

The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia, 2008

The Impact of Governance

By:

Daniel E. Moreno Morales, National Coordinator

Eduardo Córdova Eguívar

Vivian Schwarz Blum

Mitchell A. Seligson

Gonzalo Vargas Villazón

Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko

Scientific Editor of the series:

Mitchell A. Seligson



This study was possible thanks to the sponsorship endowed by the program of Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. Points of view expressed in this study correspond to the authors and do not necessarily reflect opinions by the United States Agency for International Development.

August 2008

Contents

List of figures	iv
List of tables	vii
Presentation.....	viii
Prologue: Background to the Study.....	ix
Acknowledgements.....	xvi
Executive Summary.....	xviii
Factors Affecting Political Culture Indicators.....	xxviii
Legitimacy and Tolerance: The Foundations for a Stable Democracy.....	xix
Democracy in Times of Reform.....	xx
FIRST PART: THEORY AND COMPARISONS ACROSS COUNTRIES.....	XXII
Preface: The Context of Democracy in Bolivia and the Sample of the Study.....	xxiii
Context.....	xxiii
Democracy.....	xxiii
Electoral Processes.....	xxiii
Disasters.....	xxiv
The State of the Economy.....	xxiv
Sample Description.....	xxv
General Demographic Characteristics.....	xxv
Ethnicity in the Sample of Bolivia 2008.....	xxx
Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy.....	1
Theoretical framework.....	1
Working hypothesis.....	2
Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4).....	5
Support for core values on which democracy depends.....	7
Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions.....	11
Social capital.....	13
Conclusion.....	15
SECOND PART: PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNANCE.....	16
Chapter II. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy.....	17
Theoretical framework.....	17
How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?.....	18
The measurement of corruption.....	18
Corruption victimization in comparative perspective.....	20
Corruption Victimization in Bolivia.....	23
The Impact of Corruption on Attitudes Toward a Stable Democracy in Bolivia.....	30
Conclusion.....	31
Chapter III. The Impact of Crime on Support for a Stable Democracy.....	32
Theoretical framework.....	32

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?.....	36
The Measurement of Crime Victimization	36
Crime Victimization.....	38
Who are those more exposed to crime?.....	41
The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy.....	43
Conclusions.....	46
Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy.....	48
Theoretical framework.....	48
How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?.....	50
Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions.....	50
Measuring civil society participation.....	51
Perceptions of Local Government in Comparative Perspective	52
Citizen Participation in Bolivian Local Government.....	60
The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for a Stable Democracy in Bolivia.....	63
The Degree of Local Civil Society Participation in Comparative Perspective.....	69
The Impact of Local Civil Participation on Support for a Stable Democracy in Bolivia	76
Conclusions.....	79
Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy	80
Theoretical Framework.....	80
How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?82	82
Government economic performance	82
Measuring perception of government economic performance.....	84
Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective	84
Main Factors that Explain the Evaluation of Government Economic Performance	87
Relationship Between Government Economic Performance and the Perception of the National Economic Situation89	89
Relationship Between Government Economic Performance and Approval of the President’s Job	90
The Perception of the Government Economic Performance and its impact on Support for a Stable Democracy	91
Conclusions.....	94
THIRD PART: BEYOND GOVERNANCE	95
Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy	96
Theoretical background	96
The legitimacy/tolerance equation	97
Support for stable democracy in Bolivia.....	99
Political Tolerance and Stable Democracy	103
Legitimacy of Institutions.....	107
Conclusions.....	112
Chapter VII. Political Parties in Bolivia.....	113
Trust in Political Parties.....	113
Democracy without Parties	119
Direct Involvement with Political Parties	122
Conclusions.....	127
Chapter VIII. Support for a new wave of State Reforms	129
The Constituent Assembly and the Proposal of the New Constitution.....	129

Departmental Autonomies.....	136
Separatism	144
Indigenous Autonomies	147
Conclusions.....	149
Chapter IX. Democracy and Politics According to Bolivians.....	151
Background	151
What is Democracy?	151
Participation versus Representation.....	156
“Politics of the Streets” and Institutional Politics	160
Conclusions.....	172
Chapter X. Political Controversies and the Model of the State.....	173
Departmental Autonomy	174
The Role of the State in Public Administration.....	178
Administration of Financial Resources	182
Support for the Project of the New Political Constitution of the State.....	183
Racial and ethno-cultural dimensions of Political Debate	185
Tendencies of the Political Debate by Departments.....	186
Conclusions.....	191
REFERENCES	193
APPENDICES	201
Appendix I: Sample Design Technical Description	201
Appendix II: Questionnaires (Spanish, Quechua and Aymara).....	207

