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# The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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
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## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer’s* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Vanessa Reilly  
Democracy Specialist  
Bureau for Latin American & the Caribbean  
US Agency for International Development





## **Prologue: Background of the Study**

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.  
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology  
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,  
and  
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science  
and Associate Director of LAPOP,  
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviours are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic downturn might influence democracy in Latin America

and the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues. This report on the Americas includes Parts I and II, with a focus on general trends we can identify across the entire hemisphere. The reports on individual countries also include a Part III, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

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<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Chile (N = 1,965), Ecuador (N=3,000), and Brazil (N = 2,500).

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.<sup>2</sup> In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then

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<sup>2</sup> The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

<sup>3</sup> All **AmericasBarometer** samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.












Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector, and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.








In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti, and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
<b>Mexico and Central America</b>		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone	
<b>Argentina</b>	
<b>Bolivia</b>	
<b>Brazil</b>	
<b>Chile</b>	 
<b>Colombia</b>	 
<b>Ecuador</b>	 
<b>Paraguay</b>	
<b>Peru</b>	<p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-weight: bold;"><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
<b>Uruguay</b>	 
<b>Venezuela</b>	

<b>Caribbean</b>	
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	 
<b>Guyana</b>	
<b>Haiti</b>	
<b>Jamaica</b>	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
<b>Suriname</b>	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

<b>Canada and United States</b>	
<b>Canada</b>	
<b>United States</b>	



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The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. Margaret Sarles, formerly of USAID, was one of those who helped the project get off the ground in its early phases, and helped out again this round with the Haiti survey. At the UNDP, we thank Rebecca Grynspan, Luis Felipe López Calva and Juan Pablo Corlazzoli for their strong support. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Suzanne Duryea for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton helped introduce us to the complexities of ethnicity and provided strong support from his grant from the Ford Foundation to enhance that aspect of the project. We also thank François Gélinau at Université Laval in Canada for providing support from the Canadian SSHRC for the module on federalism. Simone Bohn of York University was able to find support for aspects of the Canadian version of the survey, and Nat Stone helped us with the French translation for Canada. Lucio Renno provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Scott Mainwaring at Notre Dame University was able to provide support for the Uruguay component of the research.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the databases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department</li> <li>●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP</li> <li>●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP</li> </ul>
<b>Mexico and Central America Group</b>	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> <li>●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA</li> <li>●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
<b>Caribbean Group</b>	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA</li> </ul>
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants</li> <li>●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> </ul>
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona</li> <li>●Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and Director of Surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies, Mona</li> </ul>
Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Mark Kirton, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad &amp; Tobago</li> <li>●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad &amp; Tobago</li> </ul>
Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine</li> <li>●Mr. Niki Braithwaite, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine</li> </ul>
<b>Andean/Southern Cone Group</b>	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco, Quito</li> <li>●Daniel Montalvo, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Diana Orcés, LAPOP Research Analyst, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima</li> <li>●Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba</li> <li>●Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Manuel Orrego, CIRD</li> </ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica</li> </ul>

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
	●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
Uruguay	●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo ●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	●Dr. Lucio Renno, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Brasilia
Argentina	●Dr. Germán Lodola, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	●Dr. Damaris Canache, CISOR Venezuela and University of Illinois, USA
<b>North America Group</b>	
United States	●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
Canada	●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2010

## **Executive Summary**

This study represents the third in a series of biennial cross-national, LAPOP-directed and USAID funded political culture studies undertaken with the aim of broadening our understanding of the nature and dynamics of Jamaica's political culture, with a focus on examining trends in key democracy indicators in the context of the global economic crisis.

As with the two previous studies, findings obtained from this sample survey are expected to be generalizable to all voting age residents of Jamaica. With this objective in mind, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed, in line with a framework proposed by the LAPOP organization for its collaborating countries. The obtained sample of 1504 persons was self-weighted and was determined to be representative of Jamaica's adult population in terms of its gender, age and spatial distribution, based on the composition of the 2001 Population Census

This report presents the findings of the 2010 survey with comparative information on key variables, firstly from a national perspective utilizing results from the 2006 and 2008 studies, and then cross-nationally utilizing information from other LAPOP countries.

The report is organized under the following headings and a summary of major findings follow the respective headings and sub-headings.

### **Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview**

Following a discussion of the economic crisis' impact on the Region and Jamaica, this chapter looks at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Jamaica. It also analyzes the trends in democratic development in the last few years partly within the framework of a "democratic recession" and concludes with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy.

One of the elements we note is that it seems the region as a whole has not experienced the negative impact of the economic crisis to the extent that several countries, including some of the advanced countries, have.

Evidence of decline in major dimensions of the Jamaican economy compared to the findings of the previous study is partly counterbalanced by that indicating notable growth or resilience in others. Alongside this situation, the democratic process and culture were brought into focus by a mid-2010 jolt that we touch on. More broadly, in a few countries democracy has remained somewhat fragile and we have raise the question as to whether the economic crisis might open fissures and threat the stability of democracy in the wider Region and Jamaica more specifically.

### **Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas**

In this chapter we focus on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times including, for example, where they allocated blame, in regard to the countries included in the 2010 survey.

In order to examine the economic crisis in particular, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) employed two novel items developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. Respondents

were asked whether they perceived an economic crisis and, among those who thought that one existed, we asked who was to be blamed for the crisis. The overall picture from the 26 countries in the *AmericasBarometer* indicated that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, whether it was serious or not very serious. Of note is that the perception of the existence of an economic crisis was higher in the case of Jamaica than in all other countries participating in the 2010 round. More specifically, virtually all Jamaicans – 99.6 per cent of the population – were found to perceive an economic crisis, and of those holding that view, about four in five considered the impact of the crisis to be very serious. Furthermore, in the case of Jamaica, where the area and class disparity in reported income decline was found to be considerably greater than the regional average, citizens attributed blame somewhat evenly among the previous government, the current administration and the country's economic system. Only about six per cent indicated that the rich countries are responsible and 16 per cent believed all Jamaicans should share the blame for the crisis.

### **Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times**

In this chapter we attempt to go beyond the 2010 survey and locate a relationship between core attitudes toward democracy and economic hard times in light of the protracted economic recession that has affected many countries of the world. Results for the Region, with particular emphasis on Jamaica, are examined.

In relation to “life satisfaction”, one of our notable measures, it was found, for example, that Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans on average reported the highest levels of increased satisfaction with their lives in 2010 in comparison with 2008, but a very different picture was observed for Jamaicans who reported that in 2010 their happiness was decisively lower than that reported for 2008. Almost everywhere, life satisfaction has been observed to decline when individuals report that their personal economic condition deteriorated.

Even though in overall terms, this round of the *AmericasBarometer* has not revealed any general decline in democracy in the region; however where we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences declined during the crisis, we find reduced support for democracy. Importantly, we find that there is a very strong effect of a positive perception of government management of the economy. So, as in the case of life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy. In Jamaica, democracy indicators fell, but in most cases the decline was not statistically significant.

### **Chapter IV. Crime, Corruption and the Rule of Law**

#### **Crime and Insecurity**

In this section, the assumption is made that crime victimization and to a lesser extent, fear of crime or sense of insecurity might negatively impact citizens' embrace of tolerance, erode social capital and drive citizens to lose confidence in their political institutions and some key democratic principles such as the supremacy of the rule of law, all of which might, in effect, weaken citizens support for a stable democracy.

It is observed that for most of this first decade of the twenty-first century Jamaica has attracted the reputation of being one of the foremost ‘high crime’ societies of the world, due particularly to its alarmingly high per capita homicide rates. Surprisingly low levels of overall crime rate reported by various studies over the years have, understandably, raised doubts about the accuracy of crime statistics.

Indeed, the value of the murder rate as a measure of a country's crime and insecurity levels can hardly be discounted given that significant degrees of underreporting are not likely to be the norm for this most extreme category of crime, hence, the popularity of murder statistics in defining the country's crime and security profile.

As in the two previous LAPOP surveys, crime victimization rate for the 2010 round is relatively low, albeit showing a statistically insignificant increase over the rate for 2008. Of note also is the finding that the intensity of national insecurity (that crime threatens the country's well-being) differs significantly from local sense of insecurity (the feeling of insecurity at the community level). Nearly 78 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. Only six per cent of the sample considered their neighbourhood to be very unsafe. However, virtually the entire population expressed their concern about the potential destructive impact of crime on the national well-being. Ninety-nine per cent of the citizenry perceive the current state of disorder as a threat to the nation's future. In essence, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level, despite the fact that nearly 63 per cent of those who reported being the victim of a crime said they were attacked in their neighbourhood.

Analysis to determine who were most likely to be victims of crime reveals that none of the socio-economic, demographic or perception variables considered are statistically significant factors in predicting the likelihood of being a victim of crime in Jamaica. Wealth and age are found to have the strongest net effect on crime victimization but are both statistically insignificant. This suggests that the crime problem is a universal one, not affecting any one group more than another.

## **Corruption**

Corruption is presumed to progressively weaken the institutional foundation on which economic growth and social justice depend, causing institutional inefficiency and, in turn, the distortion of development priorities and outcomes. Furthermore, corrupt undertakings are inherently antithetical to the rule of law in that they pervert the basic citizens' rights principles of equity, equality and right to due process. Over time, pervasive corruption is assumed to erode political legitimacy and in turn, increases the prospect for democratic instability.

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica in the ranks of the highly corrupt nations of the world. Most notable are Transparency International's (TI) surveys which have accorded Jamaica a 'highly corrupt' designation every year since it was first included in these TI series of surveys in 2002. On this measure, the country's corruption situation is perceived to have progressively worsened over the years, indicated on the one hand, by an overall slippage in the index from a rating of 3.7 in 2006 to 3.0 in 2009, and on the other, by an effective decline in Jamaica's world ranking from 61 in 2006 to 99 in 2009. Remarkably, though, results of the 2010 survey indicate that this trend of progressive decline has, at least, been broken with the report of an improvement in the country's CPI score from 3.0 in 2009 to 3.3 in 2010.

In this study, the problem is assessed in terms of citizens' perception of its magnitude and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. It is found that citizens' perception that corruption is widespread in the public sphere is exceptionally high in absolute as well as in comparative terms. On the LAPOP's 100 point scale, on which 0 indicates no perceived corruption and 100 means the perception of widespread corruption, Jamaica registered a score of 81.7 points, signifying a very high level of corruption perception among the citizenry. However there was no statistically significant change over a four year period, 2006 -

2010. Among the 26 countries that participated in the 2010 LAPOP survey, Jamaica is positioned virtually at the top of the chart, registering the second highest level of citizens' lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials among these countries. Trinidad and Tobago was ranked above Jamaica, recording a score of 83 on the 100-point scale while Canada and Suriname fall at the bottom of the chart with scores of approximately 58 and 51 points respectively.

With regard to the question of the rule of law, it is posited that although there may be strong support and effort from relevant institutions and stakeholders for the rule of law in a particular jurisdiction, a multiplicity of underlying difficulties such as the country's economic condition, political culture, and culture of security and justice agencies sometimes make the rule of law a popularly espoused principle rather than reality. In essence, the rule of law ensures that there is preference for law and order and citizens are governed and subjected to laws rather than political caprice. In other words, rule of law guarantees that no individual or group, including the government, is above the law.

### **Support for the Rule of Law**

Jamaica, it has been observed, quite often shows a tendency for certain practices deemed unfavourable to the rule of law, particularly regarding observance of civil human rights in the areas such as law enforcement and the prison system. Nonetheless, the analysis of responses to questions aimed at determining the extent to which there is recognition and support for this important democratic principle found very high respect for the rule of law among Jamaicans, with about 77 per cent of the populace expressing the opinion that there should always be full compliance with law under all circumstances. Despite an appreciable decrease in levels of support in recent years, respect for this principle remains comparatively high compared to the other countries participating in the 2010 round of the LAPOP surveys. Only Belize with a score of 78.4 per cent outperformed Jamaica on this measure.

Most significantly, we found that citizens' exposure to crime significantly influence their support for the rule of law. Individuals who reported being victimized within the past year were likely to be least supportive of the principle of the rule of law. Perception of insecurity has a net negative but not a statistically significant effect.

### **The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy**

With the assumption that crime, the fear of crime and corruption yield a plethora of pernicious outcomes which might serve to compromise the effectiveness of democratic governance on the whole, and undermine citizens' faith in society's institutions, especially the judiciary, we analysed a regression model designed to examine the substantive consequences of crime, insecurity and corruption on citizens' support for a democratic system of government in Jamaica. All three factors, crime victimization, perception of corruption and perception of insecurity were found to be negatively related to support for democracy. However, crime victimization was not a statistically significant determinant of citizens' level of system support.

## **Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance**

In the theoretical sections of this chapter, it was argued that pervasive society-wide attitudes and values reflecting citizens' propensity for political tolerance and the broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy. As a consequence, our inquiry in this section focuses on selected attitudes, behaviours and values of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. The ultimate objective was to

establish, on the basis of outcomes of these measures, the extent to which the country's democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

It was found that since 2006 there has been a progressive albeit moderate decline in the prospects of democratic stability in Jamaica. In 2010, only 29.4 per cent of the citizenry were categorized to be supportive of a stable democracy, on the basis of their high support for the system and correspondingly high levels of tolerance. This is compared to 36.2 per cent in 2006. When this is viewed with further findings of appreciable decline in other key democracy indicators, such as support for democracy, institutional trust and citizens' level of confidence in the way their democracy works, it is reasonable to conclude that the economic crisis might in fact be impacting democratic stability in Jamaica quite negatively.

It seems though that in comparative terms the prospect for democratic stability in Jamaica remain somewhat favourable despite these declining measures. When ranked with other Latin American and Caribbean countries on the support for stable democracy indicator, Jamaica obtained a median score, ranking in the middle of the chart among the 25 countries participating in the 2010 round of surveys. What is difficult to determine is which factor, Jamaica's relative ranking or its trend (decline) is more important for democratic stability. We tend to view the trend as more important. Interestingly, in 2008 Jamaica was out-performed by only four other nations in the Region, with Canada then at the top of the list with an exceptionally high 66.6 per cent of its people supporting of a stable democracy. In the 2010 study, Uruguay is at the top of the list with only 49 per cent of its population manifesting the requisite of democracy-oriented attitudes and values, Canada is now in 4<sup>th</sup> place and Jamaica takes the 11<sup>th</sup> spot with 45 and 29 per cent, respectively.

## **Chapter VI. Civil Society and Political Participation**

### **Civil Society Participation and Interpersonal Trust**

In this section we assess the state of democracy in Jamaica from a Tocquevillean perspective by examining the popularity of selected associative activities and attitudes that are theorized to manifest the amount of the country's stock of social capital. Our focus is on the key dimensions of social capital civic participation and interpersonal trust. The results show a progressive decline in the respective indicators of social capital since the 2006 survey. As has been the case in the two previous studies, participation in church-related events was by far the most common cooperative activity, followed by attendance at meetings of parent organizations. It is notable though that there has been a significant decline in participation in church activities over the last four years, from 64.6 in 2006 to 48.5 in 2010.

Recognizing that social collaboration among neighbours is highly dependent upon the extent to which community members trust each other we then focus on the issue of inter-personal trust as the other critical component of social capital in society. It was found that interpersonal trust, measured in terms of citizens' level of confidence in their neighbour has remained relatively stable over the past four years albeit recording an appreciable decline in the 2010 study when compared to 2008. Age, wealth and citizens' sense of security in their community were found to be positively correlated with levels of interpersonal trust in society.

### **Electoral Participation**

It is highlighted in the introductory section of this chapter that Jamaica boasts a vibrant, uninterrupted multi-party representative democracy characterized by a healthy history of systematic



alteration between the two major political parties since universal suffrage in 1944. Additionally, despite a history of partisan political conflicts especially around the time of election, there is widespread recognition of the importance of the vote in the democratic process among Jamaicans.

In this regard, we start our analysis by examining electoral participation in terms of voter turnout. On this measure, electoral participation has historically been quite high, reported to have been as high as 87 prior to 1980 and consistently above 70 per cent up to 1993. Since the 1990s, however, the participation rate has averaged in the sixty per cent range. It is explained in this chapter that the 57 per cent turnout reported in this 2010 study represents participation in the parochial election in 2008 and not the last national parliamentary election of 2007 in which turnout was 65 per cent. Political participation measured in terms of citizens involvement in election campaigning and non-violent protest were found to be quite low when compared to other types of political activities.

Consistent with the literature, age was found to be the most influential determinant of voting behaviour and persons who voted were found to be more likely to embrace the values and attitudes that are assumed to be conducive to support for a stable democracy.

## **Chapter VII. Local Government**

The notion of “bringing the government closer to the people” through the decentralization of governmental resources, functions and responsibilities has been justified primarily on the understanding that the resulting decreased proximity between the citizenry and local public officials should promote greater sensitivity, responsiveness and accountability in the delivery of public goods and services. In the case of Jamaica, efforts to capitalize on these potential benefits of devolution have involved an ongoing programme of local government reform aimed on the one hand at the strengthening of local capacity at the Parish Council and municipal levels and on the other, facilitating the meaningful participation of community members in identifying community needs, setting priorities, searching for solutions to problems and holding public officials accountable for their actions. Despite broad public support for most of these initiatives, concerns continue to be raised about the level of commitment of the central government to the devolution of power, about the capacity of the local authorities to perform the designated roles and tasks in a timely and efficiently manner, and most importantly, about the willingness of citizens to commit themselves to a certain level of participation in the affairs of their local governmental organizations to ensure their relevance, usefulness and sustainability. In this chapter we examine citizens’ attitudes and behaviours in relation to some of these issues.

When citizens’ level of involvement in the affairs of their Parish Council in the form of meeting attendance and demand-making was examined, Jamaica fared well both in terms of relatively stable levels of participation on the basis of these measures and also its slightly below mid-range scores on both indicators when ranked among other countries in the Americas.

On the question of citizens’ evaluation of the effectiveness of Local Government, measured in terms of their levels of satisfaction with the services provided by their Parish Councils or municipal authorities, it was found that Jamaicans are among the most dissatisfied in the Region. Despite a marginal but statistically insignificant improvement in effectiveness in 2010, only Suriname scored less than Jamaica on this performance indicator.

On the whole, it was found that higher levels of satisfaction with the services of local authorities and greater citizens’ collaboration with their Parish Council positively impact system support.

## **Chapter VIII. Perceived Powerlessness in Jamaica: Effects on Social Capital and Regime Legitimacy**

The analysis in this chapter shows that levels of subjective political efficacy in Jamaica are relatively low, as measured across three different questions designed to tap these sentiments in a national sample. Moreover it is evident that there are significant associations between these perceived inefficacy levels and the chronic dysfunctions within Jamaican society of weak trust in the sociopolitical institutions and processes, in politicians and elections, and in the perceived capability of the government to solve problems. The data reveal consistent correlations of these feelings of inefficacy with a lack of citizen engagement and participation in building a stronger civic order. As such it is evident that this sense of citizen powerlessness to affect political outcomes in Jamaican society constitutes a hindrance to building social capital and to the development process more generally.

It is argued that the transition to a national electoral system that is more genuinely responsive to citizen preferences (e.g. a shift towards multi-party representation of interests that features publicly-funded campaigns; and away from the present voter-choice-limiting, garrison-based, two party electoral “lock”) would help to overcome this chronic citizen malaise. National policies that consciously foster a greater sense of active citizen inclusion, empowerment, and civic engagement in the process of building the nation would also be helpful as components of overall development strategies.

## **Chapter IX. Personality Factors in Jamaican Political Orientations: NEO-PI, Interpersonal Trust and Zero-Sum Perception**

It is widely recognized that citizens’ personality predispositions are important to democratic system support, to political participation and behaviour, and to building social capital in the Jamaican development process. The analysis in this chapter shows that there are substantial convergences in the evidence on interrelationships between personality attributes, political orientations, and support for democracy in Jamaica. Promoting positive citizen need satisfaction and emotional health, a more prosocial, non-zero-sum world view, and what Maslow termed the “self-actualization” of citizens seems to be related, across the board, to development of social capital, civic engagement, political legitimacy and a more robust civic order. In particular, of the “big five personality factors” Emotional Stability-vs.-Neuroticism was found to be significantly related to most of the important measures of socio-political system support, as is interpersonal trust-distrust, (non-) zero-sum perception, and efficacy-powerlessness.

The results suggest that developing national social policies that consciously build trust and civic cooperation, and empower citizens to make a tangible difference, are in fact useful, practical exercises in strengthening the psychological well-being of citizens, and that this, in turn, is likely to result in stronger socio-political regime support over time.

## **Chapter X. Police-Community Rapport in Jamaica: Demographic, Economic Security and Psychosocial Correlates**

Sentiments of police-citizen ‘rapport’ in Jamaica appear to be somewhat stronger, overall, than is generally acknowledged in the popular media and in academic circles. However this rapport has declined somewhat across all four indicators, since the 2008 LAPOP survey.

The rapport levels are significantly related to all three types of factors – demographic, economic security, and psychosocial. The overall pattern that emerges from these findings suggests that police-community rapport is least ‘healthy’ among the youngest segments of the population and the most

economically disadvantaged and need-deprived. Psychosocial variables also help explain problems with police-citizen rapport in Jamaica – particularly the lack of trust in the government and in people generally, the tendency towards zero-sum perception of their social world (which prevails among two-thirds of Jamaicans), and widespread feelings of citizen disempowerment – all of which are found to be significantly associated with the rapport levels.

Looking at the larger societal picture, the good news is that there continues to be overall majority support for police efforts in Jamaica, accompanied by a general willingness to cooperate with authorities in crime-fighting partnerships if these can be credibly developed and implemented within communities. Government programmes that emphasize social capital building efforts, re-socialization, and community engagement activities among those sectors would therefore be the most likely to yield favourable outcomes, as would constabulary public relations efforts targeted at producing ‘friendlier,’ more genuinely empathetic community relations with youth and the most socio-economically disadvantaged sectors of Jamaican society.

This summary would not be fully balanced, however, without a word about the longstanding historical ambivalence among the Jamaican public with respect to crime fighting and police-community relations efforts. On the one hand, as the trends outlined in this chapter illustrate, there continues to be fairly widespread overall support in principle for police efforts to rein in gang-based crime. A national poll conducted in July of 2010 during the State of Emergency operations, for example, indicated that 63 per cent of Jamaicans favoured extending the state of emergency, and 73 per cent were supportive of the government's tough new anti-crime initiatives. On the other hand, that same national poll found 72 per cent of Jamaicans angrily condemning what they felt were human rights abuses by the security forces during the emergency (Boyne 2010b). Given this ambivalent popular psychology, it would be an oversimplification to state that there is unambiguous popular support for police efforts to fight crime. Coexisting with that support, there is also in the public memory a well-known history of repeated incidents of police brutality, human rights violations, and corruption, which needs to be reconciled in the public mind before police-citizen cooperative efforts can hope to be fully successful.

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# **Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy**

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## Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

### 1.1. Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis took place in the context of what organizations like Freedom House were reporting a world-wide “democracy recession.” This economic crisis affected most nations in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in the Americas seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, thereby mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn and thereafter focus on the basis of our analysis, the *AmericasBarometer* survey data. Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September 2008; several months after the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* fieldwork had been completed. The crisis brought about a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still being felt, albeit unequally around the globe. We look at the 2008 round which was conducted prior to the full onslaught of the crisis had been experienced and the 2010 round when most countries were recovering.

In the 2008 study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on the support for stable democracy. In this round of the *AmericasBarometer* 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal financial situations have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens’ support for democracy and democratic principles? Moreover, has the economic crisis threatened support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global as well as a regional “democracy recession” which is followed by a discussion of democracy at the country level. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

### 1.2. Economic Overview

The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past eight decades. In terms of economic adjustment, the world’s real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3 per cent by the end of 2008, and in 2009 it fell to a negative 1.4 per cent (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections suggesting that a recovery was underway.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were even able to sustain growth in the context of an overall global slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that tended to sharply weaken Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

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<sup>1</sup>IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).

Although by the time that the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis still reverberated across the globe. Forty three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences from the economic crisis, with many facing under-performance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people than in 2009 will be living in extreme poverty (i.e., on less than \$1.25 per day). Moreover, initial predictions were that more than 1 billion people were expected to go chronically hungry, thereby undermining the benefits of successful anti-poverty programmes implemented in the previous decade.<sup>2</sup> Again, these predictions and projections did not factor in successful counter-cyclical and pro-poor policies that many nations implemented, so the final toll will have to await studies conducted after this one is published.




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections, 2007 - 2011  
 (Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook [2010]<sup>3</sup>)

Crisis-related increases in unemployment were substantial and widely felt. An estimate of the global unemployment rate for 2009 offered by the International Labour Organization (ILO) put the rate at 6.6 per cent, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007. The increase occurred predominantly in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has reduced work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008 the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2 per cent of all employment, implying that about 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 per day worldwide.<sup>5</sup> The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American

<sup>2</sup>See [www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm) and <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

<sup>3</sup> IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).

<sup>4</sup>ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2010), 42.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 22.

workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.<sup>7</sup> These are just some examples of the serious effects that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

These figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries such as the United States of America, the European Union and Japan experienced pronounced economic setbacks, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was more uneven and not as severe in many countries.<sup>8</sup> Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 per cent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6 per cent).<sup>9</sup> Economic recovery, however, seems to be underway based on the latest projections available at the time of writing, which show that real GDP growth may increase to 3.1 and 3.6 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.<sup>11</sup>

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances (that is, money sent home by family members working abroad) on which so many families in Latin America and the Caribbean depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30 per cent of recipient families and help to keep these families out of poverty.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the Region's nations receive 12 per cent or more of their GDP from family members living abroad. These are Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In some of these countries, remittances have become the first or second highest source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment.<sup>13</sup> As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America and there were even instances of negative growth (see Figure 1.2).

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<sup>6</sup> World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

<sup>7</sup> ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.

<sup>8</sup> Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the 'Rainy Day' at Hand?," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and

<http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>

<sup>13</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2009).






Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007-2009 as Reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009 the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, all countries that are major recipients of remittances. For example, remittances to Mexico decreased by 13.4 per cent in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent growth rate of over 25 per cent in the preceding months. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.<sup>14</sup>

The most recent data available at the time of writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the Region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.<sup>15</sup> As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the Region (collectively accounting for 91 per cent of the Region’s GDP), the decline in growth in 2009 was -2.0 per cent, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive rate of 3.7 per cent.

<sup>14</sup> See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010  
 (Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the Region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4 per cent in 2007 to negative -6.5 per cent in 2009. The general economic problems worldwide were exacerbated in Mexico partly due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the least affected countries in the Region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2 per cent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate that economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 per cent in 2010-2011. The estimate of change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the *AmericasBarometer* suffered declines in GDP. The changes in economic growth between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example in Ecuador, the economic growth rate in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico was from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008 - 2009

Fortunately, the potentially negative impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB’s latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable....<sup>17</sup>

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

<sup>17</sup> Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

### 1.3. Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Jamaica

In the face of this far-reaching global economic recession and related events of a more local and regional nature, Jamaica also found itself in the throes of an acute economic crisis in 2009 and 2010. The difficulties were underlined particularly by the fallout in three major pillars of the economy – bauxite/alumina, tourism, and as highlighted in Figure 1.2 above, the flow of remittances. The government sought to compensate by adopting a range of measures and policy efforts that included a standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In a December 2009 function largely attended by members of the business community, Prime Minister Bruce Golding emphasized that the IMF loan funds of US\$1.2 billion would not be “a panacea” but rather assistance to shore up the country’s balance of payments (OPM/JIS, 2009, p. 1).

The Minister of Finance, in his presentation on April 8, 2010 described the fiscal year 2009-2010 as a “difficult year” in which the country saw the full effects of the global recession.” He cited reduced real income and domestic demand accompanied by increased unemployment and decline in government revenues (see Table 1.1). The government resorted to “serious and tough measures.” He referred to various debt management initiatives such as the Jamaica Debt Exchange (JDX) as part of the governments broader economic programme and the fact that although debt-servicing had accounted for the largest slice of Jamaica’s national budget over a number of years, the allocation was reduced to 47 per cent for the fiscal year 2010-2011 from the previous year’s 60 per cent (Ministry of Finance and the Public Service – MFPS, 2010).

Jamaica’s economy contracted by 2.7 per cent in 2009 and the estimate for the 2009-2010 fiscal year was for a further contraction of 2.3 per cent. Inflation was projected to reach 13.5 per cent for this period but there were signs of an “improved growth outlook” for the economy (MFPS, 2010).

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) has pointed to the decline in exports in 2009 by 50.8 per cent “due mainly to the fall-off in exports from the Mining and Quarrying Industry” and of total imports by 39.4 largely because of reduced fuel prices. The trade deficit was thereby reduced by 34.0 per cent when compared to 2008 (STATIN, 2010).

Declines were recorded for the Mining and Quarrying (including bauxite/alumina), Manufacturing, and Construction sectors. However, growth of 12.1 per cent was reported for Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) which, “on average,” had higher levels of employment “in the industry [AFF] in 2009 relative to 2008” (*Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica [ESSJ] 2009, Overview, p. x*).

In the case of Mining and Quarrying, “the real value added...declined by 50.2 per cent in 2009” when the industry provided only 2.0 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), a decline from 3.8 per cent for 2008. The decline in the industry was the third in three years. Preliminary figures for export earnings indicated a reduction from US\$1,368.3 million in 2008 to US\$466.8 in 2009. Reports of a revival in Mining and Quarrying – specifically in the bauxite/alumina sector – were partly substantiated in July 2010 when one of the country’s largest bauxite/alumina plants resumed operations and recalled hundreds of workers. That plant had been closed in April 2009 “in response to the global recession and” the recession’s “negative impact on the price and demand for aluminium which resulted in the closure of less efficient aluminium and alumina plants” (*ESSJ 2009, p. x*).

Tourism, which had been performing comparatively well (when contrasted with the other two pivotal foreign exchange earners) in earlier stages of the global recession with regard to visitor arrivals,

suffered a major setback during mid-2010. This setback resulted in part from negative safety-based tour advisories issued in Jamaica’s largest market, the US, prior to and associated with the highly publicized social unrest that spread from the Tivoli Gardens inner city sector of Western Kingston in late May and from news circulating globally about the unrest itself. A US\$10 million publicity blitz aimed at recapturing lost patronage was put in motion and the Minister of Tourism announced that the level of arrivals for July showed no significant difference with those for the corresponding month in 2009.

Among its various efforts, the programme of reform of the public sector was continued and the process of divestment of major state-owned assets such as Air Jamaica (to Trinidad-based Caribbean Airlines) and the Sugar Company of Jamaica was sustained in 2010.

“The Jamaica dollar remained relatively stable” against the US dollar in 2009 when it depreciated by 0.78 per cent. In February 2010 it reached a low of J\$89.77 to the US dollar. The Minister of Finance and the Public Service in relating these statistics also cited “increasing confidence in the market and increased availability of foreign exchange due to the support from the multilateral institutions” (MFPS, 2010). During the summer months (e.g., July) rates of around J\$86 were evident.

**Table I.1. Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2005 – 2009**

Indicators	2005	2007	2008	2009
Growth in GDP in Basic Value at Constant (2003) Prices	1.0	1.5	-0.9	-2.7
Inflation Rate (Annual Ave. %)	15.1	9.3	22.0	9.6
Annual Growth in Total Imports (%)	20.7	11.8	24.0	-39.4
Annual Growth in Total Exports (%)	9.0	7.6	17.3	-50.8
Traditional Exports (US\$)	1160.1	1500.4	1529.9	66.3
- Alumina (US\$)	920.3	1193.1	1230.5	368
Private Remittance Inflows (US\$)	1651	1964.4	2021	1795.4
Foreign Ex. Earnings from Tourism (US\$m)	1545.1	1910.0	1975.5	1939.7
Net International Reserves (US\$)	2087.4	1877.7	1772.9	1729.4
Nominal Ex. Rate (J\$ per US\$) Ave. Annual	62.6	69.06	72.92	88.49
Population Growth Rate (%)	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000)	17.8	17.0	16.7	16.3
Total Fertility Rate (%)	2.5	2.45	2.38	2.4
Labour Force Participation Rate (%)	64.2	64.9	65.5	63.6
Unemployment Rate	11.2	9.8	10.6	11.4
Literacy Rate	79.9	86	86.4	86.8
Major Crime Rate (per 100,000)	311	271	373	437
Murder Rate (per 100,000)	63	59	60	62

Source: *Economic and Social Survey – 2009* (PIOJ, 2010).

Jamaica maintained its close traditional relations with the US and other long-time partners such as the UK and retained growing substantive partnerships with, for example, Venezuela and China. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010) suggests that links with Latin American neighbour, Venezuela would “remain amicable” but that concessionary petroleum-based trade arrangements for Jamaica and the Region under the PetroCaribe agreement “will wane as its [Venezuela’s] ability to maintain largesse falls in the face of a severe domestic crisis.” The Unit also forecast that Jamaica’s links with Caribbean Community (CARICOM) partners would continue to be “strong” but that the Island would “resist any additional jointly negotiated free-trade agreements (FTAs) with external trade partners as it assumes a protectionist stance amid weak economic performance.” Additionally, “relations with the UK and the EU

will centre on compensatory assistance following the dismantling of the EU sugar regime.” (EIU/cited from *Jamaica: Country outlook*).

Uncertainty in the economic sphere has impacted the social sphere significantly. Education and health, for example, are very significant not only because of the extent to which they engage major policymaking but also because they are among the principal recipients of the government’s budgetary support. Poverty alleviation, industrial unrest, and crime and violence have been among other areas attracting critical attention.

Jamaica’s Minister of Finance told the House of Representatives in his 2010-2011 budget debate presentation that “the Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) continued to be the standard bearer as far as poverty relief is concerned” and that his government had increased the number of beneficiaries under the programme from 227,949 in 2006-2007 to 341,453 in 2009-2010. The 2009/10 figure was expected rise to 360,000 during 2010-2011 (MFPS, 2010).

The *ESSJ* points out that, for 2009, “the emphasis in education and training was on promoting access and quality in educational delivery. Among the areas relating to access were the development of infrastructure, maintenance of school fee relief; providing nutritional and educational materials support; improving [the] quality of teacher education; and developing policies and programmes relating to school attendance and behaviour management.” In the case of quality, the Ministry of Education directed its main effort at “improving literacy and numeracy” (*ESSJ*, p. 22.1). For the 2010-2011 financial year, education attracted a projected 14.2 per cent of the national budget compared to 12.9 per cent for 2009-2010 and 10.3 per cent for 2008-2009 (*ESSJ*, 22.2). Other notable areas in the social sector such as national security services and health services were allocated 7.5 and 6.2 per cent respectively (MFPS, 2010).

