



Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2008:

The Impact of Governance


VIII STUDY ON THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF GUATEMALANS

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Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,
Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez, *AmericasBarometer* Grant Manager at USAID



Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy,

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the












² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted expect for Bolivia and Ecuador.

Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.




The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	 
Guatemala	
El Salvador	 
Honduras	 
Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	 
Panama	

Andean/Southern cone Group	
Colombia	 <p>Universidad de los Andes</p>  <p>observatorio de la democracia</p>
Ecuador	
Peru	<p><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
Bolivia	 <p>Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</p> 
Paraguay	 <p>CIRDA Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo</p>
Chile	 <p>Instituto de Ciencia Política</p> 
Uruguay	  <p>UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO</p>
Brazil	 <p>Universidade de Brasília</p>
Venezuela	

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup, República Dominicana, S.A.</i> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

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The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
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Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

Executive Summary

This summary contains the main findings of the eighth study on the democratic culture of Guatemalans, called “Political Culture of the Democracy in Guatemala 2008, the Impact of Governance”. The Guatemalan report is part of the regional project AmericasBarometer at Vanderbilt University, which in 2008 included surveys of 22 countries in the Americas.

This study includes data analysis from the democratic culture survey carried out in February 2008 in Guatemala; the sample included 1,538 Guatemalans and it is representative of the whole country. The technical details can be found in the Appendix of this study. When it is pertinent, the study compares the 2008 results with the results obtained in the democratic culture surveys conducted in 2004 and 2006. Among the diverse topics of the study, included are comparisons between the Guatemalan results and the results from other countries, which serve as a parameter to compare the Guatemalan democracy with that of other countries in the Americas. The questions included in the questionnaire address different topics related to the Guatemalans’ democratic values, attitudes and political behavior. The majority of the questions do not refer to current issues, but to more in-depth issues that are considered an integral part of any citizen’s democratic culture.

The structure of this report is similar to that of the reports of other countries in the region. However, results vary from country to country. In the first section of this report, the characteristics of the sample are described, as well as the theory linking citizens’ perceptions and experiences to diverse aspects related to governance and the support for stable democracy. In the second part, the evidence of that linkage in Guatemala is presented. In this regard, we analyze the impact of corruption, crime, the performance of local governments, the civic participation and the economic performance of the government on the generation of support for stable democracy. The third part is composed of two chapters. The first chapter discusses the issue of legitimacy of the political system and of the public institutions, as well as citizens’ perceptions about the given nation’s democracy. The last chapter analyzes in-depth topics related to the electoral behavior in the 2007 elections and some issues related to political parties and politics in general.

In general terms it can be said the democratic culture survey of 2008 presents contrasting results for Guatemala. In comparison with other countries in the region, there are positive aspects such as a heightened participation of the Guatemalans in some organizations of the civil society. Among the favorable aspects of this study, we find that Guatemala is situated among the countries that give more confidence to the local government. Furthermore, Guatemalans are among the most satisfied citizens in regards to the performance of their local government. Guatemalans also have a more positive perception about the economic performance of the current government than other countries in the region, although this finding may be influenced, as it is pointed out in the text, by the fact that they are evaluating a government that took power barely a month before the survey was conducted.

Across the majority of issues, the country appears to be in an intermediate position in relation to other countries in the continent that were included in the 2008 study. For example: Guatemala is located in an intermediate position in terms of legitimacy given to political institutions, interpersonal trust, electoral participation, perception of public safety, corruption victimization, support for decentralization of responsibilities and economic resources, perception of the level of democracy in the country and satisfaction with the democracy's performance in Guatemala.

Finally, on the negative side, Guatemalans appear in the last positions in terms of support for democracy, support for the right of participation, political tolerance, preference for democracy and perception of public official's corruption. The unfavorable results are especially noteworthy regarding identification with political parties and political interest, where Guatemala is located in the last and previous to last position in the continent respectively. Guatemala is also one of the countries where the larger number of citizens falls in the category of instable democracy when the variables of support for the system and political tolerance are combined.

Here we address in greater detail the main findings of each chapter in this report.

The Impact of Governance on the Support for Democracy

Chapter II analyzes the topics of corruption victimization and perception of corruption in Guatemala. Regarding direct corruption victimization it was found that 16.6% of Guatemalans reported being victims of at least one act of government corruption during the last year, which situates the country in an intermediate position in the region. Corruption victimization in 2008 was slightly higher than in previous years, but the difference is not statistically significant. As in previous years, men, medium age individuals, and people with higher education and income, are more likely to be victims of corruption. Finally, the statistical models used show that such corruption victimization does not have direct effect on the variables employed to measure the support for stable democracy in the country.

The other major topic covered in Chapter II was the perception of corruption in public officials. In this sense, Guatemala appears as one of the countries where perception of corruption is higher, reaching to 80.4 points on the 0-100 scale point used in this study. Such perception does have an impact on the support for democracy, more specifically on the legitimacy of political institutions: those who perceive greater levels of corruption tend to have less confidence in institutions.

In Chapter III the issue of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity in Guatemala are analyzed. Regarding crime victimization it was found that 17.1% of Guatemalans reported being victims of some kind of crime in the last year, which places the country in an intermediate position in the region. Crime victimization in 2008 was slightly lower than in previous years, but the difference is not statistically significant. The main predictors of crime victimization are diverse. Men, younger Guatemalans (from 18 to 25 years old), individuals with higher socioeconomic status and those who live in large cities or in the capital are more prone to

be victims of crime. Finally the statistical models employed show that this crime victimization has impact on one of the variables used to measure support for stable democracy in the country, the legitimacy of political institutions. Guatemalans who have been victims of crime give 37.5 point of confidence to institutions, while those who have not been victims give institutions an average of 43.5 points.

The other big issue addressed in this chapter was the perception of physical insecurity. It was found that this perception decreased slightly in 2008, reaching an average of 39.6 points; however, the difference with previous years it is not statistically significant. In comparison to the rest of countries in the region Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position regarding this issue, but it is noteworthy that the perception of insecurity is much higher in the capital. The perception of insecurity in Guatemala has impact on two of the variables that measure support for democracy, specifically on the legitimacy of political institutions and on interpersonal trust. Those who perceive greater levels of personal insecurity tend to display lower levels of trust in political institutions, as well as less confidence in other people.

Chapter IV contains the analysis of different topics related to the local government and to citizens' participation in social organizations. Regarding the local government, Guatemalans' levels of trust in their local government were examined first (the local government where each respondent lives). In this sense, it was found that Guatemalans give 56.1 average points to the legitimacy of their local government, result which places Guatemala among the countries with the highest levels of confidence. At the country level, when the trust in national and local governments are compared, it is found that the local government generates more confidence than the national government; the average for the latter is 50.1 points. The difference between them is statistically significant. Apart from trust in local government, the satisfaction with services provided by the local government was also measured. In comparative perspective Guatemala finds itself again among the countries with the highest levels of satisfaction, with an average of 55.9 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study.

Apart from the last two topics, this chapter also examined the frequency with which citizens participate in town meetings and the frequency with which they sought assistance or presented requests to any office of the municipality. It was found that in 2008, 14% of the citizens reported having participated in at least one municipal meeting in the last year, and a similar percentage, 12%, presented a request to the local government.

This chapter also examined the issue of citizens' support for decentralization, in two aspects, on the one hand the support for decentralization of responsibilities and on the other hand the support for decentralization of economic resources. In both cases Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position compared to other countries, with an average of 49.7 points of support for decentralization of responsibilities and 48.4 average points of support for decentralization of resources. It was also analyzed whether the satisfaction with the services the local government provides has any impact on the support for decentralization of responsibilities or resources. The analysis showed that there is not a relationship between satisfaction with local services and the support for decentralization of responsibilities. However, there is a linkage between that

satisfaction and the support for decentralization of resources. In other words, citizens satisfied with their local government's services are prone to have higher support the decentralization of economic resources.

The other big issue covered in this chapter was the citizens' participation in different civil society organizations. It is explained in the theoretical framework at the beginning of this chapter that civic participation has been considered as a key component of the democratic development in any country. It was found in the analysis that Guatemalans show high levels of participation in meetings of religious organizations, school-related organizations, community improvement groups, and women groups. The highest participation is found in religious organizations with an average of 73.2 points, followed by the participation in school-related groups with an average of 49.1 points. The participation in committees for community improvement is lower (39.6 average points) than the latter two. Participation in women groups is even lower (24 points). However, in all cases Guatemala is located among the five first countries in the continent regarding participation.

Finally, Chapter IV analyzes whether the participation in civil society organizations has an impact on the variables of support for democracy used in this report. It was found that only participation in religious organizations has an impact on the support for stable democracy, but in a negative sense. Participation in committees for community improvement has a positive impact on the legitimacy of the political institutions.

In Chapter V, the last of the Second Part of the report, we analyze the impact that citizens' perception about the government economic performance has on the support for stable democracy. In order to measure economic performance of the government an index of economic performance was constructed. This index includes citizens' evaluations regarding the extent to which government fights poverty and unemployment. In comparative perspective it was found that Guatemala is located among the countries with highest perception about the economic performance of the government, with an average of 50.6 points on the 0-100 scale used in this report. However, it is noteworthy that at the moment this survey was carried out (February 2008) a new government had just taken power, which may affect the results. In other words, the fact that the government had been in power for barely a month when the survey was carried out makes more difficult for people to make an accurate evaluation.

The central topic in this chapter is the economic performance of the government; it is explained in the theoretical framework that the situation of the economy (both the national economy and the respondents' personal economy) may influence an individual political preferences. In the majority of countries the economy appears to be the main concern for citizens. However, as it is pointed out in this report, in the case of Guatemala citizens expressed that the main problem in the country is the insecurity, not the economy. This same tendency has appeared since 2004.

Beyond the analysis of citizens' perceptions on the government economic performance, this chapter examines whether there is a relationship between the evaluation of the national

economy and the respondent's personal economy and their perception about the government economic performance. It was found that in the case of Guatemala there is not such a relationship, at least in the period in which the survey was carried out. It was also examined whether the perception about the government's economic performance has any impact on the support for stable democracy variables. In this sense, important relationships were found: higher levels of perception about the government economic performance are linked to higher the levels of political tolerance and more legitimacy of political institutions. A positive perception about the government economic performance has impact even on the levels of interpersonal trust among Guatemalans: the better the perception about the government economic performance the higher the trust in other people.

The Legitimacy of the Political System

In the third and last part of this report we analyze the topic of the legitimacy of the political system and the political institutions, as well as citizens' perceptions about democracy. Chapter VI contains the traditional analysis that has been carried out in previous studies of democratic culture in the LAPOP series. This analysis examines the relationship between support for the political system and tolerance, which generates an index of democratic stability. We found that the results obtained in 2008 are not favorable for Guatemala. In 2008 the percentage of Guatemalans who fall in the "stable democracy" cell decreased significantly, dropping from 26.8% in 2006 to 18.5% in 2008. It is even more worrisome to find that the percentage of people in the "democracy at risk" cell increased from 25.6% in 2006 to 38.4% in 2008. In comparative perspective, this places Guatemala among the countries with the lowest percentage of citizens in the "stable democracy" category, and in third place with regards to countries with attitudes prone to put democracy at risk. As it was explained in the theoretical framework of this chapter, that does not mean that a democratic breakdown will occur, but from the perspective of public support for democracy, the conditions for the development of a stable democracy decreased significantly in 2008.

The chapter tries to shed some light on the reasons that led to this negative outcome. We found that the main cause seems to be the decrease in the levels of political tolerance in the country. One of the components of the stable democracy index, the support for the political system, did not undergo significant changes in 2008, but the other component, tolerance, suffered a setback. It cannot be determined from the available data the causes of such a decrease in the levels of tolerance, but it is likely that the polarization generated during the electoral campaign in 2007 had an effect.

Beyond the analysis of the index of stable democracy, this chapter also examined the legitimacy of the different political institutions in the country, emphasizing the institutions that are part of the justice system. In general terms, it was found that although there was a general decrease in the confidence in institutions, it is not statistically significant in the majority of cases. In comparative perspective, the confidence in the system of justice in Guatemala falls in an intermediate position.

Finally, Chapter VI examined three topics related to democracy: citizens' preferences for democracy or an authoritarian regime, the evaluation about the existing levels of democracy in Guatemala, and the satisfaction with the performance of democracy. Regarding the first topic, it was found that Guatemala is one of the countries where less support for the idea of democracy exists. Only a 57.2% of Guatemalans consider that democracy is always preferable. A high percentage considers that it does not matter and a lower percentage considers that an authoritarian regime could be preferable. In the second topic related to the evaluation about the level of democracy in the country, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate low position compared to other countries. The score given to the level of democracy in the country was 52.3 points in the 0-100 scale used in this study. Finally, in terms of satisfaction with democracy, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate high position, above countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Peru, among others. A comparison across time allows us to see that Guatemalans are more satisfied with the way democracy works in 2008 than in 2006.

Voting Behavior and Political Parties

The last chapter in this report, Chapter VII, addresses the electoral behavior of Guatemalans in the 2007 elections, as well as other general issues regarding political parties and politics. The results of this chapter are mixed. On the one hand, there are positive findings; on the other hand, it is found that Guatemalans show weaknesses that in the long run can affect democratic development.

Among the positive results it was found that the context of freedom to exercise the right to vote improved in Guatemala in 2008, even compared to the recent past. More than 80% of the respondents reported not having any fear to vote in national elections, compared to 72% in 2006. It is also a highly positive finding that the levels of self-reported turnout increased, that is the attendance to the ballot box in the first round of the presidential elections in 2007. Such an increase was particularly noticeable among women, and especially among indigenous women. Even though males still show higher levels of turnout in Guatemala, the tendency on the female side is positive. Some other predictors of turnout in 2007 were higher levels of income, higher levels of education, and middle-age.

This chapter also addressed some other topics related to the electoral behavior of Guatemalans. On the one hand, it was found that in ideological terms Guatemalans continue, as it was found in the 2006 report, placing themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum. There are not big differences in the ideological self-placement of those who voted for any or the three main candidates in 2007. However, it was found that a majority of Guatemalans is in favor of a more active role of the state in terms of public welfare and the redistribution of wealth, issue that frequently is linked to the ideological placement of people. Another topic examined in broad terms was the null vote; we found that some Guatemalans voted in this way due to several reasons, among them the dissatisfaction with the political system or with the candidates. It was also found that almost one third of the respondents reported that they casted a divided vote, that is to say, they voted for a different party for president and for Congress.

The last part of the chapter goes beyond the electoral behavior in the 2007 elections and focuses on the relationship between political parties and citizens. In this sense the findings are not positive. Guatemala is the country in the whole continent where citizens have the lowest level of party identification; only 15.9% reported feeling identified with a political party. In terms of participation in meetings of political parties the situation improves a little comparatively, Guatemala places itself in an intermediate position with an average of 12.3 points.

The last topic addressed was the level of interest in politics that Guatemalans display. The comparative perspective is unfavorable again for Guatemala; it appears as the previous to last country in the continent. The average interest in politics in Guatemala is 24.3 points on a 0-100 scale. That contrasts with the levels of interest displayed by the citizens in other countries in the region, despite the fact that 2007 was an electoral year in Guatemala, which usually increases the interest in politics.

FIRST PART:
THE SAMPLE, THE
THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK AND
THE COMPARISON
AMONG COUNTRIES

Introduction: The Context of Democratic Development in Guatemala and the Description of the Data

The General Context of Democratic Development

The year 2008 represented for Guatemala the 22nd anniversary of the democratic process through which freely elected civilian rulers replaced military governments. During this period, Guatemala has had important advances in its democratizing process, but it still faces serious challenges.

One way to measure the overall advance of democracy in the country is the Freedom House Index, which is the empirical measure most commonly used as an approximation for democracy. Given that this index is annually produced it is useful to assess whether or not there are general changes in the democratic context of every country. In the period of authoritarian governments Guatemala was considered as a “not free” country according to Freedom House classification. After the democratic liberalization, the country has kept in the category of “partially free”, but it has never been considered totally “free”. The combined Freedom House Index is composed of two indicators: political rights and civil liberties, which are combined into an average.³ Such combined index has remained relatively stable for Guatemala, as we can observe in Figure 1, where the 1-7 scale used by Freedom House has been turned into a positive 14 point scale.

³ The Freedom House indicator is measured on a 1-7 scale, where 1 represents a higher level of freedom and 7 a lower level of freedom. Countries with a score between 1.0 and 2.5 are considered as “free”. Countries with scores between 3.0 and 5.0 are considered “partially free” and countries between 5.5 and 7.0 are considered “not free”. These indicators are constructed from several sources. More information regarding the methodology can be found at www.freedomhouse.org.




Figure 1. Freedom House Index for Guatemala

In order to better understand the changes we can see the disaggregation of the two components of the Freedom House Index in Table 1. At the beginning of the democratic process there were advances in terms of civil liberties, but since 1996 Guatemala has constantly obtained 4.0 points, far from the ideal 1.0 point on the 1-7 scale used by Freedom House. In terms of political rights there has been more variation, between 3.0 and 4.0 points. In fact, between 2006 and 2007 there was an improvement in the respect for political rights in the country, which helped to improve the Freedom House Index, which went from 4.0 to 3.5.

Table 1. Freedom House Index for Guatemala, 1990-2007

<i>Year</i>	<i>Freedom House Index</i>	<i>Political Rights</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i>
1990	3.5	3.0	4.0
1991	4.0	3.0	5.0
1992	4.5	4.0	5.0
1993	4.5	4.0	5.0
1994	4.5	4.0	5.0
1995	4.5	4.0	5.0
1996	3.5	3.0	4.0
1997	3.5	3.0	4.0
1998	3.5	3.0	4.0
1999	3.5	3.0	4.0
2000	3.5	3.0	4.0
2001	3.5	3.0	4.0
2002	3.5	3.0	4.0
2003	4.0	4.0	4.0
2004	4.0	4.0	4.0
2005	4.0	4.0	4.0
2006	4.0	4.0	4.0
2007	3.5	3.0	4.0

Source: www.freedomhouse.org and the data base from the Democracy Promotion project.

It is obvious that beyond the global measure of Freedom House, the democratic development in Guatemala can be analyzed from different perspectives (see for instance Azpuru et al 2007). This report merely measures Guatemalans’ public opinion about democracy, and in particular, some aspects related to the prevalent political culture in the country.

One of the most important political events in Guatemala since 2006 –when the previous study on democratic culture was conducted—was undoubtedly the seventh process of general elections in the country. The elections held in September and November of 2007 (first and second round elections) were marked by several cases of political violence on the one hand, but also by positive aspects such as a higher turnout and by international recognition of the elections as clean and valid. Regarding participation, turnout reached 60.2% of the registered citizens.⁴ The winner of the presidential election was engineer Alvaro Colom, candidate for the Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza party. Table 2 presents the final results of those elections.

⁴The total number of registered citizens according to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was 5,990,029. A total of 3,615,867 citizens participated in the September 2008 general elections.

Table 2. Results of the General Elections in Guatemala, 2007

POLITICAL PARTY	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION				LEGISLATIVE ELECTION SEPTEMBER 9		
	FIRST ELECTORAL ROUND SEPTEMBER 9		SECOND ELECTORAL ROUND NOVEMBER 4		TOTAL VOTES	PERCENTAGE(1)	SEATS
	VOTES	PERCENTAGE(1)	VOTES	PERCENTAGE(1)			
1. Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) Candidato: Alvaro Colom	926,236	25.62 (28.25)	1,449,349	50.05 (52.82)	720,285	19.98 (22.84)	51
2. Partido Patriota (PP) Candidato: Otto Pérez Molina	771,813	21.35 (23.54)	1,294,693	44.71 (47.18)	493,791	13.69 (15.66)	29
3. Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN) Candidato: Alejandro Giammattei	565,017	15.63 (17.23)	-	-	521,600	14.47 (16.54)	37
4. Centro de Acción Social (CASA) Candidato: Eduardo Suger	244,373	6.76 (7.45)	-	-	154,718	4.29 (4.88)	5
5. Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) Candidato: Luis Rabbé	239,204	6.62 (7.30)	-	-	306,166	8.49 (9.71)	14
6. Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN) Candidato: Mario Estrada	103,695	2.87 (3.16)	-	-	128,109	3.55 (4.06)	5
7. Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) Candidato: Rigoberta Menchú	100,365	2.78 (3.06)	-	-	194,809	5.40 (6.18)	4
8. Partido Unionista (PU) Candidato: Fritz García-Gallont	95,280	2.64 (2.91)	-	-	192,295	5.33 (6.10)	7
9. Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) Candidato: Oscar Castañeda	83,369	2.31 (2.54)	-	-	143,268	3.98 (4.54)	3
10. URNG-MAIZ Candidato: Miguel Angel Sandoval	70,208	1.94 (2.14)	-	-	112,249	3.11 (3.56)	2
11. Unión Democrática (UD) Candidato: Manuel Conde	24,893	0.68 (0.76)	-	-	44,359	1.23 (1.41)	1
12. Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) Candidato: Pablo Monsanto	19,640	0.53 (0.60)	-	-	43,148	1.19 (1.37)	0
13. DÍA Candidato: Héctor Rosales	18,395	0.50 (0.56)	-	-	45,082	1.25 (1.43)	0
14. Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) Candidato: Marco Cerezo	16,461	0.45 (0.50)	-	-	25,450	0.70 (0.81)	0
15. El Frente (FRENTE) (no presentó candidate presidencial)	n/a	n/a	-	-	28,604	0.79 (0.91)	0
Valid votes	3,278,949	90.68 (100.0)	2,744,042	94.76 (100.0)	3,153,216	87.45 (100.0)	158
Blank ballot	129,184	3.57	50,589	1.75	206,598	5.73	--
Null ballot	207,734	5.75	101,196	3.49	245,905	6.82	--
Total votes	3,615,867	100.0	2,895,827	100.0	3605,719	100.0	--

Source: Azpuru, Dinorah. *Electoral Studies*, 2008. Based on information from Tribunal Supremo Electoral (1) Valid votes in parenthesis.

