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British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), 75-98.

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British Journal of Political Science is currently published by Cambridge University Press.

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Trust, Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasants

MITCHELL A. SELIGSON*

Those who study political participation will find that recent investigations have been lacking neither in scope nor methodological sophistication. Participation, once conceived of in rather narrow terms (usually focusing exclusively on voting) and whose study was restricted to certain geographic areas only (the United States and Western Europe), is now taken to include a wide range of activities across the globe. Similarly, the causal factors of participation have been expanded as well, so that currently they include the social-psychological, socio-economic, demographic, structural, historical and cultural. Nevertheless, despite the abundance of inquiry, little progress has been made in the development of theory.

Fundamental to the lack of theory is the unfortunate conceptual bifurcation of political participation into *institutionalized* and *mobilized* modes, the implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption being that the two are mutually exclusive.¹ From this perspective, individuals engaged in mobilized participation, such as riots and other

* Department of Political Science, University of Arizona. The fieldwork for this study was made possible by grants from the Foreign Area Fellowship of the Social Science Research Council and the Danforth Foundation. This paper, prepared for delivery for the 1977 annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, Texas, 1977, was revised while the author held a Lester Martin Fellowship at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Susan Berk-Seligson, John A. Booth and Richard J. Moore for helpful comments on the earlier version.

¹ I am not entirely comfortable with the terms 'institutionalized' and 'mobilized' but have not yet been able to develop more suitable terminology. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 3, refer to 'within the system activity'. Such usage, however, tends to imply that certain forms of political participation (e.g. protest marches) are anti-system, when in fact such marches may be protesting against those who *oppose* the system. It is important to emphasize that the same activity may be characterized differently in different contexts. For example, protest marches may start out as mobilized participation but might ultimately become a routinized, institutionalized pattern of behaviour. The same act in different societies or at different times in the same society can take on an entirely different meaning and the investigator must be sensitive to these important differences. This perspective is enunciated by Shepard Forman in his study of peasants' political participation 'The Significance of Participation: Peasants in the Politics of Brazil', in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America*, Vol. 2: *Politics and the Poor* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), pp. 36-50. An extensive discussion of the definitional problems in the literature on participation is contained in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Images of Political Participation in Latin America', in Booth and Seligson, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America*, Vol. 1: *Citizen and State* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 3-33, and Seligson and Booth, 'Political Participation in Latin America: An Agenda for Research', *Latin American Research Review*, XI (1976), 95-119. In those essays, we use the terms 'conventional' and 'unconventional' participation rather than 'institutionalized' and 'mobilized'. I would like to thank Reuven Kahane for suggesting the terminology adopted in this paper.

forms of civil disorder, do not participate in institutionalized forms, such as campaigning and voting. Most studies published to date have dealt with either mobilized or institutionalized participation, but not both. Thus, we find articles on institutionalized participation labelling respondents in their surveys as 'apathetic' 'withdrawn' or 'inactive' when in fact many of these so-called 'non-participants' may actively engage in mobilized behaviour. Similarly, studies of mobilized participation label those involved in protest marches as 'anti-system' when in fact many of the same individuals may be active participants in several institutionalized activities, such as voting and campaigning.

The division of behaviour into mutually exclusive modes has a particularly negative impact on research focused on attitudinal predictors of participation, especially those which attempt to link it to political trust and efficacy. This paper hopes to demonstrate that some of the difficulties may be avoided if researchers were simultaneously to examine institutionalized and mobilized modes of participation.

The first section of the paper briefly reviews the literature on the trust–efficacy hypothesis and indicates some of the reasons for the discrepancy among the findings. The paper then goes on to test the hypothesis using data from a sample of Costa Rican peasants. A total of seven different forms of participation are examined, two of them mobilized and the others institutionalized. Relationships among the forms are explored in order to examine the question of mutual exclusivity. A typology of political-action types is then developed, based on the empirically-derived findings. The paper concludes with a restatement of the relationship between trust, efficacy and participation, emphasizing the importance of making clear distinctions between institutionalized and mobilized forms, and discussing the implications of the findings.

THE TRUST–EFFICACY HYPOTHESIS

The variables of trust and efficacy and their relationship to political participation have been studied for some time. The classic study by Almond and Verba demonstrated that a sense of political efficacy (termed 'subjective competence') is positively related to a high level of both party and organizational activism. The relationship between trust (referred to as 'satisfaction with the political system') and efficacy was explored, and it was demonstrated that high subjective competence is positively related to greater satisfaction with the political system.² Unfortunately, the Almond and Verba study did not directly address itself to the relationship between trust and efficacy on the one hand and political participation on the other. Moreover, the study examined only institutionalized forms of participation, excluding from consideration mobilized forms.³

Gamson was the first to develop a specific hypothesis about the roles of both trust and efficacy in predicting participation, suggesting that a high sense of efficacy and

² Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 188–96, 252–65.

³ Nevertheless, the research does provide interesting speculation about revolutionary politics as possibly being related to trust and efficacy. See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 184–5.

		Trust	
		Cynical	Trusting
Efficacy	Efficacious	Alienated activists	Allegiant activists
	Powerless	Alienated apathetics	Allegiant apathetics

Fig. 1. Hypothesized relationship between trust and efficacy

a low degree of trust 'is the optimum combination for mobilization'.⁴ Beginning with this hypothesis, several researchers have conceptualized a four-fold table which expresses the possible ways in which trust and efficacy may be related to each other. Although each analyst uses somewhat different terms to identify the two basic variables ('political powerlessness',⁵ 'efficacy', 'trust'),⁶ each derives similar predictive tables. Figure 1 summarizes the relationships suggested by these articles. On the right hand side are those individuals who trust government: *allegiant activists* (i.e., those who engage in exclusively institutionalized political participation, presumably as a result of their high trust and high sense of efficacy), and *allegiant apathetics* (those who support the system, but do not have a sufficiently high sense of efficacy to induce them to participate). On the left side of the table are those with low trust, often referred to as 'cynics': the *alienated apathetics* (i.e., the low trust, low efficacy individuals who are displeased with government, but are not wont to do anything about it) and the *alienated activists* (i.e., low trust, high efficacy persons, the ones most likely to become mobilized).

PREVIOUS TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS

Considerable empirical research has been conducted on the Gamson hypothesis. Unfortunately, much of the research is marred by errors in design, analysis and interpretation, which, in combination, should make one cautious about accepting its conclusions.

One of the early refutations of the Gamson hypothesis was that given by Fraser, which examined two types of participation – electoral and communal.⁷ Unfortunately,

⁴ William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 48.