The abolition of tuition fees for pupils in public institutions up to the secondary level was one of the planks on which the JLP based its election campaign in 2007. Another was the abolition of user fees at public health care institutions. In a budget presentation in 2010 Prime Minister Golding reminded listeners that, for example, abolishing “tuition fees in high schools” was a measure to ensure “that no child would be kept out of school because his parents...can[']t find school fees” (Office of the Prime Minister - OPM, 2010). The Government’s “strategic policy objectives emphasize improvement of the provision for health care and as a corollary, building “a healthy, productive population.” In 2009, the government maintained its effort “to remove user fees at public institutions thereby bringing health care within the reach of over 20 per cent of Jamaicans who previously reported an illness but could not afford treatment...[A]pproximately 65 per cent of those seeking care from the public facilities are from the poorest quintile” (*ESSJ*, 2009, p. 23.1). Questions about the sustainability of the removal of both charges (education and health care) remained a source of controversy in public debate in 2010. In addressing criticisms the Prime Minister responded that the removal of hospital charges had “posed challenges because more people are coming to the hospitals” but that the government had “doubled the allocation provided for the purchase of drugs” (OPM, 2010).

Poverty alleviation has been a significant plank of the present and previous governments and Prime Minister Golding informed the House of Representatives in his April 20 budget debate contribution that in two and a half years his government had “tripled the allocation for the school feeding programme and doubled the number of children who benefit” (OPM, 2010).

### 1.4. Global Trends in Democratic Development

The economic recession has featured prominently in many countries and politically, it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.<sup>18</sup> According to the 2010 Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, freedom declines offset have gains for the fourth consecutive year in 2009 (Figure I.5). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democratic decline in the 40-year history of the Freedom House series.<sup>19</sup> Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations at the same time as non-democratic nations became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).




Figure I.5. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Declines from 2003-2010, by Reporting Year

Examining of Freedom House’s specific classification of countries (Table I.2), we find that in 2009, 89 countries continue to belong to the “free” category, representing 46 per cent of the world’s 194 countries as well as 46 per cent of the global population. The number of countries that are considered “partly free” decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of “not free” nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 per cent of the world’s population, respectively. More than 2.3 billion individuals reside in “not free” countries, that is, ones where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China makes up 50 per cent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and nine of the 47 countries considered “not free” scored the lowest possible ratings in both, civil liberties and political rights.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).

<sup>19</sup> Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the “most free” and 7 the “least free.”


<sup>20</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

**Table I.2. Global Trends in Freedom 1979 - 2009**

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

Within Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development in the 2008-2010 period, according to Freedom House, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the “electoral democracy” category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.<sup>21</sup> Figure I.6 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, one (3 per cent) is regarded as “not free”, nine (26 per cent) as “partly free” (because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties) and 25 (71 per cent) as “free”. All these figures point to a “democracy recession” in the Americas within the overall “democracy recession” in the world as a whole.



**Figure I.6. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas**

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. The Freedom House measure focuses on institutions rather than political culture which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*



of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.<sup>22</sup> For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, the political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy.<sup>23</sup> So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes might only serve to reinforce anti-democratic political cultures.

## 1.5. Dimensions of Democracy in Jamaica

The ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) continued to manoeuvre during 2009 and 2010 within the confines of the narrow four-seat majority that it gained in the 2007 contest against the opposition People’s National Party (PNP) within the context of Jamaica’s two-party-dominant political democracy. The JLP had won 32 seats to the PNP’s 28 in the Parliament’s 60-seat lower chamber, the House of Representatives, in the September 2007 poll and was able to pilot several measures through but failed to do so in a number of notable instances.

The tenuous balance in Parliament was underlined by several elements including court contests in which plaintiffs sought to remove Members of Parliament (MPs) from the lower house who had been elected unconstitutionally by virtue of having sworn allegiance to another or other nations, particularly the US. In a significant instance as Jamaica faced a national social and political crisis in mid-2010 one JLP MP’s membership was temporarily nullified by the courts and a subsequent ruling later in the year stipulated that a by-election should be called. Overall, it was an environment in which calls for or expectations of a general election earlier than constitutionally required were voiced.

Arguably, the most serious political crisis and the gravest threat to the state in decades erupted in late May 2010 when dissidents concentrated in a well-known area of Prime Minister Bruce Golding’s Western Kingston constituency, called Tivoli Gardens. These dissidents barricaded themselves in as a measure to protect area leader, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke who the US had asked the JLP administration in August 2009 to extradite to face charges of drug and gun running. Sympathizers of the Tivoli area leader set fire to several police stations and this underlined the government’s interpretation of the impasse as a direct challenge to the state. A national state of emergency was called for the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew<sup>24</sup> for a month in the first instance and the military was called in to assist the police. The government’s effort to resolve the stalemate resulted in some 74 fatalities, comprising mainly of civilians.

The conflict was seen by sections of civil society and the political directorate as an opportunity to act decisively and nationally against Jamaica’s high level of violent crime. On the other hand, the controversy also involved allegations by rights groups and individual civilians that the government had used excessive force and these were joined by the public defender in initiating calls for inquiries into the operations of the security forces.

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<sup>22</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>23</sup> John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

<sup>24</sup> The state of emergency was later extended to some parts of the neighbouring parish of St. Catherine.

Following the subduing of the dissidents and the occupation of Tivoli Gardens by the joint police and military force, an agreement by both major political parties, which was highlighted by a brief session of the House of Representatives during which the administration and the parliamentary opposition agreed on a general approach - aimed at sustaining the advance against criminality. At a later sitting the House debated and passed six bills including amendments to the Firearms, Offences against the Person, Bail, and Parole Acts geared at strengthening the power of the security forces to reduce the country's high crime rate (*See the section on crime in the present study.*). Whereas the passing of these bills gained bipartisan support, the opposition PNP abstained on July 20 from the vote for an extension of the state of emergency by an additional month thereby defeating the administration's motion. Under subsequent intense criticism from the government and some sections of civil society, the PNP defended its action by arguing that it was willing to allow for an extension of two weeks only and that it did not believe that a state of emergency was necessary to sustain a concerted drive against criminal elements in the society.

Prime Minister Bruce Golding in his 2010 budget presentation told the House of Representatives that: "The level of crime and violence, particularly murder, shooting, violence against women and children and extortion is a matter of grave concern to us and, indeed, to all Jamaica" (OPM, budget debate presentation, April 20, 2010)

The opposition PNP led a motion of no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister focusing on his handling of the Coke extradition proceedings and his admission that he had been involved in the use of a US law firm to lobby for the cancellation of the extradition request. The motion was defeated 31 to 28 with one absentee when members of the House of Representatives voted along strict party lines. Calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister also came from a wide cross-section of social groups. In other developments, a public opinion poll commissioned by one of Jamaica's leading newspapers, the *Gleaner*, and conducted in April and May found "that six in every 10 Jamaicans disagreed with how Golding and his band of merry men and women handled the extradition request" (*The Sunday Gleaner*, 13 June, 2010). In disaggregating the findings the newspaper noted implications for the governing party's overall status with the electorate.

Among major civil society groups an umbrella business sector association, the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) through its president, and other notable civil society groups such as the vocal Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) were among those calling for the Prime Minister's resignation after he admitted (following a denial) before Parliament that he had been involved in the hiring of the US law firm to conduct the lobby. The PSOJ challenged the Prime Minister to adhere to the list of change measures to which he committed himself. The association also demanded that the ruling administration should ensure transparency in funding for political parties and demanded, for example, that the parties dissolve links with criminal networks. In addition, it encouraged the security forces "to continue their relentless and courageous efforts to restore law and order in certain sectors of the Capital" (PSOJ, press release brief, 2010).

Within less than three weeks after Coke was extradited, a new US ambassador-designate to Jamaica was mentioned following a hiatus of more than a year without an ambassador and a period in which a number of negative travel advisories were issued.

Since the 2008 LAPOP report there has been no radical shift in the issue of corruption, highlighted in the report as a significant national concern. Corruption remained a conspicuous issue in 2010 during which there were, for example, recriminations between Jamaica's two major political parties and finger-pointing at state institutions such as the police forces and as well as at the private sector. Prominent issues ranged through the award of contracts, funding of political parties to alleged links

between the parties and organized crime. The prime minister, in his April 20, 2010 budget debate presentation to parliament mentioned that 64 members of the police force “were arrested and charged last year [2009] for varying offences” and that “the drive to rid the Force of corruption” has remained “intense” (OPM, 2010).

A proposal to establish a National Anti-Corruption Agency was advanced by the contractor-general and broadly accepted by the government (see, e.g., OPM, PM’s April 20, 2010 budget debate presentation). During mid-2010 the contractor-general himself attracted criticism from both sides of the political divide on the premise that he was overzealous.

The *Global Corruption Report 2009* described the evidence on which it is based – broadly, that “corruption is a central and growing challenge for business and society” globally - as “conclusive and troublesome” (Executive Summary, xxv). Transparency International (TI) has in recent years ranked Jamaica among the more corrupt of the more than 100 countries examined in the organization’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). In the 2009 survey of 180 countries, Jamaica slid to joint 99<sup>th</sup> place (CPI 2009).<sup>25</sup> In the 2010 survey, however, the country received the significantly improved 87th place ranking, but only a marginal increase in its CPI score, moving from 3.3 in 2009 to 3.0 in 2010.

Consistent with the historical tendency, the country’s political context continued to be characterized by incidents of partisan political violence – albeit with less frequency – and reports of human rights abuses by members of the security forces. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, Freedom House again, in its *Freedom of the World* (2010) survey, classified Jamaica as a functioning and ‘free’ electoral and liberal democracy. This survey categorizes nations as being ‘free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ on the basis of their score on a political rights and civil liberties scale, which ranges from 1 – 7, with scores closer to 1 indicating ‘free’ and 7 being ‘not free’. Jamaica’s freedom status for 2007 was equal to that for 2006, when the country was also listed as ‘free’, based on the average of scores of two (2) for ‘political rights’ and three (3) for ‘civil liberties’.<sup>26</sup> Ranked internationally on the basis of levels of press freedom and democracy, Jamaica obtained a joint ninth place for press freedom (in a survey of 150 countries with populations exceeding one million) and 41<sup>st</sup> for democracy among 194 countries and territories (Freedom House, 2010), a similar status to that of the past several years.

## 1.6. The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the *AmericasBarometer* of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars approaching the problem from two schools of thought have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability. The first strand has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic

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<sup>25</sup> Among other Caribbean countries Barbados ranked 20, St. Lucia 22, Puerto Rico 35, Cuba 61, Trinidad and Tobago 79, Guyana 126 and Haiti 168.

<sup>26</sup> Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.

alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends”<sup>27</sup> as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crisis. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the Region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al.<sup>28</sup> found that no democracy had collapsed where the country’s per capita income exceeded US\$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the “inoculation” protection of historically adequate levels of economic development.<sup>29</sup>

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al.<sup>30</sup> also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries thereby placing most nations in Przeworski et al.’s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.<sup>31</sup> Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.<sup>32</sup>

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?<sup>33</sup> In this round of the *AmericasBarometer* surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

## 1.7. Conclusion

Following a discussion of the economic crisis’ impact on the Region and Jamaica, the present chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Jamaica. It also analysed the trends in democratic

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<sup>27</sup> Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). Bermeo disputes this notion in her book, arguing that breakdown is largely elite driven.

<sup>28</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).

<sup>29</sup> Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

<sup>30</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

<sup>31</sup> Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Insurgency and Inequality," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).

<sup>32</sup> UNDP, *Informe regional sobre desarrollo humano en América Latina y el Caribe* (New York: UNDP, 2010).

<sup>33</sup> Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52.no. 2 (2010).

development in the last few years partly within the framework of a “democratic recession” and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy.

One of the elements we have noted is that the Region as a whole does not seem to have experienced the negative impact of the economic crisis to the extent that several countries, including some of the advanced countries, have.

Evidence of decline in major dimensions of the Jamaican economy compared to the findings of the previous study was partly counterbalanced by that indicating notable growth or resilience in others. Alongside this situation, the democratic process and culture were brought into focus by a mid-2010 jolt that was touched on. More broadly, in a few countries democracy has remained somewhat fragile and we have raised the question as to whether the economic crisis might open fissures and threaten the stability of democracy in the wider Region.

In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the *AmericasBarometer 2010*.

## Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences During Hard Times in the Americas

### 2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and on the Jamaican economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer three questions. (1) How did citizens perceive the crisis? (2) Who did they blame for it? (3) How did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We first present a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis and we discuss where Jamaica is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer* survey.

### 2.2. Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the LAPOP developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the *AmericasBarometer*, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys and were administered in every country except Haiti. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceived an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was one, we asked who was to be blamed for the crisis. The following is the text of the items themselves:

**CRISIS1.** Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis. Others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

**CRISIS2.** Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Jamaicans
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also Unites States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of the country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77)**[Don't read]** Other

Because questions about the economic crisis were not asked in Haiti (where the questionnaire focused on the earthquake), the analysis presented in this chapter is based only on the 25 countries where questions about the economic crisis were asked. Looking at the Americas as a whole, we can see in Figure II.1 that most citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas, 2010

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, the United States, and El Salvador have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis, although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceive a crisis.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceives an Economic Crisis, 2010

### 2.3. Perception of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis in Jamaica

Figure II.2 illustrates that the perception of the existence of an economic crisis is higher in Jamaica than in all other countries participating in the 2010 round of LAPOP surveys. More specifically, it shows that virtually all Jamaicans – 99.6 per cent of the population – perceive an economic crisis and of those holding that view, about four in five considered the impact of the crisis to be very serious (Figure II.3).






Figure II.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceives an Economic Crisis in Jamaica, 2010

### 2.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided in Figure II.4.




Figure II.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? According to Citizens in the Americas Who Perceive a Crisis, 2010

The majority of citizens who perceived a crisis in the Americas blamed either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Fewer than eight per cent of Latin Americans who perceived a crisis blamed the “rich” countries or advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many individuals in these countries, instead, blamed themselves for the economic crisis.

We further examine these results, firstly in regard to the major regions in the Americas and then to Jamaica. As shown in Figure II.5, citizens’ attribution relating to the greatest the responsibility for the crises in the United States and Canada was mixed in terms of distribution of blame between the present and previous administrations. In the Caribbean, however, a significant majority of the respondents blamed the current government whereas in South and Central America most respondents believed the previous administration should be most blamed for the crisis.




Figure II.5. Who is to Blamed for the Economic Crisis? Regional Overview, 2010

Figure II.6 shows that in the case of Jamaica, citizens attributed blame somewhat evenly among the previous government, the current administration and the country’s economic system. Only about six per cent indicated that the rich countries are responsible and 16 per cent believed all Jamaicans should share the blame for the crisis.




Figure II.6. Responsibility for Economic Crisis, Jamaica

## 2.5. Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analysed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to be blamed for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

### 2.5.1. Jobs Loss in the Americas

The questions used in this section are the following:

**OCUP1B1.** Have you lost your job in the past two years? [Read options]

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
- (3) No, you did not lose your job
- (4) No, you did not work because you decided not to work or because of disabilities

**OCUP1B2.** Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? [Read options] (1) Yes (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7 below. Whereas three-quarters of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7 per cent did but found a new one, and about 9 per cent of the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, about 16 per cent of respondents reported lost jobs.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. The bars in Figure II.8 show the extent to which the economies of the different countries in the Region were affected by job loss over the past two years. Mexico, Colombia and the Dominican Republic were the countries that were most severely impacted, with 38 per cent or more of the population reporting a negative effect. Suriname was the only country with single digit job loss figures, with Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago reporting job loss of about 14 and 16 per cent respectively.




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at least One Family Member Who Lost His or Her Job in the Past Two Years

### 2.5.2. Reported Job Loss in Jamaica

Approximately 30 per cent of Jamaicans reported that they have personally lost their jobs or are members of households in which someone experienced job loss within the last two years (Figure II.8). A breakdown of respondents’ description of their recent personal and household employment situation is summarized in Figure II.9 below. Approximately 19 per cent indicated that they had lost their jobs within the last two years and about one fifth of them reported that they were still unemployed at the time of this survey.




Figure II.9. Percentage of Jamaicans Who Lost Jobs

A description of the recent employment history of Jamaicans by sex, age, level of education and area of residence is depicted in Figure II.10. The chart illustrates that respondents at the secondary level of schooling experienced the highest level of job loss and among those who reported losing their jobs, males and urban dwellers encountered a significantly higher re-employment rate than their female and rural counterparts.




Figure II.10. Percentage of Jamaicans Who Lost Jobs by Sex, Age, Education, and Area

## 2.6. Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

**Q10E.** Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**

- (1) Increased? **[Go to Q11]**
- (2) Remained the same? **[Go to Q11]**
- (3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.11) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, 30 per cent that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth that they have increased.




Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Changes in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who says that incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase in income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas.






Figure II.12. Has your household income decreased, remained the same, or increased over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population)

### 2.7. Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II.13 a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.

Moreover, Figure II.13 indicates that as family wealth declines, the percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases. The poorest individuals in the Region (those in the first quintile of wealth shown in the figure) are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. Whereas in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth – the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows for the ranking of individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).




Figure II.13. Percentage of Respondents in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

In the case of Jamaica, the area and class disparity in reported income decline is considerably greater than the regional average. As illustrated in Figure II.14, the negative impact of the economic crisis is experienced with much greater intensity in rural areas and among persons of the lower socio-economic status. Noteworthy is the over two times greater income decline reported by persons in the first and second quintiles compared to those in the fifth quintile.




Figure II.14. Percentage of Respondents in Jamaica Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Wealth

## 2.8. Perceptions of Both the Personal and National Economy

The *AmericasBarometer* traditionally reports on respondents’ perceptions of their personal and national economic situation. We ask respondents to consider their current personal and national economic situation and the situation a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

<p><b>SOCT1.</b> How would you describe <b>the country’s</b> economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)(4) Bad (5) Very bad</p> <p>(88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer</p>
<p><b>SOCT2.</b> Do you think that <b>the country’s</b> current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer</p>
<p><b>IDIO1.</b> How would you describe <b>your</b> overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad</p> <p>(88) Don’t know (98) Doesn’t answer</p>
<p><b>IDIO2.</b> Do you think that <b>your</b> economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer</p>

We now link these items with the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.15, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when

compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy and also for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.




Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in the Americas, 2010

Figure II.16 shows that the relationship between citizens' experience of the economic crisis in Jamaica, in terms of income flow, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being are markedly similar to what obtains across the Americas. Jamaicans who perceive their personal or the national economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who reported that the national and their personal economic situation is very good.




Figure II.16. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Jamaica

## 2.9. Conclusion

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and on the Jamaican economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the conclusion of the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* study. In this chapter the focus was on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times including, for example, where they allocated blame, in regard to the countries included in the 2010 survey.

In order to examine the economic crisis in particular, the LAPOP employed two novel survey items developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. Respondents were asked whether they perceived an economic crisis and, among those who thought that there was one, we asked who was to be blamed for the crisis. The overall picture from the 25 countries in the *AmericasBarometer* indicated that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, whether it was serious or not very serious degree. Of note is that the perception of the existence of an economic crisis was higher in the case of Jamaica than in all other countries participating in the 2010 round. More specifically, virtually all Jamaicans – 99.6 per cent of the population – were found to perceive an economic crisis and of those holding that view, about four in five considered the impact of the crisis to be very serious. Furthermore, in the case of Jamaica, where the area and class disparity in reported income decline was found to be considerably greater than the regional average, citizens attributed blame somewhat evenly among the previous government, the current administration and the country's economic system. Only about six per cent indicated that the rich countries are responsible and 16 per cent believed all Jamaicans should share the blame for the crisis.

## Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

### 3.1. Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during these hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom as we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis that afflicted wide swaths of the Region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.<sup>1</sup> Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy, while poor national economic indicators may affect individuals' support for key components of democracy.<sup>2</sup>

Given the severity of the most recent economic recession in many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and in satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined in tough times, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the *AmericasBarometer2010*, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and in Jamaica specifically.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures - that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to "life satisfaction" or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions express greater happiness.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> However, see the work of Bermeo, who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

<sup>2</sup> Córdova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean"; Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

<sup>3</sup> Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Carol Graham, *Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and*

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are the citizens of the Americas now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items. One asks people about their current happiness and the other that asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

**[GIVE CARD "A"]**

**LS6.** On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.

On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**

**[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible". Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
<b>Worst life possible</b>						<b>Best life possible</b>				<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't Answer</b>	

**LS6A.** On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans are, on average, those who report the greatest increases in satisfaction with their lives in 2010 over 2008. In stark contrast, Jamaicans reported that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than that reported for 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is appreciably lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, Haiti, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.<sup>5</sup> Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction/happiness. Nevertheless, this finding is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items specifically designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

*Perception: Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank : Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship: Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 survey, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have repeated cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.




Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that demonstrated declines or increases in life satisfaction, and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. In some countries, Jamaica included, had over half of the population expressed a decline in life satisfaction.






Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction in 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondent’s evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and a year before. If we now look at only those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3 that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. Figure III.3 shows this is the pattern for each country in the study. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic condition has deteriorated indicating that, as we suspected, there is a strong link between the two..




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of the Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents comparing the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to the one that they reported having possessed two years earlier.<sup>6</sup> To this regression equation,

<sup>6</sup> We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex, education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. Whereas in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.<sup>7</sup> Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), which was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 of this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on life satisfaction is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution and, if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”).

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction. We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reasons to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III.3. Respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s evaluation that he/she is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s economic situation matter, but the objective existence (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance*.<sup>8</sup> Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.

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<sup>7</sup> For more information on this indicator, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).

<sup>8</sup> This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government’s effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

In focussing our analysis on Jamaica (see Figure III.5), we examined possible determinants of change in life satisfaction using the same set of demographic and socioeconomic factors as in the model above and selected perception variables. Regression outcomes are shown in Figure III.5. Variables found to be statistically significant are age, trend in household income, retrospective personal economic situation perception and perception of personal economic well-being.




Figure III.5. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in Jamaica, 2010

A description of the impact of age and perception of personal economic situation on perceived life satisfaction is displayed graphically in Figure III.6. As the first chart shows, the strongest sense of diminished life satisfaction is perceived by persons in the 36-45 age group. Young adults and those in the 65 and over age cohort are more positive in their assessment of possible change in their life satisfaction. Figure III.6 illustrates that as perception of personal economic well-being increases, so does respondents' perceived change in life satisfaction.




Figure III.6. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Age and Perception of Personal Economic Situation in Jamaica

As Figure III.7 shows, persons reporting that there has been a decrease in household income in the last two years are more likely to perceive a reduction in life satisfaction.




Figure III.7. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Decreased Household Income in Jamaica

### 3.2. Support for Democracy

We now turn from respondents’ attitudes towards their own lives to their attitudes towards democracy and their political systems. This round of the *AmericasBarometer* provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the Region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.8.<sup>9</sup> The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bars show the average levels found in 2008.<sup>10</sup> The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. Countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. The Canadian decline was the sharpest. On the other hand, Chile is the only country in which support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010, at least as measured by this general “Churchillian item”<sup>11</sup> that has been so widely used in the comparative study of democracy.

<sup>9</sup> Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4**. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded in a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

<sup>10</sup> Note that there are no 2008 survey data for two countries (Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname), so only one bar is shown.

<sup>11</sup> This item is based on the notion that, attributed to Winston Churchill, that despite all its shortcomings democracy is still the best system of government




Figure III.8. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (See Figure III.9).




Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

Figure III.9 shows that education (after age) is one of the most powerful predictors of support for democracy. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this again here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute relating to the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find that higher wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.<sup>12</sup>

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.9 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job indicate that there is a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* impact of a reduction in income with increased support for democracy. However, far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

<sup>12</sup>John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).



Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis reduced support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the Americas.

The regression chart in Figure III.10 shows the statistically significant predictors of support for democracy in Jamaica. Interestingly, education is not an important factor as is the case elsewhere in the Region. However, wealth, satisfaction with the performance of the current Prime Minister and age are significant, in line with the regional trend.




Figure III.10. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Jamaica, 2010

The charts in Figure III.11 show that all three factors have a positive net impact on citizens' support for democracy. The importance of economic variables and a positive evaluation of the incumbent political administration in influencing citizens' attitude to democracy are again highlighted by the strong correlation between these factors and support for democracy. Also, as has been the case with most other democracy indicators, older persons are usually more likely to express greater support for a democratic system of government.




Figure III.11. Support for Democracy by Satisfaction with Performance of Current PM, Wealth, and Age, in Jamaica, 2010

### 3.3. Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of one’s government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources but that the performance of government in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central.<sup>13</sup> Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years.<sup>14</sup> Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. However, what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the *AmericasBarometer* data, but we look at it in this year’s report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has utilized a system support index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 scale, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

<sup>13</sup> System Support is an index created from five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V in Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.12 some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, in the case of Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 up to 60.4. We need to bear in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the inauguration of the new administration and therefore the level of support may have been elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new government administrations usually receive. Paraguay also recorded a substantial increase, with support moving from 29.5 to 46.3 in the two years under review. Other countries experiencing statistically significant increases in support for the political system despite the economic crisis are Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua. On the other hand, only Haiti, Canada, Belize, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008 and 2010. The other countries remained statistically unchanged.




Figure III.12. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

In the regression analysis, we again find that perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively system support as illustrated in Figure III.13. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Older persons and women display significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Surprisingly, unemployment does not have a strong significant impact on system support. *The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance.* Once again, then, we see that the views of individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by how their governments perform. It is also evident that satisfaction with the incumbent president or head matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.




Figure III.13. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance appears in Figure III.14. Note that in Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela and Peru, among others, significant increases were found. On the other hand, only in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Belize, Jamaica, and Haiti were significant declines recorded by the two surveys.




Figure III.14. Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance are in part driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III.15. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the increase in satisfaction with government management of the economy, the greater the increase in system support. The results show a very powerful relationship explaining 65% of the variance in system support at the national level.




Figure III.15. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

This result is found at both the national level and regional levels. In Figure III.16 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but use the sub-national strata of each sample (the variable ESTRATOPRI). For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum, and in other countries regions are used for the strata (such as the coast, highlands and Amazonian regions in Ecuador). Details of the sample designs taking note of these strata are contained in the appendix of each country report.<sup>15</sup> What we see is that even at the sub-national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.

<sup>15</sup> In El Salvador, where the sample design is based on the size of the municipality rather than geography, the strata were re-aggregated to form geographically based regions.




Figure III.16. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Subnational Level Analysis

### 3.3.1. Determinants of System Support in Jamaica

In an attempt at deepening our understanding of the dynamics of system support in Jamaica we analysed a linear regression model made up of the variables displayed in Figure III.17 below. Factors found to be statistically significant determinants were perception of national economic situation, satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister, perception of government economic performance, wealth and age.






Figure III.17. Determinants of System Support in Jamaica, 2010

Charts 1, 2, and 3 in Figure III.18 show the relationship between citizens’ support for the system and their perception of their own economic situation, their evaluation of the performance of the government, and their level of satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister, respectively. The linear relationship in each case indicates that persons who are positive in their assessment of these factors are more likely to express higher support for the system than those with negative evaluations. As illustrated by Chart 4, the positive effect of wealth is evident only after the second quintile, with the relationship becoming progressively stronger as wealth increases.




Figure III.18. System Support by Perception of National Economic Situation, Satisfaction with the Performance of the PM, Perception of Government Economic Performance and Wealth

Age was also found to be a significant determinant of system support. As illustrated by Figure III.19, older Jamaicans are generally more supportive of the political system than those of the younger age groups.




Figure III.19. System Support by Age

### 3.4. Satisfaction with Democracy

We turn now to consider the determinants of satisfaction with the way democracy works. While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what of satisfaction with democracy – another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns.<sup>16</sup> During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered in their own countries. The question therefore becomes: Are of the countries of the Americas less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy in their countries when they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the *AmericasBarometer* suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III.20 shows that in a number of countries average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 on our 0-100 scale to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 to 46.3. Other statistically significant declines occurred in the Dominican Republic. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were heavily felt by most citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period. On the other hand, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased sharply. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009.<sup>17</sup> In that country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. The largest shift occurred in Paraguay, a country at the very bottom of satisfaction in 2008, with a score of 30.2, leaping to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April 2008 election that brought the decades-long dominant party rule to an end in that country; no doubt this was a factor in the robust increase in democratic satisfaction measured in the 2010 survey. Other significant increases occurred in Panama, where there was a shift of nearly 10 points, and El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case, the FMLN) won power for the first time in the presidential election prior to the survey. In many countries, however, there was no statistically significant shift in satisfaction with democracy in spite of the severe economic crisis that left its imprint worldwide.

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<sup>16</sup>Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

<sup>17</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).




Figure III.20. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Moving on to the determinants of democratic satisfaction, we see that perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among citizens in the western hemisphere, shown in Figure III.21. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older persons have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while wealthier and more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small. More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance *in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president or head*. Individuals in the Americas are seen to be not only strongly affected in their views as to how their governments perform but also, satisfaction

with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the presidents’ performance during hard economic times are also highly important.




Figure III.21. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

### 3.4.1. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Jamaica

A linear regression model comprising the demographic, socioeconomic and attitudinal variables are shown in Figure III.22 was analysed to establish determinants of citizens’ level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Jamaica.




Figure III.22. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Jamaica

Statistically significant outcomes are graphed in Figure III.23. As chart 1 shows citizens' perception of the country's national economic situation has a substantively negative effect on their level of satisfaction with democracy. Chart 2 illustrates the net positive effect of satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister Persons with more favourable evaluation of the performance of the Prime Minister are likely to express satisfaction with the way democracy works.




Figure III.23. Satisfaction with Democracy by Negative Perception and Satisfied with Performance of PM

### 3.5. Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but the military has also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during its periods of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of Latin America's dark past. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens' support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime rate, and high levels of corruption.<sup>18</sup> The comparisons for 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III.14. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries, and especially low, for example, in Panama and Argentina. On our 0-100 scale, no country scores even as high as 50 in 2010. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, and, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal take-overs of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and thereafter they saw no reason for it; or it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action.

We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras. In two other countries support for coups was above the 50-point mark on the 0-100 scale in 2008: Peru and Guyana. In Guyana, support for coups fell by 20 points by 2010. Coup support increased significantly only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010. Support for a coup as a mechanism for governmental change also declined significantly in 2010 from 2008 levels in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana.

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<sup>18</sup> The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject, some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion, would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified; and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100 = a military coup is justified and 0 = a military coup is not justified.




Figure III.24. Justification of A Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

To return to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III.24 that unfortunately this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show greater support for military coups, suggesting that citizens in the Americas, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk. Interestingly, women also express (slightly) higher levels of this support. However, the effect is very small. Older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding that is consistent with previous results is the positive effect of the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for



authoritarian alternatives. Perception of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.




Figure III.25. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

The results in Figure III.24 above show that support for military coups in the Caribbean is remarkably high, considering that countries in the Area have historically embraced democratic approaches to changing governments. Interestingly, the scores for Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad Tobago, 38.9, 33.7 and 33.4 respectively (on the 0-100 point scale) are quite similar or higher than many countries in Latin America. Figure III.26 displays results of regression analysis aimed at determining the factors explaining citizens' attitudes in support for military coups in Jamaica.




Figure III.26. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Jamaica

As in the case of most other countries in the Americas, perceptions and experiences relating to the economic crisis have prominently featured as determinants of support for military coups in Jamaica. As the chart in Figure III.26 shows, perception of an economic crisis, decrease in household income, job lost in the respondent's household and wealth. Figure III.27 shows the cross-tabulation of two of these economic variables, illustrating the negative and positive impact of perception of economic crisis and wealth respectively.




Figure III.27. Support for Military Coups by Perception of Economic Crisis and Wealth

Figure III.28 and 29 show the positive net effect of age and education on support for military coups. In general, younger persons are more likely to support coups than those in older age groups (Figure III.28).




Figure III.28. Support for Military Coups by Age

And as illustrated by Figure III.29, persons with no formal education are nearly two times more likely to support a military take over of the government than those of other levels of schooling.




Figure III.29. Support for Military Coups by Level of Education

### 3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter we have attempted to go beyond the 2008 survey and locate a relationship between core attitudes toward democracy and economic hard times in light of the protracted economic recession that has affected many countries of the world. Results for the Region, with particular emphasis on Jamaica, were examined.

In relation to “life satisfaction”, one of our notable measures, it was found, for example, that Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans on average reported the highest levels of increased satisfaction with their lives in 2010 in comparison with 2008. A very different picture was observed for Jamaicans who reported that in 2010 their happiness was decisively lower than that reported for 2008. Almost everywhere, life satisfaction has been observed to decline when individuals report that their personal economic condition deteriorated.

