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# Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic, 2008

## The Impact of Governance

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## Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez  
*AmericasBarometer* Grant Manager at USAID



## Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson  
*Centennial Professor* of Political Science  
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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for

the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified random sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting<sup>2</sup> in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the

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<sup>2</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted expect for Bolivia and Ecuador.


Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.



Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	 
Guatemala	
El Salvador	 
Honduras	 
Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	 
Panama	

Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	 <p>Universidad de los Andes</p>  <p>observatorio de la democracia</p>
Ecuador	
Peru	<p><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
Bolivia	 <p>Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</p> 
Paraguay	 <p>CIRDA Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo</p>
Chile	 <p>Instituto de Ciencia Política</p> 
Uruguay	  <p>UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO</p>
Brazil	 <p>Universidade de Brasília</p>
Venezuela	

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
<b>Mexico, Central America, and North America</b>	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> <li>● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala</li> <li>● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc.</li> <li>● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Andean/Southern Cone</b>	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.</li> <li>• Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay</li> </ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile</li> </ul>
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo</li> </ul>
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia</li> </ul>
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois</li> <li>• Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Caribbean</b>	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee</li> <li>• Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies</li> <li>• Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2008



# Executive Summary

## Study in the Dominican Republic

The main objective of this research project is the study of the democratic values and political attitudes of the Dominican population and of the American continent. Its design includes a sample which is representative at a national level in each country.

The AmericasBarometer 2008 sample for the Dominican Republic was designed by Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. in consultancy with sampling matter experts, under the general management of Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University. Gallup República Dominicana conducted the fieldwork in March, 2008. Diligence characterized the data's processing and codification. The final size of the Dominican sample was 1507 persons, divided in four regions or strata: metropolitan, north, east and south.

In the analysis, this report uses data from LAPOP surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic in 2004, 2006 and 2008. Some graphs include data from the DEMOS surveys of prior years. Regional comparisons use data from other Latin American countries, Canada and the United States from 2008.

## Main Findings

### More Support for Democracy than Political Tolerance

- The Dominican Republic finds itself well positioned in the evaluation of democracy as the best form of government. About 75% of those interviewed, just as in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Costa Rica, expressed their agreement with the idea of democracy being preferable to another form of government. This result has been a constant in various surveys performed in the country within the last decade.
- However, the level of political tolerance averages 52 points. The Dominican Republic places closer to the countries with a lower level of tolerance. Additionally, there was a slight step backward in 2008 in comparison to the 2006 survey. This suggests the need to further engraft democratic values and to redouble efforts so that the population will become more receptive to the rights of political dissidents.
- The legitimacy of political institutions in the Dominican Republic places among the highest in the region, with an average of 45.9 points. Mexico holds the highest average among Latin American nations with 49.1 points, and Ecuador the lowest with 26.9 points. These numbers indicate a generalized mistrust of public institutions that is consistent with the so called "legitimacy crisis" of contemporary democracies, including the United States.

### Corruption and its Impact on Political Tolerance

- The perception of corruption is considerable in the Dominican Republic, yet in comparative terms within Latin America, Dominicans report having been direct victims of corruption practices at a moderate level of 16.3%.
- The percentage of Dominicans who reported having been victims of a corrupt act declined in the past years, from 25.1% in 2004, to 17.7% in 2006, and to 16.3% in 2008. The drop between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant but not between 2006 and 2008.
- The perception that there is corruption, though it has decreased slightly, remains high. On average it dropped from 80.9 points in 2004 to 78.9 in 2006 and to 74.5 in 2008. The change in the last two years is statistically significant.
- Corruption felt in a direct manner has a statistically significant negative impact on two core aspects of democracy: political legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust. Victims of corruption show a lower level of legitimacy of political institutions and less interpersonal trust.

### Crime and its Impact on Political Legitimacy

- The survey showed that crime stabilized at the beginning of 2008 in relation to 2006. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of Dominicans who reported having been victims of a criminal act in the last year rose from 6.8% to 16.2%, while in March 2008 it decreased slightly to 14.8%.
- In the regional comparison, the Dominican Republic places within the group of countries with a relatively low level of victimization by crime.
- Dominicans who reported higher victimization by crime were men, the young, inhabitants of larger cities, and those with a higher education level.
- Victims of criminal acts expressed less support for political legitimacy of institutions and less interpersonal trust. However, they showed a higher level of political tolerance than the rest.
- Regional data show that the perception of personal security in the Dominican Republic remains at a relatively moderate level, with an average of 39.5 points in March, 2008. Of the 23 countries included in the report, 14 have a lower level of perception of personal security.
- Insecurity has a detrimental effect on the democratic system. The statistical analysis reveals that the higher the perception of insecurity, the lower the political tolerance, legitimacy of political institutions, and interpersonal trust.



- Criminal acts generate a sense of insecurity, even among those who have not been victimized directly. The survey shows that the population felt less insecure in March, 2008 than in June, 2006, as the percentage of perception of insecurity dropped from 79% to 59%.
- The Dominican population expressed more trust that the judiciary and police systems would respond to a crime rather than try to prevent it. Its trust in the system to catch the guilty and convict them is relatively high, unlike its trust in the capability of the Police to protect the people.

### **Decentralization and Civic Participation**

- In general terms, the Dominican Republic shows the highest level of trust in municipal government of the countries surveyed, with an average of 63.7 points, and one of the highest levels of satisfaction with local public services, with an average of 56.9 points. Despite these relatively high valuations, major support is not present for decentralization of governmental responsibilities nor for the allocation of more resources to local governments.
- The analysis showed that when there is more satisfaction with local public services, there is also more institutional legitimacy and higher interpersonal trust.
- A substantial degree of participation in community activities was registered, mostly associative activities of a religious character. Yet, as measured in this study, a strong statistical relationship between the forms of local participation and support for democracy were not found.

### **Citizen Perception of Government Performance**

- One hypothesis supportive of this investigation's data is that the people who evaluate positively their personal and national economic situation are also inclined to hold more favorable opinions of government economic performance. Likewise, those who hold more favorable opinions of government's performance are inclined to have more favorable opinions towards democratic rights and political institutions.
- Comparative data show that during March, 2008, the Dominican Republic registered one of the highest levels of approval ratings among the surveyed countries for government economic performance with an average of 49.9 points.
- Data also show that to a similar extent the government benefits or is harmed by the citizens' evaluation of their personal finances and the national economic situation.
- People with a higher education level have a more unfavorable opinion of the government's economic performance than those with a lower education level.

- The data also reveal that government performance has a positive effect on support for democracy, the right of public contestation, institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust, yet not on political tolerance.
- These results confirm that government economic performance is important for the stability of the democratic system.

### **From Democracy to Authoritarianism?**

- The survey shows that between 2006 and 2008 the percentage of Dominicans who expressed a high level of support for the political system and high political tolerance dropped; both factors are essential for a stable democracy. Comparative data reveal that Dominican society has become more conservative, showing itself less tolerant.
- Nevertheless, in 2008 the Dominican Republic continued to have a relatively high ranking in the category of Stable Democracy when compared to many other Latin American countries.
- The level of trust in political institutions is relatively high in comparative terms in recent years. In 2008, only the police and political parties registered an average of trust under 50 points.

### **Conservative and Party-centric Society**

- Identification with political parties through political affiliation or sympathy remains high. As in 2006, the Dominican Republic heads the list of countries in the report with the highest percentage of respondents that sympathized with a political party (70% in 2008). This suggests that despite the mistrust and criticisms of the parties, Dominicans continue showing a bond with these organizations.
- The statistical analysis revealed that party sympathizers have a more favorable opinion of their economic situation, are older, and have a higher level of education.
- As in the 2006 survey, the PLD won the majority of the preferences; the second largest group (the so-called independents) does not sympathize with any party, followed by sympathizers of the PRD. The PRSC has been relegated to the status of a minority party in the political preferences.
- In all the surveyed countries, political parties received a low evaluation score. However, in the Dominican Republic, approval level of parties is the highest with an average of 39.4 points.
- On the ideological scale from left to right, the Dominican Republic appears to be more to the right than other countries in the region.

- The matter of presidential reelection shows a divided opinion among the Dominican population: 37.5% disagree, 35.1% prefer the current reelection system, and 27.4% prefer indefinite reelection.

### Gender and Migration

- Despite the efforts undertaken in the Dominican Republic to modify gender attitudes, there is still a low receptiveness among the population concerning the idea that women can be good political leaders. In the regional comparison, Dominican Republic appears last in the scale of support for women as political leaders with an average of 46.5 points.
- Between 1994 and 2001 there was a favorable change in the Dominican Republic regarding women's political participation, measured through various indicators; yet between 2004 and 2008 the level of support had stabilized, then declined, and now seems unstable. Indeed, after 2001, Dominican women's capacity to inspire trust as candidates started to decline.
- Concerning Haitians, despite the great controversy surrounding the migration issue, the survey registered an average of 38.5 acceptance points for undocumented Haitians who work in Dominican territory to receive work permits. Furthermore, average support for the children of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic to receive Dominican citizenship is 47.2 points.
- Approximately 25% of the interviewed Dominican population stated they had relatives who had lived in their home and now are living abroad, the majority in the United States. Moreover, about 25% of those surveyed said that they plan to move to or work in another country within the next three years.



**PART ONE:**  
**THEORY AND**  
**COMPARATIVE**  
**ANALYSIS**



# Preface: The context of Dominican Democratic Development and a Description of the Data

## The context

Upon taking power on August 16th, 2004, in the midst of an economic crisis, President Leonel Fernández of the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), proposed as his first objective to achieve macroeconomic stability. He signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restructure external debt. Shortly after, the economy began to grow again; it recorded low inflation, the currency was revalued, and foreign currency reserves increased considerably.

According to the data from the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy, Development and Planning, the real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was negative 0.7% in 2003 but reached a positive rate of 10.70% in 2007. The inflation rate averaged over 12 months dropped from 51.46% in 2004 to 4.19% in 2005, and has remained in single digits in subsequent years. The average exchange rate of the Dominican peso dropped from close to 50 pesos per dollar in 2004 to about 30 pesos per dollar in 2005; and the exchange rate has remained between 30 and 35 pesos. Net international reserves such as monetary emission percentage rose from 5.7% in 2003 to 69.5% in 2007. The government's other economic objective was to expand public works infrastructure, a core segment of which is the construction of the controversial Metro of Santo Domingo.

From the administrative side, the issue that has dominated public discussion is the expansion of the patronage system and unpunished acts of corruption. Upon taking power in 2004, the PLD did not submit, as it had offered to, a list of suspects of corrupt acts from the administration of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). Despite the creation of an Ethics Committee at the presidential level, the names of current government officials suspected of corruption have not been submitted either, notwithstanding several public scandals involving embezzlement of funds, such as the case of the Sun Land contract.

Crime in general, particularly drug trafficking, has been a core issue of debate. Armed confrontations between gangs of drug traffickers have become commonplace in Dominican life, as well as cargo confiscations. Crime rates in general, which soared between 2004 and 2005, was contained somewhat at the beginning of 2006. This was due in part to citizen security programs and also because of a slight improvement in the standard of living. However, crime has regained strength of late. According to data from the Attorney General's Office published by the weekly *Clave*, from January to October 2008, 714 persons died in crime related events, while the year before for the same period there were 61 fewer victims.

On the political-electoral stage, two elections were held between 2006-2008: congressional-municipal election in 2006, and the presidential election in 2008. A clear tendency toward the transformation of the party system ensued, from a clear three-party system to two party blocks—the PLD and the PRD—which encompass the majority of the Dominican electorate. The PRSC lost vitality after the

death of the *caudillo* Joaquín Balaguer in 2002. In the congressional-municipal elections of 2006, the PRSC established an electoral alliance with the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) and managed to secure some legislative and local positions, yet the reformist fragmentation continued between 2006 and 2008. In the division process, the Balaguerista voting masses gave their support to the former ruler Leonel Fernández, not the PRD, and in the presidential elections of 2008, the PRSC only obtained 4.5% of the votes.

The congressional-municipal elections of 2006 constituted a great political test for the PLD. Its capability to show strength in local politics was at stake. The high approval ratings of President Fernández and the macroeconomic stability helped the PLD's triumph, obtaining a majority in both legislative chambers and significantly increasing its presence in municipal governments. The party went from having only one senator in the period 2002-2006 to controlling 69% of the senatorial for the period 2006-2010; from 28% to 54% of the provincial councils; and from 6% to 44% of the syndicates. The 2008 presidential elections' results showed as they did in 2004, a polarization between the PLD and the PRD, which obtained 53.8% and 40.4% of the votes respectively. The PRSC is now debilitated as a third political force and zigzags between supporting the PRD and the PLD, but with a marked inclination towards the leadership and benefits offered by Leonel Fernández.

In the institutional sphere, the most important issue is the project of constitutional reform introduced by President Fernández to the Dominican Congress in September, 2008. The topic has generated strong reactions and counter-proposals, the most controversial of which is the mechanism to modify the Constitution. According to the current constitutional text, the two legislative chambers constituted in the Reviewing Assembly should? modify the Constitution. Yet the PRD and various civil society organizations insist that the Constitution must be modified by means of election of a Constitutional Assembly. Another hot-button issue is reelection. The reform proposal sets forth that, besides the consecutive reelection as established in the current Constitution, a former President is allowed to run again after a term out of power.

If the proposal that a president can be run for office more than twice is approved, the dynamic between the PLD and PRD will change. *Caudillismo* will be reinforced in both parties because Leonel Fernández is likely to remain highly influential in his party even after his term of office ends in 2012, while ex president Hipólito Mejía could opt for a new nomination in the PRD. Both leaders would weaken the chances of other aspiring candidates. The PRSC, for its part, would continue bleeding before electoral revitalization would occur, if this happens at all in the future. The party has lost many sympathizers and leaders, and there is currently no visible figure within the organization who could efficiently assume the leadership of the party and also be good presidential material.



## Data Description

In systematic public opinion studies, it is important to use a rigorous and carefully designed methodology. This chapter offers an explanation of the 2008 LAPOP survey and presents a basic analysis of the sample's characteristics.

## Methodology of the 2008 LAPOP Survey in the Dominican Republic

The principal aim of this project is the study of democratic values and political attitudes of the Dominican population. Considering these objectives, the design included a representative sample on a national level, which contained persons from all of the country's regions, urban and rural zones, women and men, employed and unemployed, all levels of education and wealth, and persons engaged and not engaged in political or civic activism.

With the purpose of including people of all socioeconomic levels, the interviews were conducted face to face rather than by phone. This method ensures that people without telephone service in their homes would have the same opportunity to participate as those who do have it. The interviewers visited selected homes during both daytime and evening hours as well as on weekends in order to ensure that people with different work schedules would be able to participate.

To ensure that the rights of respondents were protected, and to create a comfortable and safe atmosphere, the people who responded to the survey received a series of guarantees concerning their rights as interviewees. All participants received guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity in the informed consent document which appears in Annex II. All had the opportunity to decline to participate; most, however were receptive to the idea of participating in the survey and accepted.

Another important methodological aspect of the study is the quality of information collection and data processing. The survey was organized at a meeting in San Salvador in December, 2007. Attending this meeting were teams of the AmericasBarometer 2008 countries and Dr. Jana Morgan, the Dominican Republican team representative. The survey was polished from several field tests.

The LAPOP 2008 sample for the Dominican Republic was designed by Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. in consultation with Polibio Córdoba of CEDATOS Gallup Internacional en Ecuador, a renowned expert in sampling matters, under general management of Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Director of LAPOP at Vanderbilt University.

Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. performed the fieldwork in March, 2008. The supervisors had ample experience and technical capacity, and were selected and carefully trained by Gallup. The level of supervision was total, and 30% of those surveyed were interviewed again by the supervisors. The interviews were conducted using a personal digital assistant (PDAs) to ensure confidence and precision in the data's recollection, processing and codification. Due diligence was ensured in the work of gathering and processing the information.

## The Sample<sup>3</sup>

The LAPOP 2008 survey in the Dominican Republic used a multi-staged random sample; the population of interest included all civil and non-institutionalized Dominicans, 18 years or older, rural and urban zone residents, fully capable of exercising their physical and legal faculties. The population includes neither Dominican citizens residing in other countries nor institutionalized Dominicans.<sup>4</sup> People from 225 municipalities, in 31 provinces and in the national district were interviewed. Thus, this is a national sample representative of all Dominicans fully able to cast their vote; it includes not only those registered, but all those who eligible to vote.

The sample's frame is based on the cartographic inventory and the urban and rural housing listings obtained from the National Population and Housing Census from 2002. The sample is probabilistic for the selection of home, and stratified and multi-staged for conglomerates. Since the sample's design is probabilistic, all citizens have the same chance of being selected. To cover the country's different geographical areas, the sample was stratified into four regions: metropolitan region of Santo Domingo, north, east, and south. Without regional stratification, randomness would have resulted in obtaining very few interviews in any of the aforementioned regions.

It is also important to acknowledge that the sized of cities, towns, and communities were considered to ensure the selection of persons representing all the rural and urban demarcations. After establishing the stratification of four regions, the demarcation between urban and rural was divided using the established criterium of the Oficina Nacional de Estadística (ONE) in the National Census of 2002. The metropolitan region is considered urban in its totality, whereas the other three regions have both rural and urban components.

During the first level of the stratification process, the number of municipalities (the PSU – Primary Sample Units) necessary to select in each region was decided.<sup>5</sup> After choosing the municipalities by region in proportion to its population, these were divided between urban and rural areas in order to establish a probability in the selection process in the Censual Supervision Areas (the SSU – Secondary Sample Units).

As an analogy, this stratification process is like a raffle that uses 7 different ballot boxes: One ballot box for the metropolitan region, two for each of the three other regions-- one for the rural zone, and the other for the urban zone within each region. Using this approach in the sample's stratification prevents interviewing a majority of respondents residing only in the largest cities or in only one region. With the stratification by region and by area (urban and rural), the sample better ensures a representative selection of people in each region and in both areas.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex I.

<sup>4</sup> Does not include hospitalized persons, patients in mental institutions, or prison inmates.

<sup>5</sup>We included the 9 municipalities of the metropolitan region, 31 from the north region, 11 from the east, and 16 from the south, for a total of 74 selected municipalities.

After the stratification process, the precise homes were chosen within each selected municipality. These homes were the final observation units. To determine the selection of homes, conglomerates were formed in each residence domain where 6 to 8 homes were selected in urban zones and 10 to 12 homes in rural zones. Once the house was selected, within the home the interviewer would select the specific informant to participate according to his/her assigned gender and age group quota. For more details concerning the sample, see Annex I.

The final national sample size is 1507 persons divided among the four regions or strata: metropolitan, north, east, and south. In the metropolitan district, 501 persons were interviewed (33.2% of the total sample), 517 in the north (34.3%), 231 in the east (15.3%) and 258 in the south (17.1%).

A national sample of some 1500 persons has a probable sampling error of  $\pm 2.5\%$  with a confidence level of 95%. That is, 95% of the time the true value of an answer will be within the  $\pm 2.5\%$  of the estimate produced by this sample. This is the error in the worst case situation when the answers to a question are divided with parity, 50/50, making it very difficult to judge which is the preferred answer. With a sample of this size, in the worse case scenario, the survey provides a precise representation of citizen viewpoints with an error not greater than  $\pm 2.5\%$  (95% of the time) in the results that were obtained when interviewing 100% of the citizens residing in Dominican Republic. The situation improves when the answers are divided with less parity. For example, when the answers are divided 10/90, the error is only  $\pm 1.5\%$  at a confidence level of 95%.

Estimators of the sample's precision could be maintained if it was possible to perform what is known as a "simple random sample" in each stratum of the study. This process would imply a significant increase in interview costs. The alternative that considerably reduces mobilization costs for virtually all surveys is to use the conglomerate sample methodology described above. Conglomerates are groups of interviews in relatively compact areas such as blocks or groups of houses where individuals from different homes are interviewed. This system reduces costs significantly although normally it increases the sample error, consequently reducing the confidence level. Since this design is multi-staged by conglomerate, we must consider the design effect when we calculate the actual error.


According to the calculations performed by Gallup República Dominicana S.A., the error at the national level, considering the average design effect (1.8), is 3.40%. That is, in the average of the worse case scenario, when the answers show a parity of 50/50, 95% of the time, the true answers of the national population are within  $\pm 3.4\%$  of the answers given by those interviewed for the sample. We can see that the decision to save funds by the use of a stratified sample by conglomerates, instead of a simple random sample, does not imply much of a loss in the study's precision.

Within each region of the country, the sample size is smaller in proportion to the size of the region with regard to the total population. Thus, the sample errors by individual regions are larger than in the entire country. The metropolitan region produces a sampling error of  $\pm 5.8\%$ ;

the north region produces a sampling error of around  $\pm 5.41\%$ . In the east and south regions the sampling errors are of  $\pm 8.47\%$  and  $\pm 7.43\%$  respectively.


### Sample Characteristics

Data presentation starts with a general perspective of the sample characteristics and with a sample comparison of the DEMOS 2004 survey, and the LAPOP 2006 and 2008 surveys. The results of the DEMOS 2004 survey are based on a weighted sample so that they accurately reflect the population's distribution. The 2006 and 2008 samples do not need to be weighted because they were designed in such a manner that they automatically reflect the distribution of the Dominican population. The total of the LAPOP 2008 sample is of 1,507 interviews.




Graph 1. Sample Distribution by Region

In terms of distribution by region, Graph 1 shows that the three samples are very similar.




Graph 2. Sample Distribution by Gender

Graph 2 shows that the sample distribution of the 2004, 2006 and the 2008 surveys is more or less equal, with a slight difference of more women than men as participants. This representation of women is slightly higher than the difference by sex in the Dominican population because according to the 2002 Census, 50.2% of people in the Dominican Republic are female.




Graph 3. Sample Distribution by Age

In the age range distribution which appears in Graph 3, we can observe that the majority is young. This result should not seem surprising because the majority of the Dominican population is young.



Graph 4. Sample Distribution by Urban-Rural Zone

The weight of the urban population is higher than the rural one, as can be observed in Graph 4. This is expressed in the three samples.



Graph 5. Sample Distribution by Educational Level

Graph 5 presents a summary of the sample distributions by educational level. According to the 2002 Census, only 37% of the Dominican population attended high school or university. One can see then that the survey produces a sample with an educational level above the general norm. Part of the matter is explained because the National Census includes children, while the surveys only consider the population of 18 years of age or older. Since in the Dominican Republic the population is mostly young, the ratio of the population younger than 18 years old is high.<sup>6</sup> The survey includes persons who are 18 years or older, of which a high proportion has had the opportunity to complete high school education and university. Thus, the average level of education indicated by the census is lower than the one registered by the survey.

### Complete Sample of Countries Included in LAPOP 2008

This report uses the surveys conducted by LAPOP in the Dominican Republic in 2004, 2006, and 2008, and from prior years it also uses data from the DEMOS surveys. For 2008, graphs are shown that present the survey results in other Latin American countries, Canada, and the United States. It is worthwhile clarifying that in every case that shows comparative data, the sample is weighted according to the sample size of each country. Weighting is used because the samples from some countries are larger than from others and because in Ecuador and Bolivia the samples contained approximately 3000 persons, while in other countries the national samples were of more or less half that number (approximately 1500 cases). The complete weighted sample produces a database of 1500 cases for each country. The weightings do not influence the results of the comparative averages in the reports. Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that the weightings influence the size of the reported error bars. In almost all the countries, the weighted sample is at least somewhat smaller than the real sample. This is why the error bars (or confidence intervals) are higher in the weighted sample than in the real national sample. In most countries, with the exceptions of Ecuador and Bolivia, the difference in confidence intervals between the weighted sample and the real sample is minimal. The result is that the regional graphs use a conservative estimate of the confidence intervals in the complete regional sample.

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<sup>6</sup>According to the 2002 Census, 42% of the total population is younger than 18 years old.





# Capítulo I. Building Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework<sup>7</sup>

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased?

There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).<sup>8</sup> Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place over night. Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*)<sup>9</sup>.<sup>10</sup> Good governance may well be essential for

<sup>7</sup>This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

<sup>8</sup> This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

<sup>9</sup> Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term,

the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

### Working hypothesis

The central working hypothesis of this report is that citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.<sup>11</sup> Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006).

In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).<sup>12</sup> Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support

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“governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

<sup>10</sup> According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

<sup>11</sup> We emphasize *support for* stable democracy; recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

<sup>12</sup> Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

for stable democracy. There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.<sup>13</sup>

The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study.

