
Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2010


Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin American and Caribbean regions.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and so involve them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct handwritten house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local research teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to the support from all these institutions, the fieldwork in all the countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also this year, country reports are comprised of three sections. The first provides a general assessment of the economic crisis. The second section focuses on key aspects of democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister at *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere, and to the many regional scholars and national institutions that have been involved in this important initiative.

Regards,

Vanessa Reilly
Grants Administrator of USAID for the AmericasBarometer Project

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate

¹ With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N=3,000), Chile (N = 1,965), Ecuador (N=3,000), and Brazil (N = 2,500).

analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project's lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.












³ All **AmericasBarometer** samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires.








In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru	<p><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Caribbean	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	<p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p> 

Acknowledgements

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Office Administrator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director at LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor Spanish and Portuguese Department ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator at LAPOP ●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), México
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University and Consultant at “Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública” at Universidad Centroamericana in El Salvador ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova Macías, Executive Director, FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Assistant Director of “Estado de la Nación” Project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Clevel y Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
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Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Venezuela	●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and Professor Political Science, University of Illinois, USA
North America Group	
United States	●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (Project Director) ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director at LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University
Canada	●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July 2010

Executive Summary

This report is the result of research on the political culture of Salvadoran people based on a public opinion poll that was applied in February 2010. It was carried out by the Central American University's Public Opinion Institute (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, UCA) in conjunction with the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Unto Foundation. This survey was conducted under the aegis of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), with substantial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report is part of a series of studies about El Salvador, including surveys done in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008 and this 2010 survey. The research was based on a sample comprised of 1,550 Salvadoran adults, representing the population over the age of 18 residing in El Salvador. It was performed with 95% confidence level and a sample error of more/less 2.8%. The survey is part of a broader study on the political culture in the countries of the American continent: the AmericasBarometer, which is coordinated by LAPOP, and is directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson.

The title of the study is “Political Culture and Democracy in El Salvador, 2010: *Consolidating Democracy in the Americas during Hard Times*,” and it has been organized in three parts, comprised of eight chapters. The first part (*Hard Times and their Effect on Democracy*) encompasses three chapters that deal with the effects of the economic crisis and the impact on various indicators of support for democracy. The second part (*Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society*) presents the results of the study on the issues that are specific to the case of El Salvador. The third part features a chapter presenting the results on the ways in which Salvadorans solve conflicts, and an assessment of the project on Mediation Centers promoted by the Attorney General's Office. The following is a summary of the most important findings in this study.

The first chapter explores the impact of the worldwide economic crisis on Latin America in general, and its effects on El Salvador in particular. Data from diverse financial organizations and international cooperation agencies demonstrates that, despite the fact that most Latin American countries appear to be handling the crisis positively, and that some of them are regaining important levels of economic growth, in the case of El Salvador, the crisis has had a negative impact, namely a downturn in the economic growth rate and a decline in the remittance money from Salvadorans abroad.

Nevertheless, on the issue of democratic development, Chapter One shows that the presidential elections had an important role in reviving citizen expectations of the political system in an international context where the index of democracy in many countries has been backsliding.

Furthermore, Chapter Two presents the opinions Salvadoran citizens expressed regarding the economic situation around the country. Findings indicate that a large part of the population is aware of the gravity of the economic crisis, and attributes it to different players and factors. Some of these are the previous administration, the country's economic system, and the richest countries. When looking into the concrete impact the crisis has had, the survey reveals that over one third (35.4%) of households included in the 2010 sample have family-members who have lost their jobs. Similarly, although half of the households have maintained their levels of income, some 40.6% of the households have seen their incomes decline. The majority of losses are reported in rural and poor households in El Salvador.

For its part, the third chapter shows a slight yet statistically significant reduction in support for democracy on the part of Salvadoran people. According to the data, support for democracy would have declined from 68 (on a scale of 0 to 100) in 2008, to 64 in 2010. The perception of the economic situation and the perception of government performance in economic issues constitute some of the most important factors in explaining attitudes of support for democracy. However, in terms of satisfaction with the performance of democracy, the findings indicate that Salvadoran citizens currently experience greater satisfaction with the way democracy is performing, climbing from 44.5% in 2008 to 54.7% in 2010 (on a scale from 0 to 100).

The fourth chapter explores the impact of violence and corruption on the rule of law in El Salvador. It shows that 49.7% of Salvadorans feel unsafe as a result of the criminal violence that is afflicting the country. This constitutes one of the highest percentages in the levels of insecurity registered by the AmericasBarometer surveys in recent years, and puts El Salvador on the list of countries with the highest levels of perception of insecurity in the region, third only to Argentina and Peru.

The percentage of the population that said they had been direct victims of crime over the course of the last year was 24.2%; whereas, almost 40% of households had members that had been adversely affected by crime during the same time period. These findings put El Salvador in the group of countries with high levels of victimization stemming from criminal violence, and at the same time assign the country the highest percentage of victimization in Central America, right beside Guatemala. The violence particularly affects the youngest Salvadorans, those with greatest social-economic resources, those who live in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, and those living in neighborhoods where gangs are present.

Actually, the gangs turned out to be one of the most important predictors of prevalence of victimization and violence. Accordingly, they have significant impact on citizen perceptions of insecurity. About 35% of Salvadorans reported that the barrio or neighborhood where they reside is very or somewhat affected by gangs. This percentage has experienced an upward swing when compared with previous years. For instance, in 2006, 13.6% of Salvadorans reported gang presence in their community; in 2008, this percentage had risen to 29.7%.

When asked about corruption and the lack of transparency, two thirds of Salvadorans (66.7%) were of the opinion that there is a lot or some corruption among public officials. Despite the fact that this opinion is widespread, El Salvador is not counted among countries with high levels of perceptions of corruption. On the contrary, compared with the majority of American countries, the perception of corruption in El Salvador only surpasses that of Uruguay, Canada, and Suriname.

Along the same lines, corruption victimization—measured by victimization through bribery—reached 11.4% of Salvadoran citizens over the last twelve months prior to the survey. This is the lowest level of corruption reported in the AmericasBarometer over the last six years in El Salvador. Many of the bribes were requested by the police (6%), employees in the court system (4.3%), and city hall officials (4.1%). The most frequent victims of bribery were young people, men, those in better social-economic conditions, those that live in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area and those who perceived that the police are involved in crime and do not protect citizens.

Both corruption and insecurity affect the level of support for the system in El Salvador. Citizens who perceive greater levels of corruption, that have been a victim of public officials more frequently, and that feel insecure, are less willing to support the Salvadoran political system. These effects appear even in contexts where the economic situation has a substantial impact on support for the system. These issues that are linked to the rule of law also appear in results that reveal that a little over 50% of the population would justify a coup in conditions of great corruption and a high level of criminal violence. This does not mean that Salvadorans are prepared to support a coup; rather, data reflects the opinions of citizens on the conditions that generate a greater level of discontent toward the political system.

A cause for concern is the finding that reveals a little over half of Salvadorans would approve if officers of the law disregarded the law in order to fight crime. This opinion, which serves as an indicator for rejection of the rule of law, has reached its peak level in 2010 compared with prior years. Put another way, in 2004, two-thirds of the population supported respect for the rule of law. This segment shrank down to 55% in 2008, and further down to 47% in 2010. In fact, Salvadoran support for the rule of law is the lowest in the Americas in 2010, at the same level as Peru and Ecuador. A cause for greater concern is the finding that shows that support for respect of the rule of law is particularly low among the youngest segment of the population.

The fifth chapter examines the issue of political legitimacy. The scale of support for the system is intended to measure the degree to which citizens support their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent government. In the literature of political science, this is referred to as “diffuse support” or “system support.” This

scale has been constructed on the basis of the average resulting from each of the five questions used, and in order to make these results more understandable, they were converted to a 0-100 scale. The average obtained for each of the questions has been the following: the courts (45.0) and basic rights (48.3) exhibit the lowest levels; sense of pride in living in the political system (58.8) represents an intermediate level; and the highest levels correspond to support (70.2) and respect for institutions (71.3). The scale for system support has an average of 58.7.

Given that we have access to the data from surveys applied in 2004, 2006 and 2008, it is possible to see the evolution of the levels of support for the system during the period from 2004-2010. Support for the system was steadily declining during the 2004-2008 period; it dropped from an average 59.5 in 2004, to 55.4 in 2006, and 51.8 in 2008; whereas, 2010 exhibits an important increase at 58.7, which is statistically significant.

The scale for political tolerance is based on four questions that have to do with four basic liberties: the right to vote, the right to carry out peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of expression. This scale has been constructed based on an average obtained from the four questions that were used, and the results were converted to a 0-100 range. The average results for each of the questions were as follows: peaceful demonstration (53.1), right to vote (50.1), freedom of expression (39.8), and running for public office (37.4); the average for political tolerance was 45.1.

Access to data from the surveys that were carried out in 2004, 2006, and 2008 makes it possible to follow the evolution of the levels of political tolerance for the period from 2004-2010. Political tolerance climbed from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006, then dipped slightly to 54.2 in 2008, and later dropped significantly to 45.1 in 2010. This plunge would place the level of political tolerance at its lowest level, below that of its initial level in the 2004 survey.

In order to analyze the extent of support for stable democracy, we explored the relationship between the scale of support for the system and the scale of tolerance. These scales were divided into a high and a low end, creating four possible combinations. The distribution of the 2010 respondents placed in these four quadrants is as follows: 41.7% are in the authoritarian-stability quadrant, 25.7% in the stable-democracy quadrant, 21.8% in the democracy at-risk quadrant, and 10.8% are located in the unstable-democracy quadrant.

As for the assessment of democracy, 16.6% believe that the country is very democratic; 44.9% say it is somewhat democratic; 33.6% say it is not very democratic; and 4.9% say they see it as being not democratic at all. Additionally, the study has found that Salvadorans exhibit strong support for democracy as a form of government: 87.8% prefer electoral democracy, compared with 12.2% that support a strong leader who does not need to be elected; and 74.5% prefer democracy as a form of government, compared with 14.6% that prefer an authoritarian government, and 11% that say it makes no difference whether the government is democratic or authoritarian.

The findings in this survey show an improvement in the levels of satisfaction with the performance of democracy compared with data from 2008. The 2010 survey shows 6.3% feeling very satisfied, 58% satisfied, 30.7% dissatisfied, and 5% very dissatisfied with the performance of democracy.

Overall, there is a positive assessment of democracy and a recovery of levels of satisfaction with it, as well as growth in support for the system and institutional trust. It is considered that these aspects are related to the new political context that the fieldwork for the 2010 survey captured. This new context has to do with the January and March 2009 elections, and the change of party that is in control of the executive branch, the transition that developed in a stable manner from March to June, the expectations of change that were generated with the incumbent government, as well as the high levels of approval for president Funes.

The sixth chapter explores issues of interpersonal trust, as well as civic, political and electoral participation. At the same time, it studies the citizens' perceptions of political representation. Two thirds of the Salvadoran population says they trust a lot or somewhat in their fellow-citizens. Nevertheless, interpersonal trust is affected by the conditions of insecurity that are due to criminal violence. In places where there is a high level of gang presence,

where the police are perceived as being involved in crime, and where people feel very insecure, the level of trust among people diminishes. This data reveals the impact that violence is having on the social fabric of El Salvador.

Salvadoran citizens tend to participate very little in social organizations. Religious groups are the ones that muster the greatest amount of citizen participation in El Salvador. Data reveal a substantial growth in this kind of group compared with any other type of civic organization. The survey explored whether people participate in different kinds of organizations, such as community improvement committees, parents associations, unions or professional associations, and women's associations. However, the involvement of citizens in these kinds of organizations is rather modest, or utterly scarce. Moreover, organizations such as parents associations, community improvement committees and women's groups have experienced no increase in citizen participation. Only unions and professional associations have seen some growth, however small, in the levels of participation since 2004.

An interesting figure in the survey shows that the majority of citizens do not participate in public protest. Only 4.3% of Salvadorans said they had participated in a public protest during the past twelve months. This percentage of participation in public demonstrations constitutes one of the lowest when compared with the rest of the American countries. Only Jamaica and Guyana registered lower percentages of involvement in public protests.

Despite the fact that a majority of Salvadorans declared on the survey that they had voted during the last presidential elections, interest in politics in general, and sympathy for particular political parties remains very low. According to the results of the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer, a little over a third of the population exhibit substantial interest in politics – 37.2% (on a scale from 0 to 100). Likewise, 34.4% of citizens express sympathy for one of the political parties in El Salvador. In the cases of both interest in politics and party sympathy, the results do not show substantive changes regarding previous years. These results place El Salvador on intermediate levels in the group of American countries.

Direct involvement in political or election campaigns registered low percentages of citizen participation. Less than 20% of those surveyed have tried to convince their fellow citizens to vote for a specific candidate or party. The majority of the population, some 72.2%, has never done so, and only 10.3% have done this only once. On the other hand, one in ten has worked for an elections campaign, while the vast majority of the population has never gotten directly involved in a political campaign.

The results of the 2010 round also show persistence in the levels of polarization in the Salvadoran electorate. In early 2010, the two major parties, FMLN and ARENA, continued to attract the majority of Salvadorans, who tend to place themselves at either end of the ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, data also show that, in general, Salvadorans have moved to the political center in recent years. In contrast with previous years, when most Salvadorans set themselves on the right of the political spectrum, in 2010 citizens placed themselves closer to the center.

The results indicate that a significant percentage of Salvadorans feel represented by the government, and that they benefit from it. According to the data, 43.4% said the central government represents their interests a lot or somewhat; 36.7% said that very little, and almost 20% said not at all. Despite the fact that the majority of opinions point to a negative balance in assessing the central government's performance (a total of 56% said that the government benefits them little or not at all), the fact that two out of five citizens indicates that they feel somewhat represented by the government constitutes a change regarding the results obtained in previous years. The responses are less positive when they deal with the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly. According to the results of the question that refers to parliamentary officials, some 26.8% of citizens feel benefited and represented by the "deputies" (of these, only 5.7% said they felt the deputies represented them very much). A little over 73% of Salvadorans said they felt a little or not at all represented by the deputies. Finally, a little over a third of the population, 35.5% of those surveyed, said they felt very or somewhat represented by the mayors and city councils; whereas, 64.5% noted that they felt little or not at all represented by local authorities. This finding also constitutes a change with regards to results from prior years, when mayors and city councils received the highest percentages of citizen approval regarding representation of their interests.

The seventh chapter has to do with the performance of local government. The four surveys (2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010) show that city hall is the level of government that those surveyed have most frequently approached to solicit help, followed in second place by an office of the national government, and finally by the legislative deputies. This data reinforces the hypothesis regarding greater citizen closeness to local government, in terms of asking for help or cooperation in solving their problems. In 2010, on average, 23.4% requested assistance from the city government, 10.7% of a national government institution, and 5.7% of the legislative deputies.

In the 2010 survey, a significant increase has been observed in the level of trust in the national government (67.6), compared to previous surveys. This is the first time that it is greater than trust in municipal government (59.2).

Data in the survey show relatively low levels of citizen participation in local governmental projects, through two mechanisms that were taken into account: attendance at an open city council meeting or a town meeting over the last twelve months (13.2%), or through requests of help or presenting petitions (14.5%).

Citizen approval is marred by certain skepticism with regards to the attention municipal officials pay to the population's requests voiced at these open forums. Practically 6 in 10 persons are of the opinion that officials pay little or no attention to people's requests at these meetings. As for satisfaction with services rendered at municipal offices, 3.3% considers them very good, 33.3% good, 38.9% neither good nor bad, 20.7% bad, and 3.8% very bad. It has also been found that there are relatively low levels of trust in the proper handling of funds on the part of city hall. It can be seen that 13.1% have a lot of trust, 25.6% some trust, 35.9% little trust, and 25.5% no trust at all.

The 2010 data shows that 52.9% of those interviewed believe that the national government should take on more obligations and services, whereas 43% believe that more resources and obligations should be assigned to the city government; and 2.8% prefers no change.

Finally, the last chapter in the report is dedicated to presenting the data on the way in which Salvadoran citizens solve conflicts, and their perception of the Mediation Center program promoted by the Attorney General's office. As regards the first issue, the results show that the vast majority of citizens would use formal and legal mechanisms to solve conflict. Almost one fourth (24.3%) would turn to the legal system (police, courts, legal office), whereas a similar percentage would hire a lawyer; then, 21.2% said they would go to the Mediation Center, such as those run by the Office of the Attorney General, and 19.1% said they would seek to settle with the other party. This means that almost 90% of the people would use legal channels to deal with conflicts. Almost 7% said they would do nothing, and less than 5% declared they would take matters in their own hands.

Data indicates that over 40% of the citizens have heard of the Attorney General's Office's Mediation Centers, and this is the highest percentage of awareness these centers have enjoyed in the last six years. The results also indicate that almost 87% of Salvadorans that are familiar with the centers said they favored their existence, that means, the vast majority of citizens support these institutions, and 80% considered them to be important or very important. In general, the data shows that the Mediation Centers are becoming known and are valued positively by Salvadorans.

Introduction

This report is the outcome of research that was done on the political culture of democracy in El Salvador in 2010. Political culture is understood to be, in general terms, the values, standards and attitudes of citizens in the process of constructing the democracy of a country. This study is part of a regional effort coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project out of Vanderbilt University, directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, and financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in order to study political culture in the countries of Latin America.

The research in El Salvador was carried out by the “Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo” Foundation (FUNDAUNGO) and the Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (IUDOP) at Universidad Centroamericana “Jose Simeon Canas” (UCA). Locally, the effort is also part of a series of studies on political culture that began in 1991 when a study was published with the title: *Perspectives for a Stable Democracy*, which was followed by the publication of five more studies: *El Salvador: from War to Peace A Political Culture in Transition*, in 1995; *Audit of Democracy El Salvador 1999*, published in 2000; *The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador 2004*, published in 2005; *Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador 2006*, published in 2007; as well as *Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador 2008 The Impact of Governance*. Likewise, this report is a continuation of previous studies, and it contributes to envisage the advancement and stagnation in the construction of a political culture that is favorable to the country’s democratic regime. Coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, there have been studies in 2004, 2006, 2008, and now in 2010. This makes it possible to analyze several of the items in terms of the opinions and attitudes during the 2004-2010 period.

This report is structured in three parts, and consists of eight chapters. The first part (Hard Times and Their Effect on Democracy) consists of the first three chapters: “Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview,” “Citizen’s Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas,” and “Democratic Values in Hard Times.” The second part (Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption and Civil Society) includes the four chapters that follow: “The Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society,” “Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance,” “Civil Society and Civic Participation,” and “Local Government.” The third part (Beyond the Economic Crisis) is a single, final chapter that deals with the issue of mediation centers.

This paper is the result of the effort of several people at IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO that made this publication possible. At IUDOP, Bessy Moran and Roxana Argueta constituted two pillars during the preparation phase and throughout the research process. Jeannette Aguilar in her role as director of IUDOP was in charge of the new project and made all the means available for its development. At FUNDAUNGO, Victor Antonio Tablas provided technical assistance in the use of the Stata program, and Loida Pineda was in charge of document review. Finally, we would like to thank Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson for his commentaries and suggestions, as well as the support of Rubi Arana and Amy Erica Smith from LAPOP.

Ricardo Córdova Macías
José Miguel Cruz

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effect on Democracy

Chapter I . Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe worldwide economic recessions since the Great Depression in the 1930s took place. The recent crisis affected many nations in the world and the countries of the Americas were no exception. Yet, many American nations seem to have handled the crisis particularly well, no doubt mitigating the potential impact on democracy. This study opens with a brief overview of information on the economic crisis, and proceeds to analyze the data gleaned from surveys carried out by the AmericasBarometer, which is the most extensive public opinion survey carried out in the western hemisphere. The 2008 round, which took place before the effects of the crisis were felt, will be analyzed, as well as the 2010 round when many countries were in a recovery phase. The problem was set off by accumulated financial difficulties in the United States, and reached crisis proportions in September 2008, several months after the fieldwork for the 2008 AmericasBarometer round had concluded. The result was worldwide economic downturn, mounting unemployment, and a surge in the levels of poverty that is still being felt, albeit unequally, around the world.

The prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. This round of the AmericasBarometer 2010 examines the characteristics of those who were affected by the economic crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and who noted their personal economies had deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizen support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

This chapter begins with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment and levels of poverty, followed by a regional, per-country evaluation. Then it looks into the “the democratic recession” at a global and regional level, and there is discussion on the state of democracy in each country. It concludes by identifying the most significant relationships scholars have theorized about and found between economic and democratic decline.

Overview of the Economic Crisis

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, the world real GDP showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3% by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4% (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway. Moreover, while some countries had been seriously affected by the crisis, others had not, and were even able to sustain an acceptable level of growth despite the context of worldwide economic deterioration. It would actually appear, in contrast with the serious crises of the past that severely damaged the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, that careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

The 2010 round of surveys got underway at a time when the worldwide economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in different countries. Nevertheless, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered around the globe. Forty-three poor countries suffered serious consequences as a result of the economic crisis in 2009, with underperformance in vital areas such as education, health and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with the recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people may be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 a day. Moreover, predictions indicated that over 1 billion people were expected to face

famine, reversing many of the benefits that had been obtained from the successful anti-poverty programs that had been implemented in the previous decade.¹




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections
Source: IMF, 2010.

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labor Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 was estimated at 6.6%, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most increments taking place in 2009. Additionally, many workers had to accept more vulnerable employment, which has reduced work benefits, expanded precarious employment conditions, and elevated the number of working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable unemployment rose by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009 (ILO, 2010:42). Furthermore, despite the fact that the number of “extreme working poor” – that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 a day – was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 and 2008; by the end of 2008, the number of extreme working poor remained at 21.2% of all employment, which implies that around 633 million workers and their families were living on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide (ILO, 2010:22).

All these figures point to the severity of the effects of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. Although some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact on Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was not as grave.² Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average 5.5 to 3.9% between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%, World Bank, 2010). Based on the latest available predictions as of this writing, economic recovery appears to be imminent, and show that real GDP growth may increase by 3.1 to 3.6% in 2010 and 2011 respectively (World Bank, 2010). However, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly until worldwide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin

¹ See www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm y <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>.

² After an estimated drop in economic growth of 2.5% in 2009, it is expected that the US will grow 2.1% in 2010. The country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%). See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>.

America and industrialized countries are likely to deteriorate as the price of commodities collapse. (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 2009).

The financial disaster has also had a negative impact on the Latin American job market. It has been estimated that the unemployment rate rose to 8.5% during the first trimester of 2009, compared with 7.8% during the same period in 2008, which implies that over a million Latin American workers were unable to find employment (UN 2010). Furthermore, although working poor (i.e., those who live on under \$2 per day) diminished by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, it is estimated that a regression occurred in 2009 (World Bank, 2010). Additionally, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on under \$1.25 per day) increased from 7 to 9.9% in 2009 (ILO, 2010:30). These are only a few examples of the serious consequences of the financial crisis in Latin America.

The economic crisis in the United States and other industrialized nations also affected the level of remittances (money sent home by family members working abroad), which is income many families in Latin America depend on. For instance, some estimates suggest that remittances represent over half the income for about 30% of the recipient families, helping to keep those families out of poverty.³ Remittances represent a significant percentage of resources in many local economies. Seven nations in the region receive 12% or more of their GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, such as in the case of El Salvador, remittances have become the primary or secondary source of income, at times exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). Prior to 2008, remittance growth rates diminished considerably across Latin America, becoming negative in some countries (see Figure I.2).




Figure I.2. Decline in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009, as Reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, all the countries that are the major recipients of remittances. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4% in the first

³ See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986>, and <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>.

nine months of 2009, from a constant rate of growth of over 25% in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru⁴.

The most recent data as of the writing of this report shows that, while this crisis has been the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 the recovery was underway.⁵ Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP), shows that the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.⁶




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region when its growth rate dropped from 3.4% in 2007 to -6.5% in 2009. The general economic problems worldwide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the H1N1 virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil is, conversely, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region; still, it experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2% between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9% in 2010-2011. An estimate of the change from 2008 and 2009 in the real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven countries included in the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP.

Changes in the rates of economic growth between 2008 and 2009 varied from one country to another. Ecuador is one example where the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009⁷.

⁴ See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>.

⁵ See Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010.

⁶ These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (all together they make up 91% of the regional GDP).

⁷ The data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent over time or between sources. We have used the databases that seemed the most trustworthy available at the time of writing this report.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009.

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors, as stated in one of the latest analyses from IDB:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable (Izquierdo y Talvi, 2010).”

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than past episodes.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in El Salvador

The Salvadoran economy had a period of modest growth in the first half of the decade (close to 2%), increasing to 3.3% in 2005, and later growing to 4.2% and 4.3% in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Then it shrank to 2.4% in 2008, and the effects of the domestic and international economic crisis are reflected in the drop in the economic growth rate to -3.5% by 2009 (see Figure I.5).⁸ According to economic analysts, El Salvador is one of the countries that has been most affected by the economic crisis in Latin America.




Figure I.5. Annual Growth Rate of the Gross Domestic Product in El Salvador at Constant 1990 Prices, for 2000-2009

Source: Created by author based on figures released by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador

Another indicator of the impact of the economic crisis on the Salvadoran economy can be observed in the decrease in remittances from Salvadorans living abroad. The following figure presents the way family remittances had been showing sustained growth throughout the decade, until they came to their peak in 2007 when they represented 12% of the GDP, to decline to 11.9% in 2008 and drop to 11% in 2009. The downtrend from 2008 to 2009 meant going from 275.5 to 252.4 million dollars.

⁸ There are differences in data reported in Figures I.5 and I.6 as they are from different sources.




Figure I.6. Family Remittances as a Percentage of the GDP, for the Period 2000-2009
Source: Created by author, based on figures released by Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador

Trends in Democratic Development

Although the economic recession was a mayor event in many countries in 2009, politically it has gone hand-in-hand with a reverse in democratic development in many parts of the developing world (Puddington, 2010). According to the 2010 *Freedom House* report titled *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, the retreats of freedom were greater than the advances in 2009 (Figure I.7). This has been the longest uninterrupted period of reduction in democracy of the last 40 years history of the *Freedom House* series.⁹ Many countries around the world suffered an increase in the number of human rights violations, while non-democratic nations (such as Iran and Russia) further restricted civil liberties. Even countries where greater freedoms had been experienced in recent years, now have suffered deterioration in terms on political rights and civil liberties (such as Bahrein, Jordan and Kenya).

⁹ *Freedom House* includes two measurements of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures have scores between 1 and 7 for each country, where 1 indicates “most free” and 7 “least free.”




Figure I.7. Freedom in the world: Global Gains minus Declines 2003-2010, per year reported

Analyzing *Freedom House*'s per-country classification (Table I.1), 89 countries still belong to the category “free” representing 46% of the 194 countries in the world as well as 46% of the worldwide population. The number of countries considered “partially free” was reduced from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, but the number of “not free” nations grew from 42 to 47 in the same period, corresponding to 20% and 24% of the world population respectively. Specifically, in the “not free” category, over 2.3 billion people reside in countries where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China, represents 50% of this figure. The number of electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006, and among these nations that are considered not-free, 9 out of 47 countries in this category receive the lowest score possible in both indicators.¹⁰

Table I.1. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979–2009

Year	Total Countries	Free		Partially Free		Not Free	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

According to *Freedom House*, in the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest reversal in terms of democratic development in the period 2008-2010, notably the 2009 coup in Honduras that resulted in this country being removed from the category “electoral democracy.” Other reverses in freedoms were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Venezuela.¹¹ Figure I.8 shows that, out of 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by *Freedom House*, that is to say that 26% of the Latin American nations are classified as being “partially free,” which implies that they present shortcomings in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures indicate that there is currently a “democratic recession” in the Americas, just like there is a “democratic recession” in the world as a whole.

¹⁰ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*




Figure I.8. Free, Partially Free, and Not-Free Countries in the Americas

Although *Freedom House* registers a worldwide reduction in freedom, and decline in terms of freedom in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. In fact, the *Freedom House* measures are centered upon the institutions, not on the political culture, which is the focus of the present study. Central to the theory of political culture is that, in the long term, culture and institutions must be congruent, but in the short term there may exist significant incongruities (Almond and Verba, 1963). An example is that, in years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, the political culture had demonstrated solid support for democracy (Booth and Seligson, 1993). Consequently, it might also be the case that the democratic recession that is affecting the institutions in the region could be corrected in the long term by the effect of citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes are able to reinforce anti-democratic culture.

Dimensions of Democracy in El Salvador¹²

Seventeen years after the Peace Accords were signed, in 2009, important elections took place that contained three original elements. First was the fact that the elections took place on different dates. According to Salvadoran law, presidential elections are carried out on a five-year basis, whereas legislative and municipal elections are every three years, which means both coincide every fifteen years. However, on this occasion the electoral institution decided to hold them on different dates. In January, the legislative elections, and in March the presidential race. Second was the competitive nature of these elections. This was the first time in post-war elections that a candidate from the opposition party appeared in different pre-electoral opinion polls as a favorite to win the presidential race, posing the possibility for political alternation.

In the legislative and municipal elections, there were six parties that participated: ARENA, FMLN, PCN, PDC, CD and FDR. The following table presents the electoral results. The FMLN party obtained 42.6% of the vote, ARENA 37.6, PCN 8.8, PDC 6.9, CD 2.1, and FDR 0.9. As for the composition of the legislature for the period 2009-2012, the FMLN obtained 35 seats, ARENA 32, PCN 11, PDC 5, and CD 1. As for the municipal elections, ARENA obtained a majority of city halls with 122, FMLN 75, PCN 33, PDC 9, and CD 1. Also, ARENA obtained a symbolic victory by winning the San Salvador city hall, which the FMLN had previously governed for four consecutive periods.

Table I.2. Results: 2009 Legislative and Municipal Elections

Parties	Legislative Election			Municipal Election		
	Valid Votes	Percentage of valid votes	Number of Deputies	Valid Votes	Percentage of Valid Votes	Number of City Halls Won
ARENA	854,166	37.55%	32	867,273	39.04%	122
FMLN	943,936	42.60%	35	886,161	39.84%	75 +21 in coalition (a)
PCN	194,751	8.79%	11	236,029	10.62%	33
PDC	153,654	6.9%	5	185,824	8.36%	9 +3 in coalition (b)
CD	46,971	2.12%	1	25,204	1.13%	1 + 20 in coalition (c)
FDR	22,111	0.9%	0	20,962	0.94%	1 in coalition with CD
Total	2,215,589	100%	84	2,221,453	100%	262

Notes: (a) 18 in coalition with CD; 2 with PDC, and 1 with PDC/CD/FMLN

(b) 2 in coalition with FMLN and 1 with PDC/CD/ FMLN

(c) 18 in coalition with FMLN; 1 with FDR and 1 with PDC/FMLN/CD

Source: Cordova and Loya, 2009.

As for the presidential elections, a third new development was that PDC and PCN withdrew their presidential candidates, who had already been registered; and, CD failed to register a candidate; further, PCN and PDC supported the ARENA candidate in the end. The consequence was that, for the presidential race, only two candidates remained: Mauricio Funes as FMLN candidate, and Rodrigo Avila as the candidate for ARENA. In the March 15 elections, Mauricio Funes won with 51.32% of the votes, and Avila obtained 48.68% of the votes. In the legislative elections, FMLN obtained 943,936 votes, and in the presidential election their votes rose to 1,354,000; while ARENA went from 854,166 votes in legislative elections to 1,284, 588 in the presidential race.