⁵ Ada W. Finifter, 'Dimensions of Political Alienation', *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (1970), 389-410.

⁶ James W. Clarke, 'Race and Political Behaviour', in Kent S. Miller and Ralph M. Dreger, eds., *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States* (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), pp. 536-8; Jeffrey M. Paige, 'Political Orientation and Riot Participation', *American Sociological Review*, xxxvi (1971), 810-20.

⁷ John Fraser, 'The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hypothesis and Political Participation,' *Journal of Politics*, xxxii (1970), 444-9.

only the high efficacy respondents (38 per cent of the sample) were examined; thus the reader was left to wonder how low efficacy interacted with different levels of trust. But more important was the limitation of the study to institutionalized forms of participation. An exclusive focus on institutionalized participation was also a limiting factor in a study by Hawkins *et al.*, a problem which the authors themselves suggested may be the reason for their failure to substantiate Gamson's hypothesis.⁸ Watts directed his attention to mobilized participation (civil disobedience and demonstrations) and found that both efficacy and trust were negatively correlated with it.⁹ Unfortunately, Watts failed to examine institutionalized participation; hence his work erred in a direction opposite to that of Fraser, and Hawkins *et al.* A further problem with Watts's study lay in its measures of efficacy. Of the five items which constituted the scale two were more clearly measures of trust than of efficacy ('How much of the time do you think we can trust the government in Washington. . . ' and 'How much of the time do you think you can trust the Regents of this University. . . '). Watts recognized that the measurement of efficacy raises problems and criticized Gamson's use of efficacy as being 'too diffuse and conceptually unclear'.¹⁰ He pointed out, moreover, the existence of several types of efficacy, such that a more careful test of the Gamson hypothesis might be made.

The confusion in measurement is clearly illustrated by Zurcher's and Monts' test of the Gamson hypothesis, their confirmation of which can be challenged on several grounds.¹¹ Firstly, of the four variables which they used to measure efficacy, three were measures of participation rather than the attitude of efficacy (frequency of voting in local and national elections and membership in voluntary associations). Only one question tapped attitudes and it seemed to be only vaguely related to efficacy (degree of satisfaction gained from participation in community affairs). The trust questions were equally plagued with ambiguities of interpretation. Furthermore, the analysis of the data was confused because the samples included only those who were participants (the activity being anti-pornography campaigns) rather than both participants and non-participants; and because differences in trust and efficacy levels between the two cities sampled could have been entirely a result of differences in political cultures (midwestern versus southwestern) rather than of the hypothesized relationship between levels of trust and efficacy on the one hand and the virulence of the campaign on the other.

Balch and Kellstedt, in contrast to the researchers cited to this point, employed a national rather than local sample and found some support for Gamson's hypothesis when approval of protest was used as the dependent variable and specific support

⁸ Brett W. Hawkins, Vincent L. Marando and George A. Taylor, 'Efficacy, Mistrust and Political Participation: Findings from Additional Data and Indicators', *Journal of Politics*, xxxiii (1971), 1130-6.

⁹ Meredith W. Watts, 'Efficacy, Trust and Commitment to the Political Process', *Social Science Quarterly*, LIV (1973), 623-31.

¹⁰ Watts, 'Efficacy, Trust and Commitment to the Political Process', p. 630.

¹¹ Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and J. Kenneth Monts, 'Political Efficacy, Political Trust, and Anti-Pornography Crusading: A Research Note', *Sociology and Social Research*, LVI (1972), 211-19.

(approval/disapproval of Nixon) as the measure of trust.¹² However, their study tests *attitudes* towards protest behaviour rather than the behaviour itself. It is to their credit, however, that they acknowledge that, 'support for the mistrustful/efficacious hypothesis depends upon what trust and behavior measures you are examining and on the efficacy measure involved.'¹³

A clear difficulty in the various studies cited so far lies in their failure to consider carefully what type of participation might be logically related to which particular combination of attitudes. Two important exceptions are the studies by Paige and Muller. These investigations examined both institutionalized and mobilized participation and considered which types of participation corresponded to which measures of trust and efficacy. Paige, for instance, found that low trust and high efficacy predicted riot behaviour, that high trust and high efficacy predicted voting, and that intermediate levels of efficacy and trust predicted civil rights activism. Paige was sensitive to the measurement problem, stating that, 'It is difficult to construct a measure of efficacy which is not contaminated by trust. No matter how interested or active an individual is, he is unlikely to say that he can influence political affairs if he regards the government as essentially unresponsive.'¹⁴ Paige's reasoning led him to use political information as a surrogate measure of efficacy, information being a 'necessary but not sufficient condition for the exercise of political influence'.¹⁵

Muller went beyond Paige, recognizing the possibility that both institutionalized and mobilized modes of participation may be engaged in by one and the same individual. This led him to examine what he called 'political action-types'.¹⁶ Muller's analysis, which, in contrast to Paige's, did not limit itself to an examination of high-efficacy persons alone, resulted in a confirmation of the Gamson hypothesis. His analysis was not without fault, however, for he did not consider the contaminated nature of efficacy measures, used a single item as his measure of efficacy, and limited his analysis to a single mode of participation (campaign activism).

The review of the literature has revealed, then, that there are strong grounds for a further testing of Gamson's hypothesis. A test is likely to have validity only when: (1) multiple forms of both institutionalized and mobilized participation are examined; and (2) a variety of measures are employed to tap different dimensions of efficacy. This paper will present yet another test of the Gamson hypothesis, hoping to overcome some of the limitations of previous research.

¹² George I. Balch and Lyman A. Kellstedt, 'Trust in the Political System: A Construct Validation', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1975.

¹³ Balch and Kellstedt, 'Trust in the Political System: A Construct Validation', p. 21.

¹⁴ Jeffery M. Paige, 'Political Orientation and Riot Participation', *American Sociological Review*, xxxvi (1971), 810-20, p. 814.

¹⁵ Paige, 'Political Orientation and Riot participation?', p. 814.

¹⁶ Edward N. Muller, 'Behavioral Correlates of Political Support', *American Political Science Review*, Lxxi (1977), 454-68.