No one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what

<sup>13</sup> For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn<sup>14</sup>:

## Support for the idea of democracy per se

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”


In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

(ING4): Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

To answer question ING4, those interviewed would indicate on a card their level of agreement or disagreement with the query; 1 represented “highly disagree,” and 7 “highly agree”. Comparative Graph 1.2, is built with this question and this answer system. Graph 1.1, though it tackles the same topic, uses the question DEM2 of the questionnaire because it replicates exactly the question asked in the DEMOS surveys of the Dominican Republic, and it is what allows

<sup>14</sup> We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.


comparison through time for the Dominican case. Question DEM2 goes as follows: With which of the following phrases do you most agree with: (1) For people like myself, a democratic regime is the same as one that is not democratic, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or (3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one. Since two slightly different questions were used to build these graphs, there is a small percentage difference in the Dominican case for the 2008 results. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.<sup>15</sup>



Graph I-1. Percentage of Dominicans who think Democracy is Preferable to another Form of Government

Graph I-1 shows a high and consistent level of support for democracy as a government system preferable to any other. The belief in this idea of maintaining democracy has provided, without a doubt, stability for the Dominican political system, which has remained uninterrupted in a competitive manner since 1978.

<sup>15</sup> Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.



Graph I-2. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

The upper section of Graph I-2 shows that three fourths of those interviewed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic expressed their agreement with the notion that democracy is the best form of government. Even in the countries with the lowest averages of support (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) 60% of the population agreed with this idea. No population of any of the countries of the Americas had a majority in disagreement with Churchill's famous maxim.

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries ([www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org)). This is why it is important to have an ampler notion, and in this sense, other dimensions have been added: support for the right of contestation and citizen inclusiveness, political tolerance, political institution legitimacy, and interpersonal trust.

## Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

**Support for the Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.<sup>16</sup>

La escala del derecho de participación se basa en los siguientes ítems:


E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

<sup>16</sup> Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7





Graph I-3. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

The results for the scale of right of public contestation appear in Graph I-3. As in 2006, the majority of the surveyed population in each country supports these fundamental rights. Even in countries with the lowest levels of support, the average on a scale of 0-100 points is situated on a positive range indicating strong support for the right of public constestation. In eight countries, this support exceeds the average of 75 points. The Dominican Republic places among the four countries with the highest average.

**Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them,



it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:


La escala de inclusión (o tolerancia política) contiene los siguientes ítems:

**D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del [país], no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas?

**D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.


**D3.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

**D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la Televisión **para dar un discurso**?



Graph I-4. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

The results of Graph I-4 show much lower support for this democratic value than for the previous dimensions (Graphs I-2 and I-3). Only five countries have averages above 60 points on a scale of 0-100, and eight countries place beneath 50 points, i.e., with a score that indicates intolerance. Paraguay has a high value in the political tolerance series, yet the survey was conducted before the last presidential election, in which, for the first time in decades, the opposition managed to capture the presidency. On average, the Dominican Republic finds itself closer to the most intolerant countries, though it does surpass 50 points.



Graph I-5. Political Tolerance in the Dominican Republic, Temporal Perspective

Levels of political tolerance rose in 2006 with regard to 2004 but decreased slightly in 2008. At a comparative and national level, data from 2008 suggest the need to deepen democratic values in Dominican society so that the population will become more receptive to tolerating the rights of political dissidents.

## Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than the alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). Countries with stable democracies will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley

forthcoming. To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index<sup>17</sup> based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

El índice de legitimidad contiene los siguientes ítems:


- B14.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?
- B10A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
- B31.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?
- B13.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?
- B21.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

The results of Graph I-6 show that, although citizens of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust in key institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g., Colombia and Dominican Republic), the president's popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.


There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative size. Indeed, just Mexico and Belize have a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about "crisis of legitimacy" in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay's high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

<sup>17</sup> This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.



Graph I-6. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)



Graph I-7. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)


The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I-7. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom. In Graph I-6, the Dominican Republic is in seventh place with an average of 48.1, and in Graph I-7 it occupies the eighth position with an average of 45.9 points.

The variation in averages of institutional legitimacy among the countries studied suggests that the level of institutionalization is not the only factor that determines institutional trust. For example, between the United States and Haiti there is a great difference in institutionality levels; however, the difference in averages of institutional trust levels is only about 6 points. That is, the citizenry can show similar trust levels within very different institutional contexts, as in the United States and Haiti, or very different trust levels in similar institutional contexts such as is the cases of Argentina and Uruguay.

## Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). We use the classic interpersonal trust item:


**IT1.** Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, o nada confiable?



Graph I-8. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

The results appear in Graph I-8. On a scale of 0-100 points, all countries except for two place in the positive section of the same. Canada is the most outstanding country, with an average close to 80 points while Costa Rica, the second country with high interpersonal trust levels has an average of only 68.1 points. The Dominican Republic places in an intermediate position with an average of 59.4, almost 20 points away from the highest average registered by Canada, and also

from the lowest, registered by Haiti. In this regard, it is necessary to promote more development of interpersonal trust in the Dominican Republic in order to generate more social capital, government efficiency, and legitimacy of political institutions.



Graph I-9. Percentage of Dominicans who Support Democracy

Graph I-9 includes several variables related to support for, and satisfaction with democracy, which reflect an ascending tendency with some zigzag. The 2004 survey shows a pronounced drop in three of the variables because of the economic crisis, and for 2006 a recovery in the positive evaluation of democracy. The highest level of support sustained is registered in the question of whether democracy is preferable to any other type of government. The lowest level of support is expressed graphically in the question asking whether democracy is preferred though there may be unrest sometimes.

## Conclusions

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role.

Data show that the Dominican Republic is well positioned in regards to the valuation its population holds of democracy as the best form of government. Approximately three fourths of those interviewed in the Dominican Republic, as in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and Costa Rica showed agreement with the notion that democracy is preferable to any other form of government although in none of the surveyed countries did the majority of the population

disagree with this maxim. Moreover, in the Dominican case, the majority's support for democracy as a preferable form of government has remained high and consistent for a decade.

The results of the scale measuring the right of public contestation show that in 2008, the majority of the surveyed population in each country supports these fundamental rights. Even in countries with the lowest levels of support, the average on a scale of 0-100 points places in a positive range indicating strong support for the right of public contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds the average of 75 points on the scale, with real differences among those countries. The Dominican Republic places among the four countries with the highest averages.

As far as the degree of political tolerance at a national level, the Dominican Republic places closer to the countries with a lower level of political tolerance in 2008 (with less than 10 points in regards to Bolivia), and more distant from the countries with more tolerance (with slightly more than 20 points from Canada, the country registering the highest level of political tolerance). This suggests that in order to deepen democratic values within Dominican society, the population requires more education concerning the right to political dissidence. There was an improvement in 2006 compared to 2004, but it worsened somewhat in 2008 compared to 2006.

The Dominican Republic places among the countries with the highest levels of legitimacy of public institutions; however, this legitimacy is partially influenced by the highly positive valuation Dominicans give the central government and the president's performance. When controlled for the effects of these variables, the Dominican position for the average of trust in political institutions drops in the regional comparison.

Regarding interpersonal trust, the Dominican Republic places in an intermediate position, with an average of 59.4, almost 20 points from the highest average registered by Canada, and from the lowest registered by Haiti. In this sense, it is necessary to promote more development of interpersonal trust in the Dominican Republic in order to generate more social capital, government efficiency and legitimacy of the political institutions.



**PART TWO:**  
**GOVERNANCE**



## Capítulo II. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy

### Theoretical framework<sup>18</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

Unfortunately, from the methodological point of view, it is difficult to measure corruption accurately. As opposed to crime, of which there are official figures, though incomplete or doctored, public numbers about corruption are practically non-existent. Moreover, many people who offer or accept bribes do not perceive this as corruption, and, thus do not report it to the proper authorities or on public opinion surveys. On the other hand, people who identify bribery as corruption but do not report it because they do not believe that public agencies can or will do anything about the problem. Finally, the perception of corruption is more easily determined by the most publicized cases of corruption among public or private high ranking officials and not by the population's direct experience, either because they have not been direct victims of microcorruption or because the population does not define small bribes as corruption.

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<sup>18</sup> This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

## How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.<sup>19</sup> And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Victimization by corruption, i.e., corrupt practices that citizens experience directly, could have an impact on democracy in several ways. The belief that democracy is the best form of government could deteriorate in those who are victims of corruption or social capital may erode if victims of corruption have less trust in others.

## The measurement of corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

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<sup>19</sup> The TI index is based mainly on preceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...				
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima o soborno) en el último año?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8

The survey also includes the following question about the perception of corruption among citizens:


**EXC7.** Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: **[LEER]**  
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada

## Comparative Analysis

Reports about corruption focus on various key aspects: 1) the number of corruption victims, which is a dichotomous variable because it measures whether the surveyed person has been victimized by corruption or not, 2) the amount of times that a person has been the victim of corruption, 3) the institutions where corrupt acts occur, 4) the reports of corrupt practices from the population, and 5) their perceptions concerning the magnitude of corruption.


Public opinion polls are considered an adequate tool to measure citizen opinions in regards to corruption as well as to measure the incidence of corrupt practices in everyday life. This type of study looks to demonstrate that it is possible to measure the incidence of corruption in society, both its perception and concrete effects.

When estimating corruption with data from surveys, it is necessary to indicate that, despite the usefulness of knowing what the incidence of corruption is, there are very important sources of error. For example, informants can be mistaken when reporting specific incidents because they may not remember the event exactly or because practices that would be considered corrupt are not identified as such by surveyed persons. This happens, for example, with the payment of bribes to obtain a service, which oftentimes has become so institutionalized in society that it is not perceived as a form of corruption. Thus, the reports of incidence and cost of corruption serve more as approximations towards the knowledge of the problem than as exact measuring of its occurrence and incidence in society.



Graph II-1. Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective

From a comparative perspective, Graph II-1 shows a variable range of reporting of corrupt acts. The percentage of the surveyed population who reported having been a victims of corruption at least once, oscillates between 48.2% in Haiti and 8.9% in Uruguay. The Dominican Republic is the middle of the Latin American countries with 16.3% of the surveyed population indicating having been the victim of some corrupt act in the past year. This percentage dropped slightly compared to 2006 (17.7%), but the decrease is not statistically significant.



Graph II-2. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective

With regard to the perception of corruption, which was measured with the question EXC7 about the breadth of corruption present among government employees, the Dominican Republic’s position rises in Graph II-2. The average is 74.5, while only 16.3% of the surveyed population reported that they had been victims of corruption. The opposite occurs in Haiti’s case, where a higher percentage of respondents reported having been victims of corruption, yet the average in the perception that corruption exists is the lowest of all the Latin American countries in the report.

For the Dominican case, the perception of corruption is probably due to the fact the corruption in high public spheres weighs heavily in forming the population’s perceptions. That is, though many people do not report having been a victim of corruption, they conclude that there is much corruption because of the reports they hear of other corrupt acts.

## Corruption in the Dominican Republic

The last decade has seen several surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic that tackle the issue of corruption. Through a variety of questions, these surveys looked to grasp the




population's perspective about corruption and about citizens' concrete experiences regarding this problem, specifically, the payment of bribes to obtain public services.

The most important empirical studies conducted in this field are: the DEMOS surveys from 1994, 1997, 2001 and 2004, the Corruption Survey (ECO-2005), the Latin American Public Opinion Project survey (LAPOP) 2006, and the National Study of Corruption Costs for Dominican Homes 2007.


DEMOS and LAPOP are political culture surveys that undertake the study of diverse issues, among them corruption. The survey ECO-2005 focused on researching the so-called "minor corruption" but also included questions about democracy and political participation. The National Study of Corruption Costs for Dominican Homes focuses exclusively on the issue of corruption and covers different aspects of the problem.

All these surveys coincide in the central finding described earlier that, in the formation of perceptions and attitudes, perceived corruption in high public places is a significant contributor. This is because the perception that there is corruption is much higher than the percentage of people who actually reported having been the victim of corruption either because they had not been victimized or because they did not recognize bribery as a corrupt act.

The data suggest that so-called "major corruption" could be molding a majority opinion that in the Dominican Republic corruption is a widespread problem. For example, not only is the percentage of Dominicans who reported having been the victims of corruption relatively low compared to other countries, but also 71.8% of the 16.3% (11.7% of all surveyed) who reported having been victims of corruption indicated that it only happened once. In other words, this data do give a picture of a population that has been routinely victimized by corruption, as could be assumed by the opinion that corruption is a generalized problem in the country.




Graph II-3. Levels of Victimization by Corruption



Graph II-4. Percentage of the Population Victim of Corruption

Though the opinion that corruption is a widespread problem in the Dominican Republic prevails, the percentage of those who reported having been the victim of some type of corrupt act has dropped in the last four years, from 25.1% in 2004 to 16.3% in 2008. It is worth mentioning, however, that while the decline between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant, it is not so between 2006 and 2008.




Graph II-5. Probability of being a Victim of Corruption

Frequently, in each society there are certain groups of people that are more prone than others to becoming victims of corruption. The bars in Graph II-5 mean that if the vertical bars place above the 0.0 cross, the variable does not have a significant effect on the percentage of victims of corruption. Moreover, if the bar is placed completely above the 0.0 there is positive relation between the variable and being a victim of corruption, while a bar completely below the 0.0 translates into a negative relation between the variable and being the victim of corruption.


According the placement of the bars, the variables with a statistically positive relationship are wealth and education. This means that those who are wealthier report in a higher proportion than the poor about having been the victims of corruption. The same happens with those who have a higher educational level in relation to those with a lower level. This does not necessarily mean that the wealthier or those with a higher educational level can be easily duped. It could be that having more money and more knowledge of a bureaucratic system's inefficiencies makes these citizens more inclined to pay bribes and then report them as corrupt acts. Or it could simply be that these groups are more aware and are capable of identifying when corruption occurs. On the other hand, women are less prone than men to report having been victims of corruption, while

age is negatively related, i.e., the young tend to be victims of corruption more than the old. Moreover, people from the east and north are less prone to be victims of corruption than the inhabitants of the metropolitan region. The other variables do not have a significant relation with the probability of having been the victim of corruption. Complete data of the regression analysis appear in the Annex. Below are the graphs with details about the variables that have a significant relation with the probability of having been the victim of corruption.




Graph II-6. Victims of Corruption by Region

When the data is analyzed by region, Graph II-6 shows that a higher proportion of people who live in the metropolitan zone of Santo Domingo reported having been a victim of corruption (22%), while in the country's other regions the percentage was lower, oscillating between 15.1% and 12.1%. The people from the north and east of the country showed less probability of reporting having been victims of corruption.




Graph II-7. Victims of Corruption by Gender

A higher percentage of men than of women, more than double, reported having been the victim of corruption. The survey does not contain information that could elucidate why this happens. But it could be speculated that a higher proportion of men experience life in public and in the workplace on a daily basis, both of which increase the opportunities and situation in which they can be extorted, or because there is a greater need to offer bribes in order to obtain services or benefits.



Graph II-8. Victims of Corruption by Wealth Level


The percentages in Graph II-8 illustrate what the regression analysis revealed: that a higher proportion of the wealthy compared to the poor reported having been victims of corruption. The same happened with education as Graph II-9 indicates.



Graph II-9. Victims of Corruption by Educational Level

Respondents with college education report being the victims of corruption in higher percentages. The difference between the primary group and those with a higher educational level is significant. The difference in percentage between primary and secondary school is practically double. One reason could be that since those with a higher educational level tend to have more income, they may be more vulnerable to being asked for bribes or must offer bribes in order to obtain services.

Graphic II-10 clearly reveals that there is a statistically negative relation between age and corruption incidence. A higher proportion of young adults report having been victims of corruption. The same relationship was found in the 2006 survey.



Graph II-10. Victims of Corruption by Age

## Relationship between Corruption Victimization and Political Legitimacy

As discussed in the chapter’s introduction, there is empirical evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to trust political institutions. Moreover, corrupt practices that citizens perceive or experience in a direct manner could weaken the idea that democracy is preferable to another form of government, or could erode social capital when it weakens the capacity to trust others.

Corruption has been the subject of lengthy debate in the Dominican Republic. It was essential for the capital accumulation processes during the authoritarian regimes, and since the democratic transition in 1978, different social and political groups have demanded that the problem be tackled, while others have been devoted themselves to filling their pockets when they gain access to the government.

Corruption is worrisome for many reasons, among them, that it generates much inefficiency in the use of public resources, which are scarce and crucial for the development of the country. Furthermore, corruption creates a cultural and institutional context of mockery towards the basic rules of co-existence in the social community.


In the Dominican state, corruption happens in several different ways: through onerous contracts, through the famous method known as “grado a grado,” where contracts for the carrying out of public works are granted in part, without an adequate control of costs, through bribes that citizens pay to government employees, voluntarily or involuntarily, to speed up services, and through the

political patronage system directed to different social sectors. As a result, government corruption scandals appear in the press, yet many are not investigated, and almost all remain unpunished.

Public corruption devalues government performance because it erodes the public's trust that their governors watch over the common good and represent the interests of the entire citizenry. Despite this, Dominican governments have been reluctant to hamstring corruption, preferring to leave this to the politicians, although they know it causes unease in ample segments of the population who are excluded from the illegitimate share-out.

Without a doubt, corruption represents a serious problem for the economic development and the proper functioning of Dominican democracy because it prevents or delays modernization and insitutionalization processes. Low social investment, inefficient burocracies, high unemployment, and limited possibilities of social mobility represent optimal conditions for corruption to exist and expand.

The results of this study show that corruption felt in a direct manner by the population has a significant impact on two components of stable democracy: the legitimacy of basic institutions, and on interpersonal trust. Corruption diminishes trust in both at a statistically significant level. This means that there is a statistically negative relation between being a victim of corruption practices and the support to the system's political institutions and trust in others. The regression table, which presents the data pertinent to the relationship of these and other variables that measure various aspects of democracy, appears in Annex IV.




Graph II-11. Impact of Corruption on Political Legitimacy



The regression analysis indicates that having been a victim of corruption has a statistically negative relation with the legitimacy of the political system’s key institutions and with interpersonal trust. In both cases, being a victim of corruption diminishes trust. Data from the regression analysis appear detailed on Table A-2 in Annex IV and the following graphs present the tendencies in the relations.


Graph II-11 clearly indicates that the higher the incidence of corruption, the lower legitimacy of the political system’s fundamental institutions. For example, the people who were not victims of corruption show an average of institutional support of 52.9 points on a 0-100 scale, compared to only 39 points in the case of those who were victims three or more times during the last year.




Graph II-12. Impact of Corruption on Interpersonal Trust

The regression analysis that appears in Table A-2 (Annex IV) shows that victimization by corruption reduces interpersonal trust in a significant manner. Graph II-12 shows the negative relationship between these two variables: more victimization leads to less interpersonal trust. The graph indicates a rise in trust of individuals with two incidents of corruption, but this rise is not statistically significant; thus, a negative tendency remains in the relation between these two variables. When socio-demographic variables such as age, education or income are entered into the regression analysis, victimization by corruption has a significant negative impact on interpersonal trust (see Table A-2 in Annex IV for more quantitative details). What is noteworthy here is that although the graph depicting the relation between the two variables does not show a perfect linear relation (which could occur with certain frequency in this type of

equation), the regression analysis that incorporates different variables shows a statistically significant negative tendency.



Graph II-13. Perception of Corruption, 2004-2008



Graph II-14. Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Political Legitimacy

Survey after survey reveals that Dominicans perceive corruption as a serious problem. The 2004, 2006, and 2008 surveys show that a high percentage of people perceive that there is much corruption, as Graph II-13 shows. The perception that corruption exists is a variable with a negative effect on the legitimacy of political institutions, i.e., whoever perceives that corruption is generalized tends to question the legitimacy of political institutions as can be seen in Graph II-14 (see Table A-3 in Annex IV for detailed results of the regression analysis of the relation between perception of corruption and support for democracy).


The difference in perception of institutional legitimacy among those who said that corruption is “not very generalized” or “somewhat generalized” is not statistically significant. Yet in both groups there exists a higher level of institutional legitimacy than among those who considered that corruption is “very generalized”. In this sense, one could argue that a moderate level of perception of corruption does not significantly affect the level of institutional legitimacy. In other words, perception of corruption seems to affect institutional legitimacy only when it is perceived as very generalized. The graph clearly shows that the perception of corruption has an adverse effect on institutional legitimacy.

## Acceptance of Corruption


The survey used some questions such DC10 shown in Graph II-15 and DC13 shown in Graph II-16 to assess what the population considers and does not consider corruption, who is and who is not corrupt, and through this approximation understand the levels of acceptance of corruption. In these questions, the issues of victimization and perception converge because whether citizens judge an act as corrupt or not, they would be more inclined to evaluate these acts when they are directly involved. . For example, if citizens do not consider that paying a bribe in order to obtain a birth certificate is corrupt, then they would not designate that act as corrupt when asked about victimization either.

The question in Graph II-15 indicates the degree to which the population identifies the phenomenon of corruption. Faced with the example of the mother who bribes an employee to speed up a service, 84% identified the act as corrupt, and of those, 51.9% considered that the mother should be punished. This is a very severe judgement in a country where many constantly resort to the payment of bribes to obtain services. The judgment however, is less severe when the situation involves trying to obtain a job at a public institution through a family connection. Here only 65.6% said it was an act of corruption, i.e., 20% less than in the case of payment of a small bribe. .

Despite the fact that many surveys have been conducted in the Dominican Republic that address the issue of corruption, none had a battery of questions that indicated how these opinions about corruption were formed and which segments of the population would be inclined to have them.



Graph II-15. Attitudes about Common Corruption



Graph II-16. Attitudes about Corruption by Politicians

## Conclusions

As was posited in this chapter, corruption is problematic for many reasons; among them, because it leads to waste of scarce public resources, which is detrimental to the development of the country; corruption also constitutes an institutional and cultural mockery of the basic rules of co-existence in a social community.

Though the perception of corruption is high in the Dominican Republic, data show that in comparative terms within Latin America, Dominicans are victims of corrupt acts at a moderate regional level. This is why it is possible to conclude that the perception that corruption is a serious problem in the country is partly related to the corruption scandals of high ranking officials and not only by direct experience of the population with acts of bribery.

Although the idea that corruption is a generalized problem in the Dominican Republic prevails, the percentage of respondents that reports having been victims of some corrupt act has decreased in the last four years, from 21.2% in 2004 to 16.3% in 2008. Nonetheless, though the drop between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant, it is not so between 2006 and 2008.

In each society there are certain groups of people who are more prone than others to become victims of corruption. In the Dominican case, the variables with a statistically positive relation were wealth and education: the wealthier reported in higher proportion than the poor to have been the victims of corruption, and the same happened with those who possessed a higher educational level in relation to those who had a lower one. On the other hand, women were less prone than men to report having been the victims of corruption, while age is negatively related, i.e., the young are more prone than the older to be victims of corruption.

The results of this report show that corruption experienced directly by the population has a significant impact on two components of support for stable democracy: legitimacy of the political system's basic institutions, and interpersonal trust. In other words, there is a statistically negative relationship between being a victim of corrupt practices and support for the political system's institutions and trust in others. Moreover, the perception of corruption has an adverse effect on institutional legitimacy.



# Capítulo III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death.

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Fourth, the crime concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was large an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics.

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region’s political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

## How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still



quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves.


## The measurement of Crime Victimization

In order to explore the issue of crime and its impact on the opinions concerning political variables, the survey asked two key questions. The first was to determine if the interviewee had been the victim of a criminal act (vic1), and the second to measure the degree of security or insecurity that the interviewed population felt (aoj11). The first question allows us to establish the incidence of crime in the Dominican Republic and to identify possible differences in political attitudes between persons who were victims of criminal acts during the previous 12 months and those who were not. This is a way to ascertain the possible relations between criminality and politics. The second question also seeks these objectives by determining the population's perception of security or insecurity..

**VIC1.** Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

**AOJ11.** Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR




Graph III-1. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective

Although criminality has increased substantially in the Dominican Republic in recent years, the comparative graph shows that the perception of insecurity among Dominicans remains relatively moderate, at a level of 39.5 points. Among the countries included in the Graph III-1, there are 14 countries with higher levels of perception of insecurity than the Dominican Republic. In Argentina, the perception of insecurity is almost 20 points higher than in the Dominican Republic. Excluding the United States and Canada, where the perception of insecurity is less than in the Latin American countries, only six countries register a perception of insecurity lower than that of the Dominican Republic.


