Reformism and Radicalism among Peasants: An Empirical Test of Paige's Agrarian Revolution

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Reformism and Radicalism among Peasants: An Empirical Test of Paige's Agrarian Revolution*

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This study tests a well-known and widely accepted theory of agrarian revolution (Paige 1975) using data that precisely fit the categorization scheme upon which Paige's model rests. In an effort to hold constant the influences of the state and to focus upon the structural variables that Paige says are determinant, the study draws upon data on peasant political attitudes and behaviors in a single country, Costa Rica. The findings suggest serious limitations to the predictions derived from the theory. Although our tests sometimes show Paige's variables to be statistically significant and his predictions to be correct, more often than not his predictions are in the wrong direction or not significant at all. We explore other variables that aid in explaining the relevant political attitudes and compare their predictive power to that of Paige's structural variables. We conclude that the Paige model is underspecified and that a more accurate model needs to account for these other variables as well as for the influence of the national state.

It is ironic that while the ending of the Cold War may have sharply reduced the chances of world war, domestic conflicts seem to be more prevalent than ever. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Somalia, and the outbreak of violence within numerous republics of the former Soviet Union attest to this assertion. While some old conflicts appear to have been resolved, others, including several in Africa, have continued unabated, and new ones have exploded in what were previously relatively peaceful national territories. In attempting to reflect political reality, many social science theories have focused on war and international conflict. While there are good reasons to continue our study of international conflict, contemporary events now demand that we increase our attention to testing theories explaining domestic conflict. In particular we need to know how domestic conflict arises and what conditions precede it.

Most of the major domestic conflicts in the twentieth century have involved the peasantry.[1] This has been true in Mexico (Womack 1968),

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    [1]Since definitions of "peasant" vary, there are no precise estimates as to the number of peasants in the world. Despite continuing worldwide urbanization, the number of peas-

Russia (Wolf 1969, 452–71), Vietnam (Popkin 1979), Bolivia (Malloy 1970), and throughout Central America (Anderson 1994; Booth 1985; Pearce 1986) to name just a few. Although peasant rebellion in Central America has diminished, a new peasant rebellion has broken out in southern Mexico, the international and domestic effects of which we cannot yet foresee. What causes such outbursts? In Mexico and elsewhere, why do poverty-stricken, marginalized people risk all against overwhelming odds? In what has by now become a classic review of the research on peasant revolution, Theda Skocpol (1982) addresses the key questions in the field: "Which peasants are most prone to revolution and why?" In her review, Skocpol notes that of all the studies attempting to answer this question, Jeffery Paige's comparative study *Agrarian Revolution* is methodologically the "most elaborate" and sophisticated and is an "unusually meticulous piece of scholarship" (Skocpol 1982, 353–56). In addition, it is the only study in Skocpol's review that addresses not only the fact of domestic violence but also the potential for it. By studying both revolutionary movements and nonrevolutionary reformist movements, Paige draws to our attention a more complete perspective than does any study of conflict alone.[2]

We agree with Skocpol that Paige's study is methodologically one of the most interesting works of its kind, especially because it offers an extraordinarily rich opportunity for testing theory. Surprisingly, however, even though Paige's theory of peasant revolution is widely cited and used to support numerous case studies, to our knowledge, no author has tested the theory systematically using empirical data.[3] As we discuss below, a central obstacle to conducting such a test has been the absence of data sets in which the categories of peasants as defined by Paige have been clearly distinguishable. In this article, we test the Paige thesis with data collected at a time very close to that in which Paige published his theory and that we believe does allow for clear distinctions among the various types of peasants. First, however, we present a brief outline of

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ants remains very high. Among the low-income countries, where most rural dwellers would be classified by many scholars as peasants, in 1990 there were some 2.2 billion rural people out of a total world population of 5.3 billion (World Bank 1992).

[2]Among the most important reviews and critiques of Paige are Skocpol (1982) and Stinchcombe (1983).

[3]The *Social Science Citation Index* lists 308 citations to Paige's *Agrarian Revolution* in the period 1975–93. Among those recent studies that use some of Paige's concepts in examining specific cases of peasant rebellion are Knight (1986, 152–59), Herring (1989, 99), Farideh (1988, 231–56), Brockett (1991, 253–74), and Wickham-Crowley (1991a, 1991b).

the key predictions of the Paige thesis, followed by our operationalization and testing of it.

Which Peasants Are Most Prone to Revolution? The Paige Thesis

Paige's theory focuses on class relations between cultivators (i.e., the peasants) and noncultivators who extract surplus from the peasant and the land. The varying income sources of cultivators and noncultivators is the crucial factor that determines which types of peasant will be revolutionary or radical and which types engage in other forms of political behavior. Although there is no room here to recapitulate the highly nuanced thesis that Paige develops, it is perhaps easiest to understand in summary form by making reference to the typology he constructs, shown in Figure 1 below. Paige argues that the income sources of most noncultivators come primarily from land or capital whereas income sources for cultivators come from land or wages. Although the income sources are not in reality dichotomies, the neat division into categories is directly "associated with discrete forms of agricultural organization" (Paige 1975, 12). That is to say, each combination produces a different type of agricultural organization in which a particular type of peasant predominates. For each type, a distinct political outcome becomes most likely.

The four cells in the theory, which we have labeled *A–D* to aid in their identification, are shown in Figure 1. The top two cells, *A* and *B*, are the ones Paige sees as producing the most radical outcomes. Cell *A* shows that commercial haciendas emerge in settings in which cultivators and noncultivators both rely upon land as their primary source of income. According to Paige, this situation is the one most likely to lead to an agrarian revolt. This is because the noncultivating class is economically weak and therefore relies "on political restrictions on land ownership.[4] These restrictions tend to focus conflict on the control and distribution of landed property" (Paige 1975, 18). However, owing to conditions inherent in this situation, revolt is not likely to be successful in overthrowing the state, and this land-and-land scenario does not lead to revolution.

Cell *B* is dominated by sharecroppers and migratory laborers, a situation in which the cultivators draw their income from wages rather than

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[4]Paige uses the term "weak" here in a relative sense, meaning that an elite dependent on agrarian resources has less power than an elite whose wealth is based on capital and the ownership of industry. The land-dependent elite is weak relative to other kinds of elites but is quite strong in relation to the cultivating classes. Students of elite power may well debate just how weak a land-based elite really is. For example, Paige's own recent study of the Salvadoran coffee oligarchy shows how such an elite can impose its own agenda despite decades of domestic and international opposition. Again, weakness is relative (Paige 1993).