Finally, it is important to take into account the economic situation in the country in this two-year period. Again, some general indicators can give us a global perspective. Table 3 presents a summary with some economic indicators for the country in this period.

Table 3. Key Economic Indicators for Guatemala

Indicator	2006	2007	Remarks
Rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (1)	5.2	5.7	2007: the highest growth rate in ten years.
Gross Domestic Product (in millions of dollars)	30,338.83	33,532.98	Base year 2001. According to SCN 93 methodology. Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America.
Gross Domestic Product per cápita (in dollars)	2,335.9	2,513.9	Guatemala is a medium income country, however inequality is high.
Accumulated inflation (December)	5.79	8.75	2007: this figure was significantly affected by imported inflation (oil, wheat and corn prices).

Source: ASIES, Política Económica 2004-2008 (Revista ASIES No. 2-2008)

Description of the Guatemalan Data in 2008⁵

The democratic culture study is carried out in Guatemala every two years since 1993. However, in this eighth study we only show the results of the last three years, 2004, 2006, and 2008, given that the sample and the questionnaire employed were systematized at the Latin American regional level only in 2004. In this section we present the general information regarding the sample as well as several figures that show its composition.

In order to study the values, attitudes, and behavior in a democracy it is necessary to take into account all the citizens, not only the leaders, citizens who participate or the inhabitants of the largest cities. In this way, it is possible to know what all people believe, not only those who appear in the debates in the media. In order to draw valid conclusions for all the Guatemalans, we selected a relatively small group of people, called the sample, which has similar characteristics to the whole country. The sample is a “Guatemala in miniature” that includes as many similar proportions to the real population as possible, that is to say, people from different ethnicities, gender, age, religions and income, among other characteristics.

The sample used in this study is designed to include all adult Guatemalans who live and is based on the 2002 Census. In order to avoid biases when selecting respondents, we used a probabilistic design, that is to say, people were selected by a process similar to a

⁵ This section was prepared by Dinorah Azpuru and Juan Pablo Pira.

draw. Given that this kind of procedure may underrepresent some regions, we divide the country into several regions and we select a sample in each of them. This procedure is known as stratification, and each region is called stratum. This study used five strata: Metropolitan Area, Northeastern, Southeastern, Southwestern, and Northwestern⁶

Within each stratum, if we employed a draw without the proper care, we would run the risk of including more people from urban areas, given that these areas are more crowded. To avoid this problem, in each stratum we repeated the procedure of separating the citizens, this time into two areas, urban and rural, and we drew a sample for each area within each stratum. This kind of design where population is separated in several levels is known as stratified design.

The level of precision in a sample is established considering two parameters: reliability and maximum error. The maximum error refers to how much the results of a sample differ from the results we could obtain from a similar sample. The maximum error is sometimes interpreted as the maximum difference that could exist between the people in the sample and the total population. Although it would be desirable to have an error of zero, it is unavoidable to have small differences in the results when we select a smaller group from the population. Furthermore, since we have selected people using a procedure similar to a draw, it is possible that due to “bad luck” people in the sample have different opinions to those in the real population. Reliability tells in how many cases the reported results differ from the population in general, in a quantity smaller than the maximum error. For instance, when we say that we have a maximum error of 2.9% with a reliability of 95% we are affirming that at the most, one out of the 20 reported proportions have a greater difference of 2.9% than that we would have obtained if we had asked all the adults in Guatemala.

The sample in this 2008 study included 1,538 people, and we work with different levels of precision depending on the group we want to analyze. It is important to clarify that the sample only includes Guatemalans older than 18 years. In the Appendix we show the maximum error for each group (all with a reliability of 95%), as well as the details of the design errors. For the 2008 study we aggregated estimation with rejection which was calculated at the stratum level. The detail of this estimation and its effect on the maximum error appears in the Appendix. The collection of data, that is to say the field work, was carried out in February 2008.

Next, we present a series of figures that show the sample distribution in 2004, 2006, and 2008 in terms of the basic sociodemographic variables. In the first one, Figure 2 we can observe the sample distribution by region. Around one fifth of the respondents belong to the Metropolitan Area, while the region with the largest number of respondents is the Northwest. The number of interviews in each region is determined by the population size in each of them. We have tried to keep a balance in the proportion of surveys in each region across time.

⁶ For a complete description of the sample, see the Appendix.




Figure 2. Distribution of the sample by region

Next, it is important to know the sample distribution by gender. As we observe in Figure 3, we established quotas by gender; around half of the respondents were female and half male.




Figure 3. Distribution of the sample by gender

A third characteristic of the sample that is important to highlight is the age of the respondents. Guatemala is essentially a young country, so it is hardly surprising that the majority of respondents (around half) are younger than 35 years old. In the 2008 sample, as we can observe in Figure 4, almost a third part of the respondents is between 26 and 35 years old, while a fifth is between 18 and 25. As it is common in all the studies on political behavior, we only interviewed people over 18 who are legally authorized to exercise their political rights, such as voting.




Figure 4. Distribution of the sample by age

Another sociodemographic characteristic that can have an important effect on the behavior and political attitudes is education, particularly in a country like Guatemala, where an important part of the population is illiterate or has few years of formal education. Figure 5 shows that the bulk of the sample has some primary education, while around the 15% has no formal education. The percentage with some university education is low. It is worth highlighting that we asked to the respondents how many years of education they had completed and the categorization in educational levels was done afterwards. To analyze the data, we grouped under the primary category those who said that they had between one and six years of education, under the secondary those between seven and nine years of formal education. The superior category included people who said that they had twelve or more years of education.




Figure 5. Distribution of the sample by education level

Guatemala is one of the Latin American countries with the highest proportion of rural population. As we observe in Figure 6, more than half of the sample includes people who live in rural areas in every year. It is noteworthy that is urban-rural categorization is designed according to the Census and it is not a product of the question asked to the respondents.




Figure 6. Distribution of the sample by residence

Finally, there is an essential sociodemographic characteristic that makes Guatemala different from the majority of countries in Latin America, the ethnic diversity in the country, in particular the high proportion of indigenous Mayan population. Several studies have found that the most appropriate way to measure ethnicity in this kind of studies, is asking respondents for their self-identification. Ethnic self-identification is more accurate than the categorization that the interviewer could do. In the case of Guatemala, we asked respondents whether they considered themselves indigenous, ladino, garifuna, or belonging to any other ethnic group. The results are shown in Figure 7. Around 40% of the respondents identified themselves as indigenous in all years. In the “other” category we included those self-identified as garifuna or belonging to any other ethnic group.⁷

⁷ The results are similar to those in the 2002 Census.




Figure 7. Distribution of the sample by ethnic self-identification

Chapter I . Building Support for Stable Democracy⁸

Theoretical Framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).⁹ Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place over night. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested over a half

⁸ This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

⁹ This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *gobernanza*¹⁰).¹¹ Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

Working Hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.¹² Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely

¹⁰ Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

¹¹ According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

¹² We emphasize *support for stable democracy*, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).¹³ Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.¹⁴ The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not

¹³ Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

¹⁴ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule.

In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) **Belief in democracy as the best possible system:** Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) **Belief in the core values on which democracy depends:** Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) **Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:** the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) **Belief that others can be trusted:** Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn¹⁵:

Support for the Idea of Democracy

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillean concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

(ING4): Democracy may have problems, but is better than any other type of government.

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.¹⁶ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

¹⁵ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

¹⁶ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I-1. Support for democracy in comparative perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

Support for Core Values on Which Democracy Depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.¹⁷

Th scale is based on the following three items. To what extent would you approve or disapprove...

E5. That people participate in demonstrations allowed by the law.

E8. That people participate in an organization or group to try to solve community problems.

E11. That people work in electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in Figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

¹⁷ Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7.




Figure I-2. Support for the right of public contestation in comparative perspective

B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches

or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

There are persons who always speak negatively about the form of government of (country), not only the incumbent government, but the form of government. How strongly would you approve or disapprove the right of those persons to...

D1. Vote

D2. Carry out public demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view

D3. Run for public office

D4. Give a speech on television

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60 points, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (D5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.




Figure I-3. Political tolerance in comparative perspective

Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than other alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that sustain democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975;

Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹⁸ based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

- B14.** To what degree do you trust the National Government?
- B10A.** To what degree do you trust the Justice System?
- B31.** To what degree do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?
- B13.** To what degree do you trust Congress?
- B21.** To what degree do you trust political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, just barely has a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

¹⁸ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.




Figure I-4. Political legitimacy of core regime institutions in comparative perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measurement of trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I.5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I-5. Political legitimacy of core regime institutions in comparative perspective (without trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

Social Capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in other individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and

performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Now, talking about the people here, would you say that the people of your community are very reliable, somewhat reliable, not very reliable, not reliable at all?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure I-6. Interpersonal trust in comparative perspective

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

SECOND PART:
GOVERNANCE

Chapter II . Corruption and its Impact on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical Framework¹⁹

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, the reporting of and the discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

¹⁹ This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”²⁰ Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger study soon to be published consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.²¹ And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however, to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

The Measurement of Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997;

²⁰ USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html) February.

²¹ The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

In this chapter the focus is on three variables: corruption victimization, that is to say whether or not citizens have been victims of an act of corruption, the total number of kinds of corruption victimization, and finally, the perceptions that people have of corruption among public officials.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

	INAP Did not try or did not have contact	No	Ye s	DK/DR
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...				
EXC2. Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during the past year?		0	1	8
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	8
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No <input type="checkbox"/> mark 9 If it is Yes <input type="checkbox"/> ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No <input type="checkbox"/> mark 9 If it is Yes <input type="checkbox"/> ask the following: At your workplace, have you been bribed within the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No <input type="checkbox"/> note down 9 If it is Yes <input type="checkbox"/> ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. Have you use any public health services during the past year? If the answer is No <input type="checkbox"/> mark 9 If it is Yes <input type="checkbox"/> ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No <input type="checkbox"/> mark 9 If it is Yes <input type="checkbox"/> ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	9	0	1	8

Furthermore, the survey includes the following question on citizens' perception of corruption:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is (1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (8) DK/DR

Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

In order to evaluate in depth the scope of the Guatemalan results, it is important to compare them with the results from other countries in the Latin American region and in general, with other countries in the Western Hemisphere. This way, we can have parameters regarding how positive or negative the situation in Guatemala is.

Figure II-1 shows the results of the first variable in comparative perspective. The bar corresponding to Guatemala appears in a different color in order to demonstrate clarity in comparison. As we can observe, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position regarding corruption victimization. While in the country a 19.6% of citizens said that they had been a victim of any kind of act of corruption in the last year, the results are more positive than in Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina and above all, Mexico, Bolivia and Haiti, where one third of the population reported having been victimized. The extreme case is Haiti, where half of the population said that they had have victims of an act of corruption. In comparison with Guatemala, however, there are many countries with lower levels of corruption victimization. Even the rest of countries in Central America show lower rates of corruption victimization, being Panama the country that displays the lowest level.




Figure II-1. Victimization of corruption in comparative perspective

Figure II-2 shows, on the other hand, citizens’ perception regarding the corruption of public officials in each country. It is noteworthy that Guatemala finds itself among the countries with the higher levels of perceived corruption. On a 0-100 scale, Guatemala scores an average of 80.4 points, only exceeded by Argentina and Jamaica. The countries with the lower levels of corruption perception are Canada, and oddly, Haiti, despite being the country where citizens reported the highest levels of corruption victimization. This could be due to that, compared to the past, Haitian people perceive less corruption, though the levels of corruption are still high.




Figure II-2. Perception of corruption in comparative perspective

Analysis of the Guatemalan Case

After having observed the results of corruption victimization and the perception of corruption in the different countries, we now analyze in-depth the case of Guatemala. This analysis will be carried out through the analysis of the data obtained in the 2008 survey, but we will also present some comparisons across time to determine whether or not changes have occurred over time.

The Extent of Corruption Victimization

One first question to pay attention to is the frequency with which Guatemalans are victims of any act of corruption. Using the scale mentioned before, Figure II-3 shows how many times the respondents reported having been victims of acts of corruption in different governmental instances. The majority of the population, an 80.4% said that they did not experience any acts of corruption in the last year. Of course, this does not mean that they were never victimized in previous years. A 14.4% said that they had being victimized by one act of corruption in the past 12 months, while only a 2.8% said that they had being victimized by two acts and 2.4% by more than three. The total percentage of corruption victimization is the sum of those who have being victimized one or more times, that is to say, 19.6%.




Figure II-3. Index of corruption victimization in Guatemala, 2008

It is important to analyze whether or not the levels of corruption victimization have increased, decreased or kept more or less constant over the last few years. As we can observe from Figure II-4, the percentage of victimization increased slightly in 2008 compared to 2004 and 2006, but such difference is not statistically significant.²²

²²As we pointed out before, we can observe if the difference is statistically significant looking at the lines above the bars. Those lines represent the confidence intervals for each year. If lines overlap, there is not statistically significance. Those differences are significant when the lines separate clearly




Figure II-4. Percentage of the population victimized by corruption, 2004-2008

Predictors of Corruption Victimization

In every society there are a series of factors that can influence corruption victimization to a greater or lesser extent. Through an analysis of multivariate regression we can identify the factors or variables that are statistically associated with a higher levels of victimization. Among the potential factors, we can test some socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, such as the region or the size of the city or town. Some other factors could be age, gender, education, income (or wealth), even some variables such as the perception about the family economy.

Figure II-5 shows the factors that are related to corruption victimization in Guatemala. This figure, as well as similar figures in other chapters in this study, must be interpreted as follows: the horizontal lines that separate the vertical line represent the factors or variables where there is a statistically significant relationship. For instance, in Figure II-5 we see that only wealth, age, gender, and level of education, are variables that appear associated with a higher level of corruption victimization in Guatemala. In contrast, neither ethnic self-identification, regions, number of children, economic perception nor size of city are relevant factors predicting who is more prone to be a victim of an act of corruption. Although in some countries the explanatory

variables –that is to say the factors associated with a higher victimization- can be similar, the model of victimization tends to be different in each country.²³




Figure II-5. Factors associated to corruption victimization

The same relationship between corruption victimization and the aforementioned factors appears in the table in the Appendix. The factors or significant variables are those with an asterisk.

In order to see clearly the relationship between corruption victimization and the factors that, according to Figure II-5 are statistically related with it, we present a series of bivariate figures.²⁴

In the first of these figures, Figure II-6, we can observe that men are more prone to be victims of acts of corruption in Guatemala. While the percentage of men who reported that they had been victims of at least one act of corruption in 2007 was 22.7%, only 16.4% of women reported being victims.

²³To see the explanatory variables in each country, reports for each country included in the AmericasBarometer project can be found at www.lapopsurveys.org

²⁴It is noteworthy that in the graphs that show bivariate relationships, the lines of the confidence intervals not always show a statistically significant difference. However, the table in the appendix verifies that the difference is statistically significant. What matters is the multivariate relationship.




Figure II-6. Corruption victimization by gender

A second sociodemographic characteristic associated with higher levels of corruption victimization in Guatemala is education. As we can observe from Figure II-7, the higher the level of education, the higher the likelihood of being victim of an act of corruption in the country. Whereas the 44.8% of the respondents with superior education reported having been victims, only 24.7% of those with secondary education was a victim. The contrast is even sharper with those who have primary education or no education whatsoever. At this level, less than 15% said that they had been victims of any act of corruption at least once.




Figure II-7. Corruption victimization by education

Age in Guatemalans also an explanatory factor of corruption victimization. The relationship, however, unlike the case of education, is not linear; in other words, middle-age Guatemalans are those with higher levels of probability of being victims. This relationship is clearly observed in Figure II-8. Young Guatemalans, from 18 to 25, are less prone to be victims than Guatemalans between 26 and 36 years, but they are more prone to be victims than Guatemalans older than 36. Guatemalans older than 36 are less likely to be victims. This may be due to the frequency with which they have contact with the government offices.




Figure II-8. Corruption victimization by age

A final characteristic or variable that turned out to be statistically associated with higher levels of corruption victimization in Guatemala was the level of wealth, measured by the number of goods in the household.²⁵ Figure II-9 shows how there is a positive relationship between the two variables: the higher the wealth, the higher the possibility of being a victim of an act of corruption in Guatemala. Although this relationship is not so evident for the lower levels of wealth, it is clear for the upper levels, that is to say, Guatemalans with six or more capital goods are more prone to be victims of corruption.

²⁵ Given that in developing countries like Guatemala there is a high percentage of people in the informal sector, without a regular source of income, or that due to questions of personal security some respondents prefer not to say their level of income, the best way to measure the socioeconomic level of a person is to ask her how many goods she has in her household. With the sum of all those items we construct a wealth index. Among these goods we find television, fridge, washing machine, vehicle, and computer.




Figure II-9. Corruption victimization by wealth

Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy

The multivariate analysis used in this study allows us to see the impact that corruption can have on the political system, and more specifically, on the support for stable democracy.

In order to measure this, we tested some statistical models using as dependent variables the five measurements of support for stable democracy pointed out in the theoretical framework of this study: support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance (or support for the right of citizen inclusiveness), the legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust. The table with the different models can be found in the Appendix of this study. These models show that corruption victimization does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on any of the variables of support for stable democracy in Guatemala.

The scope of the perception of corruption

Even though corruption victimization is a serious problem that may affect the development of the democratic process, a relatively small percentage of the population is a direct victim of acts of corruption in governmental offices. Nevertheless, we could expect that the perception of corruption in the government is higher than the victimization itself. This is because many scandals of corruption do not involve citizens, such as embezzlement of public funds, the overestimation in

the public expenditure, the favoritism toward relatives or friends in public appointments, etc. The media, on the other hand, do not report the acts of corruption occurred day by day, but they widely cover other kinds of acts of corruption committed by public officials.

Figure II-10 shows that a high percentage of Guatemalans (62.8%) considers that corruption in the government is very common, while 20% considers that government corruption is somewhat common. In total, an 82.8% of the population perceives that there is little corruption and only 4.1% said that corruption is not common.




Figure II-10. Perception of corruption in Guatemala, 2008

The impact of the perception of corruption on the support for stable democracy

It is also important to analyze not only the scope of the corruption perception but also the impact that it can have on the political system. As we did in the last section, using multivariate analysis we can measure the impact of corruption perception on the five key variables of support for stable democracy. The table with the different regression models can be found in the Appendix. As we can observe, a higher perception of corruption leads to a decrease in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. This relationship can be better observed in Figure II.11. The average legitimacy of the institutions among those who think that corruption is not widespread is higher, reaching a score near 48 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study. On the contrary,

those who believe that corruption is widespread give an average of less than 40 points of confidence to the political institutions as a whole.




Figure II-11. Impact of the perception of corruption in the legitimacy of institutions

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have analyzed the topic of corruption victimization and the perception of corruption in Guatemala. Regarding the direct corruption victimization, we found that 19.6% of Guatemalans have been victims of at least one act of governmental corruption in the last year, which places the country in an intermediate position at continental level. The corruption in 2008 was slightly higher than in previous years, but the difference is not statistically significant. As in previous years, men, middle age citizens, and those with higher levels of education and income, are more prone to be victims of corruption. Finally, the statistical methods used show that such corruption victimization, at least in 2008, does not have a direct effect on the variables used to measure the support for stable democracy in the country.