Crime rates have risen in the Dominican Republic over the last eight years. For example, the number of homicides doubled between 2001 and 2005. The population has felt the harmful effects of this criminality and consequently, the level of discontent over this problem has risen as the surveys have registered. In 2006 several social protests were held so that the government would contain the surge in crime. The sense of fear in the population is unquestionable, and the sense of civic insecurity has continued to rise consistently as the data of the DEMOS 1994-2004 and LAPOP 2006 surveys reveal.

When interviewees were asked if when being at home or outside their home, they felt safer, the same, or less safe than five years ago, the percentage who answered more unsafe increased continuously between 1994 and 2006 from 42% to 79%. Nevertheless, in 2008 for the first time a drop in the perception of insecurity is registered (Graph III-2). This result could arouse suspicion because in the country many people continue to perceive a state of insecurity. Yet if the survey's data are correct, as we assume they are, then there has been a decline in this perception.. This could be related to the preventive measures, such as the program “Safe Neighborhood”, established after the 2006 surveys were conducted, and also to the slight decrease between 2006 and 2008 in the percentage of the population that reported to have been the victim of a criminal act in the last year (Graph III-3).




Graph III-2. Retrospective Perspective of Insecurity, 1994-2008

Crime constitutes a clear threat to personal security and has turned into a new form of threat to political stability; thus, the Dominican government has started a series of actions to combat it, among them the aforementioned “Safe Neighborhood” program, implemented in poor zones of Santo Domingo and Santiago, both of which have high crime rates.




Graph III-3. Have you been the Victim of a Crime in the last year: 2004-2008

As we can see in Graph III-3, the number of people who report having been the victims of criminal acts doubled from 2004 to 2006, yet decreased slightly in 2008 (though the difference in victimization between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant). This figure reveals that although crime in the country increased, it finally stabilized between 2006 and 2008. Many reasons were offered to explain the increase between 2004 and 2006; however, it may have been a combined outcome of the economic crisis of 2003-2004, which according to government-provided figures, created 1.5 million new poor, the recent drug trafficking boom, and the weakness of the policía in dealing with crime or their complicity in crime. The slight reduction of 2006-2008, possibly may be the result of neighborhood safety programs established by the government starting in 2005-2006.



Graph III-4. Have you been the Victim of a Crime in the last year in Comparative Perspective

In regional comparative statistics, the Dominican Republic appears to have one of the lowest percentages of people who reported having been the victim of crime in 2008 (Graph III-4). However, with this data, the question of whether the interviewees reported the incident or not always remains, above all in societies such as the Dominican where in recent times crime has risen sharply. Nonetheless, the fact that both the victimization and perception data have moved in the same descending direction perhaps suggests that there has been a real decline in crime, although unfortunate events continue to happen which capture the attention of the media and the population.




Graph III-5. Perception of Insecurity in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2008

Graph III-5 shows a clear reduction of the perception of insecurity in the Dominican population from an average of 50.7 points in the 0-100 scale in 2006, to 39.5 in 2008. This survey was conducted in the beginning of 2008, at a time when there was a perceptible decline in the levels of criminality. Perhaps that elucidates the positive change with regard to mid 2006 when the previous survey was conducted.


## Characteristics of Crime Victims

In society there are certain groups of people more prone to become victims of crime. The determination of such groups is important in order to be able to establish more effective measures to combat crime. The following graph presents the results of the regression analysis that shows which social groups were most likely to become victims of criminal acts.

The bars on Graph III-6 indicate that the variable with a statistically positive relation is education. That is, those with a higher educational level tend to report more frequently that they have been the victims of crime. On the other hand, women were less prone than men to being the victims of crime, and the youngest and those who live in larger localities, are more vulnerable (see Annex IV for complete data from the statistical regression analysis).




Graph III-6. Probability of being the Victim of Crime



Graph III-7. Victims of Crime in the last year by Locality Size

Graph III-7 shows in detail the percentage distribution of victims of a criminal act in the last year by locality size. As the regression analysis indicates, crime is higher in larger cities and in the

capital. This result was expected because in small towns community members know each other, and solidarity prevails over hostility. In the Dominican Republic, a city having more than 100,000 inhabitants is considered large; a medium size city has between 25 and 100 thousand, and a small city less than 25 thousand.




Graph III-8. Victims of Crime by Age


Graph III-8 clearly shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between age and being victim of a crime: the lower a person’s age, the higher the probability of being a victim. The percentage of of victimization among age groups younger than 46 years old is above the national percentage of 14.3. The incidence of crime decreases significantly in the case of people older than 65 years.

Crime incidence is higher in the case of men than of women. Data from 2008 vary with regard to 2004, when more women than men reported to have been the victim of a criminal act, and in 2006 when the gender distribution was similar. This change merits study jointly with other research to understand the changing patterns of crime in the country by gender.





Graph III-9. Victims of Crime in the last year by Gender



Graph III-10. Victims of Crime in the last year by Educational Level


The data show a strong statistical relationship between educational level and victimization: the more educated individuals are, the higher the possibility of reporting being the victims of a criminal act. In the case of people with college education, the percentage of 25.1 almost doubles the national percentage of 14.3. This tendency is the same as the one registered by surveys conducted in prior years. The reason for this phenomenon could be tied to the available resources in the different social groups. People with a higher educational level generally have more income and often carry more money, making them more attractive targets for muggers. It is also possible that people with more education are more likely to report their experiences of victimization. When we consider the socio-demographic variables included in this report, the group that registers the highest percentage of having been victims of a criminal act is the group of those surveyed with college education.

## **The Relationship Between Security and Support for Democracy**

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, it is possible to determine how the fear and experience of crime affect citizen support for democracy. The belief that democracy is the best political system can diminish among people who have been victims of crime. Citizens can also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens; and as a consequence, the social capital diminishes, and support for the right to public contestation erodes. Moreover, being a victim of crime and feeling unsafe can negatively affect trust in political institutions, especially in the police and the judiciary. What remains less clear is whether the most important factor is the crime itself or the fear of it. Even in countries with higher homicide rates, the probability of one person being murdered or being a victim of a serious crime is low. Therefore, the impact of victimization could be less than the fear that the population feels concerning crime. The majority of the population does not suffer criminal acts directly, but the knowledge that others have been victimized instills fear. In this section we examine the impact of crime on the dimensions of support for democracy, support for public contestation and political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

The regression analysis indicates that delinquency has a negative and significant effect on institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. People who reported having been the victims of a criminal act expressed less legitimacy in political institutions and less interpersonal trust. However, there is a positive relation between victimization by crime and political tolerance and neither is there is a statistical relation between victimization by crime and support for democracy or political participation (the complete results of the regression analysis appear in Table A-5 in Annex IV).


The following graphs show the variables for which a significant statistical relationship was detected, either positive or negative, with victimization by crime. These are political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.




Graph III-11. Impact of Crime on Political Tolerance

Graph III-11 indicates with precise numbers what the regression analysis showed: people who are victims of a criminal act in the last year expressed a higher level of political tolerance than others. This is a paradoxical result because the victims of criminal acts could become more intolerant. Yet it appears that such intolerance does not touch upon aspects that have been used in this report to measure political tolerance such as the rights of critics of the voting system critics, the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, to run for office, or to make public speeches. Perhaps the positive relationship occurs because the victims of criminal acts would like to empower themselves to express their problems and frustrations, and as such, they consider that system critics ought to have the right to express themselves politically.

Data in Graph III-12 show that people victim of a criminal act expressed a lower level of support for political legitimacy. That is, being the a victim of crime negatively affects the trust people have in political institutions, such as the national government, the justice system, congress, and political parties. This data correspond to what was expected from victims of criminal acts: their trust in the public institutional system weakens because they consider that these institutions fail to solve the problem.



Graph III-12. Impact of Crime on Political Legitimacy



Graph III-13. Impact of Crime on Interpersonal Trust


In the regression analysis we found a significant statistical relationship between crime victimization and interpersonal trust; the victims of criminal acts feel less trust in the people of their community. Graph III-13 shows the average of interpersonal trust on a scale of 0-100 for people who were or were not victims of a criminal act in the last year.

In general, crime constitutes a clear threat to personal security and has turned also into a new form of threat to political stability. Although the percentage who reported having been the victim of crime was 15% of the population in 2008, the effect of criminal acts still generates a sense of insecurity in the rest of the population, regardless of whether or not they have been direct victims. Thus, it is important to analyze, not only the opinions of those who have been the victims or not of crime, but also the spectrum of the surveyed population regarding the perception of personal insecurity.


We will now examine the impact of perception of personal security in the dimensions of support for stable democracy used in this report: support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust.

The regression analysis uses diverse control variables to examine the relation between perceptions of insecurity and the aforementioned indicators of democratic attitudes. It has been found that the higher the perception of insecurity, the more legitimacy of political institutions and interpersonal trust decline. A statistically significant relation was not found concerning support for democracy, right to public contestation and political tolerance (the complete results of the regression analysis appear in Table A-6 in Annex IV).

Graph III-14 shows the relation between personal insecurity and mistrust in political institutions: the more insecurity, the more mistrust. Citizens blame their sense of personal insecurity on political institutions because they feel vulnerable and do not find support or solutions in the institutional framework, such as the police and the justice system. For example, people who feel very secure show an average support of 54.7 points for the political legitimacy of institutions, while those who feel insecure only reach an average support of 42.7 points for institutions.



Graph III-14. Impact of the Perception of Personal Insecurity on Political Legitimacy




Graph III-15. Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust

As in the case of political legitimacy of institutions, the level of personal insecurity affects interpersonal trust: the more insecurity, the less trust in other people. Data from Graph III-15 show the magnitude of this relationship. While the level of interpersonal trust reaches 67.5 points in those who feel very secure, it drops to 47 points in the case of the people who feel very insecure.

## Perceptions Regarding the Judicial Process

Since crime constitutes a threat to human integrity and democracy's future, it is important to have a functioning justice system to combat the problem and improve perceptions of the national situation. For the system to work, the population must believe in the system, and justice must offer some tangible guarantees to citizens.


In regional terms, the Dominican Republic places favorably in the level of trust in the justice system to punish the guilty. Trust had decreased in 2006, but rebounded in 2008 to 2004 levels. The country also ranks as one of the highest with regard to the trust the population has for the police to catch the guilty. However, only 42% of the interviewed population consider that the police protect the people, while 58% think that the police are involved in criminal acts. In 2006, only 30% said that the police protect the people. Although much is left to do in the reform process of the justice and the police system, data show an improvement in the public opinion judgement in 2008 with regard to 2006.



Graph III-16. Trust the the Guilty will be Punished, by Country


In the Graph III-16, the highest values mean that people have more trust in the justice system to punish the guilty. The Dominican Republic places third with an average of 50.3 points, 25 points ahead of Paraguay, which registers the lowest level, and 6 points from Jamaica that registers the highest.






Graph III-17. Trust that the Guilty will be Punished

Graph III-17 shows the information concerning trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty in the last four years. While 2006 registered a loss of trust, it recovered in 2008. It is difficult to determine, however, the reason for this change since no important transformations have occurred in the judicial system during this time to explain this fluctuation.




Graph III-18. Trust the the Police will catch the Guilty, by Country


Confidence in the police to catch the guilty is also high in the regional context of Latin America, as Graph III-18 shows. However, data in Graph III-19 show that the population are not confident that the police protect them; they do think that they are actually involved in criminal acts. The perception that the police help the neighborhood people did improve from 2006 to 2008 as Graph III-20 shows, and, 62% indicated that they would turn to the police to report a crime or act of violence.




Graph III-19. Percentage who thinks the Police protects the People, by Country



Graph III-20. Percentage who thinks the Police protects the People, 2006-2008




Graph III-21. Where would you report a crime (vic11)



Graph III-22. Have you seen anybody selling drugs in the last year, by Country

A key problem in the rise of crime is drugs. The 2006 surveys asked in all the countries participating in the report about the relevance and magnitude of this problem in their neighborhoods. Graph III-22 presents the percentages of people in each country who have witnessed drug dealing in their own neighborhood in the last year. The level of drug activity reported by the people in the Dominican Republic ranks at an intermediate position in 2008. An 18.4% of interviewed Dominicans said that they had seen drugs being sold, which represents a slight reduction of 4% between 2006 and 2008.



Graph III-23. Have you seen anybody selling drugs in the last year, 2006-2008

## Conclusions

An objective of this report has been to explore the level of victimization by crime, identify the most vulnerable groups, and the impact of victimization and the perception of insecurity on citizen support for democracy. It was assumed the belief that democracy is the best system could diminish if citizens are victims of crime or feel insecure. They could become less tolerant toward others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens if they have been or are afraid of being the victim of crime. This erodes social capital and decreases support for the right to public contestation. Moreover, victimization by crime and fear of crime could diminish trust in political institutions, especially in the police and the justice system.

In order to explore the issue of criminality and its impact on the opinions concerning political variables, the survey used two key questions. One was posed to determine whether the interviewee had been victim of a criminal act and the other to determine the sense of security or insecurity felt by the interviewed population. Data presented in this chapter indicate the problem of crime in the Dominican Republic stabilized at the beginning of 2008 compared to 2006. It was found that between 2004 and 2006, the number of individuals who reported having been the victim of a criminal act in the past year doubled from 6.8% to 16.2%, while in 2008 it dropped to 14.8%. The groups who registered a higher percentage of victims of crime were men, the young, inhabitants of the larger cities, and people with a higher educational level. The perception of insecurity also diminished in the country from an average of 50.7 in 2006 to 39.5 in 2008.

The people who were victims of a criminal act in the last year tended to express less support for policial legitimacy and less interpersonal trust than those who were not victims. This presents a challenge for Dominican democracy because when the population expresses less political legitimacy and interpersonal trust, this means that they trust less in public institutions and in their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, the victims of crime showed more political tolerance than the rest of those interviewed. On the other hand, data indicate that the sense of personal insecurity has negative effects on political tolerance, legitimacy of political institutions, and interpersonal trust.

The fact that in 2008 the perception of personal security improved and the percentage of victims of crime decreased with regard to 2006 is positive, although indicator levels for both 2006 and 2008 remain higher than in 2004.

With regard to the criminal justice system, the population shows relatively high levels of trust in the judicial system and the police to catch the guilty, but many still feel that they cannot trust the police to protect them.

# Capítulo IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework<sup>20</sup>

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas, access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. On the other hand, Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the

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<sup>20</sup> Segments of this section were written by Daniel Montalvo.

national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Is decentralization a good idea? One of the key advantages of decentralization at a national level is that it brings the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque y Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).<sup>21</sup> Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming).

What do Latin Americans and Dominicans think of decentralization and what is its influence in their appreciation of democracy? The answers to these questions will be analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystallized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that ruled in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

Another important issue is the relation between civic participation and democracy: Does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and

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<sup>21</sup> On a national level, there are three common types of decentralization: fiscal, political, and administrative (Bunce 2000, Cai and Treisman 2002).



Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple association express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007). As a hypothesis this could mean that participation in civil society increased tolerance towards others to the degree that people who have different lifestyles interact, or it could also mean that a growing enmity could be generated because of the interaction (Armony 2004).

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of “outsiders.” There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital.

## Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government’s responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (civpart). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

The questions used to investigate these aspects are as follows:

**B32.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?

**LGL2A.** Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar *más responsabilidades*? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más al gobierno central
- (2) Algo más al gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más a la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (88) NS/NR

**LGL2B.** Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería *administrar más dinero*? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más el gobierno central
- (2) Algo más el gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

**SGL1.** ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (números) (8) NS/NR

## Measuring Civil Society Participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (as in “community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.<sup>22</sup> The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in the organizations listed below.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

<sup>23</sup> The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and to take the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know” to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de las siguientes organizaciones por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. <b>[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]</b>							
	<b>Una vez a la semana</b>	<b>Una o dos veces al mes</b>	<b>Una o dos veces al año</b>	<b>Nunca</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>	
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>	
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>	


## Comparative Analysis

The organizational levels at the local level and satisfaction with local governments vary substantially in the Americas. Thus, if these factors influence the solidification of a stable democracy, it is expected that in countries with higher participation and higher satisfaction, the population will identify more strongly with the values of democracy.

The processes of political reform promoted in Latin America over the last decades have included decentralization as an important issue on the agenda, that is, the return towards the local level as an ideal way to bring government closer to the citizenry. The Dominican Republic has not been exempt from this debate, and with the goal of facilitating decentralization, Law 166-03 passed in 2003 facilitated a significant funds transfer from the National General Budget to the municipalities.


The purpose has been to generate new forms of political participation which would forecast better governmental action and thus, improve living conditions for the population. It is thought that decentralization of governmental functions can resolve many problems that electoral democracy has not managed to address.

From this perspective, it is assumed that decentralization processes increase citizen participation and thus, higher citizen participation leads to more efficiency in public administration. In this sense, one visualizes that decentralization processes increase the possibilities of developing an authentic democracy through higher participation.




Graph IV-1. Trust in Local Government in Comparative Perspective

In relation to all the other countries included in this report, the Dominican Republic shows the highest level of trust in municipal governments. Graph IV-1 shows the the Dominican Republic at the top of the list with an average of 63.7 points of trust in local government, while Haiti registered the lowest level with an average of 38.3 on a 0-100 scale.




Graph IV-2. Support for Decentralization in Comparative Perspective

Although Dominicans show a high level of trust in municipal governments, they do not express support for decentralization of responsibilities according to the responses to the question regarding whether more responsibilities should be assigned to the central government or to the municipality. On the 0-100 scale of Graph IV-2, the Dominican Republic registers a value of 45.5 and places among the countries with the least support for decentralization of governmental responsibilities. Something similar occurs with the question regarding whether the central government or the municipalities should manage more money (Graph IV-3); the Dominican Republic occupies one of the lowest places among the averages, together with Honduras, Haiti and Ecuador.




Graph IV-3. Support for Decentralization of resources

This paradoxical result of trusting local governments and yet not want more decentralization of responsibilities and resources could mean that although the population expressed satisfaction with local government performance (Graph IV-1), it does not believe that the solutions to their problems will come through that avenue, but from the central government. If this is so, data prove the weight of the Dominican presidential system. Data are even more paradoxical when the results of Graph IV-4 are included. These show a high level of satisfaction with local services and the Dominican Republic heads the list of satisfaction with Brazil.




Graph IV-4. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective

The temporary comparison for the Dominican Republic in Graph IV-5 shows that from 2004 to 2006 an improvement occurred in the citizens evaluation of services, and the levels remained similar or improved in 2008 compared to 2006. The most significant increase in 2008, compared to other years, was in the construction of public housing. It is worth clarifying that garbage collection is a service performed by the local government, but all the rest come from the national government.




Graph IV-5. Evaluation of Public Services, 2004-2008



Graph IV-6. Comparison of trust in the Local Government and in the National Government




Graph IV-6 shows that the relative satisfaction of Dominicans with the government was registered not only at the local level, but also at the national level with 63.7 and 62.3 average points respectively. Yet the question remains of whether trust in a particular government level affects trust in the other, or if different mechanisms can explain the trust at the local and at the national level. It is possible that the trust and satisfaction levels mutually reinforce each other, as is the case in some public institutions which benefit from the trust felt in the national government. On the other hand, one could argue that since both trust levels are relatively high, that the population is inclined to prefer more centralization due to the country's deeply-rooted presidential culture.




Graph IV-7. Trust in the Handling of Funds by the City Council

Graph IV-7 indicates that, though Dominicans show satisfaction with local services, there is not much trust that city councils manage public funds well: 63.6% of those surveyed said to have little or no trust.




Graph IV-8. Participation in Municipal Meetings, 2006-2008

Despite the ideology in favor of community participation which has dominated in the last years, and the efforts undertaken to achieve it, participation in municipal meetings continues to be limited as indicated by the data presented in Graph IV-8. In fact, participation in 2008 was lower than in 2006. Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic registered the highest level of participation in municipal meetings of all the surveyed countries in this report (Graph IV-9). This could contribute toward the more positive vision that Dominicans hold of local governments.




Graph IV-9. Participation in Municipal Meetings, by Country

In a comparative perspective with other countries included in this report, the Dominican Republic ranks in a middle position with regard to the percentage of formulated petitions to municipal governments (Graph IV-10). This percentage dropped recently from 15.8% in 2006 to 12.1% in 2008, though the decline is not statistically significant (Graph IV-11).




Graph IV-10. Percentage of those who Petitioned the Municipal Government, by Country



Graph IV-11. Percentage of those who petitioned the Municipal Government, 2006-2008


## Characteristics of the People who Support Decentralization

Graph IV-12 presents the results of the regression analysis concerning the decentralization of governmental responsibilities (see Table A-7 in the Annex for more details of this regression). The graph shows that the level of wealth has a positive effect and is statistically significant on support for decentralization. That is, people with more resources express more support for decentralization of governmental responsibilities. On the other hand, women and those who showed more satisfaction with local public services do not support decentralization as much. Age, education level, place of residence, and municipal meeting attendance did not have a statistically significant relation with the position towards decentralization of governmental responsibilities. Graphs IV-13, IV-14 and IV-15 show the variables with a statistically significant relation.




Graph IV-12. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities

Graph IV-13 shows that people who are dissatisfied with local services support decentralization of services more than those who are satisfied. This is understandable because those who are unsatisfied look for changes to solve their problems.




Graph IV-13. Impact of the Satisfaction with Local Services in the Decentralization of Responsibilities




Graph IV-14. Impact of Gender on Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities

As evidenced by Graph IV-14, men have a higher tendency to support decentralization of responsibilities. Yet in no case is support for decentralization particularly high; none of the averages reached 50 points, though there is a statistically significant difference.



Graph IV-15. Impact of Wealth level on Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities


Though linearity is not perfect in Graph IV-15, the statistically significant tendency of the two variables included there, and the one observed in the regression analysis with multiple variables in Graph IV-12, is that the wealthier the interviewee, the more support for decentralization of responsibilities. The wealthier support decentralization of governmental responsibilities with an average of 71.9 while the poorest reach an average of only 32.3 points. Support is particularly high among people with a higher level of wealth. The wealthiest segments belong to the upper-middle class, who in general, are more aware of the benefits the population could derive from having municipal governments with resources and power to fulfill the needs of the municipality's inhabitants.



Graph IV-16. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources


Graph IV-16 offers a visual description of the regression analysis results of support for decentralization of economic resources. The variables with a statistically significant relationship with decentralization of resources are age and size of place of residence. The youngest citizens and people who live in smaller localities tend to show more support for decentralization of resources (complete data of the regression can be found in Table A-8 in Annex IV). The next two graphs show this statistically significant relation.





Graph IV-17. Impact of Age on Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

Preference for decentralization of economic resources is higher among younger people, including the range of ages younger than 66 years. This is expected because senior citizens are less familiar with new political ideas about decentralization and its political effects.



Graph IV-18. Impact of City Size on Support for Decentralization of Resources


The country’s rural population shows more support for decentralization than the capital’s inhabitants. Historically, Dominicans from the interior of the island have resented the great concentration of resources in the capital. This could be the reason for their stronger preference for decentralization.

### Attitudes about Decentralization and Support for Democracy

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, citizens who participate and evaluate the local government positively are more likely to believe that democracy is the best government system. Previous LAPOP research in several countries has demonstrated that those who participate in local government are more inclined to approve of the right to public contestation and citizen inclusiveness. There is also strong evidence that trust in local governments translates positively to the belief in the legitimacy of national institutions. Finally, a positive viewpoint of local governments complemented by participation could contribute to increasing interpersonal trust and thus, social capital.


The theory of social capital assumes that the higher the satisfaction with public services, the stronger the support for the political system and democracy when this is the ruling system. This report is based on that assumption and statistically analyzes the relationship between evaluation of local services and the five measures of democratic values: support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

The regression analysis shows a positive and statistically significant relation between satisfaction with local services and institutional legitimacy as well as with interpersonal trust. Details of the regression analysis appear in Table A-9 in Annex IV and below are the graphs with the variables that have a significant relation.



Graph IV-19. Impact of Satisfaction with Services on Political Legitimacy of Institutions

Data from Graph IV-19 show that the higher satisfaction with local public services, the higher the institutional political legitimacy. Data from Graph IV-20 show that the higher level of satisfaction with local services is related to higher levels of interpersonal trust. This corresponds to the hypothesis postulated at the beginning of the chapter in the theoretical framework about the relation between government efficacy and institutional trust.