The importance of these elections in the political life of El Salvador was unique in that, from that point on, El Salvador has been faced with a new political situation. After 20 years of having the ARENA (right wing) party in office, for the first time ever a left-wing government (FMLN) was elected. The 2009 elections have produced political alternation in terms of control in the Executive Branch.

A review of pre-election polls presents some of the factors that aid in explaining this result; among them are: unanswered demands, and a proposal in terms of the need for change, concern for the economic situation, and accumulated government wear and tear after 20 years of governmental administration.¹³ Also, the public figure who ran as FMLN presidential candidate made it possible for the party to neutralize the fears that ARENA had

¹² For discussion on the process of constructing democracy in El Salvador in the post-conflict era, see Córdova, Ramos and Loya, 2009.

¹³ See IUDOP, 2009.

spread in its elections campaign, and broaden the base of sympathizers to gain votes in other sectors outside the group that historically votes for FMLN.¹⁴

A recent study that presents the results of a post-electoral survey states “each of the two parties has its principal voter base on one pole: the left for the FMLN party and the right for the ARENA party; yet, they were able to attract the sympathy of those who ideologically define themselves in a center position” (Cordova and Loya, 2009:133).




Figure I.9. Distribution of voters by ARENA and FMLN in the March 2009 presidential race according to the left-right scale
Source: Taken from Cordova and Loya, 2009

The elections in January and in March took place in acceptable conditions and despite having been set in an atmosphere of polarization¹⁵ the contenders accepted the results. Nevertheless, the European Union Observer Mission made the following reflection on the electoral process as a whole:

“The Salvadoran legal framework presents a generally sufficient, although incomplete, basis for the holding of democratic and transparent elections, despite the broad participation of political parties in all of the electoral administration’s structures and the recognition of the legal possibility of challenging and appealing the election management body’s decisions through administrative proceedings. Indeed, the Salvadoran legal framework contains sufficient shortcomings, some of which were perceptible in the recent electoral process. Thus, for example, the alleged cases of tied votes in municipal elections, or the procedures for the withdrawal of presidential candidates during the election campaign, together with other insufficiencies, which are apparent in the successive amendments of the Electoral Code (48 since 1992), which have also contributed to transform the Electoral Code into a relatively incoherent and unsystematic legal instrument.

¹⁴ See Córdoba and Loya, 2009.

¹⁵ “Despite a highly polarized campaign, the legislative, municipal elections (...) took place with no major incident, while presidential elections on March 15 transpired in absolute calm even when they resulted in the alternance in power.” European Union Election Observation Mission El Salvador 2009.

The EU-EOM considers that the most important deficiencies of the Electoral Code are the following: the lack of and/or precarious regulation of the private and public financing of political parties, the insufficient regulation of election campaigns and the lack of auditing rules for campaign spending. The latter implies a total lack of transparency in these matters, but also an element of inequality regarding the conditions under which the different contenders compete. Furthermore, the Mission also noted a lack of comprehensive regulations on political party structure and operations; the absence of a media law; the weak and vague regulation of the TSE's specific functions and competencies, as well as its decision-making procedures; and, the deficient regulation of various procedural aspects within the Electoral Code. In most cases, the enactment of newly drafted specific laws will be the only possible remedy, complemented, in some cases, by regulations that develop them.

Given the number and importance of the aforementioned shortcomings, it is recommended that the Legislative Assembly go beyond a mere amendment of the current Code and consider debating and enacting a new Electoral Code. The new Code's objective, together with the previously mentioned specific laws, is to establish an adequate legal basis for future electoral processes, bringing it further in line with international commitments for democratic elections" (European Union Election Observation Mission to El Salvador 2009).

The elections that were held in 2009 have played an important part in the process of constructing democracy by producing political alternation. The recognition of advances made in the construction of democracy is taken from the evaluation by Freedom House, an organization that from 1997 to 2009 has rated El Salvador with a 2 in terms of political rights and 3 for civil liberties, which is why it has been classified as a "free" country for this period.

The elections generated an important level of expectation of a change, such that the Funes and FMLN government began the term in office in a context of high hopes for change.

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crises and democratic instability. Two schools of thought have appeared. The first focuses on the individual, analyzing the impact of the economic crisis on democracy from the point of view of the everyday citizen – in sum, how individuals react to the perception of an economic downturn. Much of the literature mentions that certain segments of society are more vulnerable than others when supporting anti-democratic alternatives. The poor in particular seem to head this group of "volatile friends of democracy" (Bermeo, 2003), in that they have been seen at the head of reactions against democratic governments in times of economic crisis. The current economic crisis has produced, as she noted, more impoverished Latin American citizens, thus creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other studies have tackled the effects of national economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on the way underdevelopment, slow economic growth, and the serious inequalities of income distribution affect democratic consolidation. The frequently cited analysis on the relationship between economic development and democracy by Przeworski *et al* (1996) found that no democracy has ever collapsed when the *per capita* income exceeds \$6,055. In Latin America, however, presently only Chile and Argentina are above that threshold, which means that the majority of Latin American countries entered the economic crisis without the necessary historic "protection" of adequate levels of economic development (Cordova and Seligson, 2010).

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski *et al* (2000:117) also found that "democracies in the poorest countries are most prone to perishing when undergoing economic crisis than when their economies grow." As

previously noted, economic growth in Latin America has contracted in many countries, which places them in the danger zone indicated by Przeworski *et al.* Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the discontent provoked by high levels of economic inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies (Muller and Seligson, 1987). Historically, Latin America has been the region of the world with the highest levels of inequality for income distribution.

Although a generalized breakdown of democracy appears inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the events in Honduras and the continuous deterioration in Venezuela demonstrate that democracy is still fragile in some countries. Could the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key elements of a liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?¹⁶ This round of AmericasBarometer surveys, which included over 40,000 interviews in 26 countries, provides the data to explore this question.

Following discussion on the impact of the economic crisis on the region and in El Salvador, this chapter has analyzed the state of democracy during the economic crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean, and particularly in El Salvador. Likewise, there is analysis of the trends in democratic development over the past years and it concludes with a brief discussion regarding the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. The following chapter focuses on citizen perception of the economic recession as measured in the AmericasBarometer 2010. Chapter III of this study examines the way in which political culture of democracy has been affected during these economically difficult times. This chapter delves into three principal values (among others): support for democracy, support for the political system, and satisfaction with life, which will help understand the impact of the crisis in the democracy of the region as a whole, and in El Salvador since 2008.

¹⁶ For more on this see Córdova and Seligson, 2009, and Córdova and Seligson, 2010.

Chapter II . Citizen Perceptions and Experiences During Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

The previous chapter gave an overview of the economic crisis in the world, in the Americas, and in the economy of El Salvador, followed by a sketch of the trends in democratic development since the last AmericasBarometer in 2008. This chapter will focus on citizen perceptions and experiences during hard times, in an attempt to respond to the following questions: 1) How did citizens perceive the crisis? 2) Whom did they hold responsible for it? And, 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? First, there is a general regional assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis in the Americas. Then an assessment of citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer. They were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two items represent a sequence. First, the respondents were asked whether they perceived an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was one, we asked who was to blame for it. The following is the wording of the items themselves:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Salvadorans
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also: United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of our country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including the 25 countries in the AmericasBarometer 2010, it can be seen in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceives an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (Percentage of the Total Population), 2010

Among all the countries in this study, as can be seen in Figure II.2 Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, the United States, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Guatemala have the highest percentages in terms of citizen perceptions of the crisis. However, in all the countries, the percentage of citizens that perceive a crisis is very high.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceives an Economic Crisis, Comparative Perspective, 2010

In the case of El Salvador, it can be seen in Figure II.3 that 61.4% believe there is a very serious economic crisis; 36.9% believe there is an economic crisis, but that it is not very serious; and only 1.7% believe there is no economic crisis. All in all, 98.3% believe that there is an economic crisis, regardless of its level of seriousness.




Figure II.3. Percentage of the Population that Perceives that there is an Economic Crisis in El Salvador, 2010

Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

This section examines to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. First of all, general results for the Americas as a whole are presented.




Figure II.4. Who is to blame for the economic crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean? (Percentage of the Total Population), 2010

The majority of citizens in the Americas who perceive a crisis blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Fewer than 10% of citizens who perceive a crisis blame the “rich” or advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American

context. Many individuals in these countries rather blame themselves for the economic crisis. In Figure II.5 the results for the principal regions in the Americas are examined.




Figure II.5. Who is responsible for the economic crisis? Overview by Regions in the Americas, 2010

In the case of El Salvador, the majority of citizens who perceive that there is a crisis in the Americas blame the previous administration for the economic crisis (29.1%) (see Figure II.6). Then, 17.8% refer to the economic system in the country; 17.2% say they had not thought of this; 11.5% blame the wealthy countries; 8.2% blame the rich in the country; 7.6% blame themselves (the Salvadorans); only 4.7% put the responsibility on the current administration; and 3.9% gave other responses.




Figure II.6. Who is responsible for the economic crisis? El Salvador, 2010

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

The previous section analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to blame for it. Here, the way citizens are experiencing the crisis is explored.

Job Loss

The items used in this section are the following:

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? **[Read options]**

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one.
- (3) No, you did not lose your job
- (4) No, you did not work because you decided not to work or because of disabilities

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? **[Read options]**

- (1) Yes (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7. Although three-quarters of the population reported not losing their job, about 7% did lose it, but then found a new one, while 8% of respondents lost their job but did not find a new one. Looking at the household situation as a whole, over 16% of respondents reported job loss.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, showing that at least one household member had lost his or her job over the past two years. El Salvador is among the countries where more jobs have been lost over the past two years (35.4%), only under Mexico, Colombia, Dominican Republic and Brazil.




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years, 2010

In the case of El Salvador, Figure II.9 shows that, out of all the persons interviewed, 21.7% lost a job; 62.7% did not lose a job; and 15.6% either chose not to have a job or were unable to do so due to disability. Of those who had lost a job, 9.7% had found a new one, and 12% had not found a new one. Regarding the other question, 22.2% of interviewed households had a member who had lost a job in the past two years.




Figure II.9. Percentage of Salvadorans Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years, 2010

Returning to the question regarding job loss (OCUP1B1), in the case of El Salvador, the following figure presents some of the characteristics of people that lose their job, by gender, age, education and place of residence. Those who have indeed lost their jobs and have not found a new one are predominantly males, aged 35 or younger, with high school studies, and urban area residents.




Figure II.10. Percentage of Salvadorans that Lost a Job, by Sex, Age, Education and Place of Residence, 2010

Reported Decrease in Household Income

Now we will examine the answers on the changes that occurred in their household. The specific item was as follows:

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income in your household: **[Read options]**

(1) Increased? **[Go to a Q11]**

(2) Stayed the same? **[Go to 11]**

(3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (Figure II.7) show that about half of the respondents say their income has remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth saying that it has increased.




Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Changes in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage of respondents who say that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income; whereas, in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase in income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic downturn has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas.




Figure II.12. Has Your Household Income Decreased, Remained the Same or Increased over the Past Two Years? (Percentage of the Total Population), 2010

In the case of El Salvador, 47.4% say it remained the same, while 12% consider it increased; and, in 40.6% household income decreased. Along with Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, these countries had the greatest decrease in household income (Figure II.13).




Figure II.13. Changes Reported in Household Income in El Salvador, 2010

Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II.9, a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole.

Moreover, Figure II.14 shows that as family wealth declines, the percentage of individuals that report a decline in income increases; in other words, the poorest individuals in the region are the most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. While prior LAPOP studies have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study a new indicator was implemented using the same variables but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.²⁰




Figure II.14. Percentage of Individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean Reporting a Decrease in Household Income, by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

The case in El Salvador responds to the trends identified for Latin America and the Caribbean. The percentage that reports a decrease in household income is greater in rural areas than in urban areas, although this difference is small; and as family wealth is smaller, the percentage of persons that report a decrease in their income grows. That is, the poorest are the most likely to report suffering a decrease in their household income.

²⁰ For more information on calculation and reliability for this indicator, see Cordova, Abby, 2009.




Figure II.15. Percentage of Individuals in El Salvador Reporting a Decrease in Household Income, by Place of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

Perceptions of the Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondents’ perceptions of their personal economic situation as well as the national economy. Respondents were asked to consider their current personal economic situation and the national economy as compared to the previous year. The following are the items used in the survey:

- SOCT1.** Now, about the economy... How would you describe **the country’s** economic situation? Would you say it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (average) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (terrible)
- SOCT2.** Do you think **the country’s** current economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse
- IDIO1.** How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (average) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (terrible)
- IDIO2.** Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse

Now we couple these items with those analyzed previously that inquired about the decrease in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.16 those who perceive their personal economic situation as being very bad have a greater probability of having experienced a loss of household income when compared with those who declare that their personal economic situation is very good. Similar, although less pronounced results, are obtained regarding the perception of the national economy, and are also valid in terms of perception of the national economy, compared to the previous year.




Figure II.16. Relationship between Citizen Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

The case of El Salvador coincides with general tendencies identified for Latin America. In the Y-axis we have the percentage of persons reporting a decrease in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.17, those who perceive their personal economic situation as being very bad, have a greater probability of having experienced a loss in household income compared with those who say their personal economic situation is very good. Similar yet less pronounced results are obtained by comparing with the economic situation the year before.




Figure II.17. Relationship between Citizen Experiences and Perceptions of their Economic Situation in El Salvador, 2010

Likewise, similar results are shown in Figure II.18. Those who perceive the economic situation in the country as being very bad have greater probability of having experienced a loss of household income, compared with those who describe the national economy as being very good. Similar but less pronounced results are obtained by comparing with the country’s economic situation the previous year.




Figure II.18. Relationship between Citizen's Experiences and Perceptions of the National Economy, El Salvador 2010

In conclusion, it can be said that the economic crisis has affected Salvadoran public opinion. El Salvador appears as one of the countries where opinions of negative impact of the crisis are more frequent. Almost the totality of citizens perceives the economic crisis, and a little over a third of surveyed households report that one of its members lost a job. Moreover, a little over 40% of households report a decrease in the levels of income and the majority of Salvadorans have watched their economic condition and that of the country grow worse over the past year. Despite the fact that Salvadorans are divided in their opinions on who is responsible for the economic crisis, almost a third of the population blames the previous administration.

Chapter III . Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

So far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008, particularly in terms of their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perception of personal and national wellbeing. The objective in this chapter is to go one step further, and look at the development of key attitudes toward democracy during these hard times.

Economic hard times have often been linked in academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For instance, some studies suggest that the poor, who, as we have previously seen, were the most affected by income reduction in the current crisis that affects extensive areas of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during economic hard times.²¹ Others suggest that national economic under-development, and low rates of economic growth also affect democracy, while others show that poor national economic indicators can affect citizens' support for key components of democracy.²²

Given the seriousness of the impact of the recent economic recession in many regions worldwide, and to a lesser degree in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have developed during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated to a decrease in support for democracy as a system of government and with less satisfaction with democracy? Besides, has support for the political system declined (i.e., political legitimacy) when times became hard, or have citizens supported their respective governments if they managed the crisis effectively? And more importantly, have Latin American citizens expressed greater preference for authoritarianism in crisis conditions? In the previous chapter we saw that the economic recession had different effects on different regions of the Americas. The AmericasBarometer 2010 takes a more detailed look at these questions through a per-region analysis, paying special attention to the case of El Salvador.

Under difficult worldwide economic conditions, we want to understand the way the citizens of the Americas have perceived the crisis. We begin by analyzing the most general of measures, in other words, subjective well being, commonly referred to as "life satisfaction," a measure also known as "happiness." We do this because other research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals that experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well being, while those individuals that enjoy better economic conditions express greater happiness.²³ On the other hand, the same research takes note of the contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.²⁴

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, just how satisfied are Latin Americans now, in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we must examine two survey items. One asks people about their present level of happiness, and the other about how happy they were in 2008, in the period before the crisis became evident. We subtract from their current level of happiness, the level of happiness they reported for 2008, and calculate the national averages for each of the countries of the Americas. The concrete questions are presented below:

²¹ See Bermeo's work, however she begins by reviewing this thesis, and in the end rejecting it: Bermeo, 2003.

²² See Cordova and Seligson, 2010; Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Przeworski et al., 2000.

²³ See Bruno and Stutzer, 2002; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000.

²⁴ See Graham, 2009; Graham, Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank, 2009; Graham and Pettinato, 2001.

[GIVE CARD "A"]
LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. A 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.
 On what step of the ladder do you feel at this moment? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**
[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible." Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98		
Worst life possible											Best life possible		Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that, on average, there is an even split in the Americas, in that citizens from about half of the countries report, on average, that they are happier now than in 2008, while about the other half of the countries, citizens report that, on average, they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see that Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, Paraguayans, Surinamese, Colombians, Panamanians, and Bolivians are those who report, on average, that they are more satisfied with their lives en 2010 than in 2008. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is considerably inferior than they report for 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than what respondents report it was in 2008 are Belize, the United States, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.²⁵ However, this finding is very general, and in the following section we examine a series of items specifically designed to measure citizen's perception on the recession.

²⁵ To clarify, here we are not comparing the 2008 survey with that of 2010, rather, we compare two questions in the 2010 survey that deal with present happiness (2010) and that of the past (2008). We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have a cross-cutting series) and we do not know the real levels of happiness reported in 2008 for the respondents from the 2010 survey.




Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data examines each segment of the surveyed population a little more carefully to show the percentages of persons who expressed a decline or increase, or those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010 in terms of life satisfaction. The results are shown in Figure III.2. In certain countries like Jamaica, for instance, over half of the population expressed a reduction in life satisfaction, while in Uruguay (along with Suriname), on the other hand, less than one fifth expressed a reduction, and a little less than one half expressed an increase.




Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010 in Latin America and the Caribbean (Percent of the Total Population)

Next we examine whether changes in life satisfaction are related to respondents' evaluations of their personal retrospective economic situation. In the previous chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own economic situation and the national economy at the moment of the interview and then a year before. Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3 that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondents' retrospective. The general conclusion is that nearly everywhere, life satisfaction decreases when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population That Perceived a Decrease in Life Satisfaction looking at Their Personal Economic Situation in Retrospective, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of the changes in the levels of life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart in Figure III.4. It is necessary to emphasize that we are not explaining the levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported they had at the time of the interview to the one that they reported having two years earlier.²⁶ Added to this equation are traditional social-

²⁶ We stress that this is not a panel design; therefore, we have no data for the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are working with what they declared were their levels of life-satisfaction for the present and past.

economic and demographic control variables, including age, sex, education, place of residence (urban or rural) and quintiles of wealth. While previous LAPOP studies used a wealth indicator based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study a new indicator was implemented with the same variables, yet based on relative wealth.²⁷ Also included in the regression are variables that measure economic evaluations, and the governmental economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on the attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which is located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution, and if appears to the left of the “0” line, a negative contribution. The statistically significant variables are presented with confidence interval lines that stretch to the left and the right of each dot; the factor is statistically significant only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line (a level 0.05 or better). The relative importance of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e., “beta weights”).

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on changes in life satisfaction. Yet, one can see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; women report a positive change during the period 2008-2010, whereas elder respondents report just the opposite, namely they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. The normal aging process, however, may influence this result, in that on average older people are afflicted with more health problems, and therefore have more reasons to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

The set of economic variables, however, has a more consistent impact, and in the majority of cases a much stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their personal economic situation have a greatly decreased sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s perception that there is a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s own economic situation matter, but also the objective information (extracted from the information provided in the survey) of a decline in household income during the same period (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. Along similar lines, yet with its own independent effect, is the fact of living in a household in which at least one member has lost his or her job during this period.

Nevertheless, of all the variables included in the regression that signaled changes in life satisfaction as perceived between 2008 and 2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the strong positive impact of *the perception of government performance on the economy*.²⁸ Given that satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and that the effect of this variable is positive as well), this means that despite the fact that individuals may perceive that they themselves are not doing so well economically, and that they may also live in a household that has suffered unemployment, when it is perceived that the government is managing the economy well, life satisfaction is greater. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in hard times.

²⁷ For more information on this indicator, see: Cordova, Abby; 2009. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).

²⁸ This was measured based on two survey questions, N1 and N12, which measure the respondents’ evaluations of government efficacy in the fight against poverty and unemployment.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the AmericasBarometer, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.5 presents the results of the regression for the case of El Salvador. The coefficients are in Appendix III.1 (at the end of the chapter). The following are the bivariate graphs for those variables that turned out to be statistically significant in the model. However, in this case the dependent variable used in the graphs is only the percentage of those respondents who manifested a decrease in life satisfaction.




Figure III.5. Determinants in Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in El Salvador, 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as education, place of residence and wealth have no significant effect on life satisfaction. In the set of demographic characteristics, sex has no significant effect; and, as for age, as it increases, life satisfaction increases slightly as well (see Figure III.6).




Figure III.6. Percentage of Persons Reporting a Decrease in Life Satisfaction by Age Groups, El Salvador 2010

The set of economic variables has a more consistent impact on life satisfaction.²⁹ Respondents who have a negative perception of their own economic situation have a much lower sense of life satisfaction. The negative retrospective perception of their personal economic situation as well as that of the country are linked to greater levels of dissatisfaction with life. Respondents that have a negative perception of the country’s economic situation are also less satisfied with life, although, in this case, the levels of dissatisfaction are also very high for those that rate it “very good.” Also associated to low levels in life satisfaction are those that reported a decrease in household income and those homes where at least one member had lost his or her job.

²⁹ For this chapter’s analysis of the data in the case of El Salvador, the meaning of the responses for four of the questions used is as follows: in IDIO1, (1) very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) bad, and (5) very bad, and it was named “negative perception of personal economic situation”; in IDIO2, (1) better, (2) same, (3) worse, and it was named “negative perception of personal retrospective situation”; in SOCT1, (1) very good, (2) good, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) bad, and (5) very bad, and it was named “negative perception of national economy”; and in SOCT2, (1) better, (2) same, (3) worse, and it was named “negative retrospective perception of national economy.”




Figure III.7. Percentage of Persons Reporting a Decrease in Life Satisfaction by Perception of their Personal Economic Situation, Retrospective Perception of Their Personal Economic Situation, Perception of the National Economy, Retrospective Perception of the National Economy, Changes in Household Income, and Households Where at Least One Member has Lost a Job, El Salvador 2010

Another important variable in terms of changes in perceived life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010 is *the perception of government economic performance* (see Figure III.8).³⁰ This finding is consistent with what had previously been reported for the Latin American region, in the sense that an improved evaluation of government economic performance is associated with greater life satisfaction. This variable can also serve as a proxy in identification with the government and its policies. In this sense, as the perception of a good economic performance on the part of the government increases, there is a decrease in life dissatisfaction.

³⁰ The scale for government economic performance in the case of El Salvador has an alpha of 0.799.




Figure III.8. Percentage of Persons Reporting a Decrease in Life Satisfaction by Perceived Government Economic Performance, El Salvador, 2010

Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not diminished. The results of support for democracy in 2008 compared with those of 2010 are shown in Figure III.9.³¹ The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy in 2010, whereas the light blue bars show the average levels in 2008.³² The reader must take into account that every time there are two gray areas overlapping, there are no statistically significant differences between those two years. For instance, support for democracy in Mexico declined from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. What we actually find is that in numerous countries change is not significant in either direction. The only countries that experienced a significant descent in support for democracy in 2010 compared with 2008 are El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. The decline in Venezuela was the most abrupt. On the other hand, there was no country in which support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010, at least using this “Churchillian” question that has been so widely used in comparative studies on democracy.

³¹ Support for democracy was measured with the following question: “ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (On a scale from 1 to 7). This question, like most used in LAPOP reports, was recoded to a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparison and comprehension.

³² It should be kept in mind that for some countries (Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname) we have no 2008 data, so a single bar is shown.




Figure III.9. Average Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy decreased significantly only in few countries, this is not to say that the crisis itself had no effect. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, economic crisis being only one of them. A country may have been seriously shaken by economic recession, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, it is likely that citizens will not have lost faith in their political system. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, a multivariate regression analysis was carried out (see Figure III.10).




Figure III.10. Determinants in Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.10 shows that education is an important determinant of support for democracy. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to construct a political culture that supports democracy. In other parts of this report, reference is made to the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those living in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding that had also been previously encountered. Women frequently are less supportive of democracy and this is corroborated here, even when controlled by education and other variables. Although there is controversy in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the AmericasBarometer 2010, considering the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find an increase of income is positively related to greater levels of support for democracy (Booth and Seligson, 2008).

The surprise in the results in Figure III.10 is that the economic crisis only has a limited impact in reduction of support for democracy. In households where a member has lost a job, there is a small reduction in support to democracy, but economic perceptions do not play an important role in any case. On the other hand, reduction of income has a weak *positive* impact on support for democracy. What is much more important is the strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, just like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is doing a good job of managing the economy, they are more favorable toward democracy.

Our conclusion is that, in terms of general support for democracy, there is no general downward trend, nor have we found that individual perceptions and experiences during the economic downturn reduce support for democracy. This is, doubtless, encouraging news, which suggests democracies have greater resilience than many analysts had predicted. The results also suggest that the democratic recession noted by *Freedom House* does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the region.

Figure III.11 shows the results of the regression for the case of El Salvador. The coefficients are presented in Appendix III.2 (at the end of the chapter). Below are the bivariate graphs for those variables that were

statistically significant in the model. In this case, for the question on support for democracy, a 0-100 format will be used.




Figure III.11. Predictors of Support for Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as place of residence and wealth have no significant effect on support for democracy. Education is the most important determinant in support for democracy, as is seen in Figure III.12. This result, as has been noted in the whole Latin American region, is consistent with findings in previous studies on democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the idea that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture of support to democracy. Among demographic characteristics, age has no significant effect (in contrast with the continental results), and as for sex, we find that women exhibit less support for democracy, and this is so even when controlled for education and other variables (see Figure III.13).




Figure III.12. Support for Democracy by Levels of Education, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.13. Support for Democracy by Sex in El Salvador, 2010

It was also surprising in this case to find that the economic crisis had limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Those who believe the economic crisis is severe tend to support democracy less compared with those who are of the opinion that the crisis is not very serious (see Figure III.14); and positive perception of their own personal economic situation is associated with slightly higher levels of support for democracy, although the group that believes their situation is “very bad” exhibits high levels of support, and there is a decrease for the group that believes it is “very good” (see Figure III.15).




Figure III.14. Support for Democracy by Evaluation of Economic Crisis in El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.15. Support for Democracy by Perception of Personal Economic Situation, 2010

Finally, we have the effect of a positive perception of government management of the economy. Similar to life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that government economic performance is good, they are more favorable toward democracy, as can be seen in Figure III.16. Also, Figure III.17 shows that positive assessment of the president’s job performance is associated with greater levels of support for democracy.




Figure III.16. Support for Democracy by Evaluation of Government Economic Performance in El Salvador, 2010.




Figure III.17. Support for Democracy by Evaluation of the President's Job Performance in El Salvador, 2010

Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of the country's government (i.e., support for the system in the country where an individual resides) is a key requirement for political stability. Through extensive research based on the LAPOP survey data, John Booth and Mitchell Seligson found that legitimacy comes from multiple sources, but government performance in satisfying citizen needs and demands is fundamental.³³ Some studies suggest that there has been a constant decrease in support for the political system, even in many of the advanced industrial democracies, over the course of the past 30 years.³⁴ Does this imply that low levels of support for the system put democracy at risk? To date there is no indication that this is the case in advanced industrial democracies. But what happens in the case of democracies that are in the process of consolidation in Latin America and the Caribbean? This theme was dealt with in depth in the national reports of the 2006 round of AmericasBarometer, however we are currently dealing with it in this report in the context of a serious economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has used a system support index based on five variables, each one measured on a scale from 1 to 7, but converted to a traditional 0-100 LAPOP scale to make the results easier to understand:

- B1.** To what degree do you believe the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Probe:** If you believe the courts do not ensure justice at all then choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point between the two)
- B2.** To what degree do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3.** To what degree do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4.** To what degree do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6.** To what degree do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

To understand the dynamics of "support for the political system," we compared the levels of support obtained in 2008 with those from 2010. As shown in Figure III.23, some countries experienced important changes in system support. For instance, in Honduras, when the coup ended and elections restored democracy to the country, support shot up from a low 46.4 before the coup to 60.4 points after. It must be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras took place only a month after the incumbent administration took office, therefore the level of system support might be high due to the effect of the well-known "honey moon" that new governments generally get. Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua likewise experienced statistically significant increases despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, only Belize, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Canada suffered a statistically significant decline (albeit quantitatively small) in system support between from 2008 to 2010. The other countries remained statistically unaffected.

³³ The index Political Support for the System is comprised of five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created see Chapter V, Part II of this paper. See: Booth and Seligson, 2009.

³⁴ See Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999.




Figure III.18. Average Support for the Political System in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Turning now to the determinants in system support, we see that, in fact, the perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with Latin American people’s system support, as shown in Figure III.19. Furthermore, in relation to support for democracy, it was found that low system support is present among those who have a pessimistic view of their family’s income and the national income levels. Older people and women show a significantly higher level of system support, but the effect is very small. Surprisingly, unemployment has no significant impact on system support. *The major impact on system support, as in the case of support for democracy, is the perception of government economic performance.* Once more, we see that persons in the Americas are strongly affected by their perceptions of government performance. Clearly, it can also be seen that satisfaction with the president’s performance is relevant, but what is most important is the perception of the current government’s performance. This finding again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis is mitigated by the perception that the government is effective when responding to this challenge.




Figure III.19. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.20 displays the results of the regression for the case of El Salvador. Appendix III.3 (at the end of the chapter) shows the coefficients. Next is a presentation of the bivariate graphs for those variables that were statistically significant in the model.




Figure III.20. Determinants for System Support in El Salvador, 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as education, place of residence, and wealth have a significant effect on system support. Education is a determinant in system support, but it operates in the contrary direction, that is to say, at a higher level of education, people have more information and are more critical of the institutional system (Figure III.21). In the rural area system support is greater than in the urban area (see Figure III.22). In terms of wealth, as the quintiles of wealth increase, there is a slight decrease in system support, and in this case it also operates in reverse, that is, at the highest levels of wealth people have more information and are more critical of the institutional system, as can be seen in Figure III.23.




Figure III.21. System Support by Level of Education, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.22. System Support by Place of Residence Urban/Rural, El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.23. System Support by Quintiles of Wealth, El Salvador 2010

As for sex, men support the system less, compared with women. As for age, Figure III.25 shows a “U” curve, where system support is greatest at either end of the age groups, and is reduced in the intermediate levels.




Figure III.24. System Support by Age Groups, El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.25. System Support by Sex, El Salvador, 2010

As for economic variables, next we present the graphs for system support in relation to the perceived magnitude of the economic crisis, and the evaluation of the national economy, followed by the evaluation of government’s economic performance.