The other big issue addressed in this chapter was the perception of corruption in public officials. In this regard, Guatemala finds itself among the countries where the perception of corruption is the highest, reaching an average of 80.4 points on the 0-100 scale we use in this study. Such a perception has an impact on the support for democracy, more specifically on the

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legitimacy of political institutions: those who perceive higher levels of corruption tend to have lower confidence in institutions.

Chapter III . Crime and its Impact on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical Framework²⁶

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not

²⁶ This section was written by the team at LAPOP Central.

resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents would be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was large an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.²⁷ According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,²⁸ says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”²⁹ In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.³⁰ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with

²⁷In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

²⁸According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

²⁹Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/r1970717.htm).

³⁰Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.³¹

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

The Measurement of Crime Victimization

In this chapter, we will focus on two variables: crime victimization and the perception of personal security. On the one hand, we measure whether the respondents have been or not victims of a criminal act in the last year, and on the other hand, we measure to what extent they feel safe

³¹The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

in their neighborhoods. The specific questions included in the LAPOP questionnaire in several countries of the Western hemisphere are the following:

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/DR

Comparative Perspective

As we did in the previous chapter, we first present a comparative perspective with other countries. We do not present the results of crime victimization, given that as we explained in the theoretical framework there are several interpretations about how to measure crime and delinquency. However, we observe in Figure III-1 the comparative perception of the existent insecurity. The results show the average for the different countries, on the 0-100 scale used in this study.

As we can see, Guatemala finds itself in a low-intermediate position, with an average of 39.6 points. There are other countries where the perception of insecurity is higher, such as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Uruguay, Paraguay, Honduras, El Salvador, Brazil, and Mexico. It is worth highlighting that in general, urban areas in Latin America present much higher levels of crime than rural areas, being Ciudad de Guatemala one of them. However, Guatemala is one of the countries in the region with the highest proportion of rural population, which makes national averages of crime victimization and perception of crime lower than in other mainly urban countries. Figure III-7 shows clearly that in Guatemala City and other urban areas, the levels of crime victimization is much higher than in rural areas.




Figure III-1. Perception of insecurity in comparative perspective

Analysis of the Guatemalan Case

Once we have observed the results of crime victimization and the perception of personal security in the different Latin American countries, we will analyze in-depth the case of Guatemala. We will look at the data obtained in the 2008 survey, although we will also present when relevant, the longitudinal comparison, in order to determine whether or not there have been changes across time.

Levels of crime victimization

First, it is important to determine the percentage of people that have been victims of crime in the last 12 months. The longitudinal results can be observed in Figure III-2. As we can observe, the total percentage of respondents that at the beginning of 2008 said that they had been victims of crime in the last year was 17.1%, which represents a slight decrease compared with the 19.2% in 2006, but it is higher than the 12.8% that reported being victims in 2004. The difference between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant, although it is in relation to 2004.³²




Figure III-2. Crime victimization in Guatemala, 2004-2008

³² As we pointed out before, we can observe whether the difference is statistically significant by the lines above each bar. Those lines represent the confidence intervals in the results of each year. If those lines overlap, there is not statistically significant difference. There are only statistically significant differences when the lines separate clearly one from another.

Predictors of crime victimization

As we pointed out in the last chapter, we can obtain a profile of those Guatemalans who are more prone to be victims of crime through multivariate analysis. Figure III-3 (and its respective table in the appendix) shows the factors or variables associated with higher victimization. These factors are size of the city/town, level of wealth, age and gender. The direction of the relationship will be shown later.




Figure III-3. Probability to be a victim of crime in Guatemala, 2008

In the respective table in the Appendix we can observe with greater detail the variables that are associated with higher levels of crime victimization (those with an asterisk are statistically significant). As we can observe in the previous figure, there are several factors or variables that can influence being or not a victim of crime in Guatemala. Women and those who live in small towns, are less likely to be victims; on the contrary, we find a positive relationship with the socioeconomic level of the respondent: wealthier people are more prone to be victims. Age is another variable that results associated to crime victimization, but in this relationship is also negative, meaning that younger Guatemalans are more likely to be victims. The following figures show these associations.

First, Figure III-4 shows the relationship between victimization and gender. The percentage of women who reported having been victims of crime in the last year was 15.4%, while in the case of men, this percentage increases to 18.7%.³³




Figure III-4. Crime victimization by gender

³³ It is worth mentioning that in the figures that show bivariate relationships, the lines of the confidence intervals not always show that the difference is statistically significant. However, in the corresponding table in the appendix we can verify that the relationship is statistically significant. What matters is the multivariate relationship.

Another factor associated with higher levels of crime victimization is age. As we can observe in Figure III-5 people younger than 25 are more prone to be victims. The tendency is clear, as age increases, the probability of being a victim decreases. The relationship is almost linear, the younger, the higher the probability of being victim.




Figure III-5. Crime victimization by age

Another factor related to crime victimization is the socioeconomic level of the respondent. Figure III-6 shows clearly that those with higher income (in this case those with more capital goods) are more likely to be victims.³⁴




Figure III-6. Crime victimization by wealth

³⁴ The situation in the highest category of income (those who have more than 8 items) is less evident; it appears a slight decrease in victimization. That can be because people with higher income tend to take more measures of protection such as alarms, private police, among others.

Finally, the size of the city or town where the respondent lives has an impact on the probability of being a victim. Figure III-7 shows clearly that those who live in Guatemala City (the capital of the country) or in large cities have higher probabilities of being victims of a criminal act. This is particular evident in the capital, where the average is 33.9 points on the 0-100 scale, while in rural areas the average is 11.3 points. It is worth recalling that (see Figure 6 in this report) that the 53.4% of the population in Guatemala lives in rural areas, which may indicate that the general rate of crime victimization in the country is lower than in other countries where the majority of the population lives in urban areas, where in general there are higher levels of victimization.




Figure III-7. Crime victimization by size of city

The impact of victimization on the support for stable democracy

As we pointed out in the last section, it is important to know the distribution of crime victimization. However, it is necessary to go beyond this description and try to understand the impact that victimization may have on the political system. A multivariate analysis allows us to understand this impact. In the appendix we can find the table with the regressions showing the relationship between crime victimization and the five basic variables of support for stable democracy pointed out in Chapter I. This analysis shows that crime victimization, in the case of Guatemala, has a statistically significant impact only on one of those variables, the legitimacy of political institutions. Figure III-8 depicts how those who said having being victims of crime in the last year have an average of confidence in the political institutions of 37.5 points (on the 0-100 scale), while those who were not victims show an average of 43.5 points.




Figure III-8. Impact of crime victimization on the legitimacy of institutions

The perception of personal insecurity

Now we analyse the perception of security/insecurity among Guatemalans. As we pointed out before, such perception is measured in this study through an item that asked to what extent

people feel safe in their neighbourhoods. Figure III-9 shows that in 2008 the perception of insecurity decreased in comparison to 2006. While in 2006 the average of insecurity on the 0-100 scale was of 42.6 points, this figure dropped to 39.6 in 2008. The difference is not statistically significant. However, there is a statistically significant difference with the same question in 2004.




Figure III-9. Perception of insecurity in Guatemala, 2004-2008

The impact of the perception of insecurity on the support for stable democracy

Again, we resort to a multivariate analysis in order to determine the impact of the perception of insecurity on the support for stable democracy. The analysis yields two relationships. On the one hand, we see that those Guatemalans who feel safer are more likely to support political institutions; on the other hand, those who feel less safe tend to show lower levels of interpersonal trust. Both relationships are shown in the following figures.

First, we see clearly in Figure III-10 that the average of legitimacy (or support) for political institutions is higher among those who said feeling safe in their neighbourhood (exceeding the 50 points on the 0-100 scale in the case of those said feeling “very safe” in their neighbourhood). The relationship is linear there on, dropping close to 35 points in the case of those feeling somewhat unsafe or very unsafe.




Figure III-10. Impact of the perception of insecurity on institutional legitimacy

Finally, Figure III-11 shows the relationship between perception of insecurity and interpersonal trust. Those who feel more unsafe have lower levels of interpersonal trust. That trust reaches almost 75 points on the 0-100 scale for those who said feeling “very safe” in their neighborhood. The relationship is linear there on, with interpersonal trust falling to a level of 50 points in the case of those who said feeling “very unsafe”.




Figure III-11. Impact of the perception of insecurity on interpersonal trust

Conclusions

In this chapter we have analyzed the topic of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity in Guatemala. Regarding the level of crime victimization we found that 17.1% of Guatemalans said having been victims of some act of crime in the last year, which places the country in an intermediate position at continental level. Crime victimization in 2008 is slightly lower than in previous years, but the difference is not statistically significant. The main predictors of crime victimization are diverse. Men, young people (between 18 and 25 years old), people with higher socioeconomic status, and those who live in large cities or in the capital are more likely to be victims of crime.

Finally, the statistical models employed show that crime victimization has an impact on one of the variables used in this study to measure support for stable democracy in the country, the legitimacy of the political institutions. Those Guatemalans who have been victims of crime have an average of 37.7 points of confidence in institutions, while those who have not been victims have 43.5 points.

The other big issue addressed in this chapter was the perception of insecurity. We found that this perception decreased slightly in 2008, reaching an average of 39.6 points; however, the difference is not statistically significant with previous years. In comparison to other countries in the continent, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position. Such perception of insecurity has an impact on two of the variables that measure support for democracy, specifically on the legitimacy of political institutions and on interpersonal trust. Those who perceive greater insecurity tend to have less trust in institutions and less trust in other persons.

Chapter IV . The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework³⁵

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America, Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most

³⁵ Parts of this section were written by Daniel Montalvo.

local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).³⁶

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cáliz and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystallized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played

³⁶ There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

and active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that rules in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple association express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government's responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (**civpart**). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and

local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

The questions used to capture these issues were the following:

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given **more responsibilities?** [Read options]

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) Somewhat more to the central government
- (3) The same amount to the central government and the municipality
- (4) Some more to the municipality
- (5) Much more to the municipality
- (88) DK/DA

LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? [Read options]

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Some more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the municipality
- (4) Some more the municipality
- (5) Much more the municipality
- (88) DK/DA

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing are...? [Read options]

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know

Measuring Civil Society Participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (as in “community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.³⁷ The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in the organizations listed below.³⁸

³⁷ This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

³⁸ The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and to take the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR		
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8		CP6
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them....	1	2	3	4	8		CP7
CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8		CP8
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8		CP9
CP10. Meetings of a labor union? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8		CP10
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political movement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8		CP13
CP20. [Women only] Associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (Male)	CP20

Comparative Perspective

First, we present the comparison with the countries included in the 2008 study. The first of these comparisons is related to the trust in the municipal government. As we see in Figure IV-1 Guatemala gets a positive result in this measure, finding itself among the countries with the highest levels of confidence in the local government. It should be remembered that the question refers to the trust in the municipality where the respondent lives. Guatemalans give an average of 56.1 points to their municipality, above citizens in countries such as Costa Rica, United States, Brazil and Argentina. Only citizens of Dominican Republic, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and El Salvador have a higher average, but except for the Dominican Republic, the difference between these countries and Guatemala is not statistically significant.³⁹

³⁹ As we pointed out before, we can observe if the difference is statistically significant through the lines above the bars. Such lines represent the confidence intervals for the results in each country. If lines overlap there is not statistically significant difference. The only case when such differences are significant is when lines are clearly apart from each other.




Figure IV-1. Trust in local government in comparative perspective, 2008

The following comparison among countries is related to the support for the decentralization of responsibilities given by citizens to the governmental instance in charge of providing public services. Figure IV-2 shows that Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position, with an average of 49.7 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study. The difference among countries is not statistically significant for the majority of the cases. On the one hand, only Bolivia stands out, obtaining a significant difference higher than the rest of countries. At the other extreme, only Panama, Haiti and Honduras obtained significant lower results than the rest of countries.




Figure IV-2. Support for decentralization of responsibilities in comparative perspective

Decentralization has become an important mechanism in the development processes in Latin American. As we pointed out in the theoretical framework of this chapter, not only it is important to decentralize the decision-making process, but also the resources assigned to local governments so that they can carry out their development programs. Figure IV-3 shows the public support for the decentralization of economic resources in comparative perspective. We observe that Guatemala is located at an intermediate position, with an average score of 48.4 points on the 0-100 scale. Considering all the countries, Costa Rica displays a more favorable position than the

rest of countries, which is statistically significant. At the other extreme, Haiti and Honduras show a significant lower support for the decentralization of resources.




Figure IV-3. Support for the decentralization of economic resources in comparative perspective

Another aspect that it is important to analyze in comparative perspective is the satisfaction with the local services provided by the municipal government. In this sense, Figure IV-4 shows how Guatemala appears among the five first countries in terms of satisfaction with local services, with an average score of 55.0 (on the 0-100 scale). Again, we observe that there are few statistically significant differences among countries. Only in Haiti and in Jamaica the support is lower. In these countries satisfaction is lower than 40 points on the same scale.




Figure IV-4. Satisfaction with the services of the local government in comparative perspective

Analysis of the Guatemalan case

Now we will analyze in depth the situation in Guatemala regarding citizens' perspectives on their local government. We observed in the comparative figures of the last section, that in general terms Guatemala obtains favorable results relative to other countries on this topic.

Citizens and local government

It is important the comparison between trust in the local government and trust in the national government in Guatemala. We observe in Figure IV-5 that there is a statistically significant difference. The local government obtains a higher score (56.1 points) than the national government (50.1 points).




Figure IV-5. Comparison of trust in municipal and national government in Guatemala, 2008

How citizens are linked to their local governments is an important aspect that may affect the democratic development in any country. One way to measure this is evaluating whether citizens participate in municipal meetings. The result in Guatemala for 2008 appears in Figure IV-6. Participation in these meetings is relatively low, only 14% of the respondents said having attended a municipal meeting in the last year.




Figure IV-6. Participation in meetings of the local government

It is also important to know if that participation at municipal level has changed across time. It would be desirable to find an increase along time. Figure IV-7 shows that there is a significant increase between 2006 and 2008 in terms of participation in meetings called by the municipality, from 7.4% in 2006 to 14% in 2008. However, the levels of participation reported in 2005 were higher, with around 17.3% said having attended those meetings.




Figure IV-7. Participation in municipal meetings in Guatemala, 2004-1008

It citizens do not want to participate in the meetings called by their municipality; there are mechanisms through which they can express their opinion. One the main mechanisms in developed democracies is presenting requests to the government, in particular related to collective interest topics. Only a 12% of the Guatemalans citizens said having presented a request or demand to the local government.




Figure IV-8. Presentation of requests to the local government

Again, we try to observe if there are differences, and particularly improvements, year after year. Figure IV-9 shows that there are not major changes in the percentage of citizens who presented a request to their municipal government in 2006 and 2008. However, there is a statistically significant difference between 2004 and 2008, such participation in fact decreased significantly in 2008.




Figure IV-9. Presentation of requests to the local government in Guatemala, 2004-2008

Predictors of support for decentralization

As we did in previous chapters, it is important to go beyond the description of the results. Again, we use here inferential statistics in order to determine the association among variables. In this case, we try to determine whether satisfaction with local services impacts the support for decentralization of responsibilities. The result of this equation appears in Figure IV-10 (and in its respective table in the Appendix). As we can observe in both, satisfaction with local services does not appear to have impact on the support for decentralization of responsibilities. Only education is an explanatory factor of the support for such decentralization.




Figure IV-10. Probability of supporting the decentralization of responsibilities

To better understand the relationship between education and support for decentralization of responsibilities we can observe Figure IV-11. This figure shows that for the first levels of education there is a linear relationship: as the level of education increases, the probability of supporting decentralization of responsibilities increases. However, that changes at the upper levels of education given that those with some level of superior education tend to be less prone to support decentralization, although they are significantly more prone to support for it than those without education or with some primary education.




Figure IV-11. Support for the decentralization of responsibilities by education in Guatemala

The same model that we employed to predict the factors associated with a higher support for decentralization of responsibilities is now used to predict the support for the decentralization of economic resources. We observe in Figure IV-12 (and in its corresponding Table in the Appendix) that in this case, satisfaction with the services provided by the local government does have an effect on the support for decentralization of economic resources. Education, again, stands out as an explanatory factor. The rest of variables included in the equation, such as size of the city, gender, or ethnic self-identification, among others, are not significant to explain the support for a greater decentralization of economic resources.




Figure IV-12. Probability to support the decentralization of economic resources

Again, in order to make easier the understanding of these relationships, we present the following figures. Figure IV-13 shows that, similarly to the support for decentralization of responsibilities, Guatemalans with secondary education are more prone to support the decentralization of economic resources. Those with superior education support for it more than those without education or with some level of primary education, but not as much as those with secondary education.




Figure IV-13. Support for the decentralization of economic resources by education

Finally, regarding local government, Figure IV-14 shows how a higher satisfaction with local services has a positive impact on the support for decentralization of economic resources. It is clear that those who consider that local services are good or fair tend to have higher support more such decentralization.




Figure IV-14. Support for the decentralization of economic resources and satisfaction with the services of the local government

As we presented in the previous chapters in this report, we tried to measure if satisfaction with local services in Guatemala has any effect on the key variables of support for stable democracy. We found that there is not such a relationship. The details can be seen in the regressions in the Appendix of this study.

Levels and effects of civil participation in Guatemala

Now we will address another set of issues regarding citizens' participation. We will try in this section to measure the scope of the civic participation in Guatemala, that is to say the participation in instances of the so-called civil society, where government institutions are not involved.

First, we present a series of figures that show how Guatemalans participate in meetings of different social groups unrelated to government, being these religious groups, parents' associations at school, committees or associations for community improvement and women groups. The first figures show a comparative perspective.

Figure IV.15 illustrates how Guatemalans have high levels of participation in religious groups (of different denominations). Guatemala finds itself in the third position regarding participation in these kinds of groups, with an average of 73.2 on the 0-100 scale used here. Only in Haiti and Jamaica citizens participate more in these groups. Dominican Republic presents a score similar to Guatemala. Below these four countries, the levels of participation decrease significantly, being the most secular countries Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. It is noteworthy that Guatemala is similar to countries in the Caribbean, but it obtains higher results than the rest of Hispanic America, United States and Canada.




Figure IV-15. Participation in meetings of religious organizations in comparative perspective

Next, we present Figure IV-6, where we can observe the level of civil participation in meetings of parents' associations at school. Again, Guatemala obtains favorable results in terms of participation, reaching the fifth position, only surpassed by Haiti, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. The average of Guatemalans' participation in meetings of parents' associations at school is 49.1 points. Haiti appears at the top, with a statistically significant difference with the rest of countries. The rest of differences are not significant, with the exception of Argentina, Panama, Canada, and the United States where participation in those associations is lower.




Figure IV-16. Participation in school parents' associations in comparative perspective

Figure IV-17 displays the comparison in the levels of participation in meetings of a committee or association for community improvement. As we can observe, Guatemala again shows high levels of participation in these groups, with an average score of 39.6 points on a 0-100 scale. Guatemala is only exceeded by Canada, Bolivia and Haiti. The differences between the first two and Guatemala are statistically significant. From there on, the level of participation decreases until we get to the countries where participation is lower such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.




Figure IV-17. Participation in meetings of committees for community improvement in comparative perspective

The last comparative figure shows the levels of participation in women groups. Guatemala is at the top, close to Haiti, as we can observe in Figure IV-18. The average obtained by Guatemala is 24.0 points on a 0-100 scale. We must note that this question was only asked to women. The differences between Guatemala—along with Haiti, Bolivia, Peru, Jamaica, and Dominican Republic—and the majority of countries are statistically significant. Countries where participation is lower are El Salvador, Colombia, as well as Venezuela, Argentina, and Uruguay. The case of Guatemala seems to be paradoxical, given that the country has one of the highest levels of femicides in the world. In order to know the reasons behind this participation a specific study would be necessary.




Figure IV-18. Participation in women’s groups in comparative perspective

The impact of civic participation on the support for stable democracy

More than knowing the levels of Guatemalans participation in different civic society organizations, it is important to analyze whether that participation has any impact on the political system, and particularly on the support for stable democracy. In order to analyze this, we ran a multivariate regression. Next, we present a series of figures that show if there is or not such association between civic participation and the different variables used in this study to measure support for stable democracy. The tables with the results from the regression can be found in the Appendix of this study.

Figure IV-9 examines if any of the different kinds of participation has an impact on the support for democracy. As we can see, only participation in religious organizations has an impact on the variable that measures the support for democracy, although the impact is in a negative sense, as we can observe in Figure IV-20.