Graph IV-20. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust


## Degree and Effects of Local Civic Participation

During the past decades, there has been great interest among social science scholars in studying democracy’s quality in both societies with stable democracies and in emerging democracies. One issue of particular concern is the decline of civic participation and politics, and also the loss of trust in public institutions due to their negative implications for the proper functioning and vitality of the democratic system.

As suggested earlier, the concept of “social capital” has been used as an important point of reference in political analysis. In essence, citizen organization and participation are vital for a democracy that aims to efficiently reach its collective and individual objectives. It is suggested that a higher level of social organization leads to an increased formation of social capital, to more political effectiveness in communities, to better public policy, and thus, to a higher trust in political institutions and to more legitimacy of the democratic system. Conversely, a lower level of social participation produces less social capital, more political incapability on behalf of communities to reach their objectives, and less effective and trustworthy governments (Putnam 1993, 1995).


The idea that civic participation is positive comes from, paradoxically, both conservative and liberal thought. The right views civil society organizations as a way of returning power to the communities, to the local sphere, rather to central government and its programs. From this perspective, decentralization is preferable to the accumulation of power in high spheres of the government. On the other hand, the liberal left values political participation as a way of increasing citizen involvement in political processes, and the common citizen's voice. Despite this perspective, it is assumed that activism in voluntary associations not only improves the levels of social tolerance, a crucial aspect of a democracy, but also political action, since there is evidence that the people who participate in voluntary associations are more likely to participate in politics. In this sense, social capital turns into political capital.

In comparative perspective, the AmericasBarometer 2006 data for the Dominican Republic showed a relatively low level of organizational membership but a significant level of participation in community activities and a high level of associative activities of a religious character. The 2008 survey also showed a high level of participation in associative activities in the comparative regional context, mainly in religious activities. On the other hand, high participation in religious activities is tied to the central role played by churches, especially the Catholic Church, in Dominican politics. This is contradictory with regard to the tendency registered by societies that are modernizing, where an important part of associative life tends to move from the religious to the civic-secular dimension.




Graph IV-21. Participation in Religious Group Meetings in Comparative Perspective

Graph IV-21 illustrates the previous arguments and shows the high positioning of the Dominican Republic concerning the population’s participation in religious organization meetings. The poorest countries tend to rank among those with higher levels of religious participation (Haiti, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Honduras), while more economically developed countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela register less participation in religious activities.




Graph IV-22. Participation in Parent Associations, by Country




Graph IV-23. Participation in Improvement Committees, by Country

The Dominican Republic places among the countries with higher participation in improvement committee meetings. This could be one of the reasons that explains why Dominicans show a high valuation of local governments, as shown at the the beginning of this chapter.




Graph IV-24. Participation in Women’s Group Meetings

Just as in the case of the improvement committees, the Dominican Republic registered a relatively high level of participation in women’s group meetings in the comparative context. Five countries registered a higher level of participation and fifteen registered less participation.



Graph IV-25. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Democracy


Graph IV-25 presents the results of the regression analysis of civic participation on support for democracy. The complete result of the analysis can be found in Table IV-10 in Annex IV. No statistically significant relation was found between any of the dimensions of local civic participation and support for democracy.



Graph IV-26. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right of Public Contestation




In order to evaluate the relation between civic participation and support for the right of public contestation, a regression analysis was performed. The results appear in Graph IV-26 and complete data can be seen in Table A-11 in Annex IV. The dimension of participation with a statistically significant relation to support for the right of public contestation is participation in improvement committees (See Graph IV-27). Participation in parent or religious associations did not have a significant effect.




Graph IV-27. Impact of Participation in Improvement Committees on the Rights of Public Contestation

Participation in improvement committees tends to enhance the support felt by those interviewed toward the right of public contestation. Nevertheless, support decreases among those who participate the most. Graph IV-28 shows that there is no statistically significant relation between local civic participation and political tolerance (complete regression data appear in Table A-12 of Annex IV).

The regression that appears in Graph IV-29 also did not show a statistically significant relation between civic participation and political institutional legitimacy (complete data of statistical analysis appears in Table A-13 of Annex IV).




Graph IV-28. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance




Graph IV-29. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Institutional Legitimacy

Furthermore, a regression analysis was performed concerning the impact of civic participation on interpersonal trust. A statistically significant relation was not found, as Graph IV-30 shows (complete regression data can be found in Table A-14).




Graph IV-30. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust




Graph IV-31. Contribution to Community problem-solving, by Country


The next three graphs show that people who participate more in associative activities tend to contribute more to the solution of local problems. The tendency is more marked in the case of people who actively participate in improvement committees or neighborhood meetings.



Graph IV-32. Contribution to Community problem-solving by Religious Participation



Graph IV-33. Contribution to Community problem-solving by School Participation



Graph IV-34. Contribution to Local Problem-solving by Community Participation

## Conclusions

This chapter showed that Dominican citizens express a high trust level in local government (the highest among the surveyed countries), and also a relatively high level of satisfaction with local services (second place among surveyed countries). However, there is not much acceptance for the idea of decentralizing governmental responsibilities or public resources, though people with more resources support decentralization more. The Dominican population also registers a higher level of participation in municipal meetings within the regional context.

Data also show that the higher the satisfaction with local public services, the higher the political legitimacy of institutions and the higher the interpersonal trust. This confirms the hypotheses posited at the beginning of the chapter within the discussion framework concerning the relation between government’s efficacy and institutional trust.

Furthermore, the Dominican population registers a relatively high level of associative participation in relation to other countries in the report, especially in religious organizations. However, this participation does not seem to have a significant impact on the various aspects that characterize democracy: support for democracy, support for participation, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust. A statistically significant relation was not found between any of the dimensions of local civic participation (religious, parent organizations, and community improvement committees) and support for democracy. The participation dimension that has a statistically significant relation to support for the right of public contestation is

participation in improvement committees, yet not the participation of parent nor religious associations. There is no statistically significant relation between local civic participation and political tolerance, nor between local civic participation and institutional legitimacy or interpersonal trust.

This finding should motivate more research and reflection about the nature of social participation in the Dominican Republic because those who participate in the analyzed organizations (improvement committees or meetings, parent associations, and religious organizations) do not seem to adopt democratic values significantly more than those who do not participate. An exception the data show is that those who participate in improvement committees tend to express more support for the right of public contestation.

# Capítulo V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework<sup>24</sup>

It has become common place in the field of democratic governance, and talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in mostly the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did one’s opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form

<sup>24</sup> This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

of legitimacy, defined as a person's conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere" (240) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton "offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies" (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society's economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

Turning now toward a government's economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been "fragmentary and inconsistent." In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country's "level of economic development is less important than economic performance" (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one's individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

## **How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?**

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.



## Measuring perception of government economic performance


A new index (**econperf**), which stands for “Perception of Government Economic Performance” was created using N1, how well does the government fight poverty, and N12, how well does the government fight unemployment.

**N1.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

**N12.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

## Comparative Analysis

In order to place the Dominican Republic’s discussion within the comparative framework and an historical context it is important to mention that the country experienced an economic crisis in 2003-2004. Upon taking power on August 16th, 2004, Leonel Fernández set out to achieve macroeconomic stability. Fernández’ government signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with which it largely complied; it also implemented two fiscal reforms involving tax increases, the first in the beginning of 2004 and the second in mid-2005. As a result the country, the Dominican Republic was able to restructure its foreign debt, grow its economy, lower inflation, revalue substantially its currency, and increase considerably its foreign currency reserves. Although economic growth still needs to provide more social equality through reduction of unemployment and poverty, economic stabilization was, undoubtedly, the main achievement of the Fernández government in the 2004-2008 period.




Graph V-1. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

Based on the economic performance index created with questions N1 and N12, comparative regional data show that the Dominican Republic registered one of the highest approval levels for government economic performance; sixth place with an average of 49.9 points, slightly behind Uruguay which occupied first place with 54.6 points, and much above the countries with low valuation for the government performance such as Paraguay, which registered an average of only 14.4 points.

## Analysis of Economic Performance in the Dominican Context

The country's main problems identified by interviewees can be grouped into five categories: economy, security, basic services, political, and others. Graph V-2 clearly shows that problems related to the economy headed the list for the majority of those interviewed: 57.1% indicated an economic problem such as unemployment, inflation, poverty, or lack of credit. The second category of problems refers to citizen security, including crime; 18.8% of respondents this as being a major problem. The third category of problems more frequently mentioned is the shortage of basic services such as the lack of electricity, water, and adequate transportation. Political problems occupied a place of little importance with only 5.6% of those surveyed having mentioned referring to the issue.




Graph V-2. Country's Main Problems

As previously noted, in the survey reports there are two economic variables to which much attention has been paid in the last years. One measures citizen perception of the state of the national economy (sociotropic variable – SOCT1) and the other, of one's personal or family finances (ideotropic variable – IDIO1). It has been observed that when economic conditions improve, both in the sociotropic variable (national economic situation) and in the ideotropic one (personal or family economic situation), citizen opinions of political leaders and institutions are more positive, and system support in general increases. The following data presented here allows the analysis of personal and national economic situations in the Dominican Republic.


SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8

These items show citizen perception about the state of the economy and allow us to analyze whether there is a direct association between perception and the government’s role in creating the situation. Some studies have found that although the population deems the government responsible for the functioning of the national economy, citizens are less inclined to blame the government for their personal economic situation. This observation, however, is not a hard and fast rule and thus, it is important to use both questions to better learn the consequences regarding political opinions of citizens’ evaluation of the economy’s performance.

We can observe in Graph V-3 that both the sociotropic and ideotropic variables are statistically significant. People with a more positive perception of the national economic situation and their individual economic situation tend to express a more favorable opinion of the government. Furthermore, the data demonstrate that the wealthiest people and those with a higher educational level have a less favorable opinion of government economic performance, while women have a more favorable opinion. Details of the regression analysis which show the statistic relations between these variables appear in the appendix in Table A-15.




Graph V-3. Predictors of the Perception of Government Economic



Graph V-4. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on the Perception of Government Economic Performance


Graph V-4 shows a clear association between the opinions about the state of the national economy and government economic performance. Respondents with a poor opinion of the national economic situation also evaluate government performance in managing the economy poorly, and viceversa. The approval rating for government economic performance is 69.2 points for those who consider that the situation is good, and only 31.2 points for those who consider that the situation is very bad.




Graph V-5. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on the Perception of Government Economic Performance

As in the case of perception of the national economic situation, perception of one's personal economic situation has a positive relation with the opinion of government economic performance. The better one's personal economic situation, the better the opinion of the government. Those who evaluated their own situation as very good approve of government economic performance with an average of 69.4 points while those who evaluate it as poor register an average support of 34.8 points. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, some reports show that the population tends to blame the government more for the state of the national economy than for their personal situation. In any event, this survey data show that the reputation of the government benefits or suffers to a similar degree in both cases.

According to the data of Graph V-6 and the regression analysis previously mentioned, people with a lower educational level show a more favorable opinion of government economic performance than those with a higher educational level. This is a paradox because people with more education are more likely to be better off financially and thus evaluate government performance better; however, education seems to make citizens more critical of government performance.




Graph V-6. Impact of Education on Perception of government economic performance



Graph V-7. Impact of Wealth on Perception of Government Economic Performance

In the regression analysis presented in Graph V-3, we observe a statistically significant relation, though not perfectly linear, between wealth and opinion of government economic performance in which wealthier people hold more negative perceptions of economic performance. Graph V-7 shows that this relationship between wealth and opinion of government economic performance is similar to that of education: the less wealth, the better the opinion of the government’s economic performance.



Graph V-8. Impact of Gender on Perception of Government Economic Performance


According to the regression analysis, women have a more positive perception of government economic performance than men and that difference by gender is statistically significant in the regression analysis.

## Perception of Government Economic Performance and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

In the introduction to this chapter a panoramic vision of the debates about the relationship between economic situation and support for democracy was offered. Recently, the argument positing that economic performance at an aggregate level in developed countries has been questioned, offering empirical evidence to determine support for democracy levels. It has even been proposed that perhaps personal economic conditions could have a stronger effect. Dalton (2004:127) emphasizes, however, that, “the relation between economic performance and political support seems tenuous” in the OCDE countries. Power and Jamison (2005) indicate that in Latin America discouraging economic conditions could partially explain the low levels of political trust. While Schwarz-Blum (2008), using LAPOP 2006/2007 data found that contrary to the conclusion of other authors who study advanced industrialized democracies, in Latin America individual evaluation of the national and personal economic conditions do have an effect on support for the political system.




The regression analysis designed to evaluate the effect of economic performance in the five variables of democratic values (support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy, and interpersonal trust) reveals that the perceptions of government economic performance has a statistically positive effect on the legitimacy of political institutions, on the right of public contestation, and on interpersonal trust. Complete data of this regression analysis appear in Table A-17 in Annex IV.




Graph V-9. Impact of Perception of government Economic Performance on Political Legitimacy

Graph V-9 shows a linear relationship between perception of economic performance and political institutional legitimacy: the better the evaluation of government performance, the more political legitimacy. Since previous graphs have showed that a favorable perception of the national and one's personal economic situation produces a more favorable attitude towards government economic performance, it is possible to conclude that a favorable perception of national and personal economic situation contributes to the political legitimacy of institutions.



Graph V-10. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Interpersonal Trust

As what also happens in the case of institutional legitimacy, interpersonal trust increases among those who hold a positive perception of government economic performance. Both cases confirm that a positive evaluation of the government helps consolidate democracy because it solidifies that make a society democratic: institutional legitimacy and trust in others.



Graph V-11. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for the Rights of the Opposition

A positive evaluation of government economic performance also helps strengthen support for the right of opposition. This is another important dimension which helps to determine citizen commitment to democracy. When government economic performance is evaluated as poor, citizens’ opinions could become more authoritarian.

## Conclusions

The central theme of this chapter is the relation between government economic performance and support for stable democracy. Several authors have submitted that economic conditions could partially explain the low levels of political trust in Latin America. The literature on the subject also argues that the level of economic development is less important than economic performance (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), though results from the research are not conclusive.

Economic stabilization is the main accomplishment of the PLD government in the 2004-2008 period. The 2006 survey showed that Dominicans’ perceptions of the country’s economic situation was somewhat positive. In the 2008 survey, the population shows again a relatively positive evaluation of the government’s performance, as indicated by the presented data. For example, in the comparative graph about government performance, the Dominican Republic registers one of the highest approval levels among the surveyed countries.



**PART THREE:**  
**BEYOND**  
**GOVERNANCE**



# Capítulo VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

## Theoretical framework

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>25</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Also, we examine a much broader range of political institutions

## The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

<sup>25</sup> Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

- B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en *nada* la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan *mucho* la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio )
- B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?
- B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano?
- B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?
- B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)?

The items used for creating the “political tolerance” index are the same we used before for creating the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness.

**Table VI-1. Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities**

	Tolerance	
System support (i.e., legitimacy)	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

The theoretical point of view purports to analyze the interrelation between support for the system and tolerance, for which it became necessary to dichotomize both scales into “high” and “low.”<sup>26</sup> Table VI-1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome.

Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such

<sup>26</sup> Each of these scales ranges from 0 to 100; therefore; the middle selected point is 50.



systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type.

## Support for stable democracy

In the Dominican Republic, we find a democracy that has been durable and stable for three decades. The transition happened in 1978 and has remained without interruption until the present. The only deviation from institutional order happened due to the 1994 electoral crisis, when Joaquín Balaguer, under accusation of electoral fraud, was forced to reduce his term from four to two years. This change took place in the context of a steamed constitutional modification needed to surmount the political impasse with an institutional mechanism. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic has not had a military government in over 40 years, albeit the Balaguer terms from 1966 and 1978 had authoritarian characteristics.


The 2006 AmericasBarometer showed that in the theoretical relation table between support for the system and tolerance, 38% of Dominicans placed in the stable democracy box, the third highest percentage among the Latin American countries compared that year. Twenty-three percent placed in the authoritarian stability box, 15 percentage points less than in authoritarian stability. The unstable democracy box registered 23% and the democracy at risk box 16%. The

situation, however, seems to have deteriorated in 2008, according to the AmericasBarometer data.

**Table VI-2. Theoretical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in the Dominican Republic, 2008**

	Tolerance	
System Support	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 29.0%	Authoritarian Stability 31.2%
Low	Unstable Democracy 20.5%	Democratic Breakdown 19.3%

Table VI-2 shows that a higher percentage, 31.2% of those surveyed in 2008, placed in the authoritarian stability box. This does not mean that an authoritarian political regime exists in the Dominican Republic, but that in the political imagination of the population, attitudes of support for the system accompanied by low political tolerance stand out. The percentage in the democracy at risk category also increased slightly, from 16% in 2006 to 19.3% in 2008. Essentially, the data suggest that intolerance has risen in the Dominican Republic because the two boxes that show a percentage increase compared to 2006 are those placing in the category of low tolerance.




Graph VI-1. Support for Stable Democracy

Although support for stable democracy has declined between 2006 and 2008, the Dominican Republic continues to occupy a position among the countries with higher support for stable democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. While six countries register higher support for stable democracy than Dominican Republic (Costa Rica, Belize, Uruguay, Jamaica, Mexico, and Colombia), 14 register less support.


### Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

The different rounds of AmericasBarometer LAPOP interviews have measured the evolution of trust in a series of democratic institutions. This section provides a general comparison of the legitimacy of the group of institutions covered in the 2008 survey. For this, “trust” was measured in each of the key institutions using a 1 to 7 scale, which was transformed into the same 0-100 scale employed throughout this report.



Graph VI-2. Legitimacy of Political Institutions

The level of institutional trust in the Dominican Republic is relatively high. According to the data of Graph VI-12, only the police and political parties average less than 50 points. In the comparison of results from prior years appearing in Graph VI-3, all the institutions scored higher in 2008 than in previous surveys, with exception of the national government and the Catholic Church, which registered a slight decline. Yet both institutions maintain their relatively high level of legitimacy according to public opinion. It must be taken in to account that the 2004 survey was conducted in the beginning of that year, in the midst of an intense economic and institutional crisis, while the surveys from 2006 and 2008 were conducted at a time of higher economic stability. This is a crucial factor that explains why the levels of institutional legitimacy are lower in 2004 than in the other two survey years.



Graph VI-3. Legitimacy of Institutions Compared by Year


Graph VI-4 is based on a group of questions seeking to measure support levels and satisfaction with the democratic system in a general sense. Included are one question about justice, one about institutions in a general sense, one about protection of basic citizen rights, and another about the general opinion of living in the Dominican political system.

**B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en *nada* la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan *mucho* la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)

**B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?

**B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano?

**B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político de la República Dominicana?



Graph VI-4. General Attitudes Toward Institutions and Rights

Averages reveal that in a general sense Dominicans have a high level of respect for political institutions, with an average of 69.1. Perhaps it could be said that the citizenry of the Dominican Republic is somewhat docile insofar as it expresses respect towards political institutions and at the same time does not express a high opinion the state of the protection of basic citizen rights. There is more than a 20 point difference between both aspects.

## Support for Populism


The subject of populism has a long analytical tradition in Latin America. Regimes and political leaders of different ideological orientations have resorted to populist styles and measures to legitimize their power. With the democratic transitions of the 80s it was assumed that populism would disappear from the Latin American political scene. However, since the end of the 90s, a populist current has experienced a resurgence in the Latin American region, particularly with the emergence of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.

The AmericasBarometer uses a battery of questions to understand the populist inclinations of the population. The 2006 survey used five questions, and the 2008 one used a total of nine questions. Some questions are repeated, but the comparison of the results between 2006 and 2008 is made difficult because of the additional questions included in the battery of 2008 and because of changes in the measurement of the answers. This statement is important because in the 2006 survey in which only five questions were directed y toward institutional order were used, such as

Congress and judges, the Dominican Republic shows a low level of populism in the regional comparison. In 2008 however, the Dominican Republic shows the highest level of populism in the regional comparison as is shown in Graph VI-6.

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones...
<b>POP101.</b> Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP102.</b> Cuando el Congreso Nacional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP103.</b> Cuando la Suprema Corte de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP106.</b> Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP107.</b> El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y <b>no</b> a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP109.</b> En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?
<b>POP110.</b> Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP112.</b> El <b>mayor</b> obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
<b>POP113.</b> Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?


There have not been significant political changes in the Dominican Republic that explain the variation from 2006 to 2008; therefore, the reason behind the higher level of populism registered in the Dominican Republic in the 2008 survey seems to be the inclusion of new questions that do not refer specifically to institutional order but rather are more closely connected to ideas such as progress, the people, and good and evil. These questions detect other aspects of populism. For example, among the new questions included in the index to measure populism are the following: In today's world, there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose one of the two. To what extent do you agree or disagree that a battle between good and evil exists? The largest obstacle for our country's progress is the dominant class which takes advantage of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree? Graph VI-4 shows that these two questions are important when codifying the average results by question of the complete populism battery used in the 2008 survey. Nevertheless, the averages of the questions that refer to institutional respect are below 50 points, such as governing without congress, without judges or without political parties. But the populism scale built for the 2008 survey uses the complete battery of nine questions in only one statistical dimension. This is why it is not comparable with the 2006 scale, and thus the different positioning of the Dominican Republic on the scales of 2006 and 2008.



Graph VI-5. Support for Different Aspects of Populism in the Dominican Republic


As set out previously, Graph VI-5 shows that Dominicans are inclined to adhere to democratic institutional norms with regard to public powers and their independence. The averages regarding institutions such as Congress, the judiciary, and political parties are below 50 points. Even the idea that the people should govern directly receives low support, with an average of 34.2 points, despite the fact that the notion that the president should follow the will of the people receives high support, with an average of 78.1 points. Respect for the separation of powers, which is central in the classic definition of democracy, combines itself with a cosmic vision that in the world there is a battle between good and evil and a sense that the dominant class takes advantage of the people. These are the items, which in the 2008 survey position the Dominican Republic with a high average of populism, while in 2006, when these questions were not included, the Dominican Republic occupied a low ranking regarding populism in the Latin American comparison.






Graph VI-6. Support for Populism in Comparative Perspective

The regression analysis, carried out with the purpose of identifying the factors that contribute to populist attitudes, shows that younger, less educated people tend to favor populism. The same occurs regarding residents of larger cities. To view the complete results of this analysis, consult Table A-15 in Annex IV.




Graph VI-7. Support for Populism Regression

It is probable that the younger population feels more attracted towards populism their ties to formal institutions are weaker, as is the case with political parties. The poorest, in their discontent, can also feel more attracted towards populism.



Graph VI-8. Support for Populism by Educational Level


Graph VI-8 shows that people with college education are less inclined than others to support opinions that can serve as a basis for the development of populist leaderships. While those with primary education show an average support for populism of 58.5 points, those with college education registered 49.2. This data reflects the fact that people with more education are more inclined towards secular and institutional stances, which have little relation to support for messianic leaders who generally accompany populist processes.



Graph VI-9. Support for Populism by Age

In regard to age, the relation to populist attitudes is not linear as it is with educational level. Graph VI-9 shows that the transition from youth to adulthood consolidates a slightly less populist cosmopolitanism, while older people showed slightly more acceptance of populist positions. The correlation is statistically significant in the regression analysis after correcting for the effects of other variables in the model, even though a very obvious relation between only two variables appeared in this graph.

Graph VI-10 shows that the average support for a coup d'état to solve problems in the Dominican Republic remains well below 50 points in all the questioned issues. The averages are higher when asked if a coup d'état would be justified to combat crime and corruption. Yet in general, it could be said that Dominican society is far from conceiving that a military government is a solution to their problems.



Graph VI-10. Coup d’Etat Justified by Different Circumstances

## Conclusions

This chapter addressed the issue of the effect of legitimacy and of political tolerance as predictors of democratic stability. In the AmericasBarometer reports, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support,” together with tolerance of political opposition were used jointly to create a kind of warning signal for democracies that could be especially fragile. Theory indicates that both legitimacy and tolerance are necessary to maintain a long-term democratic stability because citizens have faith in their political institutions and be willing to tolerate the rights of others so that the democratic system may function.

The most stable political systems show a high level of system support and political tolerance. This prediction is based on the idea that in non-coercive contexts a high degree of legitimacy is needed for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system and have the freedom to act, a change of system could eventually be inevitable.