Figure 1

Income Source of Cultivators

	Land	Wages
Land	*A* Commercial Hacienda = Agrarian Revolt	*B* Sharecropping/Migratory Labor = Agrarian Revolution
Capital	*D* Smallholding = Commodity Reform	*C* Plantation = Labor Reform

Income Source of Noncultivators

from land.[5] At the same time, the noncultivating class relies on land, as it did in cell A, and is again both economically weak and politically rigid.[6] This combination of land and wages is the most volatile situation, according to Paige, and is most likely to produce agrarian revolution. Paige argues that the cultivators' reliance on wages rather than on land means greater risk and therefore "greater receptivity to revolutionary appeals" (Paige 1975, 26). It is a combination that is highly conducive to extremism and radical mobilization among cultivators and to intransigence among noncultivators. No other cell yields revolution because the combination of income sources elsewhere produces either more flexibility among noncultivators or less radical mobilization among cultivators or both.[7]

Cells C and D constitute Paige's focus on reform and therefore on scenarios where violent conflict is avoided. It is the addition of these two cells that broadens his theory far beyond the implications of a theory focusing on revolution alone. In cells C and D, Paige discusses the domestic conditions that allow tension and political conflict to remain nonviolent and to result in reform rather than in either revolt or revolution. In cell C cultivators earn income from wages, but noncultivators rely on capital. In this capital-and-wages scenario, plantations predominate, and the noncultivating class has access to an expanding source of income. This expanding pie allows noncultivators to be flexible in political negotiations, and labor reform is the most likely political outcome in this scenario.

Finally, cell D also results in political reform. In it cultivators draw their income from the land, and noncultivators rely on capital. In this land-and-capital scenario, peasants are conservative and cautious, as

[5]Paige (1993) defines sharecropping as receipt of payment in wages, but wages in kind rather than wages in cash. This is different from the traditional way of viewing sharecropping in which the sharecropper is considered to be doing the paying, in kind, for the privilege of using the land. Paige considers that it is the landlord who is doing the paying, and therefore he can classify sharecroppers in cell B, along with migrants, as relying upon wages for income (Paige 1975, 59–65).

[6]A recent article by Paige (1993) examines the political position of one particularly rigid group of landowning elites: the coffee oligarchy in contemporary El Salvador. Although Paige's essay is not a test of his 1975 theory, it offers an interesting in-depth view of just how rigid a landowning elite can be.

[7]In Paige's theory, there are actually two outcomes associated with this cell. The sharecropping system gives rise to revolutionary socialism, whereas the migratory state system gives rise to revolutionary nationalism (1975, 58–66). Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two types of reform, and we have treated the cell as one single group. Paige himself, while making this distinction in his text, continues to use the fourfold table to depict his theory. Most of those who have used this theory to explain their cases also confine themselves to the four outcomes rather than five.

they were in cell A, while noncultivators are relatively flexible as they were in cell C and for the same reasons. The political result is reform, which Paige classifies as commodity reform.[8]

Paige's classifications based on income source and political outcomes based on history are precise and easily replicable.[9] He explains carefully how and why he classifies each peasant type as he does and clearly distinguishes the differences among reform, revolt, and revolution. This precision greatly lightens the task of replicating his scenarios and testing his predictions. The following section details our operationalization of Paige's thesis.

Operationalizing the Theory

The connection between these structural factors and the attitudes and behaviors of cultivators and noncultivators is quite direct in Paige's scheme. For example, he argues with reference to the landed estate: "The fundamentally different attitudes toward labor of land-and-capital-dependent upper classes lead to rigid, unyielding political repression on the one hand and a willingness to compromise on the other. Correspondingly the workers in a landed estate system can only protest through attempts to disrupt the working of the forced labor system" (Paige 1975, 23). Hence, an empirical test of the Paige thesis is possible by comparing the attitudes of the individuals who "inhabit" the four cells of the Paige framework.

Paige himself provides two tests of the theory, one qualitative and the other quantitative. The qualitative evidence appears in three detailed case studies of Peru, Angola, and Vietnam. These case studies have been emulated by other scholars who have attempted to show how their cases do or do not fit Paige's model. These efforts have typically focused on demonstrating that a particular type of peasant (sharecropper, smallholder, etc.) was or was not a revolutionary element (Anderson 1993, 495–522). For example, Paige's case study of Peru focuses on hacienda and plantation workers; his Angola study, on migratory labor estates; and his Vietnam study, on sharecropping. Not one of these studies, however, attempts to examine simultaneously all four major classifications of the Paige thesis so as to test the prediction that each peasant type

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[8]Paige's term "commodity reform" refers to reforms focusing on changes in the commodity market (prices, distribution, commercial practices) as opposed to fundamental reforms in structure or in the ownership of the means of production (Paige 1975, 45–48).

[9]Our summary here of Paige's (1975) theory and argument is necessarily brief and excludes many details. For a full version of the theory, see chap. 1 and the conclusion of *Agrarian Revolution*.

behaves differently from any other and that each peasant type engages in
one kind of political action. Such a test emerges only in Paige's cross-
national data analysis based on secondary data derived for 70 developing
nations.

The great virtue of the cross-national approach employed by Paige is
that it allows testing of the thesis in numerous different national contexts.
Normally it is precisely that kind of test that meets the standards of
contemporary empirical social science, and therefore Paige's conclusions
that his data confirm his predictions would be strong evidence in support
of his theory. Unfortunately, however, his analysis is flawed by serious
underspecification errors. Variables that have frequently been theorized
as having an impact on revolution were excluded from the analysis.
Among the most obvious omissions were data on land distribution (e.g.,
a Gini index of land inequality), income distribution (e.g., income share
of the top quintile), the relative level of economic development in the
country (e.g., GNP per capita), the relative level of national social devel-
opment (e.g., literacy, infant mortality rate, etc.), and the degree of re-
gime repressiveness (e.g., magnitude of violations of civil and human
rights). In several cross-national studies, all of these variables were im-
portant predictors of political behavior, revolutionary and nonrevolution-
ary alike (Muller and Seligson 1987). The inclusion of other variables in
the Paige data base, at the least, would very likely reduce the magnitude
of the regression coefficients he produced. At worst, the key structural
variables Paige uses could be supplanted entirely by one or more of these
omitted variables. In that case, the structural variable would be consid-
ered spurious.