Figure IV-19. Impact of civic participation on the support for democracy




Figure IV-20. Relationship between participation in religious organizations and support for democracy

Figure, IV-21, shows that none of the kinds of participation has an impact on the belief in the right of public contestation.




Figure IV-21. Impact of civic participation on the belief in the right of public contestation

In a similar way, we do not find in Guatemala a relationship between civic participation and political tolerance (also known as right of citizen inclusiveness), as we observe in Figure IV-22.




Figure IV-22. Impact of civic participation on political tolerance

Contrary to the last two cases, we do find in Guatemala a positive relationship between participation in meetings of a committee or association for community improvement and legitimacy of the politic institutions. That is to say, a higher participation in this kind of groups increases the legitimacy of public institutions. This can be clearly observed in Figure IV-23 and with greater detail in the regression table in the Appendix.




Figure IV-23. Impact of civic participation in the legitimacy of institutions

Finally, we observe in Figure IV-24 that there is not a statistically significant relationship in Guatemala between participation in the different civic society organizations –at least those measured in this study- and interpersonal trust.




Figure IV-24. Impact of civic participation on interpersonal trust

Conclusions

In this chapter we have analyzed different topics related to the local government and to citizens' participation in organizations of the so-called civil society. Regarding the local government, we first examined the levels of trust that Guatemalans have in their municipal government (the local government of the municipality where each respondent lives). In this sense, we found that Guatemalans give an average of 56.1 points of legitimacy to their local government, which locates Guatemala among the countries with the highest levels of trust in municipal governments. At internal level, when we compare trust in the national government and trust in local government, we find that local government garners more confidence than the national government, whose average is 50.1 points. The difference between them is statistically significant. Apart from confidence in the local government, we also analyzed citizens' satisfaction with the services provided by the municipal government. In a comparative perspective we find that again,

Guatemala finds itself among the countries with the highest levels of satisfaction, with an average of 55.9 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study.

Apart from these two issues, we examined the frequency with which citizens participate in meetings called by the local governments and with which frequency they present requests to them. We found that in 2008 a 14% of citizens said having participated at least once in the last year, and a similar percentage, 12%, said having presented a request to the local government.

Beyond the description of the data, this chapter examined the topic of support for decentralization in two aspects, on the one hand the support for decentralization of responsibilities and on the other hand the support for decentralization of economic resources. In both cases Guatemala is placed in an intermediate position at continental level, with an average of 49.7 points of support for decentralization of responsibilities and 48.4 points of support for decentralization of resources. We also analyzed whether the satisfaction with the services provided by the local government has any impact on the support for decentralization of responsibilities or resources. The analysis showed that there is no relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for decentralization of responsibilities. However, there is a relationship between satisfaction and support for decentralization of resources. In other words, citizens satisfied with the services provided by their local government are more likely to support the decentralization of economic resources.

The other issue addressed in this chapter was the participation in several civil society organizations. As we explained in the theoretical framework at the beginning of this chapter, civic participation has been considered as an essential component of the democratic development. We found that Guatemalans exhibit high levels of participation in religious organizations, school-related associations, committees or associations for community improvement and women groups. The highest levels of participation are found in religious organizations with an average of 73.2 points, followed by participation in school associations with 49.1 points. Participation in committees or associations for community improvement is lower (39.6 points) than in the last two, and participation in women groups is even lower (24 points). However, in all the cases Guatemala finds itself among the first five countries regarding participation.

Finally, we examined whether participation in organizations of civil society has an impact on the variables of stable democracy used in this report. We found that only participation in religious organizations has an impact on the support for stable democracy, but not necessarily in a positive way: those who participate in such organizations show lower support for democracy. The participation in committees or associations for community improvement has a positive impact on the legitimacy of politic institutions.

Chapter V . Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework⁴⁰

It has become common place in the field of democratic governance, and talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in mostly the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did one’s opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical

⁴⁰ This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton’s three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, bad economic outlooks and perceptions affected “peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, those citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government, however according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, that “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as

well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are having a good economic performance may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

Measuring perception of government economic performance

A new index (**econperf**), which stands for “Perception of Government Economic Performance” was created using two variables, N1 which measures the perception of how well does the government fight poverty, and N12, which measures citizens’ perceptions on how well does the government fight unemployment.

N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?

N12. To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment?

Comparative perspective

The first analysis is a comparison among the different countries. We observe in Figure V-1 that Guatemala obtains a favorable result, finding itself among the first four countries. In other words, Guatemalans consider that the current government’s economic performance is relatively acceptable, with an average of 50.6 points on the 0-100 scale. However, it is noteworthy that the survey was conducted on month after the new government took office, a short period for citizens to evaluate in depth government’s economic performance. The positive evaluation may be related to the “waiting period” or honey moon that citizens usually give to a new government before criticizing or emitting value judgments.




Figure V-1. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

Analysis of the Guatemalan case

Now, we analyze in dept the case of Guatemala. We should recall that we have to take into account the context in which the survey was conducted, that is to say, February, a few weeks after Alvaro Colom administration took office in January 2008.

The main problems in the country according to citizens

Figure V-2 shows the results of a question that asks respondents to identify the most serious problem faced by the country (A4). This is an open-ended question and it has several response options where the interviewer places the response, as we can observe in the questionnaire at the end of this study. In order to facilitate the understanding of the responses, they were recoded into five categories: basic services, security, economy, politics, and others.⁴¹ The objective here is to show to what extent economy is an important problem to citizens.

The economy is not the most important problem for Guatemalans. Insecurity was instead identified as the main problem in the country by 62.8% of citizens. That does not mean that citizens are happy with their personal economic situation or the economic situation of the country, but economic issues have been relegated due to the crisis of insecurity, which was evident in the electoral campaign of 2007, when the topic of insecurity was the main one in the debates. Chapter III in this report addresses the topic of insecurity; this chapter is focused on the analysis of the economy.




Figure V-2. Most important problem in Guatemala

It is also important to analyze to what extent citizens consider that the government has performed well in terms of economic policy. As we mentioned before, we employ two basic variables to measure to what extent citizens believe that the government fights poverty on the one

⁴¹ The table that shows which problems were included in each of these categories can be found in the appendix of this report.

hand, and combats unemployment on the other hand. Figure V-3 shows that the average evaluation on both issues is located around 50 points on a 0-100 scale, which means that only half of the population evaluates the government’s economic performance positively.




Figure V-3. Perception of the economic performance of the incumbent government in Guatemala

Predictors of the government’s economic performance evaluation

Next, we examine who is more prone to have a positive opinion about the government’s economic performance. In the field of public opinion two variables have become key variables to measure this. The first one measures citizens’ perception about the national economic situation and the second one measures citizens’ perception regarding their personal or family economic situation. These variables are called sociotropic (the one that measures the perception about the national economy) and egotropic or idiotropic (the one that measures the perception of the personal economy). The LAPOP questionnaire includes the following questions (SOCT1 and IDIO1):

SOCT1. How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

It is noteworthy that these two variables measure citizens' perception about the economic situation but they do not link such perception with the role that the government could have played regarding that situation. However, generally speaking, people tend to blame or credit the incumbent government for the national economic situation, but not much for the personal economic situation. This is not always the case, so that this study uses both variables to predict citizens' evaluations regarding the government's economic performance.

Figure V-4 (as its respective table in the Appendix) establishes the predictors of the government's economic performance evaluations. We want to analyze if the national economic situation evaluation or the personal economic situation evaluation have any specific impact. As we can observe in this figure, none of these two variables is associated with the evaluation of the government's economic performance in Guatemala in 2008. In fact, none of the variables included in the statistical model predicts a better or worse evaluation on the government. We should clarify again that this result may be due to the context in which the 2008 survey was conducted (a month after the incumbent government took office).




Figure V-4. Factors associated to the evaluation of economic performance of the government in Guatemala

The impact of the evaluation of the government’s economic performance on the support for the stable democracy.

Although we did not find specific variables in Guatemala that explain why some citizens hold a positive view of the government’s economic performance, that does not mean that everybody is satisfied with this performance, as we saw in Figure V-3. Now, we want to measure the impact that the evaluation of the economic performance of the government may have on the support for a stable democracy. This can be done through a multivariate analysis where the government’s economic performance evaluation is one of the variables included as a possible explanatory variable for the support for a stable democracy. The table showing the model with the different regressions can be found in the Appendix.

Such analysis shows that citizens’ evaluation of the government’s economic performance has influence on some of the variables of support for stable democracy. Figure V-5 depicts how a more positive evaluation of the government’s economic performance produces higher support for democracy. Both variables are measured on the 0-100 scale used in this study.




Figure V-5. Impact of the evaluation of government’s economic performance on the support for democracy

We also found a positive relationship between a better evaluation of the government’s economic performance and the support for the right of public contestation. In other words, as we see in Figure V-6, citizens who hold a more favorable opinion regarding the government’s economic performance are more likely to support the right for public contestation.




Figure V-6. Impact of the evaluation of government's economic perception on the support for the right to participate

The positive evaluation regarding the government's economic performance is also related to political tolerance or the right for citizen inclusiveness. As we can observe in Figure V-7, those who have a higher evaluation of the performance of the government in the economy, tend to be more tolerant, that is to say, to display higher levels of tolerance.




Figure V-7. Impact of the evaluation of government’s economic performance on political tolerance

The evaluation of government’s economic performance also has an impact on the legitimacy of political institutions, in a clear relationship, as we see in Figure V-8. In other words, those who hold more positive evaluations regarding the government’s economic performance are more prone to give greater legitimacy to the political institutions.




Figure V-8. Impact of the evaluation of government’s economic performance on institutional legitimacy

Finally, the statistical model allows us to see that citizens’ evaluations about the government’s economic performance have an impact on interpersonal trust. This relationship can be observed in Figure V-9.




Figure V-9. Impact of the evaluation of government’s economic performance on interpersonal trust

Conclusions

Chapter V has addressed the issue of the evaluation that citizens make of their government’s economic performance. In order to measure economic performance we constructed an index which included the evaluation that citizens make of the extent to which the incumbent government fights poverty and combats unemployment. In a comparative perspective, we found that Guatemala is located among the countries with the best perception regarding the government’s economic performance, with an average of 50.6 points on the 0-100 scale used in this report. However, as we noted across this study, the fact that the survey was conducted only one month after the government had taken office, could be an important factor affecting the results. In other words, given that the government had been in power scarcely a month when the survey was conducted, it makes more difficult for citizens to make an accurate evaluation.

They key issue in this chapter is the government’s economic performance. As we explained in the theoretical framework, the economic situation (both national and personal) may have an impact on citizens’ political preferences. In the majority of countries, in fact, the economy tends to be the main concern for citizens. However, as we mentioned in this report, in the case of

Guatemala citizens expressed that the main problem in the country is insecurity, not economy. This same pattern can be found since 2004.

Beyond the analysis of citizens' perceptions regarding government's economic performance, we examined in this chapter if there is any relationship between the evaluation of the national economic situation and respondents' personal economic situation and their perception about government's economic performance evaluation. We found that in the case of Guatemala there is not such relationship, at least when the survey was conducted. We also examined if the perception of the government's economic performance has any impact on the variables used to measure the support for stable democracy. In this sense, we found important relationships. A better the evaluation of the government's economic performance, produces higher support for democracy and for the right of public contestation, greater political tolerance and increases the legitimacy of political institutions; a positive perception regarding the government's economic performance even has an impact on the levels of interpersonal trust: the better the evaluation the greater the confidence in other people.

THIRD PART:
BEYOND
GOVERNANCE

Chapter VI . Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

Theoretical framework

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.⁴² New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in Table 3 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

⁴² Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

The items used for creating the “political tolerance” index are the same we used before for creating the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness.

Table VI.1. Theoretical relationship between tolerance and system support

	<i>POLITICAL TOLERANCE</i>	
<i>SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SYSTEM (i.e., legitimacy)</i>	HIGH	LOW
HIGH	Stable Democracy	Autoritarian Stability
LOW	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From a theoretical point of view, we propose to analyze the interrelation between support for the political system and tolerance, so that it is necessary to transform both variables into dichotomous ones, “high” and “low”⁴³. It is important to analyze the four possible combinations between system support and tolerance that appear in Table VI.1. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

⁴³ Each scale ranges from 0 to 100, the medium point is 50.

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither supports the basic institutions of the country, nor supports the rights of minorities, are more vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the existant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Support for stable democracy in Guatemala

Now, we analyze the case of Guatemala, trying to determine the percentage of the population located within each cell. Table VI.2 shows the distribution of such results for 2008, 2006, and 2004. The 2008 results are somewhat worrisome. In 2008 the percentage of citizens in the stable democracy cell decreased from 26.8% in 2006 to only 18.5% in 2008. The two intermediate cells, authoritarian stability and instable democracy experimented some changes, but not too dramatic. However, the democracy at risk cell shows a negative pattern, given that in 2008 a 38.4% of the citizens fell in this cell, compared to the 25.6% in 2006. The high percentage of population placed within the democracy at risk cell in 2008 is even greater to the 35.7% in 2004.

Table VI.2. Relationship between support for the political system and political tolerance in Guatemala, 2004-2008

	<i>POLITICAL TOLERANCE</i>	
<i>SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM</i>	HIGH	LOW
HIGH	Stable Democracy 2008: 18.5 %	Authoritarian Stability 2008: 27.7 %
	2006: 26.8 % 2004: 21.2 %	2006: 26.0 % 2004: 23.8 %
LOW	Unstable Democracy 2008: 15.3 %	Democracy at Risk 2008: 38.4 %
	2006: 21.5 % 2004: 19.3 %	2006: 25.6 % 2004: 35.7 %

In order to understand the scope of these results, we should take into account the situation in other countries in the American continent. As we can see in Figure VI-1, Guatemala holds one of the lowest levels of citizens in the stable democracy cell. Only Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Haiti, and Paraguay appear below. The most extreme case is Paraguay where less than 10% of citizens

falls within this category.⁴⁴ At the other extreme, Canada finds itself above the rest of the countries, followed by Costa Rica, the United States and Uruguay.




Figure VI-1. Support for stable democracy in comparative perspective

⁴⁴ We should take into account that in Paraguay the survey was conducted before the 2008 election.

Figure VI-2 shows the comparison among countries in terms of percentages of people who fall within the category of democracy at risk. The situation in this sense it is even more critical for Guatemala, which finds itself among the countries at risk, only exceed by Haiti and Honduras. It is closely followed by Ecuador and Peru, but the difference with these countries is not a statistically significant. Bolivia is the fifth country in the list, but the difference with Guatemala is statistically significant, which implies that Guatemala gets more negative results than Bolivia, even though in difference in the percentage is not that large.




Figure VI-2. Democracy at risk in comparative perspective

Given that the results are troublesome for Guatemala, we will try to establish the reasons or variables that can have caused such an increase in the percentage of people within the democracy at risk category. For that, we analyze the results of support for the political system and political tolerance separately across time.

Regarding the support for the political system, Figure VI-3 shows the results for the questions related to support for the political system. The specific items were enumerated at the beginning of this chapter. We can see that in one of the five items there was a statistically significant decrease between 2006 and 2008: The belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial. In this item, the average in 2006 was 53.6 points while in 2008 dropped to 44.6 points, similar to the result in 2004. The other changes were not statistically significant. Thus, the respect for political institutions has not varied much between 2004 and 2008, nor has the pride of living under the Guatemalan political system or the belief that the political system respects citizens' rights.




Figure VI-3. Individual measures of support for the political system in Guatemala, 2004-2008

Now, we analyze the second series of questions related to political tolerance. Although the questions that form this series were specified in Chapter I, we remember them again in this chapter:

D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (nationality) form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: *[To what degree?]*

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) for of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

Results across time can be observed in Figure VI-4. In all four measures of political tolerance there was a statistically significant decrease in 2008 in Guatemala in comparison to 2006. In the measure related to the right for free speech we see a significant decrease even comparing to 2004. In the rest of measures scores went back to the levels obtained in 2004.

The results of this series make us think that the reason why the percentage of Guatemalans who fell in the democracy at risk cell increased is related to the decrease in the levels of political tolerance in the country. With this study it is not possible to determine if such results are related to the polarization and violence that we observed during the 2007 electoral process, which was characterized by personal attacks, specially between the two candidates who passed to the second round.




Figure VI-4. Individual measures of political tolerance in Guatemala, 2004-2008

Legitimacy of other democratic institutions

The different survey rounds of the AmericasBarometer have followed-up the evolution of trust in a wide range of democratic institutions. In Chapter I we explored some of them (national government, justice system, Supreme Court of Justice, Congress and political parties). These institutions form the institutional legitimacy index. In this section we will present a general comparison for the legitimacy of the institutions covered by the 2008 survey in Guatemala. We measured “trust” in each of the key institutions using a 1-7 scale which was recoded into the same 0-100 scale used in this study.

Figure VI-5 shows the results for several political institutions. Although the Catholic Church and the media are not state institutions, they were included in the questionnaire as parameters for the measurement of trust in public institutions. As we can see, the Catholic Church receives the greatest average of legitimacy, with 52.9 points; however, the difference is not statistically significant with the legitimacy that the president and the national government received. In a second group we find the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the elections, the justice

system and the Supreme Court of Justice, institutions which score between 42.8 and 47.5 points, without any statistically significant difference among them. At the bottom we find the National Civil Police and the Congress with average scores of 40 points, and political parties which obtained 33.8 points on the 0-100 scale. The topic of political parties will be addressed in depth in Chapter VII.




Figure VI-5. Legitimacy of institutions in Guatemala, 2008

Beyond the comparison among institutions, it is important to take into account whether changes have occurred along time. Figure VI-6 shows that the only statistically significant difference is in relation to the national government, which in 2008 jumped from 43.9 to 50.1 points. It is worth recalling that they context could have had any effect on this result. The 2008 survey was conducted in February, and it measured the trust in the new government, Álvaro Colom’s government, who had taken office a month before. The 2006 survey measured the trust in the Oscar Berger’s government after three years in powerñ we must remember that most incumbent governments in Guatemala suffer a decrease in legitimacy over time and that the same party has never been reelected. If we compare the results obtained by Berger in the 2004 survey –which was conducted few months after he took office- the findings are very similar to those obtained by Colom in 2008.

In the case of the rest of institutions we do not find statistically significant differences between 2006 and 2008. The legitimacy of the elections and the armed forces increased slightly. On the contrary, trust in the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Congress and the justice system decreased slightly.




Figure VI-6. Legitimacy of institutions in Guatemala, 2004-2008

The justice system

One of the main topics in terms of institutional development in Guatemala is that related to the justice system. This is still the Achilles' heel of the Guatemalan democracy, therefore it is important to analyze more in-depth the opinion that citizens have about it.

First, we will analyze in a comparative perspective to what extent citizens trust in the justice system. Figure VI-7 shows how Guatemala is located in an intermediate position with an average of 44.9 points on the 0-100 scale. Guatemala finds itself among a second group of countries where the confidence in the justice system ranges from 40 to 46 points, it obtains similar results to El Salvador, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Panama, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti. The countries where the justice systems generates the highest levels of trust are Canada, Colombia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United States, Dominican Republic and Jamaica; on the contrary, the countries with the lowest levels of legitimacy are Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. The Canadian justice system is the most legitimate, while the Paraguayan is the less legitimate.




Figure VI-7. Legitimacy of the justice system in comparative perspective

It is important to have an idea of the cross-time or longitudinal changes regarding the confidence in the different institutions of the justice system. Figure VI-8 shows the details. In the majority of the institutions, we did not find statistically significant changes between 2006 and 2008. There was a slight drop in the levels of trust in the general justice system, in the Supreme Court of Justice, the National Civil Police, the courts and the Constitutional Court, but the differences between years is not significant. The only case where we see a statistically significant change is the office of the Ombudsman, which obtained an average score of 53.1 points in 2006 in comparison to 48.0 points in 2008.




Figure VI-8. Trust in the institutions of the justice system in Guatemala, 2004-2008

A different topic indirectly related to the justice system is the rehabilitation of *pandilleros* or gang members. Rehabilitation has been seen as an alternative to the traditional measures of punishment. Respondents were asked if they believed that *pandilleros* can be rehabilitated if they were given the opportunity. 61.2% of respondents considered that they can be rehabilitated while 38.8% said the opposite. This can be more clearly seen in Figure VI-9.




Figure VI-9. Belief that “pandilleros” can be rehabilitated

Other perspectives about democracy

An issue related to the legitimacy of the political system and the political institutions of the country is the perception that citizens have regarding democracy in the country. As it was noted before, a country can be democratic but it can have low legitimacy (low public support); in unusual situations, non-democratic regimes can have legitimacy. In this section we will examine more specific aspects related to citizens’ preferences for democracy and their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.