In the Dominican Republic, the AmericasBarometer 2006 showed that in the theoretical relation table between system support and tolerance 38% of the surveyed population places in the category of stable democracy (high legitimacy and tolerance) and 23% in the authoritarian stability box. That is, there are 15 percentage points more in stable democracy than in the authoritarian stability box. The unstable democracy box registered 23% and the democracy at risk category 16%.

However, in the 2008 survey this situation appears to have declined. The higher percentage, 31.2%, place in the authoritarian stability category. This does not mean that a politically authoritarian regime exists in the Dominican Republic but that in the population's political imagination attitudes of system support and low political tolerance dominate. Furthermore, the democracy at risk percentage increased slightly from 16% in 2006 to 19.3% in 2008. This data suggest that intolerance has increased in Dominican society because the two boxes showing a percentage rise in regards to 2006 are those placed in the low tolerance section. Although support for stable democracy deteriorated between 2006 and 2008, the Dominican Republic continues to rank among the countries with highest support for stable democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean included in this report.

In general, the level of institutional trust in the Dominican Republic is relatively high. Only the police and the political parties register an average lower than 50 points, and compared to years prior to 2008, all institutions register a higher score, with exception of the national government and the Catholic Church, both of which registered a slight drop. Yet both institutions keep a relatively high level of legitimacy according to the public opinion interviewed for this survey.

The analysis of Dominicans' populist tendencies reveals that they are inclined to adhere to democratic institutional norms of respect towards public powers and their independence. Yet this respect towards public institutionality, essential to the classic definition of democracy, is combined with a cosmovision that in the world there is a battle between good and evil and that the dominant class takes advantage of the people. These two items position the Dominican Republic with a high average of populism in the 2008 survey, while in 2006, when only institutional questions were asked, the Dominican Republic ranked lower in the Latin American comparison concerning populism.



## Capítulo VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties

Elections and political parties are particularly important in the Dominican Republic for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the 60s and 70s were characterized by electoral fraud; in the 80s and 90s, arduous battles were fought to tidy up the Dominican electoral system. These political battles centered on electoral processes, consolidated in Dominican society an ideology in favor of electoral participation, which has translated into high levels of voting, except in congressional and municipal elections, held separately, in which a higher absenteeism is always registered. While the average of absenteeism in presidential elections is about 26%, this percentage rises to 46% in the congressional-municipal elections which have been held on a different date than the presidential elections.

The majority of the population considers that voting in elections is a citizen's right and duty. This valuation is perhaps the reason behind the high level of registered electoral participation in presidential elections to date. The functionality of the commitment to vote is obvious in a democracy. The vote is the mechanism which allows not only to participate in government elections but it also validates these elections. Thus, a democracy must have clear game rules to ensure electoral competitiveness and transparency, which is fundamental to eliminate the possibility of fraud, outcome alteration, or economic or military coercion.

The second reason for the importance of elections and political parties is that the Dominican political system has been characterized by its political parties' dynamism and polarization. During the 60s and 70s, opposition party organized mobilizations against the incumbent government; later, during the democratic period, they dragged their historical antagonisms, more deeply rooted in the people's ideology than within the actual practices of political leaders. After a period of solid party identification with *caudillo* type leaderships incarnated by Joaquín Balaguer, Juan Bosch, and José F. Peña Gómez, political parties have come to co-participate in a vast patronage system which has allowed them to maintain or reconstruct party identification.

The third reason is that organized civil society made electoral rights a very important cause to the point that the pursuit of electoral transparency defined to a high degree the activism of a substantial segment of civil society in the first half of the 90s. A history of fraudulent electoral processes, together with the generalized disorganization of Dominican state institutions created an ideal opportunity to rally the citizenry around the vote. The positive outcome of this is the constant vitality of Dominican politics, even in the midst of crises within two of the three main parties in the system.

Citizen interest in politics and identification with political parties remain relatively high whether due militancy or sympathy. This combination has helped to produce political vitality and mixes well with the requisite operation of an electoral democracy.

In the last two decades, Latin America has been characterized by two contradictory tendencies. One has been the collapse of the party system in several countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina; the other is a major ideological differentiation of parties or political movements after a period of apparent convergence in the 80s and 90s, in the beginning of the democratic transition and neoliberal reforms. An outstanding characteristic of this process has been the emergence of political movements and governments that identify themselves as leftist and include an array of political and programmatic positions that span from Chilean institutional socialism to the populist and cult-like Venezuelan socialism.

The Dominican Republic has been characterized by the opposite tendencies. The party system has remained relatively stable and no important political alternative has emerged that would revindicate socialism. Furthermore, while in the past political parties distinguished themselves in ideological terms, they have now converged, beginning in the 80s, towards a model of patronage and scarce programmatic differences. The PLD, which has governed for eight of the past 12 years, made a strong turn to the right and increased its electoral base with the traditional voters of Joaquín Balaguer.

Furthermore, between 2004 and 2006 a realignment of electoral forces occurred which has consisted of the crumbling electoral support for the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) and a dismantling of its structure and leadership. Most of its leaders and sympathizers have shifted their support the PLD, which has strengthened this party. On its end, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) has kept a significant electoral force despite having lost the elections in 2004, 2006 and 2008. As a result, the Dominican political system has returned to a bipartisanship with the PLD and the PRD as the main political forces.


As in other countries, the combination of an historical legacy in the parties' construction and party battles have contributed to the sustainability of Dominican parties although some have languished because of weaknesses in their leadership and organization. These reasons elucidate the PRSC's substantial decline after Joaquín Balaguer's death the hardship of rebounding after the death of José F. Peña Gómez in 1998, and the effects of Hipólito Mejía's unstable administration (2000-2004). Notwithstanding the party in power, the Dominican experience reveals the political patronage system has served as a basis for government sustainability given the high level of social and economic inequality. The convergence of political parties regarding the public policies they foster has caused party preferences to be articulated largely according topatrimonial criteria. On the other hand, better economic performance has sometimes been rewarded with electoral triumphs, such as in 2006 and 2008 for the PLD, and a worse economic performance with electoral defeats such as in 2004 for the PRD.

## **Electoral Behavior**

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the Dominican Republic registers a relatively high level of electoral participation, as shown in Graph VII-1Seventy-seven and three tenths




percent of those interviewed said that they voted in the last presidential election (since the survey was conducted in March 2008, the last Dominican presidential elections were in 2004). This percentage is higher than the real electoral participation because sometimes voting levels in past elections show distortions for different reasons. These distortions may be a result of social and cultural pressure which drives people to say they voted even if they had not, especially if the elections were held much before the survey. In this regard, we point out that although the survey's reported figures do not match the real participation numbers, this does not indicate that the survey is inadequate or that in general the survey results are incorrect. To find discrepancy within electoral results reported by the survey and those actually cast at the polls is common, especially if much time has elapsed between one activity and the next, as in the case of this survey which asked in 2008 about presidential elections that occurred in 2004.




Graph VII-1. Percentage that Voted in Last Presidential Election, by Country (2004 for D.R.)

Graph VII-2 shows votes cast by party in the 2004 presidential elections., It must be mentioned that the data does not reveal the exact number of votes obtained by each of the candidates. The PLD appears with a higher proportion of the votes, while the PRD and the PRSC appear with a lower proportion. Earlier we explained what happens with this type of information in surveys that inquire into electoral behavior a considerable time from when the elections were held. At

any rate, what the data did determine is the realignment of electoral preferences. Beginning in 2004, the PLD became the majority party and the PRSC ceased to be a majority party.



Graph VII-2. Voting in Presidential Elections, (2004)




Graph VII-3. Voter Ideology by Presidential Candidate in Presidential Elections (2004)


This graph reflects a tendency towards the political right among the sympathizers of the three main parties. On a 0-100 scale, where 0 is left and 100 is right, the PLD voters place more towards the right; yet there is not a great difference among the voters of Fernández and Eduardo

Estrella. The PRD voters show slightly less inclination towards the right, and those who voted for other candidates lean more towards the left, although there was much variation in their ideological preferences.

To examine why some Dominicans voted in the 2004 presidential elections and others did not, a regression analysis was performed. Complete data appear in Table A-19 in Annex IV. However, the description appears in Graph VII-4. The bars show that a negative perception of one's family economic situation significantly increased the likelihood of voting. On the other hand, older and those with a higher educational level were more likely to vote than younger citizens and those with a lower educational level. Region, race, place of residence, wealth, and gender did not have a significant effect on the choice to vote.




Graph VII-4. Participation in Last Presidential Elections Regression (2004)




Graph VII-5. Impact of Family Economy on Electoral Participation

Graph VII-5 shows a linear image of the relationship between the perception of family finances and electoral participation. A negative perception of one’s economic situation translates into a higher level of voting, and we can assume that a strong motivation is the desire to change the government in order bring about a change in one’s personal circumstances.



Graph VII-6. Impact of Age on Electoral Participation

Graph VII-6 shows that despite that electoral participation in the Dominican Republic is relatively high, the population's involvement in electoral processes begins more frequently at age 25 years. It should be clarified, however, that voting age is 18 years old and in the category of 16 to 25 probably many who were not eligible to vote in the 2004 presidential elections appeared, which tends to drop the electoral participation percentage.



Graph VII-7. Impact of Education on Electoral Participation

Finally, Graph VII-7 shows that people with lower and higher educational levels are more likely to vote than citizens with an intermediate level education. The regression analysis, which controls the effects of other variables, shows a statistically significant relation between education and electoral participation.


## Party Sympathy

From the end of the Trujillo dictatorship, political parties have played a central role in Dominican politics, even to the detriment of the development of other social organizations. The strong *caudillo* leaderships imbued with ideological polarity were crucial in the creation of the party system and the growth of party loyalties. Between 1966 and 1986, bipartisanship prevailed under the hegemony of the PRSC and the PRD. From 1986, the PLD added its electoral weight. Each of these three parties was headed by a charismatic and egocentric leader who established the party's ideology and facilitated political affiliations: Balaguer in the PRSC, Peña Gómez in the PRD and Juan Bosch in the PLD.

With this ideological-cultish leadership, these parties became strong and stable political entities which have contributed to sustain the democratic regime that started in 1978. Thus, Dominican democracy rested, until very recently, on a structured party system with strong social support, created around their historical *caudillos*. Though this system and party model has lent stability and dynamism to Dominican politics, it has also slackened the political modernization process. After the disappearance of the *caudillos*, party organizations were unable to democratize themselves, and the new leaders prefer to imitate, more than transform their party's structure.


The PLD has been more effective in accomplishing the transition towards a new leadership, yet even in this party it has been difficult to replace power figures with more democratic party structures. The structure's leadership remains static, and for their triumphs, the party depends upon the leadership of President Leonel Fernández. For the PLD's good fortune, the PRD and PRSC have had major reorganization problems, a fact which has increased the PLD's popularity since 2004. The large scale shift of electoral preference for the PLD has been accompanied by an expansion of the patronage system. Patronage was foreign to this party because Juan Bosch had structured the PLD to be comprised of small circles, with an emphasis on political education and service mystique. Now all parties converge on patronage strategies and their one-person leaderships, successful or not.

As in the 2006 survey, the Dominican Republic heads the list of countries included in the report in the percentage who indicated sympathy for a political party. As Graph VII-8 shows, the Dominican Republic not only heads the list, but finds itself 50% above Guatemala in its level of party sympathy.




Graph VII-8. Percentage that Sympathizes With a Political Party, by Country

Graph VII-9 shows that sympathy levels remain high in the Dominican Republic, and that in spite of a certain decline between 2001 and 2006, they did rally in 2008. This data constitute a sample of one of the sources of stability of the Dominican party system, despite its limitations and transformations.



Graph VII-9. Simpatizantes partidistas en la República Dominicana, 1994-2008




Graph VII-10. Party Sympathizers Regression <sup>27</sup>

To examine the characteristics of party sympathizers in regards to those who do not sympathize, a statistical regression analysis was performed. Graph VI-10 shows that sympathizers tend to have a more favorable opinion of their economic situation, are older and have a higher educational level. There does not appear to be a statistically significant relation between

<sup>27</sup> The category of reference not included by ethnic group is “White”.




sympathy for a party and gender, region, ethnicity, place of residence, or wealth. Complete regression data appears in Table A-20 of Annex IV.




Graph VII-11. Impact of the Perception of Family Economy on Party Sympathy

Although in a clientelistic society like the Dominican Republic, one would expect that the poorer the perception of one’s family finances, the higher the inclination to sympathize with a party in order to derive some of its clientelistic benefits. Graph VII-11 shows the contrary. People who felt more satisfied with their income level expressed more sympathy for a political party, perhaps because having sufficient income gives them the necessary resources to participate in politics.




Graph VII-12. Relationship Between Age and Party Sympathy

Although the percentages of party sympathy do not show a great difference between the different age groups, the regression analysis shows a statistically significant relation. Older people show a higher sympathy level towards the parties. The 56-65 age group show a higher sympathy level towards political parties. This group is the most outstanding in terms of sympathy levels.




Graph VII-13. Relationship Between Education and Party Sympathy

Similar to age, the bars in Graph VII-13 do not show a great difference of percentages of party sympathizers among the three educational levels. Yet the statistical regression analysis did show a significant relation between educational level and party sympathy.



Graph VII-14. Distribution of Sympathizers by Party


As in the 2006 survey, the PLD maintains in 2008 the majority of the electoral preference with 47.4%. The second largest group comprises persons who have no party preference, the so-called independents, followed by those who favor the PRD. The percentages of PRSC sympathizers and other minority parties is very low.



Graph VII-15. Attitudes Regarding Presidential Reelection


Graph VII-15 shows that opinions concerning presidential terms of office is a divisive issue Dominican society: 37.5% disagrees with unlimited terms; 35.1% agrees with the current system of only one reelection period; and, 27.4% prefers unlimited terms of office.. In short, slightly more than two-thirds of the population reject unlimited presidential terms of office or accepts reelection for only one additional term.

In Graph VII-16, the highest scores indicate agreement with the phrase “democracy can exist without parties” and the lowest shows disagreement. The Dominican Republic ranks among the countries that register more disagreement with the idea that there can be democracy without parties.




Graph VII-16. There Can Be Democracy Without Political Parties, by Country

Older people express more disagreement with the idea that democracy can without parties, and the relation between the variables is statistically significant. This could be the result of more strongly held political ideas and party affinity in the older generations. To wit, in the 1960s and 70s Dominican politics was characterized by strong party polarization based on ideological differences and focus on *caudillo* figures.




Graph VII-17. There Can Be Democracy Without Political Parties, by Age



Graph VII-18. There Can Be Democracy Without Political Parties, by Party Sympathy

Independents and sympathizers of the PRSC and other minority parties are more prone to expressing that there can be democracy without political parties. The reason behind this position can vary among these groups. In reformism there is a long history of *caudillismo* and personalism in the management of politics, with the party positioned in a secondary place. In the


case of the independents and sympathizers with minority parties, this position could be due to the preponderance of leftist groups that question the existing party system and also to the weight of the electoral segments who are dissatisfied with the political system, and concretely to the parties that define themselves as independents.



Graph VII-19. Ideology Scale (Left to Right) by Country

In the 2006 and 2008 LAPOP surveys, the Dominican Republic appears in first place on the right of the ideology scale. Data in Graph VII-19 are averages on a 0-100 scale where 0 is left and 100 is right. The higher the average, the stronger the population’s tendency to define itself as rightist.


With the purpose of exploring the differences between sympathizers of the various parties in the ideological self-identification scale, a multinomial logit statistical analysis was performed, applicable to variables with multiple categories such as political party affiliation, and a significant ideological difference was found. There are also differences due to educational level, gender, and perception of one’s family economic situation.



Graph VII-20. Ideology by Sympathizers of Each Party


The bars show that the average on the ideological scale is higher for PLD sympathizers. This means that these sympathizers define themselves as more to the right than the sympathizers of any other party and than the independents. Although in all groups an identification with the right prevails (all percentages are above 50 points), the group that least identified with the right was the one that sympathizes with minority parties because these parties tend to lean left. At any rate, as seen in the previous graph, less than 1% of those surveyed said that they favored a minority party; therefore, this is not an electorally significant group. Nonetheless, the independents' segment, which is numerically substantial, also registers a weaker tendency towards defining itself as rightist. In the Dominican Republic, unlike in other Latin American countries, a leftist electoral option has not emerged; thus, this data may indicate the potential among the independents to build an alternative party with a stronger orientation towards the left.






Graph VII-21. Educational Level by Sympathizers of Each Party

Graph VII-21 shows that PRSC sympathizers are less educated than the sympathizers of other parties, who register the highest average of education. It seems that in the Dominican Republic the more highly educated sympathizers of parties find their comfort zones in smaller party organizations. Among the two main parties, the sympathizers of the PRD have a slightly higher average of educational level than those from the PLD. This reflects the massification of the PLD, since in the past this was a small party organization of well-educated politicians.



Graph VII-22. Sympathizer Gender for Each Party

Graph VI-22 indicates that more men than women tend to sympathize with the PRD or minority parties. Women tend to sympathize more with the PLD or to be independents. Regarding the PRSC, there is no difference in sympathy due to gender.



Graph VII-23. Sympathizer Perception of Family Economy of Each Party

Graph VII-23 shows that PRD sympathizers and independents have a more negative perception of their family financial situation than PLD sympathizers have.

## Attitudes concerning Political Parties

People's opinions concerning the role of political parties are helpful in understanding what citizens expect from the parties and how they are evaluated. We can assume that the higher the support for parties, the more stable the democratic system. In any event, we know that parties are generally evaluated poorly and register low scores in trust and transparency within the institutional framework of contemporary democracies.

With the goal of understanding the population's attitudes concerning political parties, a 0-100 point scale of support for the parties was developed based on the three questions presented in the box below. The emphasis has been on comprehending to what degree respondents think the parties represent voters, how much corruption there is within the parties, and if the parties listen to the people. Higher values on this scale mean more support for the political parties. Question EPP2 was codified in a manner that higher values mean less corruption in the parties.


### Escala de 1-7, donde 1 significa nada y 7 significa mucho

**EPP1.** Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos dominicanos representan bien a sus votantes?

**EPP2.** ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos dominicanos?


**EPP3.** ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?

Graph VII-24 shows that respondents offer an average evaluation of 49.8 points when asked if political parties represent their voters well. Nevertheless, the average is low, 28.5 points, when questioned as to whether there is no corruption in political parties. Also, the average was relatively low when citizens were asked if the parties listen to the common folk, such as the respondents themselves. This data reflect that the Dominican population finds that the parties do not represent the interests of their voters very well, tend to be corrupt, and do not listen much to the common folk.



Graph VII-24. Perceptions of Dominican Political Parties (epp1, epp2, and epp3)

On the comparative scale which agglutinates the three questions above, the averages for all countries are below 50 points. This means that support for political parties in the entire Latin American region is not particularly enthusiastic. Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with the highest averages, which projects a less negative evaluation of the parties.



Graph VII-25. Scale of Support for Political Parties by Country

## Conclusions

As indicated in the chapter’s introduction, elections and political parties are particularly important in the Dominican Republic. As a result, the level of electoral participation is relatively high, although it dropped in the last presidential elections and has never been high in mid-term congressional-municipal. To examine why some voted in the 2004 presidential election and others did not, a regression analysis was conducted. Data showed that the negative perception of personal economic situation may have caused voters to stay home. On the other hand, older and more educated people were more inclined to vote than younger and less educated citizens.. Neither region, race, place of residence, wealth, nor gender had a statistically significant effect on the possibility of voting.

As in the 2006 survey, the Dominican Republic heads the list of countries included in the report in the category who favored a political party, with 70% of sympathizers and more than 50% above Guatemala, which registered the lowest level of party sympathy. This suggests that despite the mistrust and criticisms of the parties, Dominicans still have ties to these organizations. This

is the combined result of an historical legacy with strong party affinities, but also, the access to clientelist benefits that parties provide. The statistical analysis also revealed that party sympathizers have a more favorable opinion of their economic situation, are older and are more educated. There is no statistically significant relation between sympathy for a party and gender, region, ethnicity, place of residence or wealth.

With regard to specific party sympathies, as in the 2006 survey, in 2008 the PLD retained the majority of electoral preferences with an average of 47.4%; the second largest group is of citizens who do not sympathize with with any political party (the so-called independents), followed by sympathizers of the PRD, the PRSC, and other minority parties. Sympathy for the PRSC and other minority parties is very low. The drop in sympathy of the PRSC has returned the Dominican Republic to bipartisanship, with the PLD and the PRD now as its main parties.

On the ideological scale from left to right, the Dominican Republic appears again in first place with an inclination towards the right. When party sympathizer characteristics are analyzed, the PLD supporters show the highest levels of self-identification with the right. Regarding educational characteristics, if we take into consideration the two main parties, PRD sympathizers have a slightly higher educational level than the PLD sympathizers. This reflects the massification of the PLD, since in the past this was a small party organization of highly educated politicians. Concerning gender, men tend to sympathize more with the PRD or minority parties, while women tend to sympathize for the PLD.

On the comparative scale of support for political parties, the averages for all countries are below 50 points, which suggests that party support in the entire Latin American region is not particularly high. Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic ranks among the highest averages, projecting a less negative evaluation of the parties. Regarding presidential terms of office, the survey registers a divided opinion, but more than two-thirds of the electorate prefers that there be no reelection or that the current system of one reelection remain.

## Capítulo VIII. Gender and Migration

### Gender

Starting in the mid 1970's, the Dominican Republic has experienced political and economic transformation processes which have favored the attitudes and social practices in gender relations. The country has reached higher levels of industrialization, urbanization, and integration to the world economy through migration, tourism, commerce, and communications. A central factor in this nation's progress was its transition to democracy in 1978.

Beginning in the 1980's, social pressure to expand citizen rights and improve the quality of democracy increased significantly with the emergence of diverse civil society organizations and NGOs. With regard to Dominican women, efforts to educate and assist them, especially with the help of international financial aid, have been noteworthy; and in general for the 90s, the issue of gender and the incorporation of women into politics became key components of various Dominican institutions.


It is worthwhile then to ask: How much has Dominican society changed in the last decades with regard to gender in terms of social equality and women's participation in politics? One way to address these questions is through public opinion polls to have an idea of how citizens, both women and men, regard women's participation.

Data from the surveys conducted over a decade in the Dominican Republic show that important changes in public opinion regarding gender rights and acceptance of women's equality in the domestic and public spheres. Several factors have contributed to this phenomenon, among them, the insertion of women into the educational system and labor market, as also gender education labor performed by women's organizations and media outlets.

This favorable change of opinion toward increased participation of women in politics has been accompanied by reforms in Dominican legislation that favor such participation. For example, the female electoral quota approval in 1997 established a minimum of 25% for female deputy and municipal officer candidacies. Afterwards, in 2000, the quota increased to 33%. This minimum of 33% has still not been reached at the congressional level, nor at the municipal level; however, the quota has served to keep the issue of women's political representation on the public agenda.

Despite these changes, in the regional comparison, the Dominican Republic indicates relatively low support level for women as political leaders, according to what Graph VIII-1 reveals by using the following question:

**VB50.** En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?  
 (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo



Graph VIII-1. Support for Women as Political Leaders

In Graph VIII-1, the scale was constructed in such a way that the lower averages reflect higher agreement with the idea that men are better leaders than women. The graph's results are especially worrisome for the Dominican Republic because they suggest that, despite the efforts undertaken to modify gender attitudes and promote women's political integration, the idea that women are good leaders has gained little ground.

The following questions were used to make the two subsequent graphs. In Graph VIII-2 each question appears as an independent variable, and in Graph VIII-3 the two questions are used to produce a scale.



**DOMW6.** ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?

**DOMW7.** ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con qué la mujer participe más en la política?

**W8.** Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer?

- (1) Un hombre
- (2) Una mujer
- (3) LE DA IGUAL (**NO LEER**)
- (4) NS/NR

**DOMW9.** ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar?


- (1) Mayor
- (2) Menor
- (3) IGUAL (**NO LEER**)
- (8) NS/NR

**W10.** Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: **[Leer]**


- (1) No es conveniente que participe
- (2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan
- (3) Debe participar igual que el hombre
- (4) NS/NR

Graph VIII-2 shows the percentage of those who disagreed with the following ideas: that politics is the realm of women; agreement with the idea that women should participate more in politics; that women should participate in politics as much as men; equal trust in female and male political candidacies; and the opinión that women have the same capability to govern as men. Statistical scales were built for each of these items. In other words, the graph summarizes public opinion positions in response to a battery of questions seeking to determine the level of public opinion support for women's participation in politics.