Again, what is surprising in this case is the limited impact that the economic crisis has on reduction of system support. Those who think the economic crisis is not very serious tend to display more system support, whereas those that say there is no crisis seem to support the system *less* (Figure III.26). The positive retrospective perception on the national economy is associated with support for the system (see Figure III.27); the same thing occurs in terms of perception of the national economy, as can be observed in Figure III.28.




Figure III.26. System Support by Perception of Economic Crisis, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.27. System Support by Retrospective Perception of National Economy, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.28. System Support by Perception of the National Economy, El Salvador 2010

Lastly, we found that a positive perception on government economic management has an important effect (see Figure III.29). When citizens perceive good government performance, they display greater support for the system.




Figure III.29. The Impact of Government Economic Performance on System Support, El Salvador 2010

Evidence of citizen perception of an improvement in government economic performance in many countries can be observed in Figure III.30. It can be seen that in Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, United States, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Paraguay there is a statistically significant increase in terms of incumbent government economic performance. On the other hand, there were significant reductions between the two surveys only in Guatemala, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Belize.




Figure III.30. Perception of Government Economic Performance in the Americas 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that the perception of an improvement in government economic performance is affecting the levels of system support is shown in Figure III.31. In this graph, the country averages are presented both for average change in perception of government performance as well as change in system support between 2008 and 2010. The results are very clear: the greater the change in satisfaction with government management of the economy, the greater the change in system support.




Figure III.31. Change in Perception of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in Support for Political System (2008-2010), Analysis at the Country-Level

This result showed up at the national level and at the sub-national level as well. Figure III.32 examines the same relationship between the change in the perception of government performance, and the change in system support use the sub-national strata, though. For instance, in Bolivia each department is a separate stratum of the sample, whereas in other countries the regions are used as strata. Sample design details can be found in the Appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub-national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is moving in a positive direction, there is an increase in average system support.




Figure III.32. Changes in the Perception of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Changes in System Support (2008-2010), Regional Level Analysis

Figure III.33 presents the results of the multivariate regression on perception of government economic performance for the case of El Salvador. Appendix III.4 (at the end of the chapter) has the coefficients. The following is a presentation of the bivariate graphs for those variables that were statistically significant in the model. However, here the graphs use the perception of government economic performance on a 1-4 scale as the dependent variable.




Figure III.33. Determinants for Perception of Government Economic Performance in El Salvador, 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as place of residence and wealth have no significant effect on the perception of government economic performance. Among the demographic characteristics, age and sex have no significant effect. The results show that education is a determinant in the assessment of government economic performance, only it operates in reverse, that is, the greater the persons' level of education, the more information people have and the more critical they are of government economic performance, as can be seen in Figure III.34.




Figure III.34. Government Economic Performance by Level of Education, El Salvador 2010

In this case, it is no surprise that the economic crisis has a negative impact on the assessment of government economic performance (see Figure III.35). Those who think the economic crisis is very serious tend to exhibit less support for the government; the same goes for those whose household income has declined. The negative perceptions of the national economy, retrospective negative perceptions of the national economy and of the personal economic situation, are all related to a negative perception of government economic performance.




Figure III.35. Government Economic Performance by Perception of the Economic Crisis, Changes in Household Income, Perception of the National Economy, Retrospective Perception of the National Economy, and Perception of Personal Retrospective Economic Situation, El Salvador 2010

Finally, in Figure III.36 it can be observed that as the positive evaluation of the president’s job performance ascends, the positive perception of government economic performance increases.




Figure III.36. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Assessment of the President's Job Performance, El Salvador, 2010

Now we move on to considering the determinants of satisfaction with the way democracy functions.

Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what happens with satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in analyzing democratic consolidation around the world? Research in advanced industrial democracies has found that over the long term there has been a decline in satisfaction with democracy, a process that started several decades ago, and still continues, which indicates that this is a process that is not directly related to economic crises.³⁵ During the periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely for citizens to express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what classic hypotheses found in much of social science literature suggest, as noted already in Chapter I. In other words, citizens can continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice they may feel democracy has not delivered. The question then becomes: Are Latin American citizens less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy when they live in economically difficult conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer indicates that this may in fact be the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III.37 shows that in several countries the average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for instance, a country that was especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 to 44.6 on our 0-100 scale, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 down to 46.3 points. Other statistically significant declines occurred in Canada, Guyana, Guatemala, Argentina and the Dominican Republic. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were greatly felt by the majority of citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period. On the other hand there were some countries where satisfaction with democracy displayed sharp growth. This is the case in Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009 (Seligson and Booth, 2010). In this country, satisfaction went from 44.8 to

³⁵ Ibid.

57.8. In the case of Uruguay, it went from 60.6 in 2008 to 67.9 in 2010. The greatest change occurred in Paraguay, a country that showed up in the lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in 2008, with a score of 30.2, and which climbed to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey took place just before the April 2008 elections that put an end to decades of party rule in that country; this was doubtless a factor that influenced the strong increase in democratic satisfaction in the 2010 survey. Another significant increase occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the FMLN party) won power for the first time in 20 years. In this case, it went from 44.5 to 54.7. In many countries, however, there were no statistically significant changes in satisfaction with democracy, despite the serious economic crisis that has left its imprint throughout the world.




Figure III.37. Satisfaction with Democracy, 2008 vs. 2010, AmericasBarometer Survey

Moving on to analyzing determinants of satisfaction with democracy, it was found that, actually, the perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among Latin American citizens, as shown in Figure III.38. It is also observed that negative perceptions of the personal and national economy, as well as a negative perception of the retrospective economic situation, both personal and national, are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions. Further, older persons have

a significantly higher satisfaction with democracy, whereas richer individuals, those with more education, and those who live in urban areas, show lower levels of satisfaction. Nevertheless, these effects are quite small. What is more interesting, as found in life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, is that the main factors that impact satisfaction with democracy are *the perception of government economic performance, and satisfaction with the job performance of the incumbent president*. Once again, we see that the citizens of the Americas are strongly influenced by their perceptions of their governments' performance. Yet we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters more when dealing with satisfaction with democracy (opposed to its lesser impact on support for democracy); this suggests that although perception of how efficiently the government is responding to the crisis is important, perceptions of the president's general performance during difficult economic times is also very important.




Figure III.38. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (total sample)

Figure III.39 presents the results of the regression on satisfaction with democracy for the case of El Salvador. Appendix III.5 (at the end of the chapter) has the coefficients. Following are the bivariate graphs for those variables that turned out to be statistically significant in the model. The dependent variable used in the graphs is satisfaction with the way democracy functions³⁶ with a 0-100 format.

³⁶ Item PN4: “In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in en El Salvador?”




Figure III.39. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in El Salvador 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as education and place of residence have no significant effect on satisfaction with democracy. As the quintiles of wealth increase, satisfaction with democracy decreases (see Figure III.40). Among demographic characteristics, sex and age have no significant effect.




Figure III.40. Satisfaction with Democracy by Quintiles of Wealth in El Salvador, 2010

In this case it is no surprise to see the impact the economic crisis has on the decline in satisfaction with democracy. Those who have a negative perception on their personal retrospective economic situation and those who have a negative perception of the national economy are less satisfied with democracy.




Figure III.41. Satisfaction with Democracy by Perception of Personal Retrospective Economic Situation in El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.42. Satisfaction with Democracy by Perception of the National Economy in El Salvador, 2010

Lastly, as the positive perception of government economic performance increases, so does satisfaction with democracy (Figure III.43); and the same occurs with the perception of the job performance of the president (see Figure III.44).




Figure III.43. Satisfaction with Democracy by Government Economic Performance, El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.44. Satisfaction with Democracy by Evaluation of President's Job Performance, El Salvador 2010

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction in hard times is for the military to take power by means of a coup. Historically in Latin America a series of coups have been attributed to economic crises, but the military have also been forced out of power when economic crises broke out during their periods of authoritarian rule. The 2009 Honduran coup heightened interest in military coups that many had thought of as a thing of the dark past of Latin America's history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizen support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents whether they would justify a coup under three different conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.³⁷ The comparisons for 2008 and 2010 are shown in Figure III.54. We have no comparative data for the countries in the entire set given that three of them have no standing army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti), so these items were not included there in 2008. In 2010, however, these three countries were asked about a take-over by police forces, in order to create a hypothetical alternative. On the other hand, the question regarding a coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries, and is particularly low in Panama and Costa Rica. On our 0-100 scale, only one country got more than 50 points. On the other hand, this support was very high in Honduras in 2008, the only country that scored higher than 50, along with Guyana, and where it is perhaps not surprising that a coup took place in 2010. Following the coup, support for such illegal forms of taking power in a democratic system decreased drastically in Honduras. It could be that the coup itself solved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they see no reason for it; or alternately it may be that the experience of the coup itself reduced support for this kind of action. We leave the discussion about the issue of a coup for the more detailed report on Honduras. We also note that support for coups increased significantly in only one country where we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010. Support for coups also dropped significantly in 2010 compared to 2008 in Nicaragua, Ecuador and Guyana.

³⁷ The index for Support Military Coups was created based on three questions: "Now, changing the subject, some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'etat (military coup). In your opinion, would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?" JC1. "When there is high unemployment." JC10. "When there is a lot of crime." JC13. "When there is a lot of corruption." Response options were: (1) "A military take-over of the state would be justified;" and (2) "A military take-over of the state would not be justified." These responses were recoded into 100 = "a military coup is justified," and 0 = "a military coup is not justified."




Figure III.45. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, we wonder whether support for military coups is higher among those that perceive the economic crisis or are unemployed. Looking at Figure III.55 we see that, unfortunately, that is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are related to higher levels of support for military coups among Latin Americans. Additionally, people who show a negative perception of the national economy, also show greater support for military coups, which suggests that in crisis conditions, Latin Americans take into account economic factors when they consider ways to punish those in power, even if this might put democracy at risk. It is interesting that women also express (slightly) higher levels of support for coups. However, the effect is very small. People that are older, wealthier, and who have higher levels of education show a lower tendency to favor coups. A noteworthy finding that is also coherent with the previous results is the positive effect of satisfaction with performance of the incumbent president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, which underscores the importance of the role played by the president in reducing support for authoritarian alternatives. Perception of the efficacy of the government gave no significant results when related to support for military coups.




Figure III.46. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.47 presents the results of the regression for the case of El Salvador. The coefficients can be found in Appendix III.6 at the end of the chapter. Next are the bivariate graphs for those variables that were statistically significant in the model. The new variable, support for military coup, is in a 0-100 format.




Figure III.47. Determinants in Support for a Military Coup in El Salvador, 2010

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as place of residence have no significant effect on support for military coups. Education has a negative sign and is significant in the sense that support for a coup declines as the level of education ascends. Likewise, as quintiles of income increase, support for a coup decreases. Among the demographic characteristics, men show lower levels of support than women do, and as age increases, support for a coup decreases.




Figure III.48. Support for a Military Coup by Level of Education, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.49. Support for a Military Coup by Quintiles of Wealth, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.50. Support for a Military Coup by Sex, El Salvador, 2010




Figure III.51. Support for a Military Coup by Age Group, El Salvador, 2010

In this case, it can be seen that impact of the economic crisis on support for a military coup is limited. Households with at least one member who lost a job and those respondents who have a negative perception of the national economy show a greater level of support for a coup (Figures III.52 and III.53).




Figure III.52. Support for a Military Coup by Households with at Least One Member Who Lost a Job, El Salvador 2010




Figure III.53. Support for a Military Coup by Retrospective Perception of the National Economy, El Salvador 2010

Finally, those who have a negative perception of the President’s Job Performance tend to show more support for a coup.




Figure III.54. Support for Military Coup by Assessment of President's Job Performance, El Salvador 2010

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have used the analysis of data from the AmericasBarometer to address several aspects that are related to exploring the possible impact of the recent economic crisis on citizens' democratic values in the countries of the Americas in general, and specifically in El Salvador.

Under difficult worldwide economic conditions in the past years, we have focused on the way citizens in the Americas perceive the crisis, to deal with five relevant democratic values: life satisfaction, support for democracy, support for the political system, satisfaction with democracy, and support for a possible military coup.

In the conclusions we would like to return to the principal findings for the case of El Salvador in the 2010 survey. First we will refer to each of these five factors, and later we will present more general reflections.

1. Life Satisfaction

Comparing perceptions of change in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, 40.8% believes it declined, 26.7% that it remained the same, and 32.5% that it increased.

A relevant finding is that the set of economic variables has had a more consistent impact on life satisfaction. Lower levels of life satisfaction are associated with those who have a negative perception of their own personal economic situation and that of the country; also those reporting a decrease in household income, and those in households where at least one member has lost a job.

Another important variable related to changes in perceived life satisfaction is *the perception of the government economic performance*. With an increase in the positive perception of government performance, there

is an increase in life satisfaction. This variable can also serve as a proxy in citizen identification with the government and its policies.

2. Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer supplies evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results of comparing support for democracy in 2008 and that in 2010 show that the only countries that experienced a significant descent in support for democracy in 2010 compared with 2008 are El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. In the case of El Salvador between 2008 and 2010, support for democracy decreased from 68.4 to 64.1.

The results show that education is an important determinant in support for democracy. This result, as has been shown for the Latin American region as a whole, is consistent with previous studies on democracy in the Americas, and once more reinforces the idea that education is one of the most effective ways to construct a political culture of support for democracy.

In this case, it is surprising to note the limited impact that the economic crisis has in reduction of support for democracy. Lower levels of support for democracy are associated with those who believe that the economic crisis is very serious, and with the negative perception of their personal economic situation.

It has also been found that the positive perception of government management of the economy has an effect. When citizens perceive that government performance is positive, they are more favorable toward democracy; further, a positive evaluation of the president's job performance is associated with higher levels of support for democracy.

3. Support for the Political System

In the case of El Salvador, between 2008 and 2010 there has been an increase in support for the system, from 51.8 to 58.7.

The results show that basic social-economic characteristics such as education, place of residence, and wealth have a significant effect on support for the system. Education is a determinant in support for the system, operating in a negative direction, though. That is, people with a higher level of education have more information and are more critical regarding the institutional system.

In this case it is also surprising to find the limited impact that the economic crisis has on reducing support for the system. The low levels of support for the system are associated with those who think that the economic crisis is not very serious; negative perception of the national economy; and the same occurs in negative score of the country's economic situation.

It has also been found that when citizens have a positive perception of government economic performance, they display greater support for the system.

4. Satisfaction with Democracy

In the case of El Salvador, between 2008 and 2010, satisfaction with democracy grew from 44.5 to 54.7.

In this case it is no surprise to see the impact that the economic crisis has on reduction in satisfaction with democracy. The levels of low satisfaction with democracy are related to those who have a negative perception of their personal economic situation and that of the country. It has also been found that as the positive perception of government economic performance increases, so does satisfaction with democracy; and the same occurs regarding the evaluation of the president's job performance.

5. Support for Military Coups

In the case of El Salvador, between 2008 and 2010, support for a possible military coup decreased from 43.1 to 40.9.

Education has a negative trend, in the sense that support for a coup declines as the level of education increases; likewise, as quintiles of income increase, support for a coup decreases.

In this case, a limited level of impact is observed in terms of the economic crisis. The highest levels of support for a military coup are associated with households with at least one member who has lost a job, and those who have a negative perception of the country's economic situation. It has also been found that those who have a negative perception of the president's job performance tend to exhibit greater support for a coup.

The following chart describes the significant variables that are related to the five aspects that were analyzed. In this regard, we would like to draw attention to three important items. First, among the social-economic and demographic characteristics, education is the most relevant in support for democracy, support for the system, and a low level of support for a military coup. Second, the limited impact of the economic variables, the most important being the perception of the country's economic situation (in four democratic values) and the perception of the person's own personal economic situation (in three values). Questions directly linked to the effects of the economic crisis, which on a hypothetical level might have had greater impact, such as decline in household income, households with at least one member who lost a job, or those who think that the economic crisis is not very serious, had a very limited impact. Third, it was found that the perception of government economic performance plays an important role in four democratic values.

Table III.1. Significant Variables Related to the Five Aspects That were Analyzed

	Life Satisfaction	Support for Democracy	Support for the Political System	Satisfaction with Democracy	Support for a Military Coup
I. Social-Economic Characteristics					
Education	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Place of Residence	No	No	Yes	No	No
Wealth	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
II Demographic Characteristics					
Sex	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Age	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
III Economic Variables					
Negative Perception of Personal Retrospective Economic Situation	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Negative Retrospective Perception of the National Economy	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Negative Perception of Personal Economic Situation	Yes	No	No	No	No
Negative Perception of the National Economy	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Decline in Household Income	Yes	No	No	No	No
Households With at Least One Member That Lost a Job	Yes	No	No	No	No
Believe the Economic Crisis is Very Serious	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
IV Other Variables					
Perception of Government Economic Performance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Evaluation of President's Job Performance	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Among the aspects that were analyzed, in the case of El Salvador there is evidence of a limited impact by the economic crisis. As for perceptions of change in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, 40.8% think it decreased, 26.7% that it remains unchanged, and 32.5% that it increased. There is a decline in the level of support for democracy. However, in this period there is an increase in system support and satisfaction with democracy while there is a decrease in the level of support for a possible military coup.

A factor to take into account regarding the limited impact that the economic crisis has on democratic values is that, in the case of El Salvador, very important elections took place between January and March 2009, which resulted in alternation in the presidency. After 20 years of government by the right-wing ARENA party, on June 1st, 2009 president Funes, who had run as a left-wing FMLN party candidate, took office. As noted in the previous chapter, the elections generated high expectations that there would be change, to which were added high levels of approval for president Funes. At the time that the survey fieldwork was going on, it can be considered that the “honeymoon” was still on between the new government and the citizens. The particular situation in the Salvadoran case would be that the time frame for the fieldwork coincided with the effects of the domestic and international economic crisis (2008-2010), and a surge of optimism and high expectations generated after the presidential race (2009) and the inauguration of the new administration. In this regard, the hypothesis would be that in some citizen evaluations, as both processes coincide, there has been a prevalence of a surge in optimism and democratic stimulus derived from the electoral process.

Appendixes

Appendix III.1. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.094*	-3.75
There is no economic crisis	0.009	-0.39
Very serious economic crisis	0.014	-0.63
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income ³⁸	-0.100*	(-4.63)
Households where at least one member lost his or her job	-0.061*	(-2.50)
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.049*	(-2.48)
Negative perception retrospective of national economy	-0.089*	(-3.34)
Negative perception of personal economic situation	-0.088*	(-2.71)
Negative perception retrospective of personal economic situation	-0.299*	(-11.62)
Perception of president's job performance	-0.012	(-0.41)
Quintiles of wealth	0.038	-1.56
Level of education	-0.045	(-1.63)
Urban	0.002	-0.1
Age	-0.056*	(-2.28)
Sex	-0.019	(-0.92)
Constant	0	-0.01
R-squared = 0.255		
No. of cases = 1519		
* p<0.05		

³⁸ To create the *LOSTJOB* indicator, two variables were fused together: *OCUPIB1* and *OCUPIB2*; it now is on a 0-100 scale. Additionally, based on the variable *Q10E* a new variable was created called *INCOMEDESR*, to measure the percentage of people that reported a decrease in household income, and it also is on a 0-100 scale. Based on the variables *LS6* and *LS6A* the variable *LIFESATIS* was created (which is a dependent in this multiple regression model), this index is on a scale from -100 to 100, and it measures the perceived change in life satisfaction. Finally, based on *CRISIS1* two dummy variables were created, *CRISISPER1* (very serious economic crisis) and *CRISISPER3* (no economic crisis).

Appendix III.2. Determinants of Support for Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Perception of government economic performance	0.103*	-2.42
No economic crisis	0.012	-0.52
Very serious economic crisis	-0.081*	(-3.24)
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income	0.012	-0.45
Households with at least one member who lost a job	0.016	-0.72
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.046	(-1.71)
Negative perception retrospective of the national economy	-0.002	(-0.05)
Negative perception of their personal economic situation	0.034	-1.17
Negative perception retrospective of their personal economic situation	0.048	-1.96
Perception of the president's job performance	-0.05	(-1.99)
Quintiles of wealth	0.028	-1.05
Level of education	0.152*	-4.29
Urban	0.031	-1.12
Age	0.142*	-5.66
Sex	0.068*	-2.9
Constant	0	(-0.00)
R-squared = 0.072		
N. of cases = 1506		
* p<0.05		

Appendix III.3. Determinants of System Support, El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Perception of government economic performance	0.444*	-14.35
No economic crisis	-0.041	(-1.74)
Very serious economic crisis	-0.060*	(-2.87)
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income	-0.039	(-1.75)
Households with at least one member who lost a job	-0.036	(-1.59)
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.083*	(-4.02)
Negative perception retrospective of the national economy	0.065*	-2.25
Negative perception of their personal economic situation	-0.037	(-1.44)
Negative perception retrospective of their personal economic situation	-0.002	(-0.08)
Perception of the president's job performance	0.015	-0.56
Quintiles of wealth	-0.065*	(-3.05)
Level of education	-0.073*	(-2.49)
Urban	-0.088*	(-3.76)
Age	-0.004	(-0.16)
Sex	-0.054*	(-2.45)
Constant	-0.004	(-0.20)
R-squared = 0.275		
N. of cases = 1521		
* p<0.05		

Appendix III.4. Determinants of Government Economic Performance in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
No economic crisis	-0.042	(-1.69)
Very serious economic crisis	-0.067*	(-3.16)
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income	-0.054*	(-2.18)
Households with at least one member who lost a job	-0.016	(-0.83)
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.067*	(-2.80)
Negative perception retrospective of the national economy	-0.110*	(-4.71)
Negative perception of their personal economic situation	-0.017	(-0.74)
Negative perception retrospective of their personal economic situation	-0.088*	(-2.75)
Perception of the president's job performance	-0.418*	(-24.48)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.022	(-0.86)
Level of education	-0.185*	(-7.14)
Urban	0.024	-1
Age	-0.038	(-1.62)
Sex	-0.006	(-0.35)
Constant	-0.004	(-0.14)
R-squared = 0.315		
N. of cases = 1524		
* p<0.05		

Appendix III.5. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Perception of government economic performance	0.229*	-7.34
No economic crisis	0.01	-0.53
Very serious economic crisis	-0.031	(-1.08)
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income	-0.008	(-0.32)
Households with at least one member who lost a job	0.007	-0.29
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.126*	(-5.04)
Negative perception retrospective of the national economy	0.021	-0.8
Negative perception of their personal economic situation	-0.052	(-1.81)
Negative perception retrospective of their personal economic situation	-0.075*	(-3.07)
Perception of the president's job performance	-0.108*	(-3.51)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.052*	(-2.34)
Level of education	-0.031	(-1.02)
Urban	-0.024	(-1.06)
Age	0.027	-1.12
Sex	0.008	-0.37
Constant	0.001	-0.04
R-squared = 0.163		
N. of cases = 1509		
* p<0.05		

Appendix III.6. Determinants of Support for Military Coup in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Perception of government economic performance	-0.027	(-0.88)
No economic crisis	0.016	-0.58
Very serious economic crisis	0.019	-0.73
Percentage of persons reporting a decline in household income	-0.009	(-0.31)
Households with at least one member who lost a job	0.038	-1.85
Negative perception of the national economy	-0.003	(-0.10)
Negative perception retrospective of the national economy	0.111*	-4.56
Negative perception of their personal economic situation	-0.060*	(-2.09)
Negative perception retrospective of their personal economic situation	0.032	-1.07
Perception of the president's job performance	0.122*	-4.12
Quintiles of wealth	-0.059*	(-2.44)
Level of education	-0.210*	(-6.23)
Urban	-0.032	(-0.95)
Age	-0.190*	(-9.04)
Sex	-0.058	(-1.92)
Constant	0.003	-0.11
R-squared = 0.127		
N. of cases = 1517		
* p<0.05		

Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society

Chapter IV . Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

Introduction

Part I of this study presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. It also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by responding to the following question: *who were most likely affected by the crisis?* There was also a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal well-being. Part I concluded with an analysis of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower support for democracy. Part II of this study attempts to test different key hypotheses about different aspects. Chapter IV deals with issues related to the rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption are able to influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis itself, are used as additional control or predictor variables, but are not the central focus of analysis here.

Theoretical Background

Rule of law is a fundamental component of democracy. According to Guillermo O'Donnell (2004) a democratic regime depends not only on periodic and constant elections that are transparent and just, but also on the observance of, and respect for, the fundamental rights of the citizens that are part of the political community. Relatively recent studies have shown that problems such as crime and violence affect democracy (Koonings and Kruijt, 2004; Zinecker, 2007; Mendez, 1999). Moreover, criminal violence erodes citizen support for democratic institutions (Cruz, 2008; Pérez, 2003; Seligson and Booth, 2010). According to several studies, people who are victims of violence or insecurity in the public sphere tend to show lower support for democracy, seek authoritarian measures with more frequency, and are more willing to support coups.

Violence also affects democracy because under situations of great violence, many governments must face the dilemma of resorting to authoritarian solutions, which at times violate fundamental rights and the rule of law in order to deal with the level of instability created by the violence.³⁹ Therefore, violence affects not only the possibility of consolidating the rule of law, but also of building up democracy. Under conditions of insecurity, citizens seem more willing to support the sort of leadership that erodes public institutions from the inside (Cruz, 2000).

Lack of transparency is another problem affecting the rule of law and democracy. In a now classic study, Seligson discovered that victimization by corruption affects the level of citizen support for a stable democracy (Seligson 2002). Previous AmericasBarometer studies dedicated not only to El Salvador but also to other countries in the region have also demonstrated that this impact is widespread in different societies.

The wave of political transitions that swept across Latin America over the past three decades and led El Salvador to establishing democracy was fundamentally based on the installation of electoral and party institutions that made it possible to hold elections in an ongoing, periodic and relatively fair manner. A lot was achieved with the inclusion of groups that had been excluded from the political regime for decades, and with the opening of political liberties. However, within the realm of the rule of law, the transformations have been slower.⁴⁰ The problems of criminal violence and corruption continue to affect the social and political dynamics in El Salvador, and have held up the establishment of the rule of law in citizens' daily lives. In this chapter we explore the way in which problems of violence and corruption persist in affecting the process of democratic consolidation and the rule of law.

³⁹ See Pearce, 2010; Pinheiro, 2007; Koonings and Kruijt, 2004.

⁴⁰ For an overview of the contributions made by the peace process in constructing democracy see: Cordova, Ramos, and Loya, 2009.

Perception of Insecurity and Crime

As discussed in several previous AmericasBarometer reports for El Salvador, perceptions of crime and violence play an important role influencing attitudes of support for democracy. The actual levels of crime can affect the rule of law and political culture of support for democracy, but so can the perceptions of these levels and the feelings of insecurity they generate. In order to examine the overall impact that criminal violence has on support for democracy in El Salvador in 2010, in this section we present results concerning the perception of insecurity and crime victimization.

Perception of Insecurity

In order to measure Salvadorans' perception of insecurity, item AOJ11 was used once again. This is the item that measures citizens' feelings of insecurity in terms of four different levels. The item read as follows:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?

Results show that by 2010, a little over 44% of Salvadorans feel very or a little unsafe. That is, close to half of the population does not feel safe due to the levels of crime. These data can be best appreciated if they are put in perspective with the rest of the countries that participated in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer. To do this, the respondents' answers were coded into a 0 to 100 scale, where 100 is the highest level of insecurity, while 0 is the lowest, that is, where people feel the safest. With this in mind, it can be observed in Figure IV.1 that Salvadorans show the highest levels of perception of insecurity compared with Latin America and the Caribbean, except for Peru and Argentina.

It is noteworthy, however, that in statistical terms, the intervals of trust place El Salvador in the same group as Venezuela and Belize. In other words, aside from Peru and Argentina, in El Salvador, Venezuela and Belize, citizens express more fear due to criminal violence. According to many sources—with the exception of Argentina—these countries are part of the group of nations with the highest levels of criminal violence in the region; consequently, finding these levels of insecurity is not odd. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in other countries in the hemisphere where there are high levels of violence like Honduras and Jamaica, the levels of insecurity perceived by the population are much lower. In other words, the high levels of violence in those nations do not generate the same levels of insecurity that they generate in El Salvador or in Venezuela.




Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity in Latin America

Nevertheless, the perception of insecurity Salvadorans display is not always the same, and although the levels of insecurity in the population may vary according to the level of crime, it can also vary based on other conditions such as exposure to the media, direct experiences of victimization, and public events. Consider this, a massacre that has been highly publicized in the news media can affect public perception of security despite the fact that citizens are living in places that are very safe. All these conditions intervene in the citizens' perception of levels of security. For this reason, it is interesting to see that the levels of perceived insecurity in El Salvador have fluctuated significantly in the past four surveys (see Figure IV.2).




Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in El Salvador: 2006-2010

As can be seen, although the perception of insecurity seems to have evened out around 45 points (on a 0-100 scale) in the past six years, it actually underwent a significant decrease between 2006 and 2008, to then rise and reach the highest level of the feeling of insecurity in the past six years (although the difference between 2006 and 2010 is not significant). In other words, Salvadorans now feel more insecure than in the recent past. These attitudes may have considerable impact on the manner in which citizens perceive the institutions of the political system, and particularly the performance of the democratic regime.

Crime Victimization

One of the contributions of the AmericasBarometer of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is the periodic measurement of the levels of crime and violence victimization in the region. As noted before, criminal violence is one of the principal problems battering the Latin American region. Previous surveys asked respondents the following question: *Have you been the victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round the question was slightly modified and now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. The following items were used in the questionnaire in order to measure crime victimization.

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]** (88) Doesn't Know **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]** (98) Doesn't Answer **[Go to VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC2AA. Could you tell me in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**
 (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality (4) In another municipality (5) In another country
 (88) doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

As shown in Figure IV.3, almost a quarter of Salvadorans (24.2%) have been victims of a criminal event, while almost 40% of households in El Salvador have a member who was a victim of crime over the course of the past year. For the most part, violent events have taken place outside the victims' homes (79%), with a third taking place outside the municipality where they reside (Figure IV.4). This suggests that although an important percentage of violent events occurred within the home, the majority of victimization that was picked up by the AmericasBarometer in El Salvador, is personal, and is not related to violent public events.




Figure IV.3. Individual and Household Crime Victimization, 2010




Figure IV.4. Place of Crime Victimization

How do these levels of victimization in El Salvador compare with those in the rest of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in the 2010 LAPOP survey? Seen from a regional perspective, where does El Salvador turn up by comparison with the rest of the countries in the region? The AmericasBarometer results in the rest of the countries in the region place El Salvador within the group of nations with the highest levels of victimization, in the same group of countries as Venezuela and Mexico. El Salvador is in fact the Central American country with the highest levels of crime victimization, although Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica show similar levels of victimization.




Figure IV.5. Percentage of Persons that were victimized by Crime in the Americas, 2010

The survey also makes it possible, with certain reservations, to compare the levels of personal victimization and the results from previous years for the Salvadoran case (keeping in mind that the question was modified by LAPOP Central when preparing this survey). As seen in Figure IV.6, between 2004 and 2008 the levels of victimization ranged between 15% and 19%, which means that in 2010 there was a significant rise in the percentages of people who had been victims of violent acts (24.2%). However, it is not possible to sustain this conclusion with certainty due to the change in the victimization question's syntax compared with previous surveys. It is possible that the substantial change in percentages is due to the change in the question, whose wording leads respondents to recall specific victimization events that in general situations are overlooked, and it also leads to overlooking many others. Therefore, the rise in the victimization rates may not be precisely due to an actual increase in the incidence of violent crime. Accordingly, the bar corresponding to 2010 has not been included in the figure, and only the data corresponding to previous years have been presented, in order to provide a perspective on the past levels of victimization.