The ideal way to improve Paige's test would be to simply add these
omitted variables into his data base. Unfortunately, however, this is not
possible for two reasons. First, although Paige's data are derived from
70 developing nations, his unit of analysis is the export sector, of which
he focuses on a total of 135. Hence, in many countries in the data base,
he includes more than one export sector. This means that it is not possible
to utilize country-level data on income, land distribution, GNP, and social
indicators. Rather, one would need to locate data on land distribution,
literacy, and infant mortality for the physical area of the export sector
selected by Paige, rather than using data that are available for the country
as a whole. In many cases, such regional data do not exist or, if they do,
would require access to raw census figures available only in the census
bureau of each country.

Second, when associating any given case with one type of agro-
export crop, he "assigns" that case to whichever type of crop appears
dominant in that region (Paige 1975, 40, 76). The assumption does not

allow for the possibility that any given crop may be grown under different mixes of land and labor within a given region. For example, coffee may be grown on both large plantations using a wage labor force and on smallholder plots or family farms within one region. This inaccurate assumption leads to inaccurate generalization: Paige associates certain land and labor combinations with specific political events. Our data show that, in fact, one type of political event, such as certain types of protest, can be found across all different income sources, albeit with varying levels of participation.

The second problem is that the Paige data are drawn from the period 1948–70, a time span during which dramatic changes took place on many of the omitted variables in the developing countries. Hence, it would be extremely difficult to determine which GNP or land Gini data point was associated with each of the cases in the data base. In short, while the Paige data base is very attractive because of its broad sweep, updating it to include key omitted variables would be extremely difficult and perhaps impossible for many cases.

Given these barriers to expanding the original Paige data base, our approach is to propose a very different test of the theory, one that returns to Paige's case study method but relies on quantitative microlevel data rather than qualitative data. We undertake a careful effort of categorizing peasants into the four cells of the Paige typology. We then examine the attitudes and behavior of the peasants in each cell to determine (1) if they vary from one another and (2) if that variation in attitudes and behaviors is consistent with the predictions made by Paige in terms of his four outcomes (revolt, revolution, labor reform, or commodity reform). We could not, of course, expect to encounter within a single country all four outcomes. Rather, our expectation is that if income sources do determine peasant attitudes and behaviors that would lead to the outcomes Paige predicts, then there should be consistent and predictable variation among the peasant types based on income sources in the direction that he forecasts. For example, peasants who fall into the upper two cells (A and B) of Figure 1 should manifest more radical attitudes and behaviors than those in cells C and D. On the other hand, peasants who fall into cells C and D according to Paige's income-based typologies should be more reformist and less radical in their attitudes and behaviors. If Paige's predictions are correct, we would expect differences in attitudes and behaviors suggesting evidence of radicalism among peasants in cells A and B and evidence of reformism among peasants in cells C and D.

To successfully apply this test of the Paige thesis, one needs to develop a data base that is sufficiently fine grained to enable the unambiguous subdivision of peasants into the categories Paige proposes.

Unfortunately, in many studies of revolution, researchers merely distinguish between peasants and urban dwellers, lumping all rural dwellers into a single category. Public opinion surveys are especially deficient in this regard. Many surveys exclude rural areas entirely or incorporate only one or two so-called representative areas. Even in those studies that focus primarily on the peasantry, insufficient information exists to allow categorization of peasants following Paige's theory.

The Data

We are fortunate to be able to overcome these limitations with a sample of Costa Rican peasants that was specifically designed to allow very precise classification of the respondents. Although Costa Rica has not undergone a major rebellion since 1948, Paige's cross-national data set uses many such cases to test the hypothesis. Costa Rica is, in fact, one of Paige's cases. Had all of his cases been ones in which revolutions occurred, he would not have had any variation in his dependent variable.

The literature on Latin American peasants suggests a number of clear-cut distinctions among rural dwellers, the most important of which is the peasant's relationship to the land (Ford 1955; Wolf 1955, 452–71; Barraclough and Flores 1965; Schulman 1966, 122–36; Smith 1970, 171–85; Feder 1971, 83–97; Stavenhagen 1975; Whyte and Alberti 1976). The major categories that emerge in all of these studies parallel Paige's categories, although they often provide a finer differentiation within his four types and often develop categorization schemes derived from different logics. At one level, a major distinction is made between the landed and landless, with the landed being further subdivided into those peasants who own their land versus those who only maintain usufructuary rights over it. These two groups conform to Paige's smallholders and sharecroppers. A finer-grained analysis also reveals that not all tenants are sharecroppers (i.e., those who pay for the use of land with a portion of the crop), since some are renters (i.e., those who pay for the use of land in cash, usually up front). At another level, distinctions are made among the landless, dividing them as Paige does into those who work on commercial haciendas versus those who work on plantations. But there are further distinctions, yielding groups of peasants who have no steady plantation or hacienda jobs, but rather work as day laborers or migrant workers. Paige groups all of these laborers into his cell *B* under the rubric of "migratory labor." In Costa Rica, prior research has shown that all of these categories of peasants exist in the country, and therefore, it is an ideal location to conduct a test of the theory (Norris 1952; Castillo 1954, 97–106; Goldkind 1961, 365; Seligson 1977b).

The data set itself consists of interviews with 531 male Costa Rican

peasants.[10] A stratified and clustered area probability sample design was used, employing the exceptionally accurate maps that the Costa Rican census bureau had just completed preparing for the decennial census in the years before the survey. On those maps, every dwelling unit in the country could be precisely located. The sample was designed to include a wide cross-section of the Costa Rican peasantry including all nine types for which data were being sought. A total of 66 villages were included in the sample, distributed among 28 districts, the district being the smallest administrative subdivision in Costa Rica. Further details are contained in Seligson (1977b, 1980). Each respondent answered numerous questions regarding land tenure and wage labor. The replies to those questions allowed precise categorization of the sample into the various types Paige describes (see Figure 2).

Our initial intention was to categorize all the 531 respondents into one of Paige's four types. We discovered, however, that in many instances a given respondent could have easily been classified into more than one cell. For example, we found cases of some smallholders who also worked as laborers and thus could have fallen into either cell *B* or cell *D*. Paige himself recognized this difficulty when he attempted to categorize his cases into mutually exclusive cells. Paige's solution was to focus on what he calls the "dominant enterprise type" (1975, 77) and thereby categorize each of the 135 cases in his worldwide data base into one of the four cells.