As graphically observed in VIII-2, between 1994 and 2001, there is a remarkable change in favor of women's political participation; yet between 2004 and 2008, support levels have stabilized, declined or appear unstable. After 2001, women have lost ground inspiring the trust men inspire as candidates, and with respect to 2006, a lower percentage of the surveyed population disagrees with the idea that politics is the realm of men. The other variables show less variability. The drop in support for women's participation in politics could be the combined effect of the women's movement decline and the abandonment of an explicit and effective agenda that favors women on behalf of the political parties and the State.




Graph VIII-2. Scale Components of Support for Women in Politics, by Year



Graph VIII-3. Scale of Support for Women in Politics, by Gender

Graph VIII-3 condenses the five questions of Graph VIII-2 on a scale and presents the surveyed population opinions by gender and in total. Women are more inclined than men to support women’s participation in politics. Like the previous graph, the ascent in favorable opinion was


consistent from 1994 to 2001, and variable in subsequent years. In 2004, opinions in favor of women’s participation in politics declined; in 2006 they recovered, and declined again in 2008.




Graph VIII-4. Support for Women to Work, by Gender

Graph VIII-4 shows that a basic question to measure opinions concerning gender equality in accessing the labor market revealed that a higher proportion of men (56.2%) vs. women (43.7%) consider that women should work outside the home only when a man’s income is insufficient to support the family. This is an idea which reveals patriarchal notions of job distribution by salaried and domestic work.

Graph VIII-5 shows that the majority of the Dominican population considers that women and men should jointly make the important decisions concerning the home, but this datum reaches more than 50% because of the weight of women’s opinion as shown in Graph VIII-6. While 61.9% of women expressed that opinion, only 38.1% of men share it with them.




Graph VIII-5. Who Makes the Decisions at Home




Graph VIII-6. Who Should Make Decisions at Home, by Gender

To determine the factors that influenced the Dominican population’s opinion concerning women’s political participation, a regression analysis was conducted with the scale of support for participation shown in Graph VIII-7. As one can observe in the horizontal bars, people with a higher educational level and wealth, and women, tend to show more support for women’s participation in politics. It was also observed that support for gender equality at home and at work is positively related with support for public contestation. Complete data of the regression analysis appear in Table A-21 in Annex IV.




Graph VIII-7. Scale of Support for Women in Politics Regression



Graph VIII-8. Wealth and Support for Women in Politics


Graph VIII-8 shows the almost linear relationship between level of wealth and support for women's political participation. Data indicate that there is more support for this participation between middle and high class persons than among the poor.




Graph VIII-9. Gender and Support for Women in Politics

Average support for women's political participation among men is lower than support among women. In the previously presented scale of support, men register an average of 2.9 points and women of 3.4 points.

Graph VIII-10 shows that, as what happened with wealth, a higher educational level also produces a higher support average for women's political participation. From this we can conclude that as long as educational levels remain relatively low in the Dominican Republic, it will be difficult to continue the advancement of full equality of women in the political sphere.




Graph VIII-10. Education and Support for Women in Politics



Graph VIII-11. Support for Women to Work and Support for Women in Politics

Graph VIII-11 shows that the average support for women’s participation in politics is lower among people who believe that women should work only if a man’s income is insufficient. As previously indicated, a statistically significant relation exists between believing that women should work only when a man’s income falls short and less support for women to participate in politics.




Graph VIII-12. Women at Home and Support for Women in Politics

Similar to the previous graph, Graph VIII-12 shows that people who think that women and men should make joint decisions show a higher average of support for women’s participation in politics. Both aspects are expressions of a more egalitarian gender ideology.


To learn the opinions regarding the construction of reproductive rights, a query was included in the questionnaire concerning the position the surveyed held about pregnancy interruption. The query included two possible answers: one was approval in cases of health risks, rape, and incest; the other, disapproval under any circumstance.

This is a controversial subject that has for the first time been debated publicly in the Dominican Republic in the last two years. The debate has been dominated by intense opposition of various churches to allowing a pregnancy to be interrupted even in exceptional cases. It is noteworthy that approximately two-thirds of those surveyed agree with interruption in those cases. We present her some socio-demographic variables to understand the characteristics of those who adopt these different positions.






Graph VIII-13. Pregnancy Interruption



Graph VIII-14. Pregnancy Interruption, by Gender


There is no significant difference registered in the support for pregnancy interruption among men and women, with percentages of 34.8 and 33.6 respectively.




Graph VIII-15. Pregnancy Interruption, by Age

Graph VIII-15 shows that people in the highest age group are the ones who least support pregnancy interruption when the mother has health problems, was raped or in the case of incest. The difference between the 16-25 year olds and the 66+ years old was almost 20%.

The difference in support levels is significant in the case of educational level. Those with a lower educational level tend to support pregnancy interruption much less in determined situations than those with secondary and college education.



Graph VIII-16. Pregnancy Interruption, by Educational Level




Graph VIII-17. Pregnancy Interruption, by Religion

The highest percentage of support for pregnancy interruption is registered by those who profess no religion. The highest difference is registered among those who do not belong to any religion, and the Evangelicals and Pentecostals. Among members of religious denominations, support is slightly higher among Catholics.

## Migration


Dominican society receives and emits migrants. It receives a considerable influx of Haitians, and many Dominicans immigrate abroad, especially to the United States and Europe.

The LAPOP survey formulated two questions concerning to Haitian migration. One refers to the agreement or disagreement with the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic being Dominican citizens, and the other to the agreement or disagreement with the Dominican government granting work permits to undocumented Haitians who live in the Dominican Republic. On the 0-100 scale, the average approval for the first question is of 47.2, and the second of 38.5 points. These averages are very similar to those registered in the 2006 survey, of 43.4 and 40.9 points respectively.




Graph VIII-18. Attitudes Regarding the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

Support for children of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic to become citizens increases with the education level of the surveyed: the more education, the higher the support.




Graph VIII-19. Support for Haitians' Children born in the Dominican Republic to be Citizens, by Education




Graph VIII-20. Support for Haitians to Receive Work Permits in the Dominican Republic

Support for granting work permits to Haitians who work in the Dominican Republic increases slightly among respondents with a higher educational level.




Graph VIII-21. Support for Haitians' Children born in the Dominican Republic be Citizens, by Wealth

Similar to the education level effect, support for children of Haitian parents born in the Dominican Republic to become citizens increases in a statistically significant manner, though not in a perfect linear relation, among people with more wealth, particularly in the wealthiest group.




Graph VIII-22. Support for Haitians to Receive Work Permits in the Dominican Republic, by Wealth

Support for the Dominican government to grant work permissions to undocumented Haitians in the Dominican Republic increases with wealth, although the relation is not completely linear.



Graph VIII-23. Support for Haitians' Children born in the Dominican Republic to Obtain Citizenship, by Racial Identification


Graph VIII-23 shows that the lowest support for the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic to obtain citizenship is registered among people who defined themselves as white, with similar averages among those who identified themselves as native Indian, black or mulatto.



Graph VIII-24. Support for Haitians Working in the Dominican Republic to Obtain Permits, by Racial Identification


Support for granting work permits to undocumented Haitians in the Dominican Republic by racial identity is lower among people who identify themselves as white or of another racial category not included in the survey.





Graph VIII-25. Percentage of Dominicans with Relatives Who Lived in Their Home and Now Reside Abroad


Almost 25% of those interviewed said that they have relatives who used to live in their homes and are now residing abroad, mostly in the United States. This shows the dimensions of Dominican overseas migration.



Graph VIII-26. Percentage of Dominicans Who Receive Remittances from Relatives Who Lived in Their Homes and Now Reside Abroad


Graph VIII-26 shows that around half of those surveyed with relatives who used to live in their home and now reside abroad, receive remittances. This could be taken as an indicator of the importance of the link between migration, remittances, and family budgets.

A fourth of the surveyed Dominican population indicated their intentions to live or work in another country in the next three years. The question is asked with regard to a specific timeframe in order to get a more concrete answer than a simple wish to immigrate. Even with that specification, a significant percentage expressed their intentions to immigrate.




Graph VIII-27. Percentage Who Intend to Live or Work in Another Country

The Dominican Republic registers one of the highest averages of support for the Free Trade Agreement, as shown in Graph VIII-28. This result is in accordance with the characteristics of a very open economy, closely linked to the United States. In fact, the Dominican Republic was probably one of the few countries in Latin America where protests against the free trade agreement with the United States and Central America (DR-CAFTA) never took place.



Graph VIII-28. Free Trade Agreements Help Improve the Economy



Graph VIII-29. Satisfaction with Life

Despite the express wish to immigrate, a high percentage of the Dominican population said that they feel satisfied with their lives. Only 9.4% said that they feel very unsatisfied or somewhat unsatisfied. It seems that a deep level of dissatisfaction is not the drive behind migration but rather the expectation of the financial advantages foreseen in other countries.

## Conclusions

As indicated in the introduction, since the mid-70s important changes have transpired in the Dominican Republic which favor the modification of attitudes and social practices in gender relations. The country reached higher levels of industrialization, urbanization, and integration to the world's economy through migration, tourism, commerce, and communications. Furthermore, 1978 saw its democratic transition effected.

Furthermore, since the 80s, social pressure to extend citizen rights and improve the quality level of democracy's democracy increased significantly with the emergence of various civil society organizations and NGO's. Regarding the status of women, the work performed regarding education and assistance, especially with the help of international financial aid, has been noteworthy; and in general for the 90s, the issue of gender and women's incorporation into politics became key components of diverse Dominican institutional programs.

Data from surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic over a decade show that important changes have taken place in public opinion with regards to gender rights and acceptance of women's equality in the domestic and political spheres. Several factors account for this phenomenon, among them, the gender education education imparted by various women's organizations and by the media.

It is discouraging to see that despite the efforts to modify attitudes toward gender, and the changes in opinion that have occurred, to the idea that women are good political leaders is still poorly received. As observed in the graphs, between 1994 and 2001, there was a noticeable change in favor of women's political participation; yet between 2004 and 2008, support levels have either stabilized, declined or have appeared unsteady. After 2001, women have lost ground trying to inspire the same trust that male candidates hold, and with regard to 2006, a lower percentage of the surveyed population disagrees with the idea that politics is a man's realm. The other three variables show less variability. People with a higher educational level and more wealth tend to support more the idea of women in politics, just as women do. It is also observed that support for gender equality at home and at work is positively related to support for political participation.

Abortion, which has been publicly debated, is amply opposed by various religious denominations that do not sanction interruption even in cases of rape, incest, or when the mother's life is in danger. What is noteworthy is that about one third of those surveyed agreed with the interruption in these cases. The most significant differences of opinion appear with regards to education and

age: those with more education and lower age tended to support abortion more in the indicated cases.

The averages of acceptance for Haitians who work in Dominican territory to receive a work permit and that children of Haitians who are born in the Dominican Republic receive citizenship are relatively high given the strong controversy surrounding the subject. Acceptance is higher among people with higher educational levels and wealth.

Finally, about 25% of surveyed Dominicans reported having relatives residing abroad; many of them receive remittances from these relatives. Another 25% expressed an intentions to live or work abroad in the next three years. Nevertheless, despite that inclination to immigrate, only a minority said that they feel only somewhat or very unsatisfied with their lives.



## Apéndice I. Descripción técnica de la muestra

### 1. POBLACIÓN

La Población objeto para este estudio está constituida por la población civil no institucional residentes en el país de 18 años o más en pleno ejercicio de sus facultades físicas y legales.

### 2. UNIVERSO

El Universo de la encuesta contemplará una cobertura nacional, 32 Provincias representadas en 225 Municipios que conforman las cuatro regiones en que se divide geográficamente el país: I Metropolitana, II Norte, III Este y IV Sur, y por demarcación urbana y rural.

### 3. MARCO MUESTRAL

El marco de muestreo está constituido por el inventario cartoGraph y el listado de viviendas por zona urbana y rural, obtenidos de la información del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda de 2002.

El país está organizado de la siguiente manera:

#### DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO ADMINISTRATIVA

- **Región:** Es una división geográfica operativa, que divide al país en cuatro áreas con el criterio de proximidad.
- **Provincia:** Es la delimitación más grande de la división Política-administrativa de la República Dominicana, la misma está constituida por municipios o distrito municipales.
- **Municipio o Distrito Municipal:** Es la delimitación constituida por Secciones.
- **Sección:** Es la delimitación que está formada por barrios si es en zona urbana, y por parajes en la zona rural. Esta división clasifica la zona de residencia en urbano-rural.
- **Barrio/Paraje:** Es la delimitación más pequeña de la división Política-administrativa, cuando es urbano ésta delimitación recibe el nombre de barrio, cuando es rural recibe el nombre de paraje.

División Política-administrativa		
REGIÓN	PROVINCIA	MUNICIPIO / DISTRITO MUNICIPAL
Metro	2	9
Norte	14	105
Este	6	32
Sur	10	79
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>225</b>

## DIVISIÓN CENSAL

- **Polígonos:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de diez (10) áreas de supervisión.
- **Áreas de Supervisión Censal (ASC):** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de cinco (5) segmentos censales.
- **Segmentos Censales:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo. Es la delimitación más pequeña de la División Censal, contiene de 12 a 24 hogares en la zona rural y de 25 a 35 hogares en la zona urbana.

## 4. UNIDADES DE OBSERVACIÓN-UNIDAD FINAL DE SELECCIÓN

La **unidad final de observación** es el hogar y la persona debe pertenecer a un solo hogar. A su vez, todo hogar habita una vivienda que puede ser compartida con otros hogares. La vivienda es una unidad fácil de identificar en el terreno, con cierta permanencia en el tiempo, por lo que será considerada como la **unidad final de selección**, identificada en un segmento censal.

## 5. TAMAÑO DE LA MUESTRA

El tamaño de la muestra es de 1507 entrevistas efectivas a nivel nacional, distribuidas por regiones y áreas.

## 6. ESTRATIFICACIÓN

La primera estratificación consiste en la división del país en cuatro (4) Regiones, a saber; I Región Metropolitana, II Región Norte, III Región Este, IV Región Sur.



La segunda estratificación consistió en dividir la población entre demarcación urbana y rural, utilizando para ello el criterio establecido por la Oficina Nacional de Estadística (ONE) en el Censo Nacional de Población y Familia del año 2002. La región Metropolitana será considerada con demarcación Urbana en su totalidad.

## 7. MÉTODO DE MUESTREO

El diseño de muestreo es probabilística hasta la selección de la vivienda, estratificado, y polietápico por Conglomerados, con selección aleatoria de unidades en cada etapa.

Probabilístico: cada elemento de la población bajo estudio tiene una probabilidad conocida, y diferente de cero, de ser seleccionado en la muestra.

Estratificado: las unidades de observación se agrupan con base a características similares, por Regiones (I-IV) y por áreas (urbano y rural).

Polietápico por Conglomerados: las unidades de observación se seleccionan a través de las siguientes etapas.

Definiciones:

**Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM)**: Municipios

**Unidades Secundarias de Muestreo (USM)**: Áreas de Supervisión Censal que comprenden alrededor de 160 viviendas en promedio.

**Unidades Terciarias de Muestreo (UTM)**: Segmentos Censales que en general comprenden entre 25 a 35 viviendas en las áreas urbanas y de 12 a 24 en las áreas rurales, en los casos en que la cantidad de viviendas sea menor a 8 se formarán grupos de Segmentos Censales conformados por un conjunto de viviendas no menor a 8 en el área urbana y no menor a 12 en las áreas rurales.

**Unidades Finales de Selección (UFS)**: Conglomerados de tamaño 6 a 8 en el área urbana y de 10 a 12 en el área rural.

**Unidad Final de Observación**: Son las viviendas y dentro de estas, el hogar.

Vivienda: Se define como vivienda, todo local o recinto estructuralmente separado e independiente que ha sido construido, hecho o convertido para fines de alojamiento permanente o temporal de personas, así como cualquier clase de albergue fijo o móvil, ocupado como lugar de alojamiento a la fecha de un censo o una encuesta.

**Comentario:** La vivienda puede estar construida por un conjunto de cuartos o un cuarto, apartamento o casa destinada a alojar a un grupo de personas o a una sola persona.

Hogar censal: Es la unidad formada por personas o grupos de persona, con o sin vínculos familiares; que comparten la misma vivienda y los mismos servicios y mantienen un presupuesto común para comer. Pueden ocupar toda la vivienda o parte de la misma.

Familia: Grupo de personas emparentadas entre sí o que viven juntas.

**Unidad Final de Estudio:** En cada unidad de vivienda de estos conglomerados se seleccionará solamente un hogar como Unidad de Observación; finalmente en cada hogar visitado se seleccionará para entrevistar **a uno y sólo un adulto** en edad de votar. La selección del informante específico a entrevistar corresponde al entrevistador, quien tiene como única limitación el cumplimiento de la cuota asignada.

Este diseño permite proveer estimaciones confiables para las principales variables y características socio-demográficas consideradas en el estudio, para los siguientes grupos:

- nivel nacional para la población de referencia
- por región geográfica (I-IV)
- por área urbano y rural.

## 8. NIVELES DE CONFIANZA Y MARGENES DE ERROR.

Para una muestra de 1500 el nivel de confianza previsto para toda la muestra nacional fue del 95% ( $Z_{.95} = 1.965$ ), con un margen de error de  $\pm 2.5$ , asumiendo una proporción 50/50 ( $P = 50$ ,  $Q = 1 - P$ ) para variables dicotómicas, en el peor de los casos.

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n}}$$

Donde

$E$  = Intervalo de error probable

$P$  = Porcentaje de población con un atributo dado del 50%.

$Q$  =  $(1 - P)$  Porcentaje de población sin el atributo considerado en  $P, Q = 50\%$

$Z$  = Valor de la distribución normal. Para un nivel de confianza del 95%, este valor es 1.965.

$n$  = *Tamaño de muestra.*

El error cometido a nivel nacional es 2.54%, esto es considerando un muestreo aleatorio simple; como este es un diseño polietápico por conglomerado, debemos considerar el efecto del diseño (*DEF*)<sup>28</sup>.

= Efecto de diseño. Relación de varianzas del diseño de muestras utilizado por conglomerados, respecto a un muestreo simple aleatorio.

El *DEF* ha sido estimado por estudios similares realizados el año 2005, el cual varía entre 1.5 y 2.1, dependiendo de la región y la demarcación.

El error cometido a nivel nacional considerando el efecto del diseño promedio (1.8), es de 3.40%.

Estimaciones de *DEF* según demarcación y regiones:

Demarcación	DEF ESTIMADO	Regiones	DEF ESTIMADO
Urbano	1.55	I. Metro	1.6
Rural	2.06	II. Norte	1.75
Total Nacional	1.8	III. Este	1.5
		IV. Sur	1.5

El error cometido por región y por demarcación se muestra en la siguiente Table

Distribución de la Muestra por Región , por Demarcación y Margen de Error			
Regiones	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
I. Metro	458	4.59	5.81
II. Norte	578	4.09	5.41
III. Este	202	6.91	8.47
IV. Sur	262	6.07	7.43

<sup>28</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, Polibio Córdova; “Auditoria de la Democracia Ecuador 2004” pag184.

Demarcación	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
Urbana	1050	3.03	3.77
Rural	450	4.63	6.65
Total Nacional	1500	2.53	3.40

## 9. AJUSTE POR NO COBERTURA

Para asegurar la eficiencia, suficiencia y precisión de la muestra se adoptó un sistema de muestreo con ajuste por no cobertura, el cual garantiza la ejecución de la muestra con los tamaños estimados como mínimos dentro de los niveles de confianza y de error máximo permisible. El método es posible por el conocimiento que se tiene de la “No cobertura” observada en estudios similares.

Este ajuste consiste en aplicar a los tamaños de la muestra estimados para cada estrato, dominio un factor de no cobertura ( $t$ ), con el cual se calcula el tamaño operativo final de selección ( $n^*$ )<sup>29</sup> dado por:

$t$  = tasa de no entrevista. Esta tasa considera situaciones de no cobertura (no entrevista, rechazos, viviendas desocupadas, ausencia de adulto, o imposibilidad de entrevistarlo, entre otros eventos). Según la experiencia de Gallup República Dominicana en estudios similares, la tasa promedio de no entrevista es de 0.22.

De esta manera entonces, el tamaño final de la muestra será se 1830 unidades.

<sup>29</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, Polibio Córdova; “Auditoria de la Democracia Ecuador 2004” pag. 186.

## 10. CALCULOS DE TAMAÑOS POR REGIÓN, POR ESTRATOS Y # DE UPMs

El Diseño de la muestra consideró asignación de unidades de selección para las 32 provincias del país, si bien la muestra no es suficiente para representar a la provincia respectiva, pero sí a las 4 regiones.

La cantidad de UPM a seleccionar será de 67. En la primera etapa de selección el número de Municipios (UPM) a seleccionar será de 1 Municipio por cada 25.000 viviendas por Región; la Región Metropolitana está formada por 9 municipios, todos serán considerados en la muestra. Las 58 Municipios faltantes se seleccionaron mediante muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

Una vez seleccionados los Municipios se determinó la población urbana y rural para la asignación de tamaños con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño, para la selección de las Áreas de Supervisión Censal (USM). La Región Metropolitana se consideró urbana en su totalidad. Para la selección de las USM, se utilizó un muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

De cada Área de Supervisión Censal (USM), se seleccionaron 2 Segmentos Censales (UTM), y de cada Segmento se seleccionará 1 conglomerado de tamaño 6 a 8 en la zona urbana y de 10 a 12 en la zona rural.

La distribución de las UPM, USM y UTM fue la siguiente:

REGIÓN	# UPM	# USM AREAS URBANAS	# USM AREAS RURAL	# USM AREAS TOTAL	# UTM SEGMENTOS URBANOS	# UTM SEGMENTOS RURALES	# UTM SEGMENTOS TOTAL
Metro	9	44	0	44	88	0	88
Norte	31	27	15	42	53	27	80
Este	11	12	4	16	24	8	32
Sur	16	12	7	19	24	14	38
TOTAL	67	91	26	117	189	49	238

En total la muestra esta constituida por 238 puntos de muestra: 189 urbanas y 49 rurales distribuidas en 225 Municipios de las 32 Provincias.

**UNIVERSO, POBLACION TOTAL DE VIVIENDA, POR REGIONES (METRO, NORTE, ESTE Y SUR) Y POR DEMARCACION (RURAL/URBANA)**

<b>POBLACIÓN DE VIVIENDA , REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA SEGÚN CENSO 2002</b>					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	1.519.247	669.381	453.016	196.601	200.249
Rural	666.059		388.465	96.951	180.643
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.185.306</b>	<b>669.381</b>	<b>841.481</b>	<b>293.552</b>	<b>380.892</b>

<b>Distribución Porcentual</b>					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	69,5%	100,0%	53,8%	67,0%	52,6%
Rural	30,5%	0,0%	46,2%	33,0%	47,4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>

**11. EXIGENCIAS DEL ESTUDIO**

- Cumplimiento de Cuota según Censo por Región de Género y Edad.

RANGO EDAD	POBLACIÓN		HOMBRES		MUJERES	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
18-29	1808883	35,1%	886160	34,9%	922723	35,3%
30-54	2424250	47,0%	1200802	47,3%	1223448	46,8%
>55	921602	17,9%	453789	17,9%	467813	17,9%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5154735</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>2540751</b>	<b>49,3%</b>	<b>2613984</b>	<b>50,7%</b>

- Mínimo 3 visitas, en caso de no encontrar al informante.
- 100% de Supervisión en Campo.
- 30% de Reentrevista.
- El error máximo permitido en la digitación es de 1/1000.

**12. DETALLES DEL DISEÑO**

Para la determinación de las fracciones de muestreo (f) se deberán considerar las distintas etapas de selección.

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

$f_i$  = Fracción de muestreo de la etapa  $i$

$n_i$  = Tamaño de muestra para etapa  $i$

$N_i$  = Total de viviendas en etapa  $i$

Para cada etapa de etapa de selección la fracción resultante será:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (etapas 1,2,3 y 4)}$$

Donde:

$f_1$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 1: UPM Municipios.

$f_2$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 2: UCM Áreas

$f_3$  = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 3: UTM Segmentos Censales

$f_4$  = Probabilidad de selección del conglomerado dentro del segmento.