List of figures

Figure 1. Sample Distribution by Department and by Year, Bolivia.....	xxvi
Figure 2. Sample Distribution by Gender and by Year, Bolivia.....	xxvii
Figure 3. Sample Distribution by Age and by Year, Bolivia.....	xxviii
Figure 4. Sample Distribution by Urban and Rural Areas and by Year, Bolivia.....	xxix
Figure 5. Sample Distribution by Levels of Education and by Year, Bolivia.....	xxx
Figure 6. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification (INE question), Bolivia 2008.....	xxxii
Figure 7. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification (question LAPOP), Bolivia 2008.....	xxxii
Figure 8. Percentage of People That Self Identify as “Indigenous” and as “White by Year.....	xxxiii
Figure I. 1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective.....	6
Figure I. 1. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective.....	8
Figure I. 2. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective.....	10
Figure I. 3. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance).....	12
Figure I. 5. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective.....	14
Figure II. 1. Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	21
Figure II. 3. Index of Corruption Victimization, Bolivia 2008.....	23
Figure II. 4. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption by Year, Bolivia.....	24
Figure II. 5. Corruption Victimization by Levels of Education, Bolivia 2008.....	25
Figure II. 7. Corruption Victimization by Age, Bolivia 2008.....	27
Figure II. 8. Corruption Victimization by City/Place of Residence, Bolivia 2008.....	28
Figure II. 9. Corruption Victimization by Wealth, Bolivia 2008.....	29
Figure II. 10. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, Bolivia 2008.....	30
Figure II. 11. The Impact of Corruption Perception on the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, Bolivia 2008.....	31
Figure III. 1. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	37
Figure III. 2. Crime Victimization by Year, Bolivia.....	39
Figure III. 3. Perception of Insecurity by Year, Bolivia.....	40
Figure III. 4. Predictors of Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008.....	41
Figure III. 5. The Impact of Size of City/Town on Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008.....	42
Figure III. 6. The Impact of Age on Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008.....	43
Figure III. 7. The Impact of Perception of Personal Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy, Bolivia 2008.....	44
Figure III. 9. The Impact of Perception of Personal Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust, Bolivia 2008.....	46
Figure IV. 1. Trust in the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	53
Figure IV. 2. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	55
Figure IV. 3. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	57
Figure IV. 4. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	59
Figure IV. 5. Comparisons between Trust in the Local Government versus Trust in the National Government, Bolivia 2008.....	60
Figure IV. 6. Participation at the Local Level by Year, Bolivia.....	61
Figure IV. 7. Requests for Assistance to the Local Government by Year, Bolivia.....	62
Figure IV. 8. Predictors of Support for Municipal Decentralization of Responsibilities, Bolivia 2008.....	63
Figure IV. 10. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008.....	65
Figure IV. 11. The Impact of Size of Place of Residency on Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008.....	66
Figure IV. 12. The Impact of the Approval of the President’s Job on Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008.....	67
Figure IV. 13. The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008.....	68
Figure IV. 14. Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	70
Figure IV. 15. Participation in Parents’ Associations in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	71

FigureIV. 16. Participation in Meetings of a Committee or Association for Community Improvement in Comparative Perspective, 2008	73
FigureIV. 17. Participation in Associations or Groups of Women or Home Makers in Comparative Perspective, 2008	75
Figure IV. 18. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization on Support for the Right of Opposition, Bolivia 2008	76
Figure IV. 19. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Parents’ Associations on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008	77
Figure IV. 20. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization on Interpersonal Trust, Bolivia 2008	78
Figure V. 1. Main Problem in the Country, Bolivia 2008	83
Figure V. 2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective	85
Figure V. 3. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Year, Bolivia	86
Figure V. 4. Predictors of the Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008	88
Figure V. 5. The Impact of the National Economic Situation on the Perception of Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008	89
Figure V. 6. The Impact of the Approval of the President’s Job on the Perception of the Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008	90
Figure V. 7. The Impact of the Government Economic Performance on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008	92
Figure V. 8. The Impact of the Government Economic Performance on Political Tolerance, Bolivia 2008	93
Figure VI. 1. Population that Express a High Political Legitimacy of Institutions and Low Political Tolerance and Population that Express High Political Legitimacy of Institutions and High Political Tolerance By Year, Bolivia ..	100
Figure VI. 2. Support for a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2008	103
Figure VI. 3 Elements of Political Tolerance, Bolivia 2008	104
Figure VI. 4. Political Tolerance by Year, Bolivia	105
Figure VI. 5. Political Tolerance by Place of Residence, Bolivia 2008	106
Figure VI. 6. Political Tolerance According to the Approval of the President’s Job, Bolivia 2008	107
Figure VI. 7. Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008	109
Figure VI. 8. Trust in Congress by Year, Bolivia	110
Figure VI. 9. Trust in the Supreme Court of Justice by Year, Bolivia	111
Figure VI. 10. Predictors of the Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008	112
Figure VII. 1. Trust in Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008	115
Figure VII. 3. Trust in Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008	117
Figure VII. 4. Trust in Political Parties by Region and Year, Bolivia	118
Figure VII. 5. Democracy Can Function Without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008	120
Figure VII. 6. Democracy Could Function Without Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008	121
Figure VII. 7. Perception of Political Parties, Bolivia 2008	122
Figure VII. 8. Identification with a Political Party in Comparative Perspective, 2008	124
Figure VII. 9. Identification with a Political Party, Bolivia 2008	125
Figure VII. 10. Ideological Orientation According to Voting for a Political Party, Bolivia 2008	126
Figure VII. 11. Active Participation in Political Activities in Comparative Perspective, 2008	127
Figure VIII. 1. Approval of the Job of the Constituent Assembly by Department, Bolivia 2008	130
Figure VIII. 2. Results of the Logistic Regression for a Positive Evaluation of the Constituent Assembly’s Job, Bolivia 2008	131
Figure VIII. 4. Expectations in Relation to the Constituent Assembly by Year, Bolivia	133
Figure VIII. 5. Approval or Rejection of the New Constitution, Bolivia 2008	134
Figure VIII. 7. Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008	137
Figure VIII. 8. The Impact of Trust of the National Government on the Average Evaluation of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008	138
Figure VIII. 9. Predictors of the Perception of Departmental Autonomies as a Division for the Country, Bolivia 2008	139

Figure VIII. 10. Perceptions of a Division of Responsibilities in Relation to the Management of Natural Resources, Bolivia 2008 140

Figure VIII. 11. Preference for the Prefectural Management of the Natural Resources by Department, Bolivia 2008 141

Figure VIII. 12. The Impact of Trust in Departmental Prefectures on the Preference for Prefectural Tax Collection, Bolivia 2008 142

Figure VIII. 13. Preference in Relation to the Administration of Economic Resources by Department, Bolivia 2008 143

Figure VIII. 14. Opinions in Favor that the Country should be Divided by Year, Bolivia..... 144

Figure VIII. 15. The Impact of the Level of Education on the Opinions in Favor of the Country to be Divided, Bolivia 2008 145

Figure VIII. 17. Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008..... 147

Figure VIII. 18. The Impact of the Approval of the Job of the President on the Positive Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008 148

Figure VIII. 19. The Impact of the Perception of Departmental Autonomies on the Positive Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008 149

Figure IX. 1. Elements with Which Democracy is Related, Bolivia 2008 153

Figure IX. 2. What does democracy mean to you? , Bolivia 2008 154

Figure IX. 3. Predictors of Democracy as Political Freedom, Bolivia 2008..... 155