Even though in overall terms, this round of the *AmericasBarometer* has not revealed any general decline in democracy in the Region, we do find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis are linked to reduced support for democracy. Importantly, there is again, the very strong effect of a positive perception of government management of the economy. So, as in the case of life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

### Appendix Chapter III

**Table III.A1. Factors Determining Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in Jamaica – Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Female	-0.037	(-1.35)
Age	-0.097*	(-3.33)
Urban	-0.002	(-0.06)
Education Level	-0.008	(-0.26)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.009	(-0.30)
Satisfaction with Performance Current President	0.038	(0.97)
Negative Perception National Econ. Situation	-0.013	(-0.35)
Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation	-0.009	(-0.36)
Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation	-0.147*	(-4.17)
Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation	-0.145*	(-4.59)
Households with at least one Member who Lost her Job	-0.017	(-0.67)
Decrease in household income	-0.097*	(-2.90)
Very Serious Economic Crisis	-0.053	(-1.74)
No Economic Crisis	-0.024*	(-2.00)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.030	(0.84)
Constant	0.016	(0.51)
R-Squared = 0.118		
Number of Observations = 1228		
* p<0.05		

**Table III.A2. Factors Determining Support for Democracy in Jamaica– Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Female	0.020	(0.74)
Age	0.078*	(2.59)
Urban	0.045	(1.03)
Education Level	-0.016	(-0.66)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.137*	(3.62)
Satisfaction with Performance Current PM	0.098*	(2.52)
Negative Perception National Econ. Situation	-0.013	(-0.38)
Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation	-0.018	(-0.52)
Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation	0.026	(0.73)
Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation	-0.037	(-1.34)
Decrease in household income	-0.056	(-1.84)
Over the past two years, has the income of your household:	0.019	(0.49)
Very Serious Economic Crisis	0.024	(0.80)
No Economic Crisis	-0.003	(-0.09)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	-0.034	(-0.80)
Constant	0.022	(0.52)
R-Squared = 0.042		
Number of Observations = 1196		
* p<0.05		

**Table III.A3. Factors Determining System Support in Jamaica– Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Female	-0.032	(-1.36)
Age	0.066*	(2.67)
Urban	-0.006	(-0.14)
Education Level	0.005	(0.20)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.108*	(3.09)
Satisfaction with Performance Current PM	0.088*	(2.54)
Per cent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.054	(-1.84)
Negative Perception National Econ. Situation	-0.099*	(-3.11)
Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation	-0.024	(-0.80)
Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation	-0.030	(-0.84)
Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation	-0.002	(-0.06)
Households with at least one Member who Lost her Job	-0.049	(-1.75)
Decrease in Household Income	-0.021	(-0.68)
Very Serious Economic Crisis	0.063*	(2.08)
No Economic Crisis	-0.022	(-0.98)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.294*	(7.43)
Constant	-0.023	(-0.58)
R-Squared = 0.194		
Number of Observations = 1229		
* p<0.05		

**Table III.A4. Factors Determining Satisfaction with Democracy in Jamaica– Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Female	-0.006	(-0.23)
Age	0.012	(0.41)
Urban	0.049	(1.12)
Education Level	0.021	(0.79)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.052	(1.72)
Satisfaction with Performance Current PM	0.178*	(4.50)
Negative Perception National Econ. Situation	-0.150*	(-4.03)
Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation	-0.024	(-0.72)
Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation	-0.071*	(-2.15)
Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation	0.015	(0.51)
Households with at least one Member who Lost her Job	-0.042	(-1.35)
Decrease in household income	0.031	(0.89)
Very Serious Economic Crisis	0.022	(0.77)
No Economic Crisis	-0.022	(-0.97)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.050	(1.28)
Constant	0.013	(0.31)
R-Squared = 0.117		
Number of Observations = 1209		
* p<0.05		

**Table III.A4. Factors Determining Support for Military Coups in Jamaica– Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Female	0.003	(0.09)
Age	-0.121*	(-4.25)
Urban	-0.067	(-1.16)
Education Level	-0.095*	(-3.13)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.151*	(-3.74)
Satisfaction with Performance Current PM	-0.016	(-0.46)
Negative Perception National Econ. Situation	0.034	(1.09)
Negative Perception Retrospective National Econ. Situation	0.063	(1.62)
Negative Perception Personal Econ. Situation	-0.037	(-1.01)
Negative Perception Retrospective Personal Econ. Situation	0.011	(0.30)
Households with at least one Member who Lost her Job	0.086*	(2.93)
Decrease in Household Income	-0.102*	(-2.48)
Very Serious Economic Crisis	-0.029	(-0.98)
No Economic Crisis	0.085*	(3.34)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.004	(0.11)
Constant	-0.002	(-0.04)
R-Squared = 0.065		
Number of Observations = 1205		
* p<0.05		

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## **Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society**

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## Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

### 4.1. Introduction

In Part I of this study, we presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *who are those most likely affected by the crisis?* We presented a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower democratic support. In Part II of this study, we attempt to test key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime, and corruption, themes that have emerged as important in a number of prior LAPOP studies. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis are used as additional control or predictor variables in this part, but are not the central focus here.

### 4.2. Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity

Crime remains one of the most serious, and a seemingly intractable problem for the overwhelming majority of countries in the Americas despite the plethora of initiatives aimed at controlling its growth and mitigating its impact on regional states. In Central and South America and the Caribbean murder rates continue to far exceed those of the US and Canada (Nation Master, 2010). And for many countries in the Region, the situation is further exacerbated by the composite of that category - robbery, rape and other serious offences.

Within the Caribbean, violent crimes tend to be the area of greatest concern. In general, there has been a significant increase in the rate of serious crime in most of the territories over the past two decades. In countries such as Jamaica, Bahamas, St. Kitts and Guyana homicide rates have shown alarmingly sharp increases since the mid-1980's and violent crimes in some countries such as St. Kitts, Grenada and Trinidad & Tobago have been showing particularly high volatility in recent times (World Bank, 2007)<sup>1</sup>. Nonetheless, consistency in homicide rates tends to vary for many countries, with periods of fluctuation suggesting that it may be possible to control the problem through effective policy measures. Traditionally, criminal activity in Caribbean countries has been characterized by low rates of violent crime and high rates of property crime, with the ratio of violent crime to property crime varying between, 1:5 and 1:10. However there appears to be a dramatic shift in this pattern, particularly in Jamaica, where in the year 2000, violent crimes represented 41 per cent of all reported crimes.

The problems of measuring crime accurately have been widely cited by various observers. A comprehensive report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank states that generally "crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be." The report adds that the "best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized

<sup>1</sup>World Bank (2007) Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS)” but “only one country in the Caribbean [Barbados] has participated in the ICVS” (2007: 4). The report further states that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. That assessment applies, for example, to Jamaica in terms of official crime figures.

LAPOP research has illustrated that at least a half of the respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime do not report the crime to the authorities, depending on the country. Comparisons across countries are also fraught with pitfalls, states the UN/World Bank report “because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (UNODC 2007: 5).

Activities or offences that would be classed as criminal in some countries may not be considered to be criminal in others and there are also differences in what is designated as crime and what is not. Guatemala is a case in point in that persons who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

Although LAPOP relies on the household survey data because it is viewed as the most reliable the researchers are conscious that even such survey data have serious limitations. One limitation is obvious: murder victims cannot be interviewed and therefore surveys are inappropriate for the most violent form of crime. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to exaggeration of crime statistics partly because they are hardly more than hearsay data based on the fact that perceptions of ‘family’ (from immediate to extended) vary among individuals. Associated with problem of perception or definition is double counting as when extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. A third, factor is that the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a particular location can determine whether an assault results in a homicide or an injury and so regions or locales with highly advanced EMS systems could have lower homicide rates because of this capacity to administer treatment.

A fourth consideration when endorsing national estimates of crime is the spread or concentration. In El Salvador and a number of other Latin American countries surveyed by LAPOP, crime (and corruption) rates have been conspicuously higher in urban than in rural areas. Jamaica was among those countries in the Caribbean displaying a similar pattern for many decades. However, there has been a shift in this pattern in the last couple of years, with a trend spiraling crime rates in many rural communities due in part to migration of criminals from urban incities to these areas.

LAPOP has sought to minimize the impact of these measurement-related problems on an ongoing basis. In any event, in the case of several countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, respondents who state that they have been victims of crime or expressed fear of crime, have tended to display attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who expressed little fear.

Social scientists view crime from varying perspectives. Elements such as lost productivity and state revenue are the focus of economists whereas the impact of crime on the ‘social fabric’ defines the sphere of sociologists. Crime has attracted much less attention in the work of political scientists and to the extent that they do address it the slant is towards issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. The tendencies arise from studying crime in wealthy, technologically advanced societies, where, even at the peaks of crime waves, levels of violent crime are a far cry from the troublingly high levels typical of many countries in Latin America. During the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s the country’s murder rate did not exceed 10 per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years (Leyva 2001).

Because the overwhelming proportion of murders tends to be reported, homicide rates are usually considered to be the most reliable indicator of the status of crime. A detailed World Bank study of homicide rates for 1970-1994 revealed a world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). Using the 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.<sup>2</sup>The homicide rate for Latin America has been estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 inhabitants – multiples of the US rate (approximately 5.5) and even more dramatically higher than that for the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland (2.0). The Pan American Health Organization which has reported a lower average of 20 per 100,000 people for Latin America as a whole<sup>3</sup>has explained that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”<sup>4</sup>Gaviria and Pages(1999) suggested that homicide rates were not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also that the gap between that region and the rest of the world was widening.

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region’s political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the Region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the Region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the *AmericasBarometer* survey data.

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<sup>2</sup> The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

<sup>3</sup> According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

<sup>4</sup> Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 ([www.paho.org/english/DPI/r1970717.htm](http://www.paho.org/english/DPI/r1970717.htm)).

### 4.2.1. Crime Victimization and Support for Democracy

The way in which crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy can be readily perceived. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear of crime. Some citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thereby eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could lead citizens to be less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. In all this, whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the most important factor that remains somewhat unclear. Even in countries that experience high murder rates, the chance of an individual being murdered or even being the victim of a serious crime remains relatively low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbours, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with sometimes macabre images of crime on the TV.

### 4.2.2. Crime Victimization and Insecurity in Jamaica

During the first decade of the twenty-first century Jamaica has tended to rank among those countries in the world that experience the highest per capita murder rates. The Island has also attracted a reputation for its high level of violent crime as a whole though it is less prominent in terms of crime in general. Despite doubts about the accuracy of crime statistics, the value of murder rate as a measure can hardly be discounted because significant levels of underreporting are not likely to be the norm for this most extreme category of crime. Table IV.1 which speaks to the incidence of “Major Crimes” for 2005-2009 partly illustrates the trend in murder and three other categories of major crimes. In 2005, the 1674 murders (or 64.10 per 100,000 inhabitants) placed Jamaica at the virtual pinnacle among top countries in this category. For 2009, with a minimal change in the total population which stood at an estimated 2.7 million,<sup>5</sup> the number of murders reported by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) stood at 1680 (see Table IV.1) – a new record high number or a rate of approximately 60 persons per 100,000. Moreover there was an increase in the total crimes committed for that year. The statistics drawn from the *Economic and Social Survey – Jamaica, 2009* (PI OJ, 2010) show that, of the four categories of major crimes listed, there were notable increases in the 2009 figures in three (murder, shooting, robbery), but a significant reduction in one (rape and carnal abuse) compared with 2008 (*ESSJ-2009*).

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<sup>5</sup> In the provisional estimate offered in the *Economic and Social Survey – Jamaica, 2009* the figure for that year was given as 2.698.8 million (Selected indicators ii) (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2010).

Table IV.1. Jamaica - Major Crimes by Number for Selected Years

Crime	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	TOTAL
<b>Offences Against the Person (Major Crimes)</b>						
Murder	1674 (64)	1340 (50)	1574 (59)	1618 (60)	1680* (62)	7886 -
Shooting	1646	1341	1441	1528	1665	7621
Rape and Carnal Abuse	1092	1142	1106	1459	1175	5974
Robbery	2210	2009	1598	2660	3003	11480

Source: *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2005, 2007, 2009.*

\*Update of preliminary figure. The figures in parentheses are the rounded figures representing murder rates for the respective years.

In 2009 a total of 28.8 per cent of murders were solved whereas in 2008 the proportion was 31.8 per cent.<sup>6</sup> In 2009 guns accounted for 76.9 per cent of the murders and gang-related occurrences were blamed “for 48.1 per cent of reported murders...” (*ESSJ 2009, PIOJ 2010, p. 24.5*). The Prime Minister, in a 2009-2010 contribution to Jamaica’s budget debate in parliament stated that the “inflow of guns into Jamaica is what facilitates most of the murders” and that the “overwhelming majority” of these weapons were “of US manufacture.” His government, he said, intended to “renew” its “efforts to strengthen bilateral cooperation with the US” in order to address “the flow of illegal guns from the US to Jamaica with the same vigour that we seek to apply to the flow of illegal drugs from Jamaica to the US” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2010, p. 28).

Parliament hastily passed six controversial anti-crime bills on June 22, 2010 (JIS, June 23, 2010) following a major standoff between the security forces and criminal elements in the Tivoli Gardens section of the Prime Minister’s Western Kingston constituency. In the events leading to the declaration of a state of emergency in the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew which was later extended to sections of neighbouring St. Catherine, dissidents opposing the extradition of area strongman, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, to the US to face drug and gun running charges, set fire to several police stations and they later burnt the nation’s largest agricultural produce market located in the vicinity. Altogether, 74 persons – mainly civilians – were killed in the ensuing battle. The effort was extended and gained wide support as a move to intensify the campaign against gangs and other violent criminal elements in the society. The events of that period of social unrest underlined questions regarding the links between politics and criminal activity.

Following the mid-year 2010 unrest and more intense operations by the security forces the police reported in early August that for July 2010 the number of murders fell to 84, a drop of 48 per cent when compared to the July 2009 figure of 160. Notable reductions were also reported for other major types of crime such as rape (37 per cent) and robbery (43 per cent). A notable element in a subsequent report in August was that 149 police personnel (or almost as many as the number for the twelve months of 2009) had been removed from the Jamaica Constabulary Force in the period from January to July 2010 in a continued anti-corruption campaign.

Historically crime and violence have been partly associated with gangs and the affiliation of some of these gangs to political parties – a connection and proliferation that became increasingly prominent in

<sup>6</sup> For major crimes overall, the 2009 clear-up rate was 22.5 percent (*ESSJ 2009, xiii*).

the post-independence years. These links were particularly highlighted in the politically and ideologically polarized environment of the 1970s when the development of ‘garrison’ constituencies – typically led by ‘dons’ or political henchmen – and bloc voting for a particular political party changed the landscape of crime. Subsequent evolution of gangs resulted in organized networks which perpetuate increased levels of organized criminal activities. The structure has shifted in part based on enlargement of sources of sustenance. Activities in more recent times embrace the illicit drug trade and money laundering and by extension, turf war, extortion, and reprisal killings. As the state fails to make good on its economic and social responsibilities, citizens in garrison communities have largely shifted their loyalty to area ‘dons’ to fill their needs. ‘Dons’ oftentimes provide financial support, employment and security. The scenario is one that has been raised by academics (e.g., separate contributions by Meeks, Harriott, and Chevannes in a 2001 journal collection) and the wider civil society over the years.

Indeed, Jamaica is known as a trans-shipment port for drug smuggling from South America to North America and Europe. Associated closely with the illicit drug trade is the importation and trade of illegal weapons which facilitate the criminal enterprise. Income from the trade helps to sustain criminal networks and may be used to corrupt key institutions such as the police force and public officials (Harriott, 2002). Somewhat related to this is the removal from the Jamaican police force, in the period January to July 2010, of 149 members (a number similar to that for the entire twelve months of 2009) in a continuing anti-corruption campaign. As the then leader of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party, Bruce Golding stated in 2005, “there is a low level of trust in the police force” (Golding, in *Jamaica: The way forward*, 2005, p. 11)

While Jamaica suffers from high levels of criminal activity generally such activity has been concentrated in particular locations, mainly urban areas of the country such as sections of Kingston and other sections of the Kingston Metropolitan Region – some sections of southern St. Andrew and St. Catherine – as well as parts of the ‘second’ city, Montego Bay (Figure IV.1).




Figure IV.1. Homicide Hot Spots in Jamaica, 2007 - 2009

During the period 1998-2002, 76 per cent of homicides occurred in Kingston (Lemard & Hemenway, 2006), “the high concentration of the incidents of violent crime in the Kingston ghetto communities is hardly a chance occurrence” (Harriott, 2001, p. 59). Specifically, crime is rampant in areas where poverty is pervasive and offenders and victims are typically undereducated and unskilled young males (Harriott, 2008). Policing in these inner city or ghetto communities is also made difficult due to a culture of silence, gang members’ resistance and the poor state of infrastructure that inhibits access in some areas. The overall environment is complicated by other factors and Harriott’s note in reference to the “crisis of public safety” retains significant currency:

*...the profound nature of the crisis is expressed not simply in the extraordinarily murder rate and rate of violent crimes more generally, or the declining level of confidence in the police force and criminal justice system, but in the development of alternate institutions for dealing with the acute problems of social violence, including self-policing and informal ‘community courts’ that exercise a wide range of punishment options. (Harriott, 2001, p. 58)*

Meeks, in the same collection with Harriott, notes that at “the community level, the dependence on the don for social welfare has grown exponentially. At the level of justice, the disconnection from the formal justice system takes two forms: For those living in the downtown ghettos, the justice of the dons is increasingly more available and reliable. For those living in the fortress-like middle-class townhouse complexes a similar reliability is to be found in the justice and efficiency of the fast-response guard services.” He argues that this “disconnection from the law and from official society” accelerates the “downward spiral” (2001, p. 14). Negative implications for democratic governance are inherent in the observations which point to a receding state with declining social capital.

We start our analysis with a focus on Jamaica’s crime problem. Analyses involve an evaluation of the extent of crime victimization and the development of a profile of likely victims of criminal acts. An examination of the issue of perceived insecurity follows, concluding with an attempt to establish the extent to which victimization and sense of insecurity affect citizens’ support for a stable democracy

### 4.2.3. Measuring of Crime Victimization

In previous LAPOP surveys, the level of crime victimization was estimated on the basis of a response to the item: *Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this year’s study, based on a series of experimental studies conducted by LAPOP that show that new wording helped increase the validity of the responses, this question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. In addition, items related to the place where the crime occurred were added. Responses to this item and other victimization-related questions are analysed below.

### 4.2.4. Extent of Crime Victimization in Jamaica

We start our examination of the crime problem in Jamaica by analysing responses to the item:

**VIC1EXT.** Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?



When asked if they have personally been the victim of any criminal act (named in the preceding question) in the past 12 months, only 10 per cent of those interviewed answered affirmatively (Figure IV.2).




Figure IV.2. Respondents Victimized by Crime in Jamaica, 2010

As has been the case in the two previous LAPOP surveys, reported level of crime victimization is curiously low. With media reports and official crime statistics indicating an island-wide trend of increasing incidence of virtually all types of serious criminal offences, it might have been expected that the current rate of victimization would have been much higher than previous years. However, as illustrated in Figure IV.3, based on respondents account of their personal experience with crime, the victimization rate for 2010 is only marginally higher than 2008, at exactly the same level of 2006 and in correspondence with rates for as far back as the mid-1990s (Harriott et al, 1996).




Figure IV.3. Crime Victimization in Jamaica: 2006-2010

The Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank recently observed that:

*...in Jamaica a lower percentage of crimes are reported to the police in areas with higher crime rates. The reporting rate can plausibly be interpreted as a measure of confidence in the police, as people will be more likely to report when they trust the police and believe they will respond. Lack of trust and confidence in the police is then lower in areas with higher local crime rates. This suggests also that official police data distort the true geographic profile of crime, because official data are biased downwards for higher crime areas.*

It is therefore widely held that properly designed surveys should provide more accurate estimates of national crime rates. Hence LAPOP's effort to better account for levels of victimization by adding two additional crime-related items to the 2010 questionnaire. The first inquires about victimization within the respondents' household and the other about place of victimization.

**VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?  
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

**VIC2AA.** Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[**Read options**]  
 (1) In your home  
 (2) In this neighbourhood  
 (3) In this Parish  
 (4) In another Parish  
 (5) In another country  
 (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer (99) N/A

Figure IV.4 shows results relating to the item on household victimization. Level of exposure to crime on this measure remains low. Just over 14 per cent of respondents reported being affected by crime either personally or having someone in their household either being victimized.




Figure IV.4. Individual and Household Crime Victimization, 2010

When asked to denote the place of victimization, about 32 per cent reported that they experienced the criminal act at home and 31 per cent said it happened in their community (Figure IV.5).




Figure IV.5. Place of Respondent's Crime Victimization, 2010

Examined comparatively, the crime victimization rate in Jamaica is curiously low (Figure IV.6). It is noteworthy though that whereas Jamaica ranks high in the world's top tier and atop at least the rest of the insular Caribbean in terms of the murder rate it has tended to rank below many other countries, including major liberal democracies such as the US and the UK with regard to overall crime rate. Indeed, in an undated article (World Crime and Murder Trends [WCMT], 2010), Dominica with a given general crime rate of 114,000 crimes per million inhabitants, was listed as the world leader ahead of New Zealand (106,000, second), Finland (102,000, third), Denmark (93,000, fourth), Chile (88,000, fifth), the UK (86,000, sixth) and the US (80,000, eighth) in an early 2000s assessment. Jamaica was listed in thirty-seventh place (14,000). The article states that the explanation may be found partly in the observation that countries such as Jamaica and Colombia (which also has had a high murder rate but comparatively low general crime rate) "have a high amount of drug related crime" which often goes unreported and unrecorded and by its nature often lead to disputes and...murder." In addition, some offences that are considered criminal in some countries are not categorized as criminal in others (WCMT, 2010).

As Figure IV.6 indicates, Jamaica is ranked with Guyana and Panama at the bottom of the chart, with these countries reporting similarly low crime rates of nine and eleven per cent respectively. At the top end of the chart is Peru with a rate of 31 per cent and Ecuador and Venezuela with 29 and 26 per cent respectively




Figure IV.6. Percentage of People Victimized by Crime across the Americas, 2010

#### 4.2.5. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Jamaica

It has been argued that Jamaica’s crime problem is predominantly an inner-city phenomenon, a possible explanation for a curiously low national victimization rates in the LAPOP and other studies of the problem over the years. We examined the extent to which this data set supports this and some other hypotheses on crime and violence in Jamaica by creating a regression model, comprising the independent variables shown in FigureIV.7 Each ‘dot’ indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable and the 95 per cent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an “I”, placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal “I”s) that intersect the blue line are not significant predictors ( $p < 0.05$ ) of the probability of being a victim of a crime. If the dot is located to the right of the vertical blue line, that means the variable has a positive

contribution and, if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. The dependent variable is dichotomous, with categories of being a victim or not being a victim of a criminal act. Detailed outcomes of this analysis are tabulated in Appendix 4, Table IV.A1, at the end of this chapter.

Interestingly, none of the socio-economic, demographic or perception variables included in the model worked out to be statistically significant factors in predicting the likelihood of being a victim of crime in Jamaica. Wealth and age are presumed to have the strongest net effect but are statistically insignificant.




Figure IV.7. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Jamaica

### 4.3. Perception of Insecurity

A large proportion of Jamaicans are preoccupied with crime. The spiralling crime threatens the security and the overall well-being of citizens. In a previous LAPOP study (2008), 62 per cent of Jamaicans identified security related fears associated with crime as the major problem Jamaica faces. More recently, a Jamaica Gleaner commissioned poll conducted by Bill Johnson, found that 58 per cent of Jamaicans reported crime and violence as their number one concern, above unemployment (24 per cent). Notably, pervasive fear and anxiety seems to not only stem from the violence itself but perhaps also from the lack of confidence and distrust in relevant institutions such as law enforcement to protect citizens while adequately addressing crime. Reports claiming police abuse of power, corruption and disregard for citizen rights have increased over the years. Between 2000 and 2007, 1422 citizens were killed by police officers. Some cases suggest strong evidence of the use of excessive force by police officers resulting in extrajudicial killings. However, flawed investigations, corruption and a failing judicial system have granted officers impunity (Amnesty report, 2008). Furthermore, despite the increase in crime statistics, law enforcement has failed to be effective in solving the majority of criminal cases, as evidenced by the extraordinarily low ‘clear-up’ rate on for reported offences over the years.

In an effort to obtain citizens’ assessment of their vulnerability to crime and violence at both the national and the community level, respondents were asked to answer the following questions:

**AOJ11.** Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?

**AOJ11A.** And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? **[Read the options]**

(1) Very much            (2) Somewhat        (3) Little            (4) None    (88) DK        (98) DA

The distribution of responses on these items is depicted in Figure IV.8. Nearly 78 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. Only six per cent of the sample considered their neighbourhood to be very unsafe. However, virtually the entire population is concerned about the potential destructive impact of crime on their well-being. Ninety-nine per cent of the citizenry perceive the current state of disorder as a threat to the nation’s well-being.




Figure IV.8. Sense of Security/Insecurity among Jamaicans

### 4.3.1. Comparative Perspective on Perception of Insecurity

So whereas sense of insecurity at the national level has been exceptionally high, increasing perception of insecurity at the community level has remained curiously low over the years. In other words, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level but are overly preoccupied with the impact of crime at the national level. Figure IV.9 shows that there has been an appreciable decline in perception of insecurity in Jamaica since the 2006 study.




Figure IV.9. Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica: 2006-2010

From a comparative perspective at the level of the Americas, sense of insecurity in Jamaica is quite low (Figure IV.10). Residents feel nearly as safe in their neighbourhoods as citizens in countries such as United States, Canada and Costa Rica, even though these countries have considerably lower crime rates. Of course, there are contextual dimensions to sense of security. This raises questions about parity in sense of safety in cross national terms. In other words, is feeling ‘unsafe’ in Jamaica the same as feeling ‘unsafe’ in the US, Canada or Costa Rica? Citizens of Peru, Argentina and El Salvador perceive the highest sense of insecurity in the Region.






Figure IV.10. Perception of Insecurity across the Americas

### 4.3.2. Conclusion

In this section, it was assumed that crime victimization and to a lesser extent, fear of crime or sense of insecurity might negatively impact citizens’ embrace of tolerance, erode social capital, and drive citizens to lose confidence in their political institutions. These experiences are also presumed to lessen citizens’ belief in some key democratic values such as right to due process and the supremacy of the rule of law, and in turn, weaken citizens’ support for a stable democracy.

It was observed that for most of this first decade of the twenty-first century Jamaica has attracted the reputation of being one of the foremost ‘high crime’ societies of the world, due particularly to its alarmingly high per capita homicide rates. Surprisingly low levels of overall crime rate reported by

various studies over the years have, understandably, raised doubts about the accuracy of crime statistics. Indeed, the value of murder rate as a measure of a country's crime and insecurity situation can hardly be discounted given that significant levels of underreporting are not likely to be the norm for this most extreme category of crime ; hence, the popularity of murder statistics in defining the country's crime and security profile.

As in the two previous LAPOP surveys, the crime victimization rate was found to be relatively low, albeit showing a statistically insignificant increase over the rate for 2008. Of note also is the finding that the intensity of national insecurity (that crime threatens the country's well-being) differs significantly from local sense of insecurity (the feeling of insecurity at the community level). Nearly 78 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. Only six per cent of the sample considered their neighbourhood to be very unsafe. However, virtually the entire population expressed their concern about the potential destructive impact of crime on the national well-being. Ninety-nine per cent of the citizenry perceive the current state of disorder as a threat to the nation's future. In essence, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level, despite the fact that nearly 63 per cent of those who reported being victims of a crime said they were attacked in their neighbourhood.

Analysis to determine who were most likely to be victims of crime revealed that none of the socio-economic, demographic or perception variables considered were statistically significant factors in predicting the likelihood of being a victim of crime in Jamaica. Wealth and age were found to have the strongest net effect but were both statistically insignificant.

## **4.4. Corruption**

### **4.4.1. Theoretical Background**

With the changed global political configuration marked by the end of the Cold War and the rise of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has emerged as one of the principal policy concerns of international politics and individual states (see Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999; see also Doig & McIvor, 1999; World Bank). Inquiries and revelations relating to corruption have been a prominent feature in public debate as well as in the parliaments and other political foray in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Frequently defined as the use of public resources for private gain, or otherwise as the "misuse of entrusted power for private benefit" (see Transparency International 2000 p.1), corruption was endemic in Latin America during the Region's long period of authoritarian rule. Media exposure and public debate were, however, constrained by censorship and safety concerns under such rule. The shift in the political culture to a more pervasive democratic environment in most of the countries in the Region has led to more open coverage and discussion of the issue.

Economists have noted over the years the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing awareness of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and its negative

impact on the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2006). The executive summary to Transparency International's (TI) *Global Corruption Report 2009* (which is said to be founded on the work of scores of experts) describes corruption as "a central and growing challenge for business and society...all over the world" (Executive summary xxiv). The summary points to the finding that "business continues to play a very exposed role as the supplier of corrupt payments to civil servants, members of government and political parties" (xxiv) and noted that whereas it is appropriate for businesses to communicate with representatives and officials in the political realm there is the concomitant "risk...that powerful private sector players capture policies and governments and profoundly thwart democratic decisions, posing a significant threat to accountable and inclusive governance everywhere." The summary cited case studies from Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh, Germany and Malaysia that pointed to "a precariously close nexus between private business and public institutions" and added that corruption affects "costs", raises "uncertainties" and exposure to "extortion", increases cost of "access to capital", undermines "company valuations" and "staff morale" while generally corroding business "success" and "legitimacy" (2009 xxvii). These sorts of themes resonate in various studies that focus on or otherwise raise the issue of corruption.

In the case of Jamaica, political regimes have been "rapidly losing their legitimacy, and this has been undermined by their long history of corruption in elections" (Lindo 2002: 66) and "both the economic and political elite are implicated" in the misuse of funds "and other types of corruption" (Harriott 2001 58). More recent works have pointed to the continuation of this tendency and media offer substantive reports in an atmosphere in which freedom of the press is notable.

Of course, it is difficult to measure corruption and so, for example, the 2008 LAPOP survey focused on citizens' perception of the extent of corruption, and, prevalence of corruption victimization (which is measured via citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals). Jamaica ranked very high at 86 on a corruption perception index ranging from 0 – 100 or top among the 22 participating countries in 2008, making it "the country with the highest level of citizens' lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials in the Region" (LAPOP 2008, Executive summary xxvi).

The Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in June 1997 and in December of that year, the OECD as well as representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe, including Central and Eastern European countries, adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and this was followed by the Global Coalition for Africa's adoption of "Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries" in February 1999.

Today's context which is characterized by markedly increased emphasis on corruption and its prevention stands in sharp contrast to that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices attracted relatively little attention from the governments of Western democracies. In addition, multinational corporations from many industrialized countries saw the offer and acceptance of bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Under the 'old order' of years ago, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

Generally, specific national anti-corruption strategies must be formulated to fit "the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it," a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook suggests. The handbook recommends a series of

initiatives to address official corruption founded on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.” Effective initiatives should therefore rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented by societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions” incentives.”<sup>7</sup>

#### 4.4.2. Examining the Problem of Corruption in Jamaica

In this effort to better understand the nature and scope of corruption in Jamaica, we attempted to determine the extent of this problem, firstly, in terms of citizens’ perception of its magnitude, and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens’ direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. This is followed by a more rigorous analysis of the data, including the development and testing of regression models with the aim of identifying the factors that might influence corruption perception and victimization and ultimately, examining the impact of these factors on the prospect for a stable democracy in Jamaica.

We begin our examination of this problem with a focus on perceptions about corruption among the populace.

#### 4.4.3. Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption in Jamaica

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica in the ranks of the highly corrupt nations of the world. Most notable are the Transparency International’s (TI) series of surveys which assign participating countries a rating on its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on “the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians”. Scores can range from ‘0’ signifying very high level of perceived corruption, to ‘10’ indicating no perceived corruption. On this index, Jamaica has been accorded a ‘highly corrupt’<sup>8</sup> designation every year since it was first included in these TI series of surveys in 2002. In fact, as Table IV.2 shows, the country’s corruption situation is perceived to have progressively worsened over the years, indicated on the one hand, by an overall slippage in the index from a rating of ‘3.7’ in 2006 to ‘3.0’ in 2009, and on the other, an effective decline in Jamaica’s world ranking from 61 in 2006 to 99 in 2009.

**Table IV.2. Transparency International’s CPI and Country Rank, Jamaica 2006 - 2010**

<b>Year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
CPI Score	3.7	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.3
Rank	61	84	96	99	87

Admittedly though, high levels of corruption perception might not necessarily be indicative of widespread actual corruption. Nonetheless, the perception of the integrity of a country’s political and

<sup>7</sup> USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Centre for Democracy and Governance ([www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html](http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html)) February.

<sup>8</sup> Countries obtaining scores of less than ‘5’ are classified as ‘highly corrupt’.

other public officials is a critical requirement for good democratic governance. In this regard, corruption perception has routinely been a topic of interest in the *AmericasBarometer* series of studies.

To measure citizens’ perception of the magnitude of corruption in the different countries, responses to the following question are analysed:

**EXC7** Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public officials: (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon?

Figure IV.11 shows the distribution of responses for this item in the case of Jamaica. Consistent with the findings of the previously discussed TI studies, and with anecdotal evidence from prevailing public discourse on the issue, the perception that corruption is commonplace in public life in Jamaica continues to be widespread. Of the nearly 94 per cent of respondents who considered it to be pervasive, 53.4 per cent perceived corruption as being very common. Only six per cent of those responding to that question considered it to be uncommon (4.5 per cent) or very uncommon (1.5 per cent).




Figure IV.11. Perceptions of the Magnitude of Corruption, 2010

#### 4.4.4. Comparative Perspective on Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

Citizens will invariably perceive some amount of corruption in their country’s public affairs. In the case of Jamaica, however, the percentage of the population with the perception that corruption is widespread is alarmingly high. In order to facilitate easy year-to-year and country-to-country comparisons, the information depicted in FigureIV.11 was reconfigured on a 0 – 100 point scale, on which 0 indicates no perceived corruption and 100 means the perception of widespread corruption. On this scale, Jamaica registered a score of 81.7 points, signifying a very high level of corruption perception among the citizenry but without statistically significant changes over a four year period. As Figure IV.12

shows, nonetheless, this measure represents a marginally lower perception level than what was reported in 2006 and 2008.




Figure IV.12. Perception of Corruption in Jamaica: 2006-2010

The perception of corruption by Jamaicans in relative terms is further highlighted in the display of comparative data on this corruption indicator for the Americas. As illustrated by Figure 0.13, among the twenty-five countries that participated in the 2010 LAPOP survey, Jamaica is positioned virtually at the top of the chart, registering the second highest level of citizens' lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials among these countries. Trinidad and Tobago was ranked above Jamaica, recording a score of 83 on the 100-point scale while Canada and Suriname fall at the bottom of the chart with scores of approximately 58 and 51 points respectively.




Figure IV.13. Perception of Corruption across the Americas, 2010

Indeed, the fundamental concern should be with actual corruption. Often though, individuals' decisions and actions are influenced more by perception than by reality. An understanding of the dynamics of citizen's perception of the problem is, therefore, critical to an appreciation of the overall effect of corruption on the different dimensions of a country's political culture. With this in mind, we sought to further our grasp of the issue by establishing the distinguishing characteristics of those persons who perceive corruption to be 'very common' as opposed to those who perceive little or no corruption. In other words, the objective here was to identify the factors which explain why citizens living in the same country and sometimes even in the same community, can have such differing perception of the magnitude of corruption in public affairs.

Accordingly, further analysis of the data involved the design of a linear regression model comprising of selected socio-economic and demographic variables that might influence such perception. Summary statistics relating to the solution of this equation are presented in Table IV.A2 in the appendix at the end of this chapter. Coefficients with an asterisk (\*) superscripted to their right distinguish factors that are statistically significant predictors. Given the pervasiveness of the perception problem in the population, only one of the independent variables – a person’s perception of family’s economic well-being worked out to be a statistically significant determinant.

Figure IV.14 provides a graphical presentation of key aspects of the information contained in Table IV.A2. Each ‘dot’ indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable and the 95 per cent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an ‘I’, placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal ‘I’s) that intersect the blue line are not significant predictor ( $p < 0.05$ ) of citizens’ perception of corruption. In this case, the coefficient for ‘perception of family’s economic well-being’ is located completely to the left of the zero line, signifying a negative and statistically significant net impact on citizens’ perception of corruption while wealth is to the right of the line indicating a positive net effect.




