
Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 2008: The Impact of Governance

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez
AmericasBarometer Grant Manager at USAID

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus

allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys,

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted expect for Bolivia and Ecuador.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.








The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	 
Guatemala	
El Salvador	 
Honduras	 
Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	 
Panama	

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador		
Peru	<p><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>	
Bolivia		
Paraguay		
Chile		
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasília	
Venezuela		

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 <p>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</p> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala ● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
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Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
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Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
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Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

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Executing a task such as this requires support from many people. Professor Seligson, in his preface, has already thanked several people in the USAID offices at Washington and in the LAPOP offices at Vanderbilt, and I join such thanks. In special, I want to thank again the work of Dominique Zéphyr, LAPOP research assistant, for his support in the statistical analyses of this report. I also want to thank Professor Mitchell A. Seligson for his generosity and leadership during the process of elaboration and implementation of the Nicaraguan survey and report, and for his vision in creating AmericasBarometer, a key tool to assess and analyze democratic values in the Western Hemisphere. I want to thank Borge y Asociados team work, especially Ms. Mara Miranda, field supervisor in Nicaragua, and the interviewers and supervisors that turned the Nicaraguan survey so successful. In Nicaragua, I want to thank Ms. Luz Marina Garcia, in the USAID-Nicaragua office, whose effort and support have made possible the preparation and distribution of this report. Finally, I am very grateful to the more than fifteen hundred Nicaraguans that provided support and their opinions so we can better know their country reality. Our desire in the AmericasBarometer, and particularly mine, is that the information provided by this report helps to deepen our understanding of the political and social realities of Nicaragua.

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August, 2008

Executive Summary

This study was carried out within the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nicaragua. The data collection was carried out by Borge y Asociados.

A probabilistic multi-stage sample was established, except at the household level, where sex and age quotas were established. The parameters for the sample design were: 1. A minimum of 1,500 cases; 2. Clusters of 6 to 8 interviews in urban areas, and 10 to 12 in rural areas for each sampling point (census sector); 3. A minimum of randomly-selected one hundred and twenty-five sampling points.

The study examines the impact of citizen perception on governance and the experience of governance (either “good” or “bad”) on the degree to which citizens in the Americas support, or not, the key features of a stable democracy. We have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 series: *we want to test the thesis that citizen perception of good governance increases citizen support for a stable democracy, which, in turn, will ultimately lead to consolidated democracies.* Alternatively, when citizens deem that their governments are not performing well, that they are not “providing the assets,” they lose confidence in democracy, open the door to other government systems, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships. This study focuses on four key elements of a stable democracy:

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy, namely, that democracy, despite all its problems, is the best political system.
- 2) *Belief in the fundamental values upon which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions of democracy, according to Robert Dahl (1971): right of opposition and inclusion.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of key institutions for democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and the political parties.
- 4) *Belief in interpersonal trust.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Corruption is an important factor to consider in studying the performance of governments in the Latin American region and is a topic that has become crucial for international donor agencies. There is clear evidence that people who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust their country’s political institutions. Other studies conclude that corruption victimization consistently erodes several dimensions of political system legitimacy. The AmericasBarometer addresses corruption asking about the direct experiences with corruption, such as: “¿Durante el último año, ha tenido usted que pagar algún soborno a algún funcionario del gobierno?” [During the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?] We also ask similar questions about bribery in local governments, public schools, the courts, public health centers, at work, and other places. This battery of questions provides two types of information. First, it allows us to determine where corruption is most common. Second, from the data we can construct scales on

corruption victimization which allow us to distinguish between interviewees that have been victims of corruption in one place from those who have been victimized in several places. As in other studies about crime victimization, we assume that it makes a difference whether a person has faced corruption once or several times.

Seventeen percent of respondents say they were victims of corruption in the last year, and the perception of generalized corruption among government officials exceeds 74 points in a 0-to-100 scale. Corruption victimization significantly reduces interpersonal trust and political legitimacy of institutions while the perception of corruption affects support for democracy and political legitimacy. Institutions' legitimacy decreases when perception of corruption increases.

Crime is a serious and growing problem in several Latin American countries. In contexts with skyrocketing crime such as the Latin American, political scientists and policy makers need to ask themselves whether crime and fear associated with crime represent a threat for democratic survival in Latin America. The belief that democracy is the best system can decline if citizens become victims or are afraid of becoming victims of crime. Citizens also could become less tolerant or less trustful towards others if they are afraid of becoming victims of crime. This would erode social capital and undermine their support to the right of participation. Finally, crime victimization and fear to crime have an effect on people inasmuch as they lose trust in public institutions, particularly in the police and the judicial system.

The report concludes that the perception of insecurity and crime victimization significantly affect important democratic values. Nevertheless, Nicaraguans express relatively low levels of insecurity compared to other countries in the project. Crime victimization has remained at the same levels reflected in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 surveys-- roughly 16% of respondents were victims of a crime in all three. Among the socio-demographic factors most highly affecting crime victimization are the variables socioeconomic level, the size of city where the survey was carried out, and age. Victimization impacts levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust as well. Additionally, perception of insecurity affects two of the most important values for stable democracy: support for the right of opposition and interpersonal trust. In each case, insecurity significantly reduces support for democratic values, quite dramatically in some cases.

Most Nicaraguans do not trust that the police or the judicial systems will arrest and punish people who have committed crimes. A majority approves that police act outside the law to capture suspected criminals. Finally, we see that most victims of crime do not report because they do not trust the judicial system. Despite the low levels of perceptions of insecurity, crime victimization significantly affects levels of support toward important democratic values. Nicaraguans express little confidence in the performance of judicial institutions.

Citizens who participate and positively assess the local government (these aspects are not necessarily correlated) may have a greater belief that democracy is the best system. Previous research in other countries using the Americas Barometer have shown that those who participate in local governments are more likely to support the right of participation and, in addition, would support the right of inclusion of citizens (i.e., minorities rights). There is strong evidence that trust

in local governments bolsters the belief of legitimacy of national institutions. Decentralization has been promoted by several governments in the region and, especially, by international agencies.

The report presents evidence that, in general, Nicaraguans provide show greater support for local governments than for the national government. While Nicaraguans support the decentralization of resources, they do not support the decentralization of responsibilities to the same extent. Satisfaction with municipal services is a significant factor in explaining changes in the levels of interpersonal trust and political legitimacy of institutions. Both democratic values decrease as the assessment of municipal services is more negative. Hence, the services provided by the local governments significantly affect important values for a stable democracy.

Participation in community improvement committees increases support for the right of participation of the opposition, the political legitimacy of state institutions, and interpersonal trust. Participation in religious organizations boosts support for democracy and political tolerance. In addition, participation in parents association raises support for the right of participation of the opposition.

The great majority of Nicaraguans have heard about the *Consejos de Poder Ciudadano* (Citizens' Power Councils), but as of now, few have attended their meetings. Thirty-three and eight-tenths percent thinks that these Councils are instruments to boost citizen participation, but 21.4% thinks that such councils are apparatuses to increase partisan control, and 16.9% believes that they are used for citizen surveillance..

AmericasBarometer 2008 analyzed citizen perception about the successes or failures of the government in dealing with critical economic challenges, such as poverty and unemployment, and its impact in the support for a stable democracy. Nicaraguans perceive their government to be performing poorly. In addition, the vast majority of Nicaraguans say that the country's main problem is the economy.

The perception of the national economic situation and the perception of personal economic situation are two important factors in the assessment of the government's economic performance. People who believe that the personal and national economic situation is good or very good tend to show more support to the government's performance. Finally, the perception on the economic performance significantly affects levels of political tolerance, political legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust.

In previous studies of the AmericasBarometer, political legitimacy, defined as "support for the system, along with the tolerance for political opposition, were joined to create a sort of warning light for fragile democracies. Theory states that both attitudes are important in order to keep democratic stability in the long run. Citizens must believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and must be able to tolerate the rights of others as well. In such a system, majority rule coexists with the minority rights. This combination is frequently seen as the quintessential definition of democracy.

Twenty and six-tenths percent of Nicaraguans show high support for the system and high political tolerance while 30.9% show low support for the system and low political tolerance, attitudes which could put democratic stability at risk. The media receive the highest levels of trust, followed by the armed forces. The President and political parties receive the lowest levels of trust. Since 2004 trust in institutions, with the exception of the military, has decreased.

The levels of satisfaction with democracy are lower than the support for democracy as political system. Significant factors influencing satisfaction with democracy are perception of the president's job performance, perception of national economic situation, perception of insecurity, and the government's economic performance. In spite of the low level of satisfaction with democracy, the majority of Nicaraguans believe their country is very democratic and more than 70% prefer democracy to an authoritarian government. Finally, Nicaraguans generally reject authoritarian solutions, even though some minorities support such solutions. A majority support the idea of authorities acting outside the law to fight crime. Some important minorities support the idea that the president should rule without the National Assembly, ignore the Supreme Court, and limit the voice and vote of the opposition.

Elections and political parties represent key institutions in a liberal democracy. Electoral turnout in Nicaragua is high, with 71.8% of respondents affirming their own participation in the presidential elections of 2006. However, political parties are the institutions with the lowest level of citizen trust among state institutions. In Nicaragua, most of the population does not sympathize with any political party. Few Nicaraguans believe that political parties represent their constituencies or listen to the people, and the perception that corruption is widespread among political parties is high. The ideological distribution of the presidential candidates' supporters in 2006 aligns with the candidates and parties; in other words, the FSLN supporters lean left, whereas the liberal supporters lean right.

PART ONE:
THEORY &
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS

Preface: Political and Economic Context in Nicaragua and Sample Description of 2008

Using for the very first time in its history an electoral system with international standards, Nicaragua freely and competitively chose its rulers and legislators in 1990, 1996, 2001, and 2006. The results of the November 2006 elections are analyzed in Chapter VII of this report. Freedom House classifies the Nicaraguan political regime as “partially free,” with a score of 3 on the scales of political liberties and civil rights.³ Nevertheless, in 2007, the institution categorized the democratic trend in Nicaragua as “decreasing,” because of the “excessive” concentration of power in the hand of the Executive as well as the passing of an act that criminalized abortion under any circumstances⁴.

A sign of the obstacles to democracy in Nicaragua was the constitutional reform passed in January, 2005, by the major parties (according to the electoral results of 2001) in the National Assembly. The country plunged into political crisis when the President, supported by a broad range of civil organizations, vetoed the reform. The long intervention of Organization of American States (OAS) negotiators, invited by the Executive and admitted by the political parties, yielded a tripartite solution. It was, nevertheless, a partial resolution, not a definite one.

The AmericasBarometer survey was conducted in early 2008 under a very polarized political context. This polarization was the result of the conflicts between the current government, under Daniel Ortega and the FSLN, and the liberal opposition that holds a majority in the Nicaraguan congress. Opposition party rifts, however, have allowed the President to pass several bills. In terms of foreign policy, the government is dealing with two different political trends: on one hand, keeping the advantages of CAFTA, such as the access to U.S. markets; and on the other hand attracting investment from countries hostile to the U.S., such as Iran.

In terms of domestic policy, President Daniel Ortega created a new superstructure in his cabinet when he established the secretaries of Security and Food Sovereignty, Communication and Citizenship, National Policies, and Development in the Atlantic Coast. All these offices were presided by ministry-ranked officers and the functioned parallel to the committees with the same names. Besides, the *Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social* (CONPES) was reformed, with the increase of its members and directors from 12 to 20, and with the increase of the President’s appointees from 6 to 17. The National Council of Reconciliation and Peace

³ The categories free, partially free, and non-free are built upon political liberties and civil rights. Political liberties include the ability to build political parties representing different positions, open competition among party leadership to access the government, etc. Civil rights include respect for the religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, familial, gender and other rights; they also include personal freedom, press, and association freedom. Indicators range from 1 to 7 (1 for the best conditions and 7 for the cases in which those rights are not observed). Thus, a score from 7 to 5.5 is assigned to countries which are not free; from 5 to 3 to those partially free, and from 2.5 to 1 for those free. Reports can be accessed in: www.freedomhouse.org No periods at the end of websites

⁴ See 2008 Nicaraguan report in, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>

(Consejo Nacional de Reconciliación y Paz), presided by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, was also created. In addition, the government started the organization of the Councils of Citizen Power (Consejos de Poder Ciudadano-CPC), aimed at fomenting citizen participation in the creation and implementation of all government programs in the communities, neighborhoods, and cities of the country. To their critics, the CPS's represent an attempt to reinforce the government party's control over Nicaraguan society. Critics are also concerned about the negative impact that the Sandinista's parallel structure will have over the authority and legitimacy of state institutions. Instead of progress, they see a serious step backward for the Citizens Participation Act, carried by general consent in the past administration.

In 2007, Nicaraguan economic growth showed a slight deceleration. The gross national product grew 3%, boosted by export expansion. Conversely, consumption growth, the principal component of aggregate spending, was lower than that of 2006. At the same time, private investment grew at a slower pace, while public investment was affected by a budget that was not wholly implemented. In this macroeconomic context, open the unemployment rate rose from 5.2% in 2006 to 5.9% in 2007. Inflation reached 13.8%, a higher rate to that of 2006 (9.4%), and the limit established by the Central Bank (7.3%). According to ECLAC estimates, in 2008 the GDP will grow 3.5% and inflation will not surpass 8.5%.

In terms of international cooperation policy, an important highlight was Nicaragua's adhesion to the project of integration and cooperation called Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA). This is an initiative led by Venezuela and Cuba was also joined by Bolivia. In addition to energy cooperation, the ALBA project offers Nicaragua resources for infrastructure, health, agricultural development, and housing development.

The economic performance of the country was impacted by adverse climatic conditions in September and October, 2007. Hurricane Felix (a level-five hurricane), a low pressure center, and two tropical waves came through Nicaragua at that time. It is especially important to note the magnitude of the damage in the Bosawás ecological reserve, the largest in Central America, where 1.3 million hectares of forests, mangrove swamps, and conifers were damaged.

Description of the Sample

The next section briefly depicts the main features of the 2008 sample and compares the samples of the three Nicaraguan Americas Barometer surveys.

This study was conducted as part of the Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nicaragua. The collection of these data was carried out by *Borge y Asociados* from February 2-28, 2008.

For this project, a probabilistic, stratified and multi-staged sample was established with the exception of household level. Quotas by gender and age were used for the selection at the

household level. The parameters were: 1. a minimum of 1500 cases; 2. clusters between 6 and 8 in urban areas and 10 to twelve in rural areas per sampling point (census segment); 3. a minimum of 125 sampling points probabilistically established.⁵




Figure P-1. Sample Distribution by Strata

Figure P-1 shows the sample distribution by strata. For the 2008 survey, conducted by Borge y Asociados, six strata were established to best represent the population and geographic distribution of the country: Metropolitan Area, Center, North, North Pacific, South Pacific and the Caribbean.⁶

⁵ Appendix 1 provides a technical description of the sample.

⁶ The 2008 sample experienced some changes with regard to the 2004 and 2006 samples. For the 2008 sample, the AmericasBarometer used the new 2005 Population Census. One of the changes was the creation of a stratum for the Metropolitan Area of Managua. With this change, the sample had six strata in 2008, instead of three strata. The stratification allows comparisons between the results of different Nicaraguan regions. In addition, having more strata reduces the margin of error. This last point is important for our statistical analysis as it takes into account the design effects.




Figure P-2. Sample distribution by gender

Figure P-2 presents the sample distribution by sex. We can see that the distribution is almost identical between the 2006 and 2004 surveys, showing that the same proportion of men and women were interviewed, despite not including the same persons.




Figure P-3. Sample Distribution by Age

Age distribution reveals some variation, although modest, among the three samples. The age average in the 2004 survey is 34.8, in 2006 it was 35.5, and in 2008 it was 34 years-old.




Figure P-4. Sample distribution by urban-rural

The sample distribution among the three surveys varies little.




Figure P-5. Sample distribution by education level

Figure P-5 indicates the distribution by level of education among the samples. We see some variation between the samples. The respondents' average with college education increases in 2008 compared to 2004 and 2006. In addition, the percentage of respondents with elementary education or less decreases.

Conclusions

This chapter has offered a brief description of the socio-political context in which the survey was carried out. It has also provided the reader with some basic information about the 2008 sample in comparison to the survey samples from 2004 and 2006.