Figure VI-10 shows the responses given by the respondents when they were asked what kind of government they prefer. As we can observe, there are three response options: democracy is preferable, it does not matter, and an authoritarian government can be preferable. Guatemala is the second to last country in terms of citizens whose first choice is the first option. Only 57.2% of Guatemalans said that democracy was always preferable, and almost one fifth considered that an authoritarian regime can be sometimes preferable. The results are close to those obtained in Brazil and Chile, but they are above Paraguay. In contrast, in the majority of countries, more than the 70% of the population said that democracy is always preferable.




Figure VI-10. Preference for democracy in comparative perspective

Citizens can prefer democracy, but may not necessarily perceive that in their country there is a high level of democracy. In the next comparative figure (Figure VI-11) we see the average score for the perception about the level of democracy that exists in the respondent’s country. Guatemala falls in an intermediate-low position, with 52.3 points on a 0-100 scale, and it obtains similar results to those in Mexico and Nicaragua. However, the majority of countries

obtain a better position than Guatemala (statistically significant difference) regarding the level of democracy in their country, with Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela at the top.




Figure VI-11. Perception of the level of democracy in the country in comparative perspective

As it has been showed in studies conducted in developed democracies, citizens can prefer democracy but may not be satisfied with its performance. Citizens with strong democratic values would prefer democracy even if it is not working as well as they would like. Figure VI-12 shows the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in different countries in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense Guatemala obtains intermediate results. It finds itself in the center, with an average of 52.1 points on the 0-100 scale. The differences between Guatemala and the majority of countries are not statistically significant. Satisfaction with democracy –statistically

speaking – is higher in the United States, Venezuela, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Canada than in Guatemala. However, at the other extreme, we observe that in several countries citizens are less satisfied with democracy than in Guatemala. The differences are statistically significant with other Central American countries, including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.




Figure VI-12. Satisfaction with democracy in comparative perspective

In terms of democratic values, it would be desirable to have citizens who permanently display a preference for democracy, but it is clear that the satisfaction with the way democracy works can have more variation due to several factors, such as the satisfaction with the current government. In the last Figure of this Chapter (VI.13) we can see how satisfaction with democracy has changed in Guatemala since 2004. We should note that in 2008 the percentage of Guatemalans very or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy works increased. In 2006 a 40.6% of the respondents said being somewhat or very satisfied while in 2008 that percentage jumped to 56.3%. In a similar fashion, the percentage of people who said that they were not satisfied with the democratic performance decreased, from a 10.1% in 2006 to only 3.6% in 2008. Percentages in 2008 went back to the levels of 2004. This may be due to the fact that both were electoral years; citizens may feel satisfied with the fact there was transparency in the electoral process. There may be other likewise valid reasons, but that analysis goes beyond the scope of this chapter.




Figure VI-13. Satisfaction with democracy in Guatemala, 2004-2008

Conclusions

Chapter VI addresses the traditional analysis that has been carried out in previous democratic culture reports in terms of the relationship between support for the political system and tolerance, which generates an index on democratic stability. We found that the results obtained in 2008 are not favorable to Guatemala. In that year, the percentage of citizens who fall within the stable democracy cell dropped markedly, from a 26.8% in 2006 to 18.5% in 2008. It is even more troublesome that the percentage of people located in the democracy at risk category increased, from a 25.6% in 2006 to 38.4% in 2008. In comparative perspective, this places Guatemala as one of the countries in the continent with the smallest percentage of citizens in the stable democracy category, and at the same time, as the third country at democratic risk. As we explained this does not mean that a democratic breakdown is likely to happen, but the conditions for the development of a stable democracy in the country decreased notably in 2008.

This chapter tries to analyze in-depth the factors that led to this negative result. The main reason seems to be the decrease in the levels of political tolerance. One of the components of the stable democracy index, support for the political system, did not suffer any significant change between 2006 and 2008, but the other one, political tolerance, dropped markedly. We are unable to speculate why with the available data, but it might be that such decrease in the levels of political tolerance is due to the polarization generated by the electoral campaign of 2007.

Apart from the analysis of the stable democracy index, in this chapter we also examined the topic of the legitimacy of different political institutions in the country, with emphasis on the institutions of the justice system. In general terms we found that although there was a generalized decline in the institutional trust, this was not statistically significant in the majority of the cases. At continental level, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position with regards to the legitimacy of the system of justice.

Finally, this chapter examined three different issues related to the support for democracy: citizens' preferences regarding democracy or an authoritarian regime, the evaluation of the level of democracy in Guatemala, and the satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country. Regarding the first topic, we found that Guatemala is one of the countries with lower support for the idea of democracy. Only 57.2% of the Guatemalans consider that democracy is always preferable. With regards to citizens' evaluations about the level of democracy existing in Guatemala, the country fares a little better, in an intermediate-low position. The average for the evaluation of the level of democracy in Guatemala is 52.3 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study. Finally, in terms of satisfaction with democracy, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate-high position, with an average of 52.1 points, above countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Peru, among others. A comparison over time allows us to see that Guatemalans are more satisfied with the way democracy works in 2008 than in 2006.

Chapter VII . Voting Behavior and Political Parties

The last chapter of this report discusses a current topic, rather than exploring permanent democratic values. The chapter also makes an in-depth examination of the behavior of Guatemalans in the 2007 elections.

There are two main methods to obtain information about electoral behavior; on the one hand we can analyze aggregate data, that is to say, electoral results, its distribution, geographic location, among other aspects. However, there are several limitations derived from the analysis of aggregate information. If we analyze the vote according to the register it is not possible to know the socio-demographic characteristics of the voters such as their ethnic identification, their level of income, or other similar factors. Another way to get information about citizens' behavior is a post-electoral survey. Those surveys can allow us to identify patterns of electoral behavior and relationships among different variables. In the 2008 survey we included a series of questions related to electoral behavior in the 2007 elections. Given that the survey was conducted only a few months after the elections it is feasible that the interviewees have responded with truthfulness and accuracy.⁴⁵

Apart from the analysis on the electoral behavior of Guatemalans, in this chapter we also address some other questions related to citizens' perspectives on political parties and on the general context in which citizens participate in the political process.

Electoral participation in Guatemala

First, it is important to know the percentage of Guatemalans older than 18 years who are registered to vote. The survey asked directly if respondents were registered to vote. Results for recent years can be found in Figure VII-1. In 2008, 81.5% of respondents said they were registered. This figure represents an increase compared to the 75.9% reported in 2004 and the 73.5% in 2006. It is worth recalling that unlike in other countries, in Guatemala people have to follow specific rules to register as potential voters.

⁴⁵. It is noteworthy that public opinion studies related to electoral behavior may have margins of errors due to several factors, but in general, it is known that they reflect general patterns if the sample is scientific.




Figure VII-1. Voters registered to vote, 2004-2008

The electoral context: the civil liberties in practice

For a registered citizen to vote several favorable conditions have to converge. In Guatemala, unlike some countries in Latin America, voting is not mandatory. Therefore motivation becomes a key factor in turnout; citizens have to believe that voting is a right and a duty and that despite the difficulties that voting represents in terms of time and resources, it is an important act in a democratic country, and consider it is worth the effort. Accessibility also plays an important role. The electoral reforms that came into effect in the 2008 elections in Guatemala decentralized the location of the polling stations to a great extent, which facilitated the access, especially for citizens in isolated areas of the country. Beyond motivation and accessibility, however, the national context must also be favorable. Robert Dahl and other political scientists have highlighted the importance of a democratic atmosphere where civil liberties and political rights are respected; only in such a context citizens' voting can be considered free.

For many years, even after democratic liberalization, it was considered that in Guatemala there was not full freedom to exercise the right to vote, especially in rural and isolated areas which were once considered conflict areas during the armed conflict that finished in 1996. However, gradually, the environment of freedom improved as reflected in the Freedom House index, mentioned at the beginning of this report. In the study of democratic values we have

included a series of questions that allow us to evaluate to what extent citizens perceive this environment of freedom to exercise their political rights.

If you decided to participate in one of the activities I am going to mention, would you do it without fear, with a little bit of fear, or with a lot of fear?

- DER1. Participate in groups that seek to solve community problems?
- DER2. Vote in a national election?
- DER3. Participate in a peaceful demonstration?
- DER4. Run for public office?

The questions directly related to electoral behavior are DER2 and DER4 and results can be observed in the following figures. The first figure, Figure VII-2, shows how in 2008 the percentage of citizens who expressed that they would vote without fear in a national election increased. In 2008, 80.2% of citizens said that they would vote without fear, compared to 71.6% in 2006 and the 73.6% in 2004. At the same time, the percentage of those who expressed a little bit of fear o a lot of fear dropped. This can be considered as a positive finding for the democratic process in Guatemala.




Figure VII-2. Perception of freedom to vote

Another issue indirectly related to this is whether citizens feel free to run for office. Obviously, there can be other reasons beyond the environment of political freedom that make a

person feel free to run for office, such as ethnic or gender discrimination. Taking into account the latter, it is important to know the changes over time regarding this issue. Figure VIII-3 shows that in 2008 the percentage of people that said feeling free to run for office increased slightly, reaching a 48.9%, in comparison to the 45.9% in 2006 and the 40.1% in 2004. Even though this percentage is still low, we observe a positive pattern. It is also remarkable that in 2008 the percentage of citizens that reported a lot fear to run for office dropped considerably.




Figure VII-3. Perception of freedom to run for office

Turnout

Now we will analyze the electoral behavior in the 2007 elections in Guatemala. As we noted before, the results reflect a post electoral analysis based on the questions included in the democratic culture survey conducted in 2008. This report does not analyze the party or candidate citizens vote for, but other aspects, particularly turnout.

Guatemala has been one of the countries with the lowest levels of electoral participation in Latin America. However, the levels of participation increased in 2007, due, among other reasons, to the decentralization of the polling stations. Figure VII-4 shows how Guatemala is located in an intermediate position in comparison to other countries in the Western Hemisphere. 73.3% of the population reported voting in the last presidential elections, specifically in the first

round. Only five countries display higher and statistically significant levels of participation: Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela. The year in which the elections take place may influence the results in each country.




Figure VII-4. Electoral participation in comparative perspective

Figure VII-5 shows the electoral turnout of Guatemala over time. The 73.3% participation in Guatemala in 2008 is much larger than the 56.5% reported in 2006 and even higher than the 64.5% reported in 2004. This is a positive pattern. The result obtained in the 2008 survey is higher than the turnout reported by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which was the 60.2% of the total registered population. This can be due to several factors. On the one hand, in electoral surveys there is a margin of “desirable” responses, that is to say, some citizens respond

according to what they consider should be the right response, and voting is usually a “desirable” action. However, we can find the same tendency in all the countries and it should not affect the results in a significant way. On the other hand, it has been noted that the electoral registrar in Guatemala needs an update, given that many registered citizens are abroad, many of them without legal status in the United States. This implies that turnout is lower given that the instrument of measurement is the electoral registrar and not the ones that are actually residing in the country; on the contrary, data from the democratic culture survey represents participation/abstention in relation to the citizens present in the country.




Figure VII-5. Electoral turnout in Guatemala, 2004-2008

When we analyze electoral behavior it is also important to know the reasons why some citizens participate in the elections and some don't. A multivariate regression can give us a perspective on this. Figure VII-6 (and its respective table in the Appendix) shows that the level of income, age, level of education and gender stand out as the characteristics of those who voted or did not vote in the first round of the presidential elections held on September 9, 2007. Specific figures showing the bivariate relationship between vote and all of these socio-demographic characteristics are presented later in this chapter.

It is noteworthy, however, the factors that did not influence the electoral turnout. The most relevant socio-demographic factor is the ethnic self-identification. This means that in

Guatemala, in general terms, there is not a statistically significant difference between indigenous and ladinos regarding their electoral participation, at least in the 2007 elections. In geographic terms, the size of the town and living in the capital or in an urban area did not have any impact. The latter finding may be due to the decentralization of polling stations implemented in these elections.




Figure VII-6. Predictors of turnout in Guatemala

Now, we analyze in-depth the predictors or factors that did have an impact on electoral turnout in 2007. Figure VII-7 shows that there is a clear relationship between a higher level of education and electoral participation. Among those citizens without any formal education participation was around 65%, increasing by ten percentage points for those how have secondary education and by twenty points for those Guatemalans with some superior education. This finding is not surprising given that even in the developed democracies, education is generally a factor positively linked to electoral participation.




Figure VII-7. Turnout by educational level

A second factor that had an impact on electoral participation in Guatemala in 2007 was gender. As we can see in Figure VII-8 there is a distance of ten percentage points between men’s electoral participation and women’s, which in statistical terms generally implies a significant difference. There is obviously a gender gap in turnout in Guatemala.




Figure VII-8. Turnout by gender

Given the importance of this topic and the magnitude of the difference between genders, it is important to analyze it more in-depth. Figure VII-9 presents the differences between men's and women's participation over time. In general terms, we observe that since 2004, men have had higher levels of participation than women. It is positive to observe, however, that even among men there was a marked increment in their electoral participation in 2007, reaching a percentage of 78.2%. In the case of women we also see a positive pattern. In fact, the reported electoral participation of women in 2007 was as high as the participation of men in previous years, reaching a 68.4%.




Figure VII-9. Turnout by gender and year

In the following figure we see the relationship between the two variables that as we explained before, have an important influence in the electoral participation in Guatemala: education and gender. Figure VII-10 shows that in the 2007 elections the lowest participation was among women without education, whose participation only reached 55.6% (the bar representing this group is colored dark)

If we analyze the rest of groups, we observe that among men education does not seem to be a relevant factor, except for the higher levels of education. In other words, almost 80% of Guatemalan men without education reported having voted versus the 85.5% of men with superior education. The difference is not statistically significant. Among women, however, education is a determinant factor of their electoral behavior. While only 55.6% of women without education reported having voted, 88.4% of women with superior education voted. The difference between women with lower or higher levels of education is statistically significant.




Figure VII-10. Turnout by gender and education

Finally, we want to analyze more in-depth the issue of ethnicity and vote. Although the general level of ethnic self-identification does not appear in the multivariate regression as one of the decisive factors at the time of voting, some previous studies on democratic culture have found that indigenous women display lower levels of turnout. Figure VII-11 shows that electoral participation was higher among indigenous men (82.9%) than among ladino men (74.2%). Among women however, there was a smaller difference in terms of ethnic self-identification: while 69.4% of indigenous women reported having voted, a slightly lower percentage, 67.3% of ladino women did. This can be seen as a positive finding, especially if we consider that results over time, which appear in Figure VII-12.




Figure VII-11. Turnout by gender and ethnic self-identification

Figure VII-12 shows that the most significant increase in terms of electoral participation in 2007 was among indigenous women. The colored bar shows the difference. While in 2004 and 2006 the gap between ladino and indigenous women was still significant, that gap seems to have disappeared in the 2007 elections. In 2004 and 2006 indigenous women voted in a ration of ten percent lower than ladino women, but this was no longer the case in the most recent elections.

In the same figure, it is interesting to observe that in 2004 and 2008, indigenous men reported higher levels of participation than ladino men, whil in 2006 the percentage was almost the same.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ It is noteworthy that the lowest level of participation reported in 2006 may be due to the fact that some respondents were not old enough to vote in the last elections, those celebrated in 2004. It is because of that that the best comparison over time is that between the reported for the 2003 elections (the 2004 report) and the 2007 elections (the 2008 report)




Figure VII-12. Turnout by year, gender and ethnic self-identification

Another influential factor according to the model regression in the electoral participation in the 2007 elections was age. We observe in Figure VII-13 that the relationship between vote and age is not linear. The highest levels of electoral participation appear among middle age population, between 25 and 55 years. Young people between 18 and 25 year old have the lowest levels of participation. This is not surprising, given that in many countries, even in developed countries, young citizens tend to have lower turnout rates. Finally, we observe that after 55 years participation starts to decline, although it does not reach the low levels of younger citizens.




Figure VII-13. Turnout by age

The last factor that in Guatemala had an impact in the electoral participation in 2007 (reported in 2008) was the socioeconomic level, which in this report is called wealth. It is worth to recall that wealth, as we explained at the beginning of this report, is measured by the number of material goods in the household and not by the levels of income per se. Figure VII-14 shows that there is a positive relationship between higher levels of wealth and electoral participation, although it is not totally linear. People with fewer goods in their household, that is to say those with lower socio-economic levels, participated less, while people with seven or more goods had the highest levels of participation.




Figure VII-14. Turnout by wealth

Voters, candidates and political parties

Apart from electoral turnout, it is important to analyze other issues related to electoral behavior in 2007. One of these issues is the ideological placement of Guatemalans. In the democratic culture survey was included a question that asked respondents to place themselves on a 1-10 scale where 1 represents left and 10 right. In previous reports we observed that the majority of Guatemalans tend to place themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum. We also saw that Guatemala is one of the countries in the region with the greatest levels of non-response.

Now, we analyze the relationship between voting preferences in 2007 and the ideology of voters. Figure VII-15 shows the ideology of voters for the three candidates and parties who obtained the majority of votes in the presidential elections. We see than in all the cases, those who favored these candidates in the first round tend to place themselves near the center or center-right of the political spectrum, between 5 and 7 on the scale. There is a statistically significant difference between those who voted for the Partido Patriota (PP) in the first round and those who voted for Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE). UNE's voters lean towards the center-left whereas PP voters lean towards the center-right. To sum up, in all the cases, voters' ideology was moderate and not extreme.




Figure VII-15. Ideological self-placement of the voters and voting preferences in 2007 (main presidential candidates)

Another way to measure ideological differences between voters is to analyze the support for the issues on the electoral campaign. In the 2007 elections one of the main issues was public safety and polices to combat crime, which has become as we observed before, the main concern for Guatemalans. The PP candidate, Otto Pérez Molina, proposed an iron fist (mano dura) to combat crime, while the other candidate who passed to the second round, Álvaro Colom from UNE, proposed that the violence must be combated with intelligence. One of the questions in the democratic culture survey is to what extent citizens consider that the problems in the country can be solved with everyone's participation or with an iron fist. The results from the last three waves can be observed in Figure VII-16. The percentage of those who preferred iron-fist dropped in 2008 in comparison to 2006 and even to 2004; only one third of the interviewed population, 33.7 said preferring an iron-fist in 2008




Figure VII-16. Preference for iron-fist to solve the country's problems

One of the main topics on the ideological debate in Latin America has to do with the role of the civil society or of the entrepreneurs. In other words, with the arrival to power of some left governments in the region, the idea that the government should have a more active role in the economy has gained strength. On the contrary, those who hold a conservative ideology claim that government intervention in the economy should be minimal. Figure VII-17 shows the opinions of citizens in Latin American on this topic. The survey included the following series of questions, which form an index of support for the role of the government.

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same scale from 1 to 7.

ROS1. The Guatemalan government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Guatemalan government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Guatemalan government, more than the private sector, is the primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Guatemalan government should implement firm policies to reduce inequality in income between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

As we can observe in Figure VII-17, in general terms there is a high support for an active role of the government in the region; the average in almost all countries exceeds 60 points, except for Haiti, Venezuela and the United States. Guatemala finds itself among the countries where there is a lower support for the involvement of the government (the country obtains 67.2 points), although the difference with the majority of countries is not statistically significant.




Figure VII-17. Support for an active role of the state in the economy

In order to know more in-depth the opinion of the Guatemalans in regard to this topic, Figure VII-18 shows the individual results for each of the items related to the role of government. We observe that on a 0-100 scale the average is relatively high the support for the idea that the government, more than the private sector or the individuals, should be responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people, for creating jobs, and for implementing firm policies to reduce inequality in income between the rich and the poor. In the three cases, the average is located around the 73 points. On the contrary, Guatemalans are less prone to believe that the government should be the owner of the main industries in the country, question that obtained an average of 50.1 points.




Figure VII-18. Perspectives about the role of the state in Guatemala

Another aspect that we evaluated in this chapter on the electoral behavior of Guatemalans is the null and blank vote. In the first round of the 2007 elections, around 10 percent of the votes casted were a null or blank, which represents a higher percentage than that obtained by the majority of parties, except for the top ones. In the 2008 survey we asked respondents if they casted a null or blank vote, as well as the reasons for that. It is noteworthy that many voters are not conscious of having emitted a null vote; sometimes null votes are decided by the Junta Receptora de Votos, given the ballot was not clearly marked. The citizen who casted his/her vote may not be aware that his vote was considered null.

