotó en otra sección, es útil calcular el DEF, como una medida para determinar la eficiencia del diseño de la muestra utilizada<sup>7</sup>. El DEF es la razón

<sup>7</sup> FRANKEL, M.: "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". Edit. ISR, U. of Michigan. 1971. Ver especialmente Apéndice E.

de la varianza de una muestra de conglomerados respecto de la varianza de una muestra irrestricta aleatoria del mismo número de elementos, esto es:

$$DEF = \frac{S^2 \text{ cong.}}{S^2 \text{ msa}}$$

Un valor de Efecto de Diseño igual a 1 indica que la muestra es tan eficiente como una muestra simple aleatoria y un valor mayor a 1 indica que hay pérdidas en la eficiencia que se deben a la formación de conglomerados. Para el caso presente se estimó el DEF= 1.022 para las regiones de Costa y Sierra y de 1.011 para la región oriental.

Los niveles de confianza calculados después de tomada la encuesta a partir de los tamaños de muestra efectivamente observados, señalan un error de + / - 1.86% para un nivel de confianza del 95%, para el agregado de la muestra nacional, y de + / - 2.97% para la sierra; + / - 2.79 % para la costa y + / - 4.54% para el oriente. Por áreas, los márgenes de error se estiman en: + / - 2.38% para lo urbano y + / - 2.99% para lo rural.

## 20. PONDERACIONES PARA AGREGACIÓN DE DOMINIOS Y ESTRATOS

El método de muestreo utilizado consideró una distribución de los tamaños de muestra autoponderada en el ámbito interno por estratos Sierra y Costa; no así en la región oriental, debido a la diferencia notable de su población respecto de las demás.

Adicionalmente, como consecuencia de la selección aleatoria en el ámbito de cada hogar, la muestra no puede proyectar exactamente la población censal por géneros, lo cual infiere la necesidad de introducir ajustes para que la muestra observe la distribución censal por género. Finalmente, si bien la selección de UPM se realizó con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño de cada unidad primaria, la asignación de conglomerados de tamaño fijo por áreas urbanas y rurales, introduce variaciones que requieren ser ajustadas mediante ponderaciones tanto de la distribución urbano / rural como de la proporción de la muestra por UPM frente a la proporción real de la población, también por UPM.

Con estos antecedentes se calcularon factores de ponderación por punto de muestra, tanto urbanos como rurales, resultantes de una cadena de componentes, como sigue:

$W_{pi}$  = Peso de cada punto de muestra  $i$  según su población frente a la población de su región.

$W_{mi}$  = Peso de cada punto de muestra  $i$  según el tamaño de muestra asignada a ella, frente al tamaño de muestra de toda su región.

$W_{gi}$  = Relación hombre / mujeres observada en la encuesta en el punto de muestra  $i$

$W_{Gi}$  = Relación hombres / mujeres observada en la unidad de muestra  $i$  según el último censo de población (2001) y proyecciones de CEDATOS a 2008.

$W_{ai}$  = Distribución urbano / rural observada en la encuesta en el punto de muestra  $i$ .

$W_{Ai}$  = Distribución urbano / rural observada en el punto de muestra  $i$ , según el censo de población 2001 y proyecciones a 2006.

Con los valores antes conformados se procede al cálculo de los siguientes factores:

$$F_{1i} = W_{pi} / W_{mi};$$

$$F_{2i} = W_{gi} / W_{Gi};$$

$$F_{3i} = W_{ai} / W_{Ai}$$

Con estos factores parciales ( $F_{ji}; j = 1, 2, 3; i = 1, \dots, 423$ ), se estimó el factor final de ponderación por localidad:

$$F_{fi} = F_{1i} \cdot F_{2i} \cdot F_{3i}$$

Este  $F_{fi}$  se incorporó al archivo de datos para cada punto de muestra  $i$ .

## II. ALGUNOS APUNTES SOBRE EL DESARROLLO DE LOS TRABAJOS ASIGNADOS A CEDATOS / GALLUP International.

### 1. PLANTEAMIENTO DE ESTE CUARTO ESTUDIO

El cuarto trabajo de la serie de estudios sobre **La Cultura política de la democracia**, ha tenido muy buenos resultados dada la experiencia positiva que se adquirió a través de los trabajos elaborados a fines de 2001, principios de 2004 y 2006, los cuales se presentaron y difundieron en varios seminarios académicos a mediados de 2002, 2004 y 2006. Ha sido también muy valiosa y positiva la relación profesional establecida con el Prof. Mitchel Seligson, director científico del estudio, con quien se han definido las metodologías más apropiadas para este tipo de investigación, desde el diseño general, diseños de muestreo y cuestionarios, hasta la toma de la información, procesamiento de datos, elaboración de archivos y edición final del estudio. Igualmente, el libro de la primera encuesta 2001, y de los correspondientes a 2004 y 2006, han sido muy útiles para la definición de formatos y referencias que han permitido volver más expedito e interesante el análisis comparativo. Además el estudio, en todas sus partes, se constituyó en una referencia de primera mano para los estudios que bajo la dirección científica del Prof. Seligson y la dirección de muestreo del autor de este anexo se realizaron en el primer

semestre de 2004 en 8 países: Centroamérica, México y Colombia; los que se realizaron en Perú, Chile y varios países del Caribe en 2006 y los estudios efectuados en Venezuela y Argentina, bajo la dirección y responsabilidad de CEDATOS, a fines de 2007 y principios de 2008.

## 2. CUESTIONARIO

El cuestionario básicamente fue similar al utilizado en 2001, 2004 y 2006, con la actualización de nombres, partidos, fechas y otros tópicos específicos para el 2008. El cuestionario, si bien es bastante largo, no presentó dificultades para su desenvolvimiento; es ágil, dinámico, claro, fluido, que despierta interés de menos a más en el entrevistado. Con estos reajustes y dada la experiencia ya adquirida en 2001, 2004 y 2006, los entrevistadores, que en su mayoría fueron los mismos del primer estudio, el tiempo promedio bajó de 50 a 45 minutos. Esta experiencia servirá también para futuros estudios. El uso de tarjetas auxiliares fue apropiado, si bien se observó alguna dificultad, que fue superada con la debida instrucción al entrevistado, en áreas rurales de menor desarrollo al promedio nacional.

El cuestionario pasó por varias versiones antes de llegar a la definitiva, pero en menor número a las de las primeras encuestas. Como en 2001, 2004 y 2006, se dio un entrenamiento suficiente a los supervisores nacionales, regionales y locales, quienes a su vez entrenaron a los entrevistadores de campo. Las pruebas de campo se realizaron en áreas urbanas y rurales. La discusión, revisión, análisis y sugerencias finales se hicieron en el Ecuador, con el apoyo de Daniel Montalvo, enviado por LAPOP de la Universidad de Vanderbilt.

Cabe mencionar que CEDATOS utilizó el cuestionario traducido al quichua para casos de hogares y adultos seleccionados que no conocían el idioma castellano y requerían que se realice la entrevista en tal idioma. Se anexa a este estudio este cuestionario.

## 3. LA MUESTRA

Tanto el diseño como la selección de la muestra no significaron problema alguno para CEDATOS dado que cuenta con la información, cartografía, conocimiento y experiencia necesaria para estos trabajos. Los tamaños resultaron apropiados para la encuesta. El último censo de población de 2001 se constituyó en información importante para la fase del diseño y la fase de procesamiento de datos y el cálculo de ponderaciones por género y edad de los entrevistados, así como por los estratos considerados en el estudio, por área urbana y rural y por regiones geográficas.

La cartografía censal utilizada en la encuesta estuvo al día y se actualizó para varios sectores nuevos urbanos y rurales. Este material fue de enorme importancia para poder realizar el diseño por paneles, que conservó las unidades similares a las de 2001, 2004 y 2006 hasta la unidad de conglomerado, en los cuales fueron seleccionados nuevos hogares y nuevos adultos para la entrevista.

#### 4. LA CAPACITACIÓN Y ENTRENAMIENTO

Fue clave la capacitación que recibieron los entrevistadores y supervisores para el éxito del trabajo. El sistema de seminarios para entrenadores de entrevistadores nuevamente dio buen resultado. La participación de Daniel Montalvo fue muy valiosa; trabajó directamente con los entrevistadores y supervisores y pudo constatar y observar el entrenamiento y la calidad del personal asignado a las áreas urbanas y rurales.

Vale reiterar en esta ocasión el valor y ventaja que significa para el estudio la estabilidad de entrevistadores y supervisores en CEDATOS, quienes aportaron con su importante experiencia para esta cuarta encuesta. Los entrevistadores tenían práctica suficiente para la identificación de unidades de muestra y para la selección final de hogares y adultos en los hogares de muestra y manejaron con destreza el cuestionario, las tablas auxiliares y el manejo de cuotas en la selección final del adulto a entrevistar.

#### 5. TRABAJO DE CAMPO; LA ENTREVISTA; REACCIONES

La entrevista se realizó de acuerdo a lo previsto en el cronograma, sin haber observado inconvenientes para el trabajo de campo.

En la mayoría de la población se observó amplia receptividad a la encuesta. En el área urbana, como en otras ocasiones, se observó cierta resistencia y falta de interés en los niveles socio económicos altos, especialmente por la extensión del cuestionario. Los supervisores cumplieron un papel muy efectivo a lo largo de todo el trabajo de campo.

Como sucedió en los tres primeros estudios, un buen número de entrevistados se mostró interesado en conocer los resultados de la encuesta; otros mostraron poco interés por los asuntos políticos, aunque si opinaron sobre la desconfianza en varias instituciones y en la lucha contra la pobreza y la corrupción. Estas observaciones de los entrevistados vuelven muy conveniente la difusión de los resultados a quienes fueron consultados, en las áreas urbanas y rurales, y no solamente a grupos académicos o de dirigencia política.

#### 6. VALIDACIÓN DE LA INFORMACIÓN

La supervisión del 100% a los lugares de muestra (para confirmar que la entrevista se hizo en el hogar de muestra y a la persona seleccionada aleatoriamente) ayudó mucho a la calidad de la información. La selección de la muestra con afijación previa de la tasa de no cobertura, es un procedimiento que hace posible completar la muestra esperada. Se cumplió el 18% de no cobertura y se volvió a observar una mayor no respuesta en las ciudades grandes, niveles socioeconómicos medio alto y alto.

La validación de la información, con re-entrevista y comprobación de respuestas se realizó hasta en un 40% de la muestra. Se cumplió la asignación de trabajo de 1 supervisor por cada 3 entrevistadores.

## 7. CRÍTICA, CODIFICACIÓN, DIGITACIÓN Y RE INGRESO DE DATOS

A partir de la segunda semana de iniciado el trabajo de campo se procedió a la crítica (evaluación y revisión) de cuestionarios, previo a la digitación e ingreso de datos. Se conformaron equipos de trabajo con tres turnos diarios (8h00 a 13h00; 13h00 a 18h00 y de 18h00 a 23h00). Se reingresó todos los cuestionarios y funcionó totalmente el control de calidad. Como en los tres estudios anteriores, el error de digitación no superó el 1 por mil.

## 8. ELABORACIÓN DE ARCHIVOS, CONTROL DE CALIDAD Y AUDITORÍA DESDE LAPOP, UNIVERSIDAD DE VANDERBILT.

En forma paralela a las demás actividades de la encuesta el equipo técnico del Centro de Cómputo de CEDATOS trabajó en la elaboración de programas para el ingreso de datos y conformación de archivos, versión SPSS. El trabajo se ajustó a los requerimientos de LAPOP, habiéndose enviado la información con la debida oportunidad.

Se enviaron los cuestionarios como señala el contrato a fin de que sean auditados por LAPOP. La respuesta del Profesor Seligson fue de total satisfacción. La clave de este resultado fue el control de calidad que se aplicó a todas y cada una de las fases del estudio.

## 9. COMUNICACIONES

Se mantuvo una permanente comunicación entre LAPOP y CEDATOS para tratar y coordinar sobre el desarrollo del estudio. Como en los tres estudios anteriores, el Profesor Seligson fue muy positivo y estuvo siempre colaborando con CEDATOS, al mismo tiempo que se atendió todos sus requerimientos. El correo electrónico fue el sistema de comunicación utilizado en forma extensiva e intensiva.

## Appendix II: Letter of Informed Consent (IRB)



Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de CEDATOS Gallup Internacional para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a Cedatos al telefono 2558640 preguntar por Vicente Paccha, persona responsable de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?





### Appendix III: Questionnaires (Spanish and Quichua)

Ecuador Versión # 18R IRB Approval: #071086



LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: ECUADOR, 2008  
 © Vanderbilt University 2008. Derechos reservados. All rights reserved.