Figure IV.14. Determinants of Perception that Corruption is Widespread, Jamaica, 2010

Figure IV.15 illustrates the relationship between the evaluation of family’s economic situation and perception of the prevalence of corruption in the society. Citizens who are most dissatisfied with their family’s economic well-being are much more likely to express the opinion that corruption is widespread in society. As indicated by the shape of the line, however, there is no appreciable difference in corruption perception among those assessing their family’s economic situation to be inadequate or those who are moderately satisfied with their economic situation. And as shown in chart 2, persons in the third quintile of wealth perceive more corruption than those in all other quintiles.






Figure IV.15. Perception of Corruption by Evaluation of Family's Economic Situation

## 4.5. Corruption Victimization

Corruption victimization measures are useful in determining the actual state of corruption in the different sectors of society. They are based on ‘experienced based indicators’ thus seeking to capture “citizens’ firm actual participation in corruption, such as bribe giving or bribe taking” (UNDP, 2008 p. 9)<sup>9</sup>.

### 4.5.1. Measuring Corruption Victimization

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in Seligson, (1999) and Seligson (1997) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

<sup>9</sup> UNDP (2008). A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption.

The complete series of items that were used to determine the extent of citizens’ experience with corruption is shown in Box IV.1. Items EXC11 to EXC16 are applicable only to subjects who are employed, who have had contact with the specified agencies or who have accessed particular government services while EXC2, EXC6 and EXC17 were pose to all respondents.

**Box IV.1. Corruption Victimization Items**

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC6.</b> In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC11.</b> In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the Parish Council office? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC13.</b> Do you work? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC14.</b> In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC16.</b> Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Admittedly, corruption defined in terms of ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’<sup>10</sup> may involve acts such as illicit enrichment, influence peddling and indeed, any form of improper payment or demand for such payment. However, as the scope of the afore-stated items (Box IV.3) indicates, corruption in this study is operationalized narrowly in terms of victimization, or the number of acts of bribery faced by the respondent in the twelve months preceding the survey.

<sup>10</sup>Transparency International.(2007). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved September 1, 2008 from [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)

### 4.5.2. Corruption Victimization in Jamaica

We start by measuring corruption victimization simply in terms of whether people have been victimized by corruption or not and then by an index of corruption victimization which summarizes observations pertaining to the seven acts of corruption (EXC 2 – EXC 16) specified in Box IV.1. Responses to these items were initially captured in the form of a 0 to 7 points scale. In creating the index, however, the relatively few responses that were located at the sixth and the seventh points on the scale were collapsed into the fifth, resulting in a new five-point scale. This corruption measure was calibrated to treat all victims of corruption equally, not taking into consideration the number of times the person was victimized. In this regard, the unit of analysis was people who had at least one experience with corruption during the previous twelve months.

Figure IV.16 shows results in response to this series of questions. In light of the forgoing evidence of exceptionally high levels of corruption perception among Jamaicans, it is reasonable to presume the existence of a comparably high number of individuals acknowledging direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals in the population. However, as can be seen in Figure IV.16, less than eight per cent of those observed reported to have been exposed to some form of corruption.




Figure IV.16. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, Jamaica, 2010

### 4.5.3. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

Examined comparatively from a cross-national perspective (Figure IV.17), Jamaica is ranked at the bottom of the chart with countries such as the United States and Canada on this measure. Canada registered the lowest corruption level, only 4.2 per cent of the population acknowledging being a party to a corruption transaction, with Chile, United States and Uruguay being the other countries obtaining better scores than Jamaica. Respondents in Haiti, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru reported the highest levels of

experience with corruption in the Region, the only nations with victimization rate of more than 30 per cent.




Figure IV.17. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective, 2010

#### 4.5.4. Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Results of a linear regression model designed to establish the factors that determine the likelihood that an individual might be a victim of corruption are graphically presented in Figure IV.18. Again, independent variables that are statistically significant predictors are identified by confidence intervals (the horizontal “T”s) that do not intersect the blue zero line at the centre of the chart. In this regard, three factors were found to be significant predictors at a  $p < 0.05$  level of significance – region and wealth with a positive coefficient, and gender with a net negative potential impact(See Table IV.A3 in Appendix 4).




Figure IV.18. Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Jamaica? (2010)

As illustrated by Figure IV.19 males are three times more likely to be victimized than females. And when the percentage of the population that reported being victimized by corruption was cross-tabulated with the wealth variable<sup>11</sup>, the positive relationship between the two factors is quite obvious. Wealthier persons are much more likely to have direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals than the less wealthy. Persons of the third to fifth quintiles are at least two times more likely to be victimized than those in the first quintile.




Figure IV.19. Corruption Victimization by Gender and Wealth in Jamaica, 2010

<sup>11</sup> In this analysis, wealth is used as a proxy variable for socio-economic status (SES).

#### **4.5.5. Conclusion**

Corruption is presumed to progressively weaken the institutional foundation on which economic growth and social justice depend, causing institutional inefficiency and, in turn, the distortion of development priorities and outcomes. Furthermore, corrupt undertakings are inherently antithetical to the rule of law in that they pervert the basic citizens' right principles of equity, equality and right to due process. Over time, pervasive corruption is assumed to erode political legitimacy and, in turn, increases the prospect for democratic instability.

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica in the ranks of the highly corrupt nations of the world. Most notable are the Transparency International's (TI) series of surveys which have accorded Jamaica a 'highly corrupt' designation every year since it was first included in these TI series of surveys in 2002. On this measure, the country's corruption situation is perceived to have progressively worsened over the years, indicated on the one hand, by an overall slippage in the index from a rating of '3.7' in 2006 to '3.0' in 2009, and on the other, an effective decline in Jamaica's world ranking from 61 in 2006 to 99 in 2009.

In this study, the problem was assessed in terms of citizens' perception of its magnitude, and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. It was found that citizens' perception that corruption is widespread in the public sphere is exceptionally high in absolute as well as in comparative terms. On LAPOP's 100 point scale, on which 0 indicates no perceived corruption and 100 means perceived widespread corruption, Jamaica registered a score of 81.7 points, signifying a very high level of corruption perception among the citizenry but without statistically significant changes over a four year period, 2006 - 2010. Among the 25 countries that participated in the 2010 LAPOP survey, Jamaica is positioned virtually at the top of the chart, registering the second highest level of citizens' lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials among these countries. Trinidad and Tobago was ranked above Jamaica, recording a score of 83 on the 100 point scale while Canada and Suriname fall at the bottom of the chart with scores of approximately 58 and 51 points respectively.

#### **4.6. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy**

As argued in the introductory section of this chapter, crime or the fear of crime might have the effect of undermining tolerance, increasing mistrust among citizens and, in turn, eroding social capital in society. Crime victimization or the fear of crime could also make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation or may cause them to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary.

Corruption is presumed to yield a plethora of pernicious outcomes which serve to compromise the effectiveness of democratic governance. Inter alia, it is presumed to undermine the rule of law, decreases levels of confidence in democratic institutions, and erodes system support which, in turn, increases the prospect for democratic instability.

With these assumptions in mind, we created and analysed a regression model designed to examine the substantive consequences of crime, insecurity and corruption on citizens' support for a democratic system of government in Jamaica. The list of control variables along with regression results are displayed in Figure IV.20. All three factors - crime victimization, perception of corruption and perception of

insecurity were found to be negatively related to support for the political system. However, crime victimization was not a statistically significant determinant of citizens' level of system support.




Figure IV.20. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in Jamaica, 2010

As Figure IV.21 depicts, the higher a person's sense of insecurity the greater the probability that such an individual will not be very supportive of the political system. Similarly, increasing perception that corruption is widespread among society's elected and other public officials is likely to be associated with declining levels of support for the system.




Figure IV.21. Impact of Perception of Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in Jamaica, 2010

Other variables from the model that were statistically significant were employment status, wealth, interest in politics and satisfaction with the performance of the current Prime Minister. As Figure IV.22 shows, persons who are temporarily unemployed, those who assumingly lost their jobs as a result of the economic crisis are likely to exhibit lower level of system support than those of other employment statuses. And as has been the case with most other democracy indicators, wealthier persons are generally more supportive of the system.




Figure IV.22. Impact of Employment Status and Wealth on System Support in Jamaica, 2010



Chart 1 in Figure IV.23 shows the linear relationship existing between citizens’ perception of the performance of the incumbent Prime Minister and support for the system. As depicted, persons who are positive in their assessment of the performance of the Prime Minister are more likely to be supportive of the political system. Also, the higher a person’s level of interest in politics, the higher the probability that such an individual will be supportive of the political system (Chart 2).




Figure IV.23. Impact of Satisfaction with Performance of PM and Interest in Politics by System Support in Jamaica, 2010

#### 4.7. Support for the Rule of Law

A concern in many developing countries is the rule of law and the impact it has on democracy and economic development. However, the term “rule of law” is rather complex, has no precise definition, and can vary across countries and legal traditions (Rosenfeld, 2001). Most definitions, however, centre around three approaches: formal characteristics, substantive outcomes or functional considerations. The formal definition refers to explicit criteria of the law or legal system such as an independent and impartial judiciary; laws that are public; absence of laws that only apply to specific individuals or classes; absence of retroactive laws; and provisions of judicial review of government actions. A substantive definition is an approach that looks at outcomes such as fairness and justice. This approach is driven by the “goodness” or morality behind a strong legal system and measures the rule of law to the extent that the system estimates this ideal. Lastly, the functional definition focuses on how well the law and legal system perform particular functions, typically constraints of government discretion and making legal decisions predictable or both (Stephenson, 2003).

A democratic government is strongly rooted in the rule of law. In fact, it is believed that both are prerequisites for economic development. In a USAID article, the relationship between the rule of law and democracy is demonstrated “the rule of law is the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy. A free

and fair political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and the courts, and economic development all depend upon accountable governments, fair and accessible application of the law, and respect for international human rights standards”.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless although the rule of law is seen as necessary for an effective democracy, it is still uncertain what specific characteristics the rule of law must possess and the role it plays in fostering a legitimate democracy. Closer scrutiny may in fact reveal a non-harmonious relationship (Rosenfeld, 2001).

In general the rule of law ensures that there is preference for law and order that citizens are governed and subjected to laws rather than political caprice. Furthermore, the rule of law reigns over government, with the principle that no one is above the law (Rosenfeld, 2001). However, Jamaica has shown a trend that is unfavourable to the realities of the rule of law, particularly regarding civil human rights. There also seems to be a disparity between the theory and practice of the rule of law as carried out by institutions critical to the concept, including law enforcement, prisons and courts. Although there may be strong support and effort from relevant institutions and stakeholders for the rule of law in a particular jurisdiction, a multiplicity of underlying difficulties such as the country’s economic condition, political culture, and culture of security and justice agencies sometimes make the rule of law a popularly espoused principle rather than reality (Griffith, 2001).

In Jamaica, in the context of the serious crime problem, there have been reports of increasing incidents of vigilante attacks and the excessive and sometimes deadly use of force by the police in treating with alleged offenders. These developments have led many to question the level of commitment of Jamaicans to the principles of rule of law and the right to due process. In this section we examine attitudes relating to these rights, deemed fundamental to any democracy. To determine the extent to which Jamaicans recognize and support these principles, we analysed responses to the following question:

**AOJ8.** In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or occasionally, they can operate at the margin of the law?  
(1) They should always respect the law  
(2) Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally  
(88 )Doesn't Know                      (98) Doesn't Answer

Results presented in Figure IV.24 indicate a very strong support for the rule of law among Jamaicans, with about 77 per cent of the populace expressing the opinion that the law should always be obeyed.

<sup>12</sup> <http://law.du.edu/documents/djilp/38No3/Astrada-Final.pdf> (p. 3).




Figure IV.24. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Jamaica, 2010

Figure IV.25 shows statistically significant fluctuations in levels of support for the rule of law in Jamaica from 2006 to 2010. The 10 per cent decline over the last two years is assumingly indicative of citizens’ frustration with the failure of the authorities to curb the escalating crime problem and a growing tendency on the part of some segments of the society to support the use of ‘whatever means necessary’ to deal with the problem.




Figure IV.25. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Jamaica by Year

Despite an appreciable decrease in levels of support for the rule of law in Jamaica in recent years, respect for this principle remains comparatively high in relation to the other countries participating in the 2010 round of LAPOP survey. As Figure IV.26 shows, with 76.7 per cent of Jamaicans supporting the right to due process, only Belize at the top of the chart with 78.4 per cent scored higher on this measure. At the other end of the list are Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru with less than 50 per cent of their population supporting complete compliance with the laws in all circumstances.




Figure IV.26. Percentage Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Comparative perspective, 2010

### 4.7.1. Impact of Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law

Results of a linear regression model designed to establish the impact of crime victimization and sense of insecurity on citizen’s level of support for the rule of law are graphically presented in Figure IV.27. Again, independent variables that are statistically significant predictors are identified by confidence intervals (the horizontal “I”s) that do not intersect the blue zero line at the centre of the chart. In this regard, crime victimization was found to be a significant predictor at a  $p < 0.05$  level of significance. Perception of insecurity has a net negative but not a statistically significant effect.




Figure IV.27. Determinants of Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Jamaica, 2010

As Figure IV.28 shows the assumption that persons who were the victims of a crime within the past twelve months would be less inclined to advocate for strict compliance with the law in fighting crime was supported by the data. Individuals who reported being victimized within the past year are likely to be less supportive of the principle of the rule of law.




Figure IV.28. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law by Crime Victimization

Other significant factors were age and trust in the justice system. Both coefficients are positive indicating that older persons and those with greater confidence in the justice system are more likely to believe that the rule of law should always be upheld. As can be observed from the frequency polygon in chart 2 (Figure IV.29), the impact of trust in the justice system is somewhat ambiguous. The positive impact of trust is likely only among persons with high level of confidence in the justice system.




Figure IV.29. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law by Age and Trust in Justice System

#### **4.7.2. Conclusion**

Jamaica, it has been observed, quite often shows a tendency for certain practices deemed unfavourable to the rule of law, particularly regarding observance of civil human rights in areas such as law enforcement and the prison system. Nonetheless, the analysis of responses to questions aimed at determining the extent to which there is recognition and support for this important democratic principle found very high respect for the rule of law among Jamaicans, with about 77 per cent of the populace expressing the opinion that there should always be full compliance with law in all circumstances. Despite an appreciable decrease in levels of support in recent years, respect for this principle remains comparatively high compared to the other countries participating in the 2010 round of LAPOP surveys. Only Belize with a score of 78.4 per cent outperformed Jamaica on this measure.

Most significantly, it was found that citizens' exposure to crime significantly influence their support for the rule of law. Individuals who reported being victimized within the past year are likely to be least supportive of the principle of the rule of law. Perception of insecurity has a net negative but not a statistically significant effect.

## Appendix Chapter IV

**Table IV. A1. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Jamaica, 2010**

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Education	-0.041	(-0.36)
Female	-0.021	(-0.20)
Age	-0.221	(-1.94)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.173	(-1.55)
Size of place	-0.076	(-0.23)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.041	(0.37)
Surrey (except KMA)	0.307	(1.18)
Middlesex	0.251	(0.72)
Cornwall	0.242	(0.78)
Constants	-2.208*	(-18.13)
F = 1.66		
Number of cases = 1355		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV.A2. Factors Determining Perception of Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Linear Regression**

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.095*	(-2.38)
Education	0.027	(0.71)
Female	0.005	(0.20)
Age	-0.045	(-1.31)
Quintiles of wealth	0.075	(2.11)
Area Size	-0.060	(-0.45)
Number of Children	0.027	(0.71)
Surrey (except KMA)	-0.038	(-0.39)
Middlesex	0.059	(0.40)
Cornwall	0.088	(0.70)
Constant	-0.011	(-0.24)
R-Squared = 0.018		
Number of Observations = 1334		
* p<0.05		



**Table IV.A3. Factors Determining Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Logistic Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>t</b>
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.060	(0.47)
Education	0.180	(1.20)
Female	-0.610*	(-5.07)
Age	0.071	(0.55)
Quintiles of wealth	0.291*	(2.19)
Size of place	-0.623	(-1.90)
Number of Children	-0.249	(-1.81)
Surrey (except KMA)	0.280	(1.13)
Middlesex	0.703*	(2.11)
Cornwall	0.667*	(2.37)
Constant	-2.709*	(-23.42)
F = 5.79		
Number of Observations = 1355		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV.A4. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in Jamaica**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Crime Victimization	-0.033	(-1.58)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.111*	(-3.43)
Per cent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.048	(-1.70)
Perception of Corruption	-0.119*	(-4.46)
No Economic Crisis	-0.042	(-1.88)
Blame the Previous Government	0.037	(0.88)
Blame the Economic System	0.064	(1.63)
Blame other Instances	0.029	(0.77)
Temporarily Unemployed	-0.080*	(-2.61)
Unemployed	-0.027	(-0.93)
Own Decision not to Work	-0.020	(-0.60)
Family Member Lost Job	-0.005	(-0.17)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.043	(1.31)
Education	-0.057	(-1.48)
Female	-0.029	(-1.08)
Age	0.034	(1.20)
Quintiles of wealth	0.136*	(3.76)
Size of place	-0.049	(-1.15)
Satisfied, Performance Current Prime Minister	0.236*	(8.20)
Interest in Politics	0.148*	(4.88)
Constant	-0.012	(-0.31)
R-Squared = 0.181		
Number of Observations = 1228		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV.A5. Factors Determining Support for the Rule of Law in Jamaica – Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>t</b>
Crime Victimization	-0.176*	(-2.69)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.042	(-0.73)
Trust in Justice System	0.192*	(2.83)
Education	-0.108	(-1.08)
Female	0.142	(1.89)
Age	0.249*	(2.94)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.019	(-0.26)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.065	(-0.84)
Area Size	0.148	(0.62)
Surrey (except KMA)	-0.028	(-0.18)
Middlesex	-0.229	(-0.91)
Cornwall	-0.235	(-1.03)
Constant	1.262*	(15.92)
F = 6.53		
Number of Observations = 1288		
* p<0.05		



## Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

### 5.1. Theoretical Background

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>1</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy<sup>2</sup>. In the preceding chapter, we examine political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by LAPOP, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

### 5.2. The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In *AmericasBarometer* studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the Region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy.<sup>3</sup> The framework shown in Table V.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

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<sup>1</sup>Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

<sup>2</sup> James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence. "Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory With a Survey-Based Experiment." *Political Research Quarterly* 58, no. 2, 2005: 187-201; John A. Booth, and Mitchell A. Seligson. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Democracy and Political Support in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson. Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America. *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11 (2), 2000.

**Box V.1. Items used in System Support Index**

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial?(**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?

**Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities**

System Support (i.e., Legitimacy )	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights are likely to enjoy stable democracy.<sup>4</sup>

When system support remains high but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in

<sup>4</sup> Robert A. Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

situations of low support and low tolerance, the eventual outcome tends towards democratic breakdown. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. However, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown as they create an environment in which elites recognize that either a coup will be tolerated, supported or opposed by the public.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.<sup>5</sup>

### 5.3. Support for the System in Jamaica

In order to measure system support, an index was created on the basis of the analysis of responses to items presented with instructions in Box V.1<sup>6</sup> above. It is a composite indicator which is designed to capture the key dimensions of support for the political system – respect for or confidence in political institutions, pride to live under the current political system, belief that the courts guarantee a free trial, belief that basic human rights are protected and support for the political system on the whole. As previously stated, it is a generalized measure of system support, developed by Mitchell Seligson of LAPOP<sup>7</sup> and based on Easton's notion of 'diffuse support'<sup>8</sup> and Lipset's conceptualization of 'legitimacy'<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> John A Booth, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." In *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*, eds. Carlos E. Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas and Javier Hurtado. México: FLACSO - Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991: 628-81; John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica." In *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 107-38; Mitchell A. Seligson, and John A. Booth. 1993. Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. *Journal of Politics* 55 (3): 777-92.

<sup>6</sup> This index has been widely used to measure system support and its validity and reliability have been repeatedly confirmed. In terms of reliability, for example, Cronbach's Alpha has always been above the .70 threshold. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha was .79.

<sup>7</sup> See Mitchell A. Seligson, 'On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico.' *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983b): 1-24.

<sup>8</sup> Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset defined legitimacy as 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society. (*Political man: The social basis of politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981, p.77. Simply put, it is citizens' confidence in their government right to rule.

Figure V.1 summarizes the outcomes relating to respective institutions and democratic values, and the resulting system support index.<sup>10</sup> Looking at the items individually, only support for the political system and confidence in the country’s political institutions received average scores that were above the 50-point mark. Respondents’ evaluation of the extent to which basic rights are protected and their pride in the political system obtained scores of below 45 points and the resulting system support index was just under 49 on the 100 point scale.




Figure V.1. Average Scores in System Support Items and Index, Jamaica 2010

### 5.3.1. Comparative Perspective on System Support

This measure of 48.6 points on the Seligson’s 100-point index represents a moderate decrease in citizens’ support for the system since 2008 but is similar to what was obtained in 2006. As Figure V.2 shows, there was a decline in average support on all five components of the system legitimacy indicator between 2008 and 2010. Interestingly, citizens’ assessment of the extent to which the political system protects the basic rights of citizens was the most unfavourable for the three rounds of surveys which raises questions about the efficacy of the nation’s human rights instruments and institutions in the guaranteeing of citizens’ basic rights and privileges.

<sup>10</sup> The familiar seven-point scale was used to capture respondent’s attitudes on each item. The system support index was obtained by aggregating the average variable value of each of these items, calculating the mean, and then re-calibrating the obtained average on the 0-100 metric scale.




Figure V.2. Comparative Average Scores in System Support Items and Index by Year

Figure V.3 shows comparative system support information for Latin American and Caribbean countries that participated in the 2010 LAPOP study. Jamaica's 48.6 points score places it close to the bottom of the chart, unlike previous years when the country was ranked among the highest performing nations on this measure. At the top of the list is Uruguay with a relative high score of 68 points followed by Costa Rica with 63 points and Honduras with 60 points. Haiti received the lowest score on this indicator, behind Argentina, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago.






Figure V.3. System Support in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## 5.4. Tolerance

### 5.4.1. Theoretical Background

By definition, tolerance is the willingness to recognize and respect the civil liberties of fellow citizens, even those with whom there is strong disagreement. Citizens must exhibit a sufficiently high level of tolerance for a democracy to function harmoniously and remain as a cohesive political community. This is not saying that tolerance is a prerequisite for stability. In fact, a society can remain stable for an extended period of time although there is a high degree of intolerance in the population. Rather, an indicator of the level of tolerance is a useful measure of the strength of a democracy, which in

turn may have implications for the consolidation of the democracy itself and the stability of the system on the whole. As argued in Seligson (2004):

*Tolerance is indispensable (in) socially, economically, culturally, and politically diverse and plural societies: while in the political sphere persons belong to the same community of citizens – all with equal rights - in the rest of their social life individuals belong to very different, unequal and even disconnected worlds. Tolerance is, to a certain extent, the adhesive that binds society (in) to the political community. (p.36)*

Tolerance is crucial to the maintenance of a democracy. It is central to the process of conflict resolution - in arriving at compromise in an environment of competing views and interests. A vibrant democracy depends on the input of those with opposing positions. The extent to which the system entertains and protects the rights of those holding differing positions determines the viability of opposition groups. A strong opposition is essential to the democratic process. Hence in this study, we assess the extent to which Jamaicans are tolerant of the positions of others, especially those that are unpopular and are held by minorities.

Indeed, the intense partisan political conflicts that have characterized the Jamaican political landscape for the past several years are primarily the result of a failure on the part of some individuals to accept the right of others to the party affiliation of their choice. There has, nevertheless, been a remarkable improvement in the sense of tolerance among the various political groups and factions in recent times. However, the noticeable pervasion of social intolerance among the populace has been a cause of great concern. Social tolerance is concerned with respect for the personal choices and lifestyles of others rather than with their acceptance of the right to participate in political activities. Our focus here is on political tolerance as defined above.

#### 5.4.2. Measuring Political Tolerance

A number of measures have been developed to estimate levels of tolerance in a society. The Latin American Public Opinion Project approach involves the use of the four core questions shown in Box V.2 below. Responses were located on a 1-10 scale (later recalibrated into a 0-100 scale):

##### **Box V.2. Core Questions Used to Measure Level of Tolerance among Jamaicans**

- |  |
|--|
| <b>D1.</b> There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's <b>right to vote</b> ? Please read me the number from the scale: [ <i>Probe: To what degree?</i> ] |
| <b>D2.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed <b>to conduct peaceful demonstrations</b> in order to express their views? Please read me the number.   |
| <b>D3.</b> Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted <b>to run for public office</b> ?   |
| <b>D4.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television <b>to make speeches</b> ?  |

Respondents' attitudes to these dimensions of political tolerance are summarized in Figure V.4. The analysis of responses on an item by item basis indicates that Jamaicans are basically tolerant of the political rights of fellow citizens.




Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance in Jamaica, 2010

Figure V.4 shows the indicators of political tolerance and the average level of tolerance (centre bar) among the citizenry. As the values on respective bars indicate, the right to protest received the highest level of approval, approximately 67 out of the possible 100 points. This is followed closely by the right to vote with just over 64.4 points. Respondents were less supportive of persons’ right to use the public media to express opposing views and their right to seek public office, with the latter falling below the 50-point mark.

A political tolerance index was created by aggregating the average response value of each of these items, calculating the mean, and then re-calibrating the resulting average on the 0-100 metric scale. The resulting tolerance index<sup>11</sup> for Jamaica worked out to be 58.5 points on this scale.

### 5.4.3. Comparative Perspective on Political Tolerance

Viewed in relation to the remarkably high index of 72.7 reported in the 2006 survey, this 2010 score of 58.5 represents a substantial decline in political tolerance among Jamaicans over a four-year period(Figure V.5). This 2010 level of tolerance is, however, comparable with that of 2008. Of note though, is the fact that the 2008 survey was conducted in the midst of a prolonged election campaign - shortly after a fiercely contested general parliamentary election and within weeks of the local government elections. At that time, party identification remained strong and partisan political tension was understandably, quite high in some areas. It is possible, therefore, that the increased intolerance in that 2008 round was largely the result of the timing of the survey. Some two years after the elections, nevertheless, the level of tolerance remains comparatively low, compared to the 2006 results on this issue.

<sup>11</sup> The average score of these items have been confirmed to represent a reliable measure of political tolerance, yielding a Cronbach alpha of .87 with regards to this sample.




Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in Jamaica by Year

Despite a substantial decline in the level of political tolerance among the citizenry over the past four years, the level of tolerance in Jamaica remains moderately high when compared to the other Latin American and Caribbean countries participating in the 2010 series of survey. As depicted in Figure V.6, Jamaica obtains a median score on this measure, with the United States and Argentina at the top of the list with scores of 70.4 and 67.3 points respectively. Haiti and El Salvador recorded the lowest scores of 43.4 and 45.1 points respectively.




Figure V.6. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 5.5. Level of Support for a Stable Democracy in Jamaica

As previously indicated, the ultimate goal of our analysis in this section was to assess the joint effect of system support and political tolerance in determining the prospect for the stability of Jamaican democracy. Both variables are dichotomized by recoding their 0-100 scales into two categories of ‘Low’ which includes all scores on the original scale which were equal to or less than 50 and ‘High’ to include all cases above 50.

Results from the cross-tabulation of the dichotomized system support and the political tolerance index for Jamaica are displayed in Table V.2. Citizens whose attitudes and values are reflective of their support for a stable democracy, that is, those with high system support matched by high tolerance, are just under 30 per cent of the citizenry. Ideally, this segment of the population should, at least be a simple

majority. In this case, however, it is less than one-third of the four groups. At the other extreme, those who exhibit low support for basic political institutions and equally low respect for the basic rights of minorities (classified in cell 4) account for just over 21 per cent of the population. Theoretically, this one-fifth of the population harbours attitudes and values that might have the effect of undermining democratic stability. This is, indeed, a relatively large group to which much attention should be paid because it means that one in five Jamaicans have expressed their lack of support for the extant political system and are likely to be inclined to accept its substitution for some alternative regime type in which basic rights and liberties are abridged.

Where system support is high but tolerance is low, as represented by the 16 per cent in cell 2, the system may remain stable due to the influence of strong citizen support. However, democratic rule may be compromised by the restriction of certain rights and liberties of minorities in attempts to appease the majority or simply to protect the regime from oppositional activities. So despite an environment of pervasive democratic attitudes, an authoritarian regime may develop, characterized by stability but also by widespread violation of civil liberties

Approximately 34 per cent of the population, those tabulated in cell 3, is characterized by high levels of tolerance but low system support. Theoretically, low levels of legitimacy are linked to instability. However, the concurrence of high levels of political tolerance among these individuals are positive for system durability since the prevalence of values and attitudes that are respectful and supportive of the positions of minorities could mean that opposition forces are afforded greater opportunities to agitate, which might eventually lead to the deepening of democracy. It is notable that this group has recorded the highest per cent change since the 2008 study – a 10-point increase in two years. This might help explain the growing visibility of civil society and political groups advocating for change in the way political affairs is conducted.

**Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Jamaica, 2010**

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	(1) Stable Democracy 29.4%	(2) Authoritarian Stability 15.9%
Low	(3) Unstable Democracy 33.5%	(4) Democracy at Risk 21.2%

**5.5.1. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective**

Assessed comparatively, firstly on a year-to-year basis, Figure V.7 shows that the proportion of citizens whose values and attitudes in support of a stable democracy has declined from 36 per cent of the population to just over 29 per cent since 2006.




Figure V.7. Support for Stable Democracy by Year

Figure V.8 shows that ranked on the basis of the proportion of citizen exhibiting the values and attitudes that are presumed to be supportive of a stable democracy; Jamaica is located at the middle of the chart with a score of just over 29 per cent. Interestingly, in 2008 Jamaica was out-performed by only four other nations in the Region, with Canada then at the top of the list with and exceptionally high 66.6 per cent. In this 2010 study, Uruguay is at the top of the list with only 49 per cent, Canada is at 4<sup>th</sup> place with 45 per cent and Jamaica now takes the 11<sup>th</sup> spot. Costa Rica and Uruguay have maintained their high ranking on this democracy measure, remaining in the top three as in the 2008 survey. At the bottom of the list are Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Haiti all with less than 20 per cent.




Figure V.8. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 5.5.2. Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy

In an attempt at deepening our understanding of political tolerance in relation to democratic stability, we did additional analysis to determine the distinguishing characteristics of those individuals in the category whose attitudes were established to be conducive to the support of a stable democracy. Here the dependent variable is binary - the recoded ‘support for a stable democracy’ indicator – where category ‘1’ is comprised of those who support stability and category ‘0’ of those classified in the other three categories – those who are not strong supporters of a stable democracy. In the analysis, we utilized a logistic regression model made up of the independent variables displayed in the regression chart below



(Figure V.9). The factors found to be statistically significant determinants of citizens' support for a stable democracy were perception of corruption and perception of insecurity, interest in politics, and satisfaction with the performance of the current Prime Minister and wealth.




Figure V.9. Who is more likely to Support Stable Democracy in Jamaica?

The graphical presentation of the cross-tabulation of the statistically significant factors in the respective charts in Figure V.10 illustrates the positive relation between interest in politics and wealth and the negative influence of corruption perception and sense of insecurity on system support. As indicated in a previous section, there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy. However, as with other countries in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*, we find that wealthier persons are more supportive of a stable democracy in Jamaica. And as in the case of other key democracy indicators, the greater citizens interest in politics, the greater their support for a stable democracy. The corrosive effect of corruption and insecurity on democratic support is highlighted in chart 1 and 4 respectively. Persons who perceive corruption to be widespread in public affairs and those harbouring a high sense of insecurity are less likely to have the values and attitudes indicating their support for a stable democracy.




Figure V.10. Support for Stable Democracy by Perception of Corruption, Wealth and Perception of Insecurity

Citizens who believe that their government and its officials are performing well may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. One of the questions we sought to answer in the analysis of this model is: How do citizens' perceptions of the performance of the Prime Minister in the handling of the country's economic crisis impact their support for a stable democracy? Figure V.11 shows that those evaluating the Prime Minister's performance to be very good are twice as likely to support a stable democracy as those who assess it to be very bad.




Figure V.11. Support Stable Democracy by Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current PM

### 5.6. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

It is widely acknowledged that the degree of confidence that citizens place in their democratic institutions determines the character of political actions and outcomes in the respective country. Indeed, questions about the relationship between citizens’ confidence in their political institutions and the durability of the democracy in which they live have been extensively addressed in studies of political culture over many years. And in virtually all the studies reviewed, there has been strong support for the notion that the level of popular acceptance of the legitimacy of societal institutions is indicative of the strength of the support for the system overall and, in turn, a good measure of the prospect for the stability of the democracy. Indeed, if citizens have confidence in the institutions and instruments of the system, there is a greater likelihood they will respect and accept the right and authority of the State. In other words, the more they trust the institutions and instruments used in the promotion of democratic norms, the more they will be inclined to perceive the decisions of the State as legitimate (Weatherford 1992).

So theoretically, confidence in the political system, to a great extent, originates from confidence citizens place in social and political institutions and political actors. Such trust is developed on the basis of the evaluation of the efficacy of these entities based on societal expectations. This evaluation might not automatically generate a political response but can translate into attitudes of confidence or distrust (Easton 1975). It is the character of a prevailing attitude – positive or negative - that influences the support that citizens give to the institution or politician, which in turn, can potentially be changed into action. It follows therefore that confidence in political actors helps to consolidate and deepen the democratic process. Further, as Mishler and Rose (1997) posit, confidence engenders ‘collective power’ which enables the state to make decisions and allocate resources without the use of force and without the need to obtain the permission of the citizenry for every course of action.

Consequently, as in previous *AmericasBarometer* series of surveys, this 2010 study sought to track citizen confidence in a wide variety of democratic institutions. The issue of generalized system support was explored earlier in this chapter. In this section, we provide an overall picture of the legitimacy of the entire range of institutions covered in the 2010 survey.

We do this by asking respondents to express their level of confidence in key institutions in Jamaica. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of questions requiring respondents to locate their trust in selected institution on a 1-7 scale on which ‘1’ indicates no trust at all and ‘7’ a lot of trust.<sup>12</sup>

### 5.6.1. Support for Key Institutions in Jamaica

Figure V.12 shows that the sense of trust in public institutions among Jamaicans is generally low. Of the eleven organizations observed in this year’s survey, only four organizations received average support of above 50 on the 100-point scale. The army and the mass media enjoy the highest level of trust, scoring approximately 66 and 61 points respectively. Other institutions receiving marginally above 50 points were the Electoral Office and Supreme Court. The institutions in which citizens expressed least trust are the Police and political parties, having received mean scores of about 33 and 34 respectively.




Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions in Jamaica, 2010

<sup>12</sup> Please see items used in the questionnaire in Appendix III.

Further analysis of the issue of trust in institutions involved the tracking of changes over time, from the 2006 to the 2010 waves of survey. As Figure V.13 shows, citizens' trust in most of the key institutions had increased marginally between 2006 and 2008. This rise in confidence was assumingly related to the promise of improved governance associated with the election of a new political administration, given that this survey was done just three months after the General Elections and less than a month following the parochial polls. The results show, however, that there was a trend of declining confidence in 2010, with only the Army receiving an appreciable increase in support. Most notable are the 14-point and the 10-point decline in trust in the Prime Minister and the Police respectively since 2008.




Figure V.13. Trust in Institutions by Year in Jamaica

## 5.7. Attitudes towards Democracy

Norris (1999)<sup>13</sup> posits that studies aimed at measuring citizens' attitudes in support of the system should necessarily examine the extent to which there is popular support for the key principles of the regime type. Indeed, we have already determined that there is strong belief in some basic rules and values of democracy, in particular, the right to due process and the supremacy of the rule of law. Also questions relating to citizens' respect for the civil liberties and the political freedom of fellow citizens were extensively examined as part of the focus on the embrace of tolerance. In this concluding section of this chapter we further examine the issue of system legitimacy in Jamaica by analysing attitudes in support of democracy per se by exploring the degree to which democracy is valued as a form of government. We then examine citizens' perception of the efficacy of their democracy by obtaining their evaluation of the degree of democratization and their level of satisfaction with working of the system.

### 5.7.1. Support for Democracy

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the "Churchillean concept of democracy," as it comes from Winston Churchill's famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) "Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

In our attempt at gauging the level of support for the notion of democracy, we analysed responses to the following question:

**ING4.** Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

Respondents were required to locate their level of support for this idea of democracy as a preferred system of government on a 7-point scale. As shown in Figure V.14, seven out of ten respondents expressed very strong endorsement for the idea that democracy is next to none as their choice of government, by selecting 5, 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale, with the modal preference falling on the 7<sup>th</sup> point.

<sup>13</sup> Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.




Figure V.14. Citizens Level of Support for Democracy as the Ideal System of Government

The results above, configured into the 0-100 index used throughout this study, show a progressive decline in support for the ‘Churchillian’ concept of democracy over the three rounds of this survey (Figure V.15). Though the fall off in support was not statistically significant on a year-to-year basis. However, the seven point decline over the four year period is significant and a reasonable cause for concern.




Figure V.15. Support for Democracy in Jamaica by Year

Examined comparatively at a hemispheric level, Figure V.16 shows that at the high end of the chart, are seven countries, headed by Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Argentina in which support for this Churchillian notion of democracy is more than 75 on the 100 point scale. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement, Peru, Honduras and Guatemala, scored more than 60 points on this index.




Figure V.16. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010



### 5.7.2. Satisfaction with Democracy

Studies on political support in Western democracies have shown that it is not unusual for there to be a high level of support for notion of democracy in a particular country yet low satisfaction with the performance of democracy in that same country. Hence, the practice of some scholars to examine citizens' evaluation of the performance of a regime as separated dimension from that of their support for democracy as an ideal form of government.<sup>14</sup> In this study, respondents were asked to report their evaluation of the performance of the current regime in their answer to the following question:

**PN4.** In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is works in Jamaica?<sup>15</sup>

Figure V.17 summarizes the responses to this item. As shown, there are more Jamaicans who are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working than those who are satisfied. Of the nearly 56 per cent who expressed dissatisfaction, about 45 per cent reported being just dissatisfied while a more than 11 per cent reported being very dissatisfied. Only about four per cent expressed strong satisfaction with the performance of their democracy.




Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy in Jamaica, 2010

As with all other key democracy indicators, there has been a moderate decline in the overall level of satisfaction with the performance of Jamaican democracy on a biennial basis since 2006 (Figure V.18).

<sup>14</sup> See the discussion of Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 'Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis, in Norris (1999).  
<sup>15</sup> This question has been extensively used to measure support for the performance of democratic regimes. In addition to the many LAPOP studies, it has been used in regional democratic values surveys such as the Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and the Latinobarometer.




Figure V.18. Satisfaction with Democracy in Jamaica by Year

Comparatively, Jamaica with its score of 45.3 is ranked among the ten countries with less than 50 points on this support for democracy measure, scoring higher than other Caribbean nations such as Haiti, at the bottom of the chart with 37.8 points, and Trinidad and Tobago having a similar score as Peru of 44.7 points. Uruguay, Panama and Costa Rica are at the upper end of the chart each with scores above 60 points (Figure V.19).




Figure V.19. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## 5.8. Conclusion

As discussed in the theoretical sections of this chapter, pervasive society-wide attitudes and values reflecting citizens’ propensity for political tolerance and the broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy. In this section we examined selected attitudes, behaviours and values of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. The ultimate objective was to establish, on the basis of these measures, the extent to which the country’s democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

Significantly, it was found that since 2006 there has been a progressive albeit moderate decline in prospect of the democratic stability in Jamaica. This was influenced primarily by a statistically significant decline in political tolerance over the four year period. In 2010, only 29.4 per cent of the citizenry were

categorized as being supportive of a stable democracy, on the basis of their high support for the system and correspondingly high levels of tolerance. This is compared to 36.2 per cent in 2006. When this is viewed with further findings of appreciable decline in other key democracy indicators, measures such as support for democracy, institutional trust and citizens' level of confidence in the way their democracy works, it is reasonable to conclude that the economic crisis might in fact be impacting democratic stability in Jamaica quite negatively.

It seems though that in comparative terms, the prospects for democratic stability in Jamaica remain somewhat favourable despite these declining measures. When ranked with other Latin American and Caribbean countries on the support for stable democracy indicator, Jamaica obtained a median score or a middle of the chart rank among the 25 countries participating in the 2010 round of surveys. Interestingly, in 2008 Jamaica was out-performed by only four other nations in the Region, with Canada then at the top of the list with an exceptionally high 66.6 per cent of its people being supportive of a stable democracy. In this 2010 study, Uruguay is at the top of the list with only 49 per cent of its population manifesting the requisite democracy-oriented attitudes and values, Canada is now at 4<sup>th</sup> place and Jamaica takes the 11<sup>th</sup> spot with 45 and 29 per cent respectively.

## Appendix Chapter V

**Table V.A1. Factors Determining Citizens' Support for a Stable Democracy in Jamaica – Results of Logistic Regression**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Crime Victimization	-0.015	(-0.23)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.213*	(-2.24)
Corruption Victimization	-0.016	(-0.20)
Perception of Corruption	-0.238*	(-3.57)
No Economic Crisis	0.027	(0.44)
Blame the Previous Government	-0.032	(-0.32)
Blame the Economic System	0.116	(1.13)
Blame other Instances	-0.099	(-0.97)
Temporarily Unemployed	-0.098	(-1.16)
Unemployed	0.058	(0.81)
Own Decision not to Work	0.029	(0.43)
Family Member Lost Job	0.157*	(2.30)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.062	(-0.70)
Education	0.067	(0.67)
Female	-0.092	(-1.36)
Age	0.170	(1.89)
Quintiles of wealth	0.364*	(3.56)
Size of place	-0.099	(-0.84)
Satisfaction with Performance Current President	0.240*	(2.80)
Political Interest	0.198*	(3.21)
Constant	-1.010*	(-9.52)
F = 4.96		
Number of Observations = 1219		
* p<0.05		

## Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

### 6.1. Theoretical Background

It is widely argued that the active participation of citizens in the organizations of civil society is critical to the building and maintenance of a strong and stable democracy (Burns, 2001; Crotty, 1991; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Putman, 2000; Shlozman, 1999; Vargas-Cullell & Rosero-Bixby, 2004). This assertion of a link between the level of citizen's involvement and the well-being of a democracy can be traced back to the 19th century in the works of theorists such as James Madison (*The Federalist*), Alexis de Tocqueville (*Democracy in America*), and John Dewey (*School & Society*). It is Pierre Bourdieu, however, who has been credited for introducing the contemporary usage of the term 'social capital' (Everingham, 2001)<sup>1</sup> in describing the aggregate involvement of individuals in community groups and organizations and the collective actions that evolve from such association. James Coleman and Robert Putman later popularized the concept in their promotion of the idea of building social capital as a way of enhancing political institutional performance and in turn, fostering social and economic development.

Despite the problem of slightly differing definitions among theorists in their use of the term social capital, it is generally accepted that the concept subsumes notions of interpersonal trust - the "strong and pervasive norms of reciprocity", impenetrable and strong social networks – these which must operate at the family, community and national levels, and a strong sense of personal worth (Putman, 2005). So, unlike other forms of capital that are located in the actors, social capital is located "in their relations with other actors" (Coleman, 1988). From a Caribbean viewpoint, Thomas (1996, p. 16) argues that social capital embodies:

*...those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society which promotes development for the collective whole. These means and processes serve to: reduce costs or impediments to social interaction (e.g., self-help); advance the pursuit of the collective aspects of social development (e.g., empowerment); engender social bonding (e.g., courtesy, devotion, trust, confidence, respect for laws, and regulations and others)...*

In this chapter we assess the state of democracy in Jamaica from this Tocquevillean perspective, by examining the popularity of selected associative activities that are proposed to contribute to the building of a nation's stock of social capital. Our emphasis is on the key dimensions of social capital – civic participation and interpersonal trust.

### 6.2. Civil Society Participation in Jamaica

We begin our examination of social capital by analysing self-reported levels of participation in various community-based group activities in Jamaica.

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<sup>1</sup> Bourdieu places the source of social capital, not just in social structure but in social connections (Portes, 1998).

### 6.2.1. Measuring Civil Society Participation

Over the years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with items from a standard battery of questions shown in Box VI.1 below. These items, known as the CP series (as in “community participation”) are used to provide a comprehensive scale of civic involvement and consequently, exclude participation in political party organizations, which is examined in the section on political participation. The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 metric scale to generate an overall index of the level of participation each respondent has in all the organizations listed below.<sup>2</sup>

**Box VI.1 Survey Items used to Measure Level of Participation among**

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]							
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Doesn't Know	Doesn't Answer	
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP20. [Women only]</b> Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...?	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

As Figure VI.1 shows, attendance at meetings of religious organizations recorded the highest average participation of 48.5 per cent, followed by a distant 22.8 per cent for those attending parent teacher association meetings. As is the case universally, church attendance is an importance ritual in the practice of religion. Relatively high level of attendance to church-related functions is a manifestation of the significance of religion in the lives of the Jamaican people.

<sup>2</sup> The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and taking the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don't know to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.




Figure VI.1. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Jamaica, 2010

Interestingly though, as illustrated by Figure VI.2, participation in the different civil society organizations are on the decline. Most remarkable is the 16 per cent fall in attendance to religious events over the period from 2006 to 2010. Despite the pervasiveness of the perception of a serious economic crisis, and the prevalence of experiences to support this perception, it is apparent that rather than seeking solace in religion as might be expected, Jamaicans are otherwise occupying their time in dealing with the challenges of ‘hard times’.






Figure VI.2. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations by Year in Jamaica, 2010

### 6.3. Protest Participation as an Indicator of Social Capital

Level of community activism, measured in terms of participation in protests and public demonstrations was also examined as a dimension of social capital in Jamaica. When asked the following question, only about three per cent responded in the affirmation (Figure VI.3).

**PROT3.** In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?  
 (1) Yes [Continue]                      (2) No [Go to JC1]                      (88) Doesn't Know [Go to JC1]  
 (98) Doesn't Answer [Go to JC1]




Figure VI.3. Citizens' Participation in Public Protest and Demonstration within the Last Year

### 6.3.1. Participation in Protest in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.4 shows the ranking of countries in the Region on this measure of community activism. Jamaica and Guyana fall at the bottom of the chart with less than four per cent of respondents acknowledging their involvement in public protest and demonstration within the last twelve months. Ranked at the top of the chart are Haiti and Argentina with 17.2 and 15.4 per cent respectively.




Figure VI.4. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective, 2010


## 6.4. Interpersonal Trust

In the preceding sections, we examined citizens’ involvement in community activities as an indicator of social capital. Social collaboration among neighbours is, however, highly dependent upon the extent to which community members trust each other; hence there is a focus on the issue of inter-personal trust in this section of the report. In order to measure this dimension of social capital, respondents were asked:

**IT1.** Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**

- (1) Very trustworthy      (2) Somewhat trustworthy      (3) Not very trustworthy  
 (4) Untrustworthy      (88) Doesn't Know      (98) Doesn't Answer

As indicated by Figure VI.5, community members generally trust one another, with 68 per cent expressing confidence in persons in their neighbourhood. Only about eleven per cent of respondents described community members as being untrustworthy.



**Figure VI.5. Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2010**

As can be seen in Figure VI.6, interpersonal trust levels have remained relatively stable over the past four years, showing only a marginal decrease between the 2008 and the 2010 survey periods.




Figure VI.6. Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica by Year

Figure VI.7 shows how Jamaica fares in comparison to other countries in the Hemisphere on this issue of interpersonal trust. Responses were converted to the metric scale to facilitate easy comparison. On this scale, Jamaica falls in a group of twelve countries in the Region scoring in the 50-points range on this measure. Haiti, Peru, and Belize are at the bottom of the list with averages lower than 50 points and Costa Rica, Canada and the US are at the top with averages of about 70, 69 and 68 points respectively.




Figure VI.7. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 6.4.1. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

A linear regression model comprising of key independent variables was analysed to determine the factors that best explain a community’s inventory of inter-personal trust. Figure VI.8 shows the results of this analysis. Wealth, age and perception of insecurity were the only statistically significant factors.




Figure VI.8. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2010

Results of the cross-tabulation of interpersonal trust and the statistically significant factors are presented in Figure VI.9. As depicted by the charts, older persons and the wealthy, tend to be more trusting of their neighbours than those of lower age groups and those of the lower wealth quintiles, respectively. And also, the more secure people feel in their community the higher the level of interpersonal trust they will likely exhibit. Notably, average trust for individuals reporting they feel ‘very safe’ is more than two times higher than those who reported feeling ‘very unsafe’.




Figure VI.9. Interpersonal Trust by Age, Perception of Insecurity and Wealth

## 6.5. Conclusion

In this section we assessed the state of democracy in Jamaica from a Tocquevillean perspective by examining the popularity of selected associative activities and attitudes that are theorized to manifest the amount of a country's stock of social capital. Our focus was on the key dimensions of social capital – civic participation and interpersonal trust. The results showed progressive decline in the respective indicators of social capital since the 2006 survey. As has been the case in the two previous studies, participation in church-related events was by far the most common cooperative activity, followed by attendance at meetings of parent organizations. Notable, though, is the significant decline in participation in church activities over the last four years, from 64.6 in 2006 to 48.5 in 2010. With regard to interpersonal trust, citizens' level of confidence in their neighbour has remained relatively stable over the past four years albeit recording an appreciable decline in the 2010 study when compared to 2008. Age, wealth and citizens' sense of security in their community were found to be positively correlated with levels of interpersonal trust in society.



## **6.6. Electoral Participation**

In the preceding section it was found that citizens' participation in meetings of political organization was quite low when compared with the list of the civil society organizations comprising the CP series. In this section we further explore citizens' political activities by examining selected values and behaviour pertaining to public political participation, or what Dalton (2006) referred to as 'conventional political action' – activities such as voting, participating in political campaigns and interest groups, and other practices normally directly associated with partisan politics.

### **6.6.1. Voter Participation in Jamaica**

It has been widely acknowledged in discussions in comparative political science that the term democracy can be quite elastic and as a consequence, "can mean all things to all people" (Bratton, 2002, p. 6). Nevertheless, while the jury is still out on questions pertaining to what democracy really is, how it might be measured, and how to classify countries according to their levels of democracy, there is widespread acceptance of the suggestion that some basic conditions for a representative democracy are competitive elections, broad citizen participation, and the respect and protection of civil and political rights (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989). Indeed, free elections and inclusive citizenship should be considered among the basic elements of a political democracy (Dahl, 1999) since it is the mechanism through which the legitimacy of the regime is validated (Benavides et al., 2003).

In an earlier study in which Jamaicans were asked to define democracy, it was found that the word was predominantly conceptualized in normative terms. In other words, it is widely perceived in terms of generally accepted democratic practices such as elections and voting (Boxill, et al., 2006). It was also reported early in this document that Jamaicans overwhelmingly prefer the democratic system of government over all other regime types. Since the achievement of universal adult suffrage in the mid-1940s, the country has had an unbroken record of parliamentary elections in line with relevant constitutional and legislative guidelines. And as Table VIII.1 shows, with the exception of 1983, when the main opposition party, the People's National Party (PNP), boycotted the elections, average turnout of the electorate for national elections has exceeded 70 per cent of all eligible voters. This was true up to 1993 when the turnout fell below this mark and has averaged in the 60s since then

**Table VI.1 Actual Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Election in Jamaica, 1967-2002**

<b>Election Year</b>	<b>Percentage Voter Turnout</b>
	81.5
1972	78.2
1976	84.5
1980	86.1
1983	28.9
1989	77.6
1993	66.7
1997	65.2
2002	59.1
2007	61.5

*Source: Electoral Office of Jamaica, 2010*

Notwithstanding this trend of falling participation in elections, recent studies have found widespread recognition of the importance of the vote and the democratic process as a whole in Jamaica (Powell & Lewis, 2008). In this section we examine the extent to which these values are manifested by the political behaviour of Jamaicans with respect to the exercise of the franchise.

Firstly, the level of participation in the most recently held national election was determined by analysing responses to the following question:

**VB2. Did you vote in the last national elections?**

(1) Voted [**Continue**]

(2) Did not vote [**Go to VB10**]

(88) Doesn't Know [**Go to VB10**]      (98) Doesn't Answer [**Go to VB10**]

As Figure VI.10 shows, only approximately 57 per cent of the sample answered in the affirmative. It must be noted, however, that the last national political poll, immediately preceding this survey, was a parochial election, held to elect councillors for the Island's local authorities. These polls are traditionally characterized by lower voter turnout when compared to general parliamentary elections in which members for the House of Parliament are selected.




Figure VI.10. Electoral Participation

### 6.6.2. Electoral Participation in Comparative Perspective

The extent to which election type affects voter participation is illustrated by comparative turnout results shown in Figure VI.11. The polls immediately preceding the 2006 and the 2010 surveys were parochial elections while that of 2008 was a general election. Compared to the last parochial election, therefore, turnout for 2010 was relatively high.




Figure VI.11. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections by Year

From a comparative perspective on a regional basis, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Haiti reported the lowest turnout rate of below 60 per cent in the last elections, while participation rates for Ecuador, Uruguay and Chile were above 90 per cent (Figure VI.12).




Figure VI.12. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 6.6.3. Determinants of Voter Participation in Jamaica

Our attempt at determining the factors that influence voter participation among Jamaicans involved the development of a logistic regression since the dependent variable was dichotomous with categories of ‘voted’ or ‘did not vote’. The independent variables used in the model are shown (Figure VI.13). As the respective coefficients and the graphical presentation of the results indicate, age, wealth and interest in politics were the only statistically significant factors in this model.




Figure VI.13. Predictors of Voter Turnout in Jamaica

Studies on electoral behaviour, especially in the United States, have consistently found age to be a strong predictor of voter participation. However, as is the case in this study, the relationship is usually never linear. Rather, as indicated by chart 1 in Figure VI.14, younger and older persons are less likely voters, hence the inverted “U” shape of the graph. So as the figure depicts, the likelihood of voting increases with age until late adulthood, about when interest in voting begins to wane.<sup>3</sup>

Also, as might have been expected, interest in politics correlates positively with citizens’ likelihood of exercising their franchise. As chart 2 in Figure VI.14 shows, persons with greater interest in politics are much more likely to vote than those with little interest. Interestingly, the idea that less privileged groups vote less, a factor that is proposed to undermine the representation and interest of the poor (Lijpart, 1997) was not supported by the data. As chart 3 shows, on the whole, electoral participation decreases with wealth, except for the uppermost quintile which demonstrated higher turnout than the two preceding quintiles.

<sup>3</sup> See Seligson, Mitchell, A. et al. Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis. In: M.A. Seligson and J. Booth (eds.). (1995). *Elections in Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, cited by Ricardo Córdova M. and Miguel Cruz. *The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador*, 2004.




Figure VI.14. Electoral Participation by Age, Interest in Politics and Wealth

### 6.7. Ideological Orientation and Voting Behaviour

The impact of citizens’ ideological orientation on voting behaviour was found to be statistically insignificant in the above equation. Its positive coefficient indicates, however that right-leaning electorates are more likely to exercise their franchise, albeit not with a statistically significant difference. Ideological orientation was measured using the Left-Right ten-point scale shown in Box VI.2. Respondents were asked to locate their political leaning on the scale from 1 – 10, where 1 indicates left-leaning or liberal and 10 is right-leaning or conservative in terms of political sympathy.

#### Box VI.2. Ideological Orientation Item and Scale

**LI.** (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those who sympathize more with the left and those who sympathize more with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>DK(88)</b> <b>DA (99)</b>
<b>Left</b>									<b>Right</b>	

As Figure VI.15 shows, the political tendency of Jamaicans is mostly to the centre on the political spectrum, with a slight leaning to the right. The average ideological self-identification score is around 6 points on this Left-Right scale. This orientation has been constant since the 2006 series of surveys.




Figure VI.15. Percentage Distribution of Respondents on Left/Right Scale

With regards to the question of the relationship between self-ascribed ideological position and electoral behaviour, it can be observed in Figure VI.16 that the bivariate analysis of the two variables found absolutely no difference in the orientation of those who voted in the last election and those who did not.




Figure VI.16. Ideological Self-placement by Electoral Participation

### 6.7.1. Ideological Orientation and Party Identification

It is widely observed that the deep polarization of the electorate along ideological lines that characterized the Jamaican political landscape during the 1970s, where supporters of the PNP were predominantly left leaning and those supporting the JLP were mostly sympathetic to the right, is no longer visible. Currently, differences between the two major parties from the perspective of ideology and policy approaches are no longer easily identified. Yet it is widely argued that electorates' party identification tend to define their ideological orientation (Popkin, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Here we examine the extent of the relationship between these two factors.

Figure VI.17 shows that when party identification is cross-tabulated with ideological orientation, there is virtually no difference in the political leanings of the supporters of the two political parties. In this chart, the blue line indicates a national ideology score of approximately 5.8 on the Left-Right scale. The mean ideology scores for those who voted for the respective political parties contesting the last national election are indicated in the small box, with the 95 per cent confidence interval around that mean shown by the horizontally placed "I". Both parties recorded roughly the same score as the average national score on this scale, confirming the widely accepted view that the parties are currently quite similar in terms of their ideological orientation.




Figure VI.17. Ideological Self-placement of Voters by Party Preference

## 6.8. Interest in Politics and Political Activism

### 6.8.1. Interest in Politics in Jamaica

We start by comparatively assessing the level of interest that Jamaicans have in politics relative to that expressed in other countries in the Americas. Indeed, in a free society, and one in which the vote is optional, the level of participation in political events and activities should be driven, in part, by the degree



to which the populace is interested in politics. We explore levels of political interest by soliciting responses to the following question:

**POL1.** How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?  
(1) A lot    (2) Some    (3) Little    (4) None    (88) Doesn't Know    (99) Doesn't Answer

Responses to this question are summarized in Figure VI.18. About 34 per cent indicated that they have absolutely no interest in politics. Those reporting having a lot of interest were less than 10 per cent of the sample.




Figure VI.18. Interest in Politics in Jamaica, 2010

When responses were re-calibrated on the familiar 100-point scale, Jamaica obtained a relatively low political interest score of roughly 35 points, the lowest since the 2006 survey (Figure VI.19). It most noted, however, that historically in Jamaica interest in politics typically peak close to election. So the score of 45 points for 2008 might be explained by the fact that year's that survey was conducted just about four months after the 2007 General Elections and shortly before the Parochial Polls of 2008.




Figure VI.19. Interest in Politics in Jamaica by Year

On the whole, interest in politics is relatively low across the Americas. As shown in Figure VI.20, most countries are below the 50 point mark, and Jamaica is one of the seventeen countries in the 2010 study scoring less than 40 points on this measure. At the bottom of the chart are Guyana, Chile, and Haiti with 28 points each and at the top, leading other nations in the Region by far is the United States, followed by Uruguay and Canada, both with 50 points.




Figure VI.20. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 6.8.2. Political Activism

Political participation might be defined as the active engagement of citizens with public institutions, an activity which falls into three well-defined modes: voting, election campaigning and contacting or pressuring either individually or through group activity, including non-violent protests (Dalton 2006; Verba et al., 1978; Parry et al., 1992). In this section, we examine citizens' level of political involvement beyond the exercise of the franchise.

Notably, unlike some Latin American countries such as Peru, voting in Jamaica is by choice and is not mandatory under the law. As a consequence, political participation might involve simply trying to convince others to participate in the political process by casting their vote or working with particular

candidates to promote the vote and usually to channel it in a particular direction. To determine the prevalence of these types of political activism in Jamaica, we asked the following questions:

**PP1.** During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**  
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

**PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of [year]?  
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

Figure VI.21 shows a breakdown of the responses to the question about convincing others to vote. As can be seen in chart 1, only 23 per cent of respondents have participated in this activity, with just about five per cent reporting to have done so frequently.

Participation at a more public and partisan level, that of getting involved in the campaign of a particular candidate is even less common. As shown in chart 2, Figure VI.21, only about nine per cent of the sample has participated in such activities.




Figure VI.21. Political Activism in Jamaica, 2010

## 6.9. Electoral Participation and System Support

Higher levels of political participation are presumed to positively impact system support and ultimately increase citizens' support for a stable democracy. Figure VI.22 shows that the data confirm this hypothesis with regard to a relation between the vote and support for the system. Persons who voted in the last elections are more likely to have the values and attitudes that make them more supportive of the system.




Figure VI.22. Voting Behaviour by Support for the Democratic System of Government in Jamaica

### 6.10. Conclusion

Jamaica boasts a vibrant, uninterrupted multi-party representative democracy notwithstanding a history of systematic substitution between only the two major political parties since universal suffrage in 1944. Measured in terms of voter turnout, the electoral participation rates in Jamaica have historically been quite high, reported to have been as high as 87 prior to 1980 and consistently above 70 per cent up to 1993. Since the 1990s, however, the participation rates have averaged in the 60 per cent range. As explained previously, the 57 per cent turnout reported in this 2010 study represents participation in the parochial election of 2008 and not the last national parliamentary election of 2007 in which turnout was 65 per cent. Political participation measured in terms of citizens involvement in election campaigning and non-violent protest was found to be quite low when compared to other types of political activities.

Consistent with the literature, age was found to be the most influential determinant of voting behaviour and persons who voted were found to be more likely to embrace the values and attitudes that are assumed to be conducive to their support for a stable democracy.

## Appendix Chapter VI

**Table VI. A5 Predictors of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica**

Independent Variables	Coefficient	T
Crime Victimization	-0.038	(-1.11)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.350*	(-10.50)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.010	(-0.29)
Education	0.082*	( 2.16)
Female	0.019	( 0.84)
Age	0.174*	( 5.49)
Quintiles of wealth	0.085*	( 2.64)
Size of place	0.100	( 1.01)
Surrey (except KMA)	-0.026	(-0.36)
Middlesex	-0.087	(-0.79)
Cornwall	0.012	( 0.13)
Constant	-0.013	(-0.33)
R-Squared = 0.185		
Number of Observations = 1294		
* p<0.05		

**Table VI. A5 Predictors of Electoral Participation in Jamaica**

Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Political Interest	0.782*	(8.29)
Satisfied, Performance Current Prime Minister	-0.110	(-1.65)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.018	(-0.28)
Education	-0.045	(-0.49)
Female	0.078	(1.31)
Age	0.495*	(6.92)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.232*	(-3.15)
Size of place	0.348	(1.52)
Surrey (KMA)	-0.136	(-0.85)
Middlesex	-0.297	(-1.23)
Cornwall	-0.264	(-1.29)
Constant	0.407*	(5.52)
F = 12.40		
Number of Observations = 1317		
* p<0.05		



## **Chapter VII. Local Government**

### **7.1. Introduction**

The notion of “bringing the government closer to the people” through the decentralization of governmental resources, functions and responsibilities has been justified primarily on the understanding that the resulting closer proximity between the citizenry and local public officials should promote greater sensitivity, responsiveness and accountability in the delivery of public goods and services (USAID, 2000; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002; UNDP, 2002; Montalvo, 2009). As a consequence, efforts to strengthen governance across Latin America and the Caribbean have invariably involved a variety of measures designed to promote increased citizen participation in government at the local level. Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been active in promoting initiatives aimed at decentralizing state activities and providing more power and control at the local level.

In Jamaica, the history of local government dates back to the late 1600s when the then British Colonial Administration introduced parish-level local authorities with the promise that the decentralization of the specified resources and responsibilities would strengthen political representation and streamline the delivery of certain local services. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, there was substantial growth in the Jamaican population overall which was accompanied by a significant expansion in the eligible voting citizenry, occasioned to a great extent by advent of universal adult suffrage in 1944. It was therefore necessary to further sub-divide each parish authority into smaller parochial divisions in order to maintain a citizen-to-elected official ratio that would facilitate the best quality of political representation possible. This development marked the birth of the local ‘Parish Council’ system, as currently exists in Jamaica today.

At present, there are 13 Parish Councils, one for each Parish, except in the case of Kingston and Saint Andrew where the Kingston and Saint Andrew Corporation (KSAC) constitutes a single council incorporating both Parishes. These thirteen local authorities are further divided into 227 parochial divisions, each headed by an elected councillor, who represents that division on the respective Parish Council.

In recent years, a number of initiatives have been undertaken by the Central Government, designed to modernize and upgrade the legal and institutional framework relating to the operations of the Parish Councils, with the goal of enhancing the capacity of these bodies to achieve their mission of ‘strengthening participatory governance at the local level’(MLGE, 2006a). Most notably was the establishment of a Local Government Reform Unit (LGRU) under the Local Government Reform Act, 2001, with the mandate to pursue the requisite development planning, infrastructure upgrading, capacity building, research, and legislation pertinent to the furthering of community-based democratic governance in Jamaica.

In the overall reform strategy, the Parish Infrastructure Development Programme has had a focal responsibility in implementing the reform tasks under a five-year programme, and this focus has been further sharpened recently. Its central objective of improving the capacity of Jamaica’s thirteen (13) Parish Councils or local authorities (comprised of 227 divisions) to deliver basic services and maintain



parish infrastructure within the framework of the Jamaican government's Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) (MLGE, 2006a).

Although the LGRU has made a deliberate effort to engage the various sectorial interest groups in the planning and implementation of Local Government reform, thus far, concerns continue to be raised, about the level of commitment of the Central Government to the devolution of power, about the capacity of the local authorities to perform their designated roles and tasks in a timely and efficient manner, and most importantly, about the willingness of citizens to commit themselves to the level of participation in the affairs of their local governmental organizations to ensure their relevance, usefulness and sustainability.

## 7.2. Participation in Local Government Meetings

In this section we examine the nature and extent of citizens' involvement with their local government authorities and agencies. As indicated earlier, the devolution of governmental operations has been justified on the premise that local administration engenders greater community engagement in the affairs of government which creates the likelihood of greater satisfaction with the services offered by the various public bodies. So in essence, it is not only the transfer of power, resources and responsibilities, but more fundamentally, the meaningful participation of community members in identifying community needs, setting priorities, searching for solutions to problems and holding public officials accountable for their actions. Here we examine the issue of local democratic governance in terms of citizens' level of participation in the affairs of their Parish Council. We start by analysing responses to the following item (NP1) which measures participation in terms of attendance at town, city council or any village meeting within recent months.

**NP1.** Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?  
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

As shown in Figure VII.1, about one in ten respondents reported that they had attended a meeting of their Parish Council or a similar event in the past few months.




Figure VII.1. Percentage of Citizens Attending Local Meetings, Jamaica 2010

As shown in Figure VII.2, there was a two percentage point decline in attendance at local meetings in Jamaica between 2008 and 2010. This, however, was not a statistical significant change in participation rates and the 11.5 per cent reported for 2010 was equal to the average level of involvement for the three rounds of survey.




Figure VII.2. Participation in Local Meetings in Jamaica by Year

Figure VII.3 presents a comparative picture of attendance at local meetings within LAPOP-surveyed countries. Jamaica assumes a close median position on this democracy indicator, obtaining a higher rank than eleven of the other 24 countries in this 2010 survey. Ranked at the top on this measure are the Dominican Republic and the United States with scores of 27.3 and 24.9 per cent respectively, which is more than two times the mean of the LAPOP-surveyed countries on this indicator. Countries at the bottom of the chart, with extremely low levels of participation, are Panama and Chile with only 3.7 and 4.0 per cent attendance rates.




Figure VII.3. Participation in Local Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 7.2.1. Demand-Making on Local Government

The extent of citizens’ involvement in Local Government in the form of demand-making on their Parish Council was examined by analysing responses to the item **NP2** in the box below:

**NP2.** Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the city/town/village within the past 12 months?  
 (1) Yes [**Continue**]      (2) No [**Go to SGL1**]      (88) Doesn’t know [**Go to SGL1**]  
 (98) Doesn’t answer [**Go to SGL1**]

Answers were initially coded as ‘1’ if the respondent answered “Yes” and ‘2’ if the respondent answered “No.” The results were then recoded on a 0-100 basis to compute the percentage of individuals who sought help from or made a request of their parish council in the 12 months preceding the survey. As Figure VII.4 shows, only about 12 per cent of the respondents acknowledged seeking help from their local authority. This relatively low rate of demand-making by citizens on their Parish Council is consistent with a trend described in Munroe and Bertram (2006), where it is explained that shrinking public resources have, over the years, resulted in the reduced capacity of political representatives to satisfy the demands and expectations of their constituents. This has led to a progressive decline in clientilistic politics, which was characterized by political favouritism in the allocation of state resources. This in turn has meant an overall reduction in the reliance of the populace on the resources of state institutions and their agents.




Figure VII.4. Demand-Making on Local Government in Jamaica, 2010

### 7.2.2. Demand-Making on Local Government: Comparative Perspective

Examined comparatively over time, Figure VII.5 shows that demand-making on Parish Councils in Jamaica has remained virtually at the same level since 2006.