THE DATA

The findings to be presented in this paper are based on a survey of 531 adult male Costa Rican peasants interviewed in late 1972 and early 1973.¹⁷ Costa Rica, one of the smallest and least populous countries in Latin America, is still predominantly rural despite the rapid modernization of its urban sector. The lion's share of its gross national product is obtained from exporting coffee and bananas, whose cultivation depends heavily on peasant labour. In contrast to many of its neighbours, Costa Rica has had a stable, liberal, constitutional regime for three decades (since 1948). The fact that civil liberties are normally guaranteed in Costa Rica was an important consideration in its selection as a research site. Since most of the nations in Latin America, and indeed in much of the Third World, are ruled by authoritarian regimes, it is difficult to conduct tests in those nations of hypotheses generated in industrial democracies, particularly when those hypotheses concern forms of political participation which are systematically repressed by such regimes. An extensive discussion of the political history and factors influencing peasant behaviour in Costa Rica is available elsewhere.¹⁸

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: MODES OF PARTICIPATION

Institutionalized Modes of Participation

Political participation in rural Costa Rica is fairly similar to that found in many other parts of the world. Elsewhere¹⁹ it has been shown that several of the participatory modes uncovered in their multi-nation studies by Verba, Nie and collaborators are also present in rural Costa Rica.²⁰ In this paper five distinct modes of institutionalized participation are examined: voting, local government activism, organizational activism, communal project participation, and workplace participation. Other institutionalized participatory modes, such as campaign activism, are not explored here because no data were collected on them. With the exception of voting, this paper deals primarily with participation at the local level, for it is there that the peasant concentrates most of his participatory energies. These activities are, of course,

¹⁷ The sample was multi-stage, stratified and clustered. A more complete description of the sample can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, 'The Peasant and Agrarian Capitalism in Costa Rica' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh); and Seligson, 'Prestige Among Peasants: A Multidimensional Analysis of Preference Data', *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXXIII (1977), 632-52.

¹⁸ Mitchell A. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).

¹⁹ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, 'Structure and Levels of Political Participation in Costa Rica: Comparing Peasants with City Dwellers', in Seligson and Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America*, vol. 2: *Politics and the Poor*, pp. 62-75; Mitchell A. Seligson and Susan Berk-Seligson, 'Language and Political Behaviour: A Methodology for Utilizing the Linguistic Component of Socio-Economic Status', *American Journal of Political Science*, XXII (1978), 712-41.

²⁰ Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), and Verba, Nie and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

TABLE I
The Modes of Participation

Mode	Variable	Operationalization	Active* (%)
I. Institutionalized	1. Voting	Voted in previous presidential election	83.1
	2. Local government activism	Attended meeting of the cantonal council (<i>municipalidad</i>) in the last year	22.0
		Attendance at meetings:†	
	3. Organizational activism	(a) PYA (<i>Patronato de educación</i>)	44.3
		(b) School Board (<i>Junta de educación</i>)	37.4
		(c) Church committee (<i>Junta de la iglesia</i>)	34.9
		(d) Progressive committee (<i>Junta progresista</i>)	21.2
	4. Communal project participation	Reported making an effort to solve respondent-identified communal problem.	29.8
		(a) Member of a co-operative	40.3
		(b) Member of a union (<i>sindicato</i>)	21.7
		Respondent participated in a land invasion	10.4
		Respondent reported agreement with strike in which he participated (55.3% of all those involved in strikes).	16.6
II. Mobilized	1. Land invasions		
	2. Strike participation		

* $N = 531$, but varies slightly owing to missing data.

† Codes: (4) almost always; (3) once in a while; (2) almost never; (1) never. Overall score is a summated index weighted by frequency of reported participation. Percentage figures refer to proportion of respondents who reported some level of participation. Organizations not present in a particular village are treated as missing data.

directly influenced by politics at the national level. Indeed, it is the political decisions about resource allocation (i.e. public goods) which often determines the nature and extent of local political participation in Costa Rica.²¹ Table 1 contains a summary of the modes of participation and their frequencies. A factor analysis revealing the interrelationships and factor structure of each of these modes has been reported in detail elsewhere.²²

Voting. In contrast to much of the rest of Latin America, where elections are often suspended, manipulated or purely ceremonial, Costa Rican elections are free and open, and are characterized by strong rivalries and vigorous campaigning among the major parties. The voting mode consists of the respondent's reported voting or non-voting in the national election (1970) prior to the survey.

Local government activism. Attendance at county government meetings is a comparatively frequent occurrence in Costa Rica. Costa Rican peasants are accustomed to attending such meetings to petition cantonal councilmen for assistance related to a wide range of community projects (schools, infant nutrition centres, water systems, roads, etc.) as well as a host of government services. The measure of local government activism used in this study was whether respondents had attended a meeting of the county government within the past year.

Organizational activism. Local organizations which are frequently attended by peasants include the school board, the parent-teacher association, community development associations and so on. Respondents were read a list of these organizations and asked whether they attended each one almost always, once in a while, almost never or never. The organizational activism index represents the respondents' total reported participation in these organizations (as a summated index weighted by frequency of reported participation).

Communal project participation. Organizational membership is not the same as active involvement in community projects. To measure communal project participation respondents were asked if they had made an effort to solve a community problem named by the respondent and whether they had made an effort to solve any other community problem. The score on this variable was the total number of affirmative responses reported for the two questions.

Workplace participation. Considerable attention has been given in recent years to what has been termed 'workplace democracy', that is, individual participation in job-related decision making. Two foci of such participation have been selected here for study: co-operatives and unions. The former constitute a highly popular form of economic organization in Costa Rica. In the present sample 40.3 per cent of the respondents belonged to one or more co-operatives. Landless peasants often become

²¹ The importance of resource allocation in determining levels of political participation is demonstrated empirically by Seligson, 'Development and Participation in Costa Rica: The Impact of Context', in Booth and Seligson, *Political Participation in Latin America*, Vol. 1, pp. 145-53, and its theoretical implications are elaborated by Booth and Seligson, 'Development, Political Participation and the Poor in Latin America', in Seligson and Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America*, Vol. 2, pp. 3-8.

²² Booth and Seligson, 'Peasants as Activists: A Reevaluation of Political Participation in the Countryside', *Comparative Political Studies*, xii (1979), 29-59. Details of coding and scale construction for these variables are contained in the notes of that article.

members of unions (*sindicatos*), especially on large foreign-owned banana plantations (e.g. the United Fruit Company), and sometimes on large domestically-owned coffee haciendas as well. Union members constituted 21.7 per cent of the total sample.

Mobilized Modes of Participation

There are at least two forms of mobilized participation which are found among peasants of Costa Rica: land invasions and strikes.

Land invasions. Inequality in the distribution of agricultural land in Costa Rica is quite marked, and the great bulk of the peasantry is landless or land-poor (i.e. owns an insufficient amount of land to make farming economically viable). In the sample analysed for this paper, 80.6 per cent were either landless or land-poor. All signs indicate that despite fifteen years of agrarian reform inequality is increasing.²³ Added to the problem of landlessness is the increasing unemployment problem in the countryside caused by mechanization. Since the labour-absorptive capacity of the urban economy is barely able to keep pace with urban population growth, the cities do not offer an attractive alternative to the peasant in search of a job. As a result, peasants are increasingly turning to land invasions.