<b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia <b>9. Ecuador</b> 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	<b>PAIS</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural (905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur	<b>ESTRATOPRI</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>UPM.</b> (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____	<b>UPM</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Provincia:</b> _____	<b>PROV</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Cantón:</b> _____	<b>MUNICIPIO</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>PARROQUIA:</b> _____	<b>ECUDISTRITO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SEGMENTO CENSAL</b> _____	<b>ECUSEGMENTO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Sector</b> _____	<b>ECUSEC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>CLUSTER.</b> (Unidad Final de Muestreo) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	<b>CLUSTER</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>UR</b> (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	<b>UR</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Tamaño del lugar:</b> (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)	<b>TAMANO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>



(2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural		
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Quichua	IDIOMA Q	<input type="checkbox"/>
Número de visitas a la casa 1 2 3		
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2008	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CON: COMENZAR</b>		
Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer		Q1

**A4 [COA4].** Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCION] **A4**

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1

<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A2</b>
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A3</b>
<b>A4i.</b> Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A4i</b>

<b>SOCT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica <b>del país</b> ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT1</b>
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual <b>del país</b> es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT2</b>
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree usted que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica <b>del país</b> será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT3</b>
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general <b>su</b> situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO1</b>
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera usted que <b>su</b> situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO2</b>
<b>IDIO3.</b> Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree usted que su situación económica será mejor, igual, o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO2</b>

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...				
<b>CP2.</b> ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> ¿A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, concejero de la municipalidad, prefecto,)?	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...		
<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una [sesión municipal del municipio en su ciudad] durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>NP2</b>	
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>LGL2A.</b> Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar <b>más responsabilidades?</b> <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional (2) Algo más al gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y al municipio (4) Algo más al municipio (5) Mucho más al municipio (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2A</b>	
<b>LGL2B.</b> Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería <b>administrar más dinero?</b> <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Algo más el gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y el municipio (4) Algo más el municipio (5) Mucho más el municipio (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2B</b>	

<b>MUNI2.</b> En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? <b>[No leer respuestas] [aceptar una sola respuesta]</b> (00) Ninguno (01) Falta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (04) Falta de aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica, falta de fondos, ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR Otros: _____	<b>MUNI2</b>	
--	--------------	--

<p><b>MUNI5.</b> ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?                  (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5A.</b> En su opinión, ¿en que se utiliza la mayoría de los gastos de la municipalidad? <b>[No Leer]</b>                  1. Aseo público 2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, canchas de fútbol, u otros obras públicas 3. Salud, educación 4. Corrupción 5. Sueldos 6. Nada Otro _____                  88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI6</b></p>
<p><b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?                  (1) Más al municipio                  (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios                  (3) No cambiar nada <b>[NO LEER]</b>                  (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios <b>[NO LEER]</b>                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>LGL2</b></p>

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<p><b>CP5.</b> Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>8</p>	<p><b>CP5</b></p>

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>
<b>CP20. [Solo mujeres]</b> ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE) <b>CP20</b>

**LS3.** Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

**LS3**

<p><b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IT1</b>
--	------------

<p><b>IT1A.</b> ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IT1A</b>
---	-------------

<p><b>IT1B.</b> Hablando en general, ¿diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? :</p> <p>(1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas                  (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IT1B</b>
---	-------------

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]**

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		<b>L1</b>	
<b>Izquierda</b>										<b>Derecha</b>	(NS/NR=88)	

**[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]**

<p><b>IMMIG1.</b> ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno de Ecuador ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, <b>a los extranjeros</b> que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Muy de acuerdo                  (2) Algo de acuerdo                  (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo                  (4) Algo en desacuerdo                  (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IMMIG1</b>
--	---------------

<p><b>IMMIG2.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los ecuatorianos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los ecuatorianos? <b>[Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</b></p> <p>(1) Hacen los trabajos que los ecuatorianos no quieren                  (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los ecuatorianos                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IMMIG2</b>
--	---------------

<p><b>PROT2.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?                  ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?</p>	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap	<b>PROT2</b>
<p>Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? <b>[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:</b></p>						
<p><b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		<b>JC10</b>
<p><b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		<b>JC12</b>
<p><b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		<b>JC13</b>
<p><b>ECUJC20.</b> Frente a una expansión del conflicto armado de Colombia a Ecuador.</p>	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		<b>ECUJC20</b>

<p><b>JC15.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	<b>JC15</b>
<p><b>JC16.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	<b>JC16</b>



<p><b>VIC1.</b> Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?                  (1) Sí                  (2) No                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC1</p>	
<p><b>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]</b> Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas <b>[Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No” anotar “0” cero]</b></p>	<p>¿Cuántas veces?                  NO = 0,                  NS/NR=88</p>	
<p><b>VIC20.</b> ¿Alguien le robó a mano armada algo que no sea su vehículo en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC20</p>
<p><b>VIC21.</b> ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? <b>[Si dice NO marque “0” y pase a VIC27] Si dice SI, sondee: ¿Cuántas veces?</b></p>		<p>VIC21</p>
<p><b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?                  (1) Sí <b>[pasar a VIC27]</b> (2) No lo denunció <b>[Seguir]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[pasar a VIC27]</b> (9) Inap (no víctima) <b>[pasar a VIC27]</b></p>		<p>AOJ1</p>
<p><b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) No sirve de nada                  (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias                  (3) No tenía pruebas                  (4) No fue grave                  (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>		<p>AOJ1B</p>
	<p>¿Cuántas veces?                  NO = 0,                  NS/NR=88</p>	
<p><b>VIC27.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC27</p>
<p><b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?                  (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>	

<p><b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ11</b>
<p><b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ11A</b>
<p><b>AOJ12.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ12</b>
<p><b>AOJ12a.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ12a</b>
<p><b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) <b>[No leer]</b> No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ18</b>
<p><b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ17</b>

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
<b>ST1.</b> La Policía Nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
<b>ST2.</b> Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>
<b>ST3.</b> La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST3</b>
<b>ST4.</b> La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]**

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Nada</b>				<b>Mucho</b>			<b>NS/NR</b>

**Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? ( <i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i> )	<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Ecuador?	<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político ecuatoriano?	<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político ecuatoriano?	<b>B4</b>
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político ecuatoriano?	<b>B6</b>

<b>Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</b>		
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		<b>B10A</b>
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		<b>B11</b>
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?		<b>B12</b>
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		<b>B15</b>
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?		<b>B18</b>
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?		<b>B19</b>
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		<b>B20</b>
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		<b>B21</b>
<b>B21A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?		<b>B21A</b>
<b>B23.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los sindicatos?		<b>B23</b>
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio?		<b>B32</b>
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser ecuatoriano?		<b>B43</b>
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		<b>B17</b>
<b>B33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?		<b>B33</b>
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		<b>B37</b>
<b>ECUB40A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos afro-ecuatorianos?		<b>ECUB40A</b>
<b>B40.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?		<b>B40</b>
<b>B42.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?		<b>B42</b>
<b>B50.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?		<b>B50</b>
<b>B46 [b45].</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión de Control Cívico Contra la Corrupción?		<b>B46</b>
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		<b>B47</b>
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		<b>B48</b>
<b>B51.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene Ud. confianza en las Organizaciones No		<b>B51</b>

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
Gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en el país?		
<b>ECUB50</b> (B50). ¿Ha oído mencionar la ONG “Participación Ciudadana”? Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a ECUB51. Si dice “sí” preguntar: ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en esta organización?	<b>B50</b>	
<b>B39</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las cámaras de los empresarios privados?	<b>B39</b>	
<b>ECUB52</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador?	<b>ECUB52</b>	
<b>ECUB53</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente	<b>ECUB53</b>	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
Usando la misma escala...		
<b>N1</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	<b>N1</b>	
<b>N3</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	<b>N3</b>	
<b>N9</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	<b>N9</b>	
<b>N10</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	<b>N10</b>	
<b>N11</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	<b>N11</b>	
<b>N12</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	<b>N12</b>	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Ecuador y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
<b>EPP1</b> . Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos ecuatorianos representan bien a sus votantes?	<b>EPP1</b>	
<b>EPP2</b> . ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos ecuatorianos?	<b>EPP2</b>	

<b>EPP3.</b> ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	<b>EPP3</b>
<b>EC1.</b> Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional estorbaba la labor del presidente?	<b>EC1</b>
<b>EC2.</b> ¿Y qué tanto tiempo perdían los diputados del Congreso Nacional discutiendo y debatiendo?	<b>EC2</b>
<b>EC3.</b> ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprobaba el Congreso Nacional?	<b>EC3</b>
<b>EC4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional cumplía con lo que usted esperaba de él?	<b>EC4</b>
<b>ECUEC5.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente haya declarado en receso permanente al Congreso?	<b>ECUEC5</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA A]**

<b>M1.</b> Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Rafael Correa es...? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>
<b>M2.</b> Y hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso ecuatoriano estaban haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? 1) Muy bien 2) Bien 3) Ni bien ni mal 4) Mal 5) Muy Mal 8) NSNR	<b>M2</b>
<b>ECUM2.</b> Hablando de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y pensando en todos los asambleístas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los asambleístas están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (8) NSNR	<b>ECUM2</b>
<b>ECUCA1.</b> ¿Cree usted que una nueva Constitución Política del Estado proporcionará una solución directa a los problemas del país o que a pesar de la nueva Constitución los problemas continuarán? <b>[Leer Opciones]</b> [1] resolverá los problemas del país [2 ] los problemas continuarán [8 ] NS/NR	<b>ECUCA1</b>

<p><b>ECUCA2.</b> En su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema más importante que la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente debería solucionar ?<b>[NO LEER LISTA. ELIJA UNA SOLA ALTERNATIVA]</b></p> <p>[1] problemas de pobreza y desigualdad en el país                  [2] problemas de tierra y territorio                  [3] problemas de estructuración del gobierno y de definición de derechos y deberes ciudadanos[constitución]                  [4] problemas de las autonomías regionales                  [5] todos los problemas del país                  [6] problemas económicos del país                  [7] problemas de corrupción                  [8] ninguno                  [9] otros                  [10] NS/NR (no leer)</p>	<p><b>ECUCA2</b></p>
---	----------------------

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

**Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	NS/NR

**Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.</p>	<p><b>ECUCA3</b></p>
<p><b>ECUCA3.</b> La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente actuó bien al decidir enviar a referéndum únicamente el texto de la nueva Constitución y no las reformas legales y de reorganización de las instituciones. Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	<p><b>ECUCA4</b></p>
<p><b>ECUCA4.</b> La oposición al gobierno en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente conforma parte de una minoría y por lo tanto es correcto que su participación en la misma sea limitada. Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	<p><b>ECUCA5</b></p>
<p><b>ECUCA5.</b> La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente es una institución democrática. Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.</p> <p><b>POP101.</b> Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP101</b></p>	
<p><b>POP102.</b> Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP102</b></p>	
<p><b>POP103.</b> Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP103</b></p>	
<p><b>POP106.</b> Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP106</b></p>	
<p><b>POP107.</b> El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y <b>no</b> a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP107</b></p>	
<p><b>POP109.</b> En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP109</b></p>	
<p><b>POP110.</b> Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP110</b></p>	
<p><b>POP112.</b> El <b>mayor</b> obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP112</b></p>	
<p><b>POP113.</b> Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP113</b></p>	



<b>EFF1.</b> A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF1</b>
<b>EFF2.</b> Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF2</b>

<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ING4</b>
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los ecuatorianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>PN2</b>
<b>DEM23.</b> Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>DEM23</b>
Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. <b>NS/NR = 8</b>	

<b>ROS1.</b> El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS1</b>
<b>ROS2.</b> El Estado ecuatoriano, más que los individuos, es el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS2</b>
<b>ROS3.</b> El Estado ecuatoriano, más que la empresa privada, es el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS3</b>
<b>ROS4.</b> El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas <b>firmes</b> para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS4</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Ecuador? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión, ¿El Ecuador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					<b>NS/NR</b>

	1-10, 88
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E5</b>
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E8</b>
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E11</b>
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E15</b>
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E14</b>
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E2</b>
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E3</b>
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E16</b>

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>										<b>NS/NR</b>
<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>										

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		<b>D32</b>
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político país?		<b>D33</b>
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		<b>D34</b>
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>
<b>ECUD38.</b> Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno regule el trabajo de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, incluyendo las Organizaciones no Gubernamentales?		<b>ECUD38</b>
<b>ECUD39.</b> Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que el gobierno elimine las fundaciones privadas que reciben fondos públicos, como por ejemplo la Fundación Malecón 2000 de Guayaquil?		<b>ECUD39</b>

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Ecuador. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>						<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>				<b>NS/NR</b>

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Ecuador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Ecuador, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas		<b>D3</b>

personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA C]**

**Ahora cambiando de tema...**

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		<b>DEM2</b>
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR		<b>DEM11</b>
<b>ECUDEM14.</b> Cual es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en el país. <b>[Leer respuestas]</b> 1. Fortalecer la Justicia 2. Fortalecer los gobiernos locales 3. Combatir la corrupción 4. Desarrollar fuentes de empleo 5. Educar en valores 6. Mejorar la seguridad ciudadana 7. <b>[NO LEER]</b> Ninguna de las anteriores 8. NS/NR		<b>ECUDEM14</b>
<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR		<b>AUT1</b>
<b>AUT2.</b> ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de		<b>AUT2</b>

nuestros líderes  
(8) NS/NR

**PP1.** Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? **[Leer alternativas]**  
(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca  
(8) NS/NR

**PP1**

**PP2.** Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?  
(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR

**PP2**

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.