In this survey, a 12.9% of the respondents reported having casted a null or blank vote in the election for deputies, while only a 4% said that had emitted a null or blank vote in the presidential election. The distribution of the reasons for this vote is observed in Figure VII-19. We note that the 40% casted a null or blank vote in order to protest, some others because they wanted to protest against the political system and some others because they wanted to show their discontent with the candidates. To this we can add a 2.5% who said that they had voted null or blank to protest for the way the electoral campaign took place. Around one third of the voters (32.5%) said they voted that way because they were confounded or did not know who to vote for.




Figure VII-19. Reasons for casting a null or blank vote

Another important issue is that of divided voting. In recent years there have been private campaigns in Guatemala that during the electoral period urge people to vote for different parties in the presidential and legislative election. The objective of such campaigns is to prevent the so-called “aplanadoras” that occur when the party in the executive has the majority of seats in the legislature. On the negative side, a divided government that emerges as consequence of the cross-vote can have negative consequences for governance. The analysis of the positive or negative aspects of the cross-voting is beyond the scope of this study, our purpose is just to show

the percentage of Guatemalans who casted a divided vote in the 2007 elections⁴⁷. The distribution is shown in Figure VII-20. Around 28.7% of the respondents reported having casted a divided vote, which represents almost a third of the voters.




Figure VII-20. Divided vote in the 2007 elections

Other issues related to political parties in Guatemala

This last section addresses a series of data related to the perception of Guatemalan citizens regarding the political parties and politics in general. The first figure in this section shows the results of a question that asked citizens if at the moment of the survey they felt identified with any political party. Party identification is a determinant factor that influences the elections in countries with stable party systems, where citizens can identify with historic political parties. Guatemala is one of the countries in the Americas with the highest levels of party fragmentation, which has been seen as negative sign for the democratic development in the country. For this reason, it is less likely to find people identified with any political party. Figure VII-21 shows that in fact, only 15.9% of the Guatemalans identifies with any political party.

⁴⁷ For a more detailed análisis regarding this issue see J. Fortín, “Voto cruzado en Guatemala y gobierno dividido: realidad o mito?”




Figure VII-21. Identification with a political party

In order to know if that almost 16% of party identification is high or low, it is necessary to compare Guatemala with other countries. Figure VII-22 shows that Guatemala is the country with the lowest percentage of party identification, which coincides with the high fragmentation of the party system in the country. The difference between Guatemala and other countries – except for Ecuador and Peru- is statistically significant. This is a troublesome finding for the democratic development of any country, given that without a stable party system which generates social support, the perspectives of democratic consolidation are weaker.




Figure VII-22. Identification with political parties in comparative perspective

Another related issue is the participation in political parties. A citizen, particularly in a pre-electoral period, can approach a party for several reasons, but he does not necessarily have to stay or identify with it in the long run. Or on the contrary, a citizen can identify with a political party but not necessarily to participate in the meetings of that organization. Figure VII-23 shows a comparative perspective regarding how much citizens participate in meetings of political parties in the American continent. 12.3% of Guatemalans participated in one or more meetings of

political parties in the previous year. Participation in political parties meetings is significantly lower in nine countries and similar in ten. Only Chile appears isolated at the bottom of the list, with participation lower than 3%. It is note recalling that during electoral years, as in 2007 in Guatemala, participation tends to increase.




Figure VII-23. Participation in meetings of political organizations

Also related to parties, we analyze in the following figure to what extent citizens believe that political parties represent voters well and to what extent they listen to the people. Figure V-

24 shows the results. The average is 37.3 points (on the 0-100 scale) regarding the belief that parties represent voters, however, this average is lower (30.8 points) regarding the belief that parties listen to voters.




Figure VII-24. Representativeness of political parties

Guatemalans and Politics

The last section of this chapter explores general themes related to the attitudes of Guatemalans towards politics. It is important that a citizen with democratic values remains informed and interested in the day-to-day political events that occur within the political system; not only during election time, but rather on a constant basis. In Figure VII-25, one can clearly see how much interest Guatemalans take in politics. On the 0-100 scale (used throughout the chapter), we can easily observe that Guatemalans' interest in their political system raised slightly from 2006 to 2008, which could have been expected, given that it was an electoral period. However, the difference between years is not statistically significant. In any event, around one-fourth of all Guatemalans demonstrate an active interest in their political system. The results make more sense when they are compared to the results of the other countries of the region. This analysis will be shown in the following Figure.




Figure VII-25. Interest in politics in Guatemala

Figure VII-26 shows that Guatemala has one of the lowest national averages in the region in regards to citizens' interest in politics; only Chile has a lower national average. This means that even during the course of an election year, Guatemalans show a relatively low interest in regards to the various political topics. The difference is statistically significant compared to the majority of countries in the region, many of which did not have an electoral process in 2007.




Figure VII-26. Interest in politics in comparative perspective

Finally, in the Figure VII-27, we examine a different topic. In the democratic culture survey of 2008, we asked the Guatemalans if they considered men to be better political leaders than women. The results demonstrated that there exists a difference in gender regarding this topic and that the level of education of the interviewees also had influence over the results. In the majority of cases, there is a marked difference between men and women. Men obtain an average of around 44 points on a 0-100 scale independently of their level of education. However, women with higher levels of education are less likely to believe that men make the best political leaders.

At the level of citizens with no education whatsoever, there are not marked differences between women and men with regards to this topic. However, the differences are notable insofar as women advance their educational level. In fact, there is a marked difference among Guatemalan males and Guatemalan females with high levels of education.




Figure VII-27. Belief that men are better political leaders than women, by gender and education

Conclusions

In the last chapter of this report, we covered a series of topics related to the political behavior of Guatemalans, in particular electoral behavior. We make reference to the topic of electoral participation in the elections of 2007. The results of this chapter are mixed. On the one hand, we find positive findings, but on the other hand it was found that Guatemalans demonstrate weaknesses that affect the development of democracy in Guatemala.

Among the positive findings we find that the context of freedom to vote improved in Guatemala in 2008, even in relation to the recent past. More than 80% of Guatemalan citizens expressed no fear of voting during national elections, whereas that number was only 72% in 2006. We also found that the level of reported electoral turnout – that is the actual attendance at the voting booths during the first round of presidential elections—rose significantly in 2007.

The aforementioned increase in attendance was particularly notable amongst women and especially amongst indigenous women. Whereas it is still true that being a male is a predictor of participation in elections in Guatemala, then the tendency on the female side is positive. Other predictors of attendance at the voting booths in 2007 were a higher income, a higher level of education, and being a Guatemalan of middle-age.

In this chapter, we also addressed other topics related to the electoral behavior of Guatemalans. On the one hand, it was found that, in terms of ideology, Guatemalans continue, as was found in the report from the year 2006, to place themselves around the center of the political spectrum. There is no major difference among the ideological position of those who voted for one of the three main candidates of the 2007 presidential election. However, it was indeed found that a majority of Guatemalans favors a more active role of the government in regards to public welfare and in the redistribution of wealth. Another topic that was explored in a general manner was that of the null vote. It was found that there are diverse reasons for which some Guatemalans voted that way. In the case of those who were aware of having registered a null vote, the main reason was a demonstrated discontent with the political system or the candidates. Furthermore, it was found that almost one-third of the respondents indicated having voted for a different party for President and for Congress.

The last part of the chapter goes beyond the behavior in the 2007 elections and focuses instead on the relationship between political parties and the citizens themselves. In this sense, the findings are not positive. It turns out that Guatemala is the country in which citizens demonstrate the lowest level of partisan identification; only 15.9% indicated that they identified with a political party. In terms of participation in meetings of political parties, the situation is slightly better by comparison, placing Guatemala in an intermediate position with an average of 12.3 points.

The final topic we examined was to what extent Guatemalans have interest in politics. The comparative perspective is again unfavorable for Guatemala, and places the country in second-to-last place on the continent. The average of interest in politics in Guatemala is 24.3 points on a 0-100 scale. This is contrasted with the levels of interest demonstrated by citizens of other countries in the region.

Appendixes

Appendix I: Description of the methodology used to design the sample for Guatemala⁴⁸

Esta muestra originalmente preparada por ASIES, forma parte de una colección de estudios similares realizados en 17 países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe. Aunque el diseño se mantiene invariable, ligeras diferencias debidas a distintas tasas de rechazo hacen que existan ligeras diferencias año con año. En este apéndice se discuten estas diferencias y se estima un error.

Diseño de la muestra

Universo

El universo de una muestra es la población o las unidades geográficas para las cuáles se puede hacer inferencias a partir de los datos obtenidos. Para este estudio, el universo incluye a todos los ciudadanos (personas de 18 años y más) en áreas urbanas y rurales en los 331 municipios existentes al momento del censo 2002 en la República de Guatemala. Las poblaciones del recientemente creado municipio de Unión Cantinil, Huehuetenango y de Raxruhá, Alta Verapaz tienen posibilidad de aparecer, en cuanto todas sus poblaciones ya existían y se encontraban en los municipios vecinos. Sin embargo, de haber sido escogida su cabecera, ésta se hubiera contado como área rural y no como área urbana para propósitos de clasificación.

Para salvar las barreras lingüísticas, los cuestionarios se tradujeron al Q'eqchi' y al K'iche' por ser los idiomas mayas en los que se realizaron el mayor número de entrevistas en las aplicaciones anteriores a 2004.

Regiones y otros dominios de estudio

Un dominio de estudios es una región o grupo específico para el cual se desea obtener estimaciones. Para este estudio, se definen cinco regiones que pueden ser utilizadas como dominios de estudios:

1. **Metropolitana:** Incluye a todos los municipios del departamento de Guatemala.
2. **Suroccidente:** Incluye todos los municipios de Escuintla, Suchitepéquez y Retalhuleu así como algunos municipios seleccionados en San Marcos y Quetzaltenango.⁴⁹


⁴⁸ Esta sección fue escrita por Juan Pablo Pira, quien elaboró la muestra usada para el estudio.

⁴⁹ Los municipios de Quetzaltenango incluidos en esta región son: Colomba, El Palmar, Coatepeque, Flores Costa Cuca, y Génova. Los municipios del departamento de San Marcos que se incluyen en esta región son El Quetzal, El Rodeo, El Tumbador, La Reforma, San Pablo, Malacatán, Catarina, Nuevo Progreso, Pajapita, Ayutla y Ocos.

3. **Noroccidente:** Incluye la totalidad de los municipios de Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Sololá, Totonicapán, Huehuetenango, así como el resto de los municipios de San Marcos y Quetzaltenango.
4. **Nororiente:** Incluye a la totalidad de los municipios de Petén, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, El Progreso, Izabal, and Zacapa.
5. **Suroriente:** Incluye los municipios de Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa, and Chiquimula.

Las regiones se presentan en el siguiente mapa.

Mapa 1



Elaboración: ASIES, 2003

Unidades de medida

Las unidades de medida son las personas u objetos a los que se refiere la información. Para este estudio, las unidades de medida son la población que reside en viviendas reportadas en los mapas del Censo Nacional 2002. Se excluye a las personas que residan en hospitales, cuarteles, asilos, internados y otras instituciones similares.

Unidades de observación, informantes y unidades finales de muestreo.

Este estudio reporta variables que se refieren al informante, el hogar y a la vivienda. Por esta razón, es conveniente utilizar la vivienda como unidad final de muestreo por ser más o menos permanente en el tiempo.

Método de muestreo

Atendiendo a los requerimientos contractuales, se diseñó una muestra compleja. El muestreo complejo incluye características tanto de muestras estratificadas como de muestras por conglomerados. Los siguientes requisitos fueron observados en la construcción de la muestra:

- El 100% de los ciudadanos guatemaltecos debe ser representado. En este caso, sólo se exceptúa a aquellos que residan en viviendas no reportadas en la cartografía 2002.
- Se define un mínimo de cinco y un máximo de ocho estratos de análisis. En este estudio, se trabajó con los cinco estratos mencionados anteriormente.
- Cada estrato puede ser usado como un dominio de estudio.
- Tanto el área urbana como el área rural deben poderse usar como dominios de estudio.
- La muestra debe ser autoponderada tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel de estrato. Este requerimiento existe para evitar el uso de pesos en el análisis de la información.

Atendiendo a estos requerimientos, se propusieron los siguientes objetivos:

- Obtener una muestra representativa que permita analizar la información para los siguientes dominios de estudio:
 1. Guatemala como país
 2. Estratos de primera etapa (dominios de estudio)
 - a. Metropolitana
 - b. Nororiente
 - c. Noroccidente
 - d. Suroccidente
 - e. Suroriente

3. Otros dominios de estudio

- a. Urbano
- b. Rural

- Obtener errores de muestreo para algunos indicadores a todos los niveles.
- Distribuir las entrevistas en una forma consistente con el presupuesto, el tamaño de muestra requerido y un margen de error adecuado para los resultados del estudio.
- Utilizar el marco muestral más reciente disponible para cada lugar poblado.

Bajo las condiciones y objetivos mencionados anteriormente, se procedió a construir la muestra compleja. Se utilizó escogencia aleatoria en todas las etapas salvo en la última en la que se establecieron cuotas por edad y sexo. En 2004, las cuotas eran calculadas para cada sector censal a manera que respondieran a las cuotas en la información censal. Durante la aplicación 2006, se utilizó la misma cuota en todos los sectores. En la aplicación 2008, se conservó el procedimiento de 2006.

Obtener una representación adecuada de Guatemala requiere que se consideren diversas. Además de las consideraciones usuales de las cuotas urbanas y rurales, se prestó especial atención a las características propias de cada municipio, en particular esto representó algunas complicaciones para cumplir con el requisito que la muestra fuera autoponderada a nivel de región. Por esta razón, aunque desde un punto de vista de traslados y logística hubiera sido más conveniente estudiar áreas urbanas y rurales del mismo municipio, en varios casos se tiene sólo áreas rurales o sólo áreas rurales de algunos municipios.

La división municipal de Guatemala presenta grandes variaciones en área y población de los municipios. Adicionalmente, la definición de área urbana y rural que se utilizaba hasta antes del censo 2002 correspondía no a actividades económicas, concentración de la población o servicios disponibles sino a la clasificación de lugar poblado. Esta definición se conservó para garantizar comparabilidad con las muestras de los estudios de 1993 a 2001. Por esta razón, se estimó conveniente partir cada estrato en sus áreas urbana y rural y luego escoger de este grupo los municipios con probabilidad proporcional a la población de cada tipo. De esta manera, un municipio dado tenía distintas posibilidades de selección para sus áreas urbanas y rurales.

Originalmente, se había sugerido que se escogiera municipalidades en una primera etapa y una vez escogidas, se escogieran comunidades u otras unidades censales dentro de los municipios seleccionados. Sin embargo, este procedimiento hubiera resultado problemático si hubiera sido seleccionado un municipio sin área rural --como lo son varios de Sacatepéquez, Sololá y la misma Ciudad de Guatemala- o uno con un área urbana muy pequeña en comparación a su población rural como ocurre en algunos municipios de Quiché y San Marcos. Eliminar la elección del municipio redujo en uno el número de etapas de selección y facilitó cumplir con el requisito de autoponderación.

Por varias razones, mayormente históricas, existen algunos municipios que muestran características muy distintas de sus vecinos. Dos casos típicos son Zaragoza en Chimaltenango y Pachalum en Quiché que tienen poblaciones mayormente ladinas y se encuentran rodeados de municipios con poblaciones mayormente indígenas. El caso opuesto ocurre en Chiquimula en las municipalidades de Camotán, Jocotán y Olopa que presentan alguna población indígena aunque sus vecinos son casi exclusivamente ladinos. Si se procediera a escoger municipalidades y luego poblaciones, es posible que si el azar favoreciera a uno de estos municipios, las proporciones ladino/indígena se verían afectadas.


Para evitar estos problemas, se construyó una regionalización de Guatemala basada en características similares más que en proximidad geográfica. Esta división se logró por medio de un procedimiento de análisis de conglomerados⁵⁰ al que se le incluyó un número elevado de variables a nivel municipal. En particular, considerando la temática del estudio, se prefirió variables relacionadas a educación, participación en las elecciones, pobreza, género y ruralidad.⁵¹

Se ensayaron divisiones desde uno hasta diez grupos y se prefirió una de seis grupos pues a partir de este punto, se obtenían demasiados grupos de sólo un municipio. Tres municipios no pudieron ser clasificados pues presentaban un número elevado de valores perdidos para las variables que se utilizaron: Santa Lucía Milpas Altas en Sacatepéquez, San Bartolo en Totonicapán y Quesada en Jutiapa. Los primeros dos municipios fueron asignados al grupo Especial 1 y Quesada al Especial 2. La división resultante se presenta en el siguiente mapa.

⁵⁰ Las variables fueron normalizadas y se utilizó una norma euclideana para medir la distancia entre los conglomerados.

⁵¹ Las variables utilizadas fueron las siguientes: población total 2002, viviendas 2002, porcentaje de autoidentificación como indígena, porcentaje de población rural, porcentaje de población masculina, alfabetismo de hombres y mujeres de más de 15 años, indicadores de eficiencia educativa, ingresos ordinarios de las municipalidades, porcentaje de población por debajo de la línea de la pobreza, índice de vulnerabilidad, prevalencia de desnutrición crónica, índice de desarrollo humano y porcentaje de ciudadanos que aparecen en el padrón.

Mapa 2



Elaboración: ASIES, 2003

Si se consideran todas las divisiones posibles de los seis grupos homogéneos y dos especiales, los cinco dominios de estudio y las dos áreas se obtiene un total de ochenta posibles divisiones. Sin embargo, sólo treinta y cuatro son no-vacías. El número de entrevistas en cada división se obtuvo asignando en forma proporcional a la población. La escogencia se realizó entonces en dos etapas: en la primera se escogieron las comunidades de la división con probabilidad proporcional al número de sectores censales. Por contarse con un número de viviendas similar en cada sector censal, la escogencia anteriormente mencionada es similar a escoger con probabilidad proporcional a la población. En la siguiente etapa, se escogieron sectores censales dentro de cada comunidad. Por tener todos los sectores censales un número similar de viviendas, esta segunda etapa es similar a una escogencia con probabilidad igual. Por el tamaño de la muestra, en la mayoría de casos se escogió un sector o dos por municipio a excepción del caso de la ciudad de Guatemala.

A cada sector censal rural se le asignaron doce entrevistas y a cada sector censal urbano se le asignaron ocho entrevistas. La muestra resultante se revisó para determinar si se había cumplido con los requisitos.

En resumen: la muestra resultante es una muestra en tres etapas con treinta y cuatro estratos de selección. La primera etapa consistía en escoger las comunidades con probabilidad proporcional al número de sectores censales. La probabilidad de escoger una comunidad C_i es entonces proporcional al número de sectores censales N_{C_i} que se encuentren en la comunidad como se muestra en la siguiente ecuación:

Ecuación 1: Probabilidad de escoger una comunidad

$$P(C_i) = \frac{N_{C_i}}{\sum_j N_{C_j}}$$

En la segunda etapa, el sector censal se escogía con una probabilidad proporcional a la población en el sector. En este caso, la población es el número de viviendas. Usualmente este valor es similar para todos los sectores.

Ecuación 2: Probabilidad de escoger un sector k en una comunidad i

$$P(S_{ki}) = \frac{Pob_{S_{ki}}}{\sum_j Pob_{S_{ji}}} = \frac{Pob_{S_{ki}}}{Pob_{C_i}}$$

Dentro de cada sector, las viviendas se escogían con probabilidad igual. Por ejemplo, para un sector rural, la probabilidad de escogencia de una vivienda sería:

Ecuación 3: Probabilidad de escoger una vivienda en el sector S_{ki}

$$P(Viv_{ikl}) = \frac{12}{Pob_{S_{ki}}}$$

La probabilidad de escogencia de una vivienda en un estrato selección (cada una de las treinta y cuatro divisiones mencionadas anteriormente) sería el producto de las tres probabilidades mencionadas. Por ser proporcionales todas las asignaciones y contarse con sectores censales de tamaños similares, las probabilidades de selección para cada vivienda a nivel nacional son similares.

En las viviendas donde se encontró más de un adulto que cumpliera la cuota, se contó con una cuarta etapa de selección que se realizó con la ayuda de una tabla números aleatorios. Estas tablas son conocidas como tablas de Kish.

Marco muestral

El Marco muestral utilizado fueron los listados de comunidades, sectores censales y mapas producidos por el INE (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*) para el Censo 2002.

Tamaño de muestra

Para cumplir con los requerimientos contractuales, se estableció un tamaño de muestra de 1500 entrevistas efectivas. Las estimaciones del margen de error en cada dominio de estudio se presentan en la sección 1.9.