Figure IV.6. Crime Victimization in El Salvador in Previous Years: 2004-2008

The 2010 survey also makes it possible to explore the characteristics of people and the variables associated with the incidence of individual crime victimization. It is important to remember that the survey only measures part of victimization, the part that respondents are able and willing to report. Therefore, these results, like all those that come from public opinion surveys, must be interpreted in the right context. A good deal of the victimization reflected in the results of this survey involves public crimes that usually stem from an economic motivation (Moser and Winton 2002).

Keeping this in mind, we ran a regression to identify the variables associated with crime incidence in El Salvador. The results, which are shown in Figure IV.7, present some interesting associations. First, variables that in previous years had turned out to be statistically significant (gender and the perception that the police protect the community) do not appear relevant in the data from the 2010 survey. However, in the case of education, the data show that victimization tends to concentrate more in people with higher levels of education.




Figure IV.7. “Who is more likely to be a Crime Victim in El Salvador?” (2010)

Before proceeding, it is important to make a note about the interpretation of the results shown in the regression figures, where we have standardized all the variables and the zero line is shown with a blue vertical line. Each predictor that does not intersect this line is a significant predictor ($p < 0.05$). The coefficients to the right of the blue vertical indicate a positive effect by the independent variable on the dependent variable. Contrarily, coefficients that show up on the left of the zero axis indicate a negative effect.

Returning to the results in Figure IV.7, the regression reveals that variables like age, wealth, and the size of the respondent’s place of residence play an important role in the incidence of victimization. Figure IV.8 shows the impact of the significant variables on the model. Younger citizens, persons in higher levels of social-economic resources, and those who live in urban metropolitan areas tend to be more frequent victims of crime than the rest of the population. These overall results coincide with those obtained in previous years and suggest that there is consistency in the effect of such variables on crime.

However, there is a finding that is noteworthy in that it appears to contradict the measure of wealth variable. That finding shows that people who consider their family financial situation to be precarious because of insufficient wages tend to be more frequent victims of violence than people who consider their economic situation not to be so precarious. In other words, crime victimization is more frequent in those with more resources, but at the same time, this is so among those with greater economic problems. The bottom line is that people’s access to social-economic resources does not always correspond to their own perception of prosperity.

Yet one of the most significant variables in the incidence of violent crime, next to age, is gang presence in the respondent’s community of residence. This means that in those neighborhoods where gang presence is greater, the percentage of persons that have been victimized by crime is much higher. The aforementioned confirms the role that gangs play in the prevalence of crime in El Salvador. Although it is not possible to determine the percentage of crimes reported by citizens that are committed by gang members or young people associated with the gangs, these results indicate that the mere presence of gang members in the community increases the probabilities of becoming the victim of a criminal act.




Figure IV.8. Crime Victimization by Age, Size of Population, Gang Presence, and Family Economic Situation in El Salvador, 2010

Corruption

Theoretical Background

As in the case of crime and violence, corruption and a lack of transparency in public officials affect citizens' attitudes of support for the political system, that is, they affect democratic political culture. The notion that corruption can serve as "a lubricant" for the mechanisms that make the system run is long gone. On the contrary, lack of transparency is recognized as one of the principal problems in consolidating the rule of law, accountability, and the balance of power within the system. In previous years, studies by Seligson in Nicaragua, Seligson, Cruz and Cordova (1999), Cordova and Cruz (2006) in El Salvador have demonstrated the impact of corruption victimization on support for the democratic system (Seligson, Cordova and Cruz 1999). Moreover, these studies have also demonstrated that the problems of corruption are frequently associated with problems of political efficacy and the lack of citizen representation. In this section we explore the problem of corruption, measured through questions that refer to public officials in the act of requesting bribes, as we gather citizen perceptions on the prevalence of corruption and we measure its impact on democratic political culture.

Assessing Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These questions were originally tested in Nicaragua (Seligson, 1999, Seligson 1997) and have been honed and improved in different studies that have been carried out since then. Given that definitions of corruption

may differ from one culture to another, we avoided ambiguity by defining corrupt practices, asking things such as: “In the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We asked similar questions regarding bribes at the local government, the public schools, the workplace, the courts, health centers, and other places. This series yields two kinds of information. On the one hand, we can find out where corruption is the most frequent. It is also possible to construct a corruption victimization scale to be able to distinguish between respondents that have faced corrupt practices in only one place, and those that have been corruption victims in multiple institutional environments. As in the studies on crime victimization, it is assumed that having been a one-time only victim has different implications than having had multiple experiences with corruption.

The complete item series for corruption is as follows:

	INAP Didn't try or had no contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen everyday...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

We begin, however, our presentation on the results of the survey on the issue of corruption with a question that has more to do with perception of corruption in public officials. The question related to the issue of corruption measures perception (rather than victimization) and is presented below. Then, we present the results of this question.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]**
(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Perception of Corruption

The first thing worth noting is that 66.7% of Salvadorans consider that corruption in public officials is very or somewhat generalized (36.1% said very, while 30.6% said somewhat); a little over 25% consider that it is a little generalized, and only 8.2% believe it is not generalized.

The overall results in perception of corruption may appear to be quite elevated given that practically two thirds of the population considers that public officials are very or somewhat corrupt. Nonetheless, when these results are seen from a regional perspective, and they are compared with the results from the rest of the countries included in the sample, Salvadoran public opinion turns out to be one of the least critical, only more so than Uruguay and Suriname, whose levels of corruption as reported by international organizations are lower than those corresponding to El Salvador.⁴¹ Before continuing, it is necessary to explain that the results to this question were converted to a 0-100 scale, where 0 is the lowest level of perception of corruption, and 100 constitutes the highest. In fact, by observing the results in Figure IV.9, it can be seen that in El Salvador, the score for persons who consider government corruption to be widespread is the lowest for the entire Latin American region, except for Uruguay. In other words, despite the fact that the majority of Salvadorans consider government officials corrupt, this kind of perception is lower in El Salvador than in any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer, excepting Uruguay and Suriname.




Figure IV.9. Perception of Corruption in Latin America

Data also indicate that perception of government corruption has decreased in 2010 compared to previous years (Table VI.1 and Figure VI.10). While in 2006 and 2008 perception of government corruption was shared by

⁴¹ See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

almost 70% of the Salvadoran population, in 2010 the number of Salvadorans that believe public officials are corrupt dipped to 64%. Although the decline is only 6 percentage points, the difference is statistically significant enough to conclude that there has effectively been a reduction in the levels of perception of corruption among public officials.

Table IV.1. Perception of Corruption in Percentages, 2004-2010

How widespread is corruption among public officials?	2004	2006	2008	2010
Very	35.9	43.1	43.9	36.1
Somewhat	31.6	28.6	30.1	30.5
A little	26.5	21.4	20.9	25.4
Not at all	6.0	6.9	5.1	8.0

Given the informative nature of this report, it is not possible to explore the possible reasons for this decline, but it is important to ask oneself whether this might be linked to the change in government that took place in 2009.




Figure IV.10. Perception of Corruption in El Salvador 2004-2010

Corruption Victimization

As seen in the case of victimization by violence, the perception of corruption is one thing, and a personal episode of victimization by corruption is another very different matter. The former only alludes to the perception of a lack of transparency, and this can be determined by a great number of factors, among which a personal experience with corruption may not be included. The latter directly includes the incidents of corruption reported by citizens who were the victims of the act—or one of the participants. In this section we focus on the personal episodes of corruption.

The base variable used in measuring corruption was constructed by compiling all the corruption victimization items described above (EXC2-EXC16) into a single percentage. This way, the variable measures the percentage of persons who have been victims of any sort of bribe, whether they were the victims of a single incident or a number of such episodes, or if they experienced it in diverse forms, that is, at the hands of the police or at the hands of a local government official.

The results indicate that only a fraction of respondents have been victims of corruption in the form of different sorts of bribes in the year prior to survey application: 88.6% of Salvadorans had not faced an incident of bribery at the hands of public officials or government institutions.




Figure IV.11. Corruption Victimization in El Salvador 2010

In an index of all forms of victimization by bribery, the majority of citizens have been the victims of only one sort of bribery during the past year (9.4%), whereas a mere 1.6% have been the victims of two different kinds of bribery. The greater the number of forms of bribery, the smaller the percentages.




Figure IV.12. Total Index of Corruption Victimization in El Salvador 2010

Overall, the general percentage of people who have been the victims of corruption by bribery seems low, particularly when compared with the two thirds of citizens who declared that corruption by public officials was

very or somewhat generalized. However, upon comparing these data with the rest of the countries in the region, the results clearly indicate that El Salvador is not among the countries with the highest levels of corruption (Figure IV.13). On the contrary, this Central American country is listed among the group of countries with the lowest levels of corruption victimization. Moreover, judging by the error intervals in the figure (the gray areas in each bar), there are no significant differences between El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica, or Trinidad & Tobago.




Figure IV.13. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

The apparent low level of corruption victimization compared to the rest of the region seems to stem from a decrease in the percentages of corruption in El Salvador in recent years. Although this decrease does not seem to reach statistically significant levels (see Figure IV.13) when compared with more recent years, there has actually been a downward tendency in reports of bribery in the AmericasBarometer surveys, at least in comparison with the levels registered for 2004.




Figure IV.14. Percentage of the Population that has been Victim of Corruption in El Salvador: 2004-2010

The 2010 AmericasBarometer data for El Salvador indicate that corruption victimization is associated with certain of the victims' personal characteristics; on the other hand, it is also related to the environment that the victims live in. In order to establish the variables that are associated with victimization by bribery, we again used a logistic regression incorporating several factors that might be at the bottom of the incidence of corruption.

The results indicate that age and gender are personal variables that are significantly associated with victimization by bribery. On the other hand, in economic terms, the most frequent victims are those that are in the higher levels on the social-economic scale (see quintiles of wealth), but likewise those who consider themselves to be in precarious economic conditions, that is, people who say that their salary does not cover all their expenses. Here again we find the same contradiction that was found in the previous section regarding crime victimization.




Figure IV.15. Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption in El Salvador? (2010)

Yet the most interesting data in the predictors of victimization by bribery are those that suggest that the size of the city where the respondent lives and the presence of police who do not protect citizens affect the likelihood of becoming a victim of corruption. In the first case, the results indicate that the people who live in larger cities are more likely to have to pay a bribe, or a “mordida” (a bite) as it is commonly referred to in El Salvador. In other words, the residents of towns or rural areas seem to be less likely to become victims of corruption. These results need to be approached with caution, however, particularly because they may be reflecting a higher frequency of reporting in metropolitan areas than in rural areas, where exchange with public officials is much less frequent. That is, the differences between large cities and small towns and the rural areas cannot be due solely to the frequency in which bribery takes place, rather it might be due to the fact that citizens interact less with public officials, and have less exposure to the attitudes related to corruption: the inhabitants of the large or more populated cities may be more exposed to abuse from authorities than the inhabitants of rural areas.

On the other hand, data also show that in communities where the police are not perceived to be protectors of the population, the rates of bribery tend to be higher. Actually, this might be an inverse relation, that is, people have this perception of the police precisely because they have been the victims of police abuse. However, it is important to maintain this variable in order to emphasize the conditions where corruption against the citizens takes place. Basically, in a community where the police delegation is known for problems of abuse and ties with crime, the citizens are more susceptible to becoming victims of police corruption because their involvement with crime makes them have less respect for the law and codes of conduct.




Figure IV.16. Corruption Victimization by Gender, Age, Place of Residence, and the Opinion that the Police Protect Citizens in El Salvador, 2010

These relationships can all be appreciated more clearly in the graphs in the previous figure (Figure IV.16). For instance, men are victimized by bribery at a rate almost double that of women. People between the ages of 26 and 35 suffered bribery in more than double the number of occasions compared with the following age group (36 to 45). As suggested by the regression graph, the people who live in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area were victims of corruption by almost 20%, which is much more than in any other place on Salvadoran territory. Finally, communities where the police are perceived to be incapable of protecting citizens, instances of corruption are almost double (13.6%) compared with communities where the police are seen in a positive light (7.5%).

So far we have looked at overall corruption victimization, but as was said before, there are different experiences of victimization by bribery. Figure IV.17 presents the results for each of the experiences of corruption. As can be seen, the police (6%), courts (4.3%), and city halls (4.1%) get the highest scores for incidences of bribery in the past year. We must clarify that in the case of the courts, the number of cases is lower, given that it only applies to people who have gone to the courts in the past 12 months, therefore the confidence interval is significantly greater).




Figure IV.17. Victimization by Types of Bribery, El Salvador, 2010

The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Democracy

How do problems such as insecurity, crime victimization and corruption victimization affect support for democracy? Previous years have shown that problems related to deficiencies in the operation of the rule of law also affect public support for democracy as preferred regime. Moreover, problems like crime victimization and corruption may also promote attitudes that support a military coup d'état. In Chapter III we examined general opinions regarding support for a military coup. In this section we concentrate on the circumstances that people consider would justify a coup. The recent case in Honduras is a sad reminder that military uprisings are still feasible in Central America and, considering the tortuous political history of the region, any clues that might help understand the way support for democracy falters is very useful in preventing possible conflicts and contributing to the process of strengthening democracy in the region.

In this sense, the AmericasBarometer's findings provide different ways of understanding the manner in which the problems that are related to the rule of law have an impact on support for democracy. One of them is comprised of the results of the items that refer to support for coups. The items collect the citizens' opinions on the justification of the occurrence of a coup due to three different hypothetical scenarios: high unemployment, a lot of crime, and a lot of corruption.⁴²

The results are very eloquent. A little over one half of Salvadorans, that is, one in two citizens believes that a coup d'état would be justified in conditions of a lot of crime and a lot of corruption. By contrast, only one in five Salvadorans think a coup is justified by high unemployment. These results suggest that problems like insecurity and corruption have considerable impact on the country's political stability (Figure IV.18). This in no way means that Salvadorans are willing and ready to support a coup. The data really only reflects the citizen's opinions on

⁴² The details of the wording for the questions were presented in Chapter III. See footnote 37.

conditions that generate more discontent toward the political regime, which they consider to be factors that justify a coup d'état.




Figure IV.18. Opinion on Different Conditions that Might Justify a Military Coup

Nevertheless, the best way to measure the impact of the problems of security and transparency, that is, problems related to the rule of law, on support for the political system is an empirical analysis of the impact. To do this, a linear regression was created using the variable system support (PSA5) as the dependent variable, and the variables that have to do with insecurity, corruption and the rule of law as the independent variables. The regression also included basic control variables such as individual and demographic characteristics and perceptions of economic performance. The results can be seen in Figure IV.19).

Overall, it can be seen that the factors associated with the rule of law have significant impact, at least at the level of public opinion, on support for the political system. The perception of insecurity, the impression that the police protect citizens in the community, victimization, and the perception of corruption affect support for a stable democracy. In the group of variables related to insecurity and the rule of law, only personal experience of crime victimization and the perception that gangs affect the neighborhood of residence have no impact on support for the system.

Other variables such as the perception of the national economy, the family's situation, and the economic standing of respondents themselves have a substantial impact on support for the democratic system. These findings seem to confirm the idea that economic variables play a fundamental role in support for a stable democracy. Along with these variables, the more political factors like the perception of government performance and interest in politics also have an effect on support for democracy in El Salvador. In fact, people that are more interested in politics and have a positive perception of governmental performance show greater support for the prevailing political system.




Figure IV.19. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in El Salvador (2010)

Returning to the variables related to rule of law, the impact of variables for insecurity and corruption occurs just as anticipated. Figure IV.20 shows the relationship between variables that are related to corruption and support for the system. In corruption victimization we used the variable EXCTOT, that is, the number of forms for victimization by corruption, instead of the absolute victim/non-victim variable. As seen in both kinds of cases—those that have to do with corruption and those that have to do with perception of corruption—respondents that had dealt with more corruption and had perceived more corruption among public officials showed significantly reduced levels of support for the system (see Figure IV.19).




Figure IV.20. Impact of Corruption Victimization and Perception of Corruption on System Support in El Salvador (2010)

The same type of relationship is found with regard to the perception of insecurity and the opinion of police performance. The charts in Figure IV.21 show that as people feel more insecure due to criminal violence, their support for the political system is significantly reduced. In terms of scoring, this means they have gone from an average of 63 on the scale of support for the political system, to an average of 54. Likewise, people who perceive that the police in the community protect citizens show greater support for the political system than people who believe the police do not protect them, or are involved in crime.




Figure IV.21. Impact of Perception of Insecurity and Opinion of Police Performance on System Support in El Salvador (2010)

Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

An important element of the rule of law is citizens’ conviction that government institutions—and not just citizens—must respect laws when accomplishing their aims. The high levels of violence and perceptions of insecurity put these convictions to the test. Insecurity could lead many citizens to justify law enforcement agencies overlooking laws in order to achieve security. Therefore, it is important to measure the extent to which the population is willing to support solutions that threaten the rule of law in order to combat crime and insecurity around the country.

In order to measure these attitudes, we again used question AOJ8, whose wording is shown in the box below. This item has been used in previous years and has always shown that there is an important percentage of Salvadorans willing to approve the idea of the authorities crossing the line between what is legal and what is not. In the 2010 round, the results show that a little over half of Salvadorans are in favor of the authorities acting outside the law to apprehend criminals. This means that the Salvadoran population is divided almost in two regarding support for the rule of law, and a significant percentage of Salvadorans tend to disregard the rule of law.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer



Figure IV.22. Support for Rule of Law in El Salvador (2010)

Put in perspective, these results are cause for great concern. A comparison of the 2010 round data with those obtained in prior years clearly indicates there has been erosion in support for rule of law in the population (see Figure IV.23). Support for the rule of law has gradually decreased from 65.3%, that is, two thirds of the population in 2004, to 56% in 2006, to 55.4% in 2008, down to 47.4% in 2010.




Figure IV.23. Support for the Rule of Law in El Salvador over Time (2010)

In regional terms, this makes El Salvador one of the countries where rule of law has the lowest population backing in 2010, at the same level as Peru, and only above Ecuador (Figure IV.24). This could be the result of the high levels of violence that have affected this small Central American country for over a decade, and the impact this has had on political attitudes of support for democracy. A string of failed security policies, the growth of

criminal groups like juvenile gangs and drug-traffickers, and the revelation in the press of high government officials' involvement in criminal activities could contribute to a context that erodes support for the rule of law.




Figure IV.24. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective

In order to determine which factors immediately affect support for the rule of law, we proceeded to create a logistic regression using respect for the rule of law as the dependent variable, and as independent variables we used data on insecurity, victimization, as well as trust in the law enforcement agencies and the justice system. We also included the demographic control variables. The results indicate that, of all the variables related to the issue of security and the institutions of justice, only the perception of insecurity and trust in the justice system appear to be predictors of respect for the rule of law. That is, citizens that perceive more insecurity show a decreasing level of support for the rule of law, and are more willing to approve of the police disregarding the law in order to fight crime. In the case of the justice system, the regression results indicate that a high level of trust in the institutions of the justice system contributes to maintaining citizen respect for the rule of law.




Figure IV.25. Determinants of Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in El Salvador, 2010

Two things can be said about these results. First, the erosion of support for the rule of law coincides with the trend that was found in the 2010 round showing the rise of insecurity due to crime over the past two years in El Salvador. In other words, underlying the decline in citizen respect for the rule of law, there is an increase in public insecurity due to crime. Second, the citizens' perceptions of the justice system have an influence on support for the rule of law.

There is, however, a third observation in these results, which has not been mentioned. This has to do with the impact of age, the only demographic variable that was a predictor in support of respect for the rule of law in El Salvador. Data shown in figures IV.25 and IV.26 suggest that the younger Salvadorans tend to show less support than the rest of the citizens. Actually, the percentage of Salvadoran citizens who support respect for the rule of law is only 40% among young people; it increases significantly in the group of people aged 45 to 56, and is particularly high (by Salvadoran standards) among people over the age of 66. This new observation is cause of great concern in that it suggests that—compared with other age groups—the new generations feel less attachment to the rule of law, and are willing to tolerate the authorities violating the law to deal with insecurity.




Figure IV.26. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law by Age Groups, El Salvador

Conclusions

In this chapter we have examined Salvadorans' opinions regarding the rule of law and the conditions that affect the way it works in the Salvadoran democracy. We have seen that crime victimization is still a significant problem in the lives of citizens, and, along with other factors, it contributes to insecurity and the erosion of support for the Salvadoran political system. The results of the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer in El Salvador also show a surge in the perception of insecurity and a possible increase in the levels of victimization by criminal violence.

Similarly, the perception of a lack of transparency, expressed in the events of victimization by bribery and in opinions that there is generalized corruption among public officials, affects support for the Salvadoran political system. This becomes even more evident when asking Salvadorans about the circumstances they feel would justify a military coup. Corruption and crime show up as the fundamental reasons over half of the citizens cite as justifying a coup d'état. Conversely, when it comes to unemployment, only 18% would back a military coup. However, these results need to be interpreted more as an evaluation of the impact of the security and transparency problems, than as a predictor of mobilization against the constitutional order. In other words, these results do not suggest that Salvadorans are promoting a coup; they only reflect opinion trends.

Perhaps one of the most important findings in this chapter is that the support of respect for the rule of law, that is, the conviction that the authorities must adhere to the rule of law, has decreased substantially in recent years, particularly as a product of the perceptions of insecurity and lack of trust in the institutions of the justice system. Moreover, the downturn seems to be more evident in the younger age groups, suggesting an unfortunate trend in the new generations of citizens.

Appendix

Appendix IV.1. Determinants of Crime Victimization

Crime Victimization		
	Coef.	t
Education	0.059	(1.91)
Woman	-0.035	(-1.14)
Age	-0.151*	(-5.27)
Quintiles of wealth	0.113*	(3.90)
Family Economic Situation	-0.063*	(-2.27)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.086*	(-3.52)
Police Protect Citizens	-0.013	(-0.59)
Gangs Affect Neighborhood	0.142*	(5.74)
Constant	-0.004	(-0.18)
R-squared = 0.095		
N. of cases = 1431		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV.2. Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Percentage of Victims of Corruption		
	Coefficients	(t)
Age	-0.407*	(-4.16)
Education	-0.063	(-0.55)
Woman	-0.370*	(-3.66)
Family Economic Situation	-0.249*	(-3.08)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.312*	(3.31)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.248*	(-2.55)
Police Protect Citizens	-0.270*	(-2.71)
Constant	-2.210*	(-22.47)
F = 12.67		
N. of cases = 1439		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV.3. Determinants of Variables of Rule of Law and System Support

System Support		
	Coef.	t
Crime Victimization	0.019	(0.70)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.068*	(-2.47)
Gangs Affect Neighborhood	-0.045	(-1.62)
Police Protect Citizens	0.122*	(5.05)
Victim of Corruption	-0.097*	(-3.20)
Perception of Corruption	-0.089*	(-2.63)
Perception of National Economy	0.125*	(5.76)
Family Economic Situation	0.086*	(2.79)
Education	-0.150*	(-5.24)
Woman	0.055*	(2.32)
Age	-0.000	(-0.00)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.071*	(-2.76)
Size of Place of Residence	0.101*	(3.72)
Evaluation of Government	0.148*	(5.80)
Interest in Politics	0.113*	(4.38)
Constant	-0.005	(-0.23)
R-squared = 0.191		
N. of cases = 1407		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV.4. Determinants of Support for Respect of the Rule of Law

Respect for Rule of Law		
	Coefficients	(t)
Crime Victimization	-0.059	(-1.02)
Perception of insecurity	-0.119*	(-2.20)
Trust in the Justice System	0.156*	(2.85)
How much do you trust the National Civil Police	0.065	(0.90)
Police Protect Citizens	0.021	(0.33)
Gangs Affect Neighborhood	-0.099	(-1.56)
Education	0.029	(0.45)
Woman	0.047	(0.87)
Age	0.226*	(4.52)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.025	(0.37)
Family Economic Situation	-0.079	(-1.21)
Size of Place of Residence	0.000	(0.00)
Constant	-0.140*	(-2.17)
F = 6.19		
N. of cases = 1414		
* p<0.05		

Chapter V . Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

This chapter deals with the way in which Salvadorans' political attitudes support democratic political stability. It is comprised of seven sections, and the first section presents the theoretical background as context; the second examines the level of support for the political system; the third deals with the issue of political tolerance; the fourth is about support for stable democracy. The fifth section looks at satisfaction with democracy, followed by an analysis of support for democracy as a political regime, to end with a rundown of the conclusions.

Theoretical Background

Legitimacy of the political system has long been regarded as a crucial element for democratic stability.⁴³ New research has stressed the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, et al., 2005) in many areas of democracy (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Gilley, 2009). This chapter seeks to deepen the understanding of political legitimacy, first through a retrospective overview of prior studies published by LAPOP, specifically those that analyze the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as predictors of democratic stability. Next, it examines a much broader series of political institutions that are used in the analysis of legitimacy.

The Equation of Legitimacy and Tolerance

AmericasBarometer studies previously defined political legitimacy in terms of “support for the system,” which, when combined with tolerance for political opposition, can produce warning signs that might be useful in locating the democracies in the region that are particularly fragile. The theory suggests that both attitudes (support for the system and political tolerance) are necessary for there to be long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political system, and be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, a majority government can coexist with minority rights, a combination of attributes considered typical in the definition of democracy (Seligson, 2000). The schema presented in Table V.1 shows all the possible theoretical combinations for system support and tolerance, when both variables are divided into high and low levels.

The following items were used in creating the “system support” index:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers [0-7] provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you believe the courts in El Salvador guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** *If you believe the courts do not ensure justice at all then choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point between the two*)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of El Salvador?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of El Salvador?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of El Salvador?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of El Salvador?

⁴³ Even dictatorships like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they do not achieve this, they can resort to coercion. In a democracy, governments that attempt to use coercion tend to fall apart swiftly.

The items used to create the “political tolerance” index are the following:

- The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in El Salvador. Please continue using the 10-point ladder.
- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the Salvadoran form of government, not just the incumbent government, but also the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: **[Probe: To what degree?]**
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to **conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Salvadoran form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to **make speeches**?

Table V.1. Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

System Support (Legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Table V.1 shows the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. Let us review each cell, one at a time. Political systems populated by citizens with high levels of system support and political tolerance would create more stability. This prediction is based on the idea that it is necessary to have a high level of support in a non-coercive environment for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system and they are at liberty to act, it may be inevitable for there to be an eventual change in the system. Systems that are stable, however, are not necessarily democratic unless minority rights are respected. Such respect could come from constitutional guarantees, of course, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for these minorities to run for public office and be elected into public office. Under these conditions, of course, the majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are politically legitimate (demonstrated by positive support for the system) and whose citizens are reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities are likely to enjoy democratic stability (Dahl 1971).

When system support is high, but political tolerance is low, the system may remain stable (given that the system has a high level of support), but democracy can be in danger in the medium term. Such systems could move toward a kind of authoritarian government (oligarchy) where democratic rights could be restricted.

The two lower cells in Table V.1 show a hypothetical situation in which there is a low level of support for the political system, and can be directly linked to situations of instability. This instability, however, does not necessarily imply a decrease in civil liberties, because instability may obligate the system to deepen its democracy, particularly when there are values of political tolerance. Therefore, in those situations where there are low levels of system support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict whether instability will yield greater democratization or a prolonged period of instability, perhaps characterized by considerable violence, which is the reason it is described as “democratic instability.” On the other hand, in situations of low system support and low tolerance, there can be a break with democracy. Evidently, democratic breakdown cannot be predicted only on the basis of public opinion data, given that there are many other crucial factors that can unleash this event, such as the role of the elite, the position of the military and support/opposition by international actors. What is true is that political systems are more vulnerable to democratic breakdown when significant sectors of the population support neither the country’s basic institutions, nor the rights of minorities, which is why this scenario is described as “democracy at risk.”

It is important to keep in mind two restrictions in this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to political systems that are already institutionally democratic. In other words, they are systems where regular and competitive elections are held, and in which widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes

in an authoritarian system would have entirely different consequences. For instance, a low level of system support and a high level of tolerance could result in the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democratic government. Second, it is assumed that, in the long run, the elite's attitudes, and those of the masses, have an impact on the kind of regime. The attitudes and kind of prevailing system can be incongruous for many years. As Seligson and Booth demonstrated in the case of Nicaragua, this incongruousness may have aided in the eventual downfall of the Somoza government. However, the case of Nicaragua was that of an authoritarian government where repression had been long used to keep the regime in place, perhaps despite the citizens' tolerant attitudes (Booth and Seligson, 1991; Booth and Seligson, 1994; Seligson and Booth, 1993).

Support for the Political System

As noted in the previous section, in order to analyze belief in the legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system we will use a legitimacy scale developed by LAPOP called "Political Support/Alienation." This scale seeks to measure the degree to which citizens support their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent government. In political science literature this phenomenon is called "diffuse support" or "system support" as well.⁴⁴

Figure V.1 presents the average results for each of the questions: the courts (45.0) and basic rights (48.3) exhibit the lowest levels; at the mid-level we find pride in living under the political system (58.8), and at the highest levels are system support (70.2) and respect for institutions (71.3).




Figure V.1. Components of Support for the Political System in El Salvador, 2010

Since we have data from the surveys done in 2004, 2006, and 2008, it is possible to observe the evolution of the levels of system support for the period 2004-2010 (Figure V.2). In the next figure we can see the evolution of the five items. Overall for the 2004-2008 period there is an identifiable downward tendency for four questions

⁴⁴ The questions used were noted in the previous section: B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6. The coding system for these variables was originally based on a 1-7 point scale (going from "nothing" to "a lot"), but to make these results easier to understand, they have been converted to a more familiar metric scale with a 0-100 range. Specifically, a 1 point measure was taken from each variable to give them all a 0-6 range, and then the resulting number was divided by 6 to give the scale a 0-1 range, which was then multiplied by 100, to give it a 0-100 range.

(courts, basic rights, pride and support); whereas, respect for institutions increases from 2004 to 2006 but then declines in 2008; and in the 2010 survey this declining tendency is reverted, as there is an observable increase in the five questions, although only in three of them is this statistically significant (basic rights, pride and support).




Figure V.2. Components in Support for Political System over Time, 2004-2010

Based on the five questions, a scale was constructed to measure system support. The scale is an average of the five items shown before.⁴⁵ Figure V.3 presents the results of the surveys from the 2004-2010 period. System support can be seen steadily declining in the 2004-2008 period: an average of 59.5 points on a 0-100 scale in 2004, 55.4 in 2006, and 51.8 in 2008, and since 2010⁴⁶ there is an important increase to 58.7 points, which is statistically significant, reaching a level close to what it had been at in 2004.

⁴⁵ In order not to lose a significant number of respondents, when three or more out of five items were answered by the respondent, an average of the answers for those items was created. When the respondents answered less than three items, they were eliminated from the study.

⁴⁶ For the 2010 survey, the confident coefficient for the system support scale is .740.