Figure IX. 4. Preferences of a Direct Democracy, Bolivia 2008 157

Figure IX. 5. The Impact of the Preference of a Direct Democracy on Trust in the National Government, Bolivia 2008 158

Figure IX. 6. Preferences for a Democracy Without Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008 159

Figure IX. 7. People who Went to Any State Office, Bolivia 2008..... 161

Figure IX. 8. What is the way that you think you can have the most influence to change things?..... 162

Figure IX. 9. Participation in Protests as the Best Way to Change Things, Bolivia 2008 163

Figure IX. 10. Participation in Protests as a Better Way to Change Things in Comparative Perspective, 2008 164

Figure IX. 12. Population that Agrees that Presidents Should Follow the People’s Will by Department, Bolivia 2008 166

Figure IX. 13. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests, Bolivia 2008 167

Figure IX. 14. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests by Department, Bolivia 2008 168

Figure IX. 15. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests in Comparative Perspective, 2008 169

Figure IX. 16. Public Manifestations in Favor or Against the Government, Bolivia 2008..... 170

Figure IX. 17. Public Manifestations in Favor or Against the Government by Department, Bolivia 2008..... 171

Figure X. 1. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on the Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008 175

Figure X. 2. Impact of Self-Identification with Camban Culture on the Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008 176

Figure X. 4. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on Support for Prefectural Administration of Some Natural Resources, Bolivia 2008 178

Figure X. 5. Impact of Trust in the National Government on the Preference for a Market State, Bolivia 2008..... 179

Figure X. 6. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on the Index of Statism, Bolivia 2008..... 181

Figure X. 7. Predictors for the Departmental Administration of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008 182

Figure X. 8. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on the Vote in Favor of the Approval of the New Political Constitution of the State, Bolivia 2008 184

Figure X. 9. Approval of the President’s Job Performance by Department, Bolivia 2008 187

Figure X. 10. Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies by Department, Bolivia 2008 188

List of tables

Table VI. 1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support.....	98
Table VI. 2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance.....	99
Table X. 1. Factors that Influence, by Department, a Positive Perception of Citizens With Regards to Departmental Autonomies.....	189
Table X. 2. Factors that Influence, by Department, the Voting Intention of Citizens in Favor of the Approval of the New Political Constitution of the State.....	190

Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt's Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez
AmericasBarometer Grant Manager at USAID

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for

the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys; we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.












² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.








The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America Group		
Mexico		
Guatemala		
El Salvador		
Honduras		
Nicaragua		
Costa Rica		
Panama		

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Bolivia		
Paraguay		
Chile		
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Brazil		
Venezuela		

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i>
	
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala ● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador ● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc. ● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. ● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois ● Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Country	Researchers
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee ● Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies ● Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

Executive Summary

The study of “The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia, 2008” presents the results of a national survey, the AmericasBarometer Survey, of the political culture in Bolivia taken from a representative sample of the voting-age Bolivian population of more than 3000 people. The survey was carried out in 22 Latin American countries between February and March of 2008. This study is the sixth of a series that started in 1998, which allows for comparisons across time as well as comparisons with the other 21 countries included in the 2008 study.

Two factors stand out in the statistical approximation employed in this study. First, the bivariate relationships shown through figures presented in the study are robust to multivariate statistics controls; in other words, the relationships that are exposed are independent from other factors such as socio-economic characteristics of the people. Secondly, analyses are based on calculations that consider the sample design (stratification and clustering) so as to calculate the standard errors of the means and, consequently, statistically significant relationships; in other words, the relationships that are shown here are based on the best statistical procedures for their estimation.

The study is based on five fundamental indicators of political culture that are keys for the health of a democracy: a) Support for democracy as the best form of government; b) Support for the right of citizens’ participation; c) Support for the right of the opposition (or political tolerance); d) Belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions; and e) trust in people that live in the same community as a measure of social capital. These five elements present a combination of vertical relationships with state institutions and horizontal relationships among citizens which are necessary for the existence of a stable democracy.

In general, indicators of the relationship between citizens and state institutions (support for democracy and institutional legitimacy) in Bolivia show similar results to other Latin American countries, which would be expected according to the level of socio-economic development of each country. On the other hand, indicators that correspond to the relationships among citizens (support for the right of participation, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust) are among the lowest in the region. It would seem, then, that Bolivians have a relatively solid and healthy relationship with state institutions, while relationships among citizens seemed to be marked by intolerance and low interpersonal trust.

Factors Affecting Political Culture Indicators

To identify the factors affecting these relationships in Bolivia, variables established by the literature as factors related to the good performance of state institutions that affect the values and perceptions of the political culture were initially considered. These factors were: citizens’ perception and experience with corruption, crime and citizen insecurity, the performance of local governments, and the economic performance of the government.

The percentage of Bolivians who affirm having being victims of an act of corruption is one of the highest in the region. In spite of this fact, Bolivians do not believe that corruption is pervasive, which denotes certain tolerance toward this set of practices. Despite this acceptance of corruption, the data demonstrate that people who have been victims of corruption tend to give less legitimacy to the state institutions than non-victims. In other words, corruption erodes the legitimacy of democratic political institutions.

The number of crime victims has been rising in Bolivia. This year, one of every five Bolivians reports having been the victim of a criminal act, which has produced high levels of citizen insecurity. The data demonstrate that experience with crime negatively affects trust in democracy as the best system of government and erodes the legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust among individuals.

Despite the repercussions of corruption and crime, Bolivians have high levels of participation and trust in their municipal governments. Citizens in this country participate actively in local activities, and local community spaces are shown as central in the lives of Bolivians. The attendance to activities of local civil society, particularly meetings of religious organizations, has a positive effect in the legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust.