Our solution differs from that of Paige. We felt that by categorizing an individual peasant based upon his predominant characteristic would have created two problems. First, the decision would have been arbitrary, since no decision rule would be entirely satisfactory. For example, had we decided to classify a respondent who both owned land and worked as a laborer depending upon which occupation encompassed more of his work year, others might reject that classification and propose instead that the criterion should not be work but income. By that standard, if the respondent earned more from the farm labor than from work on his own land, he would have been categorized as a laborer rather than a small landholder. The second difficulty was that, even if we could settle the debate over the appropriate categorization variable for each of these mixed peasant types, we would still be left with some fuzziness among them. As Paige himself notes, the four categories are part of the larger framework, and it is to be assumed that individual peasants who possess characteristics of more than one cell would themselves express attitudes

[10]The sample focused on males because they normally control the land in rural Costa Rica.

Figure 2

Income Source of Cultivators

	Land	Wages

Income Source of Noncultivators

Land

Capital

A	*B*
Commercial Hacienda = Agrarian Revolt Steady, Nonplantation ($N = 59$)	Sharecropping/Migratory Labor = Agrarian Revolution Renters ($N = 11$) Sharecroppers ($N = 25$) Migrants ($N = 15$) Day Laborers ($N = 57$) Total ($N = 108$)
D	*C*
Smallholding = Commodity Reform Titled Smallholders ($N = 56$) Untitled Smallholders ($N = 32$) Squatters ($N = 46$) Total ($N = 134$)	Plantation = Labor Reform Banana Plantation Workers ($N = 88$)

and behaviors partly consistent with one cell and partly consistent with another. As a result, we would find it much more difficult to confirm Paige's thesis, since there would be a blurring of responses within each cell and a reduced chance for statistically significant differences to emerge among the cells. We wanted to maximize the opportunity to confirm the Paige thesis.

Our approach was to exclude from the sample analyzed in this paper any cases of ambiguity as to classification. We developed profiles of each of the 531 respondents and searched carefully for any characteristics that overlapped into more than one cell. As a result of this pruning exercise, we dropped 142 cases, leaving the final sample analyzed here with 389 cases (see Figure 2). The net result of this recategorization of the initial nine types into four and the deletion of ambiguous cases allowed us to match our sample closely and unambiguously with Paige's ideal types in his theoretical design. We now turn our attention to the data analysis itself.

Findings

Our data analysis proceeds by examining four distinct sets of variables, each of which provides a different test of the Paige thesis. We begin by examining levels of political alienation among the peasants who inhabit the four cells of the framework, expecting to see higher levels of alienation among those in the upper two cells (revolt and revolution) than in the lower two cells (labor or commodity reform). We reverse this perspective by moving on beyond attitudes to an examination of conventional political participation, expecting that conventional participation would be higher among the reformist peasants and lower among the revolutionary ones. We then explore a set of attitudes and behaviors expressly designed to measure support for reformist measures, again with the expectation of higher levels to be found in the reformist cells and lower levels in the revolutionary cells. Finally, we turn to radical attitudes related to agrarian issues and expect the peasants in the revolt and revolutionary cells to score higher than those in the reformist cells. We now review each of these four tests of the thesis and present our results.

Political Alienation

One of the most fundamental attitudes studied by political scientists is political alienation. Citrin et al. (1975, 3) have defined the concept this way: "To be politically alienated is to feel a relatively enduring sense of estrangement from existing political institutions, values and leaders. At the far end of the continuum, the politically alienated feel themselves outsiders, gripped in an alien political order; they would welcome

fundamental changes in the ongoing regime." This definition is particu-
larly appropriate for our study, since it is placed within the Marxist frame-
work in which Paige devised his theory. We begin our test of theory by
examining measures of political alienation. The most commonly used
measure of political alienation is the Trust in Government series devel-
oped by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan
(Robinson, Rusk, and Head 1969). Miller (1974, 951–72) concluded that
the items produced a valid measure of political discontent. Others have
questioned the predictive power of the Trust in Government series but
have not disputed its ability to make gross distinctions between those
who are more trusting in the government versus those who are less so
(Seligson 1983; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982). The data provide us
with four separate questions designed to uncover the trust or alienation
respondents feel toward the Costa Rican government. The first of these
directly addresses levels of trust in government: "How often can you
trust the government (almost always, sometimes, never)?" The second
addresses perspectives on government uses of tax monies: "How much
does the government misspend tax money (none, a little, some, a lot)?"
The third addresses elite favoritism: "Is the government interested in the
majority of the people or in important families?" The last asks: "Does
the government help you, hurt you, or neither helps nor hurts?"

Relying upon Paige's predictions, one would expect that cultivators
in cells *A* and *B* would demonstrate higher levels of political alienation
across these four measures. On the other hand, Paige theorizes that plan-
tation workers and smallholding peasants will be more inclined toward
reformist movements. From that speculation, one might surmise that they
would also be less inclined to voice distrust in government actions than
cultivators in cells *A* and *B*. Following Paige's methodology, one would
expect these differences to be revealed in statistically significant differ-
ences between cells *A* and *B*, on the one hand, and *C* and *D*, on the other
hand. In Table 1 we compare the levels of alienation on four items for
each of the four categories of peasants suggested by Paige.

An examination of the results reveals that in no instance is there a
statistically significant difference among the four peasant types. Indeed,
examination of the data reveals many anomalies. For example, on the
first item, which measures overall alienation, the commercial hacienda
laborers express slightly *lower* extreme distrust ("almost never trust the
government") than do the smallholding peasants, theoretically the least
alienated and least radical of the four types. Although the majority of the
respondents in three of the four items answer in an alienated fashion,
indicating general discontent among the respondents, it is equally clear