Until the 1950s, land invasions tended to be very small scale, often involving no more than a handful of peasants. On many occasions no action was taken against the squatter. Today, however, pressure on the land has increased markedly as a result of a rapidly expanding rural population.²⁴ Landlords who find squatters on their property are much more likely today than ever before to call upon the police for assistance in evicting them. In order to seek safety in numbers, and partially as a result of increased efforts on the part of left-wing urban groups (mostly university students) to stir up peasant activism, land invasions became increasingly common in the 1960s and early 1970s, especially at the time interviews for this study were conducted. Since 1974, however, vigorous efforts on the part of the government to meet peasant demands has reduced, at least for the time being, the frequency and violence of such activities. Peasants involved in land invasions are engaged in a highly political, very risky, act. Land invasions challenge the very roots of the Costa Rican political, economic and social system, for power in Costa Rica is closely related to ownership of land, as it is in many other countries in Latin America. For centuries the most powerful families in the country have been the largest landholders.²⁵ Peasants who invade land risk arrest and in recent years, as a result of increased foreign investment in the agricultural sector, reprisals from private police forces paid by foreign owners who are uncertain of the state's interest in protecting foreign-owned

²³ Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism*; and Seligson, 'The Impact of Agrarian Reform: A Study of Costa Rica', *Journal of Developing Areas* (January, 1979).

²⁴ Seligson, 'Public Policies in Conflict: Land Reform and Family Planning in Costa Rica', *Comparative Politics*, October 1979, in press.

²⁵ The astonishingly clear family ties between political, economic and social power in Costa Rica are demonstrated in great detail by Samuel Z. Stone, *La dinastía de los conquistadores: La crisis del poder en la Costa Rica contemporánea* (San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1975).

property. Participation in a land invasion, then, constitutes one mode of mobilized peasant participation.

Strike participation. In rural Costa Rica strikes are unconventional and eminently political acts. Strikes among peasants were unknown until 1934 when, in the depths of the Depression, thousands of workers under the direction of communist leaders struck against the United Fruit Company. Since that time rural strikes have occurred periodically, although their record of success is uneven. Scab strike breakers are readily available because most agricultural work is unskilled and rural unemployment is high. Moreover, peasants frequently lack the resources necessary to enable them to conform to the legal complexities of the strike laws. Participation in a strike constitutes the second form of mobilized participation analysed in this paper.²⁶

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: TRUST AND EFFICACY

Trust

The questions designed to tap trust in government attempt to measure Easton's concept of 'diffuse support' rather than 'specific support' for an incumbent government.²⁷ They are modified versions of the SRC items, as reported in Table 2. A principal components analysis of the six items reveals that a single factor is extracted with an eigenvalue greater than unity (see loadings on Table 2). A scale of trust was formed by standardizing each variable and then summing the values.

Efficacy

The review of previous research on Gamson's hypothesis revealed that one of the most serious problems with that work lay in the selection of an appropriate measure of efficacy. In this paper, rather than confine the definition to one index alone, five different ones are examined. The text of the questions used (along with their marginals) is presented in Table 3. Details of the measures are discussed in the following paragraphs. These items were subjected to principal components analysis (see Table 4) in order to help substantiate the notion that they do indeed reflect five distinct modes of efficacy.

²⁶ In the preparation of the questionnaire it was recognized that not all those involved in a strike would necessarily be in agreement with it; group and union pressure sometimes make participation mandatory. Hence, in order to separate out from the sample those strike participants who were not active supporters of the strike, a question was asked regarding the agreement or disagreement of the strikers with the strike. Only those in agreement with strikes are considered to be participants in this mobilized form of behaviour.

²⁷ To help achieve this end, the series of trust questions was preceded by a statement read to the respondent to the effect that he should think about government in general rather than the particular government in power (see Table 2). However, one should retain a healthy scepticism as to how successfully the trust items measure diffuse support. For a promising effort to do this see Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, 'On the Meaning of Political Support', *American Political Science Review*, LXXI (1977), 1561-95. A translation of Muller and Jukam's diffuse support items was recently used in Mexico with considerable success, and has even more recently been used in Costa Rica, although the results are not yet available. See Seligson, 'On the Meaning of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico', paper delivered to the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1979.

TABLE 2 Questionnaire Items for Trust in Government*

Introduction: 'Now we're going to talk about government. Not only the present government, but all the governments you have seen in the country.'

Loading (varimax
rotated solution)

.71	1. Would you say that government is interested in solving the problems of the <i>majority</i> of the Costa Ricans, or is it interested only in the problems of <i>some important families</i> ? The majority 36.9% Some families 61.0% D.K. 2.1%
.69	2. Do you think that what the government does, <i>helps</i> you, <i>hurts</i> you, or neither <i>helps nor hurts</i> you? Helps 24.1% Neither 42.2% Hurts 33.3% D.K. .4%
.68	3. Would you say that the government misspends a <i>lot</i> of the money that people pay in taxes, misspends <i>little</i> of the money, or misspends <i>some part</i> of that money? None 6.0% Little 13.2% Some 17.1% Lot 51.0% D.K. 12.6% (Note: Some respondents volunteered the 'none' response; it was therefore included as a valid choice)
.63	4. How often do you think that one can trust the government to do the right thing? Do you think you can trust it <i>almost always</i> , <i>almost never</i> , or <i>sometimes</i> ? Almost always 12.8% Sometimes 26.0% Almost never 59.9% D.K. 1.3%
.60	5. Do you think that among public servants, there are <i>many</i> who aren't honest, there are <i>some</i> who aren't honest, or there a <i>few</i> who aren't honest? Few dishonest 42.4% Some dishonest 18.8% Many 32.4% D.K. 6.4%
.57	6. If you were to get involved in a court case, as the accused, do you think that they would treat you <i>justly</i> or <i>unjustly</i> ? Justly 46.7% Unjustly 46.3% D.K. 6.9%

Eigenvalue is 2.5. The variance is 42.4 per cent.

* N = 531, but varies slightly owing to missing data.