Although it has lowered in relation to 2006, Bolivians perceive the economic performance of their government as positive and relatively high compared to similar perceptions of citizens in other countries of the region. Contrary to what was expected, the impact that this perception has on indicators of democratic values and attitudes mentioned above are minimal. Only political tolerance is affected significantly by the perception of the government's economic performance, and this relationship is negative; in other words, people who indicate higher approval of the government's economic performance tend to be less tolerant of citizens who are critical of the country's form of government

Legitimacy and Tolerance: The Foundations for a Stable Democracy

The theoretical framework developed by LAPOP can be summarized in a combination of two main variables: the relationship between citizens and state institutions, system support; and the relationships among citizens, political tolerance. A stable democracy requires that citizens trust its institutions and and at the same time that they show tolerance among themselves in a country of laws; in other words, democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others.

If, in a democratic society, the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if both variables present low levels, that is to say, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability or even chaos if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but low legitimacy to the political

institutions. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions are ripe for the consolidation of an authoritarian regime.

The percentage of Bolivians who favor a stable democracy grew significantly between 2004 and 2006 but seems to have decreased in 2008. In contrast, the combination of attributes that have grown steadily since 2004 is high legitimacy and low tolerance, the category of authoritarian stability. Among the four possible combinations, 36% of Bolivian citizens favor this category, a tendency that suggests that Bolivia may be on a path toward a form of government and an organization of society with low respect for citizens rights and high levels of institutional legitimacy, that is to say, toward an authoritarian regime.

Democracy in Times of Reform

Given that Bolivia is undergoing reforms of the structure of the State and the relationships between citizens and the State, this study included a series of questions related to citizens' perceptions toward these reforms. The interviewees were asked about the performance of the Constituent Assembly, the new constitutional text proposal, departmental and indigenous autonomies, and departmental decentralization of responsibilities and resources.

In general, Bolivians disapprove of the job that the Constituent Assembly has done; citizens' expectations in relation to the job of this institution diminished substantially during the last two years. However, citizens' attitudes related to the approval of the new constitutional text are not clear; the proportion of people that would approve this text in a possible referendum was, in February of this year, the same as those who would reject it. It is noteworthy that there is a positive relationship between favorable perceptions toward the departmental autonomies and indigenous autonomies; the more citizens favor departmental autonomies, the more in favor they are of indigenous autonomies .

Beyond this observation of the particular approval of each of these proposals for state reform, there are two factors that play a central role in the determination of citizen's attitudes toward the proposed changes. One has to do with citizens' department of residence which determines in a large extent citizens' response to the proposed reforms. The other is the level of approval of President Morales' administration; those who indicate higher approval of the current governmental administration tend to have different positions on state reform than those who disapprove of the actions and policies of Morales' government.

State control of the economy is another subject in which noticeable differences prevail. Perceptions of how much the government should do in relation to the economy vary significantly among distinct population groups. Here again, citizens' positions regarding the government of President Morales is one of the decisive factors when marking these differences.

Bolivians show much higher levels of participation in protests and public demonstrations than those of any other country covered in the AmericasBarometer 2008. The study found as much

participation against the government as in favor of it. This result demonstrates the highly participatory and politicized character of Bolivian society.

Despite profound differences found in relation to diverse institutional reforms proposals, perceptions of democracy do not seem to vary greatly., Bolivians from different departments with different opinions of the Morales administration have similar concepts of what democracy is. This is a favorable factor for building agreements about reform issues and others under debate.

This study presents information that can help increase the understanding of Bolivians' perspectives, values and attitudes regarding democracy and the proposed changes to strengthen it. Although we found sharp differences among citizens, the fact that the differences are not determined by ethnic or socio-economic factors demonstrates that they can be overcome, and that the pursuit of agreements that will allow Bolivia's present political crisis to be resolved indeed occurs through political channels. It is in the pursuit of these agreements that this study hopes to contribute.

**First Part:
Theory and
Comparisons
Across Countries**

Preface: The Context of Democracy in Bolivia and the Sample of the Study

In this chapter we present the context in which the study was carried out and we describe briefly the national representative sample of the population in Bolivia employed in this study.

Context

Democracy

The most accepted indices and indicators of the condition of democracy around the world do not show important variations for Bolivia in the last period. The *Freedom in the World* yearly report by Freedom House rates Bolivia at 3 (“partially free”), the same as 2006 (Piano y Puddington 2007). On the other hand, scores from the study *Countries at the Crossroads*, also by Freedom House (which uses a scale from 0 to 7 with 0 as poor performance and 7 as good or strong performance), improved slightly in 2007 in relation to the 2005 report (the evaluation in *accountability* and public voice increased from 3.54 to 4.56; civil freedoms, from 4.12 to 4.16; rule of law, from 3.52 to 3.58; anticorruption and transparency, from 3.12 to 3.08 (Van Cott 2007)).

According to the database of Social Conflicts in Bolivia carried out by researchers Roberto Laserna and Miguel Villarroel, social protests decreased to 471 in 2006 compared to 2004 and 2005, years in which 600 and 500 annual protests were registered, respectively (Laserna y Villarroel 2008). In relation to institutional policy, the Constitutional Court has not been in session since December, 2007, due to the resignation of four judges (who were not replaced by Congress). The political situation is new for Bolivian democracy in the sense that the legislative chamber (senators) is controlled by the opposition and the majority of the prefects are opponents.

Electoral Processes

The election of constituents and the referendum on departmental autonomies took place on July 2, 2006, between the LAPOP survey rounds of 2006 and 2008. More than 83% of registered voters participated in this event, a notable figure even when taking into account that voting in Bolivia is mandatory (72% voted in the 2002 presidential elections while in 2005 this figure reached 84%). In the election of constituents, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) won the majority of the votes (50.7% of valid votes in departmental districts and 52.1% in territorial districts, which in total obtained 53.7% of the seats). The second political group was Social Democratic Power, PODEMOS (which won 23.5% of the seats with 15.3% of votes in departmental districts and 16.0% of the votes in territorial districts). The *Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente* established the need for the project of constitution to be approved by two thirds of the assembly members. Considering that the electoral norm made it

difficult for any political force to obtain two thirds of the seats,¹ an agreement between the governing party and the opposition was necessary (CNE 2006).