Table 1. Political Alienation

Question	Paige's Fourfold Classification Scheme							
	Cell A: Commercial Hacienda		Cell B: Share/Rent/ Mig./Day		Cell C: Plantation		Cell D: Smallholding	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
How often can you trust govt.?								
Almost always	8.5	5	11.1	12	10.2	9	14.2	19
Sometimes	32.2	19	17.6	19	29.5	26	25.4	34
Almost never	57.6	34	68.5	74	59.1	52	60.4	81
Don't know	1.7	1	2.8	3	1.1	1	.0	0
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
How much does govt. misspend tax money?								
None	3.4	2	1.9	2	5.7	5	6.7	9
Little	16.9	10	17.6	19	11.4	10	9.0	12
Some	16.9	10	14.8	16	14.8	13	20.1	27
Lot	49.2	29	50.0	54	55.7	49	55.2	74
Don't know	13.6	8	15.7	17	12.5	11	9.0	12
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Is govt. interested in majority or in important families?								
Majority	33.9	20	36.1	39	35.2	31	28.4	38
Families	62.7	37	61.1	66	62.5	55	68.7	92
Don't know	3.4	2	2.8	3	2.3	2	3.0	4
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Does govt. help you, hurt, or neither?								
Helps	18.6	11	22.2	24	19.3	17	25.4	34
Neither	45.8	27	46.3	50	39.8	35	37.3	50
Hurts	35.6	21	31.5	34	40.9	36	36.6	49
Don't know	.0	0	.0	0	.0	0	.7	1
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134

Note: None of the above cross-tabulations is statistically significant at < .05. Column totals are rounded to 100%.

that no one group emerges as more alienated than any other. The Paige thesis is not supported by these data.

Conventional Political Participation

Active political participation in conventional activities, such as elections, community groups, and local government, provides another test of the Paige thesis. One would expect that those who participate more in such activities would be those who are more supportive of status quo politics and less politically alienated from the system. For example, Coleman (1976) has shown that in Mexico abstention from the vote is linked to political discontent, and cross-national studies of conventional participation have shown that a wide variety of conventional forms of participation are more frequently practiced by the less alienated (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1975). Our interpretation of Paige's theory is that cells A and B should exhibit significantly lower levels of conventional political participation than do cells C and D. Table 2 presents the results.

In all but one of the conventional political participation variables, the differences are statistically significant among the four groups identified by Paige. While this result is at first encouraging, an examination of the individual cells is not. Voting ought to be lowest among the (theoretically) rebellious agrarian workers of cells A and B and highest among the reformist peasants of cells C and D. In fact, abstention from the vote is highest in cell C (plantation workers) and lowest among the presumably revolutionary renters, sharecroppers, and migratory laborers.[11] Attendance at municipal meetings also produces a statistically significant result, but one that does not support Paige. Plantation workers who should have relatively high conventional participation exhibit the lowest, whereas cell A (commercial hacienda) workers, who should have low levels of this kind of participation, are found to be higher than either cell B or C, only exceeded by cell D (smallholding peasants). Paige's prediction, therefore, is correct for only one of the four cells.

The statistics on voting behavior are particularly interesting. Voting is quite high among all four cells and across all four kinds of cultivating groups. In fact, more than two-thirds of respondents in all four cells report having voted in the last election. This high level of voting participa-

[11]These figures are slightly misleading, since those who were too young to vote in the previous presidential election are recorded as "not applicable" in this table. Plantation workers, in this sample, are younger than those in the other cells, and hence more were ineligible to vote in the previous election. Excluding those individuals from the table, however, does not alter the findings; the plantation workers remain those with the highest abstention rates, followed by cells A, D, and C. Further clarification appears in the regression analysis below.

Table 2. Conventional Political Participation

| | Paige's Fourfold Classification Scheme | | | | | | | |
| | Cell A:
Commercial
Hacienda | | Cell B:
Share/Rent/
Mig./Day | | Cell C:
Plantation | | Cell D:
Smallholding | |
Question	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Did you vote in last *election?***								
Yes	76.3	45	84.3	91	58.0	51	84.3	113
No	20.3	12	7.4	8	23.9	21	13.4	18
Not applicable	3.4	2	8.3	9	18.2	16	2.2	3
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Have you attended *a municipal* *meeting?***								
Yes	18.6	11	13.9	15	2.3	2	35.1	47
No	81.4	48	86.1	93	97.7	86	64.9	87
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Do you attend school *board meetings?***								
Participates	32.2	19	26.9	29	.0	0	40.3	54
Does not participate	67.8	40	73.1	79	100.0	88	59.7	80
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Do you attend PTA *meetings?*								
Participates	44.1	26	34.3	37	48.9	43	36.6	49
Does not participate	55.9	33	65.7	71	51.1	45	63.4	85
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134

Note: Column totals are rounded to 100%.

**statistically significant at < .01.

tion and the failure of the theory to correctly predict opinion division across all four cells leads us to suspect that factors other than agro-export structure may be involved in determining voting behavior. Those other factors appear to affect all four cultivating groups relatively equally, such that all register high levels of voting behavior regardless of the agro-export structure within which they find themselves.

Measures of Reformism

Moving beyond conventional, institutionalized political participation, we attempted to compare the four peasant types on their attitudes

toward and participation in reformist activities. We distinguish these ac-
tivities from protest activity, since they are quite mild in nature. Our
three measures of reformism are (1) willingness to take action against a
law perceived as damaging to the respondent and his neighbors; (2) agree-
ment with the formation of unions of farm workers; and (3) membership
in a union. We interpret affirmative responses to these items to indicate
a willingness to participate in democratic forms of political participation,
and hence we label these variables as indicators of reformism. The results
are presented in Table 3.

Once again, Paige's categories produce statistically significant re-
sults, but the differences are often inconsistent with his predictions. For
example, whereas the highest proportion of respondents willing to take

Table 3. Reformism

| Question | Paige's Fourfold Classification Scheme | | | | | | | |
| | Cell A: Commercial Hacienda | | Cell B: Share/Rent/ Mig./Day | | Cell C: Plantation | | Cell D: Smallholding | |
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
For damaging munic-								
*ipal law, I would**								
Do something	57.6	34	48.1	52	46.6	41	66.4	89
Do nothing	23.7	14	36.1	39	39.8	35	25.4	34
Don't know	18.6	11	15.7	17	13.6	12	8.2	11
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Agree or disagree								
with unions for farm								
*workers?***								
Agree	62.7	37	61.1	66	85.2	75	42.5	57
Neither	10.2	6	13.9	15	6.8	6	14.9	20
Disagree	15.3	9	13.9	15	8.0	7	26.9	36
Don't know what is	11.9	7	11.1	12	.0	0	15.7	21
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
Member of a								
*union?***								
Yes	16.9	10	13.0	14	83.0	73	4.5	6
No	83.1	49	86.1	93	17.0	15	95.5	128
Don't know	.0	0	.9	1	.0	0	.0	0
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134

Note: Column totals are rounded to 100%.