Chapter I . Building Support for Stable Democracy⁷

Theoretical framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests, and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how, in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich;” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).⁸ Yet, generating national wealth is a major challenge in itself and is not a process that can take place overnight. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasing attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that

⁷ This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

⁸ This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*⁹).¹⁰ Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.¹¹ Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive

⁹ Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

¹⁰ According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

¹¹ We emphasize *support for stable democracy*; recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).¹² Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matter for which aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: What works? For what does it work? and Where does it work?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub-national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.¹³ The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

¹² Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

¹³ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn¹⁴:

¹⁴ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4)

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

(ING4): Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno.

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.¹⁵ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

¹⁵ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. A recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured using a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.¹⁶

La escala está basada en los siguientes tres ítems de LAPOP:

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

¹⁶ Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7




Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power; this, then, would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that

Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del [país], no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas?

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (D5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.




Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial

decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹⁷ based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

- B14.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), the incumbent’s popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, not of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative size. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, scores just above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

¹⁷ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.




Figure I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring of trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I.5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S., which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings when the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

Social Capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors relating to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herrerros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, o nada confiable?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.

Conclusions

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

SECOND PART:
GOVERNANCE

Chapter II . Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy

Theoretical framework¹⁸

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues on the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution; thus, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, however, reporting of and discussion of corruption have become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the toxic effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June, 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November, 1998, the Council of Europe, including Central and Eastern European countries, adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February, 1999, the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

¹⁸ This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”¹⁹ Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data from only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index; however, this index does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.²⁰ And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Victimization by crime can erode citizens’ belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may also, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow citizens.

The measurement of corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997;

¹⁹ USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaidd/indexpg.html) February.

²⁰ The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume that it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...				
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8

In addition, the survey includes the following question about corruption perception among citizens:

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: **[LEER]**
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada

Comparative Analysis

In Graph II-1 we can see that Nicaragua is in eleventh place among the twenty-one countries included in the study. Sixteen and six-tenths percent of Nicaraguans say that they have been victims of corruption in the last year. Levels of victimization in Nicaragua are similar to those of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. The country with the highest percentage of victimized people is Haiti, with 48.2%, followed by Bolivia and Mexico, with more than a third of the interviewed population being victims of corruption.




Figure II-1. Percentage of people who have been victims of corruption in comparative perspective




Figure II-2. Levels of corruption in several circumstances

In Figure II-2 we see that the courts are the most frequent venue of corruption victimization. However, it is important to note that the confidence interval for that variable is very large; therefore, there is no significant statistical difference between bribes in the courts, the municipality, and the police.




Figure II-3. Corruption Perception in Comparative Perspective

Figure II-3 presents the compared results for the scale of corruption perception among public officials. We see that in all the countries, the average exceeds the mid-point (50 points) on the 0-to-100 scale. In Nicaragua, the average of corruption perception is 74.3 on the scale. Again, Nicaragua places in the middle of the group of surveyed countries.

Corruption in Nicaragua




Figure II-4. Corruption Victimization 2008

Eighty-three percent of respondents said that they had not been victims of corruption in the last twelve months (Figure II-4); 10.4% said that they were victimized once; 4.3% were victimized twice, and 2% were victimized by corruption more than three times. Although 17% seems like a small fraction of the population, in fact, it represents over 980,000 Nicaraguans.

In the next Figure (II-5), we see that the proportion of respondents who have been corruption victims has remained similar over the last four years. Confidence intervals indicate that the difference between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant.




Figure II-5. Percentage of corruption victimization by year

In order to analyze the factors that influence the likelihood of being victim of corruption, we conducted a logistic regression analysis. Results of the analysis can be seen in Figure II-6.²¹ The figure shows that the statically significant variables are: levels of wealth, education level, and gender. Levels of corruption victimization increase as the levels of wealth and education increase. In addition, men tend to be more victimized by corruption than women.




Figure II-6. Likelihood of being victim of corruption

²¹ The figure presents coefficients and confidence intervals for each factor. Variables have been standardized and the red line represents the zero point average. Factors whose coefficient do not intercept the line are statistically significant ($p < .05$). Coefficients to the right of the line represent factors positively related, and those to the left negatively related.

Figure II-7 shows that men face highest levels of corruption victimization. This might be due to the fact that, in general, men have more contact with the institutions that are the target of this study.




Figure II-7. Corruption victimization by gender




Figure II-8. Corruption victimization by education level

Figure II-8 reveals that people with a higher level of education tend to be victimized more frequently. The likelihood of college-educated people being victimized is more than double compared to people with elementary education. This result should not come as a surprise since the measurement of victimization is based in questions about bribes in different circumstances, and people with college education tend to have more contact with public institutions and more purchasing power.




Figure II-9. Corruption victimization by levels of wealth

Figure II-9 shows that corruption victimization significantly increases along with the level of wealth.²² As in the case of education, this result can be explained taking into account that bribes are more frequently demanded of people with resources, who are able to pay. Also, people with higher socioeconomic level may be more willing to pay bribes in order to speed up procedures and to prevent penalties, than people with less economic resources.

Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy

Next section analyzes the relationship between corruption victimization and values that support stable democracy. First, we see a table in which the results of regression analyses using five dependent variables are presented. These variables represent important components for

²² The AmericasBarometer measures the level of wealth by using a scale of possession of goods (Series “R” in the questionnaire). Questions asked the respondents whether they have a series of goods such as cars, refrigerators, phone, TV, etc. Scale ranges from “0, which means no possessions, to “9,” which means maximum possession of goods. For the analysis we have reduced scores higher than “6, since the number of respondents above that threshold are few, and the confidence intervals become very wide.

democratic stability.²³ We see that corruption victimization is statistically significant for only two of these variables: legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust. Second, we present two figures that show, on one hand, the relationship between corruption victimization and interpersonal trust and on the other, the relationship between corruption victimization and legitimacy of institutions.

²³ It is important to repeat that the 2008 AmericasBarometer is focused in the factors of governance that can affect democratic values. Table II.1 and all similar tables; present the regression coefficient for the independent variable in the analysis. The first row represents the key independent variable that we are studying in this section of the chapter-- in this case corruption victimization. In order to determine whether this variable is significant, we include additional independent variables, such as age, gender, wealth, etc. Although the regression indicates that several of these factors are statistically significant, here we only present figures which relate the key independent variable, corruption victimization, and those independents variables among which corruption is a significant factor.

Table II.1. Impact of corruption victimization on democratic values

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for the right of participation		Political Tolerance		Institutions legitimacy		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Total de maneras de ser victimizado en año pasado	1.625	(1.40)	-0.782	(0.82)	2.664	(1.56)	-4.452*	(0.73)	-2.974*	(1.36)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.075*	(0.03)	-0.028	(0.02)	-0.078*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.043	(0.03)	0.095*	(0.02)	0.104*	(0.03)	0.164*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.091	(0.21)	-0.009	(0.14)	0.586*	(0.25)	-0.232	(0.14)	-0.152	(0.25)
Mujer	-2.037	(1.65)	-1.070	(0.93)	-4.961*	(1.60)	2.180	(1.24)	-5.785*	(1.11)
Edad	0.438	(0.29)	0.305	(0.19)	0.535	(0.31)	-0.441*	(0.18)	0.472	(0.29)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.005	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.494	(0.71)	0.352	(0.51)	0.854	(0.58)	-1.275*	(0.45)	-0.513	(0.65)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.098	(1.05)	0.417	(1.02)	1.234	(1.61)	1.521	(1.00)	4.293*	(1.44)
Tamaño	2.060*	(0.61)	1.310*	(0.62)	1.105	(0.67)	-0.332	(0.57)	3.480*	(0.68)
Constante	60.862*	(6.54)	68.089*	(5.74)	26.841*	(7.21)	43.065*	(5.34)	33.300*	(6.42)
R-cuadrado	0.023		0.028		0.046		0.069		0.057	
N. de casos	1280		1409		1339		1421		1443	
* p<0.05										




Figure II-10. Corruption victimization and interpersonal trust

We see in Figure II-10 that interpersonal trust declines as victimization increases. It is worth mentioning that, as exhibited in Chapter I, interpersonal trust is an important value in establishing social capital, a necessary variable to strengthening citizen participation. We see in these results how corruption erodes interpersonal trust and, hence, it can negatively affect people's willingness to participate in civic ways in their community and at the national level.




Figure II-11. Corruption victimization and political legitimacy

Figure II-11 indicates that political legitimacy of institutions significantly decreases by more than 20 points when people suffer severe corruption victimization. These results confirm the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1, which indicates a strong relationship between citizens’ experiences with government—corruption— and the key dimensions of a stable democracy. The legitimacy of institutions, that is, the confidence that citizens express towards key public institutions such as national government, congress, political parties, and the judicial system, declines as people have been increasingly victimized by corruption. The demand for bribes, far from being useful for the political system, significantly erode trust in public institutions and interpersonal trust, two important democratic values.

Impact of corruption perception on values than influence democratic stability

Here we analyze the impact of corruption victimization on values that influence stable democracy. Above, we have seen that the perception of corruption of public officers is widespread. When analyzing public opinion, perceptions are sometimes more important than reality as citizens behave politically based on how they perceive reality according to their personal experiences, values, political ideology, and socioeconomic situation. The following table shows the results of regression analysis; we can see that perception of corruption is a statistically significant factor in determining two out of the five values that are analyzed here: support for democracy and the legitimacy of institutions.

Table II-1. Impact of perception of corruption on democratic values

Variables independientes	Support for democracy		Support for the right of participation		Political tolerance		Institutions legitimacy		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de la corrupción	0.076*	(0.03)	0.048	(0.03)	-0.026	(0.04)	-0.114*	(0.03)	0.010	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.063*	(0.03)	-0.018	(0.02)	-0.082*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.046	(0.03)	0.098*	(0.02)	0.108*	(0.03)	0.161*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.000	(0.23)	-0.051	(0.12)	0.603*	(0.25)	-0.215	(0.15)	-0.237	(0.25)
Mujer	-1.835	(1.51)	-0.757	(1.05)	-5.353*	(1.64)	2.665*	(1.24)	-5.531*	(1.16)
Edad	0.385	(0.31)	0.377	(0.20)	0.587	(0.30)	-0.405*	(0.17)	0.412	(0.30)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)	0.004*	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.430	(0.71)	0.036	(0.51)	1.118*	(0.55)	-1.374*	(0.43)	-0.456	(0.69)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.113	(1.10)	0.804	(1.02)	1.134	(1.61)	1.433	(1.07)	4.174*	(1.48)
Tamaño	2.164*	(0.62)	1.272*	(0.60)	1.142	(0.67)	-0.231	(0.60)	3.427*	(0.69)
Constante	56.547*	(5.74)	63.080*	(6.56)	27.688*	(7.70)	49.257*	(6.87)	33.592*	(6.38)
R-cuadrado	0.029		0.035		0.044		0.078		0.052	
N. de casos	1252		1359		1305		1368		1374	
* p<0.05										




Figure II-12. Corruption perception and support for democracy

Figure II-12 indicates that support for democracy decreases insofar as citizens perceive less corruption. This result is somewhat contradictory although the difference between support for democracy among people who perceive corruption to be widespread and those who perceive that corruption is not prevalent. We think that this result can be an effect of distribution of the sample for both variables. First, the analysis of Chapter I indicates that the proportion of Nicaraguans who do not support democracy is very low. Second, there are few people who think that there is little corruption. Hence, when the sample is small, the dispersion around the average is high and the results are less reliable.




Figure II-13. Perception of corruption and political legitimacy of institutions

In Figure II-13 we can see that the political legitimacy of institutions increases as the perception of corruption decreases. Citizens who perceive that corruption among public officials is not widespread tend to express higher confidence in state institutions.

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the levels of corruption victimization and the perception of the levels of corruption. Seventeen percent of respondents say that they have been victims of corruption in the last year. The perception that corruption among public officials is widespread reaches an average of more than 74 points on the 0-to-100 scale. Corruption victimization significantly lowers interpersonal trust and political legitimacy of institutions. Perception of levels of corruption significantly affects support for democracy and legitimacy of political institutions. Moreover, legitimacy of political institutions declines as perception of corruption increases.

Appendix

Anexo II-1. Probabilidad de ser víctima de la corrupción

	Coefficientes	(t)
Education	0.275*	(2.57)
Female	-0.231*	(-2.55)
Age	-0.049	(-0.39)
Wealth	0.454*	(4.29)
Size	0.065	(0.76)
Perception family economy	-0.051	(-0.61)
Number of children	0.169	(1.32)
Constant	-1.776*	(-20.63)
F	10.62	
Cases	1470	
* p<0.05		

Chapter III . Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require

hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it is difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents were included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all reports on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medical services (EMS) in a given location can determine if the outcome of an assault is injury or homicide. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was largely an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural areas of the U.S. did not have increases in crime like the ones which occurred in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country became more urbanized, the cities increasingly influenced national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, the same phenomenon has emerged in a number of countries.. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed regarding corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, despite the inaccuracies in crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime have significantly different attitudes toward democracy from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

Although it is said that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that many for a number of years, and in some regions, such as the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.²⁴ According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year; it stands at about 5.5 in the United States and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,²⁵ says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”²⁶ In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.²⁷ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, not only are homicide rates consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the

²⁴In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

²⁵According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

²⁶Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm).

²⁷Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the 1990s, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – about 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.²⁸

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime and the associated fear of crime, are threats to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stability, sharp reducing political violence, and expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been able to deal effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as the fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a far greater portion of the population than the victims themselves. Citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

The Measurement of Crime Victimization

In this chapter, we will focus on two variables: crime victimization (**vic1r**) and perceptions of personal security (**aoj11r**).

²⁸The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

It is important to note that our measurement of victimization is focused on survey respondents and not on their relatives or friends. Since our analysis is based in personal victimization, we do not restrict the types of crime that can affect people. Hence, here we report crime events that range from armed robbery to theft burglary, and rape.

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR

Perception of insecurity: comparative analysis

In this section we analyze the perception of insecurity in comparative perspective. Figure III-1 shows the results for the twenty-two countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008.




Figure III-1. Perception of insecurity in comparative perspective

Nicaragua places among the countries with low levels of insecurity. It averages 33.7 on the 0-100 scale while Argentina and Peru average 57 and 51 respectively.

Victimization in Nicaragua

First, we compare levels of victimization between the AmericasBarometer surveys in Nicaragua.




Figure III-2. Crime victimization by year

Levels of crime victimization have remained similar among the three surveys. In the first AmericasBarometer survey we see that 15.2% of respondents said they were victims of crime. In 2006 and 2008, that proportion rose to 16.5%. The differences among the three surveys are not statistically significant.




Figure III-3. Neighborhood affected by gangs

Fifty-one and seven-tenths percent of the people interviewed state that their neighborhood is not affected by gangs; 24.8% say that their neighborhood is not affected much by gangs; and only 23.8% perceive that their neighborhood is somewhat or very affected by gangs.




Figure III-4. Neighborhood affected by gangs according to size of town

As expected, the problem of gangs is more evident in the urban areas. We see in Figure III.4 that, in Managua, 56.1% of respondents say that their neighborhoods are affected by gangs. However, in small cities –less than 25,000 inhabitants– and rural areas, more than 70% of people interviewed say that their neighborhood is not affected by gangs.




Figure III-5. Sell of drugs in the neighborhood

Figure III-5 demonstrates that 81.5% of interviewed people say that they have not seen drug sales in their neighborhood in the last year. Figure III.6 indicates that drug sales are higher in Managua and in large and mid-size cities than in rural areas.




Figure III-6. Drug sales according to city size

We can see that perception of insecurity has shrunk in the surveys from an average of 45 in 2004 to 33.7 in 2008.




Figure III-7. Perception of insecurity by year

Who are the victims of crime?

This question will be answered with a logistic regression analysis. Figure III.8 presents the results of this analysis; we can see that the size of the city where the respondent lives, the socioeconomic level, and the age of respondents are statistically significant variables.




Figure III-8. Likelihood of being victim of crime

We can see in Figure III.9 that crime victimization decreases among elderly people. Young people tend to be victims of delinquency more frequently than middle-aged people or older.




Figure III-9. Crime victimization by age

People at higher socioeconomic levels tend to be victims of crime more frequently. In Figure III-10, we see that victimization dramatically increases among wealthier people; only 5% people with little wealth say that they have been victims of a crime, whereas more than 30% people in the highest economical echelon say that they have been victims of crime in the last year. These results reflect that better-off people have more material resources—cars, houses, jewelry, etc., and therefore, they attract more attention from criminals than poor or less well-off people.