The results of the referendum were binding on the Constituent Assembly, so that in some departments if “Yes” prevailed, the Assembly would have to design an autonomous regime in accordance with popular approval of the project of the new Political Constitution of the State in that department. The “No” option prevailed in five Bolivian departments (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí; with a notable 74.4% in La Paz). “Yes” won in the rest of the departments (Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija; in Beni with 74.8%).

The assembly was inaugurated on August 6, in the city of Sucre, capital of the Republic. Because of conflicts, the approval of the regulations for debates took more than half of the one year period designated by the Convocation Law for the elaboration of the new constitution.. Although the national law extended that period for another four months, the deliberations suffered setbacks and the constitution project was approved in a controversial way, without the presence of the main opposition force. The project was still not subject to an approval referendum. The opposition regrouped mainly around the demand for departmental autonomy. Civic organizations and prefects of the departments in which “Yes” had won in the referendum on autonomies, propelled the writing of the incompatible autonomic statutes with the present Constitution and the project of the new Constitution.

Disasters

Between December, 2006 and April, 2007 and November, 2007 and April, 2008, many areas in Bolivia were affected by flooding, especially in lowlands, and by droughts in the high plains, as a result of the El Niño and La Niña climatic phenomena. In addition to casualties and 80,000 affected families, the losses from El Niño in 2007 were estimated at 443 million U.S.dollars (CEPAL 2007b). La Niña affected 121.000 families and inflicted 517 million dollars in economic losses (CEPAL data cited in www.ops.org.bo).

The State of the Economy

Bolivia’s GDP increased by 4,6% in 2006 (CEPAL 2007b) and 4.0% in 2007 (estimates) (CEPAL 2007a). The GDP per capita remained at 1,153 American dollars (www.ine.gov.bo). GDP growth rate per inhabitant was 1.9, 1.8 and 2.5, for 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively (CEPAL 2007b: 120). The 2006 inflation rate was 4.95% and according to projected estimates it would be about 12% in 2007 (CEPAL 2007a:78).²

¹ The appointment of the seats in the Constituent Assembly was not decided by a proportional representation criterion, but by a formula that guaranteed the participation of minorities in the Assembly.

² The issue of inflation is very sensitive in Bolivia due to previous experience with the inflationary process during the first half of the 80s. Inflation reached 23.447% in September of 1985 and *decreased* to 8.170% in December of the same year (BCB 1987).

In relation to the State and foreign investment, the government began developing a program of state recovery of privatized or capitalized enterprises during the 1990s. The recovery was launched with the “Heroes of Chaco” decree, which nationalized the hydrocarbon industry in May 2006. Subsequently, the mining and telecommunication industry was nationalized.

Sample Description

General Demographic Characteristics

Studies carried out by LAPOP are oriented to allow for comparability between surveys conducted in each of the years that this study was carried out in Bolivia; at the same time, the design of the questionnaire allows for comparisons with other 21 countries included in the 2008 round of studies..

The survey conducted in Bolivia in 2008 takes into consideration a representative sample of the Bolivian population of a little more than three thousand people. The sample was designed by Encuestas y Estudios, the company in charge of gathering information, as it is usual by LAPOP studies in Bolivia, in coordination with Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública. The sample is stratified by departments and substratified by urban and rural areas., Surveys were carried out in each of the nine Bolivian departments, in equal numbers in urban as in rural areas. The sample design pays particular attention to relatively small primary sample units (clusters) (with 15 or fewer observations each), which guarantees a better sample representation.

In order to guarantee that the survey coverage is truly representative of the Bolivian population, the questionnaire was translated into Quechua and Aymara, as it has been done in previous studies. This procedure allowed monolingual citizens to be interviewed in one of these languages made it possible to include their responses in the results we present in this study.

This sample design allows for at least 300 interviews in each department, including those that have a small proportion of the national population, as in the case of Pando; this allows for the sample to be representative in each Department of the country. It was also necessary to weight the sample in a way that the number of the interviews in each department would coincide with the proportion of the national population reflected in the official data of the INE.. The result is a weighted sample of 3.003 persons, from which the distribution is adjusted to the reality of Bolivian population.³ Figure 1 illustrates this matter.

³ It is noteworthy that the percentages that usually remain within the confidence intervals have been eliminated in this case due to the small size of some segments, such as Oruro and Pando, which makes it difficult to insert text boxes. The following effects are shown with the corresponding percentages to year 2008. La Paz 28,4%, Santa Cruz 24,5%, Cochabamba 17,6%, Oruro 4,7%, Chuquisaca 6,4%, Potosí 8,6%, Pando 0,6%, Tarija 4,7% y Beni 4,4%.




Figure 1. Sample Distribution by Department and by Year, Bolivia

Given that men and women often times have different opinions and views about the same topics, it is important that the sample exhibit accurately the distribution of the population by sex. The distribution by sex in Bolivia is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Sample Distribution by Gender and by Year, Bolivia

In addition, age is a factor to be taken into consideration when determining citizens' attitudes with respect to democracy and politics in general. For that reason, the sample has been created in such a way that the distribution coincides with the demographic characteristics of the Bolivian population (See Figure 3).




Figure 3. Sample Distribution by Age and by Year, Bolivia

Throughout the years, LAPOP surveys have tried to mirror very closely the proportion of people that live in urban and rural areas of the country. Figure 4 demonstrates that the proportions have remained similar in the various samples.




Figure 4. Sample Distribution by Urban and Rural Areas and by Year, Bolivia

The sample also tries to mirror the reality of the Bolivian population in terms of levels of education. These data are shown in the following Figure 5.




Figure 5. Sample Distribution by Levels of Education and by Year, Bolivia

Ethnicity in the Sample of Bolivia 2008

The proportion of people that could be classified as relevant members of different ethnic groups in the country has been an issue of extensive debate during the last few years. Previous LAPOP studies have produced useful information for this debate and have been cited extensively by many authors. The main contribution of LAPOP in relation to this subject is that in addition to the same question that INE asked in the 2001 Census, another question was included as an option with the category “mestizo.” The results of both questions differ substantially. When the INE question is employed, about three quarters of Bolivians identify themselves as belonging to some indigenous or native group; this percentage is significantly higher than the 63% registered by the 2001 Census, which might be a result of a growing tendency to self-identification as indigenous. This topic will be discussed in the following pages. Figure 6 demonstrates the proportion of people that self-identify in each of the categories offered in this 2008 survey.