The first efficacy measure is based upon two subjective competence questions which have been used extensively in previous research and which relate to the respondent's reaction to an unjust local law. A subjective competence scale is constructed by summing the responses to these two items. Measures such as these, however, may be contaminated with trust. As a consequence, Paige's suggestion that information be used as a surrogate for the standard efficacy items is followed in this paper. Two different measures of information are used. The first of these includes two variables which measure listening to radio news and overall radio listening. At the time of the

TABLE 3 *Measures of Efficacy*

Mode	Measures	Per cent giving an efficacious response
Subjective competence	1(a) Let's suppose now that a cantonal law is being considered (it is not now a law, but is only under debate) which you consider damaging to you and your neighbours. What do you think you could do about this? <i>Do something</i>	65.7
	(b) If a group of neighbours and you made an effort to avoid passage of this law, what chance would you have to stop it? Would you have a <i>good chance</i> , a <i>bad chance</i> , or a <i>fair chance</i> to stop the passage of the law? <i>Good chance</i>	43.8
Information efficacy I	2(a) How many times a day do you listen to the news? (Average number reported was coded. Range of responses is 0 to 4 times daily.) <i>Mean =</i>	1.07
	(b) How many hours on the average do you listen to radio, including music, news, etc. (Average number reported was coded. Range of responses is 0 to 9.) <i>Mean =</i>	1.76
Information efficacy II	3(a) Can you tell me if there exists in Costa Rica a law which requires a minimum wage for farm workers? (Correct answer is 'yes'.) <i>Correct response</i>	78.7
	(b) If 'yes' to above: What is the minimum wage according to the law? <i>Correct response</i>	56.1
Efficacy skills	4(a) What is the most serious problem in this village, that is to say of (name of village)? <i>Problem named</i>	63.1
	(b) How did this problem arise? <i>Response</i>	60.1
	(c) How would you go about solving this problem? <i>Response</i>	56.3
	(d) Do you think you could do something to solve it? <i>Yes</i>	34.7
	5 Do you know who are the present councilmen in this country? <i>Mean correct</i>	16.3
	Group efficacy	6(a) Some say that going to meetings of community committees is a <i>waste of time</i> . Others, however, say that one <i>gets something out of going</i> to the meetings of the various community committees. What do you think? <i>Worthwhile</i>
(b) Some say that in order to better the lives of the people, everybody should <i>join together</i> to solve the problems of this place. Others say that each one should solve his problems <i>by himself</i> . <i>Join together</i>		75.6

TABLE 4 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Efficacy Items*

Variable†	Information efficacy II	Information efficacy I	Subjective competence	Efficacy skills	Group efficacy
What is minimum wage‡	.89	-.04	.08	.07	-.04
Minimum wage law exists	.88	.08	.03	.03	.08
Frequency of news	-.05	.83	.11	.04	.04
Hours of radio	.08	.83	.02	.03	-.03
Chance of stopping law	.06	.03	.82	.05	.01
Do something about law	.03	.09	.77	.12	.09
Per cent councilmen named	.11	.06	.04	.76	.03
Problem-solving scale	-.02	.00	.12	.76	.04
Meetings are worthwhile	.01	.15	-.01	-.04	.80
Join together	.02	-.14	.11	.11	.72
Eigenvalue	1.92	1.45	1.28	1.09	.96
Variance explained	19.2%	14.5%	12.8%	10.9%	9.6%

* N = 531, but varies slightly owing to missing data.

† A complete description of variables is contained in Table 3.

‡ Note that the two variables in 'Information efficacy II' are autocorrelated since the second question is not asked if the respondent does not know of the existence of the minimum wage law.

study televisions were rarely owned in the countryside so no measure of television viewing was included. The sum of these two items provides the 'Information efficacy I' index. The second set of information questions is a more direct test of politically-relevant information: its aim is to discover whether the respondent possesses specific pieces of information. It was designed to tap the respondent's knowledge of the existence and nature of the minimum wage law as it applies to peasants. The sum of these two items constitutes the 'Information efficacy II' index.

An additional technique for measuring efficacy is suggested by Mathiason, based upon his research among the urban poor of Venezuela.²⁸ He proposes that the efficacious person is one who is successful at four separate but related tasks. Firstly, he must be aware of a problem, then he must know how the problem arose, in addition he must know how to go about solving it, and finally he must feel that he is capable of doing something about it. In order to tap this conception of efficacy four questions were constructed, based upon a problem mentioned by the respondent. Given the cumulative nature of the questions, the four items were subjected to a Guttman scalogram analysis (rather than factor analysis) and were found to form a valid scale.²⁹ Added to Mathiason's efficacy items was a measure of the knowledge of the names of cantonal councilmen, since in rural Costa Rica nearly all community problems require the intervention of the cantonal government. The measure used was the percentage of councilmen correctly named (the percentage figure being chosen over the raw score because the number of councilmen varies according to the population of the canton). The four items from Mathiason's efficacy scale were summed and z-scored to form an index and were then added to the z-scored municipal councilmen score. This combined scale measures how well equipped the respondent is to deal with problems he may face. The scale will here be called 'Efficacy skills'.

The final measure of efficacy is the respondent's evaluation of the efficacy of group action. Two questions about the value of joining together and attending meetings were asked. This form of efficacy will be referred to as 'Group efficacy'.

FINDINGS

Relationships Among the Modes of Participation

It will be recalled that much previous research has tended to focus *either* on institutionalized *or* on mobilized participation, assuming that the two modes are negatively related. The data to be presented below demonstrate that such is not the case for participation among Costa Rican peasants.

An examination of the relationships between the participatory modes reveals that whereas all of the institutionalized forms are positively associated with each other

²⁸ John R. Mathiason, 'Patterns of Powerlessness among Urban Poor: Toward the Use of Mass Communications for Rapid Social Change', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, VII (1972), 64-88.

²⁹ A complete discussion of this method of measuring efficacy is contained in Seligson, 'A Problem-Solving Efficacy Scale: An Approach to Measuring Political Efficacy', (unpublished paper, 1979).

TABLE 5 Association Between Mobilized Modes of Participation*

	Non-strikers	Strikers
Non-squatters	88.2% (391)	96.6% (85)
Squatters	11.8% (52)	3.4% (3)
Totals	100% (443)	100% (88)
	Yule's $Q = -.58$	Sig. = .009

* Numbers in parentheses are frequencies. Goodman and Kruskal's test of significance (one-tailed) for the normal approximation of the Yule's Q (or *Gamma*) sampling distribution is used here.

(mean inter-item $r = .10$), the two mobilized forms are not. As Table 5 demonstrates, there is a strong negative correlation (Yule's $Q = -.58$) between participation in strikes and in land invasions. Of the fifty-five land invaders in the sample, only three (.6 per cent of the sample) had also been involved in strikes. Although at first this finding may seem puzzling, it is actually readily understandable. Although both forms of participation are mobilized, each is characteristic of a different group of peasants. It will be recalled that strikes occur primarily on large plantations. Squatters, on the other hand, are landless workers without steady jobs. Hence their mobilized behaviour is channelled in a different direction. Because of the distinct nature of the two mobilized forms, they will be treated separately throughout the remainder of this paper rather than be combined into a single index.