Figure III-10. Crime victimization by levels of wealth

Figure III-11 indicates that crime has a greater effect on the metropolitan area of the national capital, Managua, and the large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Rural areas and small cities with less of 25,000 populations have the lowest victimization levels. We see that victimization in Managua is three times higher than small cities and twice as high as rural areas and mid-size cities. Generally, this result is also seen in other countries included in the AmericasBarometer in which crime affects urban areas and the capital more than rural areas or small cities. Although the problem of crime affects every person in Latin America, there is no doubt that in metropolitan areas, the problem reaches critical levels.




Figure III-11. Crime victimization by city size

The impact of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity on democratic values

In the following section, we analyze the impact of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity on the values that support a stable democracy. In the table below we can see that victimization is a significant factor in ascertaining political tolerance and interpersonal trust.

Table III-1. Impact of crime victimization on democratic values

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimización por crímenes	-0.020	(0.02)	-0.012	(0.01)	0.042*	(0.02)	-0.023	(0.01)	-0.039*	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.081*	(0.03)	-0.028	(0.02)	-0.086*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.046	(0.03)	0.095*	(0.02)	0.110*	(0.03)	0.162*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.110	(0.21)	-0.021	(0.14)	0.607*	(0.25)	-0.288	(0.14)	-0.201	(0.24)
Mujer	-2.305	(1.56)	-1.002	(0.94)	-5.032*	(1.65)	2.786*	(1.28)	-5.430*	(1.21)
Edad	0.477	(0.30)	0.293	(0.19)	0.609	(0.31)	-0.582*	(0.19)	0.390	(0.28)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.005	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.626	(0.72)	0.372	(0.52)	0.884	(0.58)	-1.413*	(0.45)	-0.550	(0.65)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.138	(1.05)	0.401	(1.02)	1.439	(1.61)	1.517	(1.01)	4.242*	(1.43)
Tamaño	1.992*	(0.59)	1.294*	(0.63)	1.218	(0.69)	-0.424	(0.58)	3.339*	(0.66)
Constante	61.128*	(6.77)	68.502*	(5.82)	24.500*	(7.11)	45.785*	(5.53)	35.754*	(6.38)
R-cuadrado	0.023		0.029		0.046		0.058		0.055	
N. de casos	1277		1406		1336		1418		1439	
* p<0.05										




Figure III-12. Political tolerance and crime victimization

Figure III-12 indicates that people who have been victims of crime express higher political tolerance.²⁹ In Chapter I we discussed the link between performance of the political regime and democratic values. Here we can see that political tolerance, one of the more important democratic values, is significantly affected insofar as people are victimized by crime. Being victims of crime represents, perhaps, the greatest government deficit, given that security is the most important role of the state. Therefore, people who have been victims of crime have reasons to oppose the government and criticize its policies, and, as a consequence, they would likely express higher political tolerance toward the critics of the government.

²⁹ It is important to clarify that in the figures showing bivariate relationships, the lines of the confidence intervals not always show that the difference is statistically significant. However, in Table III-2, which shows the multivariate regression, we can see that the difference is statistically significant. What is important is the multivariate relationship.




Figure III-13. Interpersonal trust and crime victimization

Interpersonal trust significantly decreases when people have been victim of a crime. Here we see the impact on democratic values of the government failure to provide people with security. Interpersonal trust, as we have said, is an important value in the development of social capital, which, at the same time, is an important factor in civic participation.

The following table presents the regression analysis on the impact of insecurity perception. The analysis indicates that the perception of insecurity significantly affects support for the participation of opposition and interpersonal trust.

Table III-2. Impact of insecurity perception on democratic values

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.021	(0.03)	-0.068*	(0.02)	-0.000	(0.04)	-0.024	(0.02)	-0.320*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.083*	(0.03)	-0.031	(0.02)	-0.087*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.049	(0.03)	0.097*	(0.02)	0.108*	(0.03)	0.160*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.120	(0.21)	0.009	(0.14)	0.603*	(0.26)	-0.290	(0.15)	-0.098	(0.21)
Mujer	-1.930	(1.60)	-0.433	(0.92)	-5.090*	(1.61)	2.881*	(1.22)	-4.191*	(1.24)
Edad	0.508	(0.30)	0.323	(0.18)	0.624	(0.31)	-0.468*	(0.20)	0.490	(0.27)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.006	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.592	(0.72)	0.386	(0.51)	0.946	(0.57)	-1.476*	(0.46)	-0.403	(0.58)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.260	(1.07)	-0.025	(1.05)	1.228	(1.63)	1.349	(1.05)	2.731*	(1.28)
Tamaño	1.943*	(0.66)	0.957	(0.63)	1.018	(0.74)	-0.483	(0.68)	1.896*	(0.57)
Constante	61.078*	(6.86)	71.683*	(5.73)	26.359*	(7.19)	45.251*	(6.50)	50.885*	(6.15)
R-cuadrado	0.023		0.036		0.043		0.056		0.141	
N. de casos	1276		1404		1334		1415		1436	
* p<0.05										




Figure III-14. Perception of insecurity and support for the right of opposition

In Figure III-14 we see that support for the right of opposition decreases as perception of insecurity increases. People that perceive a major threat from crime express less support for the right of opposition. These results confirm the tight link between insecurity and democratic values.




Figure III-15. Perception of insecurity and interpersonal trust

Finally, we can see (Figure III-15) that the level of interpersonal trust significantly declines when the level of insecurity increases. This finding demonstrates the corrosive effect of the fear of being victim of crime on social capital, whose importance for democracy was discussed in Chapter 1. Interpersonal trust is an important factor in motivating citizens to work on solving problems in civic groups or to lobby public institutions. As we have seen, political and civic participation is a key factor in strengthening democracy. Here we see that interpersonal trust diminishes from a 70-point average for the people that perceive high levels of security in their neighborhood to less than 40 points for the people who feel very unsafe. This represents a reduction of more than 30 points on the 0-to-100 scale.

Justice Administration

The AmericasBarometer survey includes several questions about the perception on the justice system performance. Two important questions measured the role of the police and the judicial system.

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría...

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría...

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR




Figure III-16. Confidence that police will capture criminals

Figure III-16 indicates that most of the people –57.6%-- express little or no confidence that the police will capture suspected criminals.




Figure III-17. Confidence that the justice system will punish the criminals

An even lower number of Nicaraguans trust in the judicial system. In the Figure III-17 we can see that 60.3% of people interviewed have little or no trust that the judicial system will punish punishing those guilty of committing crimes.




Figure III-18. Respect the law to capture criminals

A majority of Nicaraguans, 53.3%, say that authorities can act outside the law in order to capture criminals. This result is worrisome because it demonstrates attitudes that can debilitate the rule of law to the extent that the government could ignore the law to implement repressive policies against criminals.

Finally, we see that a solid majority of Nicaraguans—58.3%--who said that they had been victims of crime did not report the incident to authorities.




Figure III-19. Did you report the crime to any institution?

In Figure III-20 we see that 45.5% of people who did not report the crime did not do so because of lack of trust in the judicial system and the police. They say that “it is useless” to report the crime; 16.3% say that it is dangerous or that they fear retaliation; and 17% say that they did not have enough evidence to report the incident. If we add the percentages of people who did not report criminal incidents because it is useless and those who are fearful of retaliation, two reasons that can be attributed to the lack of trust in the judicial system and the police, we have a majority of 61.9% of survey respondents. Again, these attitudes are distressing since they question the efficacy of the rule of law. Here we see a broad majority of Nicaraguans who do not trust in the ability of justice system institutions to carry out their functions effectively. Lack of trust in the justice system could lead citizen to favor authoritarian policies or police actions that violate their own basic rights. Even worse, citizens could take justice in their own hands and attempt to apply the law on their own.




Figure III-20. Why did you not report the crime?

Conclusions

In this chapter we have seen the impact of crime on the values of stable democracy. We see that perception of insecurity and crime victimization significantly affect important democratic values. We see that Nicaraguans express levels of insecurity relatively low compared to other countries included in the survey. Crime victimization has remained stable in the surveys of 2004, 2006, and 2008; about 16% of respondents point to having been victims of crime in all three surveys. Among the sociodemographic factors, the socioeconomic level, city size, and age are the factors that affect levels of crime victimization the most. Victimization significantly affects levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust. In addition, perception of insecurity significantly affects two of the important values for a stable democracy: support for the right of participant opposition and interpersonal trust. In each case, feelings of insecurity significantly reduce democratic values and sometimes it does so in dramatic ways, as in the case of interpersonal trust. Finally, the chapter analyzed several questions related to the justice system. We saw that the majority of Nicaraguans do not trust that the police or the judicial system will arrest and prosecute suspected criminals. A majority feels that it is acceptable that the authorities act outside the law in order to arrest criminals. We also see that most of the victims do not report the crime mostly because of their lack of trust in the judicial system. In spite of the fact that the levels of perception

■ Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 2008: The Impact of Governance

of insecurity are relatively low, crime victimization and insecurity significantly affect the levels of support of important democratic values. Nicaraguans express little trust that the criminal system institutions can fulfill their goals.

Appendix

Appendix III-1. Likelihood of being victim of crime

	Coeficientes	(t)
Educación	0.021	(0.31)
Mujer	-0.118	(-1.46)
Edad	-0.248*	(-2.99)
Riqueza	0.314*	(2.75)
Tamaño	-0.379*	(-2.91)
Constante	-1.776*	(-20.80)
F	14.21	
N. de casos	1503	
* p<0.05		

Chapter IV . The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework³⁰

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Although in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course the case of most citizens in the Americas (perhaps with the exception of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require long, costly trips. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments; many of them control and determine key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization and historically, local governments have been starved for funding and largely ignored politically. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local governments in the

³⁰ Daniel Montalvo wrote parts of this section.

region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states has traditionally been limited to local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite-centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and over the past decade have been pressing to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007). One of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).³¹

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness regarding the allocation of resources; generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people; and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase competition for resources, and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views of democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be the level of participation in civil society.. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystalized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during dictatorships that ruled in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus participation in civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil

³¹ There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level-- fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross-nationally for 31 nations that citizens active in multiple association express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that citizens who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also approve more strongly of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government's responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (civpart). The objective is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

The questions used to test these aspects are the following:

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?

LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar *más responsabilidades*? [**Leer alternativas**]

- (1) Mucho más al gobierno central
- (2) Algo más al gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más a la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería *administrar más dinero*? [**Leer alternativas**]

- (1) Mucho más el gobierno central
- (2) Algo más el gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [**Leer alternativas**]

- (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos)
- (8) NS/NR

Measuring civil society participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (“community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.³² The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent in the organizations listed below.³³

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de las siguientes organizaciones por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8

Comparative analysis

In this section we present comparative data for the following variables: trust in the local government (b32r), trust in the decentralization of the responsibilities of the national government (lg12a), support for the decentralization of economic resources (lg12b), and satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (sg11r).

³² This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which is examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

³³ The scale is computed by converting the four response categories to a 0-100 basis and taking the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know” response to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.




Figure IV-1. Trust in municipal government in comparative perspective

Figure IV-1 indicates that Nicaraguans express a relatively low level of confidence in municipal governments. Nicaragua is fourteenth in the group of 21 countries included in this analysis, with an average score of 45.5 on the 0-to-100 scale.




Figure IV-2. Support for decentralization of responsibilities in comparative perspective

Support for the idea of giving more responsibilities to the local governments reaches 46.3 points on the scale. This result places Nicaragua among the five countries with the lowest scores on the scale.

In Figure IV-3 we see that Nicaraguans tend to approve giving more resources to local governments than giving them more responsibilities. Nicaraguans had an average score of 52.9 on the scale and is ranked 7 among the 21 countries in the study.




Figure IV-3. Support for decentralization of resources

We can see that satisfaction with local services does not reach the middle of the scale, putting Nicaragua in tenth place among the twenty-one countries (Figure IV-4). We can conclude that Nicaraguans support giving more resources to the local governments, but not more responsibilities. Trust in the local governments and satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality is, more or less, in the middle of the ranking.




Figure IV-4. Satisfaction with municipal services in comparative perspective

Local Government in Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, decentralization has made important progress. Local government has become more important than it was before, and that many citizens have taken advantage of this. However, decentralization has had many obstacles: budget problems, which hamper local governance and erode the autonomy and legitimacy of local governments; the lack of authority over the use of resources; the centralist and bureaucratic tendencies of the national government; and the lack of capacity and experience of municipal governments.




Figure IV-5. Comparison between trust in national and municipal governments

Municipal governments inspire a significantly higher level of trust than the central government on the 1-to-100 scale. Nicaraguans clearly have more trust in the local governments than in the national government. In Chapter VI we will see the comparison with other public and private institutions. The next section analyzes the levels of participation in the activities of municipal governments.

The following figure presents the proportion of respondents that have participated in a municipal meeting during the last year.




Figure IV-6. Participation in municipal meetings

We can see that 10.3% of respondents say that they have participated in a municipal meeting in the last twelve months.




Figure IV-7. Participation in municipal meetings by year

Figure IV-7 indicates that participation in municipal meetings has declined from 2004 to 2008. These results represent a step backward in the levels of participation in local governments, and as a consequence, in democracy.






Figure IV-8. Attendance to a municipal meeting in comparative perspective

Figure IV-8 indicates that Nicaragua ranks twelfth among the twenty-one countries included in this analysis. Among the six Central American countries, Nicaragua is ranked in third place along with Honduras.



Graph IV-9. Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal

Eleven and one-tenth percent of survey respondents reported having petitioned the municipal government in the last year. Nearly 90% of Nicaraguans have not presented such petition.



Graph IV-10. Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal por año

Although participation in municipal meetings can be an important activity, it is also true that these meetings are sometimes a form of passive civic participation in which people's involvement does not have a direct impact on the municipality. However, petitioning the municipal government is an indication of active citizenship. Therefore, it is worrisome that petitions to the local government have declined between 2004 and 2008. We can see that the proportion of people who have presented petitions to the local government has dropped from 18.3% in 2004, to 11.1% in 2008. These results and those presented above indicate that since 2004, participation in the local government has decreased significantly in Nicaragua.




Figure IV-11. Petition to the local government in comparative perspective

Nicaraguans rank fourteenth among the twenty-one countries. It is the third country in Central America with the highest number of petitions to the municipality.

Next, we analyze the impact of satisfaction with the municipal services on the support for decentralization of responsibilities.




Figure IV-12. Predictors of support for decentralization of responsibilities

None of the factors that we have included in the regression analysis proved to be statistically significant.

Then, we analyze the variables that influence in the support for decentralization of resources.




Figure IV-13. Predictors of support to decentralization of resources

The results of the regression analysis indicate that gender and age are statistically significant in predicting the support for the decentralization of resources.




Figure IV-14. Support for the decentralization of resources by gender

Figure IV-14 indicates that men favor decentralization of resources more than women do. This may be so because women, in general, have less available resources, and hence are more reluctant to give additional resources to the municipal government.




Figure IV-15. Support for decentralization of resources by age

We see in Figure IV-5 that younger citizens and the elderly are less supportive of decentralization of resources. It is interesting to note in these results that people with more contact with local governments and those who are most likely to pay their taxes are the ones who support more decentralization of resources.

In the following section, we analyze the impact of the assessment of local government services on the values of stable democracy. In Table IV-3 we see that the evaluation of local services significantly affects the political legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust.