Figure 6. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification (INE question), Bolivia 2008

The alternative question used by LAPOP puts together the various indigenous groups under the categories of “indigenous” and “native” and offers more options, such as “Afro-Bolivian”, “white” y “mestizo”⁴. With these options, the majority of Bolivians (68%) identify themselves as “mestizos”, while the proportion of citizens that identify themselves as indigenous or natives is a little more than 20%. Figure 7 demonstrates the proportion of people in each of the categories included in the question.

⁴ The question is ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-Bolivian (black), mulatto, or of another race? (1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black o Afro-Bolivian (5) Mulatto (7) Other (8) DK/DR. The question differs slightly from the one used by LAPOP in other years when omitting the word “race”; however, there are reasons to believe that this question produces the same measurements as the one used before.




Figure 7. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification (question LAPOP), Bolivia 2008

LAPOP studies have also demonstrated that ethnic self-identification in Bolivia is dynamic and that the identification of people in different ethnic groups changes over time according to conditions of the sociopolitical context.⁵ As Figure 8 demonstrates, the proportion of people that self-identify as indigenous or native in the LAPOP question has increased substantially during the last few years, while the relative number of people that self-identify as “white” has decreased.




Figure 8. Percentage of People That Self Identify as “Indigenous” and as “White by Year

The proportion of people that self-identify as *mestizos* has been stable across time, with approximately two of three Bolivians identifying themselves with this category. Thus, the changes observed are that people who previously identified themselves as “mestizos,” now identify themselves as “indigenous”. Similarly, many Bolivians who used to feel “white”, now identify themselves as “mestizos”. This suggests that self-identification as indigenous in Bolivia is related to President Morales’ election in 2005. This information confirms that ethnic identities are malleable and can change over time and and more quickly than generally supposed.

⁵ This information has been presented in the last Auditoría de la Democracia (Moreno 2006; Seligson, et al. 2006). The subject is treated more deeply in Moreno 2008.

Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy*

Theoretical framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least insofar as the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).¹ Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place over night. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán, forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is truly no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasing, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance”

* This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

¹ This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

(in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*²).³ Good governance may well be essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable. At the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House website), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries shows deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, we face the growing problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.⁴ Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic

² Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

³ According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

⁴ We emphasize *support for* stable democracy, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).⁵ Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly which forms of governance matter for which aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those indicators in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub-national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy’s practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.⁶ The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

⁵ Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

⁶ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

There is increasing contemporary evidence that citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In previous publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn⁷:

⁷ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4)

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillean concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.⁸ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchilllean notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

⁸ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I. 1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of

democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. A recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado, forthcoming). In this study, they are measured with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.⁹

The scale is based in the following three LAPOP items:

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real differences among these countries.

⁹ Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7




Figure I. 4. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

B. Support for the **Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of

uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power; therefore, this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

- D1.** There are people who speak negatively of the Bolivian form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: [*Probe: To what degree?*]
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) for of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depends in part upon one’s position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. However, this survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (d5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.




Figure I. 5. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

Bolivia shows the lowest national average of tolerance in the sample by LAPOP. Low values of political tolerance in Bolivia were studied in more detail by Moreno and Seligson as an effort by LAPOP in order to build useful knowledge about the Bolivian political culture (Moreno y Seligson 2006).

Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson, forthcoming; Gilley, forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹⁰ based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

- B14.** To what extent do you trust the national government?
- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B31.** To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
- B21.** To what extent do you trust the political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008, are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g., Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, scores barely above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written-about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its

¹⁰ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.

extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.




Figure I. 6. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.5. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure I. 5. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

Second Part:
Public Opinion
and Governance

Chapter II. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy

Theoretical framework*

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues on the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD¹⁸ and representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November, 1998, the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February, 1999, the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

It is widely understood that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.”

* This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

¹⁸ The International Organization that groups the most industrialized 30 countries around the globe.

Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”¹⁹

How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon-to-be-published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson, forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.²⁰ And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is, so far, lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lessen their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however, to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

The measurement of corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can determine where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish

¹⁹ USAID. 1999. A Handbook to Fight Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaid/indexpg.html) febrero

²⁰ The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume that it makes a difference if an individual has had a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

	INAP Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK/DR	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during the past year?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	9	0	1	8	EXC11
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: At your workplace, have you been bribed within the past year?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. Have you use any public health services during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	9	0	1	8	EXC16

Additionally, the survey includes the following question about the perception of corruption among citizens:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]** (1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (8) DK/DR

Corruption victimization in comparative perspective

Before analyzing how corruption affects support for a stable democracy in Bolivia, it would be interesting to see where Bolivia is situated compared to other countries in Latin America where the study was carried out, in relation to some indicators related to this subject

The following Figure shows us the percentage of respondents that have been victims of any type of corruption across countries where LAPOP carried out these surveys in 2008.




Figure II. 1. Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008

After Haiti, Bolivia shows the highest percentage of respondents that have been victims of corruption during the year prior to the survey. However, this fact contrasts notably with the degree of the perception that Bolivians have when related to public administration corruption. Figure II.2 shows us that, on average, Bolivians perceive this phenomenon less intensely than other countries in the region where corruption victimization is, nonetheless, low.




Figure II. 2. Corruption Perception in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Corruption Victimization in Bolivia

As we have seen, the percentage of Bolivians that have professed being victims of corruption is one of the highest in the region (32.9%). The following figure shows the proportion of people that experienced one, two, three or more forms of corruption during the same period.




Figure II. 3. Index of Corruption Victimization, Bolivia 2008

If we compare the percentage of people victimized by acts of corruption registered by the survey of 2008 with data related to the studies carried out in 2006 and 2004, we notice a slightly downward tendency. This is shown in Figure II.4.