What of the relationships between institutionalized and mobilized participation? Strikers are significantly more participant in unions and co-operatives than non-strikers; however, they are significantly less likely to participate in local government and voting than are non-strikers (see Table 6). There are no significant differences between the two groups in communal project and organizational activism.

These findings are not surprising. The much greater union membership among strikers is to be expected since most strikes involve union members. Greater membership in co-operatives is also a result of the association between striking and union membership, because many unions offer savings and credit co-operatives as a service to their members. The significantly lower level of local government activism among strikers is a result of the enclave status of plantations on which many such respondents live. Banana plantations, and to a lesser extent, large coffee plantations, exist as islands within the Costa Rican state. They often have their own schools, water system, electricity supply, railroad, and so on. As a consequence workers in these enclaves have little need to petition the local government for services. Rather, such petitions are normally directed through the unions to the company management. Moreover, in many cases plantation owners have far greater resources at their disposal than do local governments and are therefore much more able to satisfy workers' demands. Finally, local governments tend to feel that demands coming from these enclaves should be solved by the plantation owners. Perhaps for all of these reasons strikers are found to vote less than non-strikers.

TABLE 6 *Association Between Institutionalized and Mobilized Modes of Participation**

Institutionalized modes	Mobilized modes	
	Participation in strikes	Participation in land invasions
Voting	-.42 (.02)	.01 (ns)
Local government activism	-.48 (.005)	.05 (ns)
Organizational activism	-.03 (ns)	.17 (ns)
Communal project participation	-.08 (ns)	.45 (< .001)
Member of a co-operative	.37 (< .001)	.52 (< .001)
Union member	.89 (< .001)	-.51 (.01)
Total N = 531 (varies due to non-response)		

* Correlations are Yule's *Q* except in the cases of organizational activism and project participation where the equivalent *Gamma* is used for the 3x2 table generated. Numbers in parentheses are Goodman and Kruskal's test of significance.

Voting loses some of its significance for the plantation worker since his 'political system' is the plantation rather than the canton or nation. The absence of a significant difference between strikers and non-strikers on organizational activism and communal project participation indicates, however, that within the enclave of the plantation, communal forms of participation go on much as they do outside the enclaves.

The association between participation in land invasions and the institutionalized modes of participation is also presented in Table 6. Those involved in land invasions are significantly more active in communal project participation and in co-operative membership than are those who are not, but they are much less likely to be union members. No significant differences are found on the voting, local government activism and organizational activism dimensions. This pattern of relationships is quite different from the ones uncovered for the peasants involved in strikes. The only similarities lie in co-operative membership (both modes are positively associated with membership) and organizational activism (neither mobilized mode shows any significant relationship). The greater co-operative membership on the part of squatters is easily explained by their need to establish some form of economic co-operation so as to cultivate and market their crops. Land invaders often choose inaccessible areas as their targets in the hope that their invasion may go unnoticed by owners and police for as long as possible. Invaders who occupy land for at least a year can be evicted legally only after the owner pays them for any improvements they may have made on the property. However, the inaccessibility of their land is a two-edged sword for squatters, for once the year expires and crops begin to come in, they must find a way of getting their crops to market or else face the harsh reality

that their efforts have been in vain. For this reason squatters are impelled to form co-operatives. A further factor behind the formation of co-operatives among squatters may be the hostility of local storekeepers (*pulperos*), who are the primary, and in many cases the only, source of credit and market for crops produced on squatters' lands. In addition, storekeepers may be large landowners themselves and invariably have large landowners as clients. Consequently, they are hesitant to support squatters not only because squatters pose a threat to their own landholdings but also because they fear reprisals from their wealthier clients for rendering such support. In the light of these realities squatters are often forced to find other sources of credit and their own market outlets. The co-operative is an ideal solution.

The significantly higher level of communal project participation among squatters as compared to the general peasant population further reveals the greater need on the part of squatters for a collective response to their common problems. Squatters get together not only to form co-operatives, but also to collaborate on a host of community projects. Here again, the remoteness of the areas in which they operate requires collective action. Beyond collective action for solving economic and community problems however, squatters participate at levels no different from those of the rest of the peasant population. Hence squatters vote, participate in local government and become involved in local organizations much to the same degree as do other peasants. The significantly lower union membership of squatters is explained by the same factors which produce the strong negative relationships between squatting and strike participation, and does not bear repeating here.

The overall positive association between the institutionalized modes permits the creation of an overall index of institutionalized political participation which can then be correlated with the mobilized modes. However, as noted above, the strong negative association between the two mobilized modes makes the creation of a single index for them inadvisable. The index of the institutionalized mode is constructed by computing the *z*-scores of each mode and then summing them. The overall distribution is then divided into two categories: non-participant and participant. Table 7 presents cross-tabulations of the institutionalized participation index with the two mobilized modes.

An inspection of Table 7 reveals that respondents who participate in either form of mobilized activity are more active in institutionalized modes of participation than respondents who do not participate in any mobilized behaviour. Table 7(a) shows that more than twice the proportion of non-strikers than of strikers exhibit low institutionalized participation and Table 7(b) shows that nearly twice the proportion of non-squatters than of squatters exhibit low institutionalized participation. The overall strength of association between institutionalized and mobilized participation is not very strong, however, with strike behaviour having a .48 Yule's *Q* with institutionalized participation and squatting having a .38 correlation. The reason for these coefficients not being higher is evident when one turns back to Table 6 above and notes that the relationships between each mobilized mode and the several institutionalized modes are not all in the same direction. In some cases the relationships are strongly negative, and in others they are strongly positive. Consequently the overall relationship is diluted. The use of an overall index of

TABLE 7 Association Between Index of Institutionalized Participation and Mobilized Modes*

		Institutionalized participation index		
		Non-participant	Participant	Totals
Non-strikers	Withdrawal	28.7% (127)	(a) Participation in strikes Conformative participation 71.3% (314)	100% (441)
	Nonconformative opposition	12.5% (11)	Pragmatic mobilized activism 87.5% (77)	100% (88)
		Yule's $Q = .48$. Sig. = .003		(531)
Non-squatters	Withdrawal	27.3% (130)	(b) Participation in land invasions Conformative participation 72.7% (346)	100% (476)
	Nonconformative opposition	14.5% (8)	Pragmatic mobilized activism 85.5% (47)	100% (55)
		Yule's $Q = .38$. Sig. = .05		(531)

* Numbers in parentheses are frequencies. See Table 5 (p. 89) for an explanation of the significance test used.

institutionalized participation in Table 7 reveals the general trend toward higher institutionalized participation among the mobilized participants.