Table IV-1. Impact of satisfaction with local services on values of stable democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Apoyo al derecho de participación		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.044	(0.03)	0.021	(0.04)	0.030	(0.03)	0.156*	(0.03)	0.199*	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.078*	(0.03)	-0.033	(0.02)	-0.095*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	0.035	(0.03)	0.093*	(0.02)	0.102*	(0.03)	0.135*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.161	(0.22)	0.020	(0.14)	0.642*	(0.26)	-0.412*	(0.16)	-0.216	(0.25)
Mujer	-2.081	(1.54)	-1.180	(0.96)	-4.586*	(1.60)	2.472	(1.36)	-5.165*	(1.40)
Edad	0.551	(0.30)	0.410	(0.22)	0.599	(0.30)	-0.358	(0.20)	0.547	(0.28)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.006	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.432	(0.65)	0.235	(0.54)	0.778	(0.63)	-1.317*	(0.51)	-0.609	(0.69)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.236	(1.20)	0.634	(1.01)	1.638	(1.70)	1.362	(1.00)	4.062*	(1.34)
Tamaño	2.127*	(0.61)	1.288*	(0.62)	0.864	(0.72)	-0.351	(0.62)	3.515*	(0.71)
Constante	57.302*	(6.87)	64.829*	(5.56)	25.631*	(7.55)	35.660*	(6.23)	22.172*	(6.45)
R-cuadrado	0.023		0.031		0.042		0.075		0.072	
N. de casos	1211		1325		1264		1333		1352	
* p<0.05										




Figure IV-16. Satisfaction with local services and political legitimacy of institutions

In Figure IV-16 we see that political legitimacy of institutions significantly declines as the satisfaction of local services decreases. Hence, satisfaction with services provided by the municipal governments has an impact in the confidence that the Nicaraguan people express toward the political institutions of the country. To the extent that local governments cannot meet their communities' needs, trust in national institutions declines. The lack of resources and responsibilities of local governments has an important impact in the levels of legitimacy of state institutions.




Figure IV-17. Satisfaction with local services and interpersonal trust

In Figure IV-17 we see the impact of satisfaction with local services on interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust diminishes as satisfaction declines. Interpersonal trust, which promotes civic participation, drops nearly 15 points as the measure of satisfaction with local services grows drops.

Levels of civic participation in comparative perspective

Now we move from the analysis of local governments to civic participation. From the work of Robert Putnam (1993), we know that levels of participation in civil society organizations are a good proxy to measure the quality of democracy.

In the first section we analyze civic participation in comparative perspective. We see participation mainly in religious organizations, parent associations, community development groups, and women groups.

Figure IV-18 indicates that participation in religious organizations is very high, with fifteen countries having participation indexes of more than 50 points on the 0-to-100 scale. Nicaraguans show a level of participation above the mid scale and relatively high in comparison with other countries.




Figure IV-18. Participation in meetings of religious organizations in comparative perspective




Figure IV-19. Participation in parents' association

Participation in parents' associations in Nicaragua is below the mid point of the scale but is relatively high in comparison with other countries, in particular with other Central American countries.




Figure IV-20. Participation in meetings of associations for community improvements

The level of participation in meetings of associations for community improvement is relatively low, with an average score of 26.2. This level of participation is low when we compare it with the levels of participation in meetings of parents' associations and religious organizations.




Figure IV-21. Participation in meetings of women groups

Generally, participation in women groups is low in all countries. Nicaraguans’ levels of participation place them in the twelfth position among the twenty-one countries in the study, with an average score of 11.8 on the 0-to-100 scale. Nicaragua is the second country in Central America with the highest level of participation in women groups, after Guatemala, which places second among all countries included.

Impact of civic participation on democratic values³⁴

This section uses a series of regression analyses in order to examine the impact of the ways of civic participation on democratic values: support for democracy as the best system, support for the right of participation of the opposition, political tolerance, political legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust.




Figure IV-22. Impact of civic participation on support for democracy

The regression analysis indicates that participation in meetings of religious organizations is a significant factor in the support for democracy.

³⁴ This chapter appendix contains tables with the regression analysis and the coefficients for each variable. It is important to note that here we present results only for the impact of the variables on civic participation and only when these are found to be statistically significant.




Figure IV-23. Participation in religious organization and support for democracy

Figure IV-23 indicates that people who attend religious meetings once a week or twice a month show higher support for democracy than those who attend only once or twice a year.

Now, we analyze the impact of civic participation on the support for the right of participation of the opposition. According to Figure IV-24, participation in meetings of parent associations and participation in committees for community improvement are significant variables explaining the variation in the support for opposition participation.




Figure IV-24. Impact of civic participation on the support to the right of opposition participation

Figure IV-25 indicates that people who participate more frequently in meetings of a community improvement committee show more support for the right of participation of the opposition.



Figure IV-25. Participation in community improvement committee and support for the right of participation of opposition

In order to analyze the effect of civic participation on political tolerance, we carried out a regression which is shown in Figure IV-26.




Figure IV-26. Impact of civic participation on political tolerance




Figure IV-27. Participation in religious participation and political tolerance

Political tolerance decreases as people participate less in religious organizations. Here we see the impact of participation on an important democratic value. People who attend religious meetings express higher levels of political tolerance than people who never attend this type of meeting.

We also analyzed the impact of civic participation on political legitimacy of institutions. Figure IV-28 presents the regression results.




Figure IV-28. Impact of civic participation on political legitimacy of institutions




Figure IV-29. Participation in community improvement committee and political legitimacy of institutions

Figure IV-29 shows the relationship between participation in community improvement association and the legitimacy of institutions. We can see that legitimacy diminishes significantly as participation in community improvement committees declines. Participation in meetings of community improvement associations tends to raise trust in state institutions.

Now, we analyze the impact of civic participation on interpersonal trust.




Figure IV-30. Impact of civic participation on interpersonal trust

Figure IV-30 indicates that participation in committees or associations of community improvement has a significant impact on interpersonal trust.



Figure IV-31. Participation in community improvement committee and interpersonal trust

Interpersonal trust tends to diminish when participation in the community improvement committees declines. In Figure IV-31 we can see a reduction of nearly 10 points in the interpersonal trust scale among the people who attend these committees only once or twice a year or never.

Attitudes on the Citizen Power Councils (CPC)

The current national government has proposed to reestablish the Citizen Power Councils (CPC). According to the government, each Citizen Power Council would have two roles: they oversee the performance of state institutions, and they maintain a direct relationship with the Executive. However, some argue that CPCs are a partisan instrument to increase the control of the government party. AmericasBarometer 2008 included several questions about this entity.




Figure IV-32. Have you heard about the CPCs?

We see that a 72.8% of Nicaraguans interviewed in February, 2008, that have heard about the CPCs. Thus, it can be said that information about this government plan has been sufficiently disseminated among the population.




Figure IV-33. Did you attend CPCs meetings?

However, few people have attended CPC meetings; in fact, 92.8% say they have never attended a meeting.

Figure IV-34 indicates that as of the date of the survey, slightly more than a third (33.8%) of Nicaraguans think that the CPCs were created to “stimulate citizen participation,” but 21.4% think that the goal of CPC is to increase party control; 16.9% say that CPCs are mechanisms to monitor citizens, and 13.9% stated other motivations.




Figure IV-34. Reasons behind the CPCs

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have analyzed Nicaraguans' attitudes toward decentralization of responsibilities and resources and the levels of trust in local governments. Decentralization has been promoted by several governments in the region and also by international agencies. There is much in the literature that points to decentralization as a means to increase levels of democracy and enhance civic participation. Here we see that, in general, Nicaraguans express more support for municipal governments than for the central government. Nicaraguans also favor the decentralization of resources although support for decentralization of responsibilities is quite low. Local governments receive significantly higher levels of trust than those of national government. Satisfaction with services provided by the local governments is a significant factor in explaining changes in the levels of interpersonal trust and political legitimacy of institutions. Both democratic values decrease as the assessment of the local government services becomes increasingly negative. Hence, services provided by local governments affect important values for a stable democracy. The chapter also analyzes levels of civic participation and their impact on stable democracy values. Participation in community improvement associations raises support for the right of participation of the opposition, the political legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust. Participation in religious organizations raises support for democracy and political tolerance. In addition, participation in parents associations increases support for the right of participation.

Finally, this chapter analyzed the attitudes toward the creation of the Citizen Power Councils. Most Nicaraguans have heard about the CPCs, but few have participated in their meetings. A third of respondents think that the councils are mechanisms to increase citizen participation, while 38.3% think that they are mechanisms for strengthening the partisan control or for monitoring citizens' behavior.

Appendixes

Appendix IV-1. Decentralization of responsibilities

	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios locales	-0.012	(-0.44)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	-0.001	(-0.02)
Educación	0.033	(0.77)
Mujer	-0.044	(-1.62)
Edad	0.080	(2.00)
Riqueza	0.015	(0.43)
Tamaño	-0.001	(-0.03)
Constante	-0.004	(-0.10)
R-cuadrado	0.007	
N. de casos	1316	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-2. Decentralization of resources

	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.039	(1.22)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.009	(0.32)
Educación	0.019	(0.50)
Mujer	-0.060*	(-2.15)
Edad	0.071*	(2.26)
Riqueza	0.035	(0.85)
Tamaño	-0.008	(-0.21)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.16)
R-cuadrado	0.011	
N. de casos	1308	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-3. Impact of civic participation on support for democracy

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.113*	(3.63)
Asociación padres de familia	0.021	(0.60)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.005	(0.17)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.064*	(-2.48)
Interés en la política	0.044	(1.58)
Educación	0.020	(0.64)
Mujer	-0.059*	(-2.20)
Edad	0.179	(1.39)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.166	(-1.34)
Riqueza	0.033	(0.81)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.031	(-1.10)
Tamaño	0.115*	(3.54)
Constante	0.010	(0.28)
R-cuadrado	0.036	
N. de casos	1261	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-4. Impact of civic participation on the support for the right of opposition

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.039	(1.16)
Asociación padres de familia	0.075*	(2.52)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.073*	(3.61)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.032	(-1.46)
Interés en la política	0.113*	(3.88)
Educación	-0.005	(-0.20)
Mujer	-0.047	(-1.98)
Edad	0.076	(0.59)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.047	(-0.35)
Riqueza	0.038	(0.98)
Percepción economía familiar	0.003	(0.08)
Tamaño	0.097*	(2.27)
Constante	0.013	(0.31)
R-cuadrado	0.044	
N. de casos	1384	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-5. Impact of civic participation on political tolerance

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.085*	(3.04)
Asociación padres de familia	0.011	(0.31)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.055	(1.44)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.075*	(-2.84)
Interés en la política	0.090*	(3.13)
Educación	0.087*	(2.40)
Mujer	-0.096*	(-3.68)
Edad	0.221	(1.53)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.153	(-1.03)
Riqueza	0.052	(1.70)
Percepción economía familiar	0.026	(0.66)
Tamaño	0.045	(1.36)
Constante	-0.013	(-0.32)
R-cuadrado	0.056	
N. de casos	1316	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-6. Impact of civic participation on political legitimacy of institutions

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.032	(1.18)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.005	(-0.14)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.090*	(2.41)
Interés en la política	0.199*	(6.86)
Educación	-0.059*	(-2.04)
Mujer	0.048	(1.62)
Edad	-0.377*	(-2.68)
Edad al cuadrado	0.307*	(2.26)
Riqueza	-0.100*	(-2.92)
Percepción economía familiar	0.044	(1.30)
Tamaño	-0.035	(-0.88)
Constante	-0.016	(-0.39)
R-cuadrado	0.067	
N. de casos	1396	
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-7. Impact of civic participation on interpersonal trust

	Coef.	t
Organización religiosa	0.056	(1.92)
Asociación padres de familia	-0.013	(-0.45)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.066*	(2.31)
Educación	-0.036	(-0.99)
Mujer	-0.093*	(-4.27)
Edad	0.180	(1.13)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.132	(-0.80)
Riqueza	-0.033	(-0.94)
Percepción economía familiar	0.103*	(2.81)
Tamaño	0.165*	(5.43)
Constante	0.020	(0.53)
R-cuadrado	0.063	
N. de casos	1416	
* p<0.05		

Chapter V . Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework³⁵

It has become common place in the field of democratic governance when discussing election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Indeed, citizens directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America, where citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they have also been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success and failure of the Nicaraguan government to deal with these two critical economic challenges and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a substantial drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but rather, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion. As perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did citizens’ opinion of their political leaders, institutions, and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support-- being political community, the regime and political authorities-- which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support-- diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

³⁵ This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton's three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, negative economic outlooks and perceptions affected "peoples' feelings about their leaders and institutions" (2) and that "the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions" (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance, which, according to Dalton "offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies" (2004, 113). He posits that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society's economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation between a person's financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He found that across eight US presidential administrations, citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government. However, according to Dalton, "perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall" (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton's conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, in that "the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous" (127) within the OECD nations.

Regarding a government's economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been "fragmentary and inconsistent." In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country's "level of economic development is less important than economic performance" (Power and Jamison 2005, 58); however, they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, individual assessment of both the national as well as one's own economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system. Citizens who evaluate highly both the national economic situation and their own are more likely to support the political system than those whose perceptions are not as positive.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

Measuring perception of government economic performance

A new index (**econperf**), which stands for “Perception of Government Economic Performance” was created using N1, how well does the government fight poverty, and N12, how well does the government fight unemployment.

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

Comparative analysis

First, we offer a comparative perspective of perceptions of government economic performance. Here, it is important to remember that we are not assessing the actual performance of the government economic policies, nor are we judging the virtues and failings of those policies. We simply analyze the citizens’ perceptions regarding the performance of the government.




Figure V-1. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

Figure V-1 indicates that Nicaragua is fifth lowest country of the survey in the ranking of government economic performance. Nicaraguans averaged 30.4 on the 0-to-100 scale, far below the mid-point. Hence, we can say that the population feels that the government’s performance in tackling the problems of poverty and unemployment is poor.

Perception of economic performance in Nicaragua

First, we analyze the main problem of the country according to the population. In the survey, we asked:

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [**NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN**]

Responses have been grouped as shown in Table V.1.

Table V-1. Main problem of the country according to citizens (A4), recategorized³⁶

Economía	Seguridad	Servicios Básicos	Política	Otros
Crédito, falta de (09)	Delincuencia, crimen (05)	Agua, falta de (19)	Conflicto armado (30)	Desigualdad (58)
Desempleo/falta de empleo (03)	Pandillas (14)	Caminos/vías en mal estado 18	Corrupción (13)	Desplazamiento forzado (32)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de (01)	Secuestro (31)	Educación, falta de, mala calidad (21)	Derechos humanos, violaciones de (56)	Discriminación (25)
Inflación, altos precios (02)	Seguridad (falta de) (27)	Electricidad, falta de (24)	Los políticos (59)	Drogadicción (11)
Pobreza (04)	Guerra contra terrorismo (17)	Salud, falta de servicio (22)	Mal gobierno (15)	Explosión demográfica (20)
Tierra para cultivar, falta de (07)	Terrorismo (33)	Transporte, problemas con el (60)		Medio ambiente (10)
Deuda Externa (26)	Violencia (57)	Vivienda (55)		Migración (16)
		Desnutrición (23)		Narcotráfico (12)
				Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorismo (65)
				Otro (70)

³⁶ Each cell represents one of the possible responses to the question. These responses have been grouped into five categories: economic problems, security problems, public services problems, politics, and others. Numbers in brackets represent the code used to identify the responses in the database.




Figure V-2. Main country problem by year

We can see that economic problems have been prominent since we started to survey the population in Nicaragua. In 2008, 84% of respondents say that the main problem of the country is the economy.

The following analysis explores the factors that significantly affect perception of economic performance of the government. Here we introduce two variables that measure citizen evaluation of the economic situation. First, we use the question SOCT1, which measures opinions about the national economy; this represents what sometimes is called the sociotropic analysis. Second, we use the question IDIO1, which represents the idiotropic analysis, in which citizen assesses their own economic situations. Most of the studies, at least in developed countries, have stated that opinions about national economy have a greater impact on the government evaluation than the idiotropic analysis.

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8




Figure V-3. National economic situation in comparative perspective

Nicaraguans evaluate the national economic situation negatively. Figure V-3 indicates that Nicaragua places in the bottom three countries; only Paraguay and Haiti gave poorer evaluations of their countries' economies.

In Figure V-4, we see Nicaraguans' perceptions of the national economic situation since 2004. Large majorities said that the economic situation of the country is bad or very bad in all three surveys: 67% in 2004, 66.5% in 2006, and 71.2% in 2008.




Figure V-4. National economic situation by year

The situation regarding personal finances is quite similar. In Figure V-5 we see that Nicaraguans' assessment is the second lowest compared to the rest of the countries in this study. Only Haitians expressed a more negative perception.




Figure V-5. Personal economic situation




Figure V-6. Personal economic situation by year

Perceptions of personal economic situation have substantially changed since 2006. Figure V-6 shows that 47.5% of respondents said that their economic situation was bad or very bad in 2008. This figure is higher than the 34.1% who had the same perception in 2006. From 2006 to 2008, the proportion of population that says that their economic situation is “very bad” has increased considerably, from 5.1% to 17.9%

The following analysis explores the factors that influence the perception of the government’s economic performance. We sought to identify to what extent national economic situation and personal economic situations affect the assessment of the government’s role.