Figure VII.5. Demand-Making on Local Government in Jamaica by Year

Figure VII.6 shows demand-making from a comparative perspective among LAPOP countries. Jamaica's rate of 12.3 per cent is about two percentage points less than LAPOP average of 14.6 per cent. Of note also is the significant variation across countries. At one extreme, the countries with the highest percentage of municipal demand-making are Uruguay with 18.9 per cent, and Canada and Suriname with 17.1 percent each. At the bottom of the list on this indicator of community involvement is Panama with only five per cent, and Honduras and Costa Rica with 6.5 and 8.8 per cent respectively.




Figure VII.6. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### 7.2.3. Predictors of Demand-Making Behaviour

Our attempt to determine the individuals who are most likely to seek assistance or present a request to their Parish Councils involved the development and testing of a logistic regression model with independent variables shown in Figure VII.7. The results show that the factor with the most significant influence on citizens' demand-seeking behaviour is their level of participation in meetings of the Parish Councils. Other statistical significant predictors are size of the area of residence and perception of family's economic situation.




Figure VII.7. Who is more likely to Seek Assistance or Present a Request to the Local Government in Jamaica?

As chart 1 in Figure VII.8 shows, those who attend meetings of Parish Councils are four times more likely to seek the assistance of their local authorities than those who do not attend. And persons living in the country’s capital city are less than two times less likely to make demands than those residing in smaller towns and rural areas (chart 2).




Figure VII.8. Demand-Making on Local Government by Attendance at Council Meeting and Area Size

The negative effect of perception of family’s economic situation is depicted in Figure VII.9. As the graph illustrated, persons who perceive their family’s economic situation to be in a very bad state are much more likely to make demands on their parish council than those evaluating their family’s economic well-being to be fair, good or very good.




Figure VII.9. Demand-Making on Local Government by Perception of Family’s

### 7.3. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Parish Councils

Parish Councils’ effectiveness might be assessed in terms of the citizens’ own evaluation of their councils’ responsiveness in attending to services requested by community members. In this regard, we assessed the efficiency of local authorities by analysing responses to the following item:

**MUNI10.** Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes                      (0) No                      (88) Doesn’t know                      (98) Doesn’t answer                      (99) N/A

Of those making a request of their Parish Council, only about 32 per cent reported having had their problem or request resolved (Figure VII.10).






Figure VII.10. Perception of Local Governments' Responsiveness to Citizens' Demands

As illustrated by Figure VII.11, the Parish Councils' effectiveness on this measure has declined significantly over the observed four-year period. This of course is consistent with popular views on the performance of the Island's local governmental authorities, especially since the onset of the current economic crisis. In this regard, it has been aptly observed that despite a noticeable improvement in the areas of emphases of the Local Government Reform Programme, "there is still a crying need to advance the local governance reform process further to reflect the new realities of the national, regional and world economies and to realize the imperatives of modern service delivery" (Ministry Paper, 2009). Indeed, it is widely believed that resource constraint is a real, though not the main, cause of the inefficiency in the delivery of local services; hence, the effort to improve governance capabilities remains as a key component of the ongoing Local Government Reform Programme.




Figure VII.11. Percentage of Demand Makers having Problems Solved by Year

#### 7.4. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Jamaica

Despite the popularity of the view that the devolution of state functions and resources augurs greater responsiveness and improved efficiency in the delivery of local services, there remains considerable debate over the actual impact of decentralization on the lives of ordinary citizens in many Latin American and Caribbean countries (O’Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O’Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007). In this section, we examine citizens’ evaluation of the effectiveness of Local Government, measured in terms of their levels of satisfaction with the services provided by their Parish Councils or Municipal Authorities. To make this determination, respondents were asked to indicate their assessment of the quality of services provided by the council by responding to the following question:

**SGL1.** Would you say that the services the city/town/village is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**  
 (1) Very good      (2) Good      (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)      (4) Bad      (5) Very bad  
 (88) Doesn’t know      (98) Doesn’t answer

As Figure VII.12 shows, the majority of respondents rated the services provided by their local authority to be ‘neither good nor bad’ or ‘poor’. Just over 14 per cent offered positive assessments of ‘Good’ or ‘Very Good’. Nearly 43 per cent evaluated the quality of service to be just fair. Over 40 per cent of the respondents expressed their outright dissatisfaction with the performance of their Parish Council by assessing the quality of service to be ‘Poor’ (28.2%) or ‘Very Poor’ (15.1%).




Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Jamaica, 2010

#### 7.4.1. Satisfaction with Local Government Services: A Comparative Perspective

The further analysis of this issue involved the reconfiguration of the results in Figure VII.11 on the familiar 0 – 100 point basis in order to facilitate easy comparison of findings at both the national and cross-national level. Figure VII.13 shows that despite the on-going efforts at local government reforms, and the promise of eventual enhancement in the efficiency of service delivery, citizens' level of satisfaction with the quality of services provided by the Island's Parish Councils continues to be low with virtually no change in satisfaction levels over the past four years.




Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Jamaica by Year

The extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the performance of their local authorities in Jamaica is emphasised in the cross-national comparative information presented in Figure VII.14. The 39.3-point rating obtained by Jamaica as an indicator of the level of satisfaction with the local government is the third lowest among the 25 countries participating in this 2010 study. Haiti and Suriname are ranked at the bottom of the chart with approximately 37 points and Belize immediately above Jamaica, also scoring less than 40 on the 100-point scale. Nearly one half of the 25 countries participating this year scored less than 50 points on this indicator. Colombia, Canada and Uruguay are positioned at the top of the chart, but even they only scored about 56 points.




Figure VII.14. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective (0-100 point scale)

### 7.4.2. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

In an attempt at determining the factors that relate to community members satisfaction with the services offered by their Parish Council, we analysed a linear regression model made up of the factors displayed in Figure VII.15. As depicted, the coefficients for attendance at local meetings and trust in local government are to the right of the blue line indicating a net positive effect, while perception of family’s economic situation is to the left signifying its net negative contribution on citizens’ levels of satisfaction with the services provided by local government.




Figure VII.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Jamaica, 2010

As highlighted by the cross-tabulation of attendance at local meetings and level of satisfaction with local government in Figure VII.16, persons who regularly participate in the affairs of their community by attending local municipal events are much more likely to express high levels of satisfaction with the services provided by their Parish Council and its agencies.




Figure VII.16. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Attendance at Parish Council Meetings in Jamaica, 2010

The graph in chart 1, Figure VII.17 illustrates the nature of the association between perception of family’s economic situation and satisfaction with local services. Persons who perceive their family’s economic well-being to quite bad tends to be positive in their evaluation of the quality of the service provided by their local authorities. As the graph shows, however, the relationship between the two factors is generally negative, with satisfaction with local services decreasing as perception of family’s economic situation declines. Chart 2 indicates a strong positive relationship between trust in local government and citizens’ level of satisfaction with the services provided by their local authorities and agencies. Citizens expressing high trust in Local Government are much more likely to evaluate the quality of local services positively.




Figure VII.17. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Trust in Local Government in Jamaica, 2010

### 7.4.3. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support

In this section we use multivariate analysis to determine the impact of citizens’ satisfaction with the services provided by their local authorities on system support. Figure VII.18 shows the list of the control variables that were included in the model and the statistical outcomes. Satisfaction with Local Government services was found to be a statistically significant determinant of system support. Other significant factors are wealth, age, interest in politics and satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister.




Figure VII.18. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on System Support in Jamaica, 2010

The charts in Figure VII.19 graphically illustrate the nature of the relationships among system support and the different independent variables. As citizens' satisfaction with the services provided by their local authority increases, their support for the system is likely to also increase. In addition, the greater the citizens' level of satisfaction with the performance of the Prime Minister, and the more interested they are in politics, the stronger their support for the system of government.






Figure VII.19. System Support by Satisfaction with Local Government Services, Satisfaction with Performance of the Prime Minister and Interest in Politics, Jamaica 2010

Figure VII.20 shows that there is a statistically significant difference in the level of system support reported by persons in the 65 and over age group when compared to those in the 18 – 35 cohort. Also, there is an appreciable difference in the strength of support exhibited by the very wealthy, those in the fifth quintile, when compared to all other socio-economic groups.




Figure VII.20. System Support by Age and Wealth

## **7.5. Conclusion**

The notion of “bringing the government closer to the people” through the decentralization of governmental resources, functions and responsibilities has been justified primarily on the understanding that the resulting closer proximity between the citizenry and local public officials should promote greater sensitivity, responsiveness and accountability in the delivery of public goods and services. In the case of Jamaica, efforts to capitalize on these potential benefits of devolution have involved an ongoing programme of local government reform aimed, on the one hand, at strengthening the local capacity at the Parish Council and municipal levels and on the other, facilitating the meaningful participation of community members in identifying community needs, setting priorities, searching for solutions to problems and holding public officials accountable for their actions. Despite broad public support for most of these initiatives, concerns continue to be raised about the level of commitment of the Central Government to the devolution of power, about the capacity of the local authorities to perform the designated roles and tasks in a timely and efficient manner, and most importantly, about the willingness of citizens to commit themselves to a level of participation in the affairs of their local governmental organizations to ensure the relevance, usefulness and sustainability of parish council authorities. In this chapter we examined citizens’ attitudes and behaviours in relation to some of these issues.

When citizens’ level of involvement in the affairs of their Parish Council, in the form of meeting attendance and demand-making was examined, Jamaica fared fairly well both in terms of relatively stable levels of participation on the basis of these measures and also its slightly below mid-range scores on both indicators when ranked among other countries in the Americas.

On the question of citizens’ evaluation of the effectiveness of Local Government, measured in terms of their level of satisfaction with the services provided by their Parish Councils or Municipal Authorities, it was found that Jamaicans are among the most dissatisfied in the Region. Despite a marginal but statistically insignificant improvement in effectiveness in 2010, only Suriname scored less than Jamaica on this performance indicator.

On the whole, it was found that higher levels of satisfaction with the services of local authorities and greater citizen collaboration with their Parish Council positively impact system support.

## Appendix Chapter VII

**Table VII. A1. Predictors of Demand-Making on Local Government**

Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.096	(0.99)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.553*	(6.58)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.194*	(-2.07)
Education	0.026	(0.20)
Female	0.082	(0.96)
Age	0.015	(0.12)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.099	(-0.88)
Size of place	0.342*	(2.91)
Constant	-2.104*	(-18.42)
F = 6.64		
Number of Observations = 1254		
* p<0.05		

**Table VII. A2. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services**

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Demand-Making on Parish Council	-0.004	(-0.14)
Trust in Parish Council	0.394*	(13.50)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.105*	(3.94)
Level of Education	-0.003	(-0.07)
Female	-0.028	(-1.11)
Age	-0.022	(-0.54)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.002	(-0.04)
Area Size	-0.045	(-1.28)
Constant	-0.022	(-0.60)
R-Squared = 0.186		
Number of Observations = 1063		
* p<0.05		

**Table VII. A3. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on System Support**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>t</b>
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	0.174*	(4.93)
Satisfaction with Performance Current President	0.221*	(7.76)
Political Interest	0.141*	(4.84)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.048	(1.35)
Level of Education	-0.038	(-0.85)
Female	-0.001	(-0.03)
How old are you?	0.071*	(2.23)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.143*	(3.23)
Area Size	-0.042	(-0.82)
Constant	0.004	(0.09)
R-Squared = 0.172		
Number of Observations = 1087		
* p<0.05		

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## **Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis**

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## Chapter VIII. Perceived Powerlessness in Jamaica: Effects on Social Capital and Regime Legitimacy

### 8.1. Introduction

The need for effective control over one's personal life space is a basic human sentiment underlying all established liberal democracies. Modern experimental psychology has repeatedly demonstrated that maintaining a healthy sense of personal control over the relevant reinforcers in one's social environment – a sense of subjective efficacy – is fundamental aspects of the way living organisms, including humans, cope effectively in navigating their life circumstances (White 1959; Rotter 1966; Lefcourt 1966, 1976, 1982; Berger 1992).

Where this sense of “subjective efficacy” is absent, humans, like other advanced organisms, *learn* that they are helpless to make a difference and lapse into a state of perceived powerlessness, in which after recurrent futile attempts to regain control they will eventually give up and cease to hope (extinction of the organism's response to their environment) (Seligman 1975; Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale 1978).

Perceiving that one has some degree of control over the relevant reinforcers in one's socio-political surroundings is therefore both essential to individual cognitive functioning (without which humans become passive and depressed) and to positive engagement with the larger social and political institutions of the society (without which there is alienation and anomie). In a society that repeatedly thwarts and discourages its citizens' need to have some control over their personal and collective fate – to feel “effective” in “making a difference” – people tend to “give up” and “stop trying.” They become fatalistic, withdrawn, uninterested in hoping anymore that working with others to construct a decent civil society together is possible. (Seeman 1959, 1966, 1983; Srole 1956a, b; Seligman 1975).

As such, subjective political efficacy is an essential, though often underestimated, component in social capital building within developing societies – alongside civic participation, trust, and participation (Almond & Verba 1963; Renshon 1975, 1979; Stone 1992; Payne 1994; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Munroe 1999; Sullivan & Transue 1999; Karp & Banducci 2008). This chapter summarizes measures of subjective efficacy that were included in the 2010 LAPOP/USAID survey in Jamaica, and their correlates in terms of such related factors as citizen confidence in the basic institutions of the sociopolitical system, and participation and engagement with that system.


### 8.2. Efficacy in Jamaica

To what extent do Jamaicans have a sense of “efficacy,” of their capacity to make a difference? In order to tap this dimension of citizen perception, the 2010 Jamaican LAPOP survey included three questions that have proven usefully discriminative in previous studies of efficacy, powerlessness, control expectancy and similar constructs (Rotter 1966; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman 1999). Each of the three questions asks the respondent to choose between an efficacious and a powerless alternative, in evaluating his or her relationship with the surrounding sociopolitical environment.

**Box VIII.1. Survey Items Used to Measure Subjective Political Efficacy**

<p><b>JAMEFFICACY5.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions. –OR–                  (2) This country is run by the few people in power, and there’s not much that people like you can do about it.                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>
<p><b>JAMEFFICACY2.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Which party you vote for can make a big difference in what happens. –OR–                  (2) No matter which party you vote for, it won’t make any difference in what happens.                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>
<p><b>JAMEFFICACY6.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) As far as political affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control. –OR–                  (2) By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can influence events                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>

Examining responses to these three items in the 2010 national sample (Figures VIII.1, 2, 3) it becomes clear that the overall atmosphere in Jamaica is currently one of perceived political impotence. Most citizens report that they feel relatively powerless to affect outcomes or to make a political difference. When asked if the average Jamaican citizen “can have an influence on government decisions” or “there’s not much that people like you can do about” how the country is run, 74% of Jamaicans choose the latter (Figure VIII.1).



**Figure VIII.1. Perceived Influence on Government Decisions**

Similarly, as seen in Figure VIII.2, when the question is posed in terms of whether it makes any difference which party one votes for in elections, 64% feel that “no matter which party you vote for, it won’t make any difference in what happens.”






Figure VIII.2. Perceived Effect of Electoral Party Choices

On a third subjective efficacy item, the responses are slightly more upbeat. Whereas a slight majority, 51%, say they feel that in political affairs “most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control,” a counterpoised segment of the populace (49%) expressing the view that “by taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can influence events” (Figure VIII.3). Overall, however, the general societal trend across these three items is one of low subjective efficacy.




Figure VIII.3. Perceived Control over Sociopolitical Events

Moreover, this low efficacy trend is consistent with results found in earlier 2006, 2007, and 2008 Centre for Leadership and Governance studies (Powell 2010b), which have pointed to chronically high levels of citizens' political powerlessness and alienation within Jamaican society. In the 2007 national Leadership and Governance survey, even in the midst of an election year that promised a hopeful "change of course," the prevailing mood nevertheless seemed to be one of voter discouragement. Only 38 per cent felt that "which political party you vote for can make a difference in what happens." On a similar question of citizen efficacy, 43 per cent thought that "with enough effort we can wipe out political corruption," yet a larger 51 per cent believed that "it is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office" (Powell 2010b). Another 2007 question posed a hypothetical scenario where the respondent had a complaint about a national government problem, and took that complaint to a member of the government for consideration. Fifty-seven per cent said they felt the problem would get either "no attention" or "very little" attention. Only six per cent thought it would get "a lot." Similarly, when asked how satisfied they were with how the MP from their constituency "listens to the problems of the people here," only 11 per cent indicated they were "satisfied" that their problems were being heard. In addition, in the 2008 LAPOP/USAID national survey, a year later, only 6 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed that "those who govern this country are really interested in what people like you think" (Powell & Lewis 2008).

For many Jamaicans, this sense of powerlessness appears to be linked to perceptions of indifferent, entrenched elite within the larger social system. On another 2007 question, 71 per cent of Jamaicans agree that "this country is governed for the benefit of a few powerful interests," whereas only 25 per cent are willing to say the country is "governed for everyone." And in the 2006 Leadership and Governance survey, 69 per cent said "administration of justice in Jamaica mainly favours the rich," with only 24 per cent saying it "benefits most citizens equally" (Powell, Bourne & Waller 2007).

### **8.3. The Efficacy Scale: Correlations with Civic Participation and Engagement**

These three individual questions were then combined into a simple additive scale of subjective efficacy, and correlated with citizens' views of the political system. As can be seen in Table VIII.1, the experience of feeling in effective control over one's sociopolitical surroundings is significantly related to a variety of participatory behaviors and engagements with the social system. Persons who experience a strong sense of subjective efficacy are more likely to be interested in local and national political affairs, to identify with a political party, and to vote in elections. They are also more likely to play an active political role, such as attempting to convince others to vote, attending party meetings and conventions, and working directly for a party during a national election campaign. In a more general sense, Jamaicans with a high sense of efficacy are more likely to engage with community problem solving through organizations and meetings and to follow current events in the communications media.

Conversely, the correlations in this table can also be read as indicating that those with a weak sense of efficacy – and this is clearly the majority of Jamaican citizens – are less likely to be motivated to engage in positive and frequent ways with their sociopolitical environment, and that they are passive and discouraged in their interactions with the civic order.

**Table VIII.1. Correlations of Subjective Efficacy with Indicators of Political Participation and Engagement**

Political participation/engagement behaviour	Spearman's rho <sup>1</sup>
Interested in politics	.317**
Identify with a political party	.229**
Voted in the last elections	.223**
Attempt to convince others to vote for party/candidate	.206**
Attend meetings of a political party or organization	.154**
Use mass media to obtain political information	.124**
Work for party/candidate during campaign	.103**
Attend meetings of an association of merchants/professionals	.098**
Attend meetings of a community improvement committee	.073*
Participation in a demonstration or protest march	.031
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$	$n = 1504$

### 8.4. Efficacy and Perceived Legitimacy of Sociopolitical Institutions

A perceived sense of efficacy is also associated with trust and confidence in a variety of key political institutions, and with the belief that government is legitimate and truly benefits its citizens. Jamaicans with a strong sense of efficacy are more likely to hold positive views of central political institutions and processes such as the electoral system, the parties, the parliament and prime minister, the police and defense force, and the courts. They are more likely to support the legitimacy of the overall political system and the current government, and to believe that these political forces are just and effective in combating poverty, unemployment, corruption, and crime, and that the justice system protects democratic principles and basic citizen rights.

Again, the flip side of these results is that, given the low overall efficacy levels of Jamaicans, those who feel ineffective to make a difference will be more likely to distrust the basic political institutions and processes, to question their legitimacy, and to doubt the effectiveness of the government in combating poverty, unemployment, corruption, and other chronic social ailments.

<sup>1</sup> Spearman's rho is a commonly used statistic for assessing relationship between two variables. The correlation coefficient is a number between +1 and -1. This number tells us about the magnitude and direction of the association between two variables. The MAGNITUDE is the strength of the correlation. The closer the correlation is to either +1 or -1, the stronger the correlation. If the correlation is 0 or very close to 0, there is no association between the two variables. With respect to interest in politics in the Table V.III.1 for example, there is a moderate correlation ( $r = .317$ ). The DIRECTION of the correlation tells us how the two variables are related. If the correlation is positive, the two variables have a positive relationship (as one increases, the other also increases). If the correlation is negative, the two variables have a negative relationship (as one increases, the other decreases). Here, we have a positive correlation ( $r = .317$ ). So as interest in politics increases, political participation also increases.

**Table VIII.2. Correlations of Subjective Efficacy with Trust and Support for Jamaican Socio political Institutions**

<b>Political institution or function</b>	<b>Spearman's rho</b>
Trust the elections	.285
Trust the national government	.260
Trust the political parties	.243
Trust the Prime Minister	.234
Trust the National Electoral Commission	.226
Support political system of Jamaica	.212
Believe the government fights poverty	.210
Trust the Parliament	.196
Trust the Parish Council	.192
Trust the Public Defender's Office	.185
Believe the government is managing economy well	.183
Proud of living under the Jamaican political system	.182
Believe the government combats corruption	.182
Believe the government protects democratic principles	.181
Believe the government combats unemployment	.174
Trust the National Police	.165
Trust the Supreme Court	.160
Trust the Jamaica Defence Force	.144
Believe the government improves citizen safety	.137
Trust the Attorney General's Department	.136
Believe citizens' basic rights well protected	.135
Trust the Justice system	.127
Believe Jamaican courts guarantee a fair trial	.122
Trust the commission for the Prevention of Corruption	.117
<i>p &lt; .001 for all figures in table</i>	<i>n = 1504</i>

### **8.5. Relation to Social Position and Personality Factors**

The extent of perceived political efficacy or powerlessness also varies according to one's position in Jamaican society, as well as to aspects of the personality of the perceiver. Not surprisingly, those who occupy positions of higher status and privilege in the Jamaican social hierarchy feel more politically empowered than those of lower social status. As Table VIII.3 demonstrates, one's objective income level, one's subjective sense of income adequacy, and the degree of concern over unemployment all have an impact on the extent to which Jamaicans feel that they are, or are not, efficacious in dealing with the political system in which they find themselves embedded.

Aspects of perception and personality also clearly have some impact on the extent to which Jamaicans feel they can make a difference. Thus persons with a strong sense of interpersonal trust are more likely to feel politically efficacious, as are persons who are agreeable, conscientious, extraverted and emotionally stable.

**Table VIII.3. Correlations of Subjective Political Efficacy with Demographic and Personality Measures**

<b>Demographic and Personality Measures</b>	<b>Spearman's rho</b>
<i>Demographic measures</i>	
Income level (objective economic status)	.147**
Income adequacy (subjective economic status, Q10D)	.157**
Unemployment concern (JAMSECUR2)	-.163**
Class position in Jamaican society (subjective)	.081**
Respondent's age	.120**
<i>Personality measures</i>	
Interpersonal trust	.242**
Agreeableness	.083**
Conscientiousness	.074**
Extraversion	.093**
Emotional Stability	.106**
Openness	.042
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$	$n = 1504$

## 8.6. Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has shown that levels of subjective political efficacy in Jamaica are relatively low, as measured across three different questions designed to tap these sentiments in a national sample. Moreover, it is evident that there are significant associations between these perceived inefficacy levels and the chronic dysfunctions within Jamaican society of weak trust in the sociopolitical institutions and processes, in politicians and elections, and in the capability of the government to solve problems and to resolve citizens’ concerns.

The data reveal consistent correlations of these feelings of inefficacy with a lack of citizen engagement and participation in building a stronger civic order. As such, it is evident that this sense of citizen powerlessness to affect political outcomes in Jamaican society constitutes a hindrance to building social capital and to the development process more generally. Transition to a national electoral system that is more genuinely responsive to citizen preferences (e.g. a shift towards multi-party representation of interests that features publicly-funded campaigns; and away from the present voter-choice-limiting, garrison-based, two party electoral “lock”) would probably help to overcome this chronic citizen malaise. National policies that consciously foster a greater sense of active citizen inclusion, empowerment, and civic engagement in the process of building the nation would also be helpful as components of overall development strategies.



## Chapter IX. Personality Factors in Jamaican Political Orientations: NEO – PI, Interpersonal Trust and Zero-Sum Perception

*“Politics has no foundations other than human nature.” Lucian Pye (2000)*

In an often-overlooked paper presented by the late Professor Carl Stone in 1992, he lamented that in diagnosing Jamaican development problems policy specialists “very rarely seek to focus attention in Caribbean social science theory and research on the realm of values, norms, and personality traits.” He went on to chastise a “major weakness of the western social science tradition” for failing to incorporate multidisciplinary understandings of how “the interaction between norms and values produces modal personality types in a culture or society with specific drives, motivations, expectations and propensity towards certain patterns of behaviour.” Stone further argued that whereas the policy disciplines had made some useful contributions to our understanding, “in contrast to economics, political science and sociology, the discipline of social psychology offers us a better guide and some better insights” into the dynamics of such forces.” (Stone 1-2: 1992)

This chapter will explore the “modal personality types” (or what Benedict, Mead and others had originally termed “national character”) of the Jamaican people, and trace some of the correlates of these personality types for participation and engagement with the political system. We will also look at the impact of interpersonal trust and zero-sum perception as subjective predispositions with important consequences for political behaviour.

### 9.1. Operationalizing the Basic Human Personality Factors

In the decades since the early work of Stone, Mead, Pye and others (Benedict 1946; Leites 1951; Lasswell 1960; Pye 1962a,b, 1985; Martindale 1967; Pye & Leites 1982; Stone 1992; Neiburg et al. 1998; Mead 1999, 2000a,b;), two prominent social psychologists have extended the study of “modal personality types” into the empirical realm, successfully isolating five key factors in the normal human personality that consistently appear in varying degrees across many different human cultures (Cattell 1956; Eysenck 1947, 1978; Church 2001; Allik & McCrae 2004; Schmitt et al. 2007). In an elaborate sifting process that involved testing many possible human personality attributes over time, across many world cultural contexts, McCrae and Costa's factor analysis of personality descriptors has produced a series of reliable items that have been proven highly discriminative, and which consistently group into five basic dimensions of the normal human personality (Costa & McCrae 1988, 1992; McCrae & Costa 1997, 2003, 2006, 2008). These empirically-derived “big five factors” can be briefly summarized as follows:

- I. *Agreeable* (soft-hearted, forgiving, selfless, good-natured) versus *Antagonistic* (ruthless, vengeful, selfish, irritable)
- II. *Conscientious* (careful, reliable, organized, hardworking) versus *Negligent* (careless, undependable, disorganized, lazy)
- III. *Extraverted* (sociable, affectionate, talkative, warm) versus *Introverted* (retiring, reserved, quiet, cold)
- IV. *Emotionally Stable* (calm, at ease, relaxed, secure) versus *Neurotic* (worrying, nervous, high-strung, insecure)

V. *Open to Experience* (original, creative, imaginative, broad interests) versus *Closed to Experience* (conventional, uncreative, down-to-earth, narrow interests)

This five-factor instrument is often referred to as the NEO Personality Inventory, or the NEO-PI. The full NEO-PI instrument contains a large number of items and would be impractical for use in a national survey, so a greatly abbreviated version, which attempts to capture the essence of these personality factors in ten survey items, was employed in the Jamaica 2010 LAPOP survey (Mondak et al 2008, 2010; Woods et al., 2005). The question lead-in and item wordings used were as follows:

**Box IX.1. Survey Items Used to Measure McCrae and Costa's Five Basic Personality Factors**

Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the 1-7 ladder, where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree,” please tell me the number that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

You see yourself as a:

- PER1.** Sociable and active person.
- PER2.** Critical and quarrelsome person.
- PER3.** Dependable and self-disciplined person.
- PER4.** Anxious and easily upset person.
- PER5.** Open to new experiences and intellectual person.
- PER6.** Quiet and shy person.
- PER7.** Generous and warm person.
- PER8.** Disorganized and careless person.
- PER9.** Calm and emotionally stable person.
- PER10.** Uncreative and unimaginative person.

Responses to these items in a random national sample of 1,504 Jamaicans were then used to construct scales representing the five personality factors, as follows:

- I. Agreeableness = **PER7 - PER2**
- II. Conscientiousness = **PER3 - PER8**
- III. Extraversion = **PER1 - PER6**
- IV. Emotional Stability = **PER9 - PER4**
- V. Openness = **PER5 - PER10**

The resultant raw scores on all five of the scales were then rescaled to range from 0 to 10 for convenience of interpretation. The resultant profiles on the five dimensions of the Jamaican “modal personality” are summarized in Figure IX.1. As can be seen, overall, Jamaicans tend to rate themselves as being relatively higher on Conscientiousness (dependable, reliable, organized, dutiful), Openness to Experience (creative, imaginative, original), and Agreeableness (altruistic, soft-hearted, selfless, good-natured) as basic character attributes, but less Emotionally Stable (i.e. more neurotic) and Extraverted (i.e. more introverted).






Figure IX.1. Modal Personality in Jamaica: National Averages on the “Big Five” Factors (self-ratings, n=1,504)

## 9.2. The “Big Five” Personality Factors and Support for Jamaican Political Institutions and Processes

These patterns are of course interesting in themselves, as this is the first time they have been measured at the national level in Jamaica. But what are the implications of these modal personality predispositions for patterns of orientation toward the dominant socio-political institutions of the society within which Jamaicans find themselves embedded? Table IX.1 summarizes interactions of the five factors with some of these institutional arrangements.

Overall, it is clear from the table that being higher on any one of these five personality factors is generally associated with more robust levels of positive support for, and faith in, the major visible political institutions, roles, and functions of the Jamaican system of national governance. In particular, it is evident that across nearly all of these variables Emotional Stability-Neuroticism has consistent relationships with system support, implying that there is a micro-macro connection between individual psychological health and “healthy” system support – i.e. that citizens’ emotional stability and system stability are interrelated phenomena, that the democratic political system as a collective historical construction in some way embodies and reflects the “states of mind” of its citizens.

Beyond these interactions with emotional stability of the citizenry, there are also across-the-board significant relationships with Conscientiousness and Agreeableness as fundamental human personality attributes. This can be viewed in high resolution in the figures for being “proud of being a Jamaican,” where Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability are all significantly correlated with the condensed symbol of allegiance to the nation and its political system.

Conversely, the correlations in Table IX.1 indicate that the less emotionally stable a citizen is, the less likely he or she is to trust the national elections, to be proud of being a Jamaican, and to believe the

courts will guarantee a fair trial. Less emotionally stable individuals would also be less likely to have faith in, and respect for, the parliament, the justice system, the Supreme Court, the Jamaica Defence Force, and the Attorney General's and Public Defender's offices.

**Table IX.1. Indicators of Support for Jamaican Socio-political Institutions, by McCrae and Costa's Five Basic Factors of the Human Personality ( $n=1,504$ , Spearman's  $\rho$ )**

Socio-political Attitudes and Values	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Emotional Stability	Openness
Trust the elections	.024	.011	.117**	.111**	.037
Proud of being Jamaican	.216**	.225**	.011	.127**	.120**
Respect political institutions	.085**	.069**	.003	.121**	.032
Support the political system	.093**	.078**	-.018	.080**	.046
Trust in the justice system	.044	.039	.060*	.150**	.018
Trust the Parliament	.061*	-.019	-.003	.110**	-.005
Trust Jamaica Defence Force	.129**	.086**	-.037	.110**	.034
Trust the political parties	.015	-.014	.069**	.091**	-.022
Trust the Prime Minister	.042	.032	-.027	.050	-.015
Trust the Supreme Court	.058*	.057*	.033	.128**	-.001
Trust the Parish Council	.061*	.001	.066*	.098**	.058*
Trust Attorney General's Dept.	.090**	.068*	.060*	.139**	.026
Trust Public Defenders Office	.097**	.059*	.003	.130**	.019
Believe 'govt fights poverty	-.055*	-.098**	-.092**	-.065*	-.080**
Believe govt combats unemployment	-.016	-.075**	-.091**	-.036	-.094**
Believe govt managing economy well	-.053	-.024	-.070**	-.042	.038
Believe the courts guarantee a fair trial	.048	.067*	.003	.121**	.032

\* $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .01$   $n = 1,504$

### 9.3. Personality Factors in Relation to Political Orientations and Participation

The figures in Table IX.2 provide further insights into the ways that personality interacts with political orientations and the participatory behaviours of Jamaicans. The extent to which one believes that “democracy is the best form of government” is seen to be significantly related to four of the five basic McCrae and Costa NEO-PI factors, as is Jamaican citizens' sense of “political efficacy” in impacting outcomes of the surrounding socio-political system. Jamaicans who have a preference for “equality” (over “freedom”) as a political value are also seen to be higher on the Openness and Emotional Stability factors than those who prefer “freedom” over “equality”. Note also that Jamaicans who are higher on “authoritarianism” are lower on Openness and Emotional Stability, as most of the

“authoritarian personality” literature would predict (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer 1981; Duckitt 2005, 2006; Liu et al. 2008), and that persons who see their social world in zero-sum terms (“you-or-me”) are significantly lower on Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability and Agreeableness. One can also see that interpersonal trust, a major element in maintaining social capital, is more pronounced in individuals who score high on Emotional Stability and Agreeableness. Also interestingly, among the five personality factors, life satisfaction among Jamaicans is most strongly related to Openness to Experience.

With respect to political participation behaviours, those who are more emotionally stable are also more likely to identify with a political party, and to request help from a member of parliament or a local official. Openness, too, is related to some participatory behaviours, making one more likely to identify with a political party and to attend community meetings. And persons who are high on the Conscientiousness dimension are more likely to try to solve a community problem.

**Table IX.2. Political Orientations and Participatory Behaviours, by McCrae and Costa's Five Basic Factors of the Human Personality (n=1,504, Spearman's rho)**

Attitudes, Values and Behaviours	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Emotional Stability	Openness
Belief in democracy (ING4)	.113**	.166**	.003	.122**	.186**
Sense of political efficacy	.083**	.074**	.093**	.106**	.042
Equality/freedom preference	.098**	.055	.069**	.108**	.116**
Authoritarianism (AUT1)	-.063*	-.073**	-.065*	-.074**	-.128**
Trust in people	.127**	.068*	-.044	.117**	.011
Zero-sum perception (“you-or-me world”)	-.089**	-.108**	-.010	-.095**	-.067*
Life satisfaction	.069**	.044	.015	.054*	.091**
Interested in politics	.030	.010	-.095**	-.024	-.015
Identify with a political party	.028	.042	.037	.103**	.079**
Attend town or Parish Council meetings	.032	-.003	-.087**	-.011	.050
Help solve community problems	-.023	.080**	-.046	-.002	-.029
Participate in political protest	.051*	-.012	-.061*	.029	-.002
Request help from MP	.003	-.016	.025	.093**	.046
Request help from local official	-.008	-.002	.004	.071**	-.002
Attend community improvement meeting	-.018	-.040	-.060*	-.012	-.072**

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 n = 1,504




Figure IX.2. Equality vs. Freedom Preference: Averages on the “Big Five” Personality Factors (n=1,454)




Figure IX.3. Democratic vs. Authoritarian Preference: Averages on the “Big Five” Personality Factors (n=1,343)

## 9.4. Trust in Human Nature as an Aspect of Personality

Another fundamental personality trait with relevance to the Jamaican political realm is generalized interpersonal trust, or trust in human nature – the willingness of individuals to trust other persons generally and to have trust in civic leaders, government, and the major social institutions. A shared sense of trust, a basic belief in the cooperativeness and unselfishness of human nature, is vital to building a strong civil society. It is essential to building social capital within organisations, and in all human relationships. The efficiency, and indeed survival, of individuals and groups within the society depends heavily on the presence of such trust. It is essential to modernisation, to the development process, and to achieving sustained economic growth (Rotter 1967, 1971; Deutsch 1960, 1962; Axelrod 1984; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Hudson 2004).