Figure V.3 Support for the Political System by Year, 2004-2010

Analyzing the El Salvador data in the case of the 2010 survey and comparing it with the other countries that were taken into account in this study, the increase in the levels of system support place our country in a relatively high position. Out of 25 countries included in this study, El Salvador is located under Uruguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia and Panama.




Figure V.4. Support for Political System in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Previous studies reported that a significant political variable that explains these different levels of system support has been the respondents’ political preferences. Correspondingly, ARENA voters interviewed in previous surveys exhibited a higher level of system support, whereas those who sympathized with other parties showed a medium level, and the FMLN partisans had the lowest level of support for the system (Cordova & Cruz, 2008; Cordova & Cruz, 2006). An argument that has been discussed is precisely whether these differences are in any way related to the party that was in power and those that were in the opposition.

Presently we suggest the hypothesis that, due to the fact that after the March 2009 elections there has been alternance in the party in control of the executive branch, currently partisans of president Funes and the FMLN party should exhibit a higher level of support for the system, whereas this should decrease for partisans of the ARENA party. However, when we analyze the data from the 2010 survey, we can see that there has been a significant increase for partisans of FMLN/Funes (from 40 in 2008 to 58.3 in 2010). However, in the case of partisans of ARENA/Avila there has been practically no variation (from 59.4 in 2008 to 59.6 in 2010). Subsequently, in the 2010 survey there are no statistically significant differences between the partisans of either political party.




Figure V.5. Support for the Political System by Candidate Respondent Voted for in March 2009 Presidential Race, 2010

It was noted in the first part of this report that the process and results of the 2009 elections, along with the expectations of change that were generated with the new government, as well as the high levels of approval for president Funes, are aspects that constitute a new political context that this data needs to be analyzed in.

We started looking for an explanation for the differences in the levels of system support in terms of political factors, and we considered the particular environment that the March 2009 presidential elections took place in: (a) the withdrawal or non-registration of candidates for other political parties (PCN, PDC, and CD) leaving the race up to only two parties; and, (b) with Mauricio Funes as candidate, voters and sympathizers were attracted from beyond the ranks of hard-core FMLN voters (Cordova and Loya, 2009; Nevitt, 2009); therefore, we considered it appropriate to turn to other variables beyond party/candidate the respondents voted for – or sympathize with. The following figure presents the results of a multiple regression analysis with predictors of system support when each of the other variables is constant. In Appendix V.1 (at the end of this chapter) we present the coefficients. There are basically eight statistically significant predictors: ideology, perception of government economic performance, perception of the national economy, satisfaction with democracy, age, education, place of residence, and corruption victimization.




Figure V.6 Predictors of System Support in El Salvador, 2010

Of the set, we will only present three in their bivariate relationships; they refer to factors that are eminently political. The following figure presents the level of system support with regards to the perception of government economic performance⁴⁷, which is understood as a proxy variable for identifying with the new government and its policies. In Figure V.7, it can be seen that as there is an increase in a positive evaluation of government handling of the economy, there is also an increase in the level of system support. That is, those who believe the government is handling the economy well exhibit a greater level of system support.




Figure V.7 System Support by Perception of Government Economic Performance in El Salvador, 2010

⁴⁷ The Government Economic Performance scale was based on items N1 and N2. The coding system was originally based on a 1-7 point scale, but it has been converted to a 0-100 format. Additionally, questions on the Government Economic Performance scale and the evaluation of whether the current government is handling the economy well (N15) are highly correlated (0.79). In Appendix V.2 we show the relation between them with regards to the ideology variable, but in the statistical model and in this section we only report the former.

The following figure presents the level of system support regarding a left-right ideological scale respondents can identify themselves on.⁴⁸ It can be seen that the level of support for the system increases slightly as the ideological scale moves from the left to the right, although there is an increase for those that place themselves in a central position (value 4) and a decrease for those that place themselves more to the right (value 10).




Figure V.8 System Support by Ideology Scale

Due to the importance of these two variables in explaining the levels of system support, the following figure presents the distribution of perceptions of government performance on a left-right scale. It can be seen that those that place themselves in the left or center-left positions of the scale have a more positive evaluation of government economic performance, and that this decreases as the scale moves to the right. As noted previously, the question about government economic performance works as a proxy variable for identification with the government and its policies.

⁴⁸ Question L1 on the questionnaire: “Now to change the subject, on this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. One means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?”




Figure V.9 Perception of Government Economic Performance by Ideological Scale in El Salvador, 2010

The following figure presents the level of system support regarding satisfaction with the way democracy works.⁴⁹ Here we can see that as there is an increase level of satisfaction with the way democracy works, to that degree there is an increment in the level of system support. That is, those who feel more satisfied with the way democracy works exhibit a greater level of support for the system.




Figure V.10 System Support by Satisfaction with Democracy, El Salvador, 2010

⁴⁹ Question PN4 recoded in a 0-100 format.

Extended Series of System Support Items

Several additional items were included as part of an extended series on support for the system. In Figure V.11 we can see the results for the survey that was carried out in 2010. First, it must be noted that the Catholic Church has been included in the set of institutions, although it is not a component in the democratic political system. This was done in order to use the Catholic Church as a reference point in the comparison of the different political institutions, given that it enjoys high levels of trust among the population of Latin America. The set of institutions that have the highest levels of trust are the Armed Forces (67.7), the National Government (67.6), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (65.4), and the Catholic Church (62.8). The second set of institutions involves trust in the elections (59.3), the local government (59.2), the mass media (59.1), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (54.9), the Supreme Court of Justice (54.1), the Legislative Assembly (52.1), and trust in the justice system (51.3). There is a third group with the National Civil Police (49.3) and political parties (39.1), which show the lowest levels of trust.




Figure V.11. Trust in the Institutions in El Salvador, 2010

Figure V.12 presents trust in institutions, and compares the results from different years: 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. It is noteworthy that in the period 2004-2006 there is an overall decline in citizens' trust in different institutions, which continues its downward trend in 2008, although with some variations: between 2004 and 2006, practically the same level of trust is maintained in the offices of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Attorney General, but they both decline in 2008, and the only institution that increases in 2008 in relation to 2006 is the Catholic Church. The survey in 2010 compared with that in 2008 shows a reversal in this trend, as different aspects show an increase in trust, with some distinctions, though. The case of national government showed the only increase that surpasses the high point in previous surveys, and it is statistically significant as well. In five institutions, the data for 2010 almost come to the same level as the previous highest measurement (which is 2004).

This is also the case of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Legislative Assembly, and political parties. In a couple of cases, the increase is important but is below the highest 2004 levels (Supreme Electoral Tribunal and trust in elections). In three cases there is a slight increase, or it remains the same in 2010, but still remains lower than in 2004 (Catholic Church, mass media, and local government). And in the case of the National Civil Police, the increase is very small, staying almost at the same level as it was in 2008, but below that of 2006 and even lower than 2004. One hypothesis is that some of these improvements in the levels of citizen trust are directly related to the 2009 election process and its results (in the case of the national government, the elections, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Legislative Assembly, and the political parties).




Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions, 2004-2010

When comparing the levels of trust in the different institutions between 2004 and 2010, some differences turn up. Only three institutions show an increase greater than the value for 2004, a significant case being that of the national government (7 points). It is relatively low in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (0.9) and the Human Rights Ombudsman (0.5).

Political Tolerance

As was pointed out in the first section, in order to analyze the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador, we are going to use a scale developed by LAPOP. The questionnaire included four items that referred to four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, the right to carry out peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of speech of those people that speak badly of the form of government in El Salvador.⁵⁰

In Figure V.13 we can see the average for each one of the questions in the 2010 survey: peaceful demonstration (53.1), the right to vote (50.1), freedom of speech (39.8), and running for public office (37.4).




Figure V.13. Components of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2010

Thanks to the availability of sets of data from the surveys done in 2004, 2006 and 2008, it is possible to observe the evolution of the levels of political tolerance for the period 2004-2010. Figure VI.14 shows the evolution of the four questions used for the construction of the political tolerance scale over the years. Overall, there is a noticeable and statistically significant decline in the four items; the widest gap registered is that for freedom of speech (from 51.5 to 39.8).

⁵⁰ The coding system for these variables was originally based on a 0-10 format, but to make these results easier to understand, they have been converted to a 0-100 range. The questions used were noted in the first section: D1, D2, D3, and D4.




Figure V.14. Components of Political Tolerance per Year, 2004-2010

Based on the four questions, we constructed a scale in order to measure political tolerance.⁵¹ This scale is an average of the four items shown previously.⁵² Figure V.15 presents the results for the surveys carried out in the 2004-2010 period. As can be seen, tolerance increases from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006. Then it slips slightly to 54.2 in 2008, and later contracts to 45.1 in 2010. This decline places the level of political tolerance in 2010 even lower than that registered for 2004, the initial measuring year in the survey.

⁵¹ In order not to lose a significant number of respondents, when the respondents answered two or more of the four items, an average of the responses to those items was calculated. When the respondent answered fewer than two items they were eliminated.

⁵² In the 2010 survey, the reliability alpha for the Political Tolerance scale is .782.




Figure V.15. Political Tolerance in El Salvador per Year, 2004-2010

Analyzing the data collected for the case of El Salvador in the 2010 survey by comparison with other countries included in this study, our country is placed lowest (Figure V.16), while the highest places are occupied by the United States, Argentina, and Costa Rica.




Figure V.16. Compared Political Tolerance, 2010

Previous studies have reported that an important political variable that helps explain the differences in the levels of political tolerance has been the respondents' own political preferences. Consequently, in previous surveys ARENA voters exhibited a lower level of political tolerance, while other parties' supporters exhibited an intermediate level, and FMLN partisans exhibited the highest level of political tolerance (Córdova & Cruz, 2008; Córdova & Cruz, 2006). The ongoing discussion is whether these differences are at all related to the party that was in office, and those that were in the opposition.

We propose the hypothesis that due to the alternance following the last elections, now the supporters of the ARENA party should exhibit a higher level of tolerance, whereas it should decrease in supporters of president Funes and the FMLN party. However, when analyzing the data from the 2010 survey, we see that for ARENA supporters it shows practically no variation (going from 45.8 in 2008 to 45.2 in 2010); but for the FMLN/Funes supporters there has been a significant decrease (from 69.1 in 2008 to 46.3 in 2010). Consequently, the 2010 survey shows no statistically significant differences between the supporters of ARENA (45.2) and those of Funes/FMLN (46.3).




Figure V.17. Political Tolerance by Candidate Voted for in the March 2009 Presidential Race, 2010

In order to explore the reasons for these differences in terms of political factors, we consider it timely to make use of other variables beyond the party/candidate the respondents voted for – or sympathize with. The following figure presents the results of a multiple regression analysis using the predictors of political tolerance when each of the other variables remains constant. The coefficients are presented in Appendix V.3 (end of chapter). Fundamentally there are three statistically significant predictors: sex, age, and perception of government economic performance.




Figure V.18. Predictors of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2010

The following figure presents the level of political tolerance by sex, and it can be seen that women tend to be less tolerant than men.




Figure V.19. Political Tolerance by Sex in El Salvador, 2010

The figure that follows presents the level of political tolerance by age group. In this case there is a “U” shaped behavior, where the highest levels of tolerance are at either end of the “U”.




Figure V.20. Political Tolerance by Age Groups in El Salvador, 2010

The next figure presents the level of political tolerance by government economic performance. In this case an inverted “U” is seen.




Figure V.21. Political Tolerance by Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2010

Given the importance that the reduction of the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador and the limitations of attempting to explain this using the model that was presented, it is suggested that future studies work on this in-depth.

Support for Stable Democracy

As noted in the theoretical background, in this section we will analyze the empirical relationship between political tolerance and system support in El Salvador. In Table V.2 we can see that 25.7% of respondents are in the Stable Democracy quadrant. Then, 41.7% appear in the authoritarian stability quadrant, which is the quadrant with the highest concentration. Further, 10.8% are located in the unstable democracy quadrant, and 21.8% in the democracy at risk quadrant.

Table V.2. Empirical Relation between System Support and Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2010

System Support	Political Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 25.7%	Authoritarian Stability 41.7%
	Low	Unstable Democracy 10.8%

These results can be placed in historical perspective, as data are on hand from the surveys that were done in 2004, 2006 and 2008. In Table V.3 the evolution of the four quadrants can be observed. The “stable democracy” quadrant stays at 32.2% in 2004 and 2006, decreases to 23.4% in 2008 and increases to 25.7% in 2010. This is mainly due to the rise in system support. The “authoritarian stability” quadrant shrinks from 34.6% in 2004 to 27.4% in 2006, then it grows back to 29.3% in 2008, and then it shoots up to 41.7% in 2010. The “unstable democracy” quadrant climbs from 17.2% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2006, rising to 26.9% in 2008, and then dropping to 10.8% in 2010. Finally, the “democracy at risk” quadrant goes from 16% in 2004 to 15.8% in 2006, swelling to 20.5% in 2008 and gaining again at 21.8% in 2010.

Table V.3. Empirical Relation between System Support and Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2004-2010

System Support	Political Tolerance							
	High				Low			
High	Stable Democracy				Authoritarian Stability			
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2004	2006	2008	2010
	32.2%	32.2%	23.4%	25.7%	34.6%	27.4%	29.3%	41.7%
Low	Unstable Democracy				Democracy at Risk			
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2004	2006	2008	2010
	17.2%	24.6%	26.9%	10.8%	16%	15.8%	20.5%	21.8%

The following figures show El Salvador’s position in the surveys for 2006, 2008, and 2010 in terms of the variables analyzed – system support and political tolerance – as it compared with the rest of the countries that were considered in this study. In the 2006 survey, our country located in the “stable democracy” quadrant.




Figure V.22. System Support and Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2006
 Source: Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of the Andes/LAPOP

The following figure shows the position of El Salvador in the 2008 study in terms of the variables system support and political tolerance, compared with the rest of the countries taken into account for this study. Our country continues to show up in the “stable democracy” quadrant.




Figure V.23. System Support and Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2008
 Source: Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of the Andes/LAPOP

The next figure presents the position of El Salvador in the 2010 study in terms of the variables system support and political tolerance, compared with the rest of the countries considered in this analysis. Now our country has moved and placed itself in the “authoritarian stability” quadrant. The level of system support has remained the same in the 2006-2010 period, over 50%, and the move into the “authoritarian stability” quadrant is explained by the reduction in political tolerance, which fell below 50% in the 2010 study. The implication of this finding is that there is a need for efforts to be made in order to increase the level of political tolerance in the country.




Figure V.24. System Support and Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010
 Source: Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of the Andes/LAPOP

As for the support for stable democracy quadrant (high system support and high tolerance) over time, it has gone from 32.2 in 2004 and 2006, dropped to 23.4 in 2008 and risen again to 25.6 in 2010.




Figure V.25. Support for Stable Democracy Over Time, 2004-2010.

Analyzing the 2010 data set for the case of El Salvador in the stable democracy quadrant (high system support and high tolerance) compared with the other countries included in this study we can see that our country is in a low position, just over Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.




Figure V.26. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Figure V.27 presents the results for the multiple regression analysis using the predictors of stable democracy (high support and high tolerance) when each of the other variables remains constant. In Appendix V.4 at end of chapter, there is a list of the coefficients used. Basically there are four statistically significant predictors: perception of the government economic performance, sex, age and ideology.




Figure V.27. Predictors of Stable Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

Figure V.28 presents the results at a bivariate level, and we can see that support for stable democracy grows as the evaluation of government economic performance improves; men support more than women do; age displays a “U” curve in that support for stable democracy declines as age increases, and then increases again; and in the case of ideology, it is highest at both ends of the ideological spectrum.




Figure V.28. Support for Stable Democracy by Perception of Government Economic Performance, Sex, Age and Ideology in El Salvador, 2010

Again, as noted previously, the 2010 study reveals a significant drop in the overall levels for political tolerance, below the levels found in 2004. Nevertheless, the evidence presented makes it possible to present the hypothesis that the decline in political tolerance is linked to the political parties. In the case of ARENA supporters, it has practically not varied between 2008 and 2010; whereas, for Funes and FMLN supporters, there has been a significant decrease during this same period. However, the 2010 study indicates that there are no significant differences between the supporters of ARENA (45.2) and those of Funes/FMLN (46.3). At a specific level, we could suggest the hypothesis that there are sectors on the left that have become less tolerant when the government is criticized. In any case, the reduction in the levels of political tolerance is a phenomenon that transcends the political-partisan dimension. This issue must be looked into more deeply in future studies. It presents the challenge—that is part of democratic strengthening—of fostering tolerance at the level of society as a whole, and at the more specific level in the institutions.

Satisfaction with Democracy

The survey asked citizens the extent to which they were satisfied with the way democracy works in the country.⁵³ The results reveal that only 6.3% of the population asserted that they felt very satisfied with the performance of democracy, whereas 58% confirmed they were satisfied, 30.7% declared they were dissatisfied with democracy, while 55 expressed that they were very dissatisfied (Figure V.29).




Figure V.29. Satisfaction with Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

In order to facilitate a comparison with the results from the surveys from 2004, 2006 and 2008, a 0-100 scale was created based on the response options. The comparison with the results from the previous studies shows that there has been growth in the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy functions. The average satisfaction with democracy for 2004 was 54.5; it went down to 46.4 in 2006; then to 44.5 in 2008, and later grew considerably and to a statistically significant degree to 54.7 in 2010 (Figure V.30). It could be considered that this recovery in the level of satisfaction with democracy might bear a relation to the January and March 2009 elections, the stable transition that took place from March to June, as well as evaluations and expectations of the new administration.

⁵³ The question was worded as follows: “PN4. In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in El Salvador? (1) Very Satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Dissatisfied, (4) Very Dissatisfied, (8) DK/DA.”




Figure V.30. Satisfaction with Democracy in El Salvador by Year, 2004-2010

Citizens were also asked how democratic they considered the country to be.⁵⁴ The results reveal that 16.6% is of the opinion that the country is very democratic, 44.9% that the country is somewhat democratic, 33.6% that it is not very democratic, while 4.9% said the country is not at all democratic (Figure V.31).




Figure V.31. Opinion on the Level of Democracy in El Salvador, 2010

In order to facilitate a comparison of these results with those from surveys done in 2004, 2006 and 2008, a 0-100 scale was created based on the response options. The comparison with the results from prior studies shows that positive opinions about the level of democracy in the country have increased. The average evaluation on the

⁵⁴ “PN5. In your opinion is El Salvador very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) very democratic, (2) somewhat democratic, (3) not very democratic, (4) not at all democratic, (8) DK/DA.”

level of democracy for 2004 was 56.8; it declined to 51.2 in 2006; then to 49.4 in 2008; and later it showed an important and statistically significant increase, 57.3 in 2010 (Figure V.32). We consider that this recovery in the evaluation of the level of democracy could be tied to the January and March 2009 elections, the stable transition that took place between March and June, as well as the evaluation and expectations with regards to the new administration.




Figure V.32. Opinion about the Level of Democracy in El Salvador by Year, 2004-2010

Support for Democracy as a Political Regime

The survey also explored Salvadorans' opinions about the type of political regime. To this end, we asked two questions. The first was designed to measure the preference for a democratic regime⁵⁵ and the second aimed at measuring support for electoral democracy as opposed to the option of a strong leader, even one who does not have to be elected.⁵⁶

The results from the first question reveal that the type of regime the majority of Salvadorans prefer is democracy, as 74.55 of respondents answered the question in this manner, while 14.6% said that an authoritarian government would be preferable, and 11% showed indifference, indicating that it makes no difference to them whether the government is authoritarian or democratic.

These results become even more interesting when compared with the studies that took place in 2004, 2006 and 2008. In Figure V.33, we can see there is a majority support for the democratic regime: it declines from 75.4% in 2004 to 72.7% in 2006; then it grows to 78.4% in 2008, and later decreases to 74.5% in 2010. Conversely, responses supporting authoritarianism and indifference received relatively low percentages: the level of indifference goes from 11% in 2004 to 14.9% in 2006; it shrinks to 12% in 2008, and then back down to 11% in 2010; and support for an authoritarian government was 13.5% in 2004; it dipped to 12.4% in 2006; it dropped to

⁵⁵ "DEM2. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, OR (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, OR (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer."

⁵⁶ "AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer."

9.7% in 2008, and then shot up to 14.6% in 2010, a greater level than that registered in 2004. This is an aspect that should be explored in future studies, as the level of support for an authoritarian government had been on a downward tendency from 2004 to 2008, and had a statistically significant increase in the latest measurement.




Figure V.33. The Type of Preferred Regime by Year, El Salvador 2004-2010

The second question asked respondents to express their preference with regards to a strong leader that did not have to be elected by popular vote or an elected democracy. The results show (Figure V.34) that most Salvadorans still support an elected democracy: 87.8% think that elected democracy is better, against 12.2% that believe we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. In the 2004-2008 period we observe a reduction in the levels of support for elected democracy, which goes from 94.5% in 2004 to 87.6% in 2006, down to 84.5% in 2008, but then increases to 87.8% in 2010.




Figure V.34. Preference for a Strong Leader or Elected Democracy, El Salvador 2004-2010

Finally, the survey also explored citizen support for democracy.⁵⁷ The question had a response format on a 1-7 scale; however, in order to make the results easier to understand they have been converted to a metric scale from 0-100. Support for democracy has gone from an average 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006; it then grew to 68.4 in 2008 only to decline to 64.1 in 2010 (Figure V.35).




Figure V.35. Support for Democracy by Year, El Salvador 2004-2010

⁵⁷ ING4. “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?”

In analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in support for democracy, compared with the other countries included in this study, our country is in a low position, placed only above Peru, Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay (Figure V.36).




Figure V.36. Comparative Perspective of Support for Democracy, 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that support for the system, a fundamental component of political culture linked to political stability, had been decreasing steadily until 2008, and increased significantly in 2010, reaching an average close to the one it had in 2004. Although political tolerance, another component of democratic culture, increased between 2004 and 2006, it declined slightly in 2008 and decreased significantly in 2010. This drop places the level of political tolerance lower than its initial measurement in the 2004 survey.

How can this paradox in the 2010 study be explained, where the tendency is reverted as system support moves upward on the one hand, but political tolerance decreases on the other? Prior studies reported that the respondents' political preference was an important political variable in explaining these differences in the levels of support for the system and political tolerance. In other words, previous studies showed that ARENA voters exhibited a higher level of system support and lower levels of political tolerance, while the contrary held true for FMLN adherents (Cordova & Cruz, 2008; Cordova & Cruz, 2006). One argument that has been discussed is

precisely whether those differences did not have so much to do with inherent attributes or characteristics of the parties, rather they could be explained in terms of the party that was in the government, and those that were in the opposition. That is, supporters of the incumbent government identify more with the system and government policy on the one hand, and on the other are less tolerant, as this implies recognizing the opposition's (the minority's) basic rights; contrarily, partisans of the main opposition party demonstrate stronger support for the basic rights of the minorities, as this benefits them, and at the same time they show less support for the institutional system and government policies.

However, by analyzing the data from the 2010 study, it can be seen that there has definitely been an important increase in the levels of system support by the supporters of Funes/FMLN, whereas in the case of the ARENA partisans it has practically not changed. Consequently, in the 2010 study there are no statistically significant differences between the ARENA and Funes/FMLN parties, as they have obtained practically the same average. Although there are practically no variations in the ARENA supporters' levels of political tolerance, the Funes/FMLN partisans have shown a significant decrease.

How, then, can it be explained that the variable "party voted for in the past elections" does not make it possible to identify the differences between the supporters of FMLN and ARENA parties? In order to explore a possible explanation for this question, we propose the hypothesis that perhaps in the 2010 study the variable "party voted for" does not include these differences due to certain factors that characterize the new political scenario in which the past elections took place. From this perspective, there would be two novel elements to be taken into account: (a) the particular situation surrounding the March 2009 presidential elections, where candidates from the PCN, PDC and CD parties were either not registered or they were withdrawn, leaving the race entirely up to two political parties, thus enabling both parties to draw voters beyond their traditional base of supporters; and (b) the fact that Mauricio Funes' candidacy broadened the base of voters beyond the FMLN's die-hard voter base (Cordova & Loya, 2009; Nevitte, 2009). Furthermore, during his administration president Funes' has exercised independence and has had disagreements on important issues with his own party. From this perspective, those who voted for president Funes and supported him at the time of the survey, include a broader spectrum than the traditionally left-wing sectors that voted for the FMLN in the past. For this reason we have considered it appropriate to make use of other variables beyond party/candidate voted for, or sympathize with. Regarding the relationship to system support, the multiple regression analysis indicates that basically there are eight statistically significant predictors: ideology, perception of government economic performance, perception of the national economy, satisfaction with democracy, age, level of education, place of residence, and corruption victimization.

As for political tolerance, the multiple regression analysis indicates that basically there are three statistically significant predictors: sex, age, and the perception of government economic performance. Due to the importance of the decline in the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador in recent years, it is suggested that this issue be looked into in future studies, because there is the challenge, as part of democratic reinforcement, of fostering political tolerance at the general level of society, and at a more specific level in the institutions.

Following the theoretical framework, we sought to explore the interrelation between support for the system and political tolerance. To this end both variables were dichotomized, and the four possible combinations were created. The most relevant result is the increase in the proportion of individuals that are located in the authoritarian stability quadrant, who in the 2010 study represent almost half the total Salvadoran population (41.7%). This can be explained principally by the decline in the levels of political tolerance.

Likewise, it was reported in this chapter that, overall, in 2010 Salvadorans exhibited a high level of support for democracy as a political regime and in addition they prefer electoral democracy to a strong leader who does not have to be elected. Further, Salvadorans are more satisfied with democracy now than in previous years.

This chapter also analyzed levels of trust in institutions. Previous studies reported an overall decline in citizen trust in the institutions between 2004 and 2006, continuing into 2008; yet the 2010 study shows a reversal in this trend, as there is a significant increase in trust in different institutions.


Generally speaking, the positive evaluation of democracy and the recovery in the level of satisfaction with democracy, along with the increase in support for the system and institutional trust, can be considered to be related to the new political context that can be perceived in the 2010 survey fieldwork. This new context is related to the January and March 2009 elections, alternance in the control of the executive after 20 years of uninterrupted ARENA party government, the stable transition that took place from March to June, the expectations of change that arose with the change of government, as well as president Funes' high levels of approval.

Appendixes

Appendixes V.1. Predictors of System Support in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	T
Satisfaction with democracy ⁵⁸	0.162*	-5.9
Total forms of corruption victimization	-0.099*	(-3.80)
Urban	-0.077*	(-3.23)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.043	(-1.87)
Perception of government economic performance	0.391*	-12.1
Years of education	-0.059	(-1.98)
Sex	-0.039	(-1.53)
Age	-0.326*	(-2.54)
Age squared	0.328*	-2.59
Retrospective perception of national economy	-0.023	(-0.75)
Perception of national economy	0.101*	-4.96
Crime victimization	-0.001	(-0.04)
Ideology scale	0.109*	-4.74
Perception of president's job performance	0.012	-0.44
Constant	-0.004	(-0.18)
R-squared = 0.31		
No. of cases = 1441		
* p<0.05		

⁵⁸ To simplify the interpretation of the results from the multiple regression model some of the questions were recoded: q1 became q1r with the value 0 for women and 1 for men; the variable *UR* became *URBANOR* with the value 0 for rural and 1 for urban. To facilitate interpretation, *SOCT1* and *IDIO1* became *SOCT1R* and *IDIO1R* respectively, with a value of 5 for the option "Very good", 4 for "Good", 3 for "Neither good nor bad", 2 for "Bad" and finally 1 for "Very bad"; the variables *SOCT2* and *IDIO2*, became *SOCT2R* and *IDIO2R* respectively: 1 "Worse", 2 no change ("The same") and 3 "Better". The variable *MI* became *MIR* with a value of 0 for "Very bad", 25 for "Bad", 50 for "Neither bad nor good", 75 for "Good" and 100 for "Very good"; *VIC1EXT* became *VIC1EXTR* with a range from 0 to 100; the variable *PN4* became *PN4R* with a value of 0 for "Very dissatisfied", 33 for "Dissatisfied", 67 for "Satisfied" and 100 for "Very satisfied". Additionally, a variable named *EXTOTR* was created to collect all the forms of corruption victimization, which is on a range from 0 to 4; finally we created the *ECONPERFR* scale, which goes from 0 to 100.



Appendix V.2. Relation between Evaluation of Government Management of the Economy and the Scale on Government Economic Performance, by Ideology Scale, El Salvador 2010

Appendix V.3. Predictors of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2010

	Coef.	t
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.028	(-0.95)
Total forms of corruption victimization	-0.047	(-1.61)
Urban	0.033	-1.16
Quintiles of wealth	0.029	-0.96
Perception of government economic performance	0.070*	-2.2
Years of education	0.075	-1.83
Sex	0.130*	-5.23
Age	-0.453*	(-3.80)
Age squared	0.400*	-3.57
Retrospective perception of national economy	-0.015	(-0.44)
Perception of national economy	0.002	-0.06
Crime victimization	-0.011	(-0.44)
Ideology scale	0.011	-0.34
Perception of president's job performance	-0.037	(-1.27)
Constant	0.014	-0.5
R-squared = 0.046		
N. of cases = 1444		
* p<0.05		

Appendix V.4. Predictors of High Support for Political System and High Tolerance, 2010

	Coef.	t
Satisfaction with democracy	0.03	-0.95
Total forms of corruption victimization	-0.046	(-1.87)
Urban	-0.028	(-0.95)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.035	(-1.08)
Perception of government economic performance	0.163*	-5.16
Years of education	0.042	-1.11
Sex	0.061*	-3.06
Age	-0.293*	(-2.54)
Age squared	0.272*	-2.28
Retrospective perception of national economy	-0.035	(-1.25)
Perception of national economy	0.044	-1.26
Crime victimization	0.032	-1.03
Ideology scale	0.068*	-2.46
Perception of president's job performance	-0.005	(-0.14)
Constant	0.005	-0.19
R-squared = 0.046		
N. of cases = 1441		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VI . Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

The foundation for the way a democracy works is citizen participation in the political decisions that affect them. In formal terms, this is achieved by holding periodic and regular elections to choose political representation and decide on aspects of public policy that affect the population. In more informal terms, however, this is achieved through the citizens' active participation in issues that affect their community, their children's school, and community service, as well as ongoing exchange with their political and social representatives.

In this chapter, we explore political participation, civic participation and its impact on Salvadoran democracy. First, we measure the levels of personal trust, which are fundamental to the development of any democracy; next, we delve into the issue of civic participation by examining the different ways Salvadorans participate. We close the chapter with the most political elements of citizen participation, that is, interest in politics, electoral turnout, and involvement in demonstrations and political activities. Additionally, in this chapter we add a section on measuring what has been dubbed political efficacy, that is, the extent to which citizens perceive that their authorities and representatives benefit them and represent their interests in the government.

Theoretical Background

Social capital is an important tool in the study of the processes of democratization. Ever since Alexis de Tocqueville noted the importance of civic participation in political decision-making in North America in his classic study "Democracy in America," social and political scientists have dedicated a good deal of research to understanding the impact of citizen organization and participation in democracy (Tocqueville, 2005). As a part of these efforts, James Coleman identified social capital, a term that was created in the early twentieth century to describe all the relationships that enable people to cooperate in order to achieve common goals (Coleman 2000). In the study on how democracy has functioned in Italy, for instance, Robert Putnam demonstrated that some characteristics of social organization, particularly interpersonal trust and social networks can improve the efficacy of democracy in that they facilitate coordinated action (Putnam 1994). Social capital explains, according to Putnam, the reason one finds regions within the same country that possess political institutions that are more efficient than others.