Figure II. 4. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption by Year, Bolivia

When discussing corruption and its victims, we need to take into account some members of the population respond differently; there are sectors or social groups that tend to experience corruption more frequently or are more sensitive to it. The results of the multiple logistic regression of corruption victimization show that the number of children that a person has, wealth measured by possessions of capital well-being, and the level of education increase the probability of being victims of corruption. In contrast, age and being a female lower this tendency.

In Bolivia, the data show very clearly (See Figure II.5) that the higher people’s formal education, the more sensitive they are to be victims of corruption. This could be due to the fact that a higher degree of education extends the sphere of social, economic, and institutional interrelations to which an individual can potentially access, which in turn extends the number of possible scenarios of corruption.




Figure II. 5. Corruption Victimization by Levels of Education, Bolivia 2008

Evidence from this study indicates that being a woman lowers the probability of being victims of corruption (See Figure II.6). If we take into account that in Bolivia the dominant social structure is chauvinist-patriarchal, this fact is not surprising, given that women, on average, participate in lesser degree in the formal labor market and, in general, they are not the most visible head of the family unit, which make them less sensitive to corruption. At the same time, it is noteworthy that because of cultural factors, it is possible that males are more able to admit to being victims of corruption than females.




Figure II. 6. Corruption Victimization by Sex, Bolivia 2008

Figure II.7 shows that the most sensitive population to acts of corruption is that of the age group most closely linked to the labor market, individuals between 26 and 55 years old.




Figure II. 7. Corruption Victimization by Age, Bolivia 2008

An important fact shown by the data is that the place where Bolivians reside affects the probability of being victims of corruption. As Figure II.8 reveals, residents in the main cities (Santa Cruz-Cochabamba-La Paz) are considerably more likely to be victims of corruption than those who live in other areas of the country. This may be due to the fact that the majority of the country’s economic and state activities are concentrated in these cities and are carried out by those who live there.




Figure II. 8. Corruption Victimization by City/Place of Residence, Bolivia 2008

In addition, the study results reveal that Bolivians who have a greater number of material possessions are more likely to be victims of corruption (See Figure II.9). This relationship is logical, given that the lower the wealth of an individual, the less likely he/she is to be targeted as someone that could pay bribes.




Figure II. 9. Corruption Victimization by Wealth, Bolivia 2008

The Impact of Corruption on Attitudes Toward a Stable Democracy in Bolivia

Corruption can have varying effects on the perception of democracy among citizens, not only on the current evaluation of democracy, but also in relation to its sustainability in the future; these concepts were measured in this study through variables such as support for democracy as the best form of government, citizens' right to public contestation, political tolerance, and the belief in the legitimacy of political institutions and interpersonal trust.

When each of the above-mentioned factors was taken into account as dependent variables and controlled for other factors through a multiple regression analysis, the results indicated that the extent to which Bolivians become victims of corruption has a negative impact on the belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. In order to understand this phenomenon, we should not forget that corruption, as expressed in the survey design, is linked mainly to the interaction of citizens with the State. This relationship can be seen in the following figure.




Figure II. 10. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, Bolivia 2008

The way in which the Bolivian population perceives the public administration as corrupt or not also affects their belief in the political legitimacy of institutions. Figure II.11 shows that people's belief in such institutions decreases as they perceive a greater degree of corruption by State officials.




Figure II. 11. The Impact of Corruption Perception on the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, Bolivia 2008

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the number of people who affirm having being a victim of corruption is relatively high in Bolivia. The people most sensitive to become victims of corruption are city-dwellers, males, and wealthier citizens. In spite of high levels of corruption victimization, Bolivians believe that corruption is not generalized in the country. This suggests that corruption is tolerated, and that citizens do not believe this phenomenon has reached alarming levels.

Despite this tolerance, corruption significantly damages the legitimacy of political institutions in Bolivia. In other words, citizens are the victims and participants in corruption, both of which negatively affect Bolivians' support for their political system.

Chapter III. The Impact of Crime on Support for a Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada; many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4), states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, half or more than half of the respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime do not report the crime to the authorities. In addition the UN/World Bank study emphasizes that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, makes it difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is considered to be crime and what is not. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, persons who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if car accident fatalities were included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rates of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data, Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data has serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting is impossible. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medical services (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault becomes a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, crime levels increased but this was determined to be a largely urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. area crime rates did not increase as they did in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country became increasingly urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of the cities of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its

comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, citizens who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have significantly different attitudes toward democracy from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

While it is said that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of the impact of crime only on the individual victims or their immediate families. Nonetheless, economists see wider impacts such as losses productivity and state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Such perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates are usually considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.¹ According to an extensive study of homicide rates for 1970-1994 by the World Bank, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,² says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”³ In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.⁴ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, not only are homicide rates consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above

¹In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the non-white population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

²According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

³Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/ri970717.htm).

⁴Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

data, Fajnzylber et al. using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.⁵

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to direct their attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that concern citizens deeply, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

⁵The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system of government could decline if citizens are victimized by crime or are fearful of becoming victims. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary.

What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a much larger portion of the population than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

The Measurement of Crime Victimization

This chapter focuses on two relevant variables to measure crime levels in the society: crime victimization and the perception of personal safety. The first variable measures citizen perception of insecurity, and is measured by the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/DR

First, let us compare the average of perception of insecurity in Bolivia with other countries in Latin America keeping in mind that a higher average indicates that people tend to feel more insecure than in other countries with lower levels.




Figure III. 1. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2008

It is worth noting that the results shown in Figure III.1 might not match real crime rates in each country as perceptions can be affected by recent events or by criminal activity highlighted in the media. This explains why countries with low crime rates, such as Argentina, Chile or Bolivia, show higher averages of insecurity perception than societies that are historically more violent, such as Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador.

Crime Victimization

The second variable focused upon in this chapter is an item that comes from a question posed to each citizen and asks more directly if this person was a victim of a criminal act. The question was:

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?