**DC10.** Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 5 dólares de más al empleado público del registro civil o municipal.. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? **[Leer alternativas]**  
(1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada  
(2) Es corrupto pero se justifica  
(3) No es corrupto  
(8) NS/NR

**DC10**

**DC13.** Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? **[Leer alternativas]**  
(1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado  
(2) Es corrupto pero justificado  
(3) No es corrupto  
(8) NS/NR

**DC13**

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC6</b>

	<b>INAP</b> No trató o tuvo contacto	<b>No</b>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
<p><b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año?  <b>No → Marcar 9</b>  <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b>                      Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC11</b>
<p><b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja?  <b>No → Marcar 9</b>  <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b>                      En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima en el último año?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC13</b>
<p><b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?  <b>No → Marcar 9</b>  <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b>                      ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14</b>
<p><b>EXC14A.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los fiscales? <b>[Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b>                      ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los fiscales en el último año?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14 A</b>
<p><b>ECUEXC14B.</b> En el último año ¿tuvo que tratar con abogados?  <b>[Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b>                      Ha tenido que pagar una coima a un abogado en el último año?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>ECUEX C14B</b>
<p><b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?  <b>No → Marcar 9</b>  <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b>                      Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima?</p>	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC15</b>

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió una coima para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?		0	1	8	<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					<b>EXC7</b>
---	--	--	--	--	-------------

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...					
<b>GI1.</b> ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[NO LEER: George Bush]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente? <b>[NO LEER: Alberto Acosta]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Cuántas provincias tiene el Ecuador? <b>[NO LEER: 24]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Ecuador? <b>[NO LEER: 4 años]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI5</b>

<b>VB1.</b> ¿Está empadronando para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR					<b>VB1</b>
--	--	--	--	--	------------

<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?                  (1) Sí votó [<b>Siga</b>]                  (2) No votó [<b>Pasar a VB50</b>]                  (8) NS/NR [<b>Pasar a VB50</b>]</p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>	
---	-------------------	--

<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? [<b>NO LEER LISTA</b>]                  (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) [<b>Pasar a ECUVB20</b>]                  (901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS                  (902) Gilmar Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP                  (903) Jaime Damerval, Concertación de Fuerzas Populares - CFP                  (904) Cynthia Viteri, Partido Social Cristiano – PSC                  (905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - RIAN                  (906) Luís Macas, Movimiento Pachakutik                  (907) León Roldós, Alianza RED-ID                  (908) Fernando Rosero, Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano – PRE                  (909) Luís Villacís, Movimiento Popular Democrático MPD                  (910) Marco Proaño Maya, Movimiento Reivindicación Democrática                  (911) Carlos Sagñay, Integración Nacional Alfarista                  (912) Lenín Torres, Movimiento Revolucionario Participación Popular - MPP                  (913) Marcelo Larrea, Alianza ALBA – Tercera República                  (77) Otro                  (88) NS/NR                  (99) Inap (No votó)</p>	<p><b>VB3</b></p>	
---	-------------------	--

<p><b>ECUVB20.</b> [<b>Solo para quienes dijeron que votaron nulo o blanco en una de las dos vueltas</b>] Porqué voto usted nulo o blanco en la primera o en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales? (<b>NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS</b>)                  (1) Porque no sabía por quién votar, estaba confundido(a)                  (2) Porque quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos                  (3) Porque queria protestar contra el sistema politico                  (4) Porque quería protestar por la forma en que se dio la campaña electoral                  (4) Otro _____                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB20</b></p>	
--	-----------------------	--



<p><b>VB50. [Preguntar a todos]</b> En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo    (2) De acuerdo    (3) En desacuerdo                  (4) Muy en desacuerdo    (8) NSNR</p>		<b>VB50</b>
--	--	-------------

<p><b>VB10.</b> ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b>                  (2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p>	<b>VB10</b>	
--	-------------	--

<p><b>VB11.</b> ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? <b>[NO LEER LISTA].</b></p> <p>(901) Red Ética y Democracia (RED)                  (902) Movimiento Poder Ciudadano (MPC)                  (903) Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)                  (904) Izquierda Democrática (ID)                  (905) Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)                  (906) Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN)                  (907) Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País (Pachacutik)                  (908) Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC)                  (909) Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD)                  (910) Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (PS-FA)                  (911) Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (PSP)                  (912) Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP)                  (913) Alianza PAIS-Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS)                  (88) NS/NR <b>[Pase A POL1]</b>                  (99) INAP <b>[Pase A POL1]</b></p>	<b>VB11</b>	
--	-------------	--

<p><b>VB12</b> ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido <b>[partido que mencionó en VB11]</b> es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?</p> <p>(1) Muy débil    (2) Débil    (3) Ni débil ni fuerte    (4) Fuerte                  (5) Muy fuerte    (8)NS/NR    (9) INAP</p>	<b>VB12</b>	
---	-------------	--

<p><b>POL1.</b> ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?                  (1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada      (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL1</b></p>	
<p><b>POL2.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas?  <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) A diario    (2) Algunas veces por semana    (3) Algunas veces por mes                  (4) Rara vez                  (5) Nunca      (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL2</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUVB19</b> ¿Cree usted que el voto en el Ecuador debería ser voluntario o se debería mantener como obligatorio?                  (1) Debe ser voluntario                  (2) Debe mantenerse como obligatorio                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB19</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUVB21.</b> Si el voto en el Ecuador fuera voluntario, asistiría usted a votar?                  (1) Si.                  (2) No                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB21</b></p>	
<p><b>VB20. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? <b>[No leer]</b>                  (1) No votaría                  (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente                  (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno.                  (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB20</b></p>	
<p><b>VB21.</b> ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición                  (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente                  (3) Influir de otras maneras                  (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB21</b></p>	

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]**

**LS6.** Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted.

...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible					NS/NR

**[RECOGER TARJETA D]**

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con...

**[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
<b>SD1.</b> El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	<b>SD1</b>
<b>SD2.</b> Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	<b>SD2</b>
<b>SD3.</b> El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	<b>SD3</b>
<b>SD4.</b> La calidad del aire	1	2	8	<b>SD4</b>
<b>SD5.</b> La calidad del agua	1	2	8	<b>SD5</b>
<b>SD6.</b> La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	<b>SD6</b>
<b>SD7.</b> La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	<b>SD7</b>
<b>SD8.</b> La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	<b>SD8</b>
<b>SD9.</b> El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	<b>SD9</b>
<b>SD10.</b> Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	<b>SD10</b>
<b>SD11.</b> La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	<b>SD11</b>
<b>SD12.</b> La disponibilidad de sitios	1	2	8	<b>SD12</b>

públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes

**LS4.** Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?  
 (1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR **LS4**

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1 <sup>o</sup>	2 <sup>o</sup>	3 <sup>o</sup>	4 <sup>o</sup>	5 <sup>o</sup>	6 <sup>o</sup>	
Ninguno	0						<b>ED</b>
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS/NR/	88						

**Q2.** ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? \_\_\_\_\_ años (0= NS/NR) **Q2**

**Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]** **Q3**  
 (1) Católica  
 (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).  
 (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)  
 (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).  
 (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día  
 (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).  
 (4) Ninguna **[Pase a Q10]**  
 (8) NS/NR

<p><b>Q5A.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p>	<p><b>Q5</b></p>
<p>(1) Más de una vez por semana                  (2) Una vez por semana                  (3) Una vez al mes                  (4) Una o dos veces al año                  (5) Nunca o casi nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	

<p><b>[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]</b>  <b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p>	<p><b>Q10</b></p>
<p><b>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]</b></p>	
<p>[10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país]                  (00) Ningún ingreso                  (01) Menos de \$60                  (02) Entre \$61- \$100                  (03) \$101-\$200                  (04) \$201-\$300                  (05) \$301-\$500                  (06) \$501-\$750                  (07) \$751-\$1000                  (08) \$1001-1500                  (09) \$1501-\$2000                  (10) \$2001 y más                  (88) NS/NR</p>	
<p><b>[RECOGER TARJETA E]</b></p>	

<p><b>Q10A.</b> ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior?</p>	<p><b>Q10A</b></p>
<p>(1) Sí (2) No <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b> (8) NS <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b></p>	

<p><b>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? <b>[No leer]</b></p> <p>(1) Consumo (alimento, vestido)                  (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación)                  (3) Gastos en educación                  (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias)                  (5) Gastos médicos                  (6) Ahorro/Inversión                  (7) Otro                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10a1</b></p>
<p><b>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Mucho                   (2) Algo                   (3) Poco                   (4) Nada                  (8) NS/NR   (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10B</b></p>
<p><b>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? <b>[Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar dónde; No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente                  (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países                  (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)                  (4) No <b>[Pase a Q14]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a Q14]</b></p>	<p><b>Q10C</b></p>
<p><b>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C]</b> ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Todos los días                  (2) Una o dos veces por semana                  (3) Una o dos veces por mes                  (4) Rara vez                  (5) Nunca                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>Q16</b></p>
<p><b>Q14. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>(1) Sí           (2) No                   (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q14</b></p>
<p><b>Q10D. [Preguntar a todos]</b> El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar                  (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades                  (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades                  (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades                  (8) <b>[No leer]</b> NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q10D</b></p>

<b>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]</b> (1) Soltero (acompañado) (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	(2) Casado (4) Divorciado	(3) Unión libre (5) Separado	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88).</b>			<b>Q12</b>	____ ____
<b>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</b>			<b>Q12A</b>	____ ____

<b>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-ecuatoriana, mulata, u otra?</b>  (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-ecuatoriana (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>	
--	-------------	--

<b>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR [No leer]	<b>WWW1</b>	
--	-------------	--

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

<b>R1. Televisor</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>		
<b>R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>		
<b>R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>		
<b>R4A. Teléfono celular</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>		
<b>R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?</b>	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6. Lavadora de ropa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>		
<b>R7. Microondas</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>		
<b>R8. Motocicleta</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>		
<b>R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>		
<b>R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>		
<b>R15. Computadora</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>		

<p><b>OCUP4A.</b> ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Trabajando? <b>[Siga]</b></p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? <b>[Siga]</b></p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? <b>[PASE a IMMIG3]</b></p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b></p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b></p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b></p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b></p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>OCUP4</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1.</b> ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? <b>(Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p> <p>(14) Obrero</p> <p>(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1</b></p>	<p>   </p>



<p><b>OCUP1A.</b> En su ocupación principal usted es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) ¿Asalariado del gobierno?                  (2) ¿Asalariado en el sector privado?                  (3) ¿Patrono o socio de empresa?                  (4) ¿Trabajador por cuenta propia?                  (5) ¿Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
--	----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP 12A</b> ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?</p> <p>_____ <b>[Anotar número de horas] (88)</b></p> <p><b>NS/NR (99) INAP</b></p>	<p><b>OCUP 12A</b></p>	
---	------------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP12.</b> ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?</p> <p>(1) Menos (2) Igual (3) Más (8)</p> <p>NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP12</b></p>	
---	----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>	
---	----------------------	--

**Ahora nos gustaria hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situacion laboral en diciembre de 2006**

<p><b>OCUP27.</b> –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (2) No <b>[Siga]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Siga]</b>                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP27</b></p>	
--	----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP28.</b> En esa fecha estaba usted: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Desempleado? <b>[Siga]</b>                  (2) Trabajando? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (3) Estudiando? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b>                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP28</b></p>	
---	----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP29.</b> ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo <b>[Pase a OCUP31]</b>                  (2) Fin de empleo temporal <b>[Pase a OCUP31]</b>                  (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez <b>[Pase a OCUP31]</b></p>	<p><b>OCUP29</b></p>	
--	----------------------	--

(4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente <b>[Siga]</b> (5) Despido o cese <b>[Siga]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a OCUP31]</b> (9) INAP		
<b>OCUP30.</b> ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (9) INAP	<b>OCUP30</b>	
<b>OCUP31.</b> ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (9) INAP	<b>OCUP31</b>	
<b>OCUP31A</b> ¿En esa fecha, cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	<b>OCUP31A</b>	

<b>IMMIG3. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Los problemas de crimen en Ecuador se empeoran o mejoran por la gente que viene a vivir aquí de otros países? (1) Empeoran (2) Mejoran (8) NS/NR	<b>IMMIG3</b>	
<b>IMMIG4.</b> ¿Usted diría que la cultura del Ecuador es generalmente debilitada o enriquecida por gente que viene a vivir aquí de otros países? (1) Debilitada (2) Enriquecida (8) NS/NR	<b>IMMIG4</b>	
<b>IMMIG5.</b> ¿Usted diría que es bueno o malo para la economía del Ecuador que la gente de otros países venga a vivir aquí? (1) Malo (2) Bueno (8) NS/NR	<b>IMMIG5</b>	

<b>ECUPWD1</b> ¿Tiene Usted actualmente algún tipo de discapacidad? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a TI]</b> (8) NS/NR	<b>ECUPWD1</b>	
<b>ECUPWD2</b> ¿Qué tipo de discapacidad tiene? <b>[No leer]</b> (1) Física (parálisis – amputación) (2) Sensorial (visual - auditiva) (3) Intelectual (8) NS/NR	<b>ECUPWD2</b>	

<p><b>ECUPWD3</b> ¿Es Usted miembro de alguna asociación para personas discapacitadas? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD3</b></p>
<p><b>ECUPWD4</b> ¿Tiene Usted carné del CONADIS? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD4</b></p>
<p><b>ECUPWD5</b> ¿Ha recibido Usted algún tipo de rehabilitación durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD5</b></p>
<p><b>ECUPWD6</b> Y ahora hablando de <b>accesibilidad</b>, en su opinión ¿en qué lugar se encuentran las mayores barreras de <b>acceso</b> para los discapacitados en el país? <b>[No leer]</b> (1) En los medios de transporte (2) En las calles (3) En los edificios públicos (4) En los edificios privados (5) En las iglesias (6) En los centros deportivos (7) En los lugares de recreación (8) En los centros comerciales (9) En los hoteles (10) En los centros educativos, servicios de salud (11) Otro (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD6</b></p>

TI. Hora terminada la entrevista \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ TI   
 Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] \_\_\_\_\_

**Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.**

*Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.*

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_


Comentarios:

\_\_\_\_\_


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_


## Tarjeta #1



## Tarjeta A



## Tarjeta B



## Tarjeta C

*Aprueba  
firmemente*

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

*Desaprueba  
firmemente*

1

## Tarjeta D

*Mejor vida posible*

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

*Peor vida posible*

0



## Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$60
- (02) Entre \$61- \$100
- (03) \$101-\$200
- (04) \$201-\$300
- (05) \$301-\$500
- (06) \$501-\$750
- (07) \$751-\$1000
- (08) \$1001-1500
- (09) \$1501-\$2000
- (10) \$2001 y más

Ecuador Versión # 18R IRB Approval: #071086



LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: ECUADOR, 2008

© Vanderbilt University 2008. Derechos reservados. All rights reserved.