*significant at < .05; **significant at < .01.

action on a damaging municipal law occurs, expectedly, among the smallholding group (cell *D*); the next highest level occurs in the cell in which his prediction is for lower levels of reformist activity (cell *A*, commercial hacienda). The results of the approval for union activity, however, are more supportive of Paige's thesis. As expected, the lowest support is among the smallholders (cell *D*), since individuals who own their own land may view unions as a threat.[12] Highest support is found among plantation workers (cell *C*), many of whom are unionized in Costa Rica.

Viewing the table independently of the theory, however, we notice that willingness to protest a damaging municipal law is actually relatively high across all four cells. In all four groups, more than half and up to two-thirds of all respondents would be willing to engage in such reformist behavior. These results across all cells would seem to indicate that this kind of political behavior is highly acceptable in Costa Rica and is perceived as such by many members of the population regardless of economic background. One would need to search for the explanation for such uniformity in the political norms of the country rather than in differences among income sources.

Measures of Radicalism

Up until this point in our analysis, we have been examining nonradical attitudes and behavior in which our interpretation of Paige's theory suggests that cells *C* and *D* should exhibit higher levels of reformist attributes. We now change the focus to radical attitudes and therefore expect to find higher values in cells *A* and *B*, where Paige predicted revolt or revolution. Given the nature of the Costa Rican state and widespread popular support for the regime, it is not surprising that radical acts in Costa Rica are limited in frequency. This does not mean, however, that these acts never occur nor that there is no sympathy for them (Edelman 1993; Anderson 1990, 1991, 1994). In Table 4 we provide data on three measures of radicalism: (1) willingness to attribute peasant poverty to exploitation as opposed to laziness; (2) support for "strikes by farm workers"; and (3) support for land invasions. The last two of these are given by Paige as explicit examples of behaviors that coincide with his theory.

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[12]Although from this data set Paige has predicted cell *D* correctly, we suspect that unionization among smallholders in Costa Rica may have risen substantially since these data were collected. More recent work by Anderson (1991, 111–43) uncovers a growing popularity of peasant unions throughout Costa Rica. If this is generally true throughout Costa Rica, then Paige's prediction would be incorrect for this cell as well. However, Anderson's data are not exactly comparable to those being used here, and we have not been able to incorporate them into this particular test.

Table 4. Measures of Radicalism

	Paige's Fourfold Classification Scheme							
	Cell *A*: Commercial Hacienda		Cell *B*: Share/Rent/ Mig./Day		Cell *C*: Plantation		Cell *D*: Smallholding	
Question	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
*Poor peasants are poor because?***								
Rich exploit	44.1	26	61.1	66	70.5	62	47.0	63
Are lazy	28.8	17	13.9	15	6.8	6	25.4	34
Don't know	27.1	16	25.0	27	22.7	20	27.6	37
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
*Agree or disagree with strikes of farm workers?***								
Agree	40.7	24	29.6	32	72.7	64	27.6	37
Neither	16.9	10	18.5	20	15.9	14	17.2	23
Disagree	33.9	20	44.4	48	11.4	10	52.2	70
Don't know	8.5	5	7.4	8	.0	0	3.0	4
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134
*What should peasants do who don't have enough land?**								
Organize	16.9	10	23.1	25	38.6	34	29.9	40
Save money	22.0	13	18.5	20	25.0	22	22.4	30
Wait for govt.	57.6	34	52.8	57	33.0	29	40.3	54
Nothing	3.4	2	.9	1	1.1	1	3.7	5
Don't know	.0	0	4.6	5	2.3	2	3.7	5
Total	100.0	59	100.0	108	100.0	88	100.0	134

Note: Column totals are rounded to 100%.

*significant at $< .05$; **significant at $< .001$.

That is, he expects higher levels of strikes among plantation workers (cell *C*) and higher frequency of land invasions among the commercial hacienda workers (cell *A*) (Paige 1975, 119). The first question offers respondents a chance to reject "the system" as inherently bad and, by implication, difficult or impossible to reform. The second and third questions probe for support for political tactics that are considered quite radical and illegal in Costa Rica. Strikes and land invasions by farm workers often include highway blockages that cut off food supplies for urban areas and paralyze all overland transportation nationwide (Anderson 1990, 1991, 1994).

We find that on all three questions the differences among the cells are great and statistically significant. On the first question, however, the most radical views are expressed by peasants in the labor reform cell (cell *C*), when Paige would have expected such views to be expressed in the revolt and revolutionary cells. Support for strikes is higher, as Paige predicts, in the plantation cell and is also quite high in the commercial hacienda cell. But these findings are not at all surprising and do not need to rely on the Paige thesis for their explanation. It is only in these two cells that peasants work in proletariat-like conditions, with the consequent tendency toward unionization and strikes. Smallholders, share-croppers, and renters lack a comparable target to strike against. Only migrant laborers have an immediate target for their strikes, but their mobile status rarely gives them the opportunity to develop the organizational mechanisms to launch a strike. In short, on this variable, theory and data coincide, but all other explanations of rural proletariat behavior would make the same prediction. Finally, support for organized land invasions ought to be highest among the two radical cells, *A* and *B*, but in fact it is *lowest* there. Both plantation workers and smallholders exhibit greater support for land invasions and less support for organized government reform programs than do the supposedly radical workers in the first two cells. This finding is a direct contradiction to the Paige thesis.

Paige's Analysis Reconsidered

We have seen that in many cases there are significant differences among Paige's four categories of peasants. We have also seen, however, that with this data set the theory is a poor predictor of attitudes and behaviors. In no case was Paige's thesis entirely consistent with the attitudes and behaviors found among this sample of Costa Rican peasants. These findings led us to explore the data set further to see whether there might be other variables, independent of Paige's thesis, that would provide a clearer explanation of the results. In doing so, we took the conventional approach of adding to Paige's categorization scheme standard socioeconomic status and demographic variables as predictors of the attitudes and behaviors analyzed here.

Our effort was not designed to propose a new theory of agrarian revolution but to overcome to at least a limited degree the underspecification in Paige's analysis. Doing so has two advantages. On the one hand, controlling for obvious SES variables might allow for the emergence of substantive findings consistent with Paige's thesis that are being suppressed by nonrandom biases in the nature of the sample. It may well be, once these variables are held constant, that Paige's theory will receive stronger support than it has had thus far in this paper. On the other hand,

such a test allows us to compare the predictive power of Paige's model with ordinary variables often found to influence a wide range of attitudinal and behavioral participation variables. A number of these variables are explored in studies of Latin American peasants (Booth and Seligson 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979). If Paige's conceptual model proves to be a stronger predictor of attitudes and behaviors than the conventional thesis, our analysis will have gone a long way to verify its validity.