Dado que se toman conglomerados de  $h$  viviendas por segmento de muestra, la fracción se convierte en:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVS}$$

Donde:

$TVS$  = es el número total de viviendas en el segmento

La fracción global de muestreo (probabilidad de selección dentro de cada UPM (Municipio) debe cumplir la condición:

$$PU = \frac{TVA}{TVM} \times \frac{TVS}{TVA} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVS}$$

Donde:

$TVM$  = Total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

$TVA = N^{\circ}$  de viviendas en el Área (USM)

$TVS = N^{\circ}$  de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

$NH = N^{\circ}$  de hogares en las  $h$  viviendas del conglomerado seleccionado

$h = h$  hogares a seleccionar en cada conglomerado y 1 persona en cada uno de estos hogares.

Probabilidad final de selección

La probabilidad final de selección del conglomerado (g) está dada por:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_a}{TT} \times \frac{T_s}{T_a} \times \frac{T_g}{T_s} = \frac{T_g}{TT}$$

Donde:

$TT = N^{\circ}$  total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

$T_a = N^{\circ}$  de viviendas en el Área (USM)

$T_s = N^{\circ}$  de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

$T_g = N^{\circ}$  de conglomerados de  $h$  viviendas por área

En general la probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado cualquiera en el municipio c está dado por:

$$P_m = \frac{T_{Sm}}{T_{Tm}} = \frac{n_m}{N_M} = f_m$$

Donde:

$P_m =$  Probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado de  $h$  viviendas en el municipio

$T_{Sm} = N^{\circ}$  de segmentos a seleccionar en el municipio y en estas  $a$   $h$  viviendas finales

$T_{Tm} =$  Total de viviendas en el municipio

$n_m =$  Tamaño de la muestra municipio  $m$

$N_m =$  Tamaño de la población en el municipio  $m$

$f_m =$  Fracción global de muestreo por municipio  $m$  (UPM)



## Apéndice II. Documento de consentimiento informado

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a Gallup al teléfono 567-5123 y preguntar por Carlos Acevedo, persona responsable de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?



## Apéndice III. Cuestionario

República Dominicana Versión # 18g IRB Approval: #071086

 <p><b>USAID</b> DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	 <p><i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i></p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p>Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: La República Dominicana, 2008

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<p><b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. <b>21. República Dominicana</b> 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad</p>	<p><b>PAIS</b></p>	<p><b>21</b></p>
<p><b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____</p>	<p><b>IDNUM</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Estratopri:</b> (2101) Región Metropolitana (2102) Región Norte (2103) Región Este (2104) Región Sur (2105) Ampliación de la Región Metropolitana</p>	<p><b>ESTRATOPRI</b></p>	<p><b>21</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Provincia :</b> _____</p>	<p><b>PROV</b></p>	<p><b>21</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Municipio (o Distrito Municipal) UPM:</b> _____</p>	<p><b>MUNICIPIO</b></p>	<p><b>21</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>UPM (Municipio).</b> _____</p>	<p><b>UPM</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Sección:</b> _____</p>	<p><b>DOMSECCION</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Barrio/Paraje</b> _____</p>	<p><b>DOMBARRIO</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Polígono Censal</b> _____</p>	<p><b>DOMPOLIGONO</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>Área Censal</b> _____</p>	<p><b>DOMAREACEN</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>CLUSTER.</b> (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]</p>	<p><b>CLUSTER</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
<p><b>UR</b> (1) Urbano (2) Rural</p>	<p><b>UR</b></p>	<p></p>
<p><b>Tamaño del lugar:</b> (1) Santo Domingo (región metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (&gt; 100,000) (3) Ciudad mediana (25,000-99,000) (4) Ciudad pequeña (&lt; 25,000) (5) Área rural</p>	<p><b>TAMANO</b></p>	<p></p>
<p><b>Idioma del cuestionario:</b> (1) Español</p>	<p><b>IDIOMAQ</b></p>	<p><b>1</b></p>
<p><b>Hora de inicio:</b> ____:____ [no digitar]</p>	<p></p>	<p>-----</p>
<p><b>Fecha de la entrevista día:</b> ____ mes: ____ año: 2008</p>	<p><b>FECHA</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>

**OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA**

<b>Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</b>		<b>Q1</b>	
<b>A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b>		<b>A4</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
<b>A1. Escucha noticias por la radio</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2. Mira noticias en la TV</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>A3</b>	
<b>A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>A4i</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la economía. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR					<b>SOCT1</b>
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR					<b>SOCT2</b>
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR					<b>IDIO1</b>
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR					<b>IDIO2</b>
Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.					
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	8		<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> A alguna autoridad local (síndico, regidor)?	1	2	8		<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> A algún secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8		<b>CP4</b>
Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...					
<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal o una reunión convocada por el síndico durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR					<b>NP1</b>
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, regidor o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR					<b>NP2</b>
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el ayuntamiento está dando a la gente son...? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR					<b>SGL1</b>
<b>LGL2A.</b> Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar <b>más responsabilidades</b> ? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional (2) Algo más al gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y al ayuntamiento (4) Algo más al ayuntamiento (5) Mucho más al ayuntamiento (8) NS/NR					<b>LGL2A</b>
<b>LGL2B.</b> Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería <b>administrar más dinero</b> ? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Algo más el gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y el ayuntamiento (4) Algo más el ayuntamiento (5) Mucho más el ayuntamiento (8) NS/NR					<b>LGL2B</b>

<p><b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento?                  (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>LGL3</b>	
<p><b>MUNI5.</b> ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del ayuntamiento?                  (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>MUNI5</b>	
<p><b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del ayuntamiento? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>MUNI6</b>	

<p><b>Cambiando de tema para hablar de los servicios públicos generales,</b>  <b>DOMSER1</b> ¿Cómo usted evalúa en la actualidad los siguientes servicios públicos?                  ¿El transporte público, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?                  (1)Muy bueno                  (2) Bueno                  (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>)                  (4) Malo                  (5) Muy malo/pésimo                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER1</b>	
<p><b>DOMSER2</b> ¿La educación pública, considera usted que es muy buena, buena, mala, o muy mala?                  (1)Muy buena                  (2) Buena                  (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>)                  (4) Mala                  (5) Muy mala/pésimo                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER2</b>	
<p><b>DOMSER3</b> ¿Los hospitales públicos, considera usted que son muy buenos, buenos, malos, o muy malos?                  (1)Muy bueno                  (2) Bueno                  (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>)                  (4) Malo                  (5) Muy malo/pésimo                  (8) NS/NR NR</p>	<b>DOMSER3</b>	
<p><b>DOMSER4</b> ¿El Seguro Social (IDSS), considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?                  (1)Muy bueno                  (2) Bueno                  (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>)                  (4) Malo                  (5) Muy malo/pésimo                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER4</b>	
<p><b>DOMSER5</b> ¿El servicio de electricidad, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo o muy malo?                  (1)Muy bueno                  (2) Bueno                  (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>)                  (4) Malo                  (5) Muy malo/pésimo                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER5</b>	

<p><b>DOMSER6</b> ¿El servicio de la recogida de basura, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER6</b>
<p><b>DOMSER7</b> ¿El servicio de agua potable, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER7</b>
<p><b>DOMSER8</b> ¿El servicio de la construcción de viviendas populares, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR (<b>NO LEER</b>) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMSER8</b>

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<p><b>CP5.</b> Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.</p>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP5</b>

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<p><b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<p><b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>

<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP13</b>
<b>CP20. [Sólo mujeres]</b> ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	<b>CP20</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR		<b>LS3</b>
<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR		<b>IT1</b>

<b>IT1A.</b> ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR		<b>IT1A</b>
<b>IT1B.</b> Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR		<b>IT1B</b>
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, tratarían de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharían de usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS/NR		<b>IT3</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1**

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre **su punto de vista político**, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b>
<b>Izquierda</b>					<b>Derecha</b>					(NS/NR=88)

**[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]**



<p><b>IMMIG1.</b> ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno dominicano ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Esta usted...<b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Muy de acuerdo                  (2) Algo de acuerdo                  (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo                  (4) Algo en desacuerdo                  (5) Muy en desacuerdo                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>IMMIG1</b></p>
<p><b>IMMIG2.</b> En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los dominicanos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos? <b>[Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</b>                  (1) Hacen los trabajos que los dominicanos ya no quieren                  (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>IMMIG2</b></p>

<p><b>PROT2.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?</p>	<p>(1) algunas veces</p>	<p>(2) casi nunca</p>	<p>(3) nunca</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p>9 Inap</p>	<p><b>PROT2</b></p>
<p>Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias. ...?<b>[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:</b></p>						
<p><b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JC1</b></p>		
<p><b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JC4</b></p>		
<p><b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JC10</b></p>		
<p><b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JC12</b></p>		
<p><b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JC13</b></p>		

<p><b>JC15.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	<p>SI puede haber razón (1)</p>	<p>NO puede haber razón (2)</p>	<p>NS/NR (8)</p>	<p><b>JC15</b></p>
<p><b>JC16.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	<p>SI puede haber razón (1)</p>	<p>NO puede haber razón (2)</p>	<p>NS/NR (8)</p>	<p><b>JC16</b></p>

<p><b>VIC1.</b> Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?                  (1) Sí <b>[sigua]</b>                  (2) No <b>[pasar a VIC20]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[pasar a VIC20]</b></p>	<p><b>VIC1</b></p>
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<p><b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?                  (1) Sí <b>[pasar a VIC20]</b> (2) No lo denunció <b>[Seguir]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[pasar a VIC20]</b> (9) Inap (no víctima) <b>[pasar a VIC20]</b></p>	<b>AOJ1</b>	
<p><b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) No sirve de nada                  (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias                  (3) No tenía pruebas                  (4) No fue grave                  (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<b>AOJ1B</b>	

	<p><b>¿Cuántas veces?</b>  <b>NO = 0,</b>  <b>NS/NR=88</b></p>	
<p><b>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]:</b> Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas</p>		
<p><b>VIC20.</b> Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<b>VIC20</b>
<p><b>VIC21.</b> ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<b>VIC21</b>
<p><b>VIC27.</b> En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<b>VIC27</b>

<p><b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?                  (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen                  (8)NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ8</b>	
<p><b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?                  (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ11</b>	

<p><b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AOJ11A</b>	
<p><b>DOMAOJ11B</b> Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años?                  (1) Más seguro                  (2) Igual                  (3) Menos seguro                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>DOMAOJ11B</b>	
<p><b>VIC11.</b> ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? <b>[No leer]</b>  <b>[Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]</b>                  (0) No denunciaría                  (1) Ayuntamiento                  (2) Policía                  (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría, etc.)                  (4) Iglesia                  (5) Medio de comunicación                  (6) Otros (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>VIC11</b>	

<b>AOJ12.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>
<b>AOJ12a.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12a</b>
<b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ16A</b>
<b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? <b>[Leer alternativas y asegurarse que el entrevistado entienda las opciones]</b> 1) La policía protege, o 2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia 3) <b>[No leer]</b> No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada 8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ18</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]**

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			NS/NR	

**Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? ( <i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i> )	<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?	<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano?	<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político de la República Dominicana?	<b>B4</b>
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político dominicano?	<b>B6</b>
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	<b>B10A</b>
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?	<b>B11</b>
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerza Armadas?	<b>B12</b>
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	<b>B13</b>
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	<b>B14</b>
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	<b>B18</b>
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	<b>B20</b>
<b>DOMB20A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las iglesias evangélicas?	<b>DOMB20A</b>
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	<b>B21</b>

<b>Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</b>		
<b>B21A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	<b>B21A</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?	<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su ayuntamiento?	<b>B32</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser dominicano?	<b>B43</b>	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	<b>B37</b>	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	<b>B47</b>	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?	<b>B48</b>	

	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</b>	
Usando la misma escala...		
<b>N1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	<b>N1</b>	
<b>N3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	<b>N3</b>	
<b>N9.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	<b>N9</b>	
<b>N10.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	<b>N10</b>	
<b>N11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	<b>N11</b>	
<b>N12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	<b>N12</b>	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de la República Dominicana y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</b>	
<b>EPP1.</b> Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos dominicanos representan bien a sus votantes?	<b>EPP1</b>	
<b>EPP2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos dominicanos?	<b>EPP2</b>	
<b>EPP3.</b> ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	<b>EPP3</b>	
<b>EC1.</b> Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional estorba la labor del presidente?	<b>EC1</b>	
<b>EC2.</b> ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados del Congreso Nacional discutiendo y debatiendo?	<b>EC2</b>	
<b>EC3.</b> ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso Nacional?	<b>EC3</b>	
<b>EC4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional cumple con lo que usted espera de él	<b>EC4</b>	

**[RECOGER TARJETA A]**

<b>M1.</b> Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Leonel Fernández es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>	
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<b>M2.</b> Y hablando del Congreso. Pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso dominicano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? 1) Muy bien    2) Bien    3) Ni bien ni mal    4) Mal    5) Muy Mal    8) NSNR	<b>M2</b>
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**[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

**Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS/NR
							<b>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</b>	

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.	<b>POP101</b>
<b>POP101.</b> Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	
<b>POP102.</b> Cuando el Congreso Nacional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP102</b>
<b>POP103.</b> Cuando la Suprema Corte de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP103</b>
<b>POP106.</b> Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP106</b>
<b>POP107.</b> El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y <b>no</b> a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP107</b>
<b>POP109.</b> En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP109</b>
<b>POP110.</b> Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP110</b>



<b>POP112.</b> El <b>mayor</b> obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP112</b>	
<b>POP113.</b> Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP113</b>	

**[SEGUIR UTILIZANDO MISMA TARJETA]**

<b>EFF1.</b> A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como yo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF1</b>	
<b>EFF2.</b> Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF2</b>	

<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ING4</b>	
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los dominicanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>PN2</b>	
<b>DEM23.</b> Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>DEM23</b>	
<b>DOMING5.</b> ¿En general, usted qué prefiere? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> <b>[Asegurarse que el entrevistado no utilice tarjeta]</b> (1) Democracia aunque haya a veces desorden o (2) Más orden aunque haya menos democracia? (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMING5</b>	

**[Volver a utilizar tarjeta]**

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre el rol del estado. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. **NS/NR = 8**

<b>ROS1.</b> El Estado dominicano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS1</b>	
<b>ROS2.</b> El Estado dominicano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente.	<b>ROS2</b>	
<b>ROS3.</b> El Estado dominicano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos.	<b>ROS3</b>	
<b>ROS4.</b> El Estado dominicano debe implementar políticas <b>firmes</b> para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres.	<b>ROS4</b>	

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿Usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en la República Dominicana? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>DOMPN4A</b> ¿Usted diría que la manera como está funcionando la democracia en el país le beneficia a usted mucho, algo, le perjudica o lo es indiferente? (1) Le beneficia mucho (2) Le beneficia algo (3) Lo perjudica (4) Le es indiferente (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMPN4A</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión, ¿la República Dominicana es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>	

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer **para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos**. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

	1-10, 88
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E5</b>
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E8</b>
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E11</b>
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E15</b>
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E14</b>
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E2</b>
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E3</b>
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E16</b>

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

	1-10, 88
<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	<b>D32</b>
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	<b>D37</b>

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en la República Dominicana. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

	1-10, 88
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<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</b>	<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?	<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	<b>D5</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA C]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado Tarjeta D]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta tiene una escala de 1 a 10, pero el 1 indica que está en desacuerdo totalmente y el 10 significa que está de acuerdo totalmente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desacuerdo Totalmente</b>					<b>Acuerdo Totalmente</b>					<b>NS/NR</b>

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>DOMW6.</b> ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?		<b>DOMW6</b>
<b>DOMW7.</b> ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política?		<b>DOMW7</b>

**RECOGER TARJETA D**

<b>W8.</b> Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) LE DA IGUAL ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (8) NS/NR	<b>W8</b>
<b>DOMW9.</b> ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar? (1) Mayor (2) Menor (3) IGUAL ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMW9</b>
<b>W10.</b> Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: <b>[Leer]</b> (1) No es conveniente que participe (2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan (3) Debe participar igual que el hombre (8) NS/NR	<b>W10</b>



<p><b>DOMW11.</b> ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?</p> <p>(1) Si, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza                  (2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza                  (8) NS/NR</p>	DOMW11	
<p><b>DOMW12.</b> ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar?</p> <p>(1) El hombre                  (2) La mujer                  (3) La mujer y el hombre                  (8) NS/NR</p>	DOMW12	
<p><b>DOMW13.</b> Algunos opinan que en ninguna circunstancia el hombre debe pegar a su mujer y otros opinan que a veces se justifica que el hombre pegue a su mujer, ¿Con cuál opinión está más de acuerdo?</p> <p>(1) En ninguna circunstancia el hombre le debe pegar a su mujer                  (2) A veces se justifica que el hombre le pegue a su mujer                  (8) NS/NR</p>	DOMW13	
<p><b>DOMW14.</b> ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo cuando peligra la salud de la madre y en caso de incesto o violación, o no está de acuerdo bajo ninguna circunstancia?</p> <p>(1) De acuerdo cuando peligra la salud de la madre y en caso de incesto o violación                  (2) No está de acuerdo bajo ninguna circunstancia                  (8) NS/SR</p>	DOMW14	

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<p><b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático, o                  (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o                  (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático                  (8) NS/NR</p>	DEM2	
<p><b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR</p>	DEM11	
<p><b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o                  (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor                  (8) NS/NR</p>	AUT1	
<p><b>AUT2.</b> ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o                  (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes                  (8) NS/NR</p>	AUT2	

<p><b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PP1</b></p>
<p><b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004?                  (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PP2</b></p>
<p><b>DOMPP3.</b> ¿Está trabajando usted en esta campaña electoral de 2008 para algún candidato o partido?                  (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PP3</b></p>

<p>Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.</p>	
<p><b>DC10.</b> Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar un acta de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 175 pesos de más al empleado del juzgado de paz. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada                  2) Es corrupto pero se justifica                  3) No es corrupto                  8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>DC10</b></p>
<p><b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su influencia o cuña para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado                  2) Es corrupto pero justificado                  3) No es corrupto</p>	<p><b>DC13</b></p>

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un macuteo/soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un macuteo/soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en el ayuntamiento en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en el ayuntamiento (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún macuteo/soborno en el último año?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC13</b>

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar un macuteo/soborno en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún macuteo/soborno?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún macuteo/ soborno?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió un macuteo/soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un macuteo/soborno?		0	1	8	<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					<b>EXC7</b>
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Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...					
<b>GI1.</b> ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[NO LEER:</b> George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Cómo se llama la persona que es el Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados actualmente? <b>[NO LEER:</b> Julio César Valentín ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Cuántas provincias tiene la República Dominicana? <b>[NO LEER:</b> aceptar 30, 31, 32] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en la República Dominicana? <b>[NO LEER:</b> 4 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[NO LEER:</b> Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					<b>GI5</b>

<p><b>VB1.</b> ¿Está inscrito para votar? (1) Sí (2) No <b>[Pasar VB10]</b> (3) En trámite <b>[Pasar a VB10]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pasar VB10]</b></p>	<p><b>VB1</b></p>
<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de mayo del 2004?                  (1) Sí votó <b>[Siga]</b>                  (2) No votó <b>[Pasar a VB50]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pasar a VB50]</b></p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>
<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de mayo del 2004? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b>                  (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)                  (2101) Leonel Fernández (PLD)                  (2102) Hipólito Mejía (PRD)                  (2103) Eduardo Estrella (PRSC)                  (77) Otro                  (88) NS/NR                  (99) Inap (No votó)</p>	<p><b>VB3</b></p>
<p><b>VB50.</b> En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres.                  ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?                  (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo                  (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR</p>	<p><b>VB50</b></p>
<p><b>VB10.</b> ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?                  (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b>                  (2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB10</b></p>

<p><b>VB11.</b> ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b>.                  (2101) PRD                  (2102) PLD                  (2103) PRSC                  (77) Otro                  (88) NS/NR <b>[Pase A POL1]</b>                  (99) INAP <b>[Pase A POL1]</b></p>	VB11
<p><b>VB12.</b> ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido <b>[partido que mencionó en VB11]</b> es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?                  (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte                  (8)NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	VB12
<p><b>DOMVB13.</b> ¿Pertenece usted a este partido o sólo simpatiza?                  (1) Pertenece (2) Simpatiza (8) NS/NR</p>	DOMVB13
<p><b>DOMVB14.</b> ¿En los últimos cinco años, ¿ha simpatizado o pertenecido a un partido diferente al que ahora pertenece o simpatiza?                  (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (8) NS/NR (9) INAP (ni simpatiza ni pertenece a ninguno)</p>	DOMVB14
<p><b>DOMVB15.</b> ¿A cuál partido?                  (0) Ninguno                  (1) PRD                  (2) PLD                  (3) PRSC                  (77) Otro                  (88) NS/NR                  (99) Inap</p>	DOMVB15
<p><b>DOMVB16</b> Votará usted en las elecciones presidenciales del próximo 16 de mayo?                  (1) Sí                  (2) No                  (8) NS/NR</p>	DOMVB16

<p><b>POL1.</b> ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?                  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	POL1
<p><b>POL2.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes                  (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	POL2

<p><b>DIS5.</b> Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)                  (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>
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<p><b>USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ</b>  <b>Usando nuevamente la escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 representa muy en desacuerdo, y 7 muy de acuerdo:</b></p>	<p>Escala                  Muy en Desacuerdo                  Muy de acuerdo</p>	NS/NR
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<b>DOMHAI1.</b> ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo con que los hijos de inmigrantes haitianos nacidos en la República Dominicana sean ciudadanos dominicanos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>DOMHAI1</b>
<b>DOMHAI2.</b> ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o desacuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano otorgue permisos de trabajo a los haitianos indocumentados que viven en República Dominicana?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>DOMHAI2</b>

**RECOGER TARJETA “B”**

<b>VB20. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno. (4) Ninguno (blanco o anulo) (8) NS/NR	<b>VB20</b>
<b>DOMVB22.</b> Si las elecciones presidenciales fueran hoy, ¿por cuál de los siguientes candidatos votaría usted? <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Leonel Fernández (2) Miguel Vargas Maldonado (3) Amable Aristy Castro (4) Eduardo Estrella (5) Pedro de Jesús Candelier (6) Otro (8) Ninguno (blanco o anulo) <b>[NO LEER]</b> (88) NS/NR	<b>DOMVB22</b>
<b>DOMVB23.</b> Si hay segunda vuelta y los candidatos son Leonel Fernández y Miguel Vargas Maldonado, ¿por cuál votaría usted? (1) Leonel Fernández (2) Miguel Vargas Maldonado (3) Ninguno (blanco o anulo) (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMVB23</b>
<b>DOMVB24.</b> Si hay segunda vuelta y los candidatos son Leonel Fernández y Amable Aristy Castro, ¿por cuál votaría usted? (1) Leonel Fernández (2) Amable Aristy Castro (3) Ninguno (blanco o anulo) (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMVB24</b>
<b>VB21.</b> ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR	<b>VB21</b>
<b>DOMVB25.</b> ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la reelección presidencial? (Leer opciones) (1) De manera indefinida (2) Sólo por <b>un</b> período adicional (3) No está de acuerdo (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMVB25</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]**

**LS6.** Le voy a mostrar una escalera con diez escalones: el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted ¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? [RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA]

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible					NS/NR

**[RECOGER TARJETA E]**

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con... [Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
<b>SD1.</b> El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	<b>SD1</b>
<b>SD2.</b> Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	<b>SD2</b>
<b>SD3.</b> El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	<b>SD3</b>
<b>SD4.</b> La calidad del aire	1	2	8	<b>SD4</b>
<b>SD5.</b> La calidad del agua	1	2	8	<b>SD5</b>
<b>SD6.</b> La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	<b>SD6</b>
<b>SD7.</b> La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	<b>SD7</b>
<b>SD8.</b> La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	<b>SD8</b>
<b>SD9.</b> El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	<b>SD9</b>
<b>SD10.</b> Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	<b>SD10</b>
<b>SD11.</b> La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	<b>SD11</b>
<b>SD12.</b> La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	<b>SD12</b>

**LS4.** Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?

(1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

**LS4**



Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) =  
\_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar Table abajo para código]**

	1 <sup>o</sup>	2 <sup>o</sup>	3 <sup>o</sup>	4 <sup>o</sup>	5 <sup>o</sup>	6 <sup>o</sup>	
Ninguno	0						<b>ED</b>
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
NS/NR/	88						