Lucian Pye's classic study of personality and political identity in Burmese culture, *Personality and Nation Building* (1962, 55), observed that where trust in human nature was lacking, "the basic feeling of distrust leaves people unsure of their control over the world and hence fearful that the world is either against them or indifferent to them." Without a basic faith in the trustworthiness of other people, they become more cynical, manipulative, exploitative, antisocial, and violence-prone. More recent works of Axelrod (1984), Dasgupta (1988), Putnam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995) have corroborated these earlier findings on the relationship between trust and the development of civil society, stressing the central role of trust as social capital in maintaining an ongoing sense of cooperation and perceived fairness. Studied across a variety of social science disciplines, a sense of interpersonal trust has been shown to be associated with socially-efficient outcomes, moderation of fear, greed, and opportunism among parties in social transactions; and support for democracy, equality, and civic norms (Frey & Powell 2005; Powell 2009).

To what extent are Jamaicans predisposed to trust other persons, and to have trust in leaders and the major institutions of their society? To operationalize "trust", four items were included in the 2010 LAPOP survey. Each of the four questions asks the respondent to choose between trusting and distrusting alternatives, in evaluating his or her relationship with others in society and human nature generally.

In the 2010 LAPOP survey, the four individual trust items (see Box IX.2) were combined into a simple additive scale of interpersonal trust, and correlated with citizens' views of the political system on a variety of possible indicators.

**Box IX.2. Survey Items Used to Measure ‘Trust-Distrust in Other People’ as an Aspect of Personality**

<p><b>JAMTRUST1.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Most people are essentially good and can be trusted. –OR-                  (2) Most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted.                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>
<p><b>JAMTRUST2.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance. –OR-                  (2) Most people would try to be fair.                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>
<p><b>JAMTRUST4.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Most people in the Jamaican government can be trusted to keep their promises. OR-                  (2) You can never be too careful in dealing with people in government.                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>
<p><b>IT1.</b> Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?                  (1) Very trustworthy                  (2) Somewhat trustworthy                  (3) Not very trustworthy                  (4) Untrustworthy                  (88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember</p>

As can be seen in Figures IX.4 through IX.6, regardless of how one asks the question, one finds strong tendencies toward distrust of other people pervading Jamaican society at present. On the first measure (Figure IX.4), 73 per cent of Jamaicans in the 2010 survey say they believe “most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance.”




Figure IX.4. Interpersonal Trust: Are Others Likely to Be Fair or Take Advantage of You?

The level of distrust becomes even more pronounced in the case of “persons in government” (Figure IX.5), with about 90 per cent of Jamaicans saying “you can never be too careful in dealing with people in government.” Only 9.7 per cent believe “most people in the Jamaican government can be trusted to keep their promises.”




Figure IX.5. Interpersonal Trust: People in Government

Including a generalized evaluation of human nature in the question tends to temper the severity of these harsh judgments of others, with a somewhat lower 59 per cent saying “most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted.” (Figure IX.6) However the overall pattern among Jamaicans is clearly one of weak trust in other people.

Moreover, earlier national surveys conducted in 2006, 2007, and 2008 by the Centre for Leadership and Government have confirmed a longer term trend towards widespread interpersonal distrust in Jamaican society (Powell, 2009, 2010a). In three successive surveys featuring an identical question (taken from the original 1967 Rotter interpersonal trust scale), around 84 per cent of Jamaicans said they did not trust other people generally, agreeing with the statement “you can never be too careful in dealing with people.” These percentages were very consistent over the successive years of the survey (83.5 per cent in 2006, 83.3 per cent in 2007 and 83.3 per cent in 2008 – in national samples of 1338, 1438 and 1499 respectively.) Those agreeing with the alternative statement, that “most people can be trusted to keep their promises,” were only a small minority, averaging 14 per cent across the three years.




Figure IX.6. Interpersonal Trust: Faith in Human Nature

The national findings on these two items are summarized in Tables IX.3 and IX.4. Generalized interpersonal trust as an aspect of personality is obviously related to a wide variety of political orientations. With respect to system support, one can see in Table IX.3 that there are significant correlations at the  $p < .001$  level between trust and the entire list of Jamaican system support variables, providing strong confirmation for the hypothesis that trust is a vital element in building social capital in a developing society such as Jamaica.

With respect to political orientations and behaviours, Table IX.4 indicates that trust as a personality variable is also related to belief in democracy, interest in politics, life satisfaction, and a variety of behaviours that involve participation and engagement with the community and political system.



**Table IX.3. Indicators of Support for Jamaican Socio-political Institutions by Trust, Efficacy, and Non-Zero-Sum Perception (n=1,504, Spearman's rho)**

Political Institution or Function	Trust in people	Non-Zero-Sum Perception	Subjective Efficacy
Support the political system	.211	.133	.212
Respect political institutions	.182	.111	.166
Proud of Jamaican political system	.211	.114	.182
Trust elections	.218	.148	.285
Trust in the justice system	.234	.137	.127
Trust the Parliament	.233	.128	.196
Trust Jamaica Defence Force	.147	.096	.144
Trust the political parties	.238	.151	.243
Trust the Prime Minister	.273	.162	.234
Trust the Supreme Court	.250	.190	.160
Trust the Parish Council	.183	.092	.192
Trust Attorney General's Dept.	.228	.121	.136
Trust Public Defender's Office	.236	.111	.185
Believe govt fights poverty	.127	.122	.210
Believe govt combats unemployment	.143	.137	.174
Believe govt managing economy well	.199	.127	.183
Believe the courts guarantee a fair trial	.205	.087	.122

*p* < .001 for all figures in table      *n* = 1,504

**Table IX.4. Political Orientations and Participatory Behaviours by Trust, Efficacy, and Non-Zero-Sum Perception (n=1,504, Spearman's rho)**

Attitudes, Values and Behaviours	Trust in people	Non-Zero-Sum Perception	Subjective Efficacy
Democracy best form of government	.169**	.066*	.166**
Interested in politics	.128**	.046	.317**
Voted in the last elections	.073**	.075**	.223**
Attempt to convince others to vote for party/candidate	.104**	.018	.206**
Try to solve problem in community	.091**	.084**	.086*
Pay attention to news in the media	.069*	.131*	.124
Work for party	.090**	.060*	.103*
Life satisfaction	.171**	.091**	.092**
Best/worst life possible	.213**	.107**	.106**

\**p*<.05    \*\**p*<.01      *n* = 1,504

### 9.5. The Impact of “Zero-Sum” Versus “Non-Zero-Sum” Social Worldviews

Trust is a complex, multidimensional construct. One central component of trust is the tendency to hold a zero-sum versus non-zero-sum (or “positive sum”) view of social relations (Axelrod 1984, 1997; Liebrand et al. 1986; Triandis 1991; Bateson & Shaw 1991; Perugini 2001; Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Kopelman et al. 2002; Frey & Powell, 2005). In studying personality traits that influence cooperative behaviour within groups and societies, organizational psychologists distinguish between “zero-sum” and “non-zero-sum” perceivers. In game theory, a “zero-sum game” is a competitive one in which there are distinct winners and losers, and in which one persons’/groups’/nations’ gain necessarily implies another's

loss. In contrast, a “non-zero-sum” (or “positive sum”) game is a more cooperative one, in which mutual satisfaction of the involved persons'/groups'/nations' needs is seen as possible and desirable.

This distinction also extends to generalized modes of perception, and as such affects the way people will tend to 'frame their social, political, and economic transactions in terms of either their zero-sum or non-zero-sum worldviews. People with more zero-sum oriented personalities “tend to have individualistic or competitive motives, interpret rationality according to what is right for the individual, and are more concerned with the effectiveness or utility of behaviour,” whereas people who have non-zero-sum personalities “tend to display cooperative or altruistic motives, to regard behaviour as rational if it is in the interests of the collective or group, and to be more concerned with the morality of behaviour” (Fear & Denniss 2009, 24). Several decades of related research on these perceptual types has shown that non-zero-sum perceivers are more likely to cooperate in commons dilemmas than zero-sum perceivers. Zero-sum perceivers, by contrast, usually attempt to harvest more resources for themselves from a common pool than do non-zero-sum individuals. This suggests that the social worldviews or perceptual contexts in which problems are being framed by these two different personality types, as having either individual or collective benefits, is critical to the way people will behave in a society and what they will see as appropriate policy solutions to national social problems (Liebrand et al. 1986; Keen 1986; Kopelman et al. 2002; Frey 2006).

To what extent are Jamaicans predisposed to view their social transactions in either zero-sum or non-zero-sum perceptual modes? To crudely operationalize these modes, a question was included in the 2010 LAPOP that asks the respondent to choose between “you-or-me” (zero-sum) and “you-and-me” (non-zero-sum) alternative social worlds in which “we live,” as detailed in Box IX.3.

**Box IX.3. Survey Item Used to Measure Zero-sum/Non-zero-sum Perception  
as an Aspect of Personality**

**JAMTRUST3.** Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) We live in a “you AND me” world, where people can afford to help each other out a lot. –OR–  
 (2) We live in a “you OR me” world, where it’s everyone for his or her self.  
 (88) Don’t Know      (98) Don’t Remember

In Figures IX.7 and IX.8, and in the “zero-sum” columns of Tables IX.3 and IX.4, one can immediately see that the results are potentially discouraging for efforts to build social capital and trust in Jamaican society between citizens and government, labour and management etc. Nearly two-thirds of Jamaicans (61.7%) say their ‘lived experience’ is a “you-or-me” one, implying that the dominant mode of perception for them most of the time is a zero-sum one. Only about a third (38.3%) indicates that they perceive the social world to be a cooperative “you-and-me” one.

When these two perceptual modes are compared in terms of related basic personality traits (Figure IX.8), one can see that the cooperative-minded, non-zero-sum minority are considerably higher on Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability. The “zero-sum” columns in Tables IX.3 and IX.4 also indicate that non-zero-sum persons are more likely to be system supportive across a variety of institutional contexts, and are more likely to engage in positive ways with their surrounding socio-political environment in terms of voting, participation, and communications media use.

Conversely, the evidence implies that the two-thirds of Jamaicans whose mode of perception is primarily zero-sum are experiencing a “you-or-me” subjective reality in their societal resource competition with others that makes them more likely to be sceptical of the potential benefits to them of

reciprocal altruism, community cooperation, sharing resources, and mutual participation and engagement to solve common problems that exist in Jamaican society.




Figure IX.7. Zero-Sum versus Non-Zero-Sum Perception in Jamaica




Figure IX.8. Zero-Sum Perceivers vs. Non-Zero-Sum Perceivers: Averages on the “Big Five” Personality Factors. (n=1,476)

## 9.6. Efficacy and Perceived Control over One's Socio-political Surroundings

A thorough analysis of subjective “efficacy,” the origins of the concept in social psychology and its substantial political effects in Jamaica can be found in Chapter 8 of this volume. However, briefly, it is important to note here, in Figure IX.8, the patterns which indicate that – like the five personality factors, trust and zero-sum perception, it too has demonstrable effects on political orientations as a personality attribute. In order to measure this personality dimension, the 2010 Jamaican LAPOP survey included three questions that have proven usefully discriminative in previous studies of efficacy, powerlessness, control expectancy and similar constructs (Rotter 1966; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman 1999). Each of the three questions asks the respondent to choose between an efficacious and a powerless alternative, in evaluating his or her relationship with the surrounding socio-political environment.

### Box IX.4. Survey Items Used to Measure Subjective Efficacy as an Aspect of Personality

**JAMEFFICACY5.** Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions. –OR–  
(2) This country is run by the few people in power, and there’s not much that people like you can do about it.  
(88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember

**JAMEFFICACY2.** Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) Which party you vote for can make a big difference in what happens. –OR–  
(2) No matter which party you vote for, it won’t make any difference in what happens.  
(88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember

**JAMEFFICACY6.** Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) As far as political affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control. –OR–  
(2) By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can influence events.  
(88) Don’t Know (98) Don’t Remember

These three individual questions were then combined into a simple additive scale of subjective efficacy, and correlated with citizens' views of the political system along with the five basic personality factors. Summaries of the former can be viewed in Tables VIII.1 - VIII.3 of Chapter 8, which show consistent relationships of efficacy with a variety of different indicators of citizen engagement, participation, and political system support.

More germane to the present chapter, one can also see that there are significant relationships between efficacy and four of the five McCrae-Costa factors. Figure IX.9 indicates that Jamaicans with a strong sense of subjective political efficacy are more likely to be emotionally stable, extraverted, agreeable, and conscientious than are Jamaicans who feel relatively powerless with respect to the surrounding socio-political system. Efficacy as a personality attribute is also correlated with interpersonal trust (.242) and non-zero-sum perception (.191) among Jamaicans.




Figure IX.9. Efficacious vs. Powerless Citizens: Averages on the “Big Five” Personality Factors (n=1,260)

### 9.7. Conclusion

Citizen personality predispositions are important to democratic system support, to political participation and behaviour, and to building social capital in the Jamaican development process. The analysis in this chapter has shown that there are substantial convergences in the evidence on interrelationships between personality attributes, political orientations, and support for democracy in Jamaica. Promoting optimum needs satisfaction and emotional health, a more prosocial, non-zero-sum world view, and what Maslow termed the “self-actualization” of citizens seems to be related, across the board, to development of social capital, civic engagement, political legitimacy and a more robust civic order. In particular, of the “big five personality factors” Emotional Stability-vs.-Neuroticism was found to be significantly related to most of the important measures of socio-political system support, as is interpersonal trust-distrust, (non-)zero-sum perception, and efficacy-powerlessness. The results suggest that developing national social policies that consciously build trust and civic cooperation and empower citizens to make a tangible difference are in fact useful, practical exercises in strengthening the psychological well-being of citizens, and that this, in turn, is likely to result in a stronger socio-political regime support over time.



## Chapter X. Police-Community Rapport in Jamaica: Demographic, Economic Security and Psychosocial Correlates

The critical events of the past year have focused the nation's attention, and indeed the world's, on chronic problems of crime, corruption and police-community relations in Jamaica. LAPOP's 2008 report highlighted the growing urgency of a mix of deteriorative social problems that have accumulated in Jamaica over several decades, which we described as "a complex, multivariate, 'tangled ball of yarn', that has repeatedly puzzled and frustrated policymakers trying to solve them" (Stone 1980; Chevannes 1992, 2001, 2006; Payne 1994; Figueroa 1994; *Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism*, 1997; Harriott 2000, 2003, 2004, 2008: *Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence*, 2002; Levy 2001, 2010a,b; Munroe 2009). During this past year, Jamaicans have witnessed the Golding administration's nine-month protective suppression of a U.S. extradition order, the questionable hiring of the Manatt law firm and a subsequent scandal that nearly toppled the government, an "invasion" of the Tivoli Gardens garrison community by the nation's security forces to bring "area leader" Christopher "Dudas" Coke to justice, allegations of human rights violations by the security forces in the Tivoli incursion, and the government's declaration of a State of Emergency to rein in rampant gang-based crime (Boyne 2010; Powell 2010b).

The sudden convergence of these dramatic events has been a watershed that has forced a society-wide reconsideration of police-community relations, approaches to corruption and crime, and renewed calls to resocialize youth in alternatives to crime- and gang-based behaviour. Though we cannot possibly address all of these issues in this brief chapter, we can hopefully shed some light on several essential components in the mix that relate to police-community relations and the development of rapport between security forces and citizens in the ongoing crime-fighting efforts. To that end, questions were included in the 2008 and 2010 Jamaican LAPOP surveys (in consultation with USAID) which were designed to tap Jamaicans' sentiments on police-citizen relations. In particular, we focus on this chapter on exploring some of the demographic (age, gender, education), economic (economic insecurity, unemployment, etc.) and psychocultural (trust, efficacy, life satisfaction) factors in this "tangled ball of yarn" that affect citizen orientations to the police-community relationship within the Jamaican democracy.

Because the 2010 LAPOP survey was conducted prior to the Tivoli Gardens incursion and the state of emergency operations, we cannot know to what extent there have now been further shifts of opinion on the Jamaican police-community relationship. However the trends outlined in this chapter and the comparisons with 2008 results should nevertheless be instructive to policymakers seeking solutions to these chronic problems.

### 10.1. Four Aspects of Police-Community Relations

The 2008 and 2010 LAPOP national surveys included several basic questions on police-community relations in Jamaica. These were designed to tap four interrelated aspects of the relationship that is perceived to exist between law enforcement authorities and the citizens they serve within neighbourhoods. The first question (JAMPOLICE1) asks if respondents feel that the police are considered to be "helpful" or "abusive" when they come into neighbourhoods to enforce the laws. The second question (JAMPOLICE2) looks at whether respondents perceive this police-citizen relationship as being a zero-sum game (fundamentally opposed interests, one side's gain is the other's loss) or a non-

zero-sum game (both sides share common, complimentary interests; both sides can 'win'). The third question (JAMPOLICE3) attempts to get a sense of whether respondents think a “working relationship” between citizens and police in their neighbourhood is possible and could make a positive difference. The fourth question (JAMPOLICE4) specifically asks if the respondent would be willing to cooperate with police on community projects to combat crime, or if they would hesitate to do so.

The full wordings of the four items are listed in Box X.1.

**Box X.1. Survey Items Used to Measure Police-Citizen Relations**

<p><b>Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...</b></p>
<p><b>JAMPOLICE1.</b> When the police come into your neighbourhood do you usually feel that they are: there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you?</p> <p>(1) help (2) abuse (8) Not sure/No response</p>
<p><b>JAMPOLICE2.</b> Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighbourhood are basically <u>opposed</u>, or that you have a lot <u>in common</u> with the police--that you share similar interests?</p> <p>(1) interests opposed (2) a lot in common, share similar interests (8) Not sure/No response</p>
<p><b>JAMPOLICE3.</b> Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference?</p> <p>(1) Yes, would help a lot (2) Yes, would help somewhat (3) No, would not help, make no difference (8) Not sure/No response</p>
<p><b>JAMPOLICE4.</b> Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be <u>willing</u> to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel <u>hesitant</u> to do that?</p> <p>(1) very willing (2) willing (3) somewhat hesitant (4) very hesitant (8) Not sure/No response</p>

As Figures X.1 through X.4 indicate, these patterns when viewed broadly contain two salient trends: (1) an overall public sentiment of widespread, generalized support for police efforts (if not always their specific actions and tactics) in preserving the social order, and (2) significant shifts between 2008 and 2010 in the direction of deteriorating, rather than strengthened, police-community relations.

First, one can see in both the 2008 and 2010 results that the often-negative impressions of police-community relations featured in sensationalistic news media accounts of emergent crises do not very accurately reflect the view that prevails within the broader Jamaican society (Powell & Waller, 2007; Powell & Lewis, 2009; Barnes 2009; Bruin & Robinson 2009). As Figure X.1 shows, about 78 per cent of respondents to the 2010 LAPOP survey say they feel that when the police come into their neighbourhood they are “there to help you” rather than “there to abuse you”.






Figure X.1. Are Police Helpful or Abusive?

Note, however, a second trend in these updated 2010 figures: there has been substantial erosion over the two-year period since 2008 in all four indicators of police-community rapport. The segment who believes that when police come into neighbourhoods they are “there to abuse you” has increased from 14.9 per cent in 2008 to 22.3 per cent in 2010. Parallel to this trend, those who view police and citizens as having “opposed interests” increased from 24.8 per cent to 33.9 per cent during the same period. And Figure X.2 also shows, two out of three Jamaicans (66 per cent) feel the interests of the police and the people in their neighbourhood are “in common”, rather than “opposed”.




Figure X.2. Police-Citizen Interests Fundamentally Opposed or Cooperative?

Moreover, there is greater pessimism about the prospects for tangible results from joint citizen-police efforts. The percentage expressing the view that working with police “would not help” doubled between 2008 and 2010 (8.5 per cent to 16.4 per cent). Thus, while the larger pattern of overall popular support for police efforts to fight crime continues, that support appears to have been weakened in some way in the intervening two years, especially with respect to optimism that police-citizen cooperative efforts could actually succeed. Only about half of the respondents (49 per cent) are optimistic that combined police-citizen efforts could make a tangible difference in effectively combating crime (Figure X.3).




Figure X.3. Perceived Effectiveness of Police-Citizen Collaboration

When specifically confronted with the prospect of a government programme for a police-citizen anti-crime partnership (Figure X.4), slightly over half of Jamaicans (55 per cent) say they would be willing to cooperate in “working closely” with police to fight crime in such a programme, with about 45percent indicating they would be either “somewhat” or “very” hesitant to do so. And those who are “very hesitant” to work with the police in fighting crime doubled (10 per cent to 20 per cent).




Figure X.4. Willingness to Work with the Police to Combat Crime

In general this pattern resembles that found in previous studies of attitudes towards the police, namely, that overall, Jamaicans are supportive of police attempts to tackle crime in their community, but a sizeable majority also fear that police are ultimately losing the battle with criminal elements, which leaves them “sceptical, but still hoping” (Powell Bourne and Waller, 2007, 55).

## 10.2. The Police-Citizen Rapport Scale

To operationalize the notion of the degree of rapport between citizens and police, an additive scale was developed in the 2010 LAPOP survey which combines these four survey items (JAMPOLICE1-4) into an easily interpretable ten-point measure. All four items were recoded in a positive direction (with positive scores indicating higher rapport), and equally weighted, then added together to make a 0-to-10 index of rapport. Average scores on this measure were then compared across other relevant factors (age, gender, economic insecurity measures, psychosocial factors), to determine how police-citizen rapport varies according to those, with an eye towards determining what might be useful intervention strategies to improve police-citizen cooperation in combating crime. These relationships are summarized in Table X.1. The table also breaks this composite scale down into its four component questions and traces the relationship between these four questions and a variety of relevant demographic, economic, and psychosocial factors.

**Table X.1. Perceived Police-Citizen Rapport Levels by Demographic, Economic Security and Psychosocial Measures (n = 1,504, Gamma)**

Factors	4-item police-citizen rapport index	(1) Police helpful or abusive?	(2) Police & citizens have common interests?	(3) Would working with police make a difference?	(4) Willing to work with police to fight crime?
<i>DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS</i>					
Age (under 25 vs. older)	.181**	.338**	.179**	.117*	.128**
Gender	.032	.117*	.027	.029	.059
Education level	.030	.164**	.082	-.038	.038
<i>ECONOMIC SECURITY</i>					
Income adequacy	.211**	.425**	.219**	.120**	.216**
Unemployment concern	-.120**	-.210**	-.198**	-.050	-.124**
<i>PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS</i>					
Life satisfaction	.149**	.269**	.202**	.161**	.143**
General trust in people	.286**	.351**	.258**	.264**	.246**
Trust people in government	.228**	.176**	.146**	.294**	.234**
Zero-sum perception	-.335**	-.213**	-.213**	-.313**	-.247**
Efficacy (influence decisions)	.361**	.392**	.370**	.284**	.282**
Efficacy (control events)	.297**	.367**	.284**	.321**	.273**

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 n = 1,504

### 10.3. Interactions of Police-Citizen Rapport with Demographic Variables

As can be seen in Table X.I above, among the demographic factors, age clearly has a significant effect on perceived police-citizen rapport, with youth viewing their interactions with the security forces in a more antagonistic light than do older age groups. The table shows significant associations (gamma) of age with both the composite rapport scale and across all four individual rapport items. Figure X.5 indicates that nearly twice as many youths 25-and-under are predisposed to view the police as “there to abuse you...when they come into your neighbourhood,” as compared to adults over 25.




Figure X.5. Perception of Police as Helpful versus Abusive by Age

Figure X.6 elaborates this pattern across the adult lifecycle. As age increases, perceived citizen-police rapport also increases consistently through the lifecycle, in roughly linear fashion.

Gender and education level, however, apparently make less discernible differences, except with respect to seeing the police force as “helpful or abusive”– in which case men tend to regard the police somewhat less favourably, as do persons with less education.




Figure X.6. Police-Citizen Rapport Scale by Age

#### 10.4. Interactions of Police-Citizen Rapport with Economic Security Variables

Economic insecurity also is clearly related to levels of rapport, with the most extreme categories in terms of income inadequacy and unemployment anxiety (particularly those who say they “can’t cover basic needs”) reporting substantially lower levels of perceived community rapport with police than is the case for the more economically-comfortable categories.

Respondents of the 2010 survey were asked whether they considered their income adequate to meet their family's needs (Q10D). As Table X.1 indicates, this measure of income adequacy was significantly associated with all four measures of police-citizen rapport. The association was particularly strong ( $\gamma = .43$ ) with whether respondents consider police to be helpful or abusive when they enter neighbourhoods to combat crime. Figure X. shows the breakdown between those who report that their income is “enough” and “not enough” to meet their family's needs. There is a 14 per cent difference in perceptions that police are “there to help you” between income-enough and income-not-enough respondents, with income-enough citizens viewing police efforts more favourably. Even more dramatically, one can see that income-not-enough Jamaicans were twice as likely to say that the police are “there to abuse you.”




Figure X.7. Perception of Police as Helpful-Abusive by Income Adequacy

A concern about whether one will be employed has similar economic class-rooted effects, though not quite as dramatic as with perceived income adequacy. Table X.1 shows significant associations of unemployment concerns with three of the four rapport items. The negative signs indicate that higher levels of unemployment concern are associated with lower levels of rapport.

Figure X.8, again breaks down the “helpful or abusive” item, this time by those who are worried or not worried about their employment status.




Figure X.8. Perception of Police as Helpful-Abusive by Unemployment Concern

The trend across these two 'economic security' items is consistent, namely, that the less income-adequate and employment-secure Jamaican citizens feel, the less likely they are to view the police-citizen relationship in a favourable light and to be willing to work with police in anti-crime efforts.

### 10.5. Interactions of Police-Citizen Rapport with Psychosocial Variables

In terms of psychosocial influences (Stone 1992; Pye 2000), the 2010 analysis focused on four primary factors: (1) Jamaicans' overall sense of satisfaction with their lives, (2) whether citizens have trust in people generally, (3) whether they experience transactions that occur within their social “world” as being “you-and-me” or “you-or-me”, and (4) their sense of effective control over their personal life space and conditions in the surrounding socio-political environment, as opposed to feeling “powerless” or “helpless” (Karp & Banducci 2008; Powell 2009, 2010a, b).

First and not surprisingly, one can see in Table X.1 that there are across-the-board positive associations between overall “life satisfaction” and holding a positive view of police citizen relations. As one begins to break this life satisfaction pattern down further into component orientations of trust, zero-sum perception and efficacy, the power of these psychosocial factors as predictors becomes apparent.

As Table X.1 and Figure X.9 illustrate, interpersonal trust is a particularly potent predictor. Both generalized trust in human nature and trust in people in government are significantly related to all four rapport indicators. As Figure X.9 shows, Jamaicans who feel that “most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted” are twice as likely to feel that police-citizen joint efforts to combat crime “would not help,” and there is a 13percent difference between trusters and non-trusters as to whether such efforts would “help a lot.”






Figure X.9. Perceived Effectiveness of Police-Citizen Collaboration by Interpersonal Trust

Zero-sum perception is also a strong psychosocial predictor of rapport. Seeing one's social world in zero-sum terms (“you-or-me”) is seen in Table X.1 to be negatively associated with all four rapport items. Figure X.10 shows that there is about a 10 per cent difference between “you-or-me” and “you-and-me” perceivers in terms of whether they believe that “the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighbourhood are basically opposed.”




Figure X.10. Police-Citizen Cooperative Interests by Zero-Sum Perception

Finally, the degree to which citizens experience a sense of efficacy, in controlling their personal circumstances, and in influencing events in the surrounding society and political system, also has a consistent association with the four rapport items in Table X.1. The extent of this 'efficacy effect' can be seen in Figure X.11, which shows a 16 per cent difference between perceived-efficacious and perceived-powerless respondents as to whether they think they share common interests with the police. Jamaicans who feel powerless to control events around them are also less likely to view police interventions into their neighbourhood positively, when they are required.




Figure X.11. Police-Citizen Cooperative Interests by Subjective Efficacy

## 10.6. Conclusion

Sentiments of police-citizen rapport in Jamaica appear to be somewhat stronger, overall, than is generally acknowledged in the popular media and in academic circles. However, this rapport has declined somewhat, across all four indicators, since the 2008 LAPOP survey.

The rapport levels are significantly related to all three types of factors: demographic, economic security and psychosocial. The overall pattern that emerges from these findings suggests that police-community rapport is least healthy among the youngest segments of the population, and the most economically disadvantaged and those with a high degree of unsatisfied needs. Psychosocial variables also help explain problems with police-citizen rapport in Jamaica – particularly the lack of trust in the government and in people generally, the tendency towards zero-sum perception of their social world (which prevails among two-thirds of Jamaicans), and widespread feelings of citizen disempowerment, all of which are found to be significantly associated with the rapport levels.

Looking at the larger societal picture, the good news is that there continues to be an overall majority support for police efforts in Jamaica, accompanied by a general willingness to cooperate with authorities in crime-fighting partnerships if these can be credibly developed and implemented within communities. Government programmes that emphasize social capital building efforts, re-socialization, and community engagement activities among those sectors would therefore be the most likely to yield favourable outcomes, as would constabulary public relations efforts targeted at producing 'friendlier,' more genuinely empathetic community relations with youth and the most socio-economically disadvantaged sectors of Jamaican society.

This summary would not be fully balanced, however, without a word about the longstanding historical ambivalence among the Jamaican public with respect to crime fighting and police-community relations efforts. On the one hand, as the trends outlined in this chapter illustrate, there continues to be fairly widespread overall support in principle for police efforts to rein in gang-based crime. A national poll conducted in July of 2010 during the State of Emergency operations, for example, indicated that 63 per cent of Jamaicans favoured extending the state of emergency, and 73 per cent were supportive of the government's tough new anti-crime initiatives. On the other hand, that same national poll found 72 per cent of Jamaicans condemned what they felt were human rights abuses by the security forces during the emergency (Boyne 2010b). Given this ambivalent popular psychology, it would be an oversimplification to simply state that there is unambiguous popular support for police efforts to fight crime. Coexisting with that support, there is also in the public memory a well-known history of repeated incidents of police brutality, human rights violations, and corruption which needs to be reconciled in the public mind before police-citizen cooperative efforts can hope to be fully successful.



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## **Appendixes**

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## **Appendix I: Technical Description of sample Design**

### **Design Considerations**

As with the 2006 and the 2008 rounds of survey, the sample for this 2010 study was carefully designed to reflect the key characteristics of the voting age population of Jamaica based on the composition of the 2001 Population Census. It is a self-weighted sample which was configured to be representative of all Jamaicans, eighteen years and older, who reside permanently in the country and live in private dwellings. This means that persons who live in institution-type residences such as army bases, school dormitories, orphanages and guest houses were excluded in this design.

### **Sampling Procedures**

In order to obtain a sample with the aforementioned properties, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample (with household level quotas) was designed, in line with a framework proposed by the LAPOP organization for its collaborating countries. As the term multi-stage implies, sample selection was done in a number of phases. In the first stage of the process, the country was divided into the following four regions or strata:

- Stratum 1 – This is comprised of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) which is the country's main commercial and administrative centre and the most densely populated area in Jamaica. It is comprised of Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Spanish Town and the City of Portmore
- Stratum 2 – This is county Surrey excluding Kingston and urban St. Andrew. This stratum includes areas which are involved in both large and small scale farming of sugarcane, bananas, coconuts and livestock
- Stratum 3 - This is the county of Middlesex, excluding Spanish Town and Portmore. Manufacturing and agricultural activities include bauxite mining and sugarcane and poultry farming
- Stratum 4 – This is the country of Cornwall which includes the City of Montego Bay and the main tourist areas along the west, and sections of the north coast

These strata were selected with the aim of accomplishing greater representativeness and dispersion of the units that were selected in the sample. The underlying assumption is that sampling units within each of these strata are basically homogeneous, while there are marked differences that distinguish the four regions from one other. Such strata features enhance sample reliability and, in turn, reduce variance in the estimates calculated from the data.

### **Selection of Primary Sampling Units**

In stage 2 of the process, there was a further sub-division of each stratum into Urban and Rural Areas, with the aim of ensuring that sampling units were selected in the proportion that they are distributed in rural and urban neighbourhoods across the Island. This was followed by the selection of a sample of

Enumeration Districts (EDs) from each sub-stratum. EDs are relatively small localities that are demarcated and diagrammed by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica<sup>1</sup> for sampling purposes. They are the primary sampling units (PSU) in this design. As a consequence, they were carefully chosen using a probability proportional to size (PPS) selection process, meaning that they were randomly selected in proportions reflecting the urban/rural distribution of EDs within each stratum and also, according to the distribution of these localities among the four regions.

### Selection of Respondents

In stage 3, fieldworkers were dispatched to the selected EDs with guidelines for the creation of clusters from which a sample of households, and ultimately, the sample of respondents were chosen. Ideally, we should have continued with the probabilistic selection of sampling units in this stage of the process. However, the location of randomly selected respondents would have been a relatively time consuming and an overly costly endeavour; hence the use of a cluster sampling technique with pre-determined quotas at this stage of the process. Clustering significantly reduces survey cost by arranging groups of interviews in relatively compact areas such as a particular block, avenue or row of dwellings. And more importantly, when quotas are established in advance, it is easy to ensure that the sexes and the different age groups are proportionately represented in the final sample of respondents.

Before entering the field, interviewers were provided with diagrams<sup>2</sup> depicting the location and boundaries of their respective EDs. They were instructed to create at least one cluster comprising of thirty contiguous households, starting at a random point within the ED. Subsequently, a systematic sample with a random start technique was used in the selection of every third household<sup>3</sup> in each cluster. One adult occupant from each selected household<sup>4</sup> was then interviewed following the quota design outlined in Table A3.1. If there were two or more persons of the same sex and age group in a given household, the questionnaire was applied to the resident with the next birthday. As shown, ten respondents were targeted from both rural and urban EDs. In cases where the quota is not achieved from a single cluster, more clusters will be created and selection continues until the shortfall is covered. Ultimately, the design provided for the drawing of a sample with a target N of 1,500 to be representative of the population according to its spatial, age and gender distribution. Only one person was selected from each household.