    We utilized three approaches in our test. First, we treated Paige's four categories as offering a continuum from most revolutionary (revolutionary sharecroppers and migrants) to least revolutionary (smallholding reformist peasants) and included this variable in a series of regression equations, along with the demographic and SES variables, to predict each of the dependent variables presented in Tables 1–4. We did not find either suppression effects or any indication that the Paige framework was as effective a predictor as simple SES variables. Our second effort recognized that the distances between the four categories are unknown, and therefore linear regression might be concealing significant results. We turned to ANOVA, using demographic and SES variables as covariates, and post hoc tests to overcome this difficulty but still did not find support for Paige's theory.

    Our final approach, one that follows Paige (1975, 84), is shown here in Tables 5 through 8. We created dummy variables for each of the groups of peasants, using three dummies to represent the four groups. To provide uniformity to the presentation, we selected as the base group for each OLS regression the agrarian revolution cell (cell *B*) and compared the other three cells to that one. Our regression analysis also includes age, income, and education as additional commonly used SES predictors. For the Paige thesis to be supported, the regression results should show four things. First, since there is an order from most radical to least radical among the four cells (agrarian revolution, agrarian revolt, labor reform, and commodity reform), the signs of the coefficients in each regression should all be in the same direction. Second, each dummy for a progressively less rebellious peasant type should show a progressively higher coefficient (positive or negative) with respect to the base group. Third, for the distinction among groups to be meaningful theoretically, the differences between each pair of groups should be statistically significant. Fourth, if the theory is more powerful than common demographic and SES-based theories of behavior, the dummy variables should demonstrate higher coefficients than those variables.

    Our findings are revealing. First, in those cases where we initially found no significant differences (Table 1), the introduction of SES variables does not help us predict the results (see Table 5). We conclude that

**Table 5. OLS Regression Analysis: Measures of Political Alienation
(See Table 1)**

Predictor	Trust in Government		Government Misspending of Tax Money		Interest of Government in Majority		Does Government Help/Hurt?	
	B	Beta	*B*	Beta	*B*	Beta	*B*	Beta
Commercial hacienda	− .09	− .04	− .09	− .03	.03	.02	.07	.03
Plantation	− .09	− .05	.03	.01	− .00	− .00	.15	.09
Smallholding	− .09	− .06	− .08	− .04	.09	.09	.05	.03
Age	− .00	− .01	.01	.11	− .00	− .06	.00	.02
Education	.01	.04	.05	.13*	− .00	− .02	.01	.04
Income	− .00	− .08	.00	.05	.00	.01	− .00	− .10
Intercept	2.59		2.92		1.71		2.03	
Adjusted R^2	− .03		.01		− .01		− .02	

Note: All variables coded so that higher number equals higher alienation.

*significant at < .05; **significant at < .01.

differences in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the four cells do not serve as "suppressor variables." We also note in Table 5 that in one case, education proves to be a significant predictor of a measure of political alienation (misspending of tax money), whereas none of Paige's groupings on the basis of income source is statistically significant.

Second, the significant differences we found in measures of conventional political participation are indeed more likely to be significantly associated with Paige's groups than SES variables (Table 6). Voting is predicted entirely by his income groups, and the signs of the coefficients are all in the right direction. Similarly, school board and PTA attendance are associated significantly with at least one of the groups, with the signs all being in the right direction. Attendance at municipal meetings is significantly associated with income source for two of the groups. Upon closer examination, however, these findings prove not to be supportive of Paige's thesis. Since these are all conventional behaviors, all of the coefficients for his groups should have been negative, when in fact this is only the case for voting. Attendance at school board meetings and PTA meetings are all positive, and one of the municipal attendance coefficients is negative. Further, the expected order of the coefficients does not emerge for any of the conventional participation measures, including

Table 6. OLS Regression Analysis: Measures of Political Participation
(See Table 2)

Predictor	Vote B	Vote Beta	Attend Municipal Meeting B	Attend Municipal Meeting Beta	Attend School Board Meeting B	Attend School Board Meeting Beta	Attend PTA Meeting B	Attend PTA Meeting Beta
Commercial hacienda	−.13	−.13*	.06	.05	.13	.05	.18	.05
Plantation	−.21	−.23**	−.15	−.16**	.00	.00	.47	.16*
Smallholding	−.07	−.09	.20	.24**	.48	.20**	.11	.04
Age	.00	.00	−.01	−.07	.00	.05	.01	.12*
Education	−.01	−.05	.00	.01	.05	.09	−.04	−.07
Income	.00	.08	.00	.11*	−.00	−.08	−.00	−.07
Intercept	1.92		1.19		1.33		1.52	
Adjusted R^2	.03		.10		.02		.02	

Note: All variables coded so that higher number equals higher participation.

*significant at < .05; **significant at < .01.

voting. For example, the lowest standardized coefficient should have been the commercial hacienda, when in fact it never is for any of the conventional participation measures. These findings are consistent with Table 2, where the lowest level of voting was among the plantation workers rather than the sharecropping/migratory cell. Similarly, the plantation cell is always inconsistent with the theory for the other forms of conventional participation. In the case of PTA meetings, smallholders are indistinguishable from commercial hacienda workers, even though these groups represent opposite extremes among the dummy variables shown in the equation. Finally, income and education prove to be significant predictors of two of these four modes of conventional political participation, and age is a significant predictor of another.

Third, as we can see in Table 7, reformism, which should have been highest among plantation and smallholding peasants, turns out to have results entirely inconsistent with Paige's theory. Only one of the six dummy variable coefficients is significant. Further, plantation peasants are far lower on two of the three reformist variables than are the commercial hacienda workers. The coefficients of the dummies in all three equations do not have a consistent sign, and in a number of cases the cells are virtually indistinguishable from each other. Education, it turns out,

Table 7. OLS Regression Analysis: Measures of Reformism
(See Table 3)

Predictor	Action against Municipal Law		Support Farm Worker Unions		Union Member	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Commercial hacienda	.15	.11	− .17	− .08	− .08	− .01
Plantation	− .08	− .07	.37	.14	− .77	− .59**
Smallholding	.11	.11	− .18	− .12	.04	.03
Age	.00	.03	.01	.17*	− .00	− .04
Education	.04	.20**	.04	.10	.01	.03
Income	.00	.09	.00	.04	.00	.00
Intercept	1.40		1.62		1.97	
Adjusted R^2	.06		.02		.33	

Note: All variables coded so that higher number equals higher support for reformism.