Political-Action Types

The data presented in Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate quite clearly that institutionalized and mobilized modes of participation are by no means mutually exclusive. In order to talk about the relationship between participation and attitudes it is therefore necessary to build a typology which clearly reflects this overlap in participatory activity rather than to treat the data as if they yielded two mutually exclusive types – institutionalized and mobilized.

Following Muller, four political action-types are distinguished in Table 7: Withdrawal, Conformative Participation, Pragmatic Mobilized Activism and Non-conformative Opposition.³⁰ Peasants who participate in neither institutionalized nor mobilized activities are considered to exhibit political Withdrawal. Slightly less than 25 per cent of the sample falls into this category. Institutionalized participation unaccompanied by mobilized involvement defines the Conformative Participation category, into which approximately 60 per cent of all the respondents fall. This is by far the largest group. Respondents who exhibit institutionalized participation, and who also become involved in mobilized modes are called Pragmatic Mobilized Activists. The strike-defined action types contained 8.8 per cent Pragmatic Mobilized Activists and the squatter-defined types included 13.5 per cent in this category. Finally, those who are involved in mobilized activity to the exclusion of institutionalized modes are placed in the category of Nonconformative Opposition. This is the smallest category, containing from 1.5 per cent (squatter defined) to 2.1 per cent (strike defined) of the respondents.

Now that the sample has been segmented into political action-types the analysis can turn to the relationship between attitudes and action-type.

Relationship Between Attitudes and Behaviour

The relationships between trust and the four action-types are presented in Table 8. Respondents are grouped according to their action-type as indicated in Table 7 and then cross-tabulated with the trust index (divided into three categories of low, intermediate and high trust). Since the two mobilized forms are not combined into a single index, two separate cross-tabulations are shown; but the conclusions to be drawn from each are quite similar.

Looking first at the six cells in each table which comprise the Pragmatic Mobilized

³⁰ Muller includes one category, Reformist Action, not covered here. This category involves those who exhibit intermediate levels of mobilized participation and medium to high levels of institutionalized political behaviour. Since the two mobilized forms of behaviour in this study were not combined into a single index (which would have permitted an intermediate category) the intermediate category of mobilized participation is not present. Muller refers to the 'Pragmatic Mobilized Activist' type as 'Realist Revolutionary'. Muller's terminology, while it may be appropriate for other data sets, is not entirely fitting here since most Costa Rican strikers and land invaders are not revolutionaries in the commonly understood meaning of the term.

TABLE 8 Association Between Trust and Political Action-Types*

Political action-type	Trust			Totals
	Low	Intermediate	High	
	(a) Strike participation			
Withdrawal	38.6% (49)	37.0% (47)	24.4% (31)	100% (127)
Conformative participation	42.1% (133)	38.6% (122)	19.3% (61)	100% (316)
Pragmatic mobilized activism	53.2% (41)	39.0% (30)	7.8% (6)	100% (77)
Non-conformative opposition	63.6% (7)	36.4% (4)	0% (0)	100% (11)
	<i>Gamma</i> = -.19. <i>Sig.</i> = .03.			(531)
	(b) Land invasion participation			
Withdrawal	37.7% (49)	38.5% (50)	23.8% (31)	100% (130)
Conformative participation	41.3% (143)	39.6% (137)	19.1% (66)	100% (346)
Pragmatic mobilized activism	66.0% (31)	31.9% (15)	2.1% (1)	100% (47)
Non-conformative opposition	87.5% (7)	12.5% (1)	0% (0)	100% (8)
	<i>Gamma</i> = -.26. <i>Sig.</i> = .007.			(531)

* Numbers in parentheses are frequencies.

Activism and the Non-conformative Opposition types it is quite clear that high levels of trust are rarely associated with these types. There is only a single person among the fifty-five squatters who exhibits high trust and six persons among the eighty-eight strikers who do so. When trust is correlated with dichotomized squatting/no-squatting and strike/no-strike variables (tables not shown), the Yule's *Q*s with trust are .87 and .56 respectively, both significant at $< .001$. Clearly, participation in mobilized activities is rarely associated with strong trust in government. However, the data do not support the commonly held view that high trust is a necessary condition for institutionalized participation. As can be seen, among the Conformative respondents there are over twice as many peasants with low trust as there are with high trust. When trust and each mode of institutionalized political participation (i.e. voting, local government activism, organizational activism, communal project participation and workplace participation) are cross-tabulated (tables not shown), no significant correlations are uncovered. Moreover, while researchers have predicted that political withdrawal is invariably associated with low trust, these data show that although there is a tendency for withdrawal to be more frequently associated with

lower levels of trust than with higher levels, it can and does occur at all levels of trust.

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this examination of the relationship between trust and action-types is that while the absence of high trust appears to be an important condition for mobilized participation, low levels of trust can be found among all four types. In other words, the absence of trust cannot by itself explain the full range of ways in which peasants become politically involved. This is precisely the conclusion Gamson reaches, leading him to suggest that a second attitudinal variable, efficacy, must also be taken into consideration. Let us now proceed to that analysis.

Five indices of efficacy were developed earlier in this paper. Although factor analysis has demonstrated their existence as separate attitudinal constructs, it can be expected that there will be some overlap among them when they are used to predict behaviour. As a result cross-tabulation, although desirable because it adheres to the ordinal nature of the data, would not reveal the independent contribution of each form of efficacy to participation. Moreover, the large number of tables which would be generated, many of which would have very low cell frequencies, requires a departure from contingency table analysis to multiple regression at this point in the analysis.

The results of eight separate multiple regression analyses are summarized in Table 9. Each of the attitudinal predictors is related to each of the modes of political participation. The *beta* weights (standardized regression coefficients) indicate the relative effect of each predictor on the dependent variable. Those *beta* weights which make a statistically significant contribution to the equation are indicated with an asterisk. The possibility of the presence of an interaction effect was examined. Although not shown here, the regression analyses were re-run so as to include an interaction term (for trust and efficacy), but no significant interactions were found.