**Table AI.1. Gender and Age Distribution of Quota by Cluster Type**

Age Group	Urban Cluster Quota = 10		Rural Cluster Quota = 10	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>18 -29</b>	1	1	1	1
<b>30 – 44</b>	2	2	2	2
<b>45 and over</b>	2	2	2	2
<b>Total</b>	5	5	5	5

<sup>1</sup> **The Statistical Institute of Jamaica** is the Government agency ‘invested with powers to collect, compile, analyse, abstract and publish statistical information in relation to commercial, industrial, social, economic and general activities and condition of the people’.

<sup>2</sup> These maps were obtained from the Cartography Department, Statistical Institute of Jamaica

<sup>3</sup> A household may consist of one person who lives alone, or a group of persons, relatives or not, which as a unit, jointly occupy the whole or part of a particular dwelling, having common arrangements for housekeeping and share in a least on meal.

<sup>4</sup> Especially in inner-city communities, dwellings may have more than one household. In such cases, only one household was included in a cluster.

The map in Figure AI.1 shows the island-wide distribution of respondents by constituencies within the four strata. As depicted, respondents were drawn from all sixty constituencies with the size of the dots indicating the relative number of respondents interviewed in the selected EDs in the different constituencies. Understandably, most of the larger dots appear along the coastal areas where the larger population centres are located.




Figure AI. 1. Spatial Distribution of Respondents by Constituency

## The Questionnaire

The survey instrument (included in Appendix III) is comprised of a series of questions which allowed us to examine the dynamics of the political culture, governance and democracy in Jamaica and across other LAPOP participating countries in the Americas. Most of these items are repeats of similar items that were included in previous rounds of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, permitting both temporal and cross-country tracking of possible changes in the respective opinions, values, attitudes and behaviours. And given the focus of this round on the possible impact of the economic crisis on democratic consolidation in the Region, the questionnaire also included a series of questions aimed at tapping certain crisis-related perceptions and experience of relevance to the theme of the survey. Also, in addition to the set of LAPOP core questions, the Jamaica 2010 instrument included a set of country-specific items, focusing on topics such as citizens' perception of the efficacy of their political system, impact of personality type on citizens' political behaviour, and attitudes to the police and to the emerging practice of community policing in Jamaica. These questions were added primarily to inform policies and programmes being pursued by the USAID mission in Jamaica.

## **The Fieldwork**

The fieldwork component of this survey was initiated with the pre-testing of the data collection instrument. This was done by interviewing a small group of individuals and progressively refining the questionnaire based on these respondents' understanding of the different items. These activities were supervised by Mr. Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, who collaborated with LAPOP Central and the Jamaican partners in producing the final version of the 2008 questionnaire.

Preceding the actual survey was a one-day seminar convened for the training of prospective fieldworkers. All interviewers and field supervisors were required to participate in this workshop, which was designed to familiarize them with the questionnaire, interviewing procedures and prescribed fieldworkers conduct. Training was conducted by Mr. Dominique Zephyr with input from Mr. Roy Russell, whose research organization was contracted to administer the survey. Training activities included presentations, questioning, demonstrations, and simulation of interviews.

An important technological innovation in this 2010 round was the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in the data collection phase of the study. It has been LAPOP's experience in using these instruments elsewhere in the Region that this method of recording the survey responses is extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry is eliminated entirely.

Another mandatory requirement was that interviewers obtain informed consent from potential respondents prior to the administration of the questionnaire. The content of this form (see appendix 2) was read to the targeted householder and a verbal permission to proceed requested. Only in instances where such consent was granted were interviews conducted.

## **Sample Characteristics**

As previously explained, the sample was designed to be representative of the voting age population in terms of its gender, age and geographical distribution. As shown in Table A1.2, with regard to these key demographic factors, the obtained sample is virtually identical to the adult population of Jamaica when matched with the 2001 Population Census data.

**Table AI.2 Selected Descriptive Statistics from Population Census (2001) and LAPOP (2010) Survey**

<b>Selected Population Characteristics</b>	<b>2001 Population Census</b>	<b>LAPOP 2010 Survey</b>
<b>N(n) – Voting age Jamaicans</b>	<b>1,653,906</b>	<b>(1504)</b>
<b>Region</b>		
% Kingston Metropolitan	30.9	<b>31.9</b>
% Cornwall	24.8	<b>23.4</b>
% Middlesex	33.3	<b>33.5</b>
% Surrey	10.9	<b>11.8</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
% Males	48.4	<b>50.0</b>
<b>Age</b>		
Average age (years)	40.3	<b>40.5</b>

### Estimation of design effect and sampling error

Further analysis of the sample involved the estimation of the sampling error based on the size of the sample and the design effects associated with items in the questionnaire. Basically, the estimation of the sampling error of a given statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio) involves the calculation of the standard error, taking the design effect of the sample into consideration. The standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the respective statistic, permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar conditions. The Design Effect (DEFT) on the other hand, indicates the efficiency of a given design relative to one obtained using a simple random sampling (SRS) technique. These effects, understood as the quotient between the variance obtained from a simple random sample (SRS) and a complex design, differ for each variable, and can be represented by the equation:  $DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$ .

As Table A3.2 indicates, the size the obtained sample (effective interviews) was 1,504. Given the characteristics of the design utilized, the sampling error of the survey is  $\pm 2.53$ , assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design, a 50-50% distribution for a dichotomous variable, and a 95% confidence interval. That is, 95% of the time the true value of an answer will be within the  $\pm 2.53\%$  of the estimate produced by this sample. Since the survey is based on a stratified and clustered sample, for the analysis of the data we took into account the “complex” sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the results presented in this study.



## Appendix II: The IRB “Informed Consent” Document

Centre for Leadership & Governance,  
University of the West Indies, Mona



Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion survey which is sponsored by Vanderbilt University of the USA and being undertaken by the University of the West Indies at Mona. The aim of this study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of some local and national issues.

If you agree to participate, this survey it will take 35 to 45 minutes to complete.

Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. Your answers will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name and no one will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Balford Lewis whose phone number is 977-3565 or 322-7089.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?





### Appendix III: The Questionnaire

Jamaica Version # 10.1C IRB Approval: #090103

Centre for Leadership & Governance,  
University of the West Indies, Mona









AmericasBarometer: Jamaica 2010  
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<b>PAIS. Country:</b>					<b>23</b>
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	<b>23. Jamaica</b>	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
<b>IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]</b>					_ _ _ _
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b>					
(2301) KMR      (2302) Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)					_ _
(2303) Middlesex      (2304) Cornwall					
<b>UPM (ED)</b>					_ _ _
<b>PROV. Parish</b>					
(2301) Kingston      (2306) St. Ann      (2311) St. Elizabeth					
(2302) St. Andrew      (2307) Trelawny      (2312) Manchester					
(2303) St. Thomas      (2308) St. James      (2313) Clarendon					_ _
(2304) Portland      (2309) Hanover      (2314) St. Catherine					
(2305) St. Mary      (2310) Westmoreland					
<b>MUNICIPIO. CONSTITUENCY</b> _____					_ _
<b>JAMDISTRITO. District (or parish, etc.):</b> _____					_ _
<b>JAMSEGMENTO. E.D.</b> _____					_ _ _
<b>CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]:</b> _____					
[A cluster cannot be larger than 8 interviews in urban towns, and 8 in rural areas]					
<b>UR</b> (1) Urban (2) Rural (Use country's definition)					
<b>TAMANO. Size of place:</b> (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area)      (2) Large City					
(3) Medium City      (4) Small City      (5) Rural Area					
<b>IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language:</b> (11) English					
<b>Start time:</b> _____:_____					_ _ _ _  
<b>FECHA. Date Day:</b> _____ <b>Month:</b> _____ <b>Year:</b> 2010					_ _ _ _  
<b>NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.</b>					

**Q1. [Note down; do not ask] Sex: (1) Male (2) Female**

**LS3.** To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]?**  
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied  
 (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

<b>A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]</b>			
Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Delinquency, crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98

**SOCT1.** How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**SOCT2.** Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?  
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**SOCT3.** Do you think that in 12 months the economic situation of **the country** will be better, the same or worse than it is now?  
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

**IDIO1.** How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Don't know (98) Doesn't answer

**IDIO2.** Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?  
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**IDIO3.** Do you think that in 12 months **your** economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse than it is now?  
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? <b>[Read the options and mark the response]</b>	Yes	No	DK	DA
<b>CP2.</b> A member of Parliament	1	2	88	98
<b>CP4A.</b> A local public official for example, caretaker, Parish Councilor	1	2	8	98
<b>CP4.</b> Any ministry, state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	8	98

Now let's talk about your local government...

<b>NP1.</b> Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
<b>NP2.</b> Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or Parish Councillor within the past 12 months? (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to SGL1]</b> (88) Doesn't know <b>[Go to SGL1]</b> (98) Doesn't answer <b>[Go to SGL1]</b>	
<b>MUNI10.</b> Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SGL1.</b> Would you say that the services the Parish Council is providing to the people are...? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
<b>CP5.</b> Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" or "never" to help the respondent]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98

CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

**[GIVE CARD "A"]**

LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.

On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**

**[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible". Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible					DK	DA

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

**[TAKE BACK CARD "A"]**

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**

- (1) Very trustworthy      (2) Somewhat trustworthy      (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy      (88) DK      (98)DA

**[Give Card "B"]**

L1B. (Liberal-Conservative Scale) Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. One means liberal and 10 means conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those liberals and those conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the liberals and others with the conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "liberals" and "conservatives" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DK 98	
Liberal						Conservative						

**[Take back Card "B"]**

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

- (1) Yes **[Continue]**      (2) No **[Go to JC1]**      (88) DK**[Go to JC1]**      (98)DA **[Go to JC1]**

PROT4. ¿How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in **the last 12 months**? \_\_\_\_\_ (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A

**Y4.** What was the purpose of the demonstration or protest? **[DON'T READ OPTIONS. ONLY MARK ONE ANSWER. If the respondent participated in more than one, ask about the most recent protest. If the protest had more than one purpose, ask for the most important.]**

- (1) Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities)
- (2) Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy)
- (3) Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption)
- (4) Security problems (crime, militias, gangs)
- (5) Human rights
- (6) Environmental themes
- (7) Lack of public services
- (8) Other
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**

<b>JC1.</b> When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
<b>JC10.</b> When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
<b>JC13.</b> When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

<b>JC15A.</b> Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
<b>JC16A.</b> Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without Supreme Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

**VIC1EXT.** Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

- (1) Yes **[Continue]**      (2) No **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]**      (88) DK**[Skip toVIC1HOGAR ]**  
 (98)DA **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR ]**

**VIC1EXTA.** How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? \_\_\_\_ [fill in number]      (88) DK      (98) DA      (99) N/A

<p><b>VIC2.</b> Thinking of that the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (01) Unarmed robbery, <b>no</b> assault or physical threats                  (02) Unarmed robbery <b>with</b> assault or physical threats                  (03) Armed robbery                  (04) Assault but not robbery                  (05) Rape or sexual assault                  (06) Kidnapping                  (07) Vandalism                  (08) Burglary of your home                  (10) Extortion                  (11) Other                  (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)</p>	
<p><b>VIC2AA.</b> ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?<b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) In your home                  (2) In this neighborhood                  (3) In this Parish                  (4) In another Parish                  (5) In another country                  (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>VIC1HOGAR.</b> Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or <b>any other type</b> of crime in the past 12 months?                  (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>AOJ8.</b> In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?                  (1) Should always abide by the law                  (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88 )DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>AOJ11.</b> Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very <b>unsafe</b>?                  (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe                  (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98)DR</p>	
<p><b>AOJ11A.</b> And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98)DA</p>	
<p><b>AOJ12.</b> If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>AOJ17.</b> To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?                  (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

**[GIVE CARD "C" TO THE RESPONDENT]**

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
<b>Not at all</b>						<b>A lot</b>	<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't Answer</b>

**Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA**

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.	
<b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? ( <b>Read:</b> If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	
<b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?	
<b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?	
<b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?	
<b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?	
<b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the justice system?	
<b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Commission?	
<b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Jamaica Defence Force?	
<b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	
<b>B14.</b> To what extent do you trust the national government?	
<b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Police?	
<b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?	
<b>B20A.</b> To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?	
<b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?	
<b>B21A.</b> To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?	
<b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	
<b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust the Parish Council or municipality?	
<b>B43.</b> To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?	
<b>B16.</b> To what extent do you trust the Attorney General's Department?	
<b>B17.</b> To what extent do you trust the Public Defender's Office?	
<b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the mass media?	
<b>B46 [b45].</b> To what extent do you trust the commission for the Prevention of Corruption?	
<b>B47.</b> To what extent do you trust elections?	
<b>B48.</b> To what extent do you believe that free trade agreements help to improve the economy?	

Now, using the same ladder, <b>[continue with card C: 1-7 point scale]</b> <b>NOT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT</b>	<b>Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA</b>
<b>N1.</b> To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?	
<b>N3.</b> To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects democratic principles?	
<b>N9.</b> To what extent would you say the current government combats government corruption?	
<b>N11.</b> To what extent would you say the current government improves citizen safety?	
<b>N12.</b> To what extent would you say the current government combats unemployment?	

Now, using the same ladder, <b>[continue with card C: 1-7 point scale]</b> <b>NOT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT</b>	<b>Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA</b>
<b>N15.</b> To what extent would you say that the current government is managing the economy well?	

**[Take Back Card C]**

<b>WT1.</b> How worried are you that there will be a violent attack by terrorists in Jamaica in the next 12 months? Are you very, somewhat, a little, or not at all worried, or would you say that you have not thought much about this? (1) Very worried (2) Somewhat worried (3) A little worried (4) Not at all worried (5) Haven't thought much about this (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>WT2.</b> How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of a violent attack by terrorists? Are you very, somewhat, a little, or not at all worried, or would you say that you have not thought much about this? (1) Very worried (2) Somewhat worried (3) A little worried (4) Not at all worried (5) Haven't thought much about this (88) NS (98) NR	

<b>M1.</b> Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of the current government of the Jamaica Labour Party: <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98)DA	
<b>M2.</b> Now speaking of Parliament, and thinking of members of Parliaments as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members of Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	

**[GIVE CARD "D"]:** Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

**Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know/doesn't answer**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>		<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't answer</b>

**Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA**

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements	
<b>POP101.</b> It is necessary for the progress of this country that our prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>POP102.</b> When the Parliament obstructs the work of our government, our prime ministers should govern without the Parliament. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>POP103.</b> When the Supreme Court obstructs the work of our government, our prime ministers should ignore it. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>POP107.</b> The people should govern directly <b>rather than</b> through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>POP113.</b> Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA	



**We continue using the same ladder.** Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<b>EFF1.</b> Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>EFF2.</b> You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

**Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA**

<b>ING4.</b> Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?	
<b>DEM23.</b> Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA**

<b>ROS1.</b> The Jamaican government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS2.</b> The Jamaican government, more than individuals, should be the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS3.</b> The Jamaican government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS4.</b> The Jamaican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS5.</b> The Jamaican government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS6.</b> The Jamaican government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

**[TAKE BACK CARD "D"]**

<b>PN4.</b> In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Jamaica? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>PN5.</b> In your opinion, is Jamaica very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98)DA	

**[Give the respondent card "E"]**

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
<b>Strongly disapprove</b>					<b>Strongly approve</b>						
										<b>1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA</b>	
<b>E5.</b> Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
<b>E8.</b> Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?											

E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Of people seizing private property or land to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

**[Don't take back card "E"]**

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Jamaican. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer	
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve					

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's <b>right to vote</b> ? Please read me the number from the scale: <b>[Probe: To what degree?]</b>	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed <b>to conduct peaceful demonstrations</b> in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted <b>to run for public office</b> ?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television <b>to make speeches</b> ?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted <b>to run for public office</b> ?	
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that same-sex couples can have the right to marry?	

**[Take back card "E"]**

Now changing the subject...

DEM2. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic, <b>Or</b> (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, <b>Or</b> (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98)DA	
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (88) DK (98)DA	

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98)DA	
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<p><b>PP1.</b> During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) DK (98)DA</p>	
<p><b>PP2.</b> There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2007?                  (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98)DA</p>	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC6.</b> In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<p><b>EXC11.</b> In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the in the parish council office?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                      In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?</p>	99	0	1	88	98
<p><b>EXC13.</b> Do you work?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                      In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?</p>	99	0	1	88	98
<p><b>EXC14.</b> In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                      Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?</p>	99	0	1	88	98
<p><b>EXC15.</b> Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                      In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?</p>	99	0	1	88	98
<p><b>EXC16.</b> Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                      Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?</p>	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC18.</b> Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98

<p><b>EXC7.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is <b>[Read]</b> (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
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<p><b>JAMANTICOR2.</b> In general, would you say the fight against corruption in Jamaica has been very successful, somewhat successful, not very successful, or not at all successful?                  (1) Very successful (2) Somewhat successful (3) Not very successful                  (4) Not at all successful (88) DK</p>																				
<p><b>[Give card "D" again]:</b> Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the 1-7 ladder, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree," please tell me the number that indicates the extent to which <u>you agree or disagree</u> with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.</p>																				
<p><b>Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK AND 98=DA</b></p> <table border="1" style="margin: auto; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <tr> <td style="width: 10%;">1</td> <td style="width: 10%;">2</td> <td style="width: 10%;">3</td> <td style="width: 10%;">4</td> <td style="width: 10%;">5</td> <td style="width: 10%;">6</td> <td style="width: 10%;">7</td> <td style="width: 10%;">88</td> <td style="width: 10%;">98</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="6"><b>Strongly disagree</b></td> <td colspan="2"><b>Strongly agree</b></td> <td><b>Doesn't know</b></td> <td><b>Doesn't answer</b></td> </tr> </table>		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>		<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't answer</b>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98												
<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>		<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't answer</b>											
<p><b>You see yourself as a:</b></p>																				
<p><b>PER1.</b> Sociable and active person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER2.</b> Critical and quarrelsome person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER3.</b> Dependable and self-disciplined person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER4.</b> Anxious and easily upset person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER5.</b> Open to new experiences and intellectual person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER6.</b> Quiet and shy person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER7.</b> Generous and warm person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER8.</b> Disorganized and careless person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER9.</b> Calm and emotionally stable person.</p>																				
<p><b>PER10.</b> Uncreative and unimaginative person.</p>																				
<p><b>[Take back Card "D"]</b></p>																				
<p><b>Now Changing the subject</b></p>																				
<p><b>JAMFREEQ.</b> Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if you were to choose one or the other? <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) You would consider <i>equality</i> more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that class differences between people are not so strong.                  (2) You would consider personal <i>freedom</i> more important, that is, that everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance.                  (88) DK (98) DA</p>																				
<p><b>JAMFREEORD.</b> Do you believe that it is better to live in an <i>orderly</i> society where certain freedoms are limited, or do you believe it is better to live in a society where all <i>rights and freedoms</i> are respected, although there may be less order as a result? <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) More order (2) More rights and freedoms (88) DK (98) DA</p>																				
<p><b>JAMTRUST1.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Most people are essentially good and can be trusted. –OR–                  (2) Most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>																				
<p><b>JAMTRUST2.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance. –OR–                  (2) Most people would try to be fair.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>																				
<p><b>JAMTRUST3.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) We live in a "you <i>AND</i> me" world, where people can afford to help each other out a lot. –OR–                  (2) We live in a "you <i>OR</i> me" world, where it's everyone for his or her self.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>																				

**JAMTRUST4.** Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:  
 (1) Most people in the Jamaican government can be trusted to keep their promises. –OR–  
 (2) You can never be too careful in dealing with people in government.  
 (88) DK (98) DR

**CRISIS1.** Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis, others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**  
 (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis  
 (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or  
 (3) No economic crisis **[Go to VB1]**  
 (88) DK **[Go to VB1]** (98) DA **[Go to VB1]**

**CRISIS2.** Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**  
 (01) The previous government  
 (02) The current government  
 (03) Ourselves, the Jamaican  
 (04) The rich people of our country  
 (05) The problems of democracy  
 (06) The rich countries **[Accept also Unites States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**  
 (07) The economic system of the country, or  
 (08) Never have thought about it  
 (77) **[Don't read]** Other  
 (88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DR (99) N/A

**VB1.** Are you registered to vote?  
 (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA

**VB2.** Did you vote in the last general elections?  
 (1) Voted **[Continue]**  
 (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**  
 (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

**VB3.** Who did you vote for in the last general elections? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]**  
 (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)  
 (2301) PNP  
 (2302) JLP  
 (2303) NDP  
 (77) Other  
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)

**VB10.** Do you currently identify with a political party?  
 (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]** (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**

**VB11.** Which political party do you identify with? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]**  
 (2301) PNP  
 (2302) JLP  
 (2303) NDP  
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

**POL1.** How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?  
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

**VB20.** If the next general elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]**  
 (1) Wouldn't vote  
 (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party  
 (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current government  
 (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote  
 (88) DK (98) DA

<p><b>CLIEN1.</b> In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?</p> <p>(1) Often [<b>Continue with CLIEN2</b>]                  (2) Sometimes [<b>Continue with CLIEN2</b>]                  (3) Never [<b>Skip to JAMPOLICE1</b>]                  (88) DK[<b>Skip to JAMPOLICE13</b>] (98) DA [<b>Skip to JAMPOLICE1</b>]</p>	
<p><b>CLIEN2.</b> And thinking of the last time this happened; did what they offered make you more likely or less likely to vote for the candidate or party that offered you those goods?</p> <p>(1) More likely                  (2) Less likely                  (3) Equally likely                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	

<p><b>Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...</b></p>	
<p><b>JAMPOLICE1.</b> When the police come into your neighborhood do you usually feel that they are there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you?</p> <p>(1) help (2) abuse (88) DR (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>JAMPOLICE2.</b> Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighborhood are basically <u>opposed</u>, or that you have a lot <u>in common</u> with the police--that you share similar interests?</p> <p>(1) interests opposed (2) a lot in common, share similar interests (88) DR (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>JAMPOLICE3.</b> Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference? [<b>Read options</b>]</p> <p>(1) Yes, would help a lot (2) Yes, would help somewhat                  (3) No, would not help, make no difference (88) DR (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>JAMPOLICE4.</b> Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be <u>willing</u> to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel <u>hesitant</u> to do that? [<b>Read options</b>]</p> <p>(1) very willing (2) willing (3) somewhat hesitant (4) very hesitant (88) DR (98) DA</p>	

<p><b>JAMEFFICACY2.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:</p> <p>(1) Which party you vote for can make a big difference in what happens. –OR–                  (2) No matter which party you vote for, it won't make any difference in what happens.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>	
<p><b>JAMEFFICACY5.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:</p> <p>(1) The average citizen can have an influence on government decisions. –OR–                  (2) This country is run by the few people in power, and there's not much that people like you can do about it.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>	

<p><b>JAMEFFICACY6.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:</p> <p>(1) As far as political affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control. –OR–                  (2) By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can influence events.                  (88) DK (98) DR</p>	
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**ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?**  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ (primary, secondary, university) = \_\_\_\_\_ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
None	0						<b>ED</b>
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
6th form/ "A" level	12	13					
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+			
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+		
Doesn't know	88						
Doesn't respond	98						

**Q2. How old are you?** \_\_\_\_\_ years (888=DK) (988=DR) |\_|\_|

<p><b>Y1. [Ask all respondents 25 years of age or younger] [If the interviewee is older than 25 years old, go to Q3C]</b>                  Within five years, do you see yourself playing some role in the country's politics, for example...<b>[Read options, only mark one answer]</b></p> <p>(1) Participating in a non-governmental organization (NGO), community association or political party                  (2) Running for some public office in elections                  (3) Participating in a revolutionary movement                  (4) None of the above                  (5) <b>[Do not Read]</b> Other                  (88) DK                  (98) DA                  (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>Y2. [Ask all respondents 25 years of age or younger]</b>                  What issues or problems frequently worry you? <b>[Don't read options, only mark one answer] [If the respondent answers "the future" ask: "What things about the future worry you?]</b></p> <p>(1) Work, employment, salary, income, economic or workforce stability                  (2) Having a good time, parties, sports, clubs, dates, girlfriend/boyfriend, starting a family, girls or boys                  (3) Material possessions (clothes and shoes, cell phones, ipods, computers)                  (4) Getting or finishing education, paying for education                  (5) Security, crime, gangs                  (6) Interpersonal relationships (relationships with parents, family, friends, and others)                  (7) Health                  (8) Environment                  (9) Situation of the country                  (10) Nothing, not worried about anything                  (11) Other response                  (88) DK                  (98) DA                  (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>Y3. [Ask all respondents 25 years of age or younger]</b>                  In your opinion, generally speaking, is the country moving in the right direction or in the wrong direction?</p> <p>(1) Correct                  (2) Wrong</p>	

<p>(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>[Ask all respondents 25 years of age or younger]</b>  <b>HAICR1.</b> Could you tell me, what is your main source of information about the country's situation?  <b>[Don't read options, only mark one answer]</b>  (01) TV  (02) Newspaper  (03) Radio  (04) Church  (05) Community center  (06) School  (07) Family members  (08) Coworkers or school colleagues  (09) Friends  (10) Neighbors  (11) Internet outlets (excluding newspapers)  (88) DK  (98) DA  (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>Q3C.</b> What is your religion, if any? <b>[Do not read options]</b>  <b>[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]</b>  (1) Catholic  (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).  (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).  (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)  (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).  (6) LDS (Mormon).  (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).  (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).  (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).  (12) Jehovah's Witness.  (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q5A.</b> How often do you attend religious services? <b>[Read options]</b>  (1) More than once per week                      (2) Once per week                      (3) Once a month  (4) Once or twice a year                      (5) Never or almost never                      (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q5B.</b> Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? <b>[Read options]</b>  (1) Very important    (2) Rather important    (3) Not very important    (4) Not at all important  (88) DK    (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>JAMSUBJCLAS.</b> Which would you say best represents your position in Jamaican society?  <b>[Read Options]</b>  (1) Working class    (2) Middle class    (3) Upper-middle class    (4) Upper class  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	



<p><b>JAMSECUR2.</b> How concerned would you say you are, that you will be <i>left without work or unemployed</i> during the next 12 months?          (1) Very concerned          (2) Concerned          (3) A little concerned          (4) Not at all concerned          (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>[GIVE CARD "F"]</b>  <b>Q10.</b> Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?  <b>[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]</b>          (00) No income          (01) Less than \$5,000          (02) \$5,001- \$10,000          (03) \$10,001- \$20,000          (04) \$20,001- \$30,000          (05) \$30,001- \$45,000          (06) \$45,001- \$60,000          (07) \$60,001 - \$80,000          (08) \$80,001 - \$150,000          (09) \$150,001-\$250,000          (10) \$250,001 and above  <b>[TAKE BACK CARD "F"]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10A.</b> Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?          (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to Q10C]</b> (88) DK<b>[Go to Q10C]</b>          (98) DA <b>[Go to Q10C]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10B. [Only if respondent receives remittances]</b> To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? <b>[Read Options]</b>          (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>Q10A3. [Only if respondent receives remittances]</b> In the last twelve months, has the amount of money that you receive from abroad decreased, increased, stayed the same, or you did not receive remittances from abroad in the last twelve months?          (1) Increased (2) Stayed the same (3) Decreased (4) did not receive remittances from abroad in the last twelve months (88) DK (98) DA (99) Inap</p>	
<p><b>Q10C. [Ask to everybody]</b> Do you have close relatives who use to live in this household and are now living abroad? <b>[If answer "Yes", Ask where]</b>  <b>[Don't Read]</b>          (1) Yes, in the United States only          (2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries          (3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States)          (4) No <b>[Skip to Q14]</b>          (88) DK <b>[Skip to Q14]</b> (98) DA <b>[Skip to Q14]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C]</b> How often do you communicate with them?          (1) Everyday          (2) Once or twice a week          (3) Once or twice a month          (4) Rarely          (5) Never          (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>Q14. [Ask to everyone]</b> Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?          (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

<p><b>Q10D.</b> The salary that you receive and total household income : <b>[ Read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it                  (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems                  (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched                  (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time                  (88) <b>[Don't read]</b> DK (98) <b>[Don't read]</b> DA</p>	
<p><b>Q10E.</b> Over the past two years, has the income of your household: <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Increased? <b>[Go to Q11]</b>                  (2) Remained the same? <b>[Go to Q11]</b>                  (3) Decreased? <b>[Go to Q10F]</b>                  (88) DK<b>[Go to Q11]</b> (98) DA <b>[Go to Q11]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10F.</b> What was the main reason why the income of your household decreased in the past two years? <b>[Do not read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Reduction in hours of work or salary                  (2) A member of the household lost his or her job                  (3) Reduction in sales/Business not good                  (4) A family business went into bankruptcy                  (5) Remittances from abroad decreased or stopped                  (6) A member of the household who received income was sick, died, or left the household                  (7) Natural disaster /lost of crop                  (9) Everything is more expensive/income is not enough                  (8) Other                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A ( "increased", "remained the same" or DK/DR in Q10E)</p>	

<p><b>Q11.</b> What is your marital status? <b>[Don't read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced                  (5) Separated (6) Widowed (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> Do you have children? How many children do you have? _____ <b>(00 = none → Skip to ETID)</b> (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q12A.</b> <b>[If has children]</b> How many children live with you at the present time?                  _____ <b>(00) = none</b> (88) DK (98) DA <b>(99) N/A (doesn't have children).</b></p>	
<p><b>ETID.</b> Do you consider yourself black, indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race?  <b>[If respondent says Afro-Jamaican, mark (4) Black]</b></p> <p>(4) Black (6) Indian (1) White (9) Chinese (5) Mixed (7) Other                  (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

<p><b>LENG1.</b> What is your mother tongue, that is the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? <b>[Don't read options] [Mark only one answer]</b></p> <p>(2201) English only (2202) Patois only (2303) Both English and Patois                  (2204) Other (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
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<p><b>WWW1.</b> Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Daily                  (2) A few times a week                  (3) A few times a month                  (4) Rarely                  (5) Never                  (88) <b>[Don't read]</b>DK (98) <b>[Don't read]</b> DA</p>	
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<p>For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information about politics and the country is known by the people...</p> <p><b>G10.</b> About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the</p>	
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internet? <b>[Read alternatives]:</b> (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>G11.</b> What is the name of the current president of the United States? <b>[Don't read: Barack Obama, accept "Obama"]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>G13.</b> How many constituencies does Jamaica have? <b>[Don't read: 60]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>G14.</b> How long is the government's term of office in Jamaica? <b>[Don't read: 5 years]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (88) DK (98) DA	

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

<b>R1.</b> Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R4.</b> Landline telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R4A.</b> Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R5.</b> Vehicle/car How many?	(0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more		
<b>R6.</b> Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R7.</b> Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R8.</b> Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R12.</b> Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R14.</b> Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R15.</b> Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R16.</b> Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	
<b>R18.</b> Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	

<b>OCUP4A.</b> How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently... <b>[ Read the options]</b> (1) Working? <b>[Continue]</b> (2) Not working, but have a job? <b>[Continue]</b> (3) Actively looking for a job? <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (4) A student? <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (5) Taking care of the home? <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (7) Not working and not looking for a job? <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (88) DK <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b> (98) DA <b>[Go to OCUP1B1]</b>	
<b>OCUP1A.</b> In this job are you: <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? (2) A salaried employee in the private sector? (3) Owner or partner in a business (4) Self-employed (5) Unpaid worker (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

<b>OCUP1B1.</b> Have you lost your job in the past two years? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one. (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one (3) No, did not lose your job (4) Did not work because of you decide not to work or disabilities (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>OCUP1B2.</b> Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

<p><b>PEN1.</b> Do you have a pension plan?                  (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Skip to SAL1]</b> (88) DK <b>[Skip to SAL1]</b> (98) DA <b>[Skip to SAL1]</b></p>	
<p><b>PEN3.</b> Which pension plan do you have? <b>[Read Options]</b>                  (1) Individual pension plan                  (2) National Insurance Scheme (NIS)                  (3) Company pension plan                  (7) Other                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>PEN4.</b> During the past 12 months, have you made any payment to your pension account? <b>[Read Options]:</b>                  (1) Every month                  (2) At least once or twice a year, or                  (3) Has not contributed                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	

**[Ask to all respondents]**

<p><b>SAL1.</b> Do you have health insurance?                  (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[END]</b> (88) DK <b>[END]</b> (98) DA <b>[END]</b></p>	
<p><b>SAL2.</b> Is the health insurance <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) National Health Fund (NHF)                  (2) A company plan                  or (3) Is it a private plan  <b>[Don't read]:</b> (4) Have both, from the government and private plan                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (no health insurance)</p>	
<p><b>SAL4.</b> In your health insurance plan, are you the principal or beneficiary?                  (1) Principal (2) Beneficiary (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

*These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.*

<p><b>COLORR.</b> <b>[When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent]</b> _____                  (97) Could not be classified <b>[Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]</b></p>	<p>     _ _ _ </p>
<p>Time interview ended _____ : _____</p>	<p>     _ _ _ </p>
<p><b>TI.</b> Duration of interview <b>[minutes, see page # 1]</b> _____</p>	
<p><b>INTID.</b> Interviewer ID number: _____</p>	<p>     _ _ _ </p>
<p><b>SEX1.</b> Note your own sex: (1) Male (2) Female</p>	
<p><b>COLORI.</b> Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.</p>	<p>     _ _ _ </p>

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Field supervisor's signature \_\_\_\_\_


Comments:

\_\_\_\_\_  
[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data \_\_\_\_\_


[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who verified the data \_\_\_\_\_

## Card "A"


On what step of the ladder do you feel at this moment?



## Card "B"




## Card "C"






## Card "D"



## Card "E"



## **Card “F”**

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$5,000
- (02) \$5,001- \$10,000
- (03) \$10,001- \$20,000
- (04) \$20,001- \$30,000
- (05) \$30,001- \$45,000
- (06) \$45,001- \$60,000
- (07) \$60,001 - \$80,000
- (08) \$80,001 - \$150,000
- (09) \$150,001-\$250,000
- (10) \$250,001 and above

## The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters in Vanderbilt University in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of attitudes and behavior related to democracy. The Project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Political Science of Vanderbilt University, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), as well as the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with the World Bank, the Organization of American States and others.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2010, using a nationally representative sample in both urban and rural areas. The 2010 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

The public can access the data at no charge via our web page: [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org). The data, reports, articles and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free and available to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers at such universities as Columbia, Duke, Harvard, Notre Dame, Oxford University, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Texas, the University of North Carolina, Yale, and the Brookings Institution; and at institutions in Latin America such the University of Costa Rica and Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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