*significant at < .05; **significant at < .01.

is a far stronger predictor of one form of reformist behavior than is income source, and age is a stronger predictor of another form of reformism than is income source for any of his groups.

Fourth, Table 8 shows that although four of the six dummy coefficients predicting radical behavior are significant, their signs are usually inconsistent and in the wrong direction. In this table, we would expect the commercial hacienda workers to have the highest coefficients, but this is never the case. Moreover, education, income, and age turn out to be better predictors of radicalism than all but one of Paige's groups (plantation workers on the strike variable).

Summing up our regression analysis, we find virtually no support for the Paige thesis. The four tests we proposed for the regression results were failed repeatedly; in several cases, demographic and SES variables offered similar or better predictive power than Paige's far more elaborate theory.

Conclusions

Paige's model makes an important contribution to the study of agrarian politics that is unique among theories of revolution. First, his is one of the few attempts to explain political action based upon the structural characteristics of agro-export industries. This is a unique perspective,

Table 8. OLS Regression Analysis: Measures of Radicalism
(See Table 4)

Predictor	Why Are Peasants Poor?		Agree/Disagree with Farm Worker Strikes		What Should Peasants Do Who Do Not Have Enough Land?	
	B	Beta	*B*	Beta	*B*	Beta
Commercial hacienda	−.19	−.16*	.03	.12*	−.03	−.01
Plantation	.10	.10	.71	.33**	.22	.10
Smallholding	−.11	−.12	.01	.00	.26	.14*
Age	−.00	−.05	−.01	−.15**	−.02	−.29**
Education	.03	.13*	.03	.06	.00	.01
Income	−.00	−.18**	−.00	−.05	.00	.02
Intercept	1.83		2.14		3.34	
Adjusted R^2	.11		.16		.09	

Note: All variables coded so that higher number equals stronger support for radicalism.
*significant at < .05; **significant at < .01.

since most theories take a national or subnational approach to studying revolution rather than looking at traits that are similar across national boundaries. Second, Paige's theory is also unusual in its effort to explain and predict both revolutionary or radical behavior and nonrevolutionary or reformist action.[13] It is this second characteristic that makes the theory relevant in a democratic context such as Costa Rica. Paige's willingness to address reformism as well as radicalism is a refreshing change in the literature on rural politics that has focused disproportionately upon revolution. We thus applaud Paige's effort and his breadth of approach.

At the same time, however, that breadth of approach confines his vision in another equally important way. By looking only at economic structure, Paige ignores, both in his data analysis and in his theory, contextual and national causal variables. The first of these we have already partially addressed in our own analysis. By including other variables in our regression equations, we find significant predictive power with simple

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[13]A different approach (Anderson 1994) focuses upon agrarian politics but uses a very different model that addresses both revolutionary and nonrevolutionary behavior and quiescence.

demographic and socioeconomic variables such as age, income, and education. We suspect that other independent data sets that include information on contextual variables would also find predictive power in those. It is logical to expect that factors such as age, income, and education must have an impact upon political attitudes and action. Our initial analysis reveals that they may have a greater predictive impact than does structural position or income source.

There is, however, another causal variable that helps explain our results. This is the role of a democratic and inclusive state such as Costa Rica that takes a relatively benign approach to popular protest. Skocpol (1982) criticizes Paige and others for precisely this omission of the role of the state. She argues that the state must be brought back into any explanatory arguments. Although Paige does consider the influence of former colonial status and of the colonial regime, he confines his consideration of the state to such historical circumstances (e.g., 1975, 320–26). Yet the colonial experience, both the fact of it and the nature of the colonizing power, is only one of many ways in which national states can differ from each other. They can also differ in contemporary ways quite apart from historical experience. Paige does not consider these differences.

Costa Rica, for example, is a democracy.[14] In such a state, it is not surprising for respondents to register high levels of voting behavior and to do so because that is part of the national political pattern rather than because of structural factors such as income source.[15] Similarly, in a nonrepressive state, it is not surprising to find a high willingness to protest across all four cells despite differences in source of income. Where we have found that political attitudes are strikingly similar across all four cells, we suspect that the nature of the state and the participatory rules of Costa Rica's political game explain this finding. It is, of course, not possible to test this connection with our data set alone. Its purpose was

[14]Costa Rica is widely acknowledged as one of the most democratic countries in Latin America. Since the 1960s, many Latin American experts have rated Costa Rica as being the most democratic country in the region (Johnson 1977, 89). The most recent ratings, conducted in 1991, still rank Costa Rica in first place (communication from Phil Kelly, Emporia State University, December 1991).

[15]It is, of course, possible for the effects of a democratic regime to vary among regions and thus to affect peasants in different places somewhat differently. Yet the same can be said for authoritarian regimes where repression may be more severe in some places than others. Paige does not delve into the varying regional effects of the regimes he studies but instead concentrates on landowning and land-cultivating classes and on the effects that their relationship to land has on the behavior of each group. We follow Paige's example and focus on behavior and its attitudes and not on regional variation in regime effect.

to hold the state constant and examine Paige's predictions within one country. It would be worthwhile, however, to construct a cross-national data set that would allow us to compare the predictive power of structural versus national independent variables.

Paige's principal contribution lies in the heuristic elegance of any attempt to examine and explain political causality beyond the level of the state and across national boundaries. Too many theories focus at the state- or micro-level when explaining social revolution. Yet no one, except perhaps Marx and Wallerstein, has made such a systematic attempt to explain the event by looking beyond and across national borders. We continue to be intrigued by Paige's explanatory attempt and believe that his theoretical model deserves attention because of its originality and uniqueness of perspective, even if this particular data set did not support the theory's predictions as well as we had expected. Perhaps another independent test of Paige, using data from many countries, would support his predictions better than did this data set from Costa Rica alone. Alternatively and more probably, however, a revision of Paige's theory is in order such that his macrolevel or structural perspective is combined with microlevel (contextual) and state variables to provide a more complete understanding of reformism and revolution.[16]

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[16]For an exploration of Paige's predictions using microlevel data, see Anderson (1993).

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