<b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia <b>9. Ecuador</b> 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	<b>PAIS</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural (905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur	<b>ESTRATOPRI</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>UPM.</b> (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____	<b>UPM</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Provincia:</b> _____	<b>PROV</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Cantón:</b> _____	<b>MUNICIPIO</b>	<b>9</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>PARROQUIA:</b> _____	<b>ECUDISTRITO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SEGMENTO CENSAL</b> _____	<b>ECUSEGMENTO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Sector</b> _____	<b>ECUSEC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>CLUSTER.</b> (Unidad Final de Muestreo) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	<b>CLUSTER</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>UR</b> (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	<b>UR</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Tamaño del lugar:</b> (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	<b>TAMANO</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Idioma del cuestionario:</b> (1) Español (2) Quichua	<b>IDIOMAQ</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Número de visitas a la casa</b> 1 2 3		
<b>Hora de inicio:</b> ____ : ____ [no digitar]		_____

Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2008	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSIGNACIONES PARA COMENZAR</b>		
Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre	(2) Mujer	Q1

<b>A4 [COA4].</b> Kallarinkapak, kanpa yuyaypika ¿maykan ashtawan jatun llakiyka mamallaktaka charin? [AMA KUTICHIYKUNA KILKAKATINKICHU]	<b>A4</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Yaku	19	Rankishkamanta ashka kullita kunkuna	02
Ñancunaka mana alli kankuna	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mana alli pushay	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito	09	Runakunaka shukta llaktakunaman rinkuna	16
Runakunnaka chikipikan	05	Narcotráfico mana ailli jambikunata katunapash, rantinapash	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Wambrakunamanta mana alli tandanakuykuna	14
Desempleo	03	Mana imatapash charinkuna (POBREZA)	04
Desigualdad	58	Runamanta jatariykuna	06
Mikuykuna illak	23	Unkiuk kana / jampik illak	22
Sinchiskankapak richina	32	Apupa jarkashka	31
Karu kullita mañachishka	26	Seguridadmanta illak	27
Discriminación	25	Jatun manchay	33
Mana alli jambikuna japina	11	Ama tarpunkapak chakrata tyan	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Antawa	60
Yachachikmanta illak	21	Sinchi wakliy	57
Achikmanta illak	24	wasikuna	55
May ashtawan runakunaka	20	Otro _____	70
Terrorismomanta jatun makanakuy)	17	MY/MK	88

Kunan, shukta rimankapak ( Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado)

Mashna Kutinkuna...	Tukuy punchakuna	Shuklla,ishkay punchakunaka semanapimi	Rara vez	manajaykapi	NS	
A1. Wilaykunata radiopi uyanki	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Willaykunapi televisiónpi rikunki	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Willaykunata periódicopi killkakatinki	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Willaykunapi internetpi killkakatinkichu	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

<p><b>SOCT1.</b> Kunan, kullkikunamanta rimashpak...Imashinatak <b>mamallaktapak</b> kullkikunata rikunki? Kikin ninkiman sumak, alli, shina shinalla, mana alli, yapa mana alli. (1) allipachami (2) allimi (3) shina shinallami (regular) (4) mana allimi (5) yapamana allimi (pésima) (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>SOCT1</b>
<p><b>SOCT2.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika kaypachapi, llaktapa SITUACION ECONOMICA ñaupa pachamanta ashtawan allichu, shinallachu, PEORchu, imashina kan? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>SOCT2</b>
<p><b>SOCT3.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, chunka ishkey katik killakunapi llaktapa SITUACION ECONOMICA kunanmanta, ashtawan alli kankacha? ¿shinallachu, peorchu? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>SOCT3</b>
<p><b>IDIO1.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA ¿imashina kan? ¿allipachachu, allichu, shina shinallachu, mana allichu, yapa mana allichu kan? (1) allipachami (2) allimi (3) shina shinallami (regular) (4) mana allimi (5) yapamana allimi (pésima) (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>IDIO1</b>
<p><b>IDIO2.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika kaypachapi, kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA ñaupa pachamanta ashtawan allichu, shinallachu, PEORchu, imashina kan? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>IDIO2</b>
<p><b>IDIO3.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, chunka ishkey katik killakunapi kanpa SITUACION ECONOMICA kunanmanta, ashtawan alli kankacha? ¿shinallachu, peorchu? (1) ashtawan allimi (2) shinallami (3) PEOR (8) mana yachanchu</p>	<b>IDIO3</b>

Shukta jawa manta, A VECES runakunapash, ayllupash, mana paykunapa llakikunata allichina ushashpa, shukla gobiernomanta runakunaman yanapayta mañankuna				
¿Lakikunanta allichinkapak ..... man yanapayta ushashpachu ?	<b>Ari</b>	<b>Mana</b>	<b>Mana yachanchu/mana kutinchu</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> Congresopa apuk	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> Gobiernomanta ministerio	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> CONAIE, shukta runakunapa tandanakuy	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

Ranpa municipiomanta rimakrinkichik,,,,,,,				
<p><b>NP1.</b> ¿kipa chunka ishkey killakunapi, cabildo abiertoman [alcaldeka tantanakuyma cayan] rinkichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu/ mana yuyanchu</p>	<b>NP1</b>			
<p><b>NP2.</b> ¿kipa chunka ishkey killapi, oficinaman, funionarioman, concejalman, sindicoman municipiomanta yanapayta mañashka? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu/ mana yuyanchu</p>	<b>NP2</b>			
<p><b>SGL1.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika municipiopa ruraykunaka¿Imashina kan.....?</p>				

<p>(1) allipachami (2) allimi (3) shina shinallami (4) mana allimi (5) yapamana allimi (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu</p>	<p><b>SGL1</b></p>	
<p><b>LGL2A.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, municipioka ashtawan rurykunatapassh, kulikitapah charina kabchu, mama llapakta pushyka ashtawan municipiopa ruraykunata charina kanchu . ¿imashina kana kan? Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar <b>más responsabilidades</b>? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional (2) Algo más al gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y al municipio (4) Algo más al municipio (5) Mucho más al municipio (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>LGL2A</b></p>	
<p><b>LGL2B.</b> ¿Ruraykunata ashtawan alli ruranata ushankapak, ashtawan kullkita municipioman kuyman? Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería <b>administrar más dinero</b>? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Algo más el gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y el municipio (4) Algo más el municipio (5) Mucho más el municipio (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>LGL2B</b></p>	
<p><b>MUNI2.</b> Kanpa yuyapika ¿maykan ashtawan jatun llakiyta kay pachapi, municipioka tyan? <b>[Ama kutichiykunata killkakatipay]</b> [shuklla kutichiy mañapay] (00) nimatapash (01) yakuta mana charinkunachu (02) ñankunaka mana alli kankuna (03) runakunaka chikipi kan (04) llaktaka mapami kan (05) mana SERVICIOS charinkuna (06) situación económica (10) mana alli pushakkuna charinchu (11) Pachamama lakikuna charin (88) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu Shuktakuna (killkapay):</p>	<p><b>MUNI2</b></p>	
<p><b>MUNI5.</b> ¿Imashina municipioka paypa kullkita kun yuyaypi ¿Kanka chaypi kashka? (1) Ari, kashkani (0) Mana kashkanichu (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu</p>	<p><b>MUNI5</b></p>	
<p><b>MUNI5A.</b> ¿Maypitak municipioka ashtawan paypa kullkita kun? <b>[Ama killkakatipay]</b> (1). Tukuy runamanta llaktata pichaypi (2) Ñankunapi, jatun ñankunapi, chakakunapi, pukllankapak Kanchakunapi, shuktakunapi (3) Unkushka kamankapak, wawakunata yachachinkapak (4) CORRUPCION (5) Runakunaman, paykunapa lammkaymnta, kullkita kunkapak (6) Manaimatapash</p>	<p><b>MUNI5A</b></p>	

Shuktakuna _____ (88) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu		
<b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Kanka, municipioka alli ruraykunachu kullkiwan ruray iñinkichu? (3) Ashka iñin (2) Shina shinalla iñin (1) Ashalla iñin (0) Nimatapash iñin (8) Mana yachanchu	<b>MUNI6</b>	

<b>LGL2.</b> Kikipak yuyaypi, ashtawan ruraykunatapash ashtawan kullkitapash llaktata pushak ukuman kuna kanchu, mana kashpaka mama llaktata pushakchu ashtawan ruraykunatapash uchilla llaktata pushak ukukuna ruraykunatapash rurana kanchu? (1) Ashtawan llaktata pushukkuna (2) Mama llaktata ñaupaman pushak ashtawan ruraykunata rurankapash kunkapash (3) Mana imatak shukta rurana (4) Ashatawan uchilla llaktata pushukkuna alli yanapachun (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2</b>	
---	-------------	--

	<b>Shuklla kutin semanap i</b>	<b>Shuk, ishkay kutinkun a killapimi</b>	<b>Shuk, ishkay kutinkun a watapimi rishpa</b>	<b>Manaja ycapi, niwapa y</b>	<b>Mana yachanch u</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> Kunan, shukta rimankapak, kikinka kay chunka ish kay killakunapi kikipak llaktapak shuk llakita tukuchinkapak yanapashkankichu, mana kashpaka kikipak llaktapi kawsak mashikunapak? Nipay, kanchis punllapi shuk kutita, killapi shuk kutita mana kashpaka ish kay kutita, watapi shuk kutita mana kashpaka ish kay kutita, mana ima punlla	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP5</b>

Organizacionesmanta shutikuna kikakatikrini, paykunapa tantanakuymán (1) shuklla kutin semanapi, (2) shuk, ishkey kutinkuna killapimi, (3) shuk, ishkey kutinkuna watapimi rishpa, (4) manajaycapi, niwapay	Shuklla kutin semanapi	Shuk, ishkey kutinkuna killapimi	Shuk, ishkey kutinkuna watapimi rishpa	Manajaycapi, niwapay	Manayachanchu	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Apunkchik wasimanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Yachanawasimanta jatun yachanawasimanta yayamamamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Ayllu allichinkapak tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> Profesional nishkakunapak tantarishka ukupak, jatuk runakunapak, llankak runakunapak, mana kashpaka panpapi kawsak runakunapak tantarishka ukupakpash tantanakuykunachu? Yanapay....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Llamkunamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Partido politicamanta tantanakuymán rinkichu?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>

<p><b>CP20.</b>  <b>[Warmikunalla]</b>                  Tantarishka                  ukukunapak mana                  kashpaka                  warmikuna                  tantarishkapak                  mana kashpaka                  wasipi llankak                  warmikuna                  tantanakuykunachu                  ?</p>	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	<b>CP20</b>
<p><b>LS3.</b> Kanka, ¿kanpa kausayta munankichu? (1) Ashka munakimi (2) Ari, munankimi (3) Ashalla munankimi (4) Mana munankimi (8) Mana yachanchu</p>							<b>LS3</b>
<p><b>IT1.</b> Kaymanta runakunamant arimakrinchik, ¿ayllupa, barriopa runakunaka imashna kan? Kanka paykunata iñinkichu?                  (1) Ashka iñin (2) Shina shinalla iñin (3) Ashalla iñin (4) Nimatapash iñin (8) Mana yachanchu</p>							<b>IT1</b>
<p><b>IT1A</b> Mashnatak kikinka shuk kuti riksishka runakunatak alli ninki? Kikin ninkiman: [Killka katina kaykunanata]                  (1)Tukuy shunku alli ninki (2) Shina shinalla alli ninki (3)Ashata alli ninki (4)Mana alli ninki (8)NS/NR</p>							<b>IT1A</b>
<p><b>IT1B</b> Tukuyta rimanakushpak, Kikinka tukuylla runakunata allimi ninkimancha mana kashpaka alli alli rikuna kanki shukkunata alli nina karpika?                  (1) Tukuylla runakunata allimi ninacha                  (2) Shukllata alli alli rikuna kanka shukkunata alli nina karpika                  (8) NS/NR</p>							<b>IT1B</b>

[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]



**L1.** Kay fankapi shuk ESCALAta tyan kaypi, llukimanta, allikaman, yupaykunata shukmanta chunkakaman tyan. Kay pachapi ashka runakuna paykunapa POLITICO yuyayta rikuchin, shukkuna llukita ashtawan munan, shinapash shuktakuna allita ashtawan munanmi. Kanpa yuyaykunawan llukijawamantapash, allijawamantapash kay escalapi shuk “X” kanpa yuyayman cuchumi yuyaypi churapay

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Illukijawamantapash							Allijawamantapash			(Mana yachanchu=88)

**[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]**

<p><b>IMMIG1.</b> Mashnatak kikinka ari ninki, Ecuador mamallaktatak pushak llaktakunapak ruraykunata rurasha nin, shina alli kawsaypak yanapay, yachakunamanta, kawsaypak wasikunamanta, karu llaktamanta kawasankapak shamuk runakunaman mana kashpaka mamallaktapi llankankapak shamukkunaman? Kikinka .....</p> <p>(1) Sumakmi ninkichu                  (2) Alli ninkichu                  (3) Aritapash mana aritapash ninkichu                  (4) Shina shinalla ari ninki                  (5) Mana ari ninki                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IMMIG1</b>
<p><b>IMMIG2</b> Tukuypi, Kikinka tukuy karu llaktamanta kawsankapak shamuk runakuna kaypi Ecuadormanta runakunapak llankaykunata ruran ninkimancha mana kashpaka Ecuadormanta runakunapak llankaykunata kichun ninkichu?</p> <p>(1) Ecuadormanta runakunapak mana munashka llankaykunata ruran                  (2) Ecuadormanta runakunapak llankaykunata kichun                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>IMMIG2</b>

<p><b>PROT1.</b> Kanka shuk manifestación pulicamanta rirkankichu?</p>	(1) wakin punlla	(2) Manajaykapi	(3) manajaycapi	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap	<b>PROT2</b>
--	------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------	--------	--------------