Figure V-7. Predictors of perception of government economic performance

We see that the significant factors are the evaluations of the national and personal economy. In Nicaragua, both evaluations, sociotropic and idiotropic, are important to determine perception of the government’s economic performance.




Figure V-8. Perception of the government economic performance and national economy

Figure V-8 shows that perception of the government’s economic performance significantly decreases as the perception of the national economic situation becomes more negative. As can be seen in the figure, the reduction of the perception of government economic performance as a function of the evaluation of national economy is more than 25 points.




Figure V-9. Perception of the government economic performance and personal economic situation

As can be observed in Figure V-9, perception of the government economic performance significantly declines as the perception of the personal economic situation becomes more negative. This relationship is linear, and the reduction in the positive perception of the government’s economic performance as a function of the personal situation is of more than 45 points. No doubt that the perception of the personal economic situation and the national economic situation greatly affect the perception of the government’s economic performance.

We continue our analysis of the perception of the government economic performance by examining the impact that this variable has on important values for a stable democracy. In the theoretical part of this chapter, we argued that the likely link between the perception of the economy, the legitimacy of institutions, and support for the political system. Here, we analyze those links for the case of Nicaragua.

In the following table, we can see that the perception of the government's economic performance is a significant factor in three out of the five democratic values that are under scrutiny here: political tolerance, legitimacy of the political institutions, and interpersonal trust.

Table V-2. Impact of the economic performance of the government in the values of a stable democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico	0.028	(0.04)	0.001	(0.03)	0.106*	(0.04)	0.439*	(0.02)	0.108*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.096*	(0.04)	-0.029	(0.03)	-0.146*	(0.04)				
Interés en la política	0.046	(0.03)	0.095*	(0.02)	0.097*	(0.03)	0.078*	(0.02)		
Educación	0.117	(0.21)	-0.017	(0.14)	0.632*	(0.26)	-0.179	(0.13)	-0.175	(0.26)
Mujer	-2.295	(1.59)	-1.014	(0.95)	-4.972*	(1.65)	3.252*	(1.13)	-5.287*	(1.23)
Edad	0.522	(0.28)	0.301	(0.19)	0.617	(0.31)	-0.351	(0.18)	0.420	(0.32)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.006	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)	0.004	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.531	(0.72)	0.278	(0.52)	0.933	(0.57)	-1.128*	(0.37)	-0.535	(0.65)
Percepción economía familiar	-1.214	(1.06)	0.365	(1.04)	0.961	(1.54)	0.238	(0.76)	3.930*	(1.52)
Tamaño	2.028*	(0.61)	1.295*	(0.62)	0.947	(0.67)	0.062	(0.47)	3.613*	(0.70)
Constante	59.963*	(6.51)	68.536*	(5.81)	26.292*	(6.72)	28.323*	(5.17)	30.153*	(7.03)
R-cuadrado	0.024		0.028		0.049		0.329		0.062	
N. de casos	1273		1398		1329		1412		1421	
* p<0.05										




Figure V-10. Economic performance and political tolerance

Figure V-10 presents the relationship between political tolerance and the perception of government economic performance. People who believe that government economic performance is good tend to express higher levels of political tolerance. Here we see the connection between economic governance and democratic values.




Figure V-11. Economic performance and the political legitimacy of institutions

The legitimacy of institutions significantly increases as the perception of the government role in the economic area becomes more positive; it decreases as the perceptions of the government performance become more negative. Hence, we can conclude that an important relationship exists between the assessment of the economy and government performance and the support received by the political institutions of the country. The relationship is linear and the difference is more than 40 points.




Figure V-12. Economic development and interpersonal trust

Interpersonal trust increases when people have positive perceptions of the government’s performance. Again, this demonstrates the connection between the evaluation of the government performance and democratic values.

Remittances

In this section we analyze the impact of remittances in the national economy. During the 1980s, thousands of Nicaraguans fled the country as a result of the civil war, entering the United States. Millions of Nicaraguans are still living and working outside the country and send millions of dollars to their relatives back in Nicaragua. This source of income is necessary to support many families. The AmericasBarometer 2008 included several questions about remittances.

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No [Pase a Q10c] (8) NS [Pase a Q10c]</p>
<p>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer] (1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos (6) Ahorro/inversión (7) Otro (8) NS/NR</p>
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>

In the following tables, we see the distribution of answers to these questions. In Table V-3 we see that 78% of Nicaraguans do not receive remittances from abroad.

Table V-3. Do you or somebody living in your house receive remittances from abroad?

Respuesta	%
Sí	22%
No	78%
Total	100%

Figure V-13 indicates that urban dwellers receive more remittances than rural residents.




Figure V-13. Remittances by urban/rural area

Table V-4. In what do you use the money from remittances?
(Only people who receive remittances)

Respuesta	%
Consumo (alimento, vestido)	75.3%
Vivienda (construcción, reparación)	4.2%
Gastos en educación	9.7%
Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias)	0.3%
Gastos médicos	5.4%
Ahorro/inversión	3.6%
Otro	1.5%
Total	100%

The vast majority of Nicaraguans who receive remittances use this money to cover basic expenditures such as food and clothing; 9.7% use the money for education.

Table V-5. To what extent does family income depend upon remittances? (Only people who receive remittances)

Respuestas	%
Mucho	36.9%
Algo	32.5%
Poco	23.9%
Nada	6.8%
Total	100%

Table V-5 demonstrates that the vast majority of families who receive remittances depend greatly or somewhat upon them; 23.9% do not depend very much on money received from abroad, and 6.8% do not depend at all upon that money.

Table V-6. Do you have intentions to live and work in another country? (All)

Respuestas	%
Sí	33.2%
No	66.8%
Total	100%

Finally, we see that 66.8% of Nicaraguans said that they do not intend to leave the country to live or work. However, the remaining third say that they do intend to travel outside the country. Nicaraguans express the highest level of willingness to leave the country compared to citizens in the rest of Central American countries studied here.³⁷

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the relationship between citizen assessment of the economy, both national and personal, and the values of a stable democracy. The chapter has demonstrated that Nicaraguan citizens perceive that their government is performing poorly.. In addition, the vast majority of Nicaraguans say that the main problem of the country is the country's economy. Perception of the national economic situation and one's personal finances are important factors in

³⁷ The percentages of citizens that have intention to look for employment or live abroad in other Central American countries are: El Salvador 25%; Honduras 21%; Guatemala 18%; Costa Rica 16%; and Panama 13%

assessing perceptions of the government's economic performance. People who believe that the personal and national economic situations are good or very good tend to express a higher support for the government's role in economic matters and vice versa. This is to say, the poorer the economic performance of the government, the lower the political tolerance and interpersonal trust.

Appendix

Appendix V-1. Perception of the government economic performance

	Coef.	t
Educación	0.008	(0.21)
Mujer	-0.048	(-1.77)
Edad	-0.015	(-0.55)
Riqueza	-0.033	(-0.95)
Tamaño	-0.041	(-1.11)
Situación económica nacional	0.208*	(8.44)
Situación económica personal	0.122*	(5.83)
Constante	-0.008	(-0.24)
R-cuadrado	0.086	
N. de casos	1466	
* $p < 0.05$		

THIRD PART:
BEYOND
GOVERNANCE

Chapter VI . Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

Theoretical framework

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.³⁸ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus was narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we attempt to deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing out democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both a notion of legitimacy and an attitude of tolerance are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in Table VI.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

³⁸ Dictators, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they become unpopular, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to use coercion usually fail quickly.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

- | |
|--|
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio) |
| B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)? |
| B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político (país)? |
| B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)? |
| B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)? |

The items used for creating the “political tolerance” index are the same as those we used previously to create the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness. (see chapter I).




Figure VI-1. Support for the system in comparative perspective controlling for the effect of the president's job approval rating

Figure VI-1 shows the results of the system support scale in comparative perspective controlling for the effect of approval of the president's performance. Here we can see the support for the political system without the effect of the approval or disapproval of the president's performance. Costa Rica and the USA express the highest levels of support on the 0-to-100 scale and Paraguay the lowest. Nicaragua is in the middle of the scale with an average of 50.6.

Political tolerance is one of the most important political values. In the previous section we analyzed support for the political system. Support for the system is important for political stability but it does not grant democracy. Hence, political tolerance, namely, citizens' approval of the right of other people to express divergent opinions, is important to establish and maintain a stable democratic regime. The literature on political tolerance is ample.³⁹ One of the most discussed topics is how to measure tolerance.⁴⁰ This study measures tolerance using an index based on the responses in a series of questions (the "D" series) in the questionnaire. The original scale of these variables ranges from 1 to 10. Next, we present the questions related to political tolerance in the LAPOP questionnaire.

The questions used for the analysis are the following:

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente									Aprueba firmemente	No sabe

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Panamá, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]*

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

³⁹ See Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Mitchell A. Seligson, y Dan Caspi, "Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson y Dan Caspi, "Toward and Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; y Mitchell A. Seligson, y Dan Caspi, "Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (en hebreo)," *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982); James L. Gibson, 1993, "Perceived Political Freedom in the Soviet Union." *Journal of Politics* 55:4 November 936-974; James L. Gibson, 1992a, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36:2 May 560-577; James L. Gibson, 1992b, "The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom" *American Political Science Review* 86:2, 338-356; James L. Gibson, 1988, "Political Tolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review* 82, June, 511-529; James L. Gibson, 1989, "The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era." *Journal of Politics* 51:13-35; James L. Gibson and R. Bingham, 1985, "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance." In Gibson and Bingham, *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*. New York: Praeger.

⁴⁰ For a wide discussion of this topic see the section on political tolerance in: Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburgh y CEDATOS, 2002, 45-46.

In order to conduct our analysis, we recodified the variables into a 0-to-100 scale; the logic is the same as for the scale of support for the system, although the transformation procedure is quite different.⁴¹




Figure VI-2. Political tolerance in comparative perspective

⁴¹ The transformation is carried out subtracting 1 from each score. Then the score is divided by nine and placed in an interval from 0 to 1. Finally, this score is multiplied by 100. These questions have an acceptable reliability level, with an Alpha of .887.

Nicaraguans scored 50.4 points on the 0-to-100 scale. This score places Nicaragua in the fourteenth position among the twenty-two countries included in this analysis, above Honduras and Guatemala but far lower than Canada, Argentina, and the U.S.A., countries with the highest level of tolerance.




Figure VI-3. Political tolerance in Nicaragua by year

We see that the average score of political tolerance gradually increases from 1991 to 1999; it then decreases as shown in the 2004-2008 Americas Barometer surveys. When we analyze data for 2008, we see that the education level and gender are significant factors. Figure IV-4 demonstrates that political tolerance significantly increases as the education level increases. Women were found to express less political tolerance than men.⁴²

⁴² It is important to note that the survey does not find any significant difference in the education average between women and men, 8.2 versus 7.8 education years for men and women respectively.




Figure VI-4. Political tolerance by education level and gender, 2008

Now we will analyze the relationship between political tolerance and support for the system. This analysis follows an outline created by Mitchell Seligson in previous reports. This analysis is based on splitting the scale down the middle (50 from 0-100) and crossing both variables in order to obtain a 2-by-2 table which shows us the theoretical relationship between tolerance and support for the system.⁴³ It is important to note that this outline applies only to countries in which an electoral democracy prevails since the effect of high or low support for the system would be very different in case of an authoritarian regime.

⁴³ Each one of these scales ranges from 0 to 100 so that the midpoint is 50.

Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support

	Tolerancia	
Apoyo al sistema (i.e., legitimidad)	Alto	Bajo
Alto	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
Bajo	Democracia inestable	Democracia en riesgo

Table VI-1 presents the four possible combinations using tolerance and legitimacy.. The upper cells indicate that political systems with many citizens who show high system support and high political tolerance would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the reasoning that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under such conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support, and whose citizens are reasonably tolerant of minority rights are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties since instability could force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will lead to greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the public neither supports the basic institutions of the nation nor supports the rights of minorities are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the general public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown in the case of Nicaragua, incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Support for stable democracy in Nicaragua

Here we analyze the relationship between political tolerance and support for the system in Nicaragua in comparative fashion. The results of the 2008 survey presented in Table VI-2 indicate that 20.6% of Nicaraguans express attitudes conducive to a stable democracy; 30.9% express opinions that support an unstable democracy and another 30.9% a democracy at risk; 25.4% express opinions conducive to an authoritarian stability. It is important to note that despite the fact that a minority falls into the cell of stable democracy, most Nicaraguans are positioned in “democratic” cells. It is worrisome that a plurality falls into the cell of “democracy at risk,” as it shows low political tolerance and low support for the system.

Table VI.2. Theoretical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in Nicaragua

		Tolerancia	
		Alto	Bajo
Apoyo al sistema (i.e., legitimidad)	Alto	Democracia estable 20.6%	Estabilidad autoritaria 23.1%
	Bajo	Democracia inestable 25.4%	Democracia en riesgo 30.9%




Figure VI-6. High support for the system and high political tolerance in Nicaragua

Figure VI-6 indicates that from 2004 forward the proportion of Nicaraguans expressing opinions favorable to stable democracy (high support for the system and high political tolerance) has decreased.

Legitimacy of other political institutions

The various AmericasBarometer LAPOP surveys have followed the evolution of the confidence in several democratic institutions. In Chapter 1 we explored some of them (political parties, courts, etc.). In this chapter, we have explored institutions in the “support for the system” index. In this section we provide a general comparison of the legitimacy of the complete set of institutions addressed in the 2008 round. In order to do that, we measure “trust” in each one of the key institutions using a 1-to-7 scale, which was later converted to the 0-to-100 scale.




Figure VI-7. Trust in institutions, 2008

The media are the institutions with the highest level of trust among the population, followed by the military. The president and the political parties receive the lowest levels of trust. There is a slight difference between trust in the president and trust in the national government: the former receives 4.8 less points than the latter. It is also interesting to note the difference between the justice system and the Supreme Court.




Figure VI-8. Trust in institutions by year

Figure VI-8 shows the changes in the level of trust between several institutions since 2004. We see that, in general, the levels of confidence have decreased since 2004, with the exception of the military, which has increased from a trust average score of 54.2 to 61.5.




Figure VI-9. Trust in the president in comparative perspective

The president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, has the highest level of trust across the region, followed by Dominican President Leonel Fernández. Figure VI-9 demonstrates that confidence in the presidents of the U.S., Peru, Nicaragua, and Paraguay is comparatively low. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is rated 33.3 on the 0-to-100 scale. This rating puts him in second to last place.




Figure VI-10. Trust in Congress in comparative perspective

Figure VI-10 shows the level of trust in the legislature for all twenty-two countries included in the study. First, we see that the levels of trust in the Congress are generally lower than those of the presidents. Although in Nicaragua the congress receives a higher level of trust than the president, Nicaraguans’ level of trust is relatively low with a score of 36.5 points on the scale. Paraguay and Ecuador are the countries with the lowest levels.

Other indicators of support for democracy

Here we analyze a variety of additional indicators that measure support for democracy. In Chapter 1 we saw that support for democracy in Nicaragua reaches an average score of 71.6 on the 0-to-100 scale. This result indicates that Nicaraguans express strong support for the idea that democracy is the best system, despite its difficulties. However, satisfaction with democracy does not garner the same support.

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua?

(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR




Figure VI-11. Satisfaction with democracy in comparative perspective

Nicaragua is among the ten countries with the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy, with a score of 46.2 on the 0-to-100 scale. There is a difference of 26.7 points between the support for democracy and the satisfaction with democracy. While a significant number of citizens support the idea that democracy is the best political system, they are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in Nicaragua.




Figure VI-12. Satisfaction with democracy in Nicaragua by year

Satisfaction with democracy has significantly decreased since the 2004 survey. The difference between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant.

Which factors influence the level of satisfaction with democracy? The regression analysis that we see in Figure VI-13 indicates that the most important factors are the perception of the president’s performance, the government’s economic performance, the perception of insecurity, and the national economic situation.




Figure VI-13. Predictors of satisfaction with democracy




Figure VI-14. Satisfaction with democracy and president performance

Satisfaction with democracy significantly declines as the perception of the president’s performance becomes more negative. The link between the president’s performance and the satisfaction with democracy is important because it shows how the political performance and economic performance of the president, often subject to the swings of political competition in the short term and to unforeseen or uncontrollable events, is tied to the general evaluation of the regime performance or the democratic system.