The pattern of significant *beta* weights presented in Table 9 is revealing. Table 8 had led us to suspect that while low trust is closely related to mobilized forms of behaviour, it has no clear relationship with institutionalized ones. This suspicion is clearly confirmed in the multiple regression results. Table 9 shows that trust is a significant predictor only of the mobilized modes of participation. Equally interesting is the finding that trust is the only significant predictor of strike behaviour; none of the efficacy indicators is significant. Gamson's expectation that trust and efficacy must be coupled for mobilization to occur is not supported in the case of strike participation. As regards land invasions, however, the hypothesis is partially supported. Low political trust and two forms of efficacy (Skills and Group) predict squatting behaviour. The *beta* weights indicate, however, that trust is a more powerful predictor of land invasions than is any single indicator of efficacy. In fact, the simple *r* between trust and invasion is $\cdot 19$ and the addition of the two other predictors raises it to only $\cdot 23$ (the total multiple *R* is $\cdot 25$). Hence, the addition of the efficacy indicators adds little to the predictive power of the equation.

The regression equations for the institutionalized forms of participation reveal the opposite pattern from those corresponding to the mobilized ones. Trust is not a

TABLE 9 Multiple Regressions of Trust, Efficacy and Participation (Final Step)

Participatory modes	Attitudinal predictors							Multiple R
	Trust	Subjective competence	Information efficacy I	Information efficacy II	Efficacy skills	Group efficacy		
<i>Mobilized modes</i>								
Land invasions	-.19*	-.03	.07	.06	.10*	.10*	.25	
Strikes	-.22*	.11	.10	—	.06	-.14	.28	
<i>Institutionalized modes</i>								
Voting	.05	-.02	-.01	.18*	-.09	-.01	.21	
Local government activism	-.02	.13*	.03	.04	.37*	-.04	.43	
Organizational activism	.03	.11*	.15*	—	.21*	.12*	.34	
Communal project participation	-.02	.10*	—	.03	.54*	.10*	.60	
Member of a co-operative	-.05	-.10*	.02	-.02	.28*	.10*	.30	
Member of a union	-.07	-.01	.08	-.04	.09*	.07	.15	
Institutionalized participation index	.03	.06	.07	.06	.45*	.07	.51	

* Numbers in the columns are beta weights. Betas followed by an asterisk are significant (F ratio) at the .05 level or less. Dashed lines in place of the beta weight indicate that the variable did not enter the equation.

significant predictor of any form of institutionalized participation. In every case, participation in the institutionalized modes is best predicted by efficacy; and of the five separate modes of efficacy that are presented, 'Efficacy skills' is the strongest predictor of all the institutionalized modes of participation except voting. Voting is best predicted by the 'Information efficacy II' index, indicating that this form of behaviour may have more to do with the respondent's awareness of issues in a campaign than with other aspects of efficacy. Perhaps the fact that voting is the only form of participation which is a completely individual activity explains the reason why it deviates from the pattern exhibited by the other institutionalized modes.

The summary institutionalized participation index, used earlier in Table 7 (p. 92), functions as the dependent variable in one final regression solution presented at the bottom of Table 9. The overall pattern revealed above is made quite clear by this summary index. Trust is unrelated to institutionalized participation, the best predictor of the latter being the 'Efficacy skills' scale.

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that among Costa Rican peasants institutionalized participation is related to efficacy alone, trust having no direct bearing on it. Mobilized participation, on the other hand, is largely a product of low trust, efficacy being somewhat positively related to participation in the form of land invasion. It should be pointed out that the explained variance is not very high in the regression equations just presented. At best it reaches 36 per cent (communal project participation). However, it should be kept in mind that this paper focuses on only two attitudes (efficacy and trust). The inclusion of additional attitudes (e.g. relative deprivation, or modernity), socio-economic status, demographic and structural characteristics, should markedly increase the predictive power of the regression equations. Consideration of those variables in this paper, however, would be out of place since the intention here has not been to explain participation in Costa Rica but, rather, to test the Gamson hypothesis.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to sift through the varying interpretations of Gamson's hypothesis and to test it with data drawn from a sample of Costa Rican peasants. This study has demonstrated that among Costa Rican peasants institutionalized participation is related to a sense of efficacy, whereas mobilized participation is related to low trust. Efficacy is also of some importance in predicting mobilized behaviour in the form of land invasions, but clearly the primary predictor of mobilization, the one which explains most of the variance, is trust.

Where do these findings leave Gamson's hypothesis? They demonstrate that Gamson was on the right track when he argued that both trust and efficacy are necessary to predict mobilization. This paper demonstrates that, at least among Costa Rican peasants, both trust and efficacy are important in predicting the full range of modes of political participation, trust predicting mobilized modes and efficacy institutionalized ones. Trust has no impact on institutionalized participation, however, and efficacy has only a small impact on one form of mobilized participation.

Two widely differing implications can be drawn from these findings if one is bold

enough to generalize them to peasants throughout the Third World. On the one hand, some might argue that since a sense of efficacy stimulates participation, educational policy should be directed towards the inculcation of a sense of powerlessness in the citizenry. Advocates of this position can point to Huntington's argument that the central problem of political stability in the Third World is controlling political participation so that it does not outstrip political institutionalization. Indeed, one of Huntington's central concerns has been the growth of participation among peasants, or what he termed the 'green uprising'.³¹ On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that efficacy predicts institutionalized participation, not mobilized participation. It would therefore seem that this is precisely the type of participation which, Huntington argues, governments should be encouraging. Moreover, as John Booth and I have pointed out elsewhere, there is considerable evidence to show that institutionalized participation at the local level creates resources (i.e. public goods).³² For example, participation in communal projects is an important source of local community development, and many schools, roads and other projects have been completed through the use of voluntary peasant labour. Peasant villages in Costa Rica have undergone major transformations as a result of communal effort.

The implications of the impact of trust on political participation are equally significant. Again, if the findings can be generalized, Third World peasants with low trust in government are the ones most likely to become involved in mobilized political participation. The form that such mobilization will take and the impact it will have is of course dependent on a multitude of factors beyond the range of consideration of this paper. But in Costa Rica land invasions of the early 1970s were directly responsible for a sharp change in government policy towards land reform. As a result, the pace of reform, which had almost come to a complete halt by the late 1960s, was dramatically speeded up. Similarly, as a result of strikes in the banana zones, major improvements were made in salaries, housing and work conditions. Unfortunately, elsewhere in Latin America peasant mobilization does not usually result in benefits for those involved. It was as a result of peasant mobilization that the infamous *matanza* (slaughter) of thousands of peasants occurred in El Salvador in 1932, and there are many other instances in Latin America and elsewhere of brutally repressed peasant uprisings.³³

It is too soon, however, to generalize beyond the Costa Rican data at this point. This study has demonstrated that at least in one case the links between attitudes and participatory behaviour are indeed present. Other researchers might wish to examine these links in other contexts and may find the indicators developed here to be of some value.

³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967).

³² Seligson and Booth, 'Development, Political Participation and the Poor in Latin America'.

³³ See Gerrit Huizer, *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972); and Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).