Efectos de diseño y error de muestreo

El error de muestreo y el efecto de diseño se estiman utilizando el tamaño de la muestra y los efectos de diseño obtenidos en estudios similares. Los efectos de diseño, que se definen como el cociente de la varianza obtenida con la muestra compleja entre la varianza obtenida con una muestra aleatoria irrestricta de igual tamaño como indica la siguiente ecuación:

Ecuación 4: Definición de efectos de diseño

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

Donde $V_{sa}(\theta)$ es la varianza del indicador θ obtenida usando una muestra aleatoria irrestricta y $V_{comp}(\theta)$ es la varianza para el mismo indicador utilizando una muestra compleja. Cabe resaltar que estos efectos son distintos para cada variable.

Para estimar los valores de los efectos de diseño, en 2004 y 2006 se utilizó un procedimiento iterativo del tipo *Jackknife 1* que se encuentra disponible en el software WesVar Versión 2. Para la versión 2008, en busca de mantener uniformidad con los demás países, se utilizó el programa Stata® que estima los efectos de diseño por medio de una serie de Taylor. En la siguiente tabla, se presentan los efectos de diseño para varias variables, de preferencia las que se miden en escalas 1-10 y 1-7. Ambos procedimientos producen valores similares.

Tabla 1A. Efectos de diseño para variables seleccionadas en el estudio 2006

Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)
e2	1,33	B1	2,13	D1	1,91
e3	1,51	B2	1,75	D2	1,82
E5	1,15	B3	1,89	D3	1,73
E8	1,20	B4	1,96	D4	1,83
EDUC	1,88	B6	1,70	D5	1,56

Para el estudio CAMS 2004 se había estimado un efecto de diseño promedio de (DEFT) 1.348 para estas variables usando la aproximación por series de Taylor que provee el programa

Epi Info versión 6. Para la aplicación 2006, se obtuvo un efecto de diseño promedio para estas variables usando la técnica *Jackknife 1* y el programa WesVar versión 3.2. estimable en 1.359 que difiere poco del valor obtenido en 2004. Para la aplicación 2008 se obtiene el efecto de diseño más pequeño de la serie, siendo este de 1.296. Con este diseño de 1.296 se calcularán los errores para cada estrato.

Es importante tomar en cuenta que se consideró una ligera sobremuestra para cada región basada en la tasa de rechazo observada en la aplicación 2004. Puesto que las tasas bajaron sustancialmente de la aplicación 2004 a la 2006, algunos puntos muestrales fueron eliminados con la ayuda de una tabla de números aleatorios. Para la aplicación 2008 se utilizó la misma muestra de 2006.

Tabla 2A. Entrevistas y tasas de rechazo por región

Region	Entrevistas requeridas	Tasa de rechazo estimada	Número de boletas logradas	Número de intentos (incluido las que se lograron)	Rechazos	Tasa de rechazo (real)
Guatemala	332	12%	332	1835	451	41%
Noroccidente	504	25%	503	667	61	11%
Nororient	360	12%	360	2188	502	58%
Surorient	112	14%	112	312	48	32%
Suroccidente	232	14%	232	306	15	6%
TOTAL	1540	14%	1538	5306	1077	41%

El rechazo, al estudiarse dentro de cada estrato, difiere radicalmente en cuanto a causas y comportamiento. En la tabla anterior, se considera como rechazo únicamente aquellas situaciones que resultaron en que un informante elegible rechazara la entrevista o en una entrevista incompleta. Por esta razón, se pidió que en esta ocasión se detallara cada causa de rechazo. La información se consigna en la siguiente tabla.

Tabla 3A. Causas de Rechazo por Estrato

Razones de intento de entrevista sin éxito	Estrato # 1	Estrato # 2	Estrato # 3	Estrato # 4	Estrato # 5
1. Entrevista rechazada	451	57	499	48	15
2. Entrevista incompleta	0	4	3	0	0
3. Persona elegible ausente	258	1	222	38	2
3. Vivienda desocupada	78	4	185	10	5
4. Vivienda en construcción	38	3	139	2	0
Casa de descanso/ extranjeros/ No habla el idioma de la encuesta	44	0	10	0	0
5. Nadie en casa	266	11	307	36	17
6. informantes no aptos (Mudo, enfermos mentales, borrachos, personas agresivas etc.)	40	0	34	0	0
7. No hay elegible (no corresponde a la cuota buscada)	154	84	239	27	19
8. No hay adultos en el hogar	81	0	100	39	16
9. otros	93	0	0	0	0
10. INAP	0	0	0	0	0

Errores de muestreo por dominio de estudio

Tabla 4A. Tamaños esperados de muestra y errores de muestreo

Margen de error (95% confianza)			
	Boletas	Muestra aleatoria irrestricta	Margen de error en muestra compleja.*
Metropolitana	332	5.4%	6.1%
Noroccidente	503	4.5%	5.1%
Nororiente	359	5.2%	5.9%
Suroriente	112	9.4%	10.2%
Suroccidente	232	6.6%	7.5%
Urbana	769	3.6%	4.1%
Rural	796	3.6%	4.1%
TOTAL	1538	2.5%	2.9%

* Se usa el efecto de diseño promedio de 1.296

Comparación entre la muestra y la población

En estas comparaciones se percibe un ajuste bastante preciso a las proporciones censales.

Por región

Tabla 5A. Distribución de la población y la muestra por región

	Población Censo 2002	Porcentaje	Entrevistas	Porcentaje
Metropolitana	2 541 581	22.6%	332	21.5%
Noroccidente	3 742 407	33.3%	503	32.7%
Nororiente	2 012 859	17.9%	359	23.3%
Suroriente	1 235 866	11.0%	112	7.3%
Suroccidente	1 704 486	15.2%	232	15.0%
TOTAL	11 237 199		1 538	

Por áreas urbana y rural

Tabla 6A. Distribución de la población y la muestra por áreas urbana y rural

	Población Urbana	Población Rural	Porcentaje de población urbana	Entrevistas Urbanas	Entrevistas rurales Rural	Porcentaje de entrevistas urbanas (real)
Metropolitana	2186669	354912	86.0%	308	24	92.8%
Noroccidente	1424190	2318217	38.1%	184	319	36.6%
Nororiente	590006	1422853	29.3%	96	263	26.7%
Suroriente	366029	869837	29.6%	40	72	35.7%
Suroccidente	667120	1037366	39.1%	88	144	37.9%
TOTAL			46.1%	716	822	46.6%

Apéndice II: Documento de consentimiento informado entregado a los entrevistados



**Asociación de Investigación
y Estudios Sociales**

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de la asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales –ASIES- para solicitarle una entrevista que durará cerca de 60 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a ASIES, al teléfono 2331-0277-8 y preguntar por Juan Pablo Pira o por Max Eduardo Lucas, personas responsables de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?

Apéndice III: El cuestionario utilizado

Guatemala Versión # 18Q IRB Approval: #071086



LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Guatemala, 2008

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	PAIS	2
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
ESTRATOPRI: (201). Zona metropolitana (202). Suroccidente (203) Noroccidente (204) Suroriente (205) Nororiente	ESTRATOPRI	2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM (Unidad primaria de Muestro). _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Departamento : _____	PROV	2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Municipio _____	MUNICIPIO	2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Lugar poblado _____	GUADISTRITO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	GUASEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector _____	GUASEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo) (Punto muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	UR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	TAMANO	<input type="checkbox"/>
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Achí (7) Ixil	IDIOMAQ	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hora de inicio: _____:_____ [no digitar]		
Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2008	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer **Q1**

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]** **A**
4

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...**[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1

A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR						SOCT1
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR						SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR						IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR						IDIO2
Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.						
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR			
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	8			CP2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)?	1	2	8			CP4A
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8			CP4

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...						
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR						NP1
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR						NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR						SGL1
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien						SGL2

ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR						
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR						LGL2
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (8) NS/NR						LGL2A
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (8) NS/NR						LGL2B
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR						LGL3
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año,	1	2	3	4	8	CP5

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
o nunca.						
Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]						
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8 9 (HOMBRE)	CP20

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: [Leer alternativas] (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	IT1A
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<p>IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás?</p> <p>(1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR</p>	IT1B
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda					Derecha					(NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]

<p>IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno guatemalteco ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR</p>	IMMIG1
<p>IMMIG2. En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los guatemaltecos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los guatemaltecos? [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</p> <p>(1) Hacen los trabajos que los guatemaltecos no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los guatemaltecos (8) NS/NR</p>	IMMIG2

<p>PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó "nunca" o "NS/NR", marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a JC1]</p>	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	PROT1
<p>PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?</p>	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap PROT2

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC1
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC4
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC10
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC12
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC13

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC16

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a VIC20] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]	VIC1	
VIC10. [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes usaron violencia en contra de usted? (1) Sí (2) No (9) Inap	VIC10	
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]	AOJ1	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (6) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	AOJ1B	

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No” anotar “0” cero]	¿Cuántas veces? NO = 0, NS/NR=88	
VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC20
VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC21
VIC22. ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o actos de vandalismo en contra de su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC22
VIC23. ¿Tiene usted vehículo o motocicleta? No → Marcar 99 [PASAR A VIC24] Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha sido víctima de un robo total de vehículo o motocicleta en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC23
VIC23A. [Solo si tiene vehículo o motocicleta] ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o de un robo de una parte o partes de vehículo o motocicleta? ¿Cuántas veces? 99. Inap		VIC23A
[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]. VIC24. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de alguna estafa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC24
VIC25. ¿Alguien le amenazó de/a muerte, por cualquier motivo, en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC25
VIC26 ¿Fue usted golpeado por alguien en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC26

VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?					VIC27
VIC28. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma de fuego</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?					VIC28
VIC29. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma blanca</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?					VIC29
VIC30. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún delito de tipo sexual en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?					VIC30
VIC31. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha sido usted víctima de un chantaje, extorsión? ¿Cuántas veces?					VIC31
VIC32. ¿Fue usted o algún pariente que vive en su hogar víctima de un secuestro en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas y cuántas veces? [Considere total de veces y total de personas para escribir el total]					VIC32
VIC33. ¿Algún pariente o persona que vivía en la casa con usted fue asesinada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas?					VIC33
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR					AOJ8
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR					AOJ11
<i>Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR		
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	8		VIC40
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	8		VIC41
VIC42. ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia? [Si no tiene negocio marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9	VIC42
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiarse de barrio, colonia, o vecindario por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1)	(0)	8		VIC43
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	8		VIC44
VIC45. ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si está desempleado marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9	VIC45
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					AOJ11A
VIC11. ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer] [Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]					VIC11

(0) No denunciaría (1) Municipalidad (2) Policía (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc) (4) Iglesia (5) Medio de comunicación (7) Derechos Humanos (6) Otros (8) NS/NR		
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12a	
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	AOJ16A	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas/maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ17	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (8) NS/NR	AOJ18	
VIC50. Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son, en general, altos, medios o bajos? (1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (8) NS/NR	VIC50	
GUAAOJ22. ¿Cree usted que los pandilleros o mareros pueden rehabilitarse si se les brinda una oportunidad? (1) Sí pueden rehabilitarse (2) No pueden rehabilitarse 8. NS/NR	GUAAOJ22	
VIC51. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha tomado usted en su vivienda alguna medida de seguridad para protegerse de la delincuencia? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a VIC53] (8) NS/NR [Pase a VIC53]	VIC51	

¿Qué medida de seguridad ha tomado usted en su vivienda para protegerse de la delincuencia?
[OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera respuesta preguntar, “Algo más?”].
Aceptar hasta dos respuestas.

	1ª Respuesta	2ª
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	VIC52A	Respuesta VIC52B
Ha construido muros, rejas o paredes exteriores adicionales en su casa	1	1
Ha puesto alambre de púas, "razor", malla electrificada o vidrio roto alrededor de su casa	2	2
Ha instalado alarmas en su casa	3	3
Le ha puesto más candados o chapas a las puertas de su casa	4	4
Ha adquirido o ha comprado un arma	5	5
Ha contratado un servicio de seguridad privada o a un vigilante privado	6	6
Otras medidas	7	7
NS/NR	8	8
INAP	9	9

<p>VIC53. ¿Hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un seguro que le compense o le reembolse las pérdidas o los daños causados por delitos contra usted o algún miembro de su hogar? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar?</p> <p>[Coloque la cantidad] _____</p> <p>[No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	VIC53	
<p>VIC54. Si existiera un mecanismo efectivo, hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un servicio que le garantizara que usted NO será víctima de ningún acto violento o robo? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar?</p> <p>[Coloque la cantidad] _____</p> <p>[No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	VIC54	
<p>VIC55. De las siguientes opciones, ¿cuál considera usted que es la principal causa de la inseguridad en su lugar de residencia? [Leer opciones]:</p> <p>(1) Falta de policía (2) Falta de justicia (3) Pobreza (4) Falta de programas para los jóvenes (8) NS/NR (9) [No leer] No hay inseguridad en mi lugar de residencia</p>	VIC55	
<p>VIC56. ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	VIC56	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			NS/NR	

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondée: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)	B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?	B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político guatemalteco?	B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?	B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político guatemalteco?	B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército?	B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso?	B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ministerio Público?	B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional Civil?	B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	B21A
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser guatemalteco?	B43
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de Cuentas?	B19
B17 [B45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos?	B17
B24. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los tribunales de justicia?	B24
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	B40
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Superintendencia de	B42

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR			
Administración Tributaria (SAT)?			
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte de Constitucionalidad?			B50
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?			B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?			B48

Usando la misma escala...	NADA	1	2	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO				
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno de Colom combatirá la pobreza ?				N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno promoverá y protegerá los principios democráticos?				N3
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno combatirá la corrupción en el gobierno?				N9
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno protegerá los derechos humanos.				N10
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno mejorará la seguridad ciudadana?				N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el nuevo gobierno combatirá el desempleo?				N12

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Guatemala y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos guatemaltecos representan bien a sus votantes?	EPP1
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos guatemaltecos?	EPP2
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	EPP3
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso estorba la labor del presidente?	EC1
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados del Congreso discutiendo y debatiendo?	EC2
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso?	EC3
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso cumple con lo que usted espera de él?	EC4

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Colom es...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
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<p>GUAM3. ¿Cuál cree usted que será <i>la principal</i> dificultad del nuevo gobierno para cumplir sus objetivos? [No leer lista]</p> <p>(1) Falta de recursos financieros/dinero (2) Falta de voluntad política (3) Bloqueo de sectores que se opondrán a sus políticas de gobierno (4) Falta de equipo (personas capacitadas para gobernar) (5) Bloqueo de las mafias organizadas (6) Corrupción (7) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>GUAM3</p>
<p>M2. Hablando del Congreso pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso guatemalteco están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (8) NSNR</p>	<p>M2</p>

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo							NS/NR
Muy de acuerdo							
							<p>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</p>
<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.</p>							
<p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>							<p>POP101</p>
<p>POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>							<p>POP102</p>
<p>POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>							<p>POP103</p>

POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP106
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP107
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR	POP109
POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP110
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP112
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP113

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	EFF1
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	EFF2

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los guatemaltecos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. NS/NR = 8	
ROS1. El Estado guatemalteco, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS1
ROS2. El Estado guatemalteco, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS2
ROS3. El Estado guatemalteco, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS3

ROS4. El Estado guatemalteco debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS4
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[RECOGER TARJETA B]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Guatemala es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

	1-10, 88
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E16

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		DEM2
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR		DEM11
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR		AUT1
AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes (8) NS/NR		AUT2

<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	PP1
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	PP2

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; ó (3) no corruptas.

<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga cuarenta quetzales de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada (2) Es corrupto pero se justifica (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	DC10
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	DC13

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	9	0	1	8	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida ?		0	1	8	EXC18
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					EXC7

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...					
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI1
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente saliente del Congreso de Guatemala? [NO LEER: Ruben Dario Morales] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI2
GI17. ¿Cómo se llama el nuevo Vicepresidente de Guatemala? [NO LEER: Rafael Espada] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					

GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene el Guatemala? [NO LEER: 22] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? [NO LEER: 4 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. ¿Está empadronando para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR	VB1
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VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB50] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB50]	VB2
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VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco o voto nulo) (201) Alvaro Colom, Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (202) Otto Pérez, Partido Patriota (PP) (203) Alejandro Giammattei, Gran Alianza Nacional (GANNA) (204) Eduardo Suger, Centro de Acción Social (CASA) (205) Luis Rabbé, Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) (206) Rigoberta Menchú, Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (207) Mario Estrada, Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN) (210) Fritz García-Gallont, Partido Unionista (PU) (211) Oscar Castañeda, Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) (212) Miguel Angel Sandoval, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (213) Manuel Conde, Unión Democrática (UD) (214) Pablo Monsanto, Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN)	VB3
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<p>(215) Héctor Rosales, DIA (216) Vinicio Cerezo Blandón, Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) (77) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) No aplica (No votó)</p>	
<p>GUAVB12. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en la segunda vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? [NO LEER LISTA] (1) Álvaro Colom, Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) [Pase a VB100] (2) Otto Pérez, Partido Patriota (PP) [Pase a VB100] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco o voto nulo) [Pase a VB101] (88) NS/NR [Pase a GUAVB7] (99) No aplica (No votó)</p>	<p>GUAVB12</p>
<p>VB100. ¿Qué lo motivó para votar por su candidato en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005? [Leer opciones] (1) La personalidad del candidato (2) El partido del candidato (3) Su plan de gobierno (4) Su equipo de trabajo (5) Tiene amigos o familiares en ese partido (6) Le dieron algo a cambio de votar por ese candidato (algún regalo o dinero) (7) Le ofrecieron trabajo si ganaba ese candidato (10) [No leer] Otra razón (88) NS/NR (99) No aplica (No votó)</p>	<p>VB100</p>
<p>VB101. [Solo para quienes dijeron que votaron nulo o en blanco en alguna de las dos vueltas] ¿Por qué voto usted nulo o blanco en la primera o en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales? (NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS) (1) Porque no sabía por quién votar, estaba confundido(a) (2) Porque quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos (3) Porque quería protestar contra el sistema político (4) Porque quería protestar por la forma en que se dio la campaña electoral (5) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR (9) No aplica (No votó)</p>	<p>VB101</p>

<p>GUAVB7 [VB7]. ¿Por quien votó diputado en las últimas elecciones de 2007? [NO LEER LISTA] (1) Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (2) Partido Patriota (PP) (3) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANNA) (4) Centro de Acción Social (CASA) (5) Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) (6) Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (7) Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN) (10) Partido Unionista (PU) (11) Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) (12). Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)-MAIZ (13). Unión Democrática (UD) (14). Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) (15). DIA (16). Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) (17). Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco o voto nulo) (88). NS/NR</p>	<p>GUAVB7</p>
<p>GUAVB16. ¿Votó usted por el mismo partido para presidente y para diputados en la primera vuelta de las elecciones de 2007? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) No aplica (no votó)</p>	<p>GUAVB15</p>
<p>VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR</p>	<p>VB50</p>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]. (201) Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (202) Partido Patriota (PP) (203) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANNA) (204) Centro de Acción Social (CASA) (205) Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) (206) Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (207) Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN) (210) Partido Unionista (PU) (211) Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) (212) Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (213) Unión Democrática (UD)</p>	<p>VB11</p>

(214) Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) (215) DIA (216) Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) (217) NINGUNO 88. NS/NR [Pase A POL1] 99. INAP [Pase A POL1]		
VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte (8)NS/NR (9) INAP	VB12	

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	POL1	
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] (1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR	POL2	
Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:		
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS2	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS5	

VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [No leer] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno. (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía (8) NS/NR	VB20	
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR	VB21	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D] LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida		
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posible para usted.
 ...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible			posible					Mejor vida			NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con... [Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	SD1
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	SD2
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	SD3
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8	SD4
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8	SD5
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	SD6
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	SD7
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	SD8
SD9. El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	SD9
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	SD10
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	SD11
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	SD12

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?
 (1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería, o no la aprobaría ni la entendería. **[Después de cada pregunta lea: aprobaría, no aprobaría pero entendería, o no aprobaría ni entendería]**

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	[No leer] NS/NR
VOL201. Suponga que una persona agrade a alguien que le quitó el esposo o la esposa. Usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a una hija o hijo. Usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata, usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienza a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente indeseable. Usted...	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9				
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado (Secundaria)	10	11	12				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria							
NS/NR/	88						

GUAED1. La escuela/colegio al que usted asistió era: **[Solo para quienes tienen algún grado de educación]**

- (1) Colegio privado
- (2) Escuela pública
- (8) NS/NR
- (9) No aplica (no ha asistido a la escuela)