Figure VI-15. Satisfaction with democracy and perception of insecurity

Perception of insecurity affects satisfaction with democracy. To the extent that citizens feel less safe in their neighborhoods or communities, satisfaction with democracy significantly decreases. This result is in accordance with those presented in Chapter III, in which we saw that the insecurity perception affects support for the right of participation of the opposition and interpersonal trust in significant ways.




Figure VI-16. Satisfaction with democracy and national economic situation

Satisfaction with democracy significantly declines as the perception of national economic situation worsens. Here we see that the sociotropic effect is more important than the idiosyncratic. In other words, the evaluation of democracy performance is made based upon the national economic situation and not upon the personal situation.




Figure VI-17. Satisfaction with democracy and the government economic performance

Figure VI-17 shows that satisfaction with democracy rises as the perception of the government economic performance improves. Here we see a direct link between perceptions about governance, or the lack of it, and satisfaction with the democratic system.

The survey comprises another question that examines perceptions on the state of democracy in Latin America.

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

- (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático
 (8) NS/NR




Figure VI-18. Perception of democracy level in comparative perspective

Nicaraguans perceive relatively low levels of democracy. Their average score barely surpasses the mid-point of the scale. Nicaragua is positioned among the 10 countries with the worst perception of democracy levels, although it is 7.6 points above Honduras, the second to last country with the worst perception of democracy.




Figure VI-19. Perception of democracy level by year

Figure VI-19 indicates that perception of the level of democracy in Nicaragua has improved 4.3% since 2006 but does not reach the 2004 level.

Another form of analyzing support for democracy is by using question DEM2, which measures support for different types of regimes.

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:

- (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, o
- (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o
- (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
- (8) NS/NR




Figure VI-20. Preference for democracy in comparative perspective

Seventy-two and nine-tenths percent of Nicaraguans prefer a democratic regime; 12.1% prefer an authoritarian government, and 8.6% say that it does not matter to them whether the government is democratic or authoritarian. Six and a half percent did not respond to the question. With these percentages, Nicaragua places in the middle of the group of countries included in the study. The majority of citizens in the countries included in the 2008, with the exception of Paraguay, prefer democracy.




Figure VI-21. Electoral democracy or strong leader

A vast majority of Nicaraguans support electoral democracy rather than a non-elected authoritarian leader. This result shows a wide support for democracy, particularly for electoral competition as a key mechanism to choose a president.

Finally, we ask questions that attempt to measure population approval of some features of political authoritarianism.

We see that Figure VI-22 shows that a wide majority of Nicaraguans support general participation and not the implementation of strong armed policies.




Figure VI-22. Strong hand or general participation

However, in Figure VI-23 we see that most of Nicaraguans support the idea that sometimes authorities are allowed to act outside the law; 53.3% of respondents feel that authorities can skirt the law in order to capture criminals. Here we see the effect that crime has on democratic attitudes. A majority of Nicaraguans are willing ignore the law in order to tackle the crime problem.




Figure VI-23. Respect the law or act outside the law

Concentration of presidential power

The concentration of power in the executive branch, the so-called hyper-presidentialism, is an historic characteristic of the Latin American political systems. Democracy requires independent institutions that wield some checks and balances in order to avoid the abuse of power. Although the countries of the region have made progress in creating independent judicial and legislative institutions, the presidentialist tradition continues to affect democratic development. Over the last ten years in particular we have seen a deepening of concentration of presidential powers, especially in the form of populist policies. The AmericasBarometer 2008 includes a series of questions that attempt to analyze citizen support of presidential power concentration.

Here we analyze the following questions of the series:

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.

POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(8) NS/NR

POP102. Cuando la Asamblea Nacional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(8) NS/NR

POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(8) NS/NR

POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(8) NS/NR

These questions were originally designed to be measured on a 1-to-7 scale. For our analysis we have dichotomized the answers and have divided the respondents between those who support (scores from 5 to 7) and those who do not support (scores from 1 to 4). Figure VI-24 present the percentages that support power concentration.




Figure VI-24. Support for presidential power concentration

We see that a wide majority of Nicaraguans support the idea of the president always following the will of the people. The support for the idea of the president limiting the voice and vote of the opposition is lower. However, between a fifth and a third of the people interviewed support the idea of broad presidential power.





Figure VI-25. Support for the idea that the president should rule without Congress by party vote in 2006

The results of Figure VI-25 indicate that people who voted for the FSLN and MRS in 2006 elections express higher support for the president ruling without Congress. The difference between the two parties is not statistically significant, nor is the difference between the PLC and ALN voters. Nevertheless, the difference between the PLC and the Sandinista-leaning parties is significant.



Graph VI-26. Support for the idea that the president should ignore the Supreme Court by party vote in 2006

We see some difference in party distribution regarding the support for the president ignoring the Supreme Court. Figure VI-24 indicates that 31.7% of FSLN voters support that statement. Regarding the MRS, the dispersion in the confidence interval indicates that there is an important difference among its voters; hence, we cannot offer a conclusion regarding this party. However, we can see that there is a significant difference between those who supported liberal parties and those who voted for the FSLN, whose supporters are much more in favor of the country's president having broad powers and MRS supporters. However, we must emphasize that such support is found in only the minority in all parties.

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the legitimacy of the political system and the link between legitimacy and political tolerance as a cornerstone of stable democracy. We have seen that 20.6% of Nicaraguans express high support for the system and political tolerance as well. On the other hand, 30.9% express low support for the system and low political tolerance, attitudes that risk democratic stability. Also, we have seen that the media are the institution with the highest level of public trust, followed by the military. The president and the political parties are the institutions

with the lowest levels of trust. The results show that since the 2004 survey, public trust in institutions has declined, with the exception of trust in the military. The chapter analyzed satisfaction with the performance of democracy; the data indicate that the levels of satisfaction are lower than the general support for democracy as a political system. The significant factors that influence satisfaction with democracy are the perception of the president's performance, the perception of the national economic situation, the perception of insecurity, and the economic performance of the government. Despite the variations in levels of satisfaction, the majority of Nicaraguans believe the country is very democratic and more than 70% prefer democracy over an authoritarian government. In general, Nicaraguans reject authoritarian solutions, although important minorities support authoritarian attitudes, and a majority support acting outside the law in order to fight crime. Finally, we see that more than a fifth of Nicaraguans support the president ruling without Congress, ignoring the Supreme Court, and restricting the opposition vote. FSLN voters expressed higher support for these measures.

Appendix

Appendix VI-1. Satisfaction with democracy

	Coef.	T
Educación	-0.002	(-0.07)
Mujer	-0.006	(-0.27)
Edad	0.029	(0.81)
Riqueza	-0.045	(-1.24)
Tamaño	0.030	(1.05)
Situación económica nacional	0.134*	(3.76)
Situación económica personal	0.002	(0.04)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.188*	(6.15)
Desempeño económico	0.113*	(4.81)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.087*	(-3.29)
Victimización por crimen	0.030	(1.24)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.13)
R-cuadrado	0.130	
N. de casos	1349	
* p<0.05		

Chapter VII . Voting Behavior and Political Parties

Free and competitive elections represent a fundamental characteristic of democracy. In this chapter, we analyze levels of electoral participation and attitudes toward the political parties. Table VII-1 presents participation levels and the results for the presidential elections from 1984 to 2001. We see a relatively high level of participation and a tendency to vote intentions polarization between the two strongest political forces in the country: Sandinism and liberalism.

Table VII-1. Participation and results in national elections⁴⁴

	1984	1990	1996	2001/a
TOTAL INSCRITOS	1,551,597	1,752,088	2,421,067	2,997,228
VOTOS TOTALES	1,170,142	1,510,838	1,842,643	ND
VOTOS NULOS	71,209	90,294	91,587	ND
VOTOS VALIDOS	1,098,943	1,420,544	1,757,775	2,162,213
ABSTENCION (total votos validos/total de inscritos)	29.2%	18.9%	27.4%	27.8%
RESULTADOS	FSLN 67% PCD 14% PLI 10% Otros 9%	UNO 55% FSLN 41% Otros 4%	AL 51% FSLN 38% Otros 11%	PLC56% FSLN 42% Otros 1%

a. En el caso de las elecciones del 2001 no fue posible obtener datos del número de votos nulos. La abstención para estas elecciones es sobre el total de votos válidos.

The last presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua were held on November 5, 2006. A long constitutional dispute in 2005 was the prelude to the electoral process. The dispute became an institutional crisis about the balance between the legislative and executive power which had to be solved through the intervention of the Organization of American States (OAS).

In 2000, liberal and Sandinist legislators reformed the Constitution in an attempt to share the control of several state institutions—without including other political forces. For example, the CSE increased from five directors to seven in order to ensure a numeric balance between liberal and Sandinista magistrates. The big parties also created a new electoral law which restricted the formation of new parties, eliminated non-partisan modes of electoral participation, and limited

⁴⁴ Sources include: Consejo Supremo Electoral de Nicaragua (www.cse.gov.ni); Jose Luis Rocha, “PLC: ganador rotundo en las urnas y en el pacto”, *Revista Envío*, No. 236, noviembre 2001, Managua: Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); Equipo Envío, “Cómo votó Nicaragua? Los resultados electorales”, *Revista Envío*, No. 102, abril 1990, Managua: Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); Equipo Nítlan-Envío, “Cómo votaron los nicaragüenses,” *Revista envío*, No. 176, noviembre 1996, Managua: Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); Equipo Envío, “4 de Noviembre: análisis de los resultados electorales,” *Revista Envío*, No. 41, noviembre 1984, Managua: Universidad Centroamericana (UCA).

electoral competition. Although some unconstitutional obstacles were eliminated in October, 2002, some restrictions, such as the prohibition of popular candidacies remained untouched in 2006. These changes, the result of political agreements between the parties leaderships, were known as the “the pact.” The pact raised concerns about whether the electoral law and a politicized CSE would give some unjustified political advantages to the main parties and would suppress small parties’ participation.

Although the 2001 elections took place without major problems, in the 2004 elections some problems and irregularities arose, especially in the mishandling of electoral minutes in some municipalities. In 2005, the new political forces feared that the leaders of the largest political parties would use the power they had in the courts and in the General Controller’s Office to prevent other presidential candidates from participating in the 2006 elections.

By the end of 2004, a new political agreement between Sandinistas and Liberals injected even more strain into the electoral process. Big parties changed the Constitution again, this time in order to require that cabinet nominees and other posts be approved by a majority of 60% in Congress. Such changes precipitated a political crisis that lasted ten months, when President Enrique Bolaños rejected the amendments and appealed to the OAS for help. The Organization of American States appointed Dante Caputo, former Argentine chancellor, to seek a solution to the crisis. In October, 2005, an agreement to postpone some of the controversial reforms until January, 2007, was reached.

On May 31, 2006, despite the fears of a possible ban on some candidacies, the five parties that wanted to participate in the 2006 elections succeeded in registering their own candidates. These included two dissident candidates who had previously split up from the big parties (FSLN and PLC) in order to form their own parties. The five candidates running for president in 2006 were Daniel Ortega from the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN), José Rizo from the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), Eduardo Montealegre from the recently formed Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance-Conservative Party (ALN-PC); Herty Lewites from the already existent Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), and Edén Pastora from the small party Alternative for Change (AC). In accordance with the 2000 pact, a candidate could win the presidential elections in the first round with only 40% of votes, and even with 35% if the candidate was five-percent points ahead of the candidate in second place.

Table VII-2 shows the results of the last presidential election in Nicaragua on November 5, 2006. Table VII-3 presents the result of the legislative election. According to data from the Electoral Supreme Council, the level of participation was 66.8% of registered voters.

Table VII-2. Results of the presidential elections on November 5, 2006

Partidos Políticos	Candidatos	No. de votos validos	%
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)	Daniel Ortega Saavedra	930.862	38,0%
Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN)	Eduardo Montealegre Rivas	693.391	28,3%
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)	José Rizo Castellón	664.225	27,1%
Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS)	Edmundo Jarquín Calderón	154.224	6,3%
Alternativa por El Cambio (AC)	Edén Atanacio Pastora Gómez	7.200	0,3%
Total votos válidos		2.449.902	
Total de votantes inscritos		3,665,141	

Table VII-3. Results of the legislative elections on November 5, 2006

Partido	Escaños
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)	38
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)	25
Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense-Partido Conservador (ALN-PC)	22
Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS)	5
Alternativa por El Cambio (AC)	0
Total	90

(*) Uno escaño en la Asamblea Nacional es reservado para el Presidente de la República que ejerció su mandato en el periodo anterior a la actual legislatura y otro para el candidato presidencial que obtuvo el segundo lugar en la anterior disputa presidencial.

The AmericasBarometer asked about participation in the presidential elections. Figure VII-1 indicates that more than 72% of respondents said that they voted in the November 2006 elections. This figure is similar to that offered by the Electoral Supreme Council.




Figure VII-1. Did you vote for president in the last elections of 2006?

Here we present a logistic regression analysis in which we seek to determine the significant predictors of the vote.




Figure VII-2. Predictors of the vote

Figure VII-2 indicates that significant predictors are education level, age, and interest in politics.




Figure VII-3. Turnout in 2006 presidential elections and education level

As expected, we see in Figure VII-3 that people with college education tend to vote in higher proportions. The figure also shows a decline in turnout levels for the people with middle education. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that in 2006, the FSLN mobilized its bases among the more marginalized clusters of the population, comprised by poor and low education level.




Figure VII-4. Turnout in 2006 and age

We can see in Figure VII-4 that the level of electoral participation increases as the respondent's age increases. Young people between 16 and 25 have the lowest turnout level. Citizens between 56 and 65 years-old have the highest turnout level. We see a slight drop in the turnout levels in the group of people over age 65.

Finally we can see that the interest in politics is an important factor in participation in elections.




Figure VII-5. Turnout in 2006 and interest in politics

People who are very interested in politics turn out to vote at a level of 20 points higher than people who are not interested in politics. Conversely, the difference between people who say they are “somewhat” interested in politics and those who are “not very” interested in politics is not statistically significant, even though they reach nearly 10 points below those who are very interested in politics.




Figure VII-6. Ideology Distribution in Nicaragua, 2008

Figure VII-6 indicates that in Nicaragua there is an ideological polarization with significant proportions of people at both extremes, although most of the people remain in the center of the spectrum. Here, the political polarization of the 1980s and the 1990s between the left of the FSLN, currently in office, and the right of the liberal parties, is reflected.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Our analysis indicates that the PLC is more to the ideological right than the other liberal party, the ALN.




Figure VII-7. Ideology Distribution by Year

We can see that between 2004 and 2006, there was a shift toward the left, from a 6.2 average score to 5.3. For 2008 we see a slight but statistically significant move to the right. However, it is important to note that the average scores fall always on the center or center-right of the scale. The move to the right reflected in the 2006 survey in comparison with 2004 may have been a factor in the victory of the FSLN that year.




Figure VII-8. Turnout in the presidential elections of 2006

Figure VII-8 presents the results the vote for president in the November 2006 elections. We can see that the survey results are very similar to those of the elections. The percentages for the fourth and fifth place are practically identical to those of the elections. However, we can see some differences between the first three candidates with Daniel Ortega receiving 8% more than in the election, and Eduardo Montealegre and José Rizo reflecting results below those of the elections with 2.4% and 5.4% respectively. We must point out that in the post-electoral surveys, respondents may say that they voted for the winner when they actually voted for one of the losing candidates. The margin of error of the survey must also be taken into account.

Here we analyze the ideological distribution of the supporters of the 2006 presidential candidates.




Figure VII-9. Ideological distribution of the 2006 presidential election voters

Figure VII-9 shows the ideological distribution of the 2006 presidential election voters. We can see that supporters of the FSLN score to the left of the mean of the scale, which is 4.5. The voters in the Sandinismo faction, led by Edmundo Jarquín, express a leftist ideology but to the right of the FSLN, although there does not seem to be a significant difference between the two because the confidence intervals overlap. Supporters of José Rizo, the PLC candidate, are the most right-leaning, with an average of 7.6. We can see little dispersion and hence we can conclude that few ideological differences exist among the supporters of the PLC. People who voted for Eduardo Montealegre, the runner up, have an ideological score of 6.6, leaning to the right of the scale. It is obvious that Montealegre and Rizo battled over the votes of the political right. The results for Edén Pastora are inconclusive since the very few survey respondents said that they had voted for him, and the dispersion of the results is very high.