Kanpa municipiomanta rimakrinkichik, Shukta runakunaka, shukkuna kuntinkunapi aukakunaka pushayta japiyman, alli kayman, nin, kanpa yuyaypika, Ima kutikunapi aukakunaka pusahayta japichun alli kayman					
<b>JC10.</b> Ashka juchak tyakpi.	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	8) Mana yachanchu	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Ashka kulllilita rantinkapak kuna kakpi.	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	8) Mana yachanchu	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> CORRUPCION tyakpi	(1) Alli Kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	8) Mana yachanchu	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>ECUJC20.</b> Colombiamanta jatun makanakuyta jatun yachina tiyakpi.	(1) Alli kayman	(2) Mana alli kayman	(8) Mana yachanchu	<b>ECUJC20</b>	

<b>JC15.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, Pushakka Congresomanta wichikana ruray tukunchu?	(1) Ari	(2) Mana	(8) MAY/MK	<b>JC15</b>	
<b>JC16.</b> Kanpa yuyaypika, Corte Supremamanta wichikana ruray tukunchu?	(1) Ari	(2) Mana	(8) MAY/MK	<b>JC16</b>	

<b>VIC1.</b> ¿kupa chunka ishkey killakunapi maykan runakunaka kanta makashkapash, shuwashkapashchu? (1) Ari [katipay] (2) Mana (8) Mana yachanchu	<b>VIC1</b>	
---	-------------	--

<b>[TUKUYLLATA TAPUNA]</b> Kunan yuyapay kay chunka ishkey yallishka killakunapi kay kati tapuykunata tikrachinkapak <b>[Ari nishpak tikrachishpaka “Ari”, tapuna Mashna kutita? Killkana yupayta mashna kutita; Mana nishpak tikrachishpaka “Mana” killkana “0” illak]</b>	¿Mashna kuti? ? <b>NO = 0, NS/NR=88</b>	
<b>VIC20.</b> Pipash kikinta kay yallishka chunka ishkey killakunapi imatapash mana antawa kashkata arma nishkawan shuwarkachu? Mashna kutitak?		<b>VIC20</b>
<b>VIC21.</b> Kay yallishka chunka ishkey killakunapi kikinkpak wasiman shuwankapak yaikurkachu? <b>[Mana nikipika churay “0” yalli VIC27man] Ari nikipika “Ari”, sondeo: Mashna kuti?</b>		<b>VIC21</b>

<p><b>AOJ1.</b> Kay yallishkata shuk yanapak ukuman willarkankichu?                  (1) Ari [<b>yalli VIC27</b>]                  (2) Mana willarkachu [<b>katina</b>]                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p><b>AOJ1</b></p>	
<p><b>AOJ1B</b> Imashpatak mana yallishkata willarkanki? [<b>ama kay katikunata killkatina</b>]                  (1) Mana valinchi                  (2) Llakichinamantapash kutin llakichinata manchaymantapash                  (3) Mana imashina rikuchinata charimanta                  (4) Mana yapa kakpi                  (5) Mana maypi willanata yachan                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>AOJ1B</b></p>	

	<p>¿Mashna kuti?  <b>NO = 0,</b>  <b>NS/NR=88</b></p>	
<p><b>VIC27.</b> Chunka ishka yallishka killakunapi wakin auka kikinta mana alli shimikunawan rimarka, waktarka mana kashpaka kikinta chukrichirkachu? Mashna kutitak?</p>		<p><b>VIC27</b></p>

<p><b>AOJ8.</b> Juchakkunata japinkapak, chapakkunaka LEYshina nikpi rurana kanchu, shukla kutikunapash rurana ushanchu?                  (1) LEYshina nikpi rurana kan (2) Shukla kutikunapash rurana ushan                  (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	<p><b>AOJ8</b></p>	
<p><b>AOJ11.</b> Kanpa llaktapi, shuwaymanta, wañuchiyanta, kanka ¿SEGURO Kankichu?                  (1) Seguro kanimi (2) Shina Shinallami (3) Mana SEGURO kanichu (4) Yapa mana SEGURO kanichu (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	<p><b>AOJ11</b></p>	
<p>Mama llaktamanta rimanakushpak, Mashnatak kikinka shuwashpak llakichikunata charinchik yuyanki kuan kay lakikunaka shamuk punllakunapak llakikunchu? [<b>Mana kay katikunata Killkatina</b>]                  (1) Ashtaka (2) Wakin (3) Ashalla                  (4) illak (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ11A</b></p>	

<p><b>AOJ12.</b> Kikinta shuwashpak llakichishka kakpika, Mashnatak kay tukuy Kamachikushka shimikuna shuwakunata llakichin ninki? Alli ninkiman..... Mashnatak alli ninki kay aukakuna shuwakunata japin?</p> <p>(1) Ashtaka (2) Wakin (3) Ashalla (4) illak (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ12</b>
<p><b>AOJ12a.</b> Kikinta shuwashpak llakichishka kakpika, Mashnatak kay tukuy Kamachikushka shimikuna shuwakunata llakichin ninki? Alli ninkiman..... Mashnatak alli ninki kay aukakuna shuwakunata japin?</p> <p>(1) Ashtaka (2) Wakin (3) Ashalla (4) illak (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ12a</b>
<p><b>AOJ18.</b> Wakin runakuna kay llaktamanta aukakunaka mana runakunata shuwakunamanta mitzanchu nin, shukkuna aukakunapash shuwakunawanmi ninguna. Imatak kikinka yuyanki?</p> <p>(1) Aukakunaka yanapanchu, mana kashpaka (2) Aukakuna shuwakunawanmi (3) [Ama Killka katina] Mana yanapanchu, mana shuwakunawanmi mana kashpaka yanapanpash shuwakunawanpash (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ18</b>
<p><b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, Ashka, Imalla, Ashalla, Manimatapash, Mana yachanchu?</p> <p>(1) Ashka (2) Imalla (3) Ashalla (4) Manimatapash (8) Mana yachanchu</p>	<b>AOJ17</b>

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente Kutento marikanshi, Ayshanago marikanchi, Ayshinago nagustatany, Ashysa inagustany? (REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)

	Kutento marikanshi	Ayshanago o marikanchi	Ayshinago nagustatany	Ashysa inagustany	[No leer] No hizo trámites	MAY/MK	
ST1. Mamallaktamanta chapakkunal	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST 1</b>
ST2. Jusgadospipash, tribunales de justicia pipash	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST 2</b>
ST3. Fiscaliapichu	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST 3</b>
ST4. Alcaldiapichu	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST 4</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]**

Shukta pankapi kilakrishun. Kay pankapi yupaykunata shukmanta kanshisman tyan. Shukka manaimashina kan, kutin kanshiska ashka shina kan. Imashina, ñukaka mashnatak televisiónta rikunata munanki tarpukpika, kanka manaima munashpashuklla japinkiman, shinapash manaima munashpa shukllata japinkiman. Shina shinalla munashpa, hukta yupayta japinkiman. Shina kashpaka. ¿Mashnatak televisiónla rikunata munanki? Yupayta japipay **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
manimatapash				ashka			manayachanchu

**Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

<b>B1.</b> ¿Kanpa yuyaypika ¿Ecuadormanta taripankapak tantanakuykunpi juchakman alli taripay rurankunachu? ( <i>Sondee: S i UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i> )	<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> ¿Mashnatak mamallaktamanta pushaykunapi ñinki?	<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> ¿Mashnatak runakunapa allikunata Ecuadormanta pushakkunaka rikun?	<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> ¿Mashnatak mama llakta pushayta munanki?	<b>B4</b>
<b>B6.</b> ¿Kanpa yuyaypika, ¿Mashnatak Ecuadormanta pushayta quimina kan?	<b>B6</b>
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Sistema de Justicia ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B10A</b>
<b>B11.</b> ¿Shitay rikukpi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B11</b>
<b>B12.</b> ¿Aukakunapi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B12</b>
<b>B13.</b> ¿Pushakmanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B13</b>
<b>B14.</b> ¿Mama llaktamanta pushaypi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B14</b>
<b>B15.</b> ¿Fiscalía General de la Naciónpi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B15</b>
<b>B18.</b> ¿Chapakkunapi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B18</b>
<b>B19.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kay Contraloría alli yuyanki?	<b>B19</b>
<b>B20.</b> ¿Kuchipatakunapi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B20</b>
<b>B21.</b> ¿Partido politicokunapi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B21</b>
<b>B21A.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakta alli yuyanki?	<b>B21A</b>
<b>B23.</b> ¿Llamkasmanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B23</b>
<b>B31.</b> ¿Corte Suprema de Justiciapi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B31</b>
<b>B32.</b> ¿Ciudadmanta pushaypi ¿Mashnatak ñinki?	<b>B32</b>
<b>B43.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikin Ecuador mamallaktamanta kaymanta kushi yuyanki?	<b>B43</b>
<b>B17.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay Defensoría del Pueblo nishka ukuta alli yuyanki?	<b>B17</b>

<b>Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</b>	
<b>B33.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay prefectura provincial nishka ukuta alli yuyanki?	<b>B33</b>
<b>B37.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay radiokunapi televisiónkunapi nishkata alli yuyanki?	<b>B37</b>
<b>ECUB40A.</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay yana runakuna tantanakushka ukuta alli yuyanki?	<b>ECUB40A</b>
<b>B40.</b> ¿Kichwa runakunamanta tantanakuypi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	<b>B40</b>
<b>B42.</b> ¿Servicio de Rentas internaspí ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	<b>B42</b>
<b>B50.</b> ¿Tribunal Constitucionalpi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	<b>B50</b>
<b>B46 [b45].</b> ¿Ima pachakamanta kikinka kay Comisión de Control Cívico Contra la Corrupción nishka ukuta alli yuyanki?	<b>B46</b>
<b>B47.</b> ¿Kanpa mashikunapi ¿Mashnatak iñinki?	<b>B47</b>
<b>B48.</b> Ima pachakamantak kikinka kay shuk karu llaktakunawan jatuykuna randikunaka llaktapak kullkikunata allichipi yanapanka yuyanki?	<b>B48</b>
<b>B51.</b> ¿ONG's mamallktapi llamkashpan. Imatak iñinki?	<b>B51</b>
<b>ECUB50 (B50).</b> ¿kanka ONG participación Ciudadnata riksinkichu? (Si dice "no" marcar 9 y pasar a ECUB51. Si dice "sí" preguntar) Kanka imatak kanta ininki?	<b>B50</b>
<b>B39.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kikinka kay cámaras de los empresarios privados nishka ukukunamanta alli yuyanki?	<b>B39</b>
<b>ECUB52.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kikinka kay mamallaktapak uchilla llaktata ñaupaman pushak tantanakushka ukumanta alli yuyanki?	<b>ECUB52</b>
<b>ECUB53.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kikinka kay mamallaktapak Asamblea Nacional Constituyente nishkamanta alli yuyanki?	<b>ECUB53</b>

	<b>Anota r 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</b>
Usando la misma escala...	
<b>N1.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kikinka kay mamallaktata pushakka wakchakunamanta rurashka ninki?	<b>N1</b>
<b>N3.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kay mamallaktata pushakka Democracia nishkawan apamun wakaychin ninki?	<b>N3</b>
<b>N9.</b> ¿ Ima pachakamantak kay mamallaktata pushakka runakunapak kawsayta wakaychin ninki?	<b>N9</b>
<b>N10.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kay mamallaktata pushakka llaktapi runakunapak alli kawsayta allichin ninki?	<b>N10</b>
<b>N11.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kay mamallaktata pushakka llankaykuna illayta tukuchinkapak ruran ninki?	<b>N11</b>

Usando la misma escala...	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</b>
<b>N12.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak kay mamallaktata pushakka llankaykuna illayta tukuchinkapak desempleo ninki?	<b>N12</b>

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Ecuador y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</b>
<b>EPP1.</b> Tukuy ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuypi yuyarishpak,	<b>EPP1</b>
<b>EPP2.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak Ecuador mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantaka paykunapak shitakkunata alli ruraykunawan rikurinkuna?	<b>EPP2</b>
<b>EPP3.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak Ecuador mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuypak ukupi mana alli ruraykuna tyan?	<b>EPP3</b>
<b>EC1</b> Mashnatak ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantaka ñukanchik shina runata uyankunachu?	<b>EC1</b>
<b>EC2</b> Kunanka, Congreso Nacional nishka ukumanta yuyashpak. Ima pachakamantak Congreso Nacional nishka ukuka mamallaktata ñaupaman pushak ruraykunata jarkan?	<b>EC2</b>
<b>EC3.</b> ¿Mashna punllakunatak Congreso Nacional nishka ukuta ñaupaman pushakkunaka chinkachinkuna rimanakushpa paypura rimarinakushpa?	<b>EC3</b>
<b>EC4.</b> ¿Imashina minishtirishkatak mamallaktapak kay Congreso Nacional ukupi kamachikunata ari niskakakunaka?	<b>EC4</b>
<b>ECUEC5.</b> ¿Ima pachakamantak Asamblea Constituyente nishka Congreso Nacionalta shayachishkata alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?	<b>ECUEC5</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA A]**

<b>M1.</b> Congresomanta rimashpa kay ukupi llankakkunapi tukuyta tantachishpa yuyashpa, mana ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantata rikushpa, kikinka kay Ecuador mamallakta?	<b>M1</b>
---	-----------