In the case of social organizations, these constitute a vehicle for the collective expression of individual interests and initiatives that would otherwise have very little influence on political institutions. Religious organizations, for example, tend to be considered by some as fundamental instruments in generating civic participation. Beyond their purely religious character, they facilitate the achievement of collective aims. Although Putnam has doubts whether some kinds of religious participation contribute to social capital and civic life, there are those that propose that religious participation has a certain impact on social and political life.

On the other hand, direct political participation expressed both in terms of electoral participation and in the broader area of political participation, is doubtless one of the cornerstones of democracy (Barnes 1998). There is simply no democracy if people do not organize to form political groups, do not elect their rulers, and do not call them to account once they have achieved public office. The determinants of political participation are many, from personal characteristics to the individuals' economic and social conditions, to situations in the immediate environment.

In this chapter we explore this broad spectrum of political behavior. We begin with the fundamental elements of social capital, that is, interpersonal trust and participation in social organizations, and then we move on to aspects of participation that are more formally political, that is, involvement in elections and political campaigns.

Interpersonal Trust

One of the fundamental elements of social capital is interpersonal trust. Carrying out activities that involve collective participation fundamentally requires that the participants, or in this case the citizens, feel a minimal level of mutual trust, particularly when this implies achieving collective goals. In El Salvador, the problems related to insecurity suggest that the level of interpersonal trust may have suffered some erosion in recent years. To measure the levels of interpersonal trust among Salvadorans, the AmericasBarometer incorporated a question whose wording is shown below. This item was designed as a scale where people could identify the degree to which they trust their neighbors.

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA

The results are very interesting. First, as Figure VI.1 shows, most citizens show a great deal of mutual trust (note that the question is about neighbors): a little over 63% of the people trust in their own neighbors a lot or somewhat. Only one third declare they trust their peers in the community little or not at all.




Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust in El Salvador, 2010

Second, seen from a regional perspective (see Figure VI.2), Salvadorans exhibit a relatively high level of interpersonal trust compared with the rest of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer; they were only surpassed by Costa Rica and Honduras in Central America.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ To do this, responses were converted to a 0 to 100 standardized scale, where 100 constitutes the highest possible level of interpersonal trust, and 0 the lowest.




Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

A third comment is that interpersonal trust has changed very little between 2004 and 2010 (Figure VI.3). Over half the population expressed high levels of interpersonal trust, and the violence and insecurity that prevail seem to have done little to reduce this trust. However, the data from this round offer an opportunity to identify the variables driving the levels of interpersonal trust among the inhabitants of El Salvador, and at the same time they make it possible to test the hypothesis about the relationship between insecurity and the levels of trust. In the next section, we analyze the determinants underlying Salvadorans' levels of interpersonal trust.




Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust by Year in El Salvador

What are the variables associated with interpersonal trust? Three kinds of factors are used to identify the determinants of interpersonal trust in El Salvador. The first type of variable has to do with the respondent’s individual characteristics, in other words, gender, age, and education. The second kind refers to social characteristics: kind of population where she or he lives, economic position, and the opinion about the condition of the national economy. The third set of variables, and the most important in the Salvadoran case, refers to the conditions associated with insecurity, namely: crime victimization, perception of insecurity, opinion about police performance, and gang presence reported in the area of residence.

The results are quite interesting (Figure VI.4). First of all, they reveal that men and younger people tend to express greater interpersonal trust in their own neighbors, and, therefore, in the rest of the population. As age increases, people’s expressions of trust in others decline in a statistically significant manner. Women, conversely, express greater distrust of their own neighbors. Education is another fundamental variable in the issue of interpersonal trust. As expected, the greater the number of years a person has received education, the more they trust others. Apparently, education opens areas of certitude in social relationships.

It must be noted, on the other hand, that people’s area of residence and economic position appears not to impact the levels of trust. In other words, overall, there is the same level of trust in neighbors in a small city or a rural area. Likewise, a Salvadoran who has few economic resources displays the same level of trust as one who has a lot of resources.




Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust El Salvador (2010)

Now, judging by the results of the linear regression shown in Figure VI.4, the variables associated with insecurity (except crime victimization) are the ones with the greatest impact on interpersonal trust. Indeed, the perception of insecurity has a very strong effect on interpersonal trust in El Salvador: citizens that feel insecure trust their neighbors much less than those citizens who feel secure; interpersonal trust falls from a score of 75 among those who feel very secure to a 50 among those who feel more insecure. Likewise, interpersonal trust is tied to the presence – or at least the perception of presence – of police that protect citizens. If, on the contrary, Salvadorans perceive that the police do not protect them, or are involved in criminal activity, the levels of interpersonal trust plummet.

Additionally, the perception of gang presence in the community plays a significant role in eroding interpersonal trust. This can be observed in the negative association expressed in Figures VI.4 and VI.5. Actually, people who perceive gang presence in their community exhibit a correspondingly inferior level of interpersonal trust. In figure VI.5 it can be observed that interpersonal trust drops almost 18 points on a 100 point scale when people perceive that their neighborhood is very affected by juvenile gangs in El Salvador.




Figure VI.5. Interpersonal Trust in El Salvador by Perception of Insecurity and Perception of Gangs Affecting Neighborhood (2010)

Civic Participation

Measuring Civic Participation

The AmericasBarometer survey has incorporated several items to collect data on different forms of civic participation. These range from collaborating with community initiatives to participating directly in different organizations. These organizations are the following: religious, parents' associations at school, community improvement committees, associations of professionals, political parties and associations of women or housewives. The wording of the questions used to collect the different forms of civic participation is as follows:

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once of twice a year	Never	Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in last 12 months	1	2	3	4	88	98
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" or "never" to help the respondent]						
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once of twice a year	Never	Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or homemakers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	DK 88	DA 98 NA 99

The data were converted to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the lowest level of participation, while 100 is the highest. An initial review of the results reveals that participation in religious organizations draws a high percentage of involvement of people. On the 0-100 scale, participation in religious groups is 62 points (in percentage this means a little over 50% of Salvadorans said they attend a religious group meeting at least once a week). The second most frequent kind of civic participation is attending parents' association meetings at school. However, this sort of participation is significantly lower than religious participation with 26.5 points (actually, only 2% of the population declared they went to parents' associations meetings once a week, whereas 33% said they attended them once or twice a month). Participation in community improvement committees only got 16 points, with less than 18% of the population attending monthly or biweekly meetings. Finally, participation in women's organizations and professional associations is very low. As for professional associations, the average is 6.8 points, while women's group gets only 6.1. In terms of percentage points, less than 15% of the population attends this kind of organization's meetings per year (Figure VI.6).




Figure VI.6. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in El Salvador (2010)

Now, how has the citizens’ civic participation varied in recent years? Is it possible to say that Salvadorans are participating less or more in civic organizations? Overall, results suggest that the answer is negative, except for participation in religious groups. In Figure VI.7 we presented the participation tendencies for each kind of group starting in 2004. It can be seen, that only attendance at religious groups’ meetings has grown significantly, particularly since 2006. By the middle of the decade participation had only got 37 points; by the end of the decade the levels of participation have doubled. Religious activities and membership in religious groups is more frequent than ever.

Professional associations have also experienced growth in the levels of participation. This increase has been gradual and although it is statistically significant over the course of six years, it is not on a par with the magnitude of growth of religious groups. The rest of the civic groups, parents’ associations, community improvement committees, and women’s groups register no significant changes in their levels of participation.




Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations by Year in El Salvador

All of the results indicate that it is not possible to speak of growth in civic participation in El Salvador. Despite the fact that religious groups have seen an increase in their membership and the involvement of Salvadorans in religious organizations seems to be a characteristic of the political culture at the end of the decade, it is necessary to approach these results with caution because, as Putnam (1991) pointed out, religious participation is not always civic in character.

Participation in Demonstrations or Protest Marches

Measuring Participation in Demonstrations

Unlike the kinds of participation examined in the previous section, participation in demonstrations and protest marches constitutes an unmistakable sign of citizen participation. In order to measure this type of participation, the following item was used:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to JC1] (88) Doesn't Know [Go to JC1] (98) Doesn't Answer [Go to JC1]

The results indicate that Salvadorans' involvement in demonstrations and marches is, actually, quite low. Only 4.3% of the population said they had participated in this type of action in the last 12 months. Although

participation by Latin Americans is very low in general (around 15% for Argentines, and 12% for Peruvians and Paraguayans), Salvadorans tend to protest collectively even less.




Figure VI.8. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective

In fact, Figure VI.8 shows that only the Caribbean countries Jamaica and Guyana have lower rates of participation than El Salvador. Besides, in this case the percentage of people participating in demonstrations is so low that it is inappropriate to identify differences between social groups or in terms of specific variables. The number of occurrences in each group is so low that the differences lose their statistical significance.

Electoral Participation

There are three aspects that need to be examined in the issue of electoral participation. The first refers to electoral participation per se, that is, the act of attending elections in order to vote. This is focused on presidential elections. The second has to do with the percentage of Salvadorans who say they sympathize with a political party. The third is in reference to the political preferences and ideological orientation of Salvadorans.

a) Voting at presidential elections

Electoral participation is political participation par excellence. By this is meant the act of attending elections and voting in order to elect representatives. In order to measure this type of participation, the AmericasBarometer asked directly whether the respondent had voted in the last presidential election. In this case, this refers to the 2009 presidential election.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential election** in 2009?
 (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to VB10]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to VB10]**

We see that 79.3% of citizens said they had voted in the last presidential election. This is a particularly high percentage, especially when considering that electoral participation registered by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was only 63% of voting age persons (UCA Department of Political Science, El Salvador, 2009). These results, therefore, must be approached with caution because rather than showing real participation, they show citizen attitudes toward electoral participation, which are influenced by what has been called social desirability effect, namely, the respondent's intention to answer adequately on an item that may have a certain moral or social burden.




Figure VI.9. Percentage of Citizens Who Report Having Voted in Last Elections over Time in El Salvador

Accordingly, when comparing these results to those from previous years (See Figure VI.9) it can be seen that in 2010 more Salvadorans said they had voted compared with preceding years. This also contradicts what we know about electoral participation. According to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the highest level of electoral participation in contemporary Salvadoran history took place in 2004 when Antonio Saca was elected, and there was a 67.3% voter turnout. In the 2006 LAPOP survey, the data reported for electoral participation in 2004 are very much like those reported by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal: 67.9%. Nevertheless, when the 2006 survey asked citizens about their participation in the 2006 legislative elections, the percentage of persons who say they voted is much higher (67%) than the data for electoral participation reported by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (54.2%). Again, it is important to keep in mind that these results have to be approached with caution. These data place El Salvador as one of the countries with the highest frequency of people saying they voted.

Rather than showing high citizen participation in elections, these results shed light on Salvadorans' wish to show a willingness to vote, even when this does not correspond with a real action.




Figure VI.10. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Presidential Election

However, the best way to identify the variables underlying attitudes toward participation is by creating a logistic regression using the factors that can usually affect electoral participation. These are the following: personal characteristics, attitudes toward politics, the citizen's own economic situation, and insecurity due to crime.

The results, which are shown in Figure VI.11, indicate that only the respondent's age, education, and attitude of interest in politics constitute predictors of electoral participation in El Salvador. Variables such as area of residence, economic standing (measured by quintiles of wealth), gender, perception of insecurity, or the perception of the national economy seem not to have any significant effects on responses about electoral participation.




Figure VI.11. Predictors of Electoral Participation in El Salvador, 2010

In terms of age, the data indicate that as citizens' age approaches 55, electoral participation rises accordingly. In the case of education, data reveal that reports of electoral attendance do not differ much between persons that have very low levels of education and those who have finished high school. However, electoral participation increases significantly in the group that has higher education. The former suggests that middle-aged adults and persons with university education are the ones who participate more in electoral events.⁶⁰




Figure VI.12. Electoral Participation in El Salvador by Age and Education, 2010

⁶⁰ See Córdova, Loya and Nevitte, 2009.

b) Identification with a Political Party

As it explored electoral participation, the AmericasBarometer included a question to learn whether citizens identified with any particular political party.

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]

The responses showed 34.4% of citizens said they identify with a political party. These results contrast with the high number of responses on voter turnout we saw in the previous section, and suggest that actually only a third of the population identifies with a political party. Putting the data in perspective over time, the results indicate that there was a statistically significant increase between 2006 and 2008, but the results dropped down again by 2010. In other words, although there has not been a return to the 2006 levels, identification with political parties is not at its highest in 2010. It must be considered, however, that perhaps the 2008 hike was due to the interest in the 2009 electoral campaign, while the 2010 survey came after the 2009 elections, when interest had declined.




Figure VI.13. Identification with a Political Party 2006- 2010

Identification with a political party placed El Salvador in the group of countries with intermediate political identification. However, compared on a 0-100 scale, the levels of identification among Salvadorans are some of the lowest in Central America, only above those that correspond to Guatemala (Figure VI.14).




Figure VI.14. Identification with a Political Party in Comparative Perspective, 2010

c) Voter Ideological Self-identification and Voter Choice

The third point that is noteworthy in the section on electoral participation has to do with the political preferences of Salvadorans. This has two dimensions. On the one hand, there is the issue of party preference, which refers to the party the citizens voted for. On the other, we find their own ideological self-identification, that is to say, where they place themselves in terms of the left-right political spectrum.

In the case of electoral preference, the survey included the following item:

VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? [DON'T READ THE LIST]
 (00) None (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot),
 (301) Rodrigo Ávila, ARENA,
 (302) Mauricio Funes, FMLN,
 (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote), [In any case go to VB10]

This question was only put to respondents who answered that they had gone to vote in the previous item. We see that 68% of respondents said that they had voted for Mauricio Funes and the FMLN, whereas only 28.3% said they had voted for Rodrigo Avila and ARENA. The rest offered other responses. Again, these results do not

coincide with electoral behavior in the past presidential election, as the percentage of persons who said they had voted for the winning candidate is much higher than what was reported in the actual elections. Once more, we see the social desirability effect, particularly in an environment where public opinion favors the president.




Figure VI.15. “Who did you Vote for in the 2009 Presidential Election?”

Therefore, in this report we will not focus on the data for the distribution of political preferences. Instead, in this section we focus on the ideological self-identification of these political preferences. That is, where do Salvadorans who say they voted for one of the two presidential candidates in the last elections place themselves ideologically? This exercise provides an outlook on citizen ideological disposition, and the levels of political polarization.

Before proceeding to examine the relationship between electoral preference and ideological self-identification, let us look at the results for the latter. A little over a third of Salvadorans (35%) described their position on the left of the ideology scale, that is, between points 1 and 4; whereas, 27% set their position on the right, that is, between points 7 and 10. 38% described their position in the center, between points 5 and 6. Overall, the ideology scale average was 5.2, and the mode was 5, which indicates that a significant number of citizens tend toward the center. However, the data also indicates the existence of a high standard deviation (2.5), which suggests certain levels of polarization.

How does Salvadoran ideological self-identification in 2010 compare with that in previous years? The answer is in Figure VI.16 where we can see that Salvadorans have moved from a predominantly right position toward one more in the center. This is probably a product of a rise in the voters’ acceptance of the left party and candidate. As we can see, in 2004, just after the presidential elections that the ARENA party won, a substantial number of Salvadorans were on the right of the political spectrum. This changed significantly in 2006, and, since then, there has been a trend toward the center.




Figure VI.16. Ideological Self-identification of Salvadorans, 2004-2010

What is the relationship between ideological self-identification and the 2009 electoral preferences? According to the data from the AmericasBarometer, there is a very clear relationship, and the population is divided not only in terms of the candidates, but also by ideological positions, and probably, by program positions as well. The people who voted for now-president Mauricio Funes and the FMLN are definitely on the left of the political spectrum as expected; contrarily, voters for the ARENA party are on the right of the scale. Both groups exhibit strong levels of cohesion judging by the error intervals, that is, the majority of the people who decide to vote for one or the other come together around a point to the left or to the right, and it is not very common for people who voted for the left to be on the right, or for voters on the right to identify with a leftist ideology (Figure VI.17).




Figure VI.17. Ideological Voter Self-identification and Electoral Preferences

Interest in Politics

Interest in politics was measured through the following item:

POL1. To what extent are you interested in politics: a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A Little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

The results reveal that most Salvadorans are not interested in politics. Actually, 68.6% said they had little or no interest in politics, and only 14% expressed a high level of interest in politics (Figure VI.18). To be able to compare this level of interest in politics with that of previous years, we went on to create a scale from 0 to 100 where the last value represents the greatest level of interest in politics. The results presented in Figure VI.19 show a slight gain for interest in politics, particularly between 2006 and 2008, but even then it is still not statistically significant. Therefore it can be said that this is not a real increase. In any case, these data reveal that over the past five years, the majority of Salvadorans have not been particularly interested in political affairs.




Figure VI.18. Interest in Politics in El Salvador, 2010




Figure VI.19. Interest in Politics over Time in El Salvador

By comparison with the rest of the countries in the region, Salvadorans' interest in politics is at an intermediate level, just below that of the people in Mexico and Colombia, and above those in Panama and Nicaragua in the Central American region (see Figure VI.20).




Figure VI.20. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective

Amid this relative apathy toward politics, who shows more interest? According to the survey, which can be seen in figure VI.21, the persons who show most interest in political affairs are men; people with higher levels of education, that is, those who have a higher education; those living in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area; and those with greater economic resources. These findings coincide with results from other studies that show that persons with a better social standing dedicate their attention to politics more frequently.




Figure VI.21. Predictors of Interest in Politics in El Salvador, 2010

Figure VI.22 shows the levels of interest in politics by the size of the respondent’s area of residence. In essence, interest in politics is concentrated in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area. In the rest of the country, politics does not seem to attract the citizens’ curiosity, particularly in rural areas. This attitudinal tendency is no novelty; actually, it is possible to find this distribution in previous AmericasBarometer studies (Cordova, Macias & Cruz 2008; Seligson, Cordova & Cruz 1999).




Figure VI.22. Interest in Politics by Size of Area of Residence

Political Activism

Citizen engagement in politics also has a much more active dimension, not only when they show up to vote and express their electoral preferences, but also when citizens actively join in campaigns to persuade others to participate and to vote for specific candidates. In the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer, we also explored the frequency with which Salvadorans get involved in political activism; that is, their participation in political party proselytism. This comprises another indicator of the extent to which citizens are politically involved.

Two items were designed to measure the level of involvement. One refers to the act of persuading others to vote for a candidate during the elections. The other refers to working directly on a political campaign. The wording of the items is as follows:

<p>PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options] (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of [year]? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>

On the one hand, the results indicate that less than 20% of respondents had tried with any frequency to persuade others to vote for a candidate or party in particular (Figure VI.23). The majority of the population, 72%, has never done this, and only 10% has done so on rare occasions. On the other hand, one in ten has worked on an electoral campaign, whereas the vast majority of the population has never done so.




Figure VI.23. Political Activism in El Salvador, 2010

Relationship with Political Representatives

There is another dimension beyond that of political participation that has to do with the citizens' relationship their political representatives. Some political scientists have called this perception of political efficacy (Finkel 1985) and it has to do with the citizens' perception that those in government – both leaders at the national level, and representatives at the local level – represent their interests and benefit them as citizens. This aspect of public opinion is not only related to participation, but also to the fundamental exercise of political representation. We have decided to include it in this report in the final section of this chapter as a counterpoint for the results of citizen participation in politics. In other words, we want to examine the way citizen participation in politics corresponds to the perception that the government, the deputies, and the mayors represent the citizens' interests.

There are three items that collect this type of opinion, and they have to do with the three types of elected official in El Salvador: officials in the central government, deputies in the Legislative Assembly, and mayors. A question was written for each one of them in order to collect the degree of political representation that is perceived. The specific wording of the questions as presented to the respondents was as follows:

EPN3A. To what extent does the Central Government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? Does it represent your interests a lot, somewhat, little or not at all?

(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

EPN3B. To what extent do the Deputies in the Legislative Assembly represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? Do they represent your interests a lot, somewhat, little or not at all?

(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

EPN3C. To what extent do the Mayor and the City Council represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? Do they represent your interests a lot, somewhat, little or not at all?

(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

First of all, the results indicate that a significant percentage of Salvadorans feel the government represents and benefits them. According to the data, 43.4% said that the central government represents their interests a lot or somewhat; 36.7% said there was little representation; and almost 20% said not at all. Although for most part opinions tend toward a negative balance for the central government's work performance (56% of all respondents said that the government benefits them little or not at all), the fact that two out five citizens indicate that they feel somewhat represented by the government constitutes a change with regards to the results from previous years.

Responses are less positive when in reference to the deputies at the Legislative Assembly. According to the results for the item that refers to parliamentarian officials, 26.8% of citizens feel benefited and represented by deputies (of these, only 5.7% said they felt "very well" represented by the deputies). A little over 73% of Salvadorans said they felt they were represented little or not at all by the deputies.

On the other hand, a little over one third of the population, 35.5% of respondents, said they felt represented a lot or somewhat by the mayors and city councils; whereas 64.5% noted they felt represented little or not at all by local administration. This finding also constitutes a change regarding results from previous years, in which mayors and city councils received the highest percentages of approval rate by citizens in terms of representing their interests.

Therefore, the central government, despite its more diffuse environment and although it is, in theory, more distant from citizens than parliamentarians or mayors, get the highest percentage of responses and is the one that best represents and benefits the interests of citizens. This can clearly be seen in Figure VI.24 which compares the results after they have been converted to a continuous scale from 0 to 100 (100 represents the highest degree of perception of representativity).




Figure VI.24. Perceptions of Citizen Representation, 2010

Perhaps the most interesting finding in this data is that there is a shift in the opinions about the government entities that represent and benefit citizens. As can be seen in Figure VI.25, from 2004 to 2008 there was a downward trend in the opinion that the central government represents citizens; in fact, the government was not an entity that received the most positive evaluation in terms of representing citizen interests. In 2010, this opinion shows a significant upswing, and makes the central government the entity with the best citizen approval rate, even above local government, which had always collected the greatest number of favorable opinions. In other words, in 2010, a great number of Salvadorans' perception is that the government represents and benefits them more than it did in the past. This trend seems to cover deputies as well, who recovered certain positive opinions compared with previous years. Only the mayors and city councils appear to have suffered erosion in terms of citizen sentiment. By 2010, fewer Salvadorans felt represented by municipal government than in the past. As mentioned in previous chapters, this might have something to do with the 2009 elections, when, after fifteen years, the opposition party won the presidential elections.

This is probably due to the change in government that took place in 2009. Beyond measuring citizen support for the current government, these results probably reflect the fact that there is a new administration in charge of the central government, and this has renewed perceptions on the government's relationship with citizens.




Figure VI.25. Citizen Perceptions of Representation in El Salvador in Comparative Perspective

Now then, who tends to feel the central government best represents them? According to the results of a linear regression created to identify the underlying variables, the fundamental factors that influence these opinions about the central government are: interest in politics, political preference, and family economic situation (Figure VI.26). Specifically, people that are more interested in politics tend to feel better represented by the central government; FMLN supporters feel represented more than the rest of the population; and those who have a positive evaluation their family's economic situation have high scores in representation by the central government.




Figure VI.26. Determinants of Citizen Perception of Representation in El Salvador, 2010

Conclusions

Summing up, in this chapter we have examined citizen participation in the country's political and social life. We began by examining the Salvadorans' levels of interpersonal trust. Overall, citizens show high levels of interpersonal trust. Despite the prevailing sense of public insecurity that has affected the country for years now, expressions of trust in others do not seem to have declined in 2010. Overall, El Salvador is in the group of countries with top levels of citizen trust.

As regards civic participation, the results shown in this chapter indicate that religious groups attract a large portion of the population and, in fact, constitute the only non-political group that attracts a significant portion of citizens. Moreover, participation in religious organizations is the only one that has registered an increase in recent years compared with the other kinds of civic participation. Involvement in parents' associations, although exhibiting modest participation levels, has not registered any significant change in recent years. The other types of civic participation that were measured in the survey, membership in associations of professionals and women's groups, collect very small percentages of the population, and although the former appear to register a slight increase, the percentages of participation are still so small that their impact on the collective is relatively low.

Participation in street demonstrations and marches also registers a very low percentage in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey for El Salvador. In fact, compared with the rest of the region, El Salvador is one of the countries where people participate the least in public demonstrations, only above Guyana and Jamaica. All this coincides with a general climate of scant interest in politics and limited levels of political activism, which, although on a modest upturn over the past two years, does not involve the majority of the population. Actually, Salvadorans continue to appear apathetic toward the more active aspects of politics. The survey suggests that citizens tend not to participate in political parties directly, although they do turn out to vote.

In terms of electoral participation, the data show much greater levels of voter attendance than those actually registered in the last election. This is due to the social desirability effect, that is, that many people respond according to what they consider correct. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to other data that indicate that no more than a third of citizens identify with the system or show support for a political party. These sympathies are concentrated around the country's two major parties and contribute to the polarized scheme that is not new on the local political scene. It is noteworthy, however, that citizens' ideological orientation has shifted in recent years, moving from the right to a clearly more central position. This comes as a result of the increase in the number of persons who describe themselves as left and center, to the detriment of people who identify with the ideological right.

Finally, one of the most interesting results in this chapter shows that the majority of Salvadorans now feel less represented and benefited by the deputies and mayors than they did in the past, whereas the central government collects more positive opinions than in previous surveys. This recovery in public opinion regarding the government performance is probably related to the change in the administration in the central government as a result of the 2009 elections; in fact, FMLN supporters feel more represented by the government than any other political group.

Appendixes

Appendix VI.1. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

Level of Interpersonal Trust		
	Coef.	T
Crime victimization	-0.042	(-1.60)
Perception of insecurity	-0.202*	(-6.71)
Police protect citizens	0.071*	(3.21)
Gangs affect neighborhood	-0.115*	(-3.29)
Family economic situation	0.040	(1.49)
Education	0.101*	(3.14)
Woman	-0.069*	(-2.47)
Age	0.087*	(3.61)
Quintiles of wealth	0.024	(0.77)
Size of area of residence	0.008	(0.28)
Constant	0.003	(0.11)
R-squared = 0.112		
N. of cases = 1420		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VI.2. Determinants of Electoral Participation

Did you vote in the last presidential elections?		
	Coefficients	(t)
Interest in politics	0.194*	(2.63)
Evaluation of government	0.119	(1.91)
Family economic situation	-0.026	(-0.39)
Perception of the national economy	-0.012	(-0.21)
Perception of insecurity	0.006	(0.09)
Education	0.403*	(3.90)
Woman	0.087	(1.31)
Age	0.685*	(7.26)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.019	(-0.19)
Size of area of residence	0.003	(0.05)
Constant	1.479*	(19.99)
F = 7.75		
N. of cases = 1538		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VI.3. Determinants of Interest in Politics

Interest in politics		
	Coef.	T
Gender	-0.145*	(-6.58)
Age	-0.036	(-1.46)
Education	0.153*	(4.97)
Size of Place of residence	-0.058*	(-2.23)
Quintiles of wealth	0.047*	(2.13)
Constant	0.000	(0.01)
R-squared = 0.075		
N. of cases = 1547		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VI.4. Determinants of Opinion about Central Government Representation

Represented by the Central Government		
	Coef.	T
Woman	0.030	(0.98)
How old are you?	0.074	(1.92)
Education	-0.034	(-0.91)
Size of area of residence	0.034	(1.19)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.009	(-0.24)
Family economic situation	0.126*	(3.24)
Party voted for	0.128*	(4.10)
Interest in politics	0.181*	(4.84)
Perception of insecurity	-0.030	(-1.02)
Constant	0.055*	(2.01)
R-squared = 0.070		
N. of cases = 967		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VII . Local Government

This chapter deals with the issue of Salvadorans' attitudes and evaluations in terms of their local governments. The first section examines the degree to which citizens trust different levels of government, and the second analyzes participation in municipal government meetings. In the third section we examine the way requests for assistance are made, followed by satisfaction with municipal services and trust in the way funds are managed. We end with the analysis of support for decentralization and general conclusions.

Citizens' Relationship with Different Levels of Government

In this section we are going to explore the hypotheses on the local government's proximity to citizens based on a set of items that were included in the questionnaire, in order to explore the relationship or the occasional contact between respondents and the local elected officials, deputies and city hall. The wording was as follows:

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...

CP2. A deputy of the Legislative Assembly?

CP4A. A local public official (mayor, city hall)?

CP4. Any ministry/secretariat, public institution, or state office?

To simplify analysis, the response options were converted to a 0-100 format. As these items were included in the surveys in 2004, 2006, and 2008, the results for the four studies are presented in the following figure. Overall, during the 2004-2008 period there was a noticeable downward trend in requests for help of deputies, local officials and national governmental institutions, and in the 2010 study there was an increase for all three, although the only one that was statistically significant is the change in aid requested of institutions of the national government (Figure VII.1).

On the other hand, out of the four measurements, the municipality was the level where respondents principally directed their requests for aid, followed in second place by an institution of the national government, and lastly by the deputies. These data reinforce the hypothesis of greater proximity between citizens and the local government, in terms of having requested help or cooperation to solve their problems. In 2010, on average 23.4 have requested help at the municipality, 10.7 at an institution of the national government, and 5.7 of the deputies.




Figure VII.1. Who have you requested help or cooperation from? El Salvador 2004–2010

The survey included items to measure the level of trust in different institutions, and in this section we will present the results comparing the national government and local government.⁶¹ Responses were converted to a scale from 0 to 100. The following figure presents the average trust in national government (67.6) and in municipal government (59.2) for 2010. It can be seen that there is a greater level of trust in the former, and this difference is statistically significant. By comparison with the 2008 study, we can see a significant increase in trust in the national government.⁶²




Figure VII.2. Trust in Municipal and National Government Compared, El Salvador 2010

⁶¹ Item B14 measures trust in the national government and question B32 measures trust in the municipal government.

⁶² In 2008, average trust in the national government was 46.9 and trust in the municipal government was 57.1.

In the following figure shows the evolution in trust in municipal government for the 2004-2010 period, but basically it has not varied, as the differences are not statistically significant: 62.9 for 2004; 59.6 for 2006; 57.1 for 2008; and 59.2 for 2010.




Figure VII.3. Trust in the Municipality in El Salvador, 2004-2010

By comparing the levels of trust in the municipal government with the other countries included in the 2010 survey, it can be seen that our country has the top average for trust in municipal government.




Figure VII.4. Trust in Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Participation in Municipal Government Meetings

The survey included questions about citizen participation in local government: “NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, or city council meeting in the past 12 months?” In Figure VII.5 it can be seen that 13.2% attended a municipal meeting in 2010.




Figure VII.5. Attendance at Municipal Meetings, 2010

This question was included in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 surveys, so it is possible to compare the 2010 data with the previous studies. In Figure VII.6 we can see that the percentage of Salvadorans that attended municipal meetings was 12.6% in 2004; this dropped to 10.7% in 2006; it bounced back to 12% in 2008 and continued upward to 13.2% in 2010. However, these differences are not statistically significant, so we can conclude that the percentage of citizens participating in municipal meetings has not varied in the 2004-2010 period.