Political Parties

Political parties play an important role in democracy. They contribute to electoral processes, to the integration of the institutions of government and representation, to political socialization, to the formation of public opinion, and to the dynamics of the party systems that provide citizenship with different options of political programs. They also yield an institutional interplay of checks and balances. However, partisanship and trust toward the political parties as tools of citizen representation is eroding quickly. The personalization of politics, the seeming verticality in the decision-making process within the parties, and the claims that the parties are oligarchies that decreasingly represent citizens, have led many Nicaraguans to reject the importance of the parties as political system tools and to question their capacity to mobilize and represent the people.

The survey includes a question that inquires about citizens' opinions of political parties as being essential to democracy.

DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

The question is measured on a 0-to-7 scale. In the following figure we see the results of the comparative analysis, converted to a 0-to-100 scale. High figures mean strong support for the idea that democracy can exist without political parties.




Figure VII-10. Democracy without political parties in comparative perspective

Solo 7 de los 21 países en el análisis expresan opiniones favorables - promedio por encima de la mitad de la escala- a la idea que la democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. Nicaragua tiene un promedio de apoyo a la proposición del 46.9. Haití es el país donde los ciudadanos apoyan más la idea de que puede haber democracia sin la participación de los partidos políticos. Argentina es el país donde los partidos políticos reciben el mayor nivel de apoyo.

Another aspect of the analysis of Nicaraguan political parties is the trust they inspire. In Chapter VI we see that political parties are the institution in Nicaragua with the lowest level of trust. When we asked Nicaraguans whether they support a political party, most of them responded that they did not. In Figure VII-11 we can see a significant decline in the support for political parties since the 2006 survey.




Figure VII-11. Support for any political party by survey year




Figure VII-12. Party preference by urban/rural area

The vast majority of respondents in urban and rural areas do not have a preference for any political party. The FSLN captures the highest level of support in both areas. In rural areas, the PLC gets 13.7% of citizens' support.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Results of figures VII-12, 13 y 14 can be seen in table format in the appendix of this chapter.




Figure VII-13. Party preference by education level

The FSLN receives the highest level of support with 21.5% among respondents with college education. The PLC gets most of its support from people who have only elementary education.




Figure VII-14. Party preference by age

Figure VII-14 indicates that people between the ages of 16 and 25 are the least interested in political parties. The levels of support increase as the age of the respondent rises. People between 36 and 45 years old express the highest level of support for the FSLN; 24.5% of those in this age group support this party. The highest level of support for the PLC is found among people aged 66 or older. The ALN receives its greatest support among people between ages 56 and 65 with 13% of the respondents in that age group.

In the 2008 survey we included questions which analyze citizens' attitudes toward two aspects of the political parties' institutionality: representation and the perception of the corruption level.

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Nicaragua y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos nicaragüenses representan bien a sus votantes?
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos nicaragüenses?
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?




Figure VII-15. Opinions on representation and level of corruption of the political parties in Nicaragua

Figure VII-15 shows that Nicaraguans express little confidence that political parties pay attention to citizens' demands or represent them adequately. However, a large majority of Nicaraguans believe that there is a lot of corruption in the political parties.




Figure VII-16. Parties represent properly their voters in comparative perspective

Uruguay and Dominican Republic express the highest support to the claim that the political parties properly represent their voters. Brazil and Paraguay express the lowest levels. Nicaragua is in fifteenth place among the twenty-one countries included in this analysis.




Figure VII-17. Corruption in political parties in comparative perspective

With the exception of Haiti, respondents of the 2008 AmericasBarometer perceive high levels of corruption in political parties. Nicaragua is third among the countries with the highest levels of perception of corruption in political parties.




Figure VII-18. Parties pay attention to people like oneself in comparative perspective

Figure VII-18 indicates that in none of the populations studied does the perception that political parties pay attention to the citizens reach the midpoint of the scale. The country with the highest score was the Dominican Republic with a score of 39.9 on the 0-to-100 scale. Nicaragua is third from last with a score of only 25 points. Only Paraguay and Brazil had lower scores than Nicaragua in this regard.

Participation of women in politics

Despite the historic domination of men in politics and in Latin American society, in recent decades there has been a significant rise in female participation in all aspects of national life. At present, there are two countries, Chile and Argentina, governed by women and in recent years, Panama, Guyana, and Nicaragua have had females at the head of their countries. The 2008 AmericasBarometer asked several questions seeking Nicaraguans' opinions regarding the participation of women in politics.

VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR

W8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer?

- (1) Un hombre
- (2) Una mujer
- (3) LE DA IGUAL (**NO LEER**)
- (8) NS/NR

W10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo:

- (1) No es conveniente que las mujeres participen en política
- (2) Las mujeres sólo deben participar en política cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permiten
- (3) Las mujeres deben participar en política igual que los hombres
- (8) NS/NR




Figure VII-19. Men are better leaders than women

Figure VII-19 indicates that a vast majority, 74.7%, of Nicaraguans express disagreement with the statement that “men are better political leaders than women;” 25.3% express agreement.




Figure VII-20. Men are better political leaders than women by gender

As expected, men agree with the claim that they are better leaders than women. In Figure VII-20 we see that 31.4% of men agree or highly agree, and 19.3% of women believe the same.




Figure VII-21. When voting, who inspires your trust, men or women?

To 44.3% of Nicaraguans, the gender of the candidate is irrelevant when voting; interestingly, 31.6% have higher trust female candidates and 24.1% in male candidates. If we add up the people who have higher confidence in a woman to those to whom gender is not important, a total of 75.9% of citizens can easily support a woman for political posts.

Although we see in Figure VII-22 that nearly 60% of men have higher trust in their own gender, an important minority of men, 39.6%, say they have more trust when voting for a woman. Sixty percent of women trust in candidates of their own gender, but 40% trust more in men. More men than women express the idea that ‘it does not matter to them’ whether a candidate is male or female.




Figure VII-22. When voting, who inspires you trust, men or women? by gender

Finally, Figure VII-23 indicates that 90% of Nicaraguans believe that women should participate in politics at the same levels as men.




Figure VII-23. About political participation of women

Conclusions

Elections and political parties are key institutions in a liberal democracy. Electoral participation in Nicaragua is high; 71% of Nicaraguans said that they voted in the 2006 presidential elections. However, political parties of the least amount of public trust among state institutions. In Nicaragua, most of the people do not support any political party. Few Nicaraguans think that political parties represent the people appropriately or pay attention to the people. Many think that there is a lot of corruption in political parties. The ideological distribution of the 2006 candidate supporters fits the expectations of every candidate and political party. FSLN supporters are at the left and liberal supporters to the right. Most Nicaraguans express disagreement with the notion that men are better political leaders than women, and majority believe that there is no difference between genders when considering for whom to vote. Finally, most Nicaraguans believe that women and men should participate equally in politics.

Appendix

Appendix VII-1. Did you vote in the last election?

	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	0.449*	(4.44)
Mujer	0.019	(0.34)
Edad	0.804*	(7.11)
Riqueza	-0.029	(-0.33)
Tamaño del lugar	0.020	(0.26)
Interés en la política	0.325*	(4.08)
Constante	1.082*	(12.02)
F	17.22	
N. de casos	1497	
* p<0.05		

**Appendix VII-2. Political party of preference by urban/rural area
(in percentages)**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted?								
Zona de residencia	Otro	NS/NR, No simpatiza	PLC	FSLN	ALN	Partido Conservador	MRS	Total
Urbano	0.5	64.6	6.7	18.0	8.1	0.5	1.8	100.0
Rural	0.4	58.5	13.7	20.3	6.3	0.0	0.7	100.00
Total	0.5	61.9	9.8	19.0	7.27	0.3	1.3	100.0

**Appendix VII-3. Political party of preference by education level
(in percentages)**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted?								
Nivel educativo	Otro	NS/NR, No simpatiza	PLC	FSLN	ALN	Partido Conservador	MRS	Total
Ninguno	0.0	57.1	20.3	18.8	3.8	0.0	0.0	100.0
Primaria	1.0	59.8	11.8	19.3	8.0	0.0	0.4	100.0
Secundaria	0.2	65.9	7.0	17.1	7.6	0.3	2.0	100.0
Superior	1.1	59.3	7.8	21.5	7.4	0.7	2.2	100.0
Total	0.5	61.9	9.9	18.7	7.4	0.3	1.3	100.0

**Appendix VII-4. Political party of preference by age
(in percentages)**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted?								
Edad	Otro	NS/NR, No simpatiza	PLC	FSLN	ALN	Partido Conservador	MRS	Total
16-25	0.3	70.6	5.7	15.7	5.9	0.3	1.4	100.0
26-35	0.7	62.0	11.5	17.1	7.0	0.3	1.4	100.0
36-45	1.1	54.7	10.1	24.5	8.3	0.4	1.1	100.0
46-55	0.0	57.8	12.2	21.7	7.2	0.0	1.1	100.0
56-65	0.0	43.0	19.0	23.0	13.0	0.0	2.0	100.0
66+	0.0	46.9	20.3	23.4	9.4	0.0	0.0	100.0
Total	0.5	61.8	9.8	19.1	7.3	0.3	1.3	100.0

Anexo I: Descripción técnica de la muestra

METODOLOGIA MUESTRA LAPOP NICARAGUA 2008

I. Antecedentes

En base a las especificaciones técnicas señaladas en los términos de referencia se ha elaborado un diseño a partir del cual se obtiene una muestra autoponderada, y en la que la etapa final de selección se realiza a través de cuotas de sexo y edad. El tipo de muestreo es estratificado, por conglomerados y multietápico.

II. Universo

El universo o población objetivo corresponde a la población nicaragüense adulta de 16 años y más que habita en las zonas urbanas y rurales del país.

La composición de esta población objetivo por región, zona geográfica y sexo se incluye en la Tabla 1.

Tabla 1: Población de 16 años y más

POBLACIÓN 16 años y más	TOTAL URBANO	TOTAL RURAL	TOTAL
PACÍFICO	590616.5	421058.5	1011675
METROPOLITANA	719039.4	45335.61	764375
NORTE CENTRO	374356.3	569537.7	943894
CARIBE	119885.3	248083.7	367969
TOTAL	1803898	1284015	3087913
Fuente: Censo Nicaragua 2005			

III. Diseño muestral

El diseño que se presenta se sustenta en los siguientes criterios metodológicos:

Que el tamaño de la muestra final sea igual o superior a 1500 casos.
A nivel de manzanas (área urbana) y entidades (área rural).

Etapas del diseño y procedimiento de selección

A. Primera etapa

En la primera etapa de muestreo se realizó una estratificación de tipo geográfica, que divide al país en 5 estratos. A partir de esta estratificación se agrupan los 153 municipios del país. La estratificación toma en cuenta la cantidad de población de los municipios y su ubicación geográfica. En la Tabla A1, se observan los criterios de estratificación de la primera etapa de muestreo.

Tabla A1. Número de municipios según estrato				
Estratos/Dominio	Menos 25000 habitantes	Entre 25000 y 100000 habitantes	Más de 100000 habitantes	TOTAL
PACÍFICO	35	19	4	58
METROPOLITANA	1	2	2	5
NORTE CENTRO	39	23	2	64
CARIBE	16	10		26
TOTAL	91	54	8	153
Fuente: Censo Nicaragua 2005				

En el diseño propuesto, los municipios correspondientes a la unidad de muestreo primaria (UMP), se clasificaron como autorrepresentados y correpresentados:

i. Comunas Autorrepresentadas

Corresponden a aquellos municipios que deben estar presentes en la muestra, en atención a su importancia poblacional en cada estrato. Se trata de los municipios distribuidos en las zonas metropolitanas, Pacífico, Norte centro del país que poseen más de 100 mil habitantes, y que en total corresponden a 8 municipios. La probabilidad de selección de estos municipios es igual a 1.

ii. Comunas Correpresentadas

Corresponden a aquellos municipios con menos de 100 mil habitantes que no fueron incluidas automáticamente en la muestra, y que poseen una probabilidad de selección proporcional a su tamaño.

El número de unidades primarias *correpresentadas* se obtuvo de manera proporcional al porcentaje de población representada en cada estrato. Se seleccionan un total de 39 municipios de las cuales 8 son *autorrepresentados* y 31 *correpresentados*, tal como se especifica en la Tabla A2.

Tabla A2

Población	< 25 mil habitantes	> 25 < 100 mil habitantes	> 100 mil habitantes	Total
PACIFICO	235575	429884	346216	1011675
METROPOLITANA	8526	64713	691136	764375
NORTE CENTRO	272974	518086	152834	943894
CARIBE	113972	253997		367969
TOTAL	631047	1266680	1190186	3087913
%	< 25 mil habitantes	> 25 < 100 mil habitantes	> 100 mil habitantes	Total
PACIFICO	37%	34%	29%	33%
METROPOLITANA	1%	5%	58%	25%
NORTE CENTRO	43%	41%	13%	31%
CARIBE	18%	20%	0%	12%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
Número de entrevistas	< 25 mil habitantes	> 25 < 100 mil habitantes	> 100 mil habitantes	Total
PACIFICO	120	210	180	510
METROPOLITANA	30	30	330	390
NORTE CENTRO	120	240	90	450
CARIBE	60	120	0	180
TOTAL	330	600	600	1530
Municipios a seleccionar	< 25 mil habitantes	> 25 < 100 mil habitantes	> 100 mil habitantes	Total
PACIFICO	4	7	4	15
METROPOLITANA	1	1	2	4
NORTE CENTRO	4	8	2	14
CARIBE	2	4	0	6
TOTAL	11	20	8	39

A partir del marco muestral, se seleccionaron con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño (PPT) una muestra de 8 municipios autorrepresentados (más de 100 mil habitantes), 20 municipios entre 25 y 100 mil habitantes, y 11 municipios con menos de 25 mil habitantes.

B. Determinación de las unidades primarias de muestreo o upm

- Municipios correpresentados

En el caso de los municipios correpresentados, cada municipio fue considerado como una UPM y se entrevistó a 30 personas en cada municipio.

- Municipios autorrepresentados

La muestra consiste de 8 municipios autorrepresentados. Se seleccionó un número específico de localidades dentro de estos municipios autorrepresentados tal y como aparece en la tabla B1. Por

ejemplo, para el caso del municipio de Managua, se seleccionaron 12 localidades y se realizaron 30 entrevistas en cada localidad.

Tabla B1

Estrato	Dominio	Municipios	TOTAL mayor 16 años	%	Número de entrevistas	Número de localidades que se deben seleccionar
Pacífico	Más de 100 mil habitantes	Granada	66907	19.3%	90	3
		Chinandega	75972	21.9%	120	4
		Masaya	88575	25.6%	120	4
		León	114762	33.1%	180	6
		Total	346216	100.0%	510	17
Metropolitana	Más de 100 mil habitantes	Tipitapa	63763	9.2%	30	1
		Managua	627373	90.8%	360	12
		Total	691136	100.0%	390	13
Norte Centro	Más de 100 mil habitantes	Estelí	71388	46.7%	210	7
		Matagalpa	81446	53.3%	240	8
		Total	152834	100.0%	450	15

C. Selección de los segmentos censales

Una vez seleccionados los municipios según estrato de tamaño y agrupación geográfica, se definió el número de segmentos a seleccionar dentro de cada municipio.

1. Se agruparon los segmentos censales por su ubicación geográfica: urbano y rural.
2. La distribución de los segmentos en cada municipio se realizó de manera proporcional a la cantidad de población que representa al interior de cada estrato y la distribución urbano/rural.
3. Se siguió la regla de LAPOP de realizar 5 a 8 entrevistas en los segmentos urbanos y 10-12 entrevistas en los segmentos rurales.

Anexo II: Documento de consentimiento informado



Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de la empresa Borge y Asociados, S.A. para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a Borge y Asociados, S.A. al teléfono 2687341-2687352 y preguntar por Mara Miranda, persona responsable de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?