Sumak sumak (2 )Alli (3)shina shinalla (4) mana alli (5) mana valin (8) NS/NR		
<b>M2.</b> Congresopak diputadokuna llankayta ruranakun sumak sumak, alli, shina shinalla, mana alli, mana valin? Sumak sumak (2 )Alli (3)shina shinalla (4) mana alli (5) mana valin (8) NS/NR	<b>M2</b>	
<b>ECUM2</b> Asamblea Nacional Constituyentemanta rimashpa kay ukupi llankakkunapi tukuyta tantachishpa yuyashpa, mana ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantata rikushpa, kikinka kay asambleístakuna llankayta ruranakun sumak sumak, alli, shina shinalla, mana alli, mana valin? Sumak sumak (2 )Alli (3)shina shinalla (4) mana alli (5) mana valin (8) NS/NR	<b>ECUM2</b>	
<b>ECUCA1.</b> ¿ Ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymanta Kikin kay shuk mushuk mamallaktapak kamachikunakunaka mamallaktapak llakikunatapacha tukuchinkapak yanapanka mana kashpaka kay mushuk kamachiwan kakkipash llakikunaka katinka yuyanki? <b>[Leer Opciones]</b> [1] Mamallaktapak llakikunaka tukurinka [2] Llakikunaka katinka [8 ] NS/NR	<b>ECUCA1</b>	
<b>ECUCA2.</b> Kikipak yuyaypi, Maykan llakitak ashtawan Asamblea Nacional Constituyenteka tukuchina kan? [NO LEER LISTA. ELIJA UNA SOLA ALTERNATIVA] [1] wakchamanta llakikunapash charikkuna wakchakuna mamallaktapipash [2] allpamanta llakikuna mamallaktapakpash [3] mamallaktata ñaupaman pushak allichikunamanta llakikunapash runakunapak kawsayta sinchiyachinamantapash llaktamanta runakunapak ruranakunatapash [constitución] [4] llaktakuna chakchurimanta llakikuna [5] tukuy mamallaktapak llakikuna [6] mamallaktapak kullkikunamanta llakikuna [7] mana allita ruraymanta llakikuna [8] illak [9] shukkuna [10] NS/NR	<b>ECUCA2</b>	



**[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]**

Kunan, paypura uchilla pankakunawan rurakrinchik, shinapish 1 yupayka “mama nikuymi” 7 yupayka “ari nikuymi”. Shuk yupay 1 manta 7 kamanka chawpimi. Ñuka kikinman killka katikrini tauka ninakuyknatapash kikinkunaka niwachun munayman, imapachakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki chay yuyaykunatapash.

Killkkana 1-7 yupayta, 8 paykuna NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
mama nikuymi ari nikuymi							NS/NR
							Killkkana 1-7 yupayta, 8 paykuna NS/NR

<p>Kunanpi mamallakta imashina kakta rikushpa, kikinkuna niwachun munayman wiñay wiñay uchilla pankawan llankakushpa imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki kay kati yuyaykunamanta.</p> <p><b>ECUCA3.</b> ¿Asamblea Nacional Constituyenteka allitachu rurarka kay mushuk kamachikunata tapuchun kachashpaka, mana kamachita mushukyachispapash kay ukukunata mushukyachishkapash. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<b>ECUCA3</b>
<p><b>ECUCA4.</b> Mamallaktatak ñaupama pushakta Asamblea Nacional Constituyentepe jarkamukkunaka ashallakunami shinamanta allichu kikipak yanapay kay ukupi jarkashka kankapash. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<b>ECUCA4</b>
<p><b>ECUCA5.</b> Asamblea Nacional Constituyenteka shuk democrática nishka ukumi. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<b>ECUCA5</b>

<p>Kunanpi mamallakta imashina kakta rikushpa, kikinkuna niwachun munayman wiñay wiñay uchilla pankawan llankakushpa imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki kay kati yuyaykunamanta.</p>	<p><b>POP101</b></p>	
<p><b>POP101.</b> Mamallakta ñaupaman rinamanta, ñukanchik mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkunapak shimitapash tantarishka ñaupaman pushakkuna jarkakkunapak shitaytapash jarkana minishtirin. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>		
<p><b>POP102.</b> Mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakpak ruraykunata Congreso jarkakpi, ñukanchik mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkunaka Congreso illakchu ñaupaman pushana kankuna. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP102</b></p>	
<p><b>POP103.</b> Mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakpak ruraykunata Corte Suprema de Justicia nishka uku jarkakpika, ñukanchik mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkunamanta mana uyashka kankuna. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP103</b></p>	
<p><b>POP106.</b> Mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkunaka llaktakunapak munayta katina kan, imashpak llaktakunapak munay wiñay wiñaylla sumakmi. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP106</b></p>	
<p><b>POP107.</b> Llaktakunapacha ñaupaman pushana kan, mana ñukanchik akllashka runakunamanta. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP107</b></p>	
<p><b>POP109.</b> Kunanpi kay pachapi, alliwan mana alliwan shuk makanakuy tyan, runakunami ishkandimanta shukta akllana kankuna. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki kay alliwan mana alliwan shuk makanakuy tyanwan? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP109</b></p>	
<p><b>POP110.</b> Llaktakuna ña allita akllan, ñukanchik ashalla jarkak runakunata jarkana kanchi. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP110</b></p>	

<p><b>POP112</b> Mamallakta ñaupaman rinata sinchi jarkakka charik runakunami mana kashpaka mana alli ñaupaman pushakkuna llaktata shuwan. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP112</b></p>
<p><b>POP113.</b> Shuk runakuna mana tukuykullawan ari nishpaka mamallaktapak waklli. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP113</b></p>
<p><b>EFF1.</b> Mamallaktata ñaupaman pushakkunaka ñukanchik shina runapak yuyayta munankuna. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<p><b>EFF1</b></p>
<p><b>EFF2.</b> Imashina mamallaktata ñaupaman pushaykunamanta alli intindini yuyani. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<p><b>EFF2</b></p>
<p><b>ING4.</b> Democraciaka aska llakita charin. Kanka kay forma de goiernoka may allimi kan?</p>	<p><b>ING4</b></p>
<p><b>PN2</b> Ñukanchik shuk shuk yuyayta charishpapish, Ecuadormanta runakunaka tauka ruraykunapash kawsay yuyaykunapashmi mamallakta shina tantarinchik. Imapachakamantak alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<p><b>PN2</b></p>
<p><b>DEM23.</b> Ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymanta illak democracia tiay ushan. Imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?</p>	<p><b>DEM23</b></p>

Kunanka mamallaktapak ruraykunamanta kikinman killka katikrini. Kikin niwa imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki? Kay 1 a 7 yupaywan llankashpak katishun

**NS/NR = 8**

<b>ROS1.</b> Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk charikkunapak randi ashtawan jatun empresayuk, industriayukpash kana. Imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?	<b>ROS1</b>	
<b>ROS2.</b> Ecuador mamallaktaka, runakunata yalli, paypak makipimi runakuna alli kawsayta charichun. Imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?	<b>ROS2</b>	
<b>ROS3.</b> Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk charikkunapak empresata yalli, paypak makipimi llankaykunata wiñachina. Imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?	<b>ROS3</b>	
<b>ROS4.</b> Ecuador mamallaktaka sinchi kamachikunata mirachina kan charikkunapak wakchakunapak kullki shikan yaikuyta pishiyachinkapak? Imapachakamantak kay yuyayta alli yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli yuyanki?	<b>ROS4</b>	

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

<b>PN4.</b> Tukuypi, Kikin ninkiman Ecuadorpi paktachishka, shina shina pakatachishka, mana paktachishka, mana imata paktachishka democracia nishkawan alli pushamun? (1) Paktachishka (2) Shina shina pakatachishka (3) Mana paktachishka (4) Mana imata paktachishka (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> Kikinpak yuyaypi, Ecuadorka shuk may democrático mamallaktami, shina shinalla democrático, asha democrático, mana democrático? (1)May democrático (2)Shina shinalla democrático (3)Asha democrático (4)Mana democrático. (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>	

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]**

Shukta pankapi killkarkinki. Kay mushuk pankaka shukmanta, chunkakaman yuyaykunaka charin. Shukka, kanka mana shina yuyankishina kan, chunkaka, kanka shinami yuyanki shina kan. Runakinaka, politico imakinata, yuyakunapash charinkapak, kay imakunapash ruranata ushan. Kanka shina yuyankichu, mana shina yuyankichu

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyankichu					Kanka shina yuyankichu					Mana yachanchu

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
E5. Jatariykunapi kachun	<b>E5</b>	
E8. Llakikunata allichinkapak tantanakuykunaman richun	<b>E8</b>	
E11. Partido politicomanpash, pushakkunamanpash llamkachun	<b>E11</b>	
E15. Ñankunata wishikachun	<b>E15</b>	
E14. Shuk runamanta llaktaman, wasimanpash, shinapash payka mana ari nikpi yaykuchun	<b>E14</b>	
E2. Llamkay ukuman, shukta jatun wasimanpash mana charikkuna ari nikpi yaykuchun	<b>E2</b>	
E3. Pushayta mana munashpa, makanakuyta rurachun	<b>E3</b>	
E16. Estadoka mana justicia ruranchu, chaymanta runakunaka, paypa justiciaka ruran	<b>E16</b>	

Mama llakta ruaymanta rimakrinchik. Shuk manta, chunka kaman japishun.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyankichu					Kanka shina yuyankichu					Mana yachanchu

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>D32.</b> ¿ Kanpa yuyaypika runakunaka mana jatariykunata rurana ushankapak leyta rurachun alli kanchu, mana alli kanchu?	<b>D32</b>	
<b>D33.</b> ¿Runakuna ñankunata mana kashpaka uchilla ñankunata wichaypi kankuna. Wiñay wiñaylla shinallata llankana, lmapachakamantak kayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki?	<b>D33</b>	
<b>D34.</b> ¿lmapachakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki mamallaktata apamuykunata maykanpash tantanakuy rimakpi shuk kamachi amanichun nin?	<b>D34</b>	
<b>D37.</b> ¿lmapachakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki mamallaktata ñaupaman pushak televisiónpi rimaykunata jarkan?	<b>D37</b>	
<b>ECUD38.</b> Imashina sinchitak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki mamallaktata ñaupaman pushak llaktapak tantakushka uku llankayta rikunchun, shinallata shuk llaktamanta yanapak ukutapash?	<b>ECUD38</b>	

**ECUD39.** Kikinka imashina sinchitak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki mamallaktata ñaupaman pushak shuk fundación nishka uku mamallaktapak kullkita chashkikta wichanchun, Fundación Malecón 2000 de Guayaquilta shina?

**ECUD39**

Tay tapuykunaka Ecuadormanta runakunapa yuyaykunata yachankapak kan. Shuk manta, chunka kaman japishun [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Mana shina yuyakinchu					Kanka shina yuyankinchu					Mana yachanchu

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>D1.</b> Shukkunaka tukuy Ecuadormanta pushaykunaka mana alli kan, nin. ¿Kay runakunaka shitana kanman?		<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Kay runakunaka alli jatariykunaka rurana kanmanchu? Yupayta nipay		<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> ¿Kay runakunaka pushaypi llamkana usan?		<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> ¿Kikinka imashina sinchitak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ari ninki kay runakuna televisiónkunapi rimankapak llukshichun?		<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?		<b>D5</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA C]**

¿Imashina kanka yuyankichu?

<b>DEM2.</b> Kay quimsa rimaykunamanta, maykan ashtawan munanki: (1) Democraciapimi Kausashka, mana democraciapimi kausashkachu shinalla (2) Democraciaka shuklaq pushaymanta ashtawam alli kan (3) kutin kitikunapimi shuk kamak pushayka ashtawan alli kan (8) Mana yachanchu/mana yuyanchu	<b>DEM2</b>
<b>DEM11.</b> Kikinka ñukanchik mamallaktapi shuk sinchi makiwan ñaupaman pushakta minishtin yuyanki mana kashpaka tukuykunapak yanapaywan llakikunaka tukurinka? (1) Sinchi maki (2) Tukuykunapak yanapaywan (8) NS/NR	<b>DEM11</b>
<b>ECUDEM14.</b> Imamantatak democraciamanta allichinchu? [Leer respuestas] 1. Fortalecer la Justicia 2. Fortalecer los gobiernos locales 3. Combatir la corrupción 4. Llamkay rurachin	<b>ECUDEM14</b>

<p>5. Valores yachay 6. Seguridad ciudadana allichin [NO LEER] Ninguna de las anteriores 8. Mana kaypichu tiyan</p>		
<p><b>AUT1.</b> Shuk runakunaka nin: Ñukanchikka sinchi apukta mutzurinchik shinapash ñukanchikka payta mana shitawan akllana kana kanchu. Shukta runakunaka nin: Mana shina kashpaka shitayka ashtawan alli kan. Kanka imatak yuyanki? (1) Ñukanchikka sinchi apukta mutzurinchik shinapash ñukanchikka payta mana shitawan akllana kana kanchu (2) Shitayka ahtawan allikan (8) Mana yachanchu/ mana kutinchu</p>	<b>AUT1</b>	
<p><b>AUT2.</b> Maykanwantak kikinka kay kati yuyaykunamanta ashtawan alli yuyanki? (1) Llaktamanta runakuna shina ñukanchikpak ñaupaman pushakkunata ashtawan rimana mana kashpaka (2) Llaktamanta runakuna shina ñukanchikpak ñaupaman pushakkunata ñaupaman pushak kaymanta ashtawan yupaychayta rikuchina kanchik. (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AUT2</b>	
<p><b>PP1.</b> Akllaykunapika, shuk runakunaka shukta runakinata nin: Kay apuk tukunaka akllan. Kaypika kanta ninchu? <b>[Yupak killka katinki]</b> (1) Tukuy akllay (2) Achnka akllay (3) Asha akllay (4) Manarak (8) MY/MK</p>	<b>PP1</b>	
<p><b>PP2.</b> Runakunaka pushak tukunata llamkay. Kanka 2006 akllaykunapika shuk pushak tukunawan llamkarkanki? (1) Ari llamkarkanki (2) Mana llamkarkanki (8) MY/MK</p>	<b>PP2</b>	
<p>Kikin rimachun munashkayman kay katiruraykunata (1) mana alli ruraykunata llakichina (2) mana alli ruraykuna kakkipash shinapish yallichina (3) mana waklli .</p>		
<p><b>DC10.</b> Shuk tauka wawawan mamaka wawatak riksinkapak pankata shuk wawapata llukchina. Payka ama shuyamanta pikchka dularta registro civil nishkapak llankakman kun mana kashpaka uchillal llaktata pushakman.... Kikinma warmi rurashkata yuyanki? (1) Wakllimi, payka llakichishkami kana (2) Wakllimi, shinapish yallichina (3) Mana wakllichu (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DC10</b>	
<p><b>DC13</b> Shuk llankay illak runaka rikshka ñaupaman pushakpak mashami...payka payman rimashpak mamallaktapak llankayta tarin. Kikin kay rikshika ñaupaman pushakmanta yuyanki? (1) Mana allichu llakichishka mi kana (2) Mana allichu shinapish yallichinami (3) Mana wakllichu (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DC13</b>	