Figure VII.6. Attended a Municipal Meeting in El Salvador, 2004-2010

When placed in comparative perspective with the other countries included in the 2010 survey, it can be seen that El Salvador is among the countries with the highest rates of participation in municipal meetings, only below the Dominican Republic, the United States, Canada, Guatemala, Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago.




Figure VII.7. Attended a Municipal Meeting in Comparative Perspective, 2010

The questionnaire included the question: “NP1B. To what extent do you believe municipal officials pay attention to what people request at these meetings? They pay attention: (1) A lot, (2) Somewhat, (3) Little, (4) Not at all, (8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t respond.” In Figure VII.8 it can be seen that according to the 2010 data, the evaluation is tinged by a certain skepticism in relation to municipal officials’ interest in responding to the population’s demands: 13.7% believe they pay a lot of attention; 26% somewhat; 40.7% little, and 19.6% not at all. Practically 6 in 10 persons believe officials pay little or no attention to what people request at these meetings.




Figure VII.8. To what extent do you believe municipal officials pay attention to what people request at these meetings? 2010

In Figure VII.9 we can see that this evaluation shows relatively little improvement in the studies for the 2004-2010 period; the differences are not statistically significant.




Figure VII.9. To what extent do you believe municipal officials pay attention to what people request at these meetings? 2004-2010

Presenting Requests or Seeking Help

Attending meetings can be considered a passive way of participating in politics, therefore the questionnaire included an item aimed at measuring a more direct manner of participation: “NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official, or councilperson of the local government during the past 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer.” In 2010, 14.5% had requested the help of the municipality.




Figure VII.10. Presented Request at the Municipality during Past Year, 2010

This item was part of the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 surveys, making it possible to compare the four. Figure VII.1 shows the percentage of Salvadorans who sought help or presented a request was 12.2% in 2004; this increases to 20% in 2006; it dips down to 15.6% in 2008, and to 14.5% in 2010. However, the difference between 2008 and 2010 is not statistically significant, which leads to the conclusion that the percentage of Salvadorans that sought aid or presented a request has not varied.




Figure VII.11. Sought Help at Municipal Government over Time, El Salvador, 2004-2010

Figure VII.12 presents the results of the regression for who is more likely to seek the aid of the local government in the case of El Salvador in 2010. The coefficients are presented in Appendix VII.1 (at the end of the chapter). Basically there were three variables that turned out to be statistically significant in the model. Those who had attended a municipal meeting; those who live in small municipalities or in a rural area; and those with a lower educational level are more likely to seek aid at the municipality.




Figure VII.12. Who is more likely to seek aid at the local government level? El Salvador 2010

Continuing with the issue of presenting requests or demands at the municipality in 2010, another item read as follows: “MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?” Here, 30.2% answered that their issue or request had been resolved.




Figure VII.13. Did they resolve you issue or request? El Salvador, 2010

Looking at the item in comparative perspective with the other countries included in the 2010 survey, we can see that El Salvador is in an intermediate position in terms of presenting issues or requests at the municipal level in 2010.




Figure VII.14. Presenting Requests at Municipal Governments, Comparative Perspective, 2010

Satisfaction with Municipal Government Services

In order to measure citizen satisfaction with municipal government services in general, the questionnaire included the following item: “SGL1. Would you say that the services people receive at the municipality are: (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor bad (fair), (4) Bad, (5) Very bad, (88) Doesn’t know /doesn’t respond.” This question was part of the 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys; therefore, the following figure presents the comparison of the results. Overall, the levels of citizen satisfaction with municipal services practically remain unchanged between 2006 and 2010.




Figure VII.15. Would you say the services the municipality gives people are, 2004-2010

To simplify the comparison, the response options for this item were changed to a 0-100 scale, and Figure IV.16 shows the results. We can see that the average satisfaction with municipal services in 2004 was 57.3; it dips to 54.5 in 2006; then it drops to 53.5 in 2008, and moves further down to 52.9 in 2010. However these differences are not statistically significant.




Figure VII.16. Comparison – Average Satisfaction with Municipal Services 2004-2010

Figure VII.17 presents the results from the regression on satisfaction with municipal services in the case of El Salvador, 2010. The coefficients are included in Appendix VII.2 (end of chapter). Basically, there are five variables that turned out to be statistically significant in the model: size of place of residence, in the sense that, to the extent that municipalities are smaller or rural, the level of satisfaction with services decreases; sex, where women are more satisfied with municipal services than men; and age, which presents a “u” curve, that is, young people and seniors show higher levels of satisfaction compared with middle-aged adults. As for the perception of personal economic situation and trust in the municipality, those who are less satisfied with their own economic situation and those that trust least in local government, are less satisfied with municipal services.




Figure VII.17. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, El Salvador 2010

Trust in Management of Funds

The questionnaire included the following item: “MUNI6. To what extent do you trust the city hall to manage its funds well? (3) A lot, (2) Somewhat, (1) Little, (0) Not at all, (88) Doesn’t know, (98) Doesn’t Answer.” In Figure VII.18 it can be seen that 13.1% trust a lot, 25.6% trust somewhat, 35.9% trust little, and 25.5% do not trust at all.




Figure VII.18. Level of Trust in Proper Management of Funds by City Hall, El Salvador, 2010

This item was included in the 2004 and 2008 studies; therefore, it is possible to compare the data from the 2010 with those from previous studies. In Table VII.1 it can be seen that, in general terms, there has been a small upward trend in levels of trust in in proper fund management by the city hall.

Table VII.1. Level Of Trust In Proper Management of Funds by City Hall, El Salvador 2004-2010

	2004	2008	2010
No trust	487 (32.91%)	489 (32.56%)	388 (25.49%)
Trust little	554 (37.43%)	510 (33.95%)	546 (35.87%)
Trust Somewhat	304 (20.54%)	345 (22.97%)	389 (25.56%)
Trust A Lot	135 (9.12%)	158 (10.52%)	199 (13.07%)
Total	1,480 (100.00%)	1,502 (100.00%)	1,522 (100.00%)

Support for Decentralization

An item was included in the questionnaire that aimed at exploring the level of support for decentralization. The question was whether more resources and responsibilities should be assigned at the government’s national level or at the local level. The wording was as follows: “LGL2. In your opinion, should more responsibilities and more money be given to the municipality, or should the national government be allowed to assume more municipal level responsibilities and services? (1) More to city hall, (2) Let the national government assume more obligations and services, (3) No change, (4) More to the municipality if it improves services, (88) Doesn’t know, (98) Doesn’t respond.” The 2010 data show that 52.9% of those interviewed believe the national government should assume more responsibilities and services, whereas 43% are of the opinion that more resources and responsibilities should be assigned the municipality. There is even 1.3% for giving more resources and responsibilities to the municipality but on condition that services improve; altogether, this is 44.3% favorable opinion for the local government; and 2.8% prefer no change. In Figure VII.19 we compared the responses to this question over the period 2004 to 2010.




Figure VII.19. Whom should more resources and responsibilities go to? 2004-2010

Conclusions

This chapter examined Salvadorans' attitudes and evaluations about local government. The data provides evidence there is greater proximity between citizens and local government in terms of having requested help or cooperation to solve their problems.

In previous studies, the municipal government had higher levels of citizen trust compared with the national government, and this level remained stable in the 2004-2008 period. However, due to the significant increase in trust in the national government in the 2010 study, which as noted in the previous section, is tied with alternance and high levels of approval for president Funes, now the local government is below the national government in terms of citizen trust.

Likewise, relatively low levels of citizen participation were reported regarding two aspects that this survey looked at: attending a town meeting or municipal meeting (13.2%), and seeking help or presenting requests (14.5%). The levels that correspond to the 2010 study do not collect statistically significant differences with regards to the 2008 study.

We also found low levels in citizens' perceptions of municipal officials' interest in responding to the populations petitions: 13.7% believes they pay a lot of attention, 26% somewhat, 40.7% little, and 19.6% not at all. Practically 6 out of 10 persons believe that officials pay little attention or none at all to people's requests at these meetings. Also, we examined levels of satisfaction with municipal services. Almost 25% of Salvadorans, that is, 1 in 4 people feel dissatisfied with their local government's services. Five predictors for satisfaction with municipal services were statistically significant: size or area, sex, age, perception of personal economic situation, and trust in municipality.

Additionally, it was found that there has been a small overall increase in the levels of trust in good management of funds at the city halls.

Finally, we saw there are more favorable opinions of the national government in terms of assigning more resources and responsibilities: 52.9% point to the national government and 44.3% the municipal government, whereas only 2.8% say they would change nothing.

Appendixes

Appendix VII.1. Determinants of Who is More Likely to Seek Help of the Local Government, El Salvador 2010

	Coef.	t
Trust in the municipality	0.042	-1.39
Has attended a municipal meeting	0.282*	-8.37
Size of area of residence	-0.073*	(-2.61)
Age	-0.154	(-1.30)
Age squared	0.125	-1.06
Sex	0.03	-1.36
Years of education	-0.072*	(-2.47)
Constant	0	-0.02
R-squared = 0.09		
N. of cases = 1544		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VII.2. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, El Salvador 2010

	Coef.	t
Size of area of residence	-0.069*	(-2.83)
Quintiles of wealth	0.029	-1.45
Sex	0.064*	-2.71
Age	-0.277*	(-2.37)
Age squared	0.271*	-2.3
Years of education	0.063	-1.97
Participation in local government meetings	-0.011	(-0.48)
Sought help from municipality	0.045	-1.44
Perception personal economic situation	-0.104*	(-4.32)
Perception personal retrospective economic situation	-0.021	(-0.80)
Trust in the municipal government	0.436*	-21.29
Constant	-0.001	(-0.05)
R-squared = 0.217		
N. of cases = 1531		
* p<0.05		

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII . Mediation Centers

Introduction

In this chapter we deal with Salvadorans' opinions regarding a project promoted by the Office of the Attorney General of El Salvador. The project consists of creating and maintaining Mediation Centers, which seek to intervene in citizen conflict resolution, to contribute to find solutions that prevent the escalation of interpersonal and legal conflicts, and avoid congestion in the justice system and at public institutions.

Nowadays, conflict is resolved by negotiation, but also by way of force. The State is empowered to administer both types of strategies in order to achieve the results that it may esteem convenient. However, the character of political regimes is not always linked to the way conflicts are resolved. That is, negotiations are not always the only channel for conflict resolution in a democracy; neither is force the only instrument in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Actually, the difference lies in the respect for human rights, which are universal values, the observance of certain procedures associated with the rule of law, and the degree to which the principle that no citizen is above the law is in operation.

The justice system, the law enforcement agencies, and those institutions that guarantee transparency in public management all constitute fundamental instruments to channel and solve social conflicts, whether between the state and the citizens, or among the citizens themselves. However, on occasion institutional design and traditions inherited from past authoritarian regimes, among other factors, may erode the institutions' capacities, or they may prevent them, even in a democratic regime, to adequately channel conflicts, not only those that are most politically relevant, but also, and above all, those that arise on a daily basis. In the long run, this lack of capacity may affect the government's ability to procure certain levels of order and social integration, which may become a threat to democratic stability. The emergence of economic crises, such as that presently underway in different countries, puts to the test these capacities for social integration and conflict resolution, as they can increase in number and intensity as the crisis affects large sectors of the population.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first focuses briefly on citizens' opinions about the way they respond when faced with conflict, whereas the second part presents the results regarding the Mediation Centers.

Conflict Resolution

What do Salvadorans do when faced with a conflict or a possible conflict? Citizen response toward conflict was explored by means of the following item included in the Salvadoran AmericasBarometer questionnaire.

ELSB52. What would you do if you had to face a conflict, whether legal, civil, interpersonal or any other kind? **[Read alternatives]**
(1) Do nothing, (2) Try to settle with the other party, (3) Solve it your own way, (4) Go to an authority (Judge, Police, Attorney General), (5) Hire a lawyer (9) Use a mediation center (88) Doesn't know, (98) Doesn't answer

The results are presented in the following figure, and they reveal that citizens would use formal and legal mechanisms in order to solve conflict. For instance, almost one fourth (24.3%) would go to an authority (police, court, attorney general), while a similar percentage would hire a lawyer; then, 21.2% said they would go to a mediation center, such as those promoted by the Attorney General's Office, and 19.1% said they would try to settle with the other party. This means that practically 90% of the people would use legal means to face conflict. Just fewer than 7% said they would do nothing, and less than 5% declared they would solve it their own way, alluding to possible strategies outside the legal order of things.




Figure VIII.1. What would you do if you had to face a conflict?

All in all, this is good news, because it indicates that the percentage of people willing to bypass legal mechanisms is very low. When these results are compared with those obtained in previous years, the news is better still. As can be seen in the following table, the percentages of people who said that they would turn to the authorities or would hire a lawyer remains practically unchanged since 2004; however, the number of people who said they would use the Mediation Center has increased steadily and significantly over the same period; furthermore settlements have also increased. But the most important thing is the drop in the percentage of persons that would do nothing or would solve them their own way. The percentage of persons who would face conflicts in private has decreased from 13.4% in 2004 to 4.9% in 2010. The latter suggests that, overall, the use of Mediation Centers has had a positive effect on the manner in which citizens solve their conflicts because it erodes informal—and potentially illegal—practices for solving differences.

Table VIII.1. What would you do if faced with a conflict? in Comparative Perspective, 2004, 2006, 2010

	2004	2006	2010	All
Nothing (n)	167	143	101	411
(%)	11.41	8.58	6.59	8.81
Settle with the other party (n)	263	376	293	932
(%)	17.96	22.57	19.11	19.99
Solve your own way (n)	196	210	74	480
(%)	13.39	12.61	4.83	10.29
Turn to authority (n)	362	363	372	1,097
(%)	24.73	21.79	24.27	23.53
Hire a lawyer (n)	360	392	368	1,120
(%)	24.59	23.53	24.01	24.02
Use a Mediation Center (n)	116	182	325	325
(%)	7.92	10.92	21.20	6.97

The way in which citizens solve conflicts was also measured by providing the respondents with a concrete situation and asking them who they would go to in order to solve this dilemma. The situation was in reference to a conflict that shows up relatively frequently in Salvadoran courts, that is, a property conflict or dispute. The question was worded as follows:

ELSAY7. Suppose you had a problem with a piece of property someone else claims is theirs. Who would you go to in order to solve this problem? **[Do not read alternatives]**

- | | |
|---|--|
| (0) City Hall | (1) A non-governmental organization (NGO) that provides assistance |
| (2) A friend or relative with influence in the government | |
| (3) A court of law | (4) The police |
| (5) A government office in charge of these issues | |
| (6) A friend or relative with experience solving issues | |
| (7) A lawyer (88) DK (98) DA | |

The results to this item confirm those obtained in the previous question, that is, the majority of citizens would use legal channels in order to solve the dispute: 37.4% would hire a lawyer to represent them; 32.9% would seek help at a government office; 18.9% would go to the court of law; while 5.3% would go to local government, and 3.2% would seek out the police. This means that over 95% of Salvadorans would use legal means to deal with a property dispute. Aside from turning to a non-governmental organization, a mere 3% would use informal and potentially illegal means.




Figure VIII.2. Who would you turn to in order to solve a property dispute?

When we compared these results with data from the 2004 and 2006 studies, we found, overall, that citizens' responses are similar over time, except for the percentage of persons that would go to a government office. In fact, this percentage has gone from 21% in 2004, to 24% in 2006, and to 33% in 2010 (see Table VIII.2). This is probably the effect of the presence of Mediation Centers and their impact on the behavior in conflict resolution on the part of citizens.

Table VIII.2. "Who would you go to in order to solve a property dispute?" 2004, 2006, 2010

Who would you go to?	2004	2006	2010
A lawyer	42.8	43.4	37.4
A government office	21.0	23.6	32.9
A court of law	19.0	12.2	18.9
The City Hall	9.0	14.0	5.3
The police	3.4	2.0	3.2
A person with experience solving problems	2.4	2.4	0.7
An NGO	1.4	1.1	1.0
A person with government influence	0.5	1.4	1.7

In summary, in 2010 Salvadorans showed they are more interested in solving conflicts using legal channels and government offices than by informal solutions. This constitutes a significant change in citizen attitudes toward conflict resolution, and Mediation Centers could be behind this.

Mediation Centers

What is the extent to which Salvadorans know or have heard about these relatively new institutions? To answer this question, the 2010 version of the AmericasBarometer included a series of items on Mediation Centers. The first question had to do with the knowledge people have of these centers, and the wording was as follows:

ELSB56. Have you heard of the existence of mediation centers promoted by the Attorney General's Office?
(1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Go to ELSAY7**]

The data indicate that a little over 40% of Salvadorans have heard about the Attorney General's Mediation Centers (Figure VIII.3). This, once more, is good news for the people behind this project, particularly considering it is a relatively new project that was little known six years ago.

Actually, if this data is compared with that obtained in previous years, a significant increase can be seen in the population's knowledge of Mediation Centers. In 2004, only 11.4%, or one in ten Salvadorans, was aware these institutions existed; by 2006, awareness had reached 30% of the population, which means that practically one in three Salvadorans knew about the centers at that time; in 2010, two out of five Salvadorans knew about the Mediation Centers.⁶³ A good deal of the increment in awareness took place between 2004 and 2006, but data indicate that by 2010 still more people are learning about Mediation Centers (Figure VIII.4).

Even though almost 60% of citizens have yet to hear about the Mediation Centers, the percentage of awareness can be considered high given that, in general, a lot of citizens are not aware of the existence of many national institutions, including institutions that are older such as the Court of Auditors. Therefore it is important to explore who the people are that have heard about the Mediation Centers. To this end, a logistic regression was created to identify the factors that distinguish those who know about the Mediation Centers, from those who do not.

⁶³ In 2008 there were no questions about Mediation Centers in the AmericasBarometer survey.




Figure VIII.3. Awareness of Mediation Centers, 2010




Figure VIII.4. Awareness of Mediation Centers, 2006, 2008, 2010

As can be seen in Figure VIII.5, there are only two factors that distinguish awareness of Mediation Centers: age and level of education. In fact, awareness of these institutions increases as people enter adulthood until the age of 45; over half of Salvadorans between the ages of 36 and 45 are aware of the existence of Mediation Centers. Beyond this, awareness drops off among persons that are older, but is not as low as it is among young people.




Figure VIII.5. Determinants of Awareness of Mediation Centers, 2010

In the case of schooling, results indicate a clear linear relationship. The higher the level of education, the greater the awareness of Mediation Centers is. Therefore, only 37% of persons with no education know about the Centers; this percentage climbs to a little over 40% among Salvadorans who have finished primary or secondary school, and almost reaches 50% among those with higher education (Figure VIII.6).

It is interesting to note that neither gender, economic standing, nor area of residence seem to have an effect on people's awareness of Mediation Centers. In other words, the degree to which people are aware of Mediation Centers is not dependent upon gender, or income, or place of residence. It only depends on age and education. Neither does awareness of these centers depend on having been a victim of crime, which suggests that the people who are going to these centers are those who have conflicts that have not necessarily escalated into crimes.




Figure VIII.6. Awareness of Mediation Centers by Age and Education, in Percentages

Citizens were also asked about the quality of the information they had about the Mediation Centers. Concretely, they were asked whether they thought that what they knew about these centers was enough or not. The item used to explore this is shown below, and it was only put to people who knew about Mediation Centers.

ELSB57. Do you consider that the information you have about the Mediation Centers promoted by the Attorney General's office is...?
 (1) Adequate (2) Not enough (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

As can be seen in Figure VIII.7, where the results of the question are presented, two thirds of the persons that knew about the existence of the centers, that is 63.6%, considered that the information they had about them was still insufficient. Only a third believed they had adequate information about these centers. Crossing some of the results not shown here, people that tended to complain about the scarcity of information about Mediation Centers were women, younger people, and those who live in the urban centers in the country. In fact, among the latter, 67% complained to the surveyor about not having enough information about the centers, compared with 56% of rural area inhabitants who said the same.




Figure VIII.7. Opinion about Information Regarding Mediation Centers, 2010

How much do citizens approve of the existence of this kind of center? To explore approval for Mediation Centers, the following item was included in the 2010 round questionnaire.

ELSB58. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the Mediation Centers promoted by the Attorney General's Office?
(1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

The results indicate that about 87% of Salvadorans who are familiar with these centers said they agree they should exist, that is, the great majority of citizens support these institutions. However, this high level of approval is not new. In fact, in previous years, those who knew about the Mediation Centers exhibited even higher percentages of support (see Figure VIII.8). Nevertheless, although these differences are statistically significant, this decrease does not change the idea that the great majority of citizens support these institutions.




Figure VIII.8. Mediation Center Approval 2004, 2006 and 2010

Finally, the survey asked citizens their opinion about the importance of these Mediation Centers. The wording was as follows:

ELSB59. In your opinion, these Mediation Centers promoted by the Attorney General's Office are...
 (1) Not important (2) A little important (3) Important (4) Very important
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

Once again, the majority of respondents who knew about Mediation Centers were of the opinion that they are important or very important. As can be seen in the following figure, 80% described these institutions as important or very important; while only 19% saw them as a little or not important. When looking at these data over time, it can be seen that there has been a shift in opinions regarding this issue: the great majority of citizens consider these centers to be very important.




Figure VIII.9. Opinion about Mediation Centers' Importance, 2010




Figure VIII.10. Opinion about Mediation Centers' Importance over Time, 2004, 2006 and 2008

Conclusions

In this chapter we have explored the way Salvadoran citizens solve conflicts. We have also evaluated their awareness of the Mediation Center project promoted by the Attorney General's Office, and their opinions about the centers.

Data indicate that citizens make more use of legal mechanisms to solve conflicts. Reliance on public institutions – whether part of the justice system, law enforcement agencies, or Mediation Centers – is currently Salvadorans' first choice when seeking help in conflict resolution. Engaging lawyers is another strategy that is frequently used by a sector of citizens. Responses that favored the use of informal mechanisms, such as a relative or friend with political influence, or availing oneself of persons who have their own way of solving things, has decreased significantly in recent years.

This may be tied to the growing awareness and use of Mediation Centers. According to data collected in the 2010 survey, over 40% of citizens now know about the centers. This percentage is much higher than what had been found six years ago when these centers were created. Knowledge of these centers is associated with very favorable opinions. Almost all citizens who know about these centers regard them in a positive light; they favor their existence, and consider them to be very important. The only problem that the results obtained here show is that a significant number of respondents consider that they still do not have adequate information about them. Therefore, it is clear that, along with the goal of reaching a greater number of people, these centers need to provide people with adequate information.

Appendix

Appendix VIII.1. Determinants of Awareness of Mediation Centers
“Have you heard of Mediation Centers?”

	Coefficients	(t)
Woman	-0.027	(-0.51)
How old are you?	0.241 *	(4.58)
What is the number of years of education you completed or passed?	0.234*	(3.46)
Quintiles of wealth	0.025	(0.42)
Size of area	-0.002	(-0.03)
Crime Victimization	0.053	(1.08)
Constant	-0.318*	(-5.32)
F = 5.27		
N. of cases = 1545		
* p<0.05		

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Appendixes

Appendix A: Technical Description of the El Salvador Study

Determinación de la muestra

1.1 Universo poblacional

El universo de estudio comprendió la totalidad geográfica del país, el cual ésta compuesto por 14 departamentos y 262 municipios, incluyendo tanto las zonas urbanas y rurales de éstos.

De acuerdo a la Proyección de Población de El Salvador 1995-2025 de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos del Ministerio de Economía (DIGESTIC)*, el país contaba en el 2007 con una población total de 7,104,999, de la cual el 60.28% estaba concentrada en las zonas urbanas del país y el restante 39.72% corresponde a los habitantes de las zonas rurales.

1.2 Población

Las unidades objeto de estudio correspondió a la población mayor de 18 años, residente en hogares.

1.3 Método de muestreo

El primer criterio para diseñar el procedimiento de muestreo es que la muestra resultante reflejase lo más fielmente posible la totalidad de la población salvadoreña, tomando como base la Proyección de Población de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos del Ministerio de Economía (DIGESTIC).

El sistema de muestreo utilizado fue probabilístico, estratificado y multietápico, por conglomerados y aleatorio en la selección de las unidades en cada una de las etapas que comprende el muestreo.

El muestreo fue estratificado según los 262 municipios que corresponden a los 14 departamentos del país; y contó con varias etapas de selección de la unidades: en un primer momento se seleccionaron las Unidades Primarias de Muestreo que corresponden precisamente a los municipios, luego las Unidades Secundarias que corresponden a segmentos censales en el área urbana y cantones en el área rural, posteriormente se eligieron las Unidades de Tercera Etapa conformadas por manzanas y finalmente se eligieron conglomerados de 6,7 u 8 viviendas en el caso del área urbana –dependiendo del estrato- y 12 viviendas en el área rural. Dentro de cada estrato las UPM's se seleccionaron de acuerdo a la probabilidad proporcional al tamaño poblacional de cada municipio.

En cada vivienda se seleccionó un único hogar y dentro de éste se entrevistaron a una sola persona mayor de 18 años que cumpla con los requisitos de sexo y edad requerida para completar la muestra.

1.4 Marco muestral

Dicho marco está compuesto por la cartografía censal obtenida de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTIC), la cual incluye tanto a las ciudades de las zonas urbanas del país como a los cantones que comprende la zona rural.

* These figures were created by the General Bureau of Statistics & Census (DIGESTIC) in the Ministry of the Economy, based on the 1992 Population Census. See: "Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTIC), Fondo de población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP) y Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE) (1996) *Proyección de la población de El Salvador 1995-2025*, San Salvador: Ministerio de Economía." This census provided the basis for the calculations that correspond to this sampling, also using the aforementioned population projection as a basis for the projection.

La mayor parte de la cartografía censal está actualizada hasta 1996 y otra al 2000, como parte de los esfuerzos hechos por la DIGESTIC para actualizar su información de base para las Encuestas de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples. Pero hay que mencionar que una parte de la cartografía que será utilizada en la encuesta corresponde a la levantada durante la ejecución del censo de 1992 y la cual no ha sido actualizada posteriormente, pero es la única con la que se cuenta en la actualidad, sobre todo en el caso de algunos mapas de la zona rural.

1.5 Tamaño de la muestra

Se estableció de antemano realizar un total de 1,500 entrevistas. Tomando en cuenta el dato anterior y considerando un 95% de confianza (Z), una varianza de 50% (p), el error muestral estimado es del +/- 2.5%. Para establecer dicho error se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula diseñada para poblaciones infinitas:

$$E = Z \sqrt{pq / n}$$

donde,

$$E = (1.96)^2 (0.5) (0.5) / 1,500 = 2.5$$

La forma de selección de la muestra fue polietápica, realizando dentro del proceso de muestreo una serie de estratificaciones que permitieron seleccionar una muestra aleatoria.

1.6 Determinación de la muestra por estrato y áreas urbano/rural

Por la falta de información sobre la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural por municipio, se procedió a estimar dicha población utilizando las tasas de crecimiento anual tanto de la zona urbana como rural a nivel nacional. Para lo anterior, se hizo uso de los datos existentes sobre el crecimiento poblacional tanto en lo urbano como en lo rural de los años 1995, 2000, 2005 y 2010* para poder estimar los datos municipales de interés para el año 2007. Así, tomando los datos del Censo Nacional de 1992 del Ministerio de Economía y la Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTIC), se obtiene la información poblacional por municipio para el año 1992. A estos datos se les aplicó la tasa de crecimiento poblacional anual estimada para el período de 1992 a 1995 para obtener la población urbana y rural para el año 1995.

Por ejemplo, la tasa de crecimiento anual del área urbana entre 1992 y 1995 fue de 8.2%. Para estimar la población urbana por municipio para 1995 se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula:

$$\text{Población urbana municipal para 1995} = [((8.2/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 1992} \\ \times 3) + \text{Población urbana municipal en 1992}]$$

En el caso de la zona rural, se tenía que la tasa de crecimiento anual fue de -1.1%. Para estimar la población rural por municipio para 1995 se hizo uso de la siguiente fórmula:

$$\text{Población rural municipal para 1995} = [((-1.1/100) \times \text{Población rural municipal en 1992} \\ \times 3) + \text{Población rural municipal en 1992}]$$

Obteniendo el dato poblacional urbano – rural por municipio para 1995, se realizó el mismo procedimiento anterior para calcular dicha población al 2000, al 2004, al 2006 y luego al 2008 basándose en los datos obtenidos anteriormente. Las fórmulas utilizadas para calcular la población urbana y rural para 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008 y posteriormente para 2010 son las siguientes:

* These data correspond to the Projection of the Population of El Salvador, 1995-2025, prepared by the DIGESTIC (General Bureau of Statistics & Census) based on the 1992 Population Census.

Población urbana municipal para 2000 = $[(2.6/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995} \times 5] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995}$

Población rural municipal para 2000 = $[(1.3/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995} \times 5] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 1995}$

Población urbana municipal para 2004 = $[(2.3/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000} \times 3] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000}$

Población rural municipal para 2004 = $[(1.2/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000} \times 3] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2000}$

Población urbana municipal para 2006 = $[(2.3/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2004} \times 2] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2004}$

Población rural municipal para 2006 = $[(1.2/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2004} \times 2] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2004}$

Población urbana municipal para 2008 = $[(0.8/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2006} \times 2] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2006}$

Población rural municipal para 2008 = $[(0.36/100) \times \text{Población urbana municipal en 2006} \times 2] + \text{Población urbana municipal en 2006}$

Teniendo la cantidad poblacional por zona urbana y rural en cada municipio y por ende la cantidad total en cada uno de ellos, se procedió en un primer momento a estratificar la población con base en la cantidad de habitantes por municipio, éstos últimos son en este caso las Unidades Primarias de Muestreo. El primer estrato estaba conformado por aquellos municipios con más de 100,000 habitantes (estos municipios tienen una probabilidad de selección de 1; es decir, quedan autoseleccionados dentro de la muestra); el segundo estrato contenía a los municipios con 50,000 a 100,000 habitantes; el tercer estrato correspondía a los municipios con 20,000 a 50,000 habitantes y el cuarto y último estrato incluyó a los municipios con menos de 20,000 habitantes.

En un paso posterior, se determinó el número de boletas a aplicar por estrato de acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional que aglutinaba cada uno de ellos. Así, el estrato uno comprende el 39.40% de la población total del país, por lo que tendría que realizarse en dicho estrato 591 boletas del total de las 1500 establecidas para la muestra. El estrato dos comprende el 16.93% de la población total, en este sentido tendría que aplicarse 254 encuestas, los estratos tres y cuatro aglutinan al 20.80% y 22.87% del total poblacional respectivamente, y correspondería realizar 312 y 343 encuestas en cada uno de ellos respectivamente.

De acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural que concentra cada estrato, se procedió a distribuir la cantidad de boletas para cada estrato establecido anteriormente, de acuerdo a la cantidad poblacional urbana y rural en cada uno de ellos. Así por ejemplo, en el estrato 1 se estimó que habría que realizarse 591 encuestas, de las cuales 531 serían hechas en la zona urbana y 60 en la rural. Y así sucesivamente para cada estrato, a continuación se presenta el detalle de la distribución de la muestra por estrato y zona:

Tabla 1. Distribución de la muestra por estrato y zona

Estratos	Tamaño de la muestra		Muestra urbana		Muestra rural	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Estrato 1	39.40	591	57.97	531	10.27	60
Estrato 2	16.93	254	15.39	141	19.35	113
Estrato 3	20.80	312	13.86	127	31.68	185
Estrato 4	22.87	343	12.77	117	38.70	226
Total	100.00	1500	100.00	916	100.00	584

1.7 Ajuste de la muestra por “no cobertura”

En esta muestra no se admitió la sustitución y reemplazo de unidades de muestreo con el objetivo de eliminar los sesgos que pueden generar esta sustitución y reemplazo; por lo mismo y para garantizar el desarrollo de la muestra con los tamaños mínimos esperados, en un paso posterior se hizo un “ajuste por no cobertura” del tamaño de la muestra de cada zona (urbana – rural) de cada uno de los estratos, tomando en cuenta el factor de “no cobertura”. Dicho factor utilizado para cada estrato y en zonas urbanas y rurales, es el estimado con base en la experiencia del IUDOP en estudios anteriores. Por ejemplo, en el caso de los municipios del estrato 1, la tasa de “no cobertura” es de 0.15 en la zona urbana y 0.2 en la zona rural. Con base en lo anterior, el nuevo tamaño de la muestra para la zona urbana del estrato 1 es el siguiente:

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.15) \times 531$$

$$n^* = 611$$

y en el caso de la zona rural

$$n^* = (1 + t) \times n$$

$$n^* = (1 + 0.2) \times 60$$

$$n^* = 72$$

Tabla 2. Distribución de la muestra ajustada de acuerdo a la “tasa de no cobertura” según estrato y zona

Estratos	Muestra urbana ajustada	Muestra rural ajustada	Tamaño muestra ajustada
Estrato 1	611	72	683
Estrato 2	162	136	298
Estrato 3	146	222	368
Estrato 4	135	271	406
Total	1054	701	1755

1.8 Selección de las diferentes unidades de muestreo

Para continuar el proceso se eligieron los municipios que se incluirán dentro de la muestra (dentro de cada estrato), luego se seleccionaron los cantones en las zonas rurales y los segmentos en las zonas urbanas. Este último proceso de escogitación de segmentos se llevó a cabo cuando se contó con todos los mapas censales de las zonas urbanas de los municipios que componen la muestra, luego de realizar el proceso de segmentación de los mismos –el cual se explicará detalladamente más adelante–.

Para la selección de los municipios, se tomaron en cuenta el número de conglomerados que serían necesarios elegir para completar la muestra urbana en cada uno de los estratos. Para ello se definió de antemano que en el estrato 1 se escogerían conglomerados de 6 viviendas cada uno, en el estrato 2 y 3 serían de 7 viviendas y en el estrato 4 cada conglomerado tendría 8 viviendas. En el caso de estrato 1, se calculó que se realizarían 611 entrevistas en el área urbana, esto se dividió entre seis para obtener el número de conglomerados necesarios, lo cual dio como resultado un total de 102 conglomerados. Como en este estrato todos los municipios fueron autoseleccionados, se procedió a distribuir el total de conglomerados en cada municipio en proporción al tamaño de cada uno de ellos. Para lo anterior se utilizó el procedimiento que se describió a continuación.

Se construyó un listado de municipios por estratos ordenándolos del más grande al más pequeño de acuerdo a la cantidad de población en cada uno de ellos. Además, el listado contenía una columna con la suma acumulativa de las poblaciones de cada uno de los municipios. Luego, se eligió dentro del listado acumulativo un inicio aleatorio y

se estableció un intervalo para realizar, a partir de ese inicio aleatorio, una selección sistemática de los municipios dentro de cada departamento. Para seleccionar el inicio aleatorio, se generó un número aleatorio en cada estrato haciendo uso de la función RAND de Excel (número aleatorio normalizado entre 0 y 1), dicho número se multiplicó por el total de la población que aglutinaba cada estrato y el municipio donde se ubicaba la cantidad resultante dentro del listado acumulativo, era el primer municipio seleccionado. Por ejemplo, en el caso del estrato 1 el número aleatorio generado por Excel fue de 0.37812, al multiplicarlo por el total de la población aglutinada en dicho estrato ($0.37812 \times 2,688,878$) dio como resultado 1,016,718.5, dicho número se ubica en la cantidad acumulada correspondiente al municipio de Soyapango, por lo mismo ese municipio fue el primero donde se ubicó el primer conglomerado dentro del estrato 1.

Luego para continuar con la ubicación del total de conglomerados correspondientes al estrato, se hizo uso de un intervalo, el cual se determinó dividiendo el total de la población del estrato entre el número de conglomerados necesarios para completar la muestra. Dicho intervalo se sumaba a la cantidad inicial que determinaba el primer municipio y así, el municipio donde se ubicaría el siguiente conglomerado era aquel donde se completaba dicha sumatoria, y así sucesivamente hasta ubicar el total de conglomerados del estrato. En el caso del estrato 1, todos los municipios comprenden más de un conglomerado, por el hecho de que estos aglutinan una cantidad considerable de población. Continuando con el estrato 1, el intervalo que se obtuvo de dividir el total de la población del estrato entre el número de conglomerados necesarios ($2,688,878 / 102$) fue de 26,362, dicho intervalo fue sumado a la cantidad del inicio ($1,016,718.5 + 26,362$) y se obtuvo el valor de 1,043,080 el cual indicó el segundo municipio donde se ubicaría el siguiente conglomerado, que es este caso resulto ser el mismo municipio de Soyapango. Así se procedió sucesivamente hasta ubicar el total de conglomerados en el estrato. Cuando la aplicación de la sumatoria del intervalo excedía la población total del estrato, se acumulaba para continuar con el procedimiento desde el inicio del listado de dicho estrato. Este procedimiento antes descrito se utilizó en cada uno de los estratos para seleccionar los municipios a incluir en la muestra y ubicar dentro de ellos los conglomerados necesarios para cumplir con la muestra de cada estrato.

Tabla 3. Listado de municipios del Estrato 2 utilizado para la selección de los mismos

Municipio	Población	Población acumulada	Orden de selección en áreas urbanas
Usulután	90,020	90,020	4, 5
San Marcos	86,298	176,318	6,7
Chalchuapa	83,135	259,453	8,
Cuscatancingo	79,735	339,189	9, 10
Zacatecoluca	78,294	417,483	11
San Martín	76,781	494,264	12, 13
Cojutepeque	68,241	562,505	14
Ilobasco	67,182	629,687	15,16
Izalco	66,965	696,652	17
San Vicente	63,967	760,619	18
Quezaltepeque	62,028	822,647	19
Metapán	61,871	884,518	20,21
Acajutla	60,767	945,284	22
Opico	59,203	1,004,487	23
Colón	54,865	1,059,352	1
La Unión	50,480	1,109,832	2
Sensuntepeque	50,463	1,160,295	3
Total	1,160,295		

Número aleatorio generado: 0.883199

Cantidad inicial de selección: $1,160,295 \times 0.883199 = 1,024,771$

Intervalo obtenido: $1,160,295 / 23 = 50,448$

La tabla 3 especifica cómo se seleccionaron los municipios en el estrato 2. En la primera columna se listan los municipios que comprenden el estrato 2 del más grande al más pequeño en población, la segunda columna muestra la población de cada municipio; en la tercera se detalla la población acumulada y en la última se especifica el orden en el cual fueron seleccionados los municipios. Como se observa, cuando la aplicación de la sumatoria del intervalo excede la población total del estrato se acumula para continuar con el procedimiento desde el inicio del listado.

Una vez seleccionados los municipios en cada estrato y distribuida la muestra urbana en cada uno de ellos, se procedió a distribuir la muestra rural en cada estrato. Para ello, se aplicó el mismo procedimiento utilizado para distribuir la muestra urbana, sólo que en esta ocasión sólo fueron listados de mayor a menor los municipios seleccionados en el paso anterior, para distribuir en esos mismos municipios la muestra rural. Para el caso de la muestra rural estableció seleccionar conglomerados de 12 viviendas, que para este caso cada conglomerado de 12 viviendas corresponderá a un cantón a seleccionar.

Hay que señalar, que en el caso de algunos municipios, que según en censo de 1992 ya no poseen población rural y que fueron seleccionados dentro de la muestra a través de proceso de distribución de la muestra urbana, se eliminaron del listado utilizado para distribuir los conglomerados necesarios para cubrir la muestra rural en cada estrato. En dichos municipios únicamente se realizará el total de conglomerados que les corresponde a la muestra urbana.

Posteriormente, se eligieron los diferentes puntos de muestreo dentro de cada municipio que deberán ser incluidos en la muestra. Para ello se realizaron dos procedimientos diferentes en función de la naturaleza de la zona del municipio. En las zonas urbanas se procedió a dividir cada municipio en segmentos poblacionales con base en los mapas de la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTIC); mientras que en las zonas rurales, se tomó a los cantones como unidad poblacional y se listarán para ser elegidos de forma aleatoria.

En el caso específico de las zonas rurales, se eligieron por municipio seleccionado tantos cantones como conglomerados fuesen necesarios para cubrir la muestra, para lo cual se hizo de una forma totalmente aleatoria, pues en la mayoría de los casos fue necesario elegir únicamente un cantón por municipio y solamente en algunos de ellos fue necesario seleccionar dos cantones. Los cantones fueron ordenados en orden alfabético dentro de cada municipio seleccionado, luego elegía un número aleatorio entre 0 y 1, ese número se multiplicaba por el total de cantones pertenecientes al municipio y en el cantón que se ubicaba en el número resultante era el seleccionado; cuando se requería de dos cantones se realizó ese mismo procedimiento para seleccionar el segundo cantón.

En las zonas urbanas, el proceso de selección de los segmentos donde se aplicaron las encuestas fue sistemático con un punto de arranque aleatorio utilizando los mapas de la DIGESTIC. Por municipio se seleccionaron tantos segmentos como conglomerados le correspondan a cada municipio; es decir, que en cada segmento se realizaron únicamente la cantidad de encuestas que le corresponde a un conglomerado, la cual varía en función del estrato al que pertenece cada municipio, como ya se mencionó anteriormente.

Cada mapa de los municipios muestra una zona urbana de dos mil a quince mil viviendas y fueron divididos en segmentos numerados correlativamente siguiendo una secuencia en espiral. Cada segmento abarcará alrededor de 100 viviendas en aquellos municipios con bajas concentraciones poblacionales y alrededor de 300 viviendas en aquellos que son densamente poblados. Una vez divididos los mapas, se procedió a calcular una constante que permita seleccionar los segmentos de forma sistemática, de acuerdo a la cantidad de conglomerados que le corresponda a cada municipio para completar la muestra urbana.

Luego, para cada mapa urbano se dividió el número de segmentos del mapa del municipio entre el número de segmentos que deberán ser incluidos dentro de la muestra, el cual corresponde al número de conglomerados necesarios para cubrirla. Esto dio como resultado una cifra que se convirtió en un intervalo de razón fija, según la cual se escogió los segmentos en función de un punto de arranque aleatorio. Por ejemplo, si la división del número total de segmentos entre el número de segmentos a escoger da como resultado 8, se escogerá un número aleatorio entre el 1 y el 8, y a partir de ese número se escogerán los segmentos en un intervalo de 8 segmentos. Más concretamente, si el número elegido aleatoriamente es el 6, se escogerá el segmento con ese número, luego se sumaran 8 segmentos más y así el próximo número elegido será el 14, y así sucesivamente hasta tener el número de segmentos estipulado para ese municipio.

La muestra contó con un total de 222 puntos de muestreo diferentes, tomando en cuenta zona urbana y rural –59 puntos de muestreo en la zona rural y 163 en la zona urbana–.

La aplicación del cuestionario se hizo por aproximación sistemática a los hogares ubicados en los segmentos y cantones. En el caso de la zona urbana se dividió cada segmento en un número determinado de manzanas, conteniendo cada una de ellas una cantidad constante de viviendas. Luego, se eligió dentro de cada segmento una manzana en forma aleatoria. Posteriormente, dentro de cada manzana seleccionada se eligió un conglomerado de 6, 7 u 8 viviendas continuas –dependiendo del estrato al que pertenezca el municipio-. Dichas viviendas se eligieron a partir de la vivienda situada más al sur de la manzana seleccionada –esa fue la primera vivienda del conglomerado- y las siguientes 5 viviendas (ó 6 ó 7) correspondieron a las viviendas que se encuentran contiguas a la primera seleccionada, correspondiendo la manzana en dirección a las agujas del reloj.

En los cantones se ubicó la vivienda más al sur del cantón y se tomaron las 11 viviendas contiguas a ella y para elegir las se hizo igual que en la zona urbana; es decir, se recorrió el cantón siguiendo las agujas del reloj.

En cada una de las viviendas que comprendan el conglomerado se ubicó a la persona que cumpla con los requisitos requeridos para la muestra. Los entrevistadores explicaron a las personas abordadas los objetivos y el tema general de la encuesta y se entrevistaron únicamente a las personas que quisieran colaborar, entrevistando sólo a una persona por hogar que cumpla con las características de sexo y edad requeridas para completar la muestra.

En la última etapa del muestreo se consideraron dichas cuotas por sexo y edad de las personas a encuestar. Esto con el propósito de asegurar una distribución de la muestra que corresponda a la distribución de la población total del país en función de esas dos variables; así como también, eliminar el criterio de selección personal del encuestador al escoger la persona a entrevistar en cada vivienda. Las cuotas por sexo y edad estaban distribuidas como lo muestra la tabla 4.

Tabla 4. Distribución de cuotas por sexo y edad
(Muestra ajustada por no cobertura)**

			Género		Total
			Hombre	Mujer	
Grupos de edad	De 18 a 34 años	Recuento	391	390	781
		% de Grupos de edad	50.1%	49.9%	100.0%
		% de Género	52.5%	48.4%	50.4%
	35 años y más	Recuento	354	415	769
		% de Grupos de edad	46.0%	54.0%	100.0%
		% de Género	47.5%	51.6%	49.6%
Total		Recuento	745	805	1550
		% de Grupos de edad	48.1%	51.9%	100.0%
		% de Género	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Según las proyecciones de población para el 2005. Ver: DIGESTYC, FNUAP y CELADE (1996).

Con todos los procedimientos anteriores se permite la aleatoriedad y la distribución en la selección de la muestra, lo cual asegura la representatividad poblacional del estudio.

Procesamiento de la información

Es necesario señalar que para el desarrollo de esta encuesta el levantamiento de datos se realizó con equipo PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) comúnmente llamado en el mercado Palm.

El uso de la palm o PDA en esta investigación tenía como objetivo mejorar el procesamiento y recolección de información. Una de las ventajas del uso de esta tecnología es que se reducen los tiempos generales, permitiendo obtener tiempo adicional para el análisis de los datos, ya que la información recolectada por los encuestadores en

** Los datos expuestos en esta tabla sobre cantidad poblacional según sexo y rangos de edad, han sido extraídos de “La Proyección de la población de EL Salvador 1995-2025” elaborada por la Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (DIGESTYC) del Ministerio de Economía (1996), junto con CELADE Y FNUAP.

campo era descargada diariamente, lo cual permitía verificar la cantidad y calidad de las encuestas que se estaban tomando.

El procesamiento de la información se realizó de forma automática. En primer lugar se hizo el proceso de sincronización de la palm con la computadora para luego ejecutar el vaciado de información. Posteriormente la información recopilada era trasladada automáticamente al “Statistical Package for Social Science” (SPSS).

Análisis estadístico

Se utilizaron métodos de análisis estadístico relativamente simple. Para establecer la asociación entre dos variables numéricas se usa el coeficiente de correlación de Pearson. Este tiene valores de 0 a 1. Cuando hay perfecta correspondencia entre dos valores el coeficiente es igual a la unidad. Mientras que para establecer la asociación entre una variable continua y otra categórica se utiliza el análisis de variancia. Para establecer si hay una relación estadísticamente significativa entre dos variables categóricas, se utilizó el test de chi cuadrado. Para integrar la información de varias preguntas sobre un mismo tema se construyeron escalas así construidas se utiliza el coeficiente Alfa de Cronbach. Coeficientes de 0.70 o más se consideran confiables y consistentes, pero en algunos casos se usaron escalas cuyos coeficiente están por debajo de dichos valores. También se utilizó el análisis factorial para determinar el número de dimensiones o factores implícitos en una serie de preguntas sobre el mismo tema.

En repetidas ocasiones se estimaron modelos lineales de regresión múltiple por mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. Usualmente la variable dependiente en estos modelos es algún índice construido con varios reactivos. Los coeficientes de regresión de estos modelos (y su significancia) permiten valorar de manera concisa los co-factores que “explican” estos índices. Aunque a veces nos referimos a estos co-factores como “determinantes, en realidad, con la información disponible no es posible establecer relaciones de causalidad. Únicamente se tienen “asociaciones”. En los modelos de regresión también se presentan los coeficientes de regresión estandarizados “Beta”. Estos son útiles para valorar la importancia relativa de los distintos factores explicativos en el modelo, pues miden los efectos de unidades estándar. Como indicador de la bondad de ajuste del modelo en su conjunto se usó el coeficiente de determinación “R cuadrado”. Este coeficiente informa de la proporción de variancia explicada por el modelo en su conjunto, en comparación con la explicación que se obtendría con un modelo “nulo” (variable dependiente estimada simplemente por su promedio). También se utilizaron modelos de regresión logística binaria cuando la variable dependiente es dicotómica en sus valores. En estos casos, se utilizó el “R cuadrado” de Nagelkerke como indicador de la variancia explicada por el modelo.

Precisión de los resultados

Toda encuesta por muestreo está afectada por dos tipos de errores: los errores de no muestreo y los errores de muestreo. Los errores de no muestreo son aquellos que se cometen durante la recolección y procesamiento de la información, estos se pueden controlar construyendo un adecuado instrumento de medición, entrenando a los encuestadores para una correcta aplicación del instrumento, supervisando el trabajo de campo, creando un programa de captura de datos eficiente, revisión de cuestionario y adecuada codificación, así como una limpieza del archivo, entre otras. Estos errores se pueden controlar pero no se pueden cuantificar. Sin embargo la comparación de los resultados de la muestra con los de la población da una idea de si esos errores han generado sesgos que restan representatividad a la muestra.

Los errores de muestreo, por otro lado, son producto del azar y resultan del hecho de entrevistar una muestra y no el total de la población. Cuando se selecciona una muestra esta es una de las tantas muestras posibles a seleccionar de la población. La variabilidad que existe entre todas éstas posibles muestras es el error de muestreo, el cual podría medirse si uno dispusiese de todas esas muestras, situación obviamente irreal. En la práctica, lo que se hace es estimar este error sobre la variación obtenida a partir de la misma muestra. Para estimar el error de muestreo de un estadístico (promedio, porcentajes, diferencias y totales), se calcula el error estándar que es la raíz cuadrada de la variancia poblacional bajo las mismas condiciones. Para el cálculo de este error es muy importante considerar el diseño con el que se seleccionó la muestra.

El efecto del diseño, EED, indica la eficiencia del diseño empleado en relación a un diseño de muestra irrestricto aleatorio (MIA). Un valor de 1 indica que la variancia obtenida por ambos diseños (complejo y MIA) es igual, es decir el muestreo complejo es tan eficiente como uno MIA con el mismo tamaño de muestra. Si el valor es menor a 1, indica que la variancia obtenida con el muestreo complejo es menor a la obtenida con el MIA.

Appendix B: Informed Consent Letter



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13 de enero de 2010

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo del Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) para solicitarle una entrevista que durará alrededor de 45 minutos. El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de El Salvador.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse al Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), a los teléfonos 2210-6672 ó 2210-6600, ext. 415, con la Mtra. Jeannette Aguilar o el señor Mauricio Gavidia.

¿Desea participar?

Atentamente,


Jeannette Aguilar
Directora

Appendix C: Questionnaire

El Salvador, Versión # 10.1a IRB Approval: #090103



El Barómetro de las Américas: El Salvador, 2010
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PAIS.					3
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					□□□□
ESTRATOPRI: (301) Mayores de 100 mil habitantes (302) Entre 50 y 100 mil habitantes (303) Entre 20 y 50 mil habitantes (304) Menos de 20 mil habitantes					3□□
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					□□□
PROV. Departamento: _____					3□□
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					3□□
ELSCANTON. Cantón: _____					□□
ELSZONA. Zona: _____					□□
ELSSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____					□□□
ELSSEC. Sector: _____					□□□
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]					□□
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					□□
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural					□
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					□
Hora de inicio: ____:____					□□□□
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2010					□□□□
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA					
Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer					

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses **su** situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.					
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR	
CP2. ¿A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa?	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local, como el alcalde o un concejal?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...					
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No [Pase a NP2] (88) No Sabe [Pase a NP2] (98) No Responde [Pase a NP2]					
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la alcaldía hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR					
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]					
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.					
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR					

LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la alcaldía, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más a la alcaldía (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más a la alcaldía si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (88) NS (98) NR					
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la alcaldía? [Leer alternativas] (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (88) NS (98) NR					
ELSMUNI20. ¿Conoce usted el nombre del Alcalde del municipio donde usted vive? Nombre: _____ (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) NR					

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98 INAP 99

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del cero al diez. El cero es la grada más baja y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es la grada más alta y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué grada de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja la grada que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98	
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible					NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué grada diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)
Izquierda					Derecha					

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?
_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]**

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otro
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? [Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:					
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Legislativa y gobierne sin la Asamblea Legislativa?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC31] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC31] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC31]					
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? _____ [Marcar el número] _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP					
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencia sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión [o alguien le pidió "renta"] (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)					
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP					
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC31] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (88) NS [pasar a VIC31] (98) NR [pasar a VIC31] (99) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC31]					

<p>AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (6) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VIC31. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha sido usted víctima de un chantaje, extorsión o renta ? ¿Cuántas veces? (0) No Sí [Anote el número de veces] _____</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delinquentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delinquentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] Algunos miembros de la policía protegen y otros están involucrados en la delincuencia (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...	Sí	No	NS	NR	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
VIC42. ¿Ha cerrado algún negocio a causa de la delincuencia? [Si no ha tenido negocio, marque 99]	(1)	(0)	99	88	98
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "comunidad"]	(1)	(0)	88	98	
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
VIC45. ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si está desempleado marque 99]	(1)	(0)	99	88	98
VIC46. ¿Ha cambiado el número de teléfono (fijo o celular) a causa de amenazas? [Si no tiene teléfono marque 99]	(1)	(0)	99	88	98
VIC47. Por temor a la delincuencia ¿Ha pensado en irse del país?	(1)	(0)	88	98	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? (**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político salvadoreño?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fuerza Armada?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Legislativa?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional Civil?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser salvadoreño(a)?

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7]	NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?		
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?		

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en El Salvador en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR

WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR

<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Mauricio Funes es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>M2. Hablando de la Asamblea Legislativa y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa salvadoreña están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR</p>	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]								
Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		
							88	98
							Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones</p> <p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>POP102. Cuando la Asamblea Legislativa estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea Legislativa. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

<p>EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
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Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

<p>ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
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<p>Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. NS = 88, NR = 98</p> <p>ROS1. El Estado salvadoreño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>ROS2. El Estado salvadoreño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>ROS3. El Estado salvadoreño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>ROS4. El Estado salvadoreño debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
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ROS5. El Estado salvadoreño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado salvadoreño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en El Salvador? (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho (a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho (a) (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿El Salvador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
EPN3A. ¿Qué tanto el Gobierno Central representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho sus intereses, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (2) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
EPN3B. ¿Qué tanto los Diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho sus intereses, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (2) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
EPN3C. ¿Qué tanto la Alcaldía y Concejo Municipal representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho sus intereses, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (2) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR	
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					88	98	
											1-10, 88, 98	

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

[No recoja tarjeta "E"]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en El Salvador. Por favor continúe usando la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta "E"]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...				88	98
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía de la ciudad donde vive en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (o soborno) en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está:
[LEER]
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta "D"] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escala del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Usted se considera una persona que es:

PER1. Sociable y activa

PER2. Una persona crítica y peleonera

PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestar

PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual

PER6. Una persona callada y tímida

PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa

PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada

PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable

PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación

[Recoger Tarjeta "D"]

<p>CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o (3) No hay crisis económica [Pase a ELSB52] (88) NS [Pase a ELSB52] (98) NR [Pase a ELSB52]</p>	
<p>CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: [LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA] (01) El gobierno anterior (02) El gobierno actual (03) Nosotros, los salvadoreños (04) Los ricos de nuestro país (05) Los problemas de la democracia (06) Los países ricos [Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón] (07) El sistema económico del país, o (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto (77) [NO LEER] Otro (88) [NO LEER] NS (98) [NO LEER] NR (99) INAP</p>	

Ahora vamos a hablar de otros temas

<p>ELSB52. ¿Qué haría en el caso de que usted enfrentara un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal o de otro tipo?: [Leer alternativas] (1) No haría nada (2) Conciliaría con la contraparte (3) Lo resolvería a su manera (4) Acudiría a una autoridad judicial (Juez, Policía, Fiscal) (5) Conseguiría un abogado (9) Utilizaría un centro de mediación para resolver el conflicto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>ELSB54. ¿Cree usted que el hecho de que las audiencias en los procesos penales sean públicas contribuye a disminuir la impunidad? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>ELSB56. ¿Ha escuchado hablar acerca de la existencia de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a ELSAY7] (88) NS [Pase a ELSAY7] (98) NR [Pase a ELSAY7]</p>	
<p>ELSB57. ¿Considera que la información que usted tiene acerca de los centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República es...? (1) Adecuada (2) No es suficiente (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>ELSB58. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo muy en desacuerdo con la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>ELSB59. ¿Para usted, la existencia de estos centros de mediación promovidos por la Procuraduría General de la República son...? (1) Nada importantes (2) Poco importantes (3) Importantes (4) Muy importantes (8) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

<p>EL SAY7. Suponga que usted tiene un problema con respecto a una propiedad que otra persona reclama como suya. ¿A quién acudiría usted para resolver ese problema? [No leer alternativas] (0) Alcaldía (1) A una organización no gubernamental de ayuda (ONG) (2) A un amigo o familiar que tiene influencias en el gobierno (3) A un tribunal de justicia (4) A la PNC (5) A una oficina del gobierno encargada de esos asuntos (6) A un amigo o familiar que tiene experiencia resolviendo problemas por su cuenta (7) A un abogado (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>VB1. ¿Está empadronado para votar? ¿Tiene usted Documento Único de Identidad (DUI)? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]</p>	

<p>VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (301) Rodrigo Ávila, ARENA (302) Mauricio Funes, FMLN (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó) [En cualquier caso pasar a VB10]</p>	
<p>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [No leer alternativas]anotar una sola respuesta] (1) Falta de transporte (2) Enfermedad (3) Falta de interés (4) No le gustó ningún candidato (5) No cree en el sistema (6) Falta de cédula de identidad (7) No se encontró en padrón electoral (10)No tener edad necesaria (11) Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo (13) Incapacidad física o discapacidad (14) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (301) ARENA (302) FMLN (303) PCN (304) PDC (305) CD (77) OTRO (88) NS [PASE A POL1] (98) NR [PASE A POL1] (99) INAP [PASE A POL1]</p>	
<p>VB12 ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte (88)NS (98)NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a ED] (88) NS [Pase a ED] (98) NR [Pase a ED]</p>	
<p>CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien? (1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código]						
	1^o	2^o	3^o	4^o	5^o	6^o
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16		
NS	88					
NR	98					

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)

<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C] Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... [Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario (4) Ninguna de estas (5) [NO LEER] Otra (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?] (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras) (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros) (7) Salud (8) Medio ambiente (9) Situación del país (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada (11) Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada? (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]
HAICR1. Podría decirme ¿ cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**
 (01) TV
 (02) Diario
 (03) Radio
 (04) Iglesia
 (05) Centro comunitario
 (06) Escuela
 (07) Familiares
 (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio
 (09) Amigos
 (10) Vecinos
 (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios)
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**
[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]
 (01) Católico
 (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discipulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).
 (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).
 (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)
 (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).
 (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).
 (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
 (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)
 (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)
 (12) Testigos de Jehová.
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes
 (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante
 (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]
Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]
 (01) Menos de \$45
 (02) Entre \$46- \$90
 (03) \$91-\$144
 (04) \$145-\$288
 (05) \$289-\$432
 (06) \$433-\$576
 (07) \$577-\$720
 (08) \$721-1008
 (09) \$1009-\$1440
 (10) \$1441 y más
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?
 (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a Q10A4]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q10A4]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10A4]**

Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses? (1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10A4. ¿Usted o alguien que ahora vive en esta casa estuvo viviendo en los Estados Unidos en los últimos dos años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] (2) Sí, en los estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] (3) Sí, en otros países (no en estados Unidos) [Siga] (4) No [Pase a Q14] (88) NS [Pase a Q14] (98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11] (2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11] (3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F] (88) NS [Pase a Q11] (98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	
<p>Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (“Aumentó”, “Permaneció igual” o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-salvadoreña, codificar como (4) Negra]**
 (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra
 (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

ELSETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata?
 (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]**
 (301) Castellano (español) (302) Náhuatl (304) Otro (nativo)
 (305) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Rara vez
 (5) Nunca
 (88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...
G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]:**
 (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez
 (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]**
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde

G13. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene El Salvador? **[NO LEER: 14]**
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en El Salvador? **[NO LEER: 5 años]**
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Trabajando? **[SIGA]**
 (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[SIGA]**
 (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B]**
 (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B]**
 (88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas] (1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p>PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones o jubilación ? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SAL1] (88) NS [Pase a SAL1] (98) NR [Pase a SAL1]</p>	
<p>PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? [Leer alternativas] (1) Cuentas individuales, es decir una AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones) (2) Sistema público o de seguro social (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó/contribuyó a su fondo de jubilación/pensión? [Leer alternativas]: (1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No cotizó/contribuyó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
[Preguntar a todos]	
<p>SAL1. ¿Tiene usted seguro médico, ya sea público (afiliado al Seguro Social) o privado? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Finalizar] (88) NS [Finalizar] (98) NR [Finalizar]</p>	
<p>SAL2. Es su seguro médico... [Leer opciones] (1) Del gobierno, parte del seguro social (2) De otro plan del Estado (3) Es un plan privado [No leer]: (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)</p>	
<p>SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario? (1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

<p>COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] ____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]</p>	<p>□□□</p>
<p>Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____</p>	<p>□□□□</p>
<p>TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____</p>	
<p>INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____</p>	<p>□□□□□</p>
<p>SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</p>	
<p>COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____</p>	<p>□□□</p>

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Comentarios: _____

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta "A"


¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta "B"




Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"



Tarjeta "E"



Tarjeta "F"

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$45
- (02) Entre \$46- \$90
- (03) \$91-\$144
- (04) \$145-\$288
- (05) \$289-\$432
- (06) \$433-\$576
- (07) \$577-\$720
- (08) \$721-1008
- (09) \$1009-\$1440
- (10) \$1441-y más