<p>Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)</p>	<p>Q2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Católica (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano). (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas) (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo). (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Religiones Mayas). (4) Ninguna (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q3</p>
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>Q5A</p>
<p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]</p> <p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]</p> <p>(00). Ningún ingreso (01). de 0 a 1000 quetzales (02). de 1001 a 1500 quetzales (03). de 1501 a 2000 quetzales (04). de 2001 a 2500 quetzales (05). de 2501 a 3300 quetzales (06). de 3301 a 4000 quetzales (07). de 4001 a 5000 quetzales (08). de 5001 a 6600 quetzales (09). de 6601 a 9500 quetzales (10). más de 9500 quetzales (88) NS/NR</p> <p>[RECOGER TARJETA E]</p>	<p>Q10</p>
<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No [Pase a Q10c] (8) NS [Pase a Q10c]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>
<p>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer]</p> <p>(1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos</p>	<p>Q10a1</p>

(6) Ahorro/Inversión (7) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) Inap		
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10B	
Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No [Pase a Q14] (8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14]	Q10C	
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	Q16	
Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	Q14	
Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) [No leer] NS/NR	Q10D	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88).	Q12	____
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, 99 INAP (no tiene hijos)	Q12A	____
ETID. Usted se considera...? [Leer alternativas] (3) Indígena (2) Ladino (4) Garífuna (7) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR	ETID	

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (201) Sólo Español (202) Mam (203) K'iche' (204) Kaqchiquel (205) Q'eqchi' (206) Otro (nacional o extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR	LENG1
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR [No leer]	WWW1

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1
R3. Refrigeradora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3
R4. Teléfono convencional o fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15
OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] (1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a MIG1] (4) Es estudiante? [Pase a MIG1] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a MIG1] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a MIG1] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a MIG1] (8) NS/NR	OCUP4		

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulantes, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p> <p>(14) Obrero</p> <p>(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1 </p>
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<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>
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<p>OCUP 12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?</p> <p>_____ [Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP 12A</p>
<p>OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?</p> <p>(1) Menos (2) Igual (3) Más (8) NS/NR (9)</p> <p>INAP</p>	<p>OCUP12</p>

<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro médico a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1C</p>
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Ahora nos gustaria hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situacion laboral en diciembre de 2006		
OCUP27. -En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí [Pase a MIG1] (2) No [Siga] (8) NS/NR [Siga] (9) INAP		OCUP27
OCUP28. En esa fecha estaba usted:[Leer alternativas] (1) Desempleado? [Siga] (2) Trabajando? [Pase a MIG1] (3) Estudiando? [Pase a MIG1] (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? [Pase a MIG1] (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [Pase a MIG1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MIG1] (9) INAP		OCUP28
OCUP29. ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas] (1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pase a OCUP31] (2) Fin de empleo temporal [Pase a OCUP31] (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [Pase a OCUP31] (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Siga] (5) Despido o cese [Siga] (8) NS/NR [Pase a OCUP31] (9) INAP		OCUP29
OCUP30. ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí [Pase a MIG1] (2) No [Pase a MIG1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MIG1] (9)INAP		OCUP30
OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a MIG1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MIG1] (9) INAP		OCUP31
OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha, cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP		OCUP31A
MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?: (1) En el campo (2) En un pueblo (3) En una ciudad (8) NS/NR		MIG1

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


TARJETA #1



TARJETA A



TARJETA B



TARJETA C

**Aprueba
firmemente**

10

9

8

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
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2

**Desaprueba
firmemente**

1

TARJETA D



TARJETA E

- (00). Ningún ingreso
- (01). de 0 a 1000 quetzales
- (02). de 1001 a 1500 quetzales
- (03). de 1501 a 2000 quetzales
- (04). de 2001 a 2500 quetzales
- (05). de 2501 a 3300 quetzales
- (06). de 3301 a 4000 quetzales
- (07). de 4001 a 5000 quetzales
- (08). de 5001 a 6600 quetzales
- (09). de 6601 a 9500 quetzales
- (10). más de 9500 quetzales

Apéndice IV: Las tablas de regresión

A. Las tablas de predictores específicos por capítulo

Predictores de victimización por corrupción en Guatemala

Probabilidad de ser víctima de corrupción		
	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	0.222*	(2.42)
Mujer	-0.160*	(-2.04)
Edad	-0.211*	(-2.59)
Riqueza	0.506*	(5.16)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.008	(-0.08)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.139	(-1.60)
Número de hijos	0.133	(1.59)
Suroccidente	0.067	(0.55)
Noroccidente	0.084	(0.70)
Suroriente	-0.052	(-0.54)
Nororiente	-0.063	(-0.50)
Indígena	0.183	(1.91)
Constante	-1.550*	(-18.93)
F	6.91	
N. de casos	1428	
* p<0.05		

Fuente: Guatemala 2008, Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Predictores de victimización por delincuencia en Guatemala

Probabilidad de ser víctima de la delincuencia		
	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	0.134	(1.22)
Mujer	-0.134*	(-2.13)
Edad	-0.269*	(-3.38)
Riqueza	0.287*	(2.63)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.336*	(-3.66)
Constante	-1.743*	(-18.80)
F	10.27	
N. de casos	1524	
* p<0.05		

Predictores de apoyo a la descentralización de responsabilidades

Probabilidad de dar apoyo a la descentralización de responsabilidades		
	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.028	(0.94)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.046	(1.56)
Educación	0.101*	(2.18)
Mujer	-0.048	(-1.76)
Edad	0.006	(0.20)
Riqueza	0.024	(0.65)
Tamaño del lugar	0.028	(0.85)
Autoidentificación étnica	0.027	(0.98)
Constante	0.001	(0.02)
R-cuadrado	0.017	
N. de casos	1332	
* p<0.05		

Predictores de apoyo a la descentralización de recursos

Probabilidad de dar apoyo a la descentralización de recursos		
	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.082*	(2.67)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	-0.017	(-0.56)
Educación	0.094*	(2.11)
Mujer	-0.023	(-0.92)
Edad	0.008	(0.27)
Riqueza	0.025	(0.64)
Tamaño del lugar	0.036	(0.98)
Autoidentificación étnica	-0.009	(-0.37)
Constante	0.007	(0.22)
R-cuadrado	0.019	
N. de casos	1332	
* p<0.05		

Predictores de evaluación del desempeño económico del gobierno

Desempeño económico del gobierno		
	Coef.	t
Educación	-0.035	(-0.88)
Mujer	-0.017	(-0.79)
Edad	-0.011	(-0.33)
Riqueza	0.003	(0.06)
Tamaño del lugar	0.074	(1.87)
Situación económica nacional	0.031	(0.97)
Situación económica personal	0.046	(1.26)
Constante	0.007	(0.17)
R-cuadrado	0.013	
N. de casos	1375	
* p<0.05		

Predictores de participación electoral en Guatemala

Probabilidad de asistir a las urnas electorales		
	Coefficientes	(t)
Area urbana	0.015	(0.05)
Tamaño del lugar	0.090	(0.26)
Zona metropolitana	-0.254	(-1.54)
Educación	0.555*	(5.66)
Número de hijos	0.180	(1.96)
Edad	0.321*	(3.81)
Riqueza	0.232*	(2.39)
Mujer	-0.254*	(-3.83)
Ladino	-0.083	(-0.30)
Indígena	0.189	(0.67)
Constante	1.112*	(13.68)
F	15.18	
N. de casos	1473	
* p<0.05		

B. Las tablas de impacto en las variables conducentes a una democracia estable

Impacto de la victimización por corrupción en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por corrupción	1.243	(1.25)	-0.045	(1.10)	0.103	(1.54)	-1.138	(1.29)	0.999	(1.18)
Aprobación del trabajo presidente	0.052	(0.07)	0.019	(0.06)	-0.087	(0.06)				
Interés en la política	0.153*	(0.03)	0.067*	(0.03)	0.021	(0.03)	0.133*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.059	(0.33)	0.836*	(0.24)	0.568*	(0.23)	-0.244	(0.18)	0.088	(0.22)
Mujer	-0.703	(1.74)	-0.792	(1.42)	-0.004	(1.50)	0.024	(1.12)	-0.743	(1.39)
Edad	0.056	(0.30)	-0.631*	(0.25)	-0.213	(0.28)	-0.296	(0.20)	-0.004	(0.25)
Edad al cuadrado	0.001	(0.00)	0.008*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.375	(0.62)	-0.217	(0.66)	-0.060	(0.51)	-1.245*	(0.62)	1.309*	(0.64)
Percepción economía familiar	4.294*	(1.60)	0.375	(1.10)	0.473	(1.11)	3.834*	(1.06)	1.757	(1.15)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.411	(0.81)	1.073	(0.60)	0.327	(0.63)	1.493	(0.88)	2.679*	(0.82)
Constante	40.009*	(10.77)	64.174*	(6.12)	46.408*	(8.36)	36.727*	(6.83)	40.708*	(6.36)
R-cuadrado	0.044		0.034		0.015		0.064		0.019	
N. de casos	1084		1210		1152		1354		1443	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de la percepción de corrupción en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política (apoyo al derecho de oposición)		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de corrupción	-0.008	(0.04)	-0.038	(0.03)	-0.003	(0.03)	-0.112*	(0.03)	0.044	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo presidente	0.041	(0.07)	0.004	(0.06)	-0.083	(0.07)				
Interés en la política	0.157*	(0.04)	0.076*	(0.03)	0.023	(0.03)	0.139*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.146	(0.34)	0.878*	(0.25)	0.599*	(0.24)	-0.245	(0.18)	0.120	(0.23)
Mujer	-1.487	(1.87)	-1.335	(1.51)	0.096	(1.57)	0.728	(1.12)	-1.201	(1.50)
Edad	0.176	(0.32)	-0.536*	(0.25)	-0.279	(0.28)	-0.246	(0.19)	-0.079	(0.27)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.001	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.382	(0.66)	-0.094	(0.71)	-0.191	(0.53)	-1.223*	(0.61)	1.346*	(0.64)
Percepción economía familiar	4.490*	(1.54)	0.757	(1.09)	0.944	(1.21)	4.204*	(1.03)	1.543	(1.25)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.093	(0.79)	1.141	(0.60)	0.219	(0.63)	1.488	(0.80)	2.707*	(0.86)
Constante	37.000*	(10.55)	64.247*	(6.43)	46.905*	(8.95)	43.340*	(6.33)	38.828*	(7.25)
R-cuadrado	0.047		0.041		0.017		0.088		0.022	
N. de casos	1026		1117		1081		1253		1304	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de la victimización por delincuencia en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por crimen	0.009	(0.03)	-0.009	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)	-0.037*	(0.02)	-0.008	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.055	(0.07)	0.015	(0.06)	-0.087	(0.06)				
Interés en la política	0.154*	(0.03)	0.067*	(0.03)	0.020	(0.03)	0.134*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.062	(0.33)	0.838*	(0.25)	0.566*	(0.23)	-0.252	(0.18)	0.096	(0.22)
Mujer	-0.828	(1.80)	-0.894	(1.39)	-0.052	(1.47)	-0.051	(1.13)	-0.889	(1.41)
Edad	0.076	(0.30)	-0.618*	(0.25)	-0.217	(0.28)	-0.304	(0.20)	0.009	(0.25)
Edad al cuadrado	0.000	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.448	(0.61)	-0.187	(0.67)	-0.055	(0.53)	-1.200	(0.62)	1.346*	(0.66)
Percepción economía familiar	4.222*	(1.61)	0.336	(1.09)	0.475	(1.15)	3.790*	(1.06)	1.679	(1.15)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.413	(0.85)	1.043	(0.60)	0.333	(0.63)	1.327	(0.88)	2.637*	(0.83)
Constante	39.551*	(11.25)	64.520*	(6.04)	46.502*	(8.28)	37.937*	(6.82)	41.288*	(6.38)
R-cuadrado	0.044		0.034		0.015		0.066		0.018	
N. de casos	1082		1207		1150		1350		1437	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de la percepción de inseguridad en el apoyo a la democracia estable										
Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.032	(0.03)	-0.025	(0.03)	-0.007	(0.03)	-0.155*	(0.03)	-0.285*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.047	(0.06)	-0.002	(0.06)	-0.104	(0.06)				
Interés en la política	0.156*	(0.03)	0.067*	(0.03)	0.022	(0.03)	0.134*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.047	(0.34)	0.829*	(0.25)	0.603*	(0.23)	-0.226	(0.18)	0.201	(0.23)
Mujer	-0.093	(1.71)	-0.446	(1.39)	0.235	(1.47)	0.842	(1.12)	-1.019	(1.36)
Edad	0.152	(0.30)	-0.628*	(0.25)	-0.153	(0.28)	-0.297	(0.20)	-0.016	(0.26)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.000	(0.00)	0.008*	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.332	(0.64)	-0.297	(0.67)	-0.198	(0.52)	-1.559*	(0.55)	1.178	(0.63)
Percepción economía familiar	4.218*	(1.55)	0.259	(1.06)	0.687	(1.05)	3.044*	(0.94)	-0.106	(1.16)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.456	(0.83)	0.995	(0.61)	0.226	(0.67)	0.750	(0.84)	1.270	(0.72)
Constante	40.418*	(11.03)	66.959*	(6.44)	46.300*	(8.71)	47.408*	(6.26)	61.849*	(6.79)
R-cuadrado	0.043		0.033		0.016		0.104		0.108	
N. de casos	1057		1172		1121		1314		1388	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de la satisfacción con los servicios del gobierno local en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfacción con servicios locales	-0.059	(0.05)	0.001	(0.04)	-0.028	(0.04)	0.083	(0.05)	0.085	(0.05)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.070	(0.07)	0.014	(0.06)	-0.090	(0.07)				
Interés en la política	0.154*	(0.04)	0.080*	(0.03)	0.013	(0.03)	0.132*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.100	(0.34)	0.839*	(0.25)	0.612*	(0.24)	-0.345	(0.18)	0.173	(0.23)
Mujer	-0.106	(1.81)	-0.426	(1.42)	-0.213	(1.60)	0.301	(1.20)	-1.354	(1.50)
Edad	0.078	(0.30)	-0.586*	(0.27)	-0.249	(0.27)	-0.360	(0.19)	0.126	(0.25)
Edad al cuadrado	0.000	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.295	(0.69)	-0.164	(0.70)	0.043	(0.53)	-1.140	(0.59)	1.172	(0.63)
Percepción economía familiar	4.468*	(1.67)	0.432	(1.15)	0.132	(1.12)	4.131*	(1.06)	1.272	(1.24)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.613	(0.82)	1.112	(0.65)	0.271	(0.62)	1.428	(0.81)	2.550*	(0.87)
Constante	42.239*	(10.22)	62.780*	(5.74)	49.339*	(8.25)	33.076*	(7.32)	35.925*	(6.34)
R-cuadrado	0.047		0.037		0.016		0.066		0.020	
N. de casos	1023		1134		1082		1252		1323	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de evaluación del desempeño económico del gobierno en el apoyo a la democracia estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico del gobierno	0.294*	(0.05)	0.125*	(0.03)	0.200*	(0.04)	0.443*	(0.02)	0.148*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.104	(0.07)	-0.070	(0.06)	-0.198*	(0.07)				
Interés en la política	0.140*	(0.03)	0.056	(0.03)	0.007	(0.03)	0.075*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.232	(0.34)	0.899*	(0.25)	0.696*	(0.23)	-0.124	(0.16)	0.154	(0.24)
Mujer	-1.239	(1.86)	-0.805	(1.40)	0.537	(1.49)	0.031	(1.23)	-0.574	(1.43)
Edad	0.147	(0.29)	-0.670*	(0.27)	-0.374	(0.29)	-0.321	(0.18)	0.080	(0.26)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.000	(0.00)	0.008*	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.740	(0.65)	-0.111	(0.68)	-0.076	(0.50)	-1.019*	(0.48)	1.581*	(0.65)
Percepción economía familiar	3.341*	(1.46)	-0.127	(1.16)	-0.230	(1.08)	2.725*	(0.84)	0.556	(1.12)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.695	(0.88)	0.884	(0.56)	-0.069	(0.63)	0.692	(0.50)	2.958*	(0.83)
Constante	32.682*	(11.23)	64.826*	(6.15)	47.282*	(8.14)	20.182*	(5.48)	32.467*	(6.73)
R-cuadrado	0.109		0.052		0.060		0.333		0.044	
N. de casos	1045		1151		1105		1264		1322	
* p<0.05										

Impacto de la participación cívica en el apoyo a la democracia		
	Coef.	t
Participación en organización religiosa	-0.069*	(-2.48)
En asociación padres de familia	0.025	(0.70)
En comité o junta de mejoras	0.027	(0.84)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.019	(0.55)
Interés en la política	0.133*	(4.49)
Educación	0.008	(0.16)
Mujer	-0.003	(-0.10)
Edad	0.012	(0.08)
Edad al cuadrado	0.038	(0.26)
Riqueza	0.030	(0.77)
Percepción economía familiar	0.097*	(2.58)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.023	(-0.63)
Constante	-0.020	(-0.53)
R-cuadrado	0.045	
N. de casos	1064	
* p<0.05		

Impacto de la participación cívica en el apoyo al derecho de participación		
	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	-0.035	(-1.17)
Asociación padres de familia	0.010	(0.33)
Comité o junta de mejoras	-0.033	(-1.06)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.010	(0.25)
Interés en la política	0.074*	(2.53)
Educación	0.153*	(3.60)
Mujer	-0.013	(-0.46)
Edad	-0.328	(-1.97)
Edad al cuadrado	0.375*	(2.19)
Riqueza	-0.024	(-0.47)
Percepción economía familiar	0.011	(0.34)
Tamaño del lugar	0.061	(1.81)
Constante	0.021	(0.56)
R-cuadrado	0.034	
N. de casos	1185	
* p<0.05		

Impacto de la participación cívica en la tolerancia política		
	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	-0.044	(-1.52)
Asociación padres de familia	0.005	(0.14)
Comité o junta de mejoras	-0.042	(-1.36)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.048	(-1.21)
Interés en la política	0.032	(1.11)
Educación	0.108*	(2.65)
Mujer	0.002	(0.06)
Edad	-0.065	(-0.39)
Edad al cuadrado	0.066	(0.40)
Riqueza	-0.014	(-0.33)
Percepción economía familiar	0.011	(0.33)
Tamaño del lugar	0.031	(0.83)
Constante	-0.004	(-0.13)
R-cuadrado	0.017	
N. de casos	1127	
* p<0.05		

Impacto de la participación cívica en la legitimidad política de las instituciones		
	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.062	(1.44)
Asociación padres de familia	0.065	(1.70)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.076*	(2.42)
Interés en la política	0.139*	(4.77)
Educación	-0.072*	(-2.28)
Mujer	-0.000	(-0.02)
Edad	-0.365*	(-2.81)
Edad al cuadrado	0.341*	(2.57)
Riqueza	-0.113*	(-2.40)
Percepción economía familiar	0.135*	(4.20)
Tamaño del lugar	0.066	(1.19)
Constante	0.017	(0.32)
R-cuadrado	0.082	
N. de casos	1325	
* p<0.05		

Impacto de la participación cívica en la confianza interpersonal		
	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.010	(0.37)
Asociación padres de familia	0.031	(1.03)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.049	(1.61)
Educación	0.015	(0.38)
Mujer	-0.009	(-0.40)
Edad	-0.066	(-0.48)
std_q2sq	0.092	(0.67)
Riqueza	0.080	(1.85)
Percepción economía familiar	0.053	(1.77)
Tamaño del lugar	0.132*	(3.11)
Constante	0.001	(0.02)
R-cuadrado	0.024	
N. de casos	1408	
* p<0.05		

C. Tabla de clasificación de los principales problemas del país identificados por los entrevistados

Tabla de clasificación del principal problema del país				
Economía	Seguridad	Servicios Básicos	Política	Otros
Crédito, falta de (09)	Delincuencia, crimen (05)	Agua, falta de (19)	Conflicto armado (30)	Desigualdad (58)
Desempleo/falta de empleo (03)	Pandillas (14)	Caminos/vías en mal estado 18	Corrupción (13)	Desplazamiento forzado (32)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de (01)	Secuestro (31)	Educación, falta de, mala calidad (21)	Derechos humanos, violaciones de (56)	Discriminación (25)
Inflación, altos precios (02)	Seguridad (falta de) (27)	Electricidad, falta de (24)	Los políticos (59)	Drogadicción (11)
Pobreza (04)	Guerra contra terrorismo (17)	Salud, falta de servicio (22)	Mal gobierno (15)	Explosión demográfica (20)
Tierra para cultivar, falta de (07)	Terrorismo (33)	Transporte, problemas con el (60)		Medio ambiente (10)
Deuda Externa (26)	Violencia (57)	Vivienda (55)		Migración (16)
		Desnutrición (23)		Narcotráfico (12)
				Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorismo (65)
				Otro (70)

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