	INAP	Mana	Ari	MY	
Kunanka ñukanchikka kanpa yachay kaysaymanta rimana munan...					
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Kayna watapika shuk aukak kikinta kullkita mañashkachu?		0	1	8	<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> Kayna watapika shuk mamallaktapak llankak kikinta kullkita mañashkachu Mana mañarkachu mana kashpaka mañarka		0	1	8	<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Kay watapika mncicipiopi kanka shuk pankata mutzurikpi llakta llankak kullkita mañashka (Ashtawan kullkita kamachita nin)? Kanka mana shuk pankata mutzurishka (iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Kanpa llamkaypika, shuk mana alli kullkita mañashka? Kanka mana llamkankichu? (iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki)	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿Kay watapika Juzgadoman rishkanki? (mana nikpi iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki) ¿Juzgadopika coimat kina kanki?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC14A.</b> ¿Kay watapika fiscalkunawan rishkani? Kaypika shuk mana alli kullkita mañashka?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14A</b>
<b>ECUEXC14B.</b> Kay watapika abogado kunawan rishkani?	9	0	1	8	<b>ECUEXC14B</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Kay watapika kanka shuk mamallakta jampiwasi man rishkanki? (mana nikpi iskunpimi shuk kaspita churanki) Kay yachana washipika kullkita mañashka? (ashtawan kulki ima kamachita nin)	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> kayna watapi, Shuk wawata yachana wasipi? <b>Mana → Churana 9</b> <b>Ari → Tapuna:</b> Kayna watapi yachana wasipi, Wakin kullkita pakalla pagana karka?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> Pipish pakalla kullkita kikinta mañarka ama michata kuchuchun?		0	1	8	<b>EXC17</b>



	INAP	Mana	Ari	MY	
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Imashina kunanpi kaymantami wakinpi kullkita pakalla paganki?		0	1	8	<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Kikinpak kawsayta rikushpa mana kashpaka uyashkata rimana, mamallaktapak llankakkuna ismushkami: <b>[KILLKATINA]</b> (1) Tukuylla (2) Wakinkuna (3) Ashalla (4) Manapi 8) NS/NR					<b>EXC7</b>
--	--	--	--	--	-------------

Kunan mashanatak mamallakta ñaupaman pushanamanta yachankapak munanki mamallaktamanta yachashkata runakunaman yachachinki.... <b>GI1.</b> Ima shutitak kunan Estados Unidos ñaupaman pushakka? [MANA KILLKATINA: George Bush] (1) Shinami (2) Mana shinachu (8) Mana yachan (9) Mana Tikrahin					<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> Ima shutitak Asamblea Nacional Constituyenteta ñaupaman pushakka? [MANA KILLKATINA: Alberto Acosta] (1) Shinami (2) Mana shinachu (8) Mana yachan (9) Mana Tikrahin					<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> Mashna provinciakuata Ecuador mamallaktaka charin? (NO LEER 24) (1) Shinami (2) Mana shinachu (8) Mana yachan (9) Mana Tikrahin					<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> Mashna watata Ecuadorpi ñaupaman pushakkunaka llankan? [NO LEER: 4 años] (1) Shinami (2) Mana shinachu (8) Mana yachan (9) Mana Tikrahin					<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> Ima shutitak Brasil mamallaktapak ñaupaman pushakka? [MANA KILLKATINA: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Shinami (2) Mana shinachu (8) Mana yachan (9) Mana Tikrahin					<b>GI5</b>

<b>VB1.</b> Shitankapak shutita kamukunachurakun? (1) Ari (2) Mana (3) Rurakun (8) NS/NR					<b>VB1</b>
<b>VB2.</b> Kikinka kay yallirka ñaupaman pushakta akllaypi 2006 shitarkanki? [MANA KILLKATINA](1) Ari (2) Mana (8) NS/NR					<b>VB2</b>

<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Pimantak kikinka kay yallirka ñaupaman pushakta akllaypi 2006 shitarkanki? [MANA]</p> <p>(00) Manapiman (shitankapak rirka shinapish yurakpi sakirka mana kashpaka mana piman shitarka [Pasar a ECUVB20]</p> <p>(901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS</p> <p>(902) Gilmar Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP</p> <p>(903) Jaime Damerval, Concentración de Fuerzas Populares - CFP</p> <p>(904) Cynthia Viteri, Partido Social Cristiano – PSC</p> <p>(905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - RIAN</p> <p>(906) Luís Macas, Movimiento Pachakutik</p> <p>(907) León Roldós, Alianza RED-ID</p> <p>(908) Fernando Rosero, Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano – PRE</p> <p>(909) Luís Villacís, Movimiento Popular Democrático MPD</p> <p>(910) Marco Proaño Maya, Movimiento Reivindicación Democrática</p> <p>(911) Carlos Sagñay, Integración Nacional Alfarista</p> <p>(912) Lenín Torres, Movimiento Revolucionario Participación Popular – MPP</p> <p>(913) Marcelo Larrea, Alianza ALBA – Tercera República</p> <p>(77) Otro</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) Inap</p>	<p><b>VB3</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUVB20.</b> [ Pitak shuknikipi mana kashpaka ish kayniki akllaypi manapiman shitarka mana kashpaka yurapi shitarka nirka] Imashpatak kikinka manapiman mana kashpaka yurapi shuknikipi mana kashpaka ish kayniki ñaupaman pushakkunata akllaypi?</p> <p>(MANA KILLKATINA)</p> <p>(1) Imashpak mana piman shitanata yachaymanta, chinkashka karkani</p> <p>(2) Imashpak tukuy ñaupaman pushak tunkunkapak munakkunata mana munayta rikuchinkapak</p> <p>(3) Imashpak kay ñaupaman pushaykunata mana alli kachishpa rimankapak munaymanta</p> <p>(4) Imashpak kay ñaupaman pushak tunkunkapak munakukkuna rimashkata mana alli kachishpak rimankapak munaymanta</p> <p>(7) Otro _____</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB20</b></p>	

<p><b>VB50.</b> [Tukuyllata tapuna] Tukuyypi, runakunaka warmikunata yalli alli ñaupaman pushakuna. Kiiinka kayta Sumakmi yayanki, alli yuyanki, mana allichu yuyanki mana kashpaka yapa mama alli yuyanki?(1) Kiiinka kayta Sumakmi yayanki (2) alli yuyanki (3) mana allichu yuyanki (4) mama alli yuyanki (8) NSNR</p>	<p><b>VB50</b></p>	
<p><b>VB10.</b> Kay uraspi, maykanpash ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantata munankichu?(1Ari <b>[Siga]</b> (2) Mana <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB10</b></p>	
<p><b>VB11.</b> Maykan ñaupaman pushakkuna shuk shuk tantanakuymantatak kikkinka munanki? <b>[MANA KILLKA KATINA]</b> (901) Red Etica y Democracia (RED) (902) Movimiento Poder Ciudadano (MPC) (903) Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) (904) Izquierda Democrática (ID) (905) Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) (906) Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN) (907) Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País (Pachacutik) (908) Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC) (909) Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) (910) Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (PS-FA) (911) Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (PSP) (912) Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) (913) Alianza PAIS-Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS) (88) NS/NR <b>[Pase A POL1]</b> (99) INAP <b>[Pase A POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB11</b></p>	
<p><b>VB12</b> ¿ Kikinka kay kikin nirkanki <b>[ VB11]</b> ñaupaman pushak tantanakuyta manani ninkiman yapa irki, mana irki mana sinchi, sinchi mana kashpaka yapa sinchi?(1)Yapa irki (2)Irki (3)Mana irki mana sinchi (4) sinchi (5) Yapa sinchi (8)NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>VB12</b></p>	
<p><b>POL1.</b> ¿Mashnatak kikinka kay ñaupaman pushaykunata munanki: ashka, wakin, ashata mana kashpaka mana ima? (1) Ashka (2) wakin (3) Ashata (4) mana ima (8)NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL1</b></p>	
<p><b>POL2.</b> ¿Mashna kutitak ñaupaman pushanamanta shuk runakunawan rimanki? <b>[Killka katina]</b> (1) Tukuy punllakuna (2) Wakinpi kanchis punllapi (3) Wakinpi killapi (4) wakinpilla 5) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL2</b></p>	

<p><b>ECUVB19</b> ¿ Kikinka Ecuadorpi shitayka munaymanta kana mana kashpaka kunanpi shina shitanami kana yuyanki?                  (1) Munaymanta shitana kana                  (2) Kunanpi shina shitanami kana                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB19</b></p>
<p><b>ECUVB21.</b> Ecuadorpi shitayka munaymanta kaspika, kikinka shitankrinkimancha?                  (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUVB21</b></p>

<p><b>VB20.</b> Kay dumingu punllapi ñaupaman pushakkunata akllana kaspika, maykan ñaupaman pushak tantanakuymanta kikinka shitankiman?  <b>[Mana killka katina]</b>                  (1) Mana shitankiman                  (2) Ñaupaman pushak kanaman shitankiman mana kashpaka kunan ñaupaman pushakpak tantanakuymanta shitankiman                  (3) Shuk ñaupaman pushak kanaman shitankiman mana kashpaka kunan ñaupaman pushakta jarkakman shitankiman                  (4) Shitankapak rinkiman shinapish yurapi mana kashpaka mana maykanman shitankiman                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB20</b></p>
<p><b>VB21.</b> ¿ Imashinata kikinka ashtawan alli ruraykunaman tikrachinapi rikunata charin yuyanki? <b>[killka katina]</b>                  (1) Shitana akllankapak paykunapak yuyayta mitzakman                  (2) Rimak tantanakuymanta yanapana alli ruraykunaman tikrachichun                  (3) Shuk ruraykunawan alliman tikrachina                  (4) Manami                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB21</b></p>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]**

**LS6.** Kikin shuk chakanata illakmanta chunkakaman makiwanta yuyaripay, maypi illakka urapimi chunkaka ashtawan jawapimi. Yuyashun kayta ñuka kikinta nisha chakanapak ashtawan jawa makika ashtawan jawaka alli kawsaymi kikipak, chakanapak ura makika llaki kawsaymi kana kikipak, Jawamantaka chunkami uramantaka illakmi, ima chakana makipitak kay uras kikinka kani yuyanki? (SHUKLLA TIKRACHI / SHINALLA) alli ruraykunaman tikrachita ushana kanchu, shinallata kun imata rurakupipash.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Allichina kawsay						Mana alli kawsay					NS/NR

**[RECOGER TARJETA D]**

Kay llaktapi / kikin kawsakukpi, paktachishkami mana kashpaka mana paktachishkachu...[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Paktachishka	Shina shina pakatachishka	NS/NR	
<b>SD1</b> Tukuypak antawaka	1	2	8	<b>SD1</b>
<b>SD2.</b> Jatun ñankunata, ñaukunata, uchilla ñankunata	1	2	8	<b>SD2</b>
<b>SD3.</b> Tukuy yachakunakuna, yachana wasikunapash	1	2	8	<b>SD3</b>
<b>SD4.</b> Wayraka allichu, mana allichu	1	2	8	<b>SD4</b>
<b>SD5.</b> Yakuka allichu, mana allichu	1	2	8	<b>SD5</b>
<b>SD6.</b> Janpik wasikunapika allichu mana allichu, kawsayka allichu mana allichu	1	2	8	<b>SD6</b>
<b>SD7.</b> Alli kawsana wasikuna tyanchu, randi ushanallachu	1	2	8	<b>SD7</b>
<b>SD8.</b> Kawsak llaktaka juyayllachu	1	2	8	<b>SD8</b>
<b>SD9.</b> Antawakuna utka allichu purin	1	2	8	<b>SD9</b>
<b>SD10.</b> Ñanpi runakuna purina mana kaspaka runakuna gallina	1	2	8	<b>SD10</b>
<b>SD11.</b> Samana panpakuna, pukllana panpakuna, kirukuna tyan	1	2	8	<b>SD11</b>
<b>SD12.</b> Alli runakunapak pukllana panpa runakuna pukllay ushachun	1	2	8	<b>SD12</b>

tyan

**LS4.** Kikinka tukuy rimashakakuna kay llaktapi / kaypi, kikin ninkiman paktachisha mana kashpaka mana paktachishkachu kikin kawsak llaktapi?  
 (1) Paktachishka (2) Shina shina pakatachishka (3) Mana paktachishka (4) Mana imata paktachishka (8) NS/NR

**LS4**

Kunanka ñukaka asha taripaykunaka yupankapak ruranki.....