**Q2.** ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? \_\_\_\_\_ años (0= NS/NR) **Q2**

**Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]** **Q3**

(1) Católica  
 (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).  
 (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)  
 (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).  
 (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día  
 (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).  
 (4) Ninguna (8) NS/NR

**Q5A.** ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]** **Q5**

(1) Más de una vez por semana  
 (2) Una vez por semana  
 (3) Una vez al mes  
 (4) Una o dos veces al año  
 (5) Nunca o casi nunca (8) NS/NR

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA F]** **Q10**

**Q10.** ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

**[Si no entiende, pregunte: Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]**

(00) Ningún ingreso  
 (01) Menos de 875 pesos  
 (02) Entre 876 y 1750 pesos  
 (03) 1751-3500 pesos  
 (04) 3501-5250 pesos  
 (05) 5251-7000 pesos  
 (06) 7001-10500 pesos  
 (07) 10501 –14000 pesos  
 (08) 14001-17500 pesos  
 (09) 17501-26250 pesos  
 (10) 26251-50000 pesos  
 (11) Más de 50000 pesos  
 (88) NS/NR



[RECOGER TARJETA F]		
<b>Q10A.</b> ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b> (8) NS <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b>	<b>Q10A</b>	
<b>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> ¿En qué utiliza <b>generalmente</b> el dinero de las remesas? <b>[No leer]</b> <b>[Si responde varias opciones, enfatizar generalmente o preguntar ¿en qué utiliza más el dinero de las remesas?]</b> (1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos (6) Ahorro (7) Otro (8) NS/NR	<b>Q10a1</b>	
<b>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	<b>Q10B</b>	
<b>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? <b>[Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar dónde; No leer alternativas]</b> (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No <b>[Pase a Q14]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a Q14]</b>	<b>Q10C</b>	
<b>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C]</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	<b>Q16</b>	
<b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>Q14</b>	
<b>Q10D.</b> El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) <b>[No leer]</b> NS/NR	<b>Q10D</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS/NR	<b>Q12</b>	____

<b>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento?</b> 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	<b>Q12A</b>	____
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<b>ETID.</b> ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, negra, mestiza, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (4) Negra (5) Mulata(Jabao) (2) Mestiza(Indio) (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>	
<b>DOMETIDA.</b> Considera que su madre es o era una persona Blanca, negra, mulata (Jabao), mestiza u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Negra (3) Mulata(Jabao) (4) Mestiza(Indio) (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	<b>DOMETIDA</b>	
<b>LENG1.</b> ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (2101) Español (2104) Otro (nativo) (2105) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	<b>LENG1</b>	

<b>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet?</b> <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR <b>[No leer]</b>	<b>WWW1</b>	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

<b>R1. Televisor</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>
<b>R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>
<b>R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>
<b>R4A. Teléfono celular</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>
<b>R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?</b>	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6. Lavadora de ropa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>
<b>R7. Microondas</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>
<b>R8. Motocicleta (motor)</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>
<b>R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>
<b>R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>
<b>R15. Computadora</b>	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>

<b>OCUP4A.</b> ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Trabajando? <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? <b>[Siga]</b> (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? <b>[OCUP27]</b> (4) Es estudiante? <b>[OCUP27]</b> (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? <b>[OCUP27]</b> (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? <b>[OCUP27]</b> (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? <b>[OCUP27]</b> (8) NS/NR	<b>OCUP4</b>	
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<p><b>OCUP1.</b> ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (<b>Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?</b>) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p> <p>(14) Obrero</p> <p>(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1</b></p> <p>□ □ □</p>
<p><b>OCUP1A.</b> En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP 12A</b> ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?</p> <p>_____ [Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP 12A</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP12.</b> ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?</p> <p>(1) Menos                      (2) Igual                      (3) Más                      (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP12</b></p>
<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No    (8) NS/NR    (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>

<b>Ahora nos gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situación laboral en diciembre de 2006</b>		
<b>OCUP27.</b> -En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Siga</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Siga</b> ] (9) INAP	<b>OCUP27</b>	
<b>OCUP28.</b> En esa fecha estaba usted:[Leer alternativas] (1) Desempleado? [ <b>Siga</b> ] (2) Trabajando? [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (3) Estudiando? [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (9) INAP	<b>OCUP28</b>	
<b>OCUP29.</b> ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas] (1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (2) Fin de empleo temporal [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [ <b>Siga</b> ] (5) Despido o cese [ <b>Siga</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (9) INAP	<b>OCUP29</b>	
<b>OCUP30.</b> ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía/liquidación o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (9)INAP	<b>OCUP30</b>	
<b>OCUP31.</b> ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí [ <b>Siga</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a MIG2</b> ] (9) INAP	<b>OCUP31</b>	
<b>OCUP31A</b> ¿En esa fecha, cuanto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	<b>OCUP31A</b>	

<b>MIG2.</b> Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) En este mismo municipio [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (2) En otro municipio en el país [ <b>Siga</b> ] (3) En otro país [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ]	<b>MIG2</b>
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Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [ <i>minutos, ver página # 1</i> ] _____	<b>TI</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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**Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.**

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_


Comentarios:

\_\_\_\_\_


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_


**Tarjeta #1**



### Tarjeta A




### Tarjeta B







### Tarjeta C



### Tarjeta D



### Tarjeta E



## Tarjeta F

- 00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 875 pesos
- (02) Entre 876 y 1750 pesos
- (03) 1751-3500 pesos
- (04) 3501-5250 pesos
- (05) 5251-7000 pesos
- (06) 7001-10500 pesos
- (07) 10501 –14000 pesos
- (08) 14001-17500 pesos
- (09) 17501-26250 pesos
- (10) 26251-50000 pesos
- (11) Más de 50000 pesos
- (88) NS/NR

## Apéndice IV. Resultados completos de las regresiones

**Table A-1. Probabilidad de ser víctima de la corrupción**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.194*	(2.44)
Mujer	-0.460*	(-6.32)
Edad	-0.426*	(-4.21)
Riqueza	0.229*	(2.74)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.044	(-0.33)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.012	(-0.15)
Número de hijos	0.070	(0.88)
Norte	-0.248*	(-2.02)
Este	-0.220*	(-2.13)
Sur	-0.064	(-0.44)
Mestiza (Indio)	-0.047	(-0.37)
Negra	0.087	(0.76)
Mulata (Jabao)	0.001	(0.01)
Otra	0.019	(0.25)
Constante	-1.827*	(-23.13)
F = 9.47		
N. de casos = 1453		
* p<0.05		

Table A-2. Impacto de la victimización de la corrupción en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por corrupción	-1.561	(1.52)	-0.028	(1.19)	2.114	(1.31)	-4.871*	(1.03)	-2.609*	(0.96)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.060*	(0.03)	-0.005	(0.02)	-0.138*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.029	(0.03)	0.038*	(0.01)	0.035	(0.02)	0.162*	(0.02)		
Años aprobados de educación	0.353*	(0.17)	0.520*	(0.14)	0.746*	(0.21)	-0.476*	(0.17)	0.320	(0.19)
Mujer	-1.449	(1.48)	-2.325*	(1.07)	-7.497*	(1.66)	4.081*	(1.48)	-4.044*	(1.75)
Edad	0.580*	(0.26)	0.167	(0.16)	-0.311	(0.24)	-0.583*	(0.22)	0.050	(0.21)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.326	(0.60)	0.174	(0.31)	1.637*	(0.42)	-1.341*	(0.51)	1.245*	(0.56)
Percepción Economía familiar	0.610	(1.31)	0.472	(0.59)	-1.328	(0.84)	3.998*	(0.69)	3.261*	(0.97)
Tamaño del lugar	0.970*	(0.45)	-0.182	(0.43)	0.338	(0.68)	-0.437	(0.50)	1.406*	(0.58)
Constante	45.205*	(5.47)	68.947*	(3.68)	58.383*	(5.37)	55.926*	(3.95)	40.010*	(4.71)
R-cuadrado	0.037		0.028		0.072		0.103		0.040	
N. de casos	1324		1410		1378		1407		1418	

\* p<0.05

Table A-3. Impacto de la percepción de la corrupción en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de la corrupción (exc7r)	0.029	(0.03)	0.045	(0.02)	0.045	(0.03)	-0.173*	(0.03)	-0.007	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente (m1r)	0.065*	(0.03)	-0.000	(0.02)	-0.137*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política (pol1r)	0.027	(0.03)	0.050*	(0.02)	0.026	(0.02)	0.162*	(0.02)		
Años aprobados de educación (eds)	0.336*	(0.17)	0.473*	(0.13)	0.629*	(0.21)	-0.252	(0.16)	0.238	(0.21)
Mujer (q1=1)	-2.033	(1.50)	-2.596*	(1.08)	-7.250*	(1.73)	3.674*	(1.35)	-3.566*	(1.71)
Edad (q2s)	0.698*	(0.25)	0.262	(0.18)	-0.240	(0.25)	-0.551*	(0.22)	-0.020	(0.20)
Edad al cuadrado (q22)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza (Wealths)	0.124	(0.61)	0.084	(0.30)	1.755*	(0.43)	-1.143*	(0.52)	1.284*	(0.61)
Percepción Economía familiar (q10dr)	0.560	(1.34)	0.720	(0.64)	-1.010	(0.85)	3.216*	(0.65)	3.129*	(1.07)
Tamaño del lugar (tamano)	1.096*	(0.43)	-0.177	(0.43)	0.203	(0.65)	-0.566	(0.52)	1.405*	(0.58)
Constante	40.630*	(6.31)	63.174*	(4.21)	54.934*	(5.34)	66.467*	(4.80)	42.398*	(4.72)
R-cuadrado	0.039		0.038		0.070		0.134		0.035	
N. de casos	1242		1300		1279		1300		1290	
* p<0.05										

**Table A-4. Probabilidad de ser víctima del delito**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.265*	(3.00)
Mujer	-0.228*	(-3.61)
Edad	-0.282*	(-3.07)
Riqueza	0.102	(1.14)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.267*	(-3.33)
Constante	-1.869*	(-20.83)
F = 8.85		
N. de casos = 1484		
* p<0.05		



Table A-5. Impacto de la victimización del delito en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por delito	0.010	(0.02)	0.015	(0.01)	0.047*	(0.02)	-0.039*	(0.02)	-0.039*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.064*	(0.03)	-0.004	(0.02)	-0.137*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.027	(0.03)	0.038*	(0.01)	0.037	(0.02)	0.158*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.338*	(0.17)	0.508*	(0.14)	0.723*	(0.21)	-0.478*	(0.17)	0.333	(0.19)
Mujer	-1.109	(1.45)	-2.225*	(0.99)	-7.563*	(1.64)	4.735*	(1.46)	-3.812*	(1.71)
Edad	0.583*	(0.26)	0.168	(0.16)	-0.308	(0.24)	-0.585*	(0.22)	0.046	(0.20)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.281	(0.60)	0.156	(0.30)	1.631*	(0.42)	-1.393*	(0.51)	1.251*	(0.57)
Percepción Economía familiar	0.613	(1.31)	0.515	(0.60)	-1.148	(0.81)	3.803*	(0.71)	3.090*	(1.00)
Tamaño del lugar	1.036*	(0.43)	-0.152	(0.43)	0.380	(0.67)	-0.367	(0.51)	1.407*	(0.59)
Constante	44.224*	(5.41)	68.469*	(3.71)	57.656*	(5.27)	55.485*	(4.03)	40.151*	(4.86)
R-cuadrado	0.036		0.028		0.074		0.094		0.040	
N. de casos	1324		1410		1378		1407		1418	

\* p<0.05

**Table A-6. Impacto de la percepción de seguridad personal en el apoyo a la democracia estable**

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.009	(0.02)	0.005	(0.02)	-0.002	(0.03)	-0.115*	(0.02)	-0.172*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.058	(0.03)	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.139*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.030	(0.03)	0.038*	(0.01)	0.036	(0.02)	0.160*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.382*	(0.16)	0.508*	(0.14)	0.750*	(0.21)	-0.441*	(0.17)	0.379*	(0.19)
Mujer	-0.980	(1.40)	-2.481*	(0.97)	-7.886*	(1.64)	5.240*	(1.41)	-3.380	(1.71)
Edad	0.580*	(0.25)	0.173	(0.16)	-0.300	(0.24)	-0.584*	(0.22)	0.053	(0.20)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.261	(0.60)	0.200	(0.30)	1.663*	(0.43)	-1.593*	(0.50)	0.939	(0.58)
Percepción Economía familiar	0.488	(1.29)	0.563	(0.59)	-1.309	(0.84)	3.471*	(0.68)	2.678*	(0.96)
Tamaño del lugar	0.954*	(0.44)	-0.180	(0.43)	0.296	(0.69)	-0.624	(0.47)	0.979	(0.55)
Constante	45.125*	(5.31)	68.659*	(3.70)	59.203*	(5.45)	60.710*	(3.91)	48.838*	(4.53)
R-cuadrado	0.037		0.028		0.069		0.110		0.067	
N. de casos	1322		1405		1373		1403		1412	
* p<0.05										

**Table A-7. Apoyo a la descentralización de las responsabilidades**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Satisfacción con servicios locales	-0.073*	(-2.48)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.018	(0.59)
Educación	0.028	(0.74)
Mujer	-0.066*	(-2.53)
Edad	-0.032	(-1.01)
Riqueza	0.098*	(2.81)
Tamaño del lugar	0.017	(0.43)
Constante	0.002	(0.06)
R-cuadrado = 0.022		
N. de casos = 1302		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-8. Apoyo a la descentralización de los recursos económicos**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.015	(0.51)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.027	(0.79)
Educación	0.059	(1.60)
Mujer	-0.027	(-1.04)
Edad	-0.072*	(-2.79)
Riqueza	0.021	(0.53)
Tamaño del lugar	0.081*	(2.26)
Constante	0.001	(0.02)
R-cuadrado = 0.020		
N. de casos = 1284		
* p<0.05		

Table A-9. Impacto de la satisfacción con los servicios locales en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfacción con servicios locales	-0.038	(0.04)	-0.013	(0.02)	-0.002	(0.03)	0.177*	(0.03)	0.127*	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.063*	(0.03)	-0.005	(0.02)	-0.136*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.032	(0.03)	0.033*	(0.01)	0.043	(0.02)	0.160*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.330*	(0.16)	0.513*	(0.15)	0.800*	(0.22)	-0.443*	(0.18)	0.364	(0.19)
Mujer	-0.660	(1.55)	-2.279*	(0.88)	-7.792*	(1.62)	5.174*	(1.35)	-4.214*	(1.71)
Edad	0.561*	(0.26)	0.210	(0.14)	-0.325	(0.25)	-0.579*	(0.19)	0.088	(0.20)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.290	(0.63)	-0.048	(0.28)	1.482*	(0.46)	-1.651*	(0.48)	1.030	(0.55)
Percepción Economía familiar	0.693	(1.35)	0.500	(0.60)	-1.467	(0.86)	3.734*	(0.65)	3.165*	(0.93)
Tamaño del lugar	1.161*	(0.48)	-0.244	(0.41)	0.173	(0.70)	0.259	(0.46)	1.946*	(0.63)
Constante	46.894*	(6.41)	70.422*	(3.33)	60.235*	(6.39)	42.834*	(4.24)	29.713*	(5.83)
R-cuadrado	0.036		0.024		0.068		0.128		0.053	
N. de casos	1272		1350		1321		1349		1358	

\* p<0.05

**Table A-10. Impacto de la participación cívica en el apoyo a la idea de democracia**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	-0.011	(-0.37)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.041	(-1.20)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.046	(1.58)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.063*	(2.28)
Interés en la política	0.031	(0.92)
Educación	0.056*	(2.05)
Mujer	-0.006	(-0.22)
Edad	0.358*	(2.22)
std_q2sq	-0.192	(-1.14)
Riqueza	0.021	(0.53)
Percepción economía familiar	0.018	(0.44)
Tamaño del lugar	0.058*	(2.41)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.10)
R-cuadrado = 0.039		
N. de casos = 1300		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-11. Impacto de la participación cívica en el apoyo a los derechos de participación**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	-0.014	(-0.61)
Asociación padres de familia	0.024	(0.66)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.088*	(2.65)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.013	(-0.58)
Interés en la política	0.064*	(2.53)
Educación	0.108*	(3.57)
Mujer	-0.057*	(-2.14)
Edad	0.106	(0.83)
std_q2sq	-0.064	(-0.49)
Riqueza	0.027	(0.92)
Percepción economía familiar	0.029	(1.09)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.012	(-0.37)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.09)
R-cuadrado = 0.038		
N. de casos = 1381		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-12. Impacto de la participación cívica en la tolerancia política**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	-0.009	(-0.35)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.026	(-1.08)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.029	(1.06)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.132*	(-5.04)
Interés en la política	0.041	(1.43)
Educación	0.113*	(3.59)
Mujer	-0.124*	(-4.56)
Edad	-0.086	(-0.58)
std_q2sq	0.088	(0.56)
Riqueza	0.105*	(3.84)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.040	(-1.56)
Tamaño del lugar	0.012	(0.32)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.09)
R-cuadrado = 0.069		
N. de casos = 1351		
* p<0.05		



**Table A-13. Impacto de la participación cívica en la legitimidad política**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	0.058	(1.76)
Asociación padres de familia	0.003	(0.08)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.021	(0.57)
Interés en la política	0.228*	(8.00)
Educación	-0.097*	(-3.11)
Mujer	0.083*	(2.85)
Edad	-0.334*	(-2.34)
std_q2sq	0.333*	(2.26)
Riqueza	-0.108*	(-2.71)
Percepción economía familiar	0.144*	(5.88)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.019	(-0.64)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.08)
R-cuadrado = 0.094		
N. de casos = 1380		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-14. Impacto de la participación cívica en la confianza interpersonal**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	0.024	(0.95)
Asociación padres de familia	0.014	(0.46)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.039	(1.39)
Educación	0.033	(1.16)
Mujer	-0.065*	(-2.32)
Edad	-0.015	(-0.13)
std_q2sq	0.099	(0.79)
Riqueza	0.075*	(2.13)
Percepción economía familiar	0.095*	(3.39)
Tamaño del lugar	0.073*	(2.45)
Constante	-0.004	(-0.12)
R-cuadrado = 0.038		
N. de casos = 1391		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-15. Principal problema del país de acuerdo a los ciudadanos (A4) recodificado en categorías**

<b>Economía</b>	<b>Seguridad</b>	<b>Servicios Básicos</b>	<b>Política</b>	<b>Otros</b>
Crédito, falta de (09)	Delincuencia, crimen (05)	Agua, falta de (19)	Conflicto armado (30)	Desigualdad (58)
Desempleo/falta de empleo (03)	Pandillas (14)	Caminos/vías en mal estado 18	Corrupción 13	Desplazamiento forzado (32)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de (01)	Secuestro (31)	Educación, falta de, mala calidad (21)	Derechos humanos, violaciones de (56)	Discriminación (25)
Inflación, altos precios (02)	Seguridad (falta de) (27)	Electricidad, falta de (24)	Los políticos (59)	Drogadicción (11)
Pobreza (04)	Guerra contra terrorismo (17)	Salud, falta de servicio (22)	Mal gobierno (15)	Explosión demográfica (20)
Tierra para cultivar, falta de (07)	Terrorismo (33)	Transporte, problemas con el (60)		Medio ambiente (10)
Deuda Externa(26)	Violencia (57)	Vivienda (55)		Migración (16)
		Desnutrición (23)		Narcotráfico (12)
				Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorismo (65)
				Otro (70)

**Table A-16. Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Educación	-0.108*	(-4.08)
Mujer	0.103*	(3.77)
Edad	-0.010	(-0.35)
Riqueza	-0.081*	(-2.47)
Tamaño del lugar	0.010	(0.44)
Situación económica nacional	0.387*	(16.77)
Situación económica personal	0.159*	(6.36)
Constante	0.007	(0.28)
R-cuadrado = 0.245		
N. de casos = 1431		
* p<0.05		

Table A-17. Impacto de la percepción del desempeño del gobierno en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico	0.076	(0.04)	0.049*	(0.02)	0.003	(0.04)	0.493*	(0.02)	0.123*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.007	(0.04)	-0.039	(0.02)	-0.143*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.018	(0.02)	0.034*	(0.01)	0.037	(0.02)	0.081*	(0.01)		
Educación	0.371*	(0.16)	0.528*	(0.14)	0.774*	(0.20)	-0.037	(0.12)	0.434*	(0.21)
Mujer	-1.482	(1.38)	-2.480*	(0.97)	-7.884*	(1.65)	1.755	(1.20)	-4.479*	(1.68)
Edad	0.674*	(0.26)	0.230	(0.16)	-0.308	(0.24)	-0.354*	(0.17)	0.096	(0.21)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.346	(0.58)	0.233	(0.31)	1.703*	(0.43)	-0.822*	(0.31)	1.483*	(0.58)
Percepción Economía familiar	0.424	(1.29)	0.376	(0.59)	-1.395	(0.83)	0.587	(0.62)	2.445*	(1.01)
Tamaño del lugar	0.997*	(0.44)	-0.210	(0.43)	0.251	(0.69)	-0.126	(0.39)	1.355*	(0.56)
Constante	43.061*	(5.44)	67.670*	(3.38)	59.233*	(5.33)	30.447*	(3.97)	32.201*	(4.72)
R-cuadrado	0.040		0.031		0.071		0.437		0.055	
N. de casos	1319		1400		1373		1397		1387	

\* p&lt;0.05

**Table A-18. Escala del populismo**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	-0.209*	(-6.30)
Género	0.032	(1.02)
Edad	-0.099*	(-3.15)
Riqueza	-0.045	(-1.30)
Tamaño	0.067	(1.98)
Constante	0.036	(1.10)
R-cuadrado = 0.060		
N. de casos = 1008		
* p<0.05		

**Table A-19. Análisis de votar en las últimas elecciones**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.369*	(5.14)
Género	0.030	(0.72)
Edad	0.955*	(11.07)
Riqueza	0.040	(0.47)
Tamaño	0.111	(0.96)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.155*	(-2.25)
Indio	0.018	(0.21)
Negro	-0.028	(-0.31)
Mulato	0.024	(0.36)
Otro Group Étnico	-0.096	(-1.66)
Norte	0.169	(1.36)
Este	-0.049	(-0.64)
Sur	0.018	(0.18)
Constante	1.001*	(14.95)
F = 14.89		
N. de casos = 1451		
* p<0.05		
La categoría de referencia por los Grupos Étnicos es “Blanco.”		
La categoría de referencia por la región es “Metropolitana.”		

**Table A-20. Análisis de simpatizantes de partidos políticos**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.175*	(2.10)
Mujer	0.056	(1.01)
Edad	0.192*	(3.20)
Riqueza	-0.119	(-1.35)
Tamaño del lugar	0.108	(1.06)
Percepción economía familiar	0.183*	(2.89)
Mestiza (Indio)	0.017	(0.17)
Negra	0.040	(0.43)
Mulata (Jabao)	0.040	(0.45)
Otra	-0.047	(-0.84)
Norte	0.062	(0.48)
Este	0.063	(0.77)
Sur	0.139	(1.04)
Constante	0.899*	(11.77)
F = 2.58		
N. de casos = 1421		
* p<0.05		



**Table A-21. Apoyo por la idea que puede haber democracia sin partidos**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Independientes	0.060*	(2.98)
Simpatizantes del PRD	0.035	(1.32)
Simpatizantes del PRSC	0.052*	(2.22)
Simpatizantes de Otros Partidos	0.026	(0.84)
Educación	-0.028	(-0.76)
Género	-0.009	(-0.36)
Edad	-0.100*	(-2.82)
Riqueza	-0.036	(-1.11)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.049	(-1.97)
Constante	0.005	(0.17)
R-cuadrado = 0.017		
N. de casos = 1320		
* p<0.05		
Simpatizantes del PLD es la categoría de referencia		

**Table A-22. Análisis de apoyo a la mujer en la política**

	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Apoyo a la mujer en el trabajo	0.164*	(5.05)
Los dos deben tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.260*	(7.37)
La mujer debe tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.090*	(3.48)
Educación	0.177*	(6.36)
Mujer	0.123*	(4.29)
Edad	0.040	(1.53)
Riqueza	0.065*	(2.21)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.022	(-0.81)
Casado/Unido	0.028	(1.28)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.12)
R-cuadrado = 0.219		
N. de casos = 1306		
* p<0.05		

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