Anexo III: Cuestionario

Nicaragua Versión # 18f IRB Approval: #071086

 <p>USAID DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	 <p>B&A Borge y Asociados</p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p>LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Nicaragua, 2008
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<p>País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá</p>	PAIS	5 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____</p>	IDNUM	
<p>ESTRATOPRI: (501) Norte centro (502) Pacífico (503) Costa Atlántica</p>	ESTRATOPRI	5 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>UPM.(Unidad primaria de Muestreo) _____</p>	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Departamento) : _____</p>	PROV	5 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Municipio: _____</p>	MUNICIPIO	5 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>DISTRITO, BARRIO, O COMARCA: _____</p>	NICDISTRITO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>SEGMENTO CENSAL _____</p>	NICSEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Sector _____</p>	NICSEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo) (Punto muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]</p>	CLUSTER	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]</p>	UR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural</p>	TAMANO	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español</p>	IDIOMAQ	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Hora de inicio: ____: ____ [no digitar]</p>		-----
<p>Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2008</p>	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR</p>		
<p>Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte):</p>	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer Q1

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios			02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos			59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno			15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente			10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración			16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico			12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas			14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza			04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)			06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio			22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro			31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)			27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo			33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de			07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el			60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia			57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda			55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro			70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR			88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días,” “una o dos veces por semana,” “rara vez,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	
SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?					SOCT1		
(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR							

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	SOCT2	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2	
Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.		
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No
	o	NS/NR
CP2. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Nacional?	1	2
		8
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (Coordinador regional, concejal regional, alcalde o concejal)?	1	2
		8
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2
		8
Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...		
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP1	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP2	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	SGL1	
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional (2) Algo más al gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y a la alcaldía (4) Algo más a la alcaldía (5) Mucho más a la alcaldía (8) NS/NR	LGL2A	
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Algo más el gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y la alcaldía	LGL2B	

(4) Algo más la alcaldía (5) Mucho más la alcaldía (88) NS/NR		
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR	MUNI5	
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la alcaldía? [Leer alternativas] 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6	
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en la alcaldía durante los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí [siga] (0) No [pase a MUNI11] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11]	MUNI8	
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (Regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (Pésimo) (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	MUNI9	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	MUNI10	
MUNI11. [A Todos] ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la alcaldía? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	MUNI11	
MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? [Leer alternativas] (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR	MUNI15	
NICMUNI16. ¿Ha escuchado hablar de los CPC o Consejos del Poder Ciudadano? (1) Si [Siga] (2) No [Pase a CP5] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP5]	NICMUNI16	
NICMUNI16A. Pensando en los CPC o Consejos del Poder Ciudadano, ¿Cuál cree usted que es el rol principal de estos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Estimular la participación de los ciudadanos (2) Son un método para estimular la rendición de cuentas (3) Promover el control partidista (4) Facilitar la descentralización de poderes (5) Son un mecanismo para vigilar a los ciudadanos (5) Otro [No leer] (88) NS/NR	NICMUNI16A	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.	1	2	3	4	8	CP5
Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13

NICCP14. ¿Reuniones de un CPC o Consejo del Poder Ciudadano? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	NICCP14	
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	CP20

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: [Leer alternativas] (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	IT1A
IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR	IT1B

[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿Dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda										Derecha (NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]

PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap	PROT2
Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:						
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		JC1
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		JC4
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		JC10
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		JC12
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder		(8) NS/NR		JC13

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Nacional, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC16

<p>VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a VIC20] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>	
<p>VIC10. [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes usaron violencia en contra de usted? (1) Sí (2) No (9) Inap</p>	<p>VIC10</p>	
<p>AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]</p>	<p>AOJ1</p>	
<p>AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>AOJ1B</p>	

<p>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No,” anotar “0” cero]</p>	<p>¿Cuántas veces? NO = 0, NS/NR=88</p>	
<p>VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿Alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC20</p>
<p>VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC21</p>
<p>VIC22. ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o actos de vandalismo en contra de su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC22</p>
<p>VIC23. ¿Tiene usted vehículo o motocicleta? No → Marcar 99 [PASAR A VIC24] Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha sido víctima de un robo total de vehículo o motocicleta en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?</p>		<p>VIC23</p>
<p>VIC23A. [Solo si tiene vehículo o motocicleta] ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o de un robo de una parte o partes de vehículo o motocicleta? ¿Cuántas veces? 99. Inap</p>		<p>VIC23A</p>

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]. VIC24. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de alguna estafa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC24
VIC25. ¿Alguien le amenazó de muerte, por cualquier motivo, en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC25
VIC26 ¿Fue usted golpeado por alguien en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC26
VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC27
VIC28. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma de fuego</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC28
VIC29. ¿Fue usted herido con un <i>arma blanca</i> en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC29
VIC30. ¿Ha sido víctima de algún delito de tipo sexual en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC30
VIC31. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha sido usted víctima de un chantaje o extorsión? ¿Cuántas veces?				VIC31

VIC32. ¿Fue usted o algún pariente que vive en su hogar víctima de un secuestro en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas y cuántas veces? [Considere total de veces y total de personas para escribir el total]				VIC32
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VIC33. ¿Algún pariente o persona que vivía en la casa con usted fue asesinada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas?				VIC33
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AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR				AOJ8
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR				AOJ11

<i>Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	8	VIC40
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	8	VIC41

VIC42. ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia? [Si no tiene negocio marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9	VIC42
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1)	(0)	8		VIC43
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	8		VIC44
VIC45. ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si está desempleado marque 9]	(1)	(0)	8	9	VIC45

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					AOJ11A
VIC11. ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer] [Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?] (0) No denunciaría (1) Alcaldía (2) Policía (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc) (4) Iglesia (5) Medio de comunicación (6) Otros (8) NS/NR					VIC11
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					AOJ12
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					AOJ12a
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR					AOJ16A
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					AOJ17

<p>AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ18</p>
<p>VIC50. Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son en general altos, medios o bajos? (1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC50</p>
<p>VIC51. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha tomado usted en su vivienda alguna medida de seguridad para protegerse de la delincuencia? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a VIC53] (8) NS/NR [Pase a VIC53]</p>	<p>VIC51</p>

¿Qué medida de seguridad ha tomado usted en su vivienda para protegerse de la delincuencia? **[OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera respuesta preguntar, “Algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta dos respuestas.**

	1ª Respuesta VIC52A	2ª Respuesta VIC52B
Ha construido muros, rejas o paredes exteriores adicionales en su casa	1	1
Ha puesto alambre de púas, “razor,” malla electrificada o vidrio roto alrededor de su casa	2	2
Ha instalado alarmas en su casa	3	3
Le ha puesto más candados o chapas a las puertas de su casa	4	4
Ha adquirido o ha comprado un arma	5	5
Ha contratado un servicio de seguridad privada o a un vigilante privado	6	6
Otras medidas	7	7
NS/NR	8	8
INAP	9	9

<p>VIC53. ¿Hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un seguro que le compense o le reembolse las pérdidas o los daños causados por delitos contra usted o algún miembro de su hogar? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar? [Coloque la cantidad] _____ [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC53</p>
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<p>VIC54. Si existiera un mecanismo efectivo, hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un servicio que le garantizara que usted NO será víctima de ningún acto violento o robo? Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar? [Coloque la cantidad] _____ [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa (8888) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC54</p>
<p>VIC55. De las siguientes opciones, ¿cuál considera usted que es la principal causa de la inseguridad en su lugar de residencia? [Leer opciones]: (1) Falta de policía (2) Falta de justicia (3) Pobreza (4) Falta de programas para los jóvenes (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC55</p>
<p>VIC56. ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VIC56</p>

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

<p>B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</p>	<p>B1</p>
<p>B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua?</p>	<p>B2</p>
<p>B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense?</p>	<p>B3</p>

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político nicaragüense?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Consejo Supremo Electoral?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército de Nicaragua?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?		B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?		B21A
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?		B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser nicaragüense?		B43
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48
NICB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los CPC o Consejos del Poder Ciudadano?		NICB49

Usando la misma escala...	NADA 1 2 3	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
4 5 6 7 MUCHO		
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		N3
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?		N9
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.		N10
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		N12

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Nicaragua y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos nicaragüenses representan bien a sus votantes?	EPP1
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos nicaragüenses?	EPP2
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	EPP3
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en la Asamblea Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto la Asamblea Nacional estorba la labor del presidente?	EC1
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados de la Asamblea Nacional discutiendo y debatiendo?	EC2
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba la Asamblea Nacional?	EC3
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto la Asamblea Nacional cumple con lo que usted espera de ella?	EC4
NICEC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Presidente. ¿Hasta qué punto el Presidente estorba la labor de la Asamblea Nacional?	NICEC1

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Daniel Ortega es...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
M2. Hablando de la Asamblea Nacional y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Nacional de Nicaragua están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (8) NSNR	M2

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	
							NS/NR
							Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.</p> <p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP101
<p>POP102. Cuando la Asamblea Nacional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP102
<p>POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP103
<p>NICPOP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo de la Asamblea Nacional, debe ser ignorada por nuestros diputados. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	NICPOP103
<p>POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP106
<p>POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP107
<p>POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR</p>	POP109

POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP110	
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP112	
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP113	

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	EFF1	
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	EFF2	

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los nicaragüenses tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre el rol del Estado. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7.

NS/NR = 8

ROS1. El Estado nicaragüense, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS1	
ROS2. El Estado nicaragüense, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS2	
ROS3. El Estado nicaragüense, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS3	
ROS4. El Estado nicaragüense debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS4	

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

<p>PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR</p>	PN4
<p>PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR</p>	PN5

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

	1-10, 88
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E16

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Nicaragua. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		DEM2
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR		DEM11
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR		AUT1

<p>AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT2</p>
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP1</p>
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2006? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>

<p>Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.</p>	
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 90 córdobas de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora: [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada (2) Es corrupto pero se justifica (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DC10</p>
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político: [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DC13</p>

	<p>INAP No trató o tuvo contacto</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Sí</p>	<p>NS/NR</p>	
<p>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</p>					

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	9	0	1	8	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	8	EXC18

<p>EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está:</p> <p>[LEER]</p> <p>(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada</p> <p>(3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8)</p> <p>NS/NR</p>		EXC7	
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<p>Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...</p> <p>G11. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos?</p> <p>[NO LEER: George Bush]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No</p> <p>Responde</p>		G11	
<p>G12. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional de Nicaragua?</p> <p>[NO LEER: René Núñez Téllez]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No</p> <p>Responde</p>		G12	
<p>G13. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Nicaragua?</p> <p>[NO LEER: 15 ó 17 ACEPTAR CON Y SIN COMARCAS]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No</p> <p>Responde</p>		G13	
<p>G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Nicaragua?</p> <p>[NO LEER: 5 años]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No</p> <p>Responde</p>		G14	
<p>G15. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil?</p> <p>[NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"]</p> <p>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No</p> <p>Responde</p>		G15	

<p>VB1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR</p>		VB1	
<p>VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales del 2006?</p> <p>(1) Sí votó [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No votó [Pasar a VB50]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB50]</p>		VB2	

<p>VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales del 2006? [NO LEER LISTA] (0) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) (501) Eduardo Montealegre (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense) (502) José Daniel Ortega Saavedra (FSLN) (503) José Rizo Castellón (Partido Liberal Constitucional) (504) Edmundo Jarquín Calderón (Movimiento Renovador Sandinista) (505) Edén Atanasio Pastora Gómez (Alternativa para el Cambio) (77) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (No votó)</p>	<p>VB3</p>	
<p>VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR</p>	<p>VB50</p>	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>	
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]. (501) Partido Liberal Constitucional (502.) Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (503) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (504) Partido Conservador (505) Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (77) Otro (88) NS/NR [Pase A POL1] (99) INAP [Pase A POL1]</p>	<p>VB11</p>	
<p>VB12 ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>VB12</p>	

<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POL1</p>	
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] (1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>POL2</p>	
<p>VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [No leer] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno. (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VB20</p>	
<p>VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VB21</p>	
<p>W8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) LE DA IGUAL (NO LEER) (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>W8</p>	
<p>W10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: (1) No es conveniente que las mujeres participen en política (2) Las mujeres sólo deben participar en política cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permiten (3) Las mujeres deben participar en política igual que los hombres (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>W10</p>	
<p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA D] LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. ...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)</p>		

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible					NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con...
[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	SD1
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	SD2
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	SD3
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8	SD4
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8	SD5
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	SD6
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	SD7
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	SD8
SD9. El congestionamiento del tráfico	1	2	8	SD9
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	SD10
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	SD11
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	SD12

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive? (1) Satisfecho (2) Insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS4
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Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS/NR/	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR) **Q2**

<p>Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Católica</p> <p>(2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).</p> <p>(3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)</p> <p>(5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).</p> <p>(6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día</p> <p>(7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).</p> <p>(4) Ninguna</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	Q3
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Más de una vez por semana</p> <p>(2) Una vez por semana</p> <p>(3) Una vez al mes</p> <p>(4) Una o dos veces al año</p> <p>(5) Nunca o casi nunca</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	Q5A

<p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]</p> <p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>[Si no entiende, pregunte: Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) C\$ 1,500 córdobas o menos (02) Entre C\$1,501- C\$3,000 (03) C\$3,001-C\$4,250 (04) C\$4,251- C \$5,500 (05) C\$5,501- C \$8,500 (06) C\$8,501- C \$12,750 (07) C\$12,751- C \$17,000 (08) C\$17,001- C 21,250 (09) C\$21,251- C \$25,500 (10) C\$25,501y más (88) NS/NR</p> <p>[RECOGER TARJETA E]</p>	<p>Q10</p>
<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No [Pase a Q10c] (8) NS [Pase a Q10c]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>
<p>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer]</p> <p>(1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos (6) Ahorro/inversión (7) Otro (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10a1</p>
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p>Q10B</p>
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí” preguntar ¿dónde?]</p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No [Pase a Q14] (8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	<p>Q10C</p>

<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>Q16</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) [No leer] NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10D</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q11</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88).</p>	<p>Q12</p>	<p>____ ____</p>
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	<p>Q12A</p>	<p>____ ____</p>
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro- nicaragüense, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro- nicaragüense (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR</p>		
<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR [No leer]</p>	<p>WWW1</p>	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R6	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	R7	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	R15	
OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]					OCUP4A	
(1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a TERMINA] (4) Es estudiante? [TERMINA] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [TERMINA] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [TERMINA] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR						
OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]					OCUP1	
(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestros de primaria y secundaria, artistas, deportistas, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados						

<p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Asalariado del gobierno? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>
<p>OCUP12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal? _____ [Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP 12A</p>
<p>OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas? (1) Menos (2) Igual (3) Más (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP12</p>
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud (seguro social) a través de su empresa o su empleador? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1C</p>
<p>Ahora nos gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situación laboral en diciembre del 2006</p>	
<p>OCUP27. –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí [TERMINA] (2) No [Siga] (8) NS/NR [Siga] (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP27</p>
<p>OCUP28. En esa fecha estaba usted:[Leer alternativas] (1) Desempleado? [Siga] (2) Trabajando? [TERMINA] (3) Estudiando? [TERMINA] (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? [TERMINA] (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [TERMINA] (8) NS/NR [TERMINA] (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP28</p>

<p>OCUP29. ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pase a OCUP31]</p> <p>(2) Fin de empleo temporal [Pase a OCUP31]</p> <p>(3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [Pase a OCUP31]</p> <p>(4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Siga]</p> <p>(5) Despido o cese [Siga]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [Pase a OCUP31]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP29</p>
<p>OCUP30. ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba?</p> <p>(1) Sí [TERMINA]</p> <p>(2) No [TERMINA]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [TERMINA]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP30</p>
<p>OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No [TERMINA]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [TERMINA]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP31</p>
<p>OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha, cuanto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo?</p> <p>(1) Menos de un mes</p> <p>(2) Entre un mes y tres meses</p> <p>(3) Entre tres meses y seis meses</p> <p>(4) Más de seis meses</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP31A</p>

<p>Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____</p> <p>TI. Duración de la entrevista [<i>minutos, ver página # 1</i>]</p>	<p>TI <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
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Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta #1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


Tarjeta A



Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D

**Mejor vida
posible**



**Peor vida
posible**

Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) C\$ 1,500 córdobas o menos
- (02) Entre C\$1,501- C\$3,000
- (03) C\$3,001-C\$4,250
- (04) C\$4,251- C \$5,500
- (05) C\$5,501- C \$8,500
- (06) C\$8,501- C \$12,750
- (07) C\$12,751- C \$17,000
- (08) C\$17,001- C 21,250
- (09) C\$21,251- C \$25,500
- (10) C\$25,501y más
- (88) NS/NR

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