**ED.** ¿Ima tikuri yachana wasika wtatak kutirkanki?

\_\_\_\_\_ Wataka \_\_\_\_\_ (Yachana wasika, jatunyachana wasika, sumakyachana wasika) \_\_\_\_\_ años total [**Yupak pankata japinki**]

	1 <sup>o</sup>	2 <sup>o</sup>	3 <sup>o</sup>	4 <sup>o</sup>	5 <sup>o</sup>	6 <sup>o</sup>	
Mana yachana wasika rirka	0						<b>ED</b>
Yachana wasika	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Jatun yachana wasika	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Sumak yacha yasika	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
MY/MK	88						

**Q2.** ¿Mashna wattatak charinki? \_\_\_\_\_ Watakunami)

**Q2**

**Q3.** Maykan religiunta katinki? (No leer alternativas)

- (1) Católica (Kay Apunchik rimaytwa ruran)  
 (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).  
 (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)  
 (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).  
 (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día  
 (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).  
 (4) Ninguna [**Pase a Q10**]  
 (8) NS/NR

**Q3**

**Q5A.** Mashna kutitak kikinka iglisiaman rinki?

- (1) Kanchis punllapi shuk kutita yalli  
 (2) Kanchis punllapi shuk kutita  
 (3) Killapi shuk kutita  
 (4) Watapi shuk kutita yalli  
 (5) Mana ima punlla mana kashpaka wakinpilla

**Q5**

(8) NS/NR

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]**

**Q10.** ¿Tukuy killapika mashna kullkitak kanpa ayllujuna charinki? (Shukta mamallaktaka kullkita churanki) **[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]** [10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país]

- (00) Nipapash
- (01) Asahgu \$60
- (02) Entre \$61- \$100
- (03) \$101-\$200
- (04) \$201-\$300
- (05) \$301-\$500
- (06) \$501-\$750
- (07) \$751-\$1000
- (08) \$1001-1500
- (09) \$1501-\$2000
- (10) \$2001 imallapas
- (88) NS/NR

**Q10**

**[RECOGER TARJETA E]**

**Q10A.** Kikin mana kashpaka pipash kikinwan kawsak shuk karu llaktamanta kullkita japinkichu?

**Q10A**

Imatatak chay kullkiwanka ruran? [Mana killlka katina]

- (1) Ari
- (2) Mana [Pase a Q10c]
- (8) NS [Pase a Q10c]

**Q10A1.** Karu llaktamanta kullkita japikmanlla] [No leer]

- (1) kawsaypak (mikuna, churakunakuna)
- (2) Wasipak (wasichinkapak, wasita allichinkapak)
- (3) Wawakuna yachakunamanta pagankapak
- (4) Llakta (yachana wasita allichinkapak, iglisiata allichinkapak, llaktapak raymipak)
- (5) Janpik wasipi pagankapak
- (6) Wakichina / kullkita ashtawan mirachinaman
- (7) Shuk
- (8) NS/NR
- (9) Inap

**Q10a1**

**Q10B.** [Sólo si recibe remesas] Imapachakamantak ayllukunapak yaykuk kullkika shuk llaktamanta shamuk kullkimanta kan? [Leer alternativas]

**Q10B**

- (1) Achka
- (2) Imaras
- (3) Amsa
- (4) Imas
- (8) NS/NR
- (9) Inap

<p><b>Q10C.</b> [Tukuyllata tapuna] Kikinka punda kay wasipi kawsashka ayllukunata kunanpi shuk karu llaktapi kawsan? [Ari nikpika “Ari”, tapuna maypi; Mana killka katina]</p> <p>(1) Ari, Estados Unidospilla                  (2) Ari, Estados Unidospi shuk karu llaktakunapipash                  (3) Ari, shuk karu llaktapi (mana Estados Unidospi)                  (4) Mana [Yalli Q14man]                  (8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	<p><b>Q10C</b></p>	
<p><b>Q16</b> [Ari nishpa Q10Cpi ikrachishkakunamanlla] Mashna kutitak paykuwan rimanki?                  [Kaykunata killka katina]</p> <p>(1) Tukuy punllakuna                  (2) Simanapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkay kuti                  (3) Killapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkay kuti                  (4) Wakinpilla                  (5) Mana ima punlla                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>Q16</b></p>	
<p><b>Q14.</b> (Preguntar a todos) Kikinka kay shamuk kimsa watapi kawsankapak rinkapak munanki mana kashpaka llankankapak?                  (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q14</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10D.</b> Killa llankashka kullkika mana kashpaka kikinka llankashkamanta mashnata japinki, tukuy ayllupak yaykukuk kullkipash. [Kaykunata killka kati]</p> <p>(1) Kankunata alli paktancho, wakichi ushankichi                  (2) Kankunata pakta paktallachu, mana sinchi llakiwan                  (3) Kankunata mana paktancho, llakikunata charikkichi                  (4) Kankunata mana paktancho, sinchi llakikunata charikkichi                  (8) [Mana killka katina] NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q10D</b></p>	
<p><b>Q11.</b> Wawakunata charinkichu? Mashnata? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Manarak kusayuk (2) Kusayuk-warmiyuk (3) Kusa tukunawan (4) Divorciado (5) Separado                  (6) Sepalla (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q11</b></p>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> ¿Mashna wawakunatak charinki? _____ (00= mana wawakuna sharin→ Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88).</p>	<p><b>Q12</b></p>	
<p><b>Q12A.</b> [Si tiene hijos] Wawakunata charikpika] Mashna wawakunatak kunanpi Kikinpak wasipi kawsan? _____ (00= mana wawakuna sharin→ Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88).</p>	<p><b>Q12A</b></p>	



<b>ETID.</b> ¿Imatak kanki? (1)wiracucha (2)Mishu (3)Runa (4) Negro-Afro-ecuatoriano (5) Sukta (6)Otro (8)NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>
<b>WWW1</b> [Shukkunamanta rimashpak, Mashna kutitak kikinka Internet nishakata japinki? (1) Tukuy punllakuna mana kashpaka ashallamanta tukuy punlla (2) Simanapi shuk kutillapash (3) Killapi kutillapish (4) Wakinpilla (5) mana ima punlla (8) NS/NR	<b>WWW1</b>

Imatak ashtawanpachaka ruranki? Kikinka kunanpimi: [ kaykunata killka katina]

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>		
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>		
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>		
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>		
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo. Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>		
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>		
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>		
<b>R12.</b> washi ukupi	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>		
<b>R14.</b> Armana uku	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>		
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>		

<b>OCUP4A.</b> Imatak ashtawanpachaka ruranki? Kikinka kunanpimi: [ kaykunata killka katina] (1) Llakakunki? <b>[Kati]</b> (2) Kunan uras mana llankakunki shinapish llankayta charin? <b>[Kati]</b> (3) Llankayta maskakunmi? <b>[Kati IMMIG3man]</b> (4) Yachakukmi? <b>[Kati IMMIG3man]</b> (5) Kikinka wasipi rurayta ruranki? <b>[Kati IMMIG3man]</b> (6) Tauka watata llankashka kunanka samakunmi, mana llankay ushakkmi llankankapakka? <b>[Kati IMMIG3man]</b> (7) Mana llankachu, mana llankayta maskakunchu? (8) NS/NR	<b>OCUP4</b>
---	--------------

<p><b>OCUP1.</b> Imatak ruranki mana kashpaka imapitak llankanki? Rikuna: Imapipachatak llankan?          [Mana kaykunata killka katina]          (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)          (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)          (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)          (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)          (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)          (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)          (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)          (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados          (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)          (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)          (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)          (12) Artesano          (13) Servicio doméstico          (14) Obrero          (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)          (88) NS/NR          (99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1</b></p>	
---	---------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP1A.</b> Kikinpak llankaykami:          (1) Mamallaktapak llankak?          (2) Shuk charikkunapak llankan?          (3) Empresayuk mana kashpaka kullkiwan yanapak mashi?          (4) Kikinllakta llankak?          (5) Kullki illak llankak?          (8) NS/NR          (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
---	----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP 12A</b> Mashna pachakunatak simanapi kikinpak llankaypi llankanki?          _____ [Anotar número de horas] (88)          NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP12A</b></p>	
---	-----------------------	--

<p><b>OCUP12.</b> Kikinka ashtawan llankankapak munanki, pishi, shinallata pachakunatak? (1) Pishi (2) Shinallata (3)Ashtawan (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP12</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Kikin unkukpi janpirinatak kikipak empresamanta mana kashpaka paypak llankachikmanta charinkichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>
<p><b>Kunan wakin tapuyta churankapak munani kay llankakkunamanta 2006 dicimbri killapi</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP27.</b> – Chay punllapi, kikinka chay llankaytallatak charirkankichu? (1) Ari <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (2) Mana <b>[Siga]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Siga]</b> (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP27</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP28.</b> Chay punllapi kikinka karkanki (1) Mana llankaywan? (2) Llankashpak? <b>[Siga]</b> (3) Yachakushpak? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (4) Wasipi llankayta rurashpak? <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (5) Shukkuna (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP28</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP29</b> Imamantatak chay punlla mana llankayta tarirkanki? (1) kikipak llankayta sakita munaymanta sakirkanki (2) Llankay punllakuna turirka <b>[Pase a</b> (3) Llankayta kallarinapak maskakurkani (4) Punda empresapi llankakushkaka wiharirka (5) Llankaymanta kacharcha mana kashpak tukurirka<b>[Siga]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a OCUP31]</b> (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP29</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP30.</b> ¿ Kikinka llankayta tukuchishkamanta mana kashpaka llankaymanta kachashkamanta empresamanta kullkita japirkankichu? (1) Ari <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (2) Mana <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (9)INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP30</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP31.</b> ¿ En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Ari <b>[Siga]</b> (2) Mana <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a IMMIG3]</b> (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP31</b></p>

<p><b>OCUP31A</b> Chay punllapi, llankayta maskakurkankichu?                  (1) Wakin punllakunata killapi                  (2) Shuk killata kimsa killakunashina                  (3) kimsa killakunata sukta killashina                  (4) sukta killata yalli                  (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP31A</b></p>	
<p><b>IMMIG3.</b> [Preguntar a todos] ¿Ecuadorpi wañuchik llakikunaka ashtawan waklli mana kashpaka ashtawan allitukun kayman shuk llaktamanta runakuna kawsankapak shamushkamanta?                  (1) Anchanyana (2) Allichina (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>IMMIG3</b></p>	
<p><b>IMMIG4.</b> ¿Ecuadorpak kawsaykunaka irkiyashkachu mana kashpaka sinchiyashka kayman shuk llaktamanta runakuna kawsankapak shamushkamanta?                  (1) Irki (2) Charikyana (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>IMMIG4</b></p>	
<p><b>IMMIG5.</b> ¿Kikinka alli mana kashpaka mana alli ninkiman Ecuadorpak kullkikunaka kayman shuk llaktamanta runakuna kawsankapak shamushkamanta?                  (1) Mana ali (2) alli (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>IMMIG5</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUPWD1</b> ¿ Kikinka kunanpi imatapash nanayta charinkichu?                  (3) Ari [Siga]                  (4) Mana [Pase a TI]                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD1</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUPWD2</b> Ima nanayta charinki?                  (1) Mana purik ushan- chakita manakashpaka Makita muchushka                  (2) Ñawipi- rinripi                  (3) Umapi                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD2</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUPWD3</b> Kikinka shuk nanaywan runakunapak tantanakuypichu kanki?                  (1) Ari                  (2) Mana                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD3</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUPWD4</b> ¿ Kikinka CONADISmanta pankatak charinkichu?                  (1) Ari                  (2) Mana                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD4</b></p>	
<p><b>ECUPWD5</b> Kay chunka ishkay yallirka killakunapi kikinka ima janpitallapash japirkankichu?                  (1) Ari                  (2) Mana                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD5</b></p>	

<p><b>ECUPWD6</b>                  Kunan ruraykunamanta rimashpak, kikipak yuyaypi. Maypitak kikipak nanaymanta kay llaktapi ashtawan sinchita tuparirkanki?                  Antawakunapi                  (12)Ñanpi                  (13)Mama llaktapak wasi ukupi                  (14)Shuk charikkunapak wasipi                  (15)Iglisiakunapi                  (16)Pukllana ukukunapi                  (17)Saman panpakunapi                  (18)Jatun jatuna ukukunapi                  (19)Puñuna ukukunapi                  (20)Yachakuna ukukunapi, janpik wasi ukukunapi                  (21)Otro                  (88)NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ECUPWD6</b></p>
--	-----------------------

<p>Ima pachatak tapuyjunata tukuchin _____ : _____                  TI. Mashna pachatak tapuykunatak karka? [chinillakuna, shuk pankaka rikunki) _____</p>	<p><b>TI</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
--	------------------	---

*Chaykuna tikuy tapuykunami karka. Yupaychanimari*  
*Ñukaka apunchikpak shutipik rimani, kay tapuykunaka alli runakunawanmi rurani.*  
*Tapuychik shutikkaz \_\_\_\_\_ Puncha, killa, wata \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_*


*Tapuychik apuka shutikka \_\_\_\_\_*  
*Tapuychik chutika:*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Killkay kutik shutika \_\_\_\_\_*  
*Kutik rikuk shutika \_\_\_\_\_*


## Tarjeta #1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Illukijawamantapash					Allijawamantapash				

## Tarjeta A



## Tarjeta B





## Tarjeta C

*Mana shina  
yuyakinchu*

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

*Kanka shina  
yuyankichu*

1

## Tarjeta D

*Allichina  
kawsay*

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

*Mana alli  
kawsay*

0

## Tarjeta E

- (00) Nipapash
- (01) Asahgu \$60
- (02) yaycui \$61- \$100
- (03) \$101-\$200
- (04) \$201-\$300
- (05) \$301-\$500
- (06) \$501-\$750
- (07) \$751-\$1000
- (08) \$1001-1500
- (09) \$1501-\$2000
- (10) \$2001 imallapas