The results of this question in Bolivia are not remarkably high. Almost one of every five individuals affirms having being a victim of crime during the past year (See Figure III.2.). The percentage of people that affirm having been victims of criminal activity seems to have increased slightly over the past two years. This increase is statistically significant in the multivariate statistical model, which suggests that crime victimization rose in the country during the past two years. As can be observed, the increase is relatively small in substantive terms (slightly more than two percentage points), but occurring over a shorter period of time (less than two years).




Figure III. 2. Crime Victimization by Year, Bolivia

Despite the rise in crime victimization, the perception of insecurity (See Figure III.3) has not increased; on the contrary, the average of personal insecurity seems to have slightly decreased during the past two years.




Figure III. 3. Perception of Insecurity by Year, Bolivia

Who are those more exposed to crime?

Figure III.4 shows the effect of various factors that could increase the likelihood of becoming a victim of crime. Technically, this Figure is a representation of the effects of the independent variables on the probability of a person becoming a victim of crime in a multivariate logistic statistical regression




Figure III. 4. Predictors of Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008

As can be seen, females in Bolivia do not seem to be more vulnerable to crime than males, or at least their responses in terms of crime victimization are similar (the line that represents the coefficient whose interval crosses zero, so that its effect cannot be understood as different from 0). The same happens with wealth; those who have more assets do not appear to be more sensitive to becoming victims of crime than those who have fewer assets. The variables that have a different effect from 0 are size of city/town (a relationship shown in the following figure), age, and level of education.




Figure III. 5. The Impact of Size of City/Town on Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008

Figure III.5 shows the effect of size of city/town on crime victimization. In the metropolitan areas of Bolivia’s three main cities, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and La Paz, almost three of every ten Bolivians affirm having being victims of crime. In contrast, in rural areas, as well as small and medium size cities, crime victimization is substantially lower.

Crime victimization is higher among individuals between 16 and 45 years old; the proportion of people that affirm having being victims of crime is practically the same across age groups. Crime victimization decreases among those older than 45 years old. Figure III.6 shows this relationship.




Figure III. 6. The Impact of Age on Crime Victimization, Bolivia 2008

Finally, more educated people tend to affirm more frequently that they have been victims of crime than those with lower education. It is possible that these results show differences in response rates rather than differences in levels of victimization.

The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy

Now we turn our attention the effect that crime victimization and perception of personal insecurity has on the indicators of support for a stable democracy which are the focus of this volume

From the two variables that we consider, it is perception of personal insecurity that has a clearer effect on the indicators of support for a stable democracy. First, support for democracy as the best form of government decreases the more unsafe a person feels, as shown by Figure III.7.




Figure III. 7. The Impact of Perception of Personal Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy, Bolivia 2008

A similar result occurs with the legitimacy of political institutions. Citizens that feel more unsafe confer less legitimacy to democratic institutions. This relationship is observed clearly in Figure III.8.




Figure III. 8. The Impact of the Perception of Personal Insecurity on the Belief in the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, Bolivia 2008

Finally, levels of interpersonal trust also seem to be significantly affected by citizens' perception of insecurity, as shown by Figure III.9




Figure III. 9. The Impact of Perception of Personal Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust, Bolivia 2008

Conclusions

The evidence shown and discussed in this Chapter indicates that the existent levels of crime victimization, in spite of not being overwhelmingly high, have an important effect on the indicators of a stable democracy. The negative effect of the perception of insecurity is expressed clearly in relation to state institutions and in relation to other individuals.

Regarding the State itself, the perception of high insecurity make citizens view political institutions as less legitimate. At the same time, the more unsafe a person feels, the less this person agrees with the idea of democracy as the best form of government.

Perception of insecurity also affects interpersonal relationships among citizens. Trust in other people decreases as an individual's perception of insecurity increases.

The institutions and policy makers that are interested in increasing the legitimacy of democratic institutions would do well to pay attention to the perception of citizens' insecurity as a relevant factor to improve citizens' perception of democracy. The challenge seems to be able to achieve this in a context such as Bolivia, where crime victimization has increased during recent years.

Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework*

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon in Latin America for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. However, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in such groups as local parent-teacher associations and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators or cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, many of which control and determine key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services vital to the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has had a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and largely ignored politically. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been through local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments and harbor doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. Similarly, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond national capitals. Nonetheless, citizens

* Parts of this theoretical framework were written by Daniel Montalvo from the LAPOP central team at Vanderbilt University.

have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been exerting pressure, over the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots level. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists of bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).¹

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase in competition for resources, and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar, forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does this issue influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be the level of civil society participation. For many years it was thought that only advanced industrial democracies had active civil societies. This thinking was crystallized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that rules in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens may be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This

¹ There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent research, it has been shown cross-nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple associations express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

In the specific case of Bolivia, the study of people's opinion in relation to decentralization is particularly important. The process of municipal decentralization that has taken place in Bolivia through the Ley de Participación Popular has been one of the most profound in the region and has substantially transformed the country and the local political scene. At the same time, the demands for more departmental decentralization acquire more resonance in the changing times that Bolivia is currently experiencing..

How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables which themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well believe more strongly that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that participants in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of members of their own culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, may build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government, support of decentralization of national government's responsibilities, support for decentralization of economic resources, satisfaction with municipal services, and civic participation at the local level (civpart). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy. The following questions were asked:

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more responsibilities? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) Somewhat more to the central government
- (3) The same amount to the central government and the municipality
- (4) Some more to the municipality
- (5) Much more to the municipality
- (88) DK/DA

LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Some more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the municipality
- (4) Some more the municipality
- (5) Much more the municipality
- (88) DK/DA

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing are...? **[Read options]**

- (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know

Measuring civil society participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (for “community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates community-level civil society organizations in our survey.² The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in organizations listed below.³

² This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

³ The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis and taking the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know” to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them....	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8

Perceptions of Local Government in Comparative Perspective

In the following, we will see where Bolivia is located in relation to other countries where LAPOP carried out similar studies in 2008 and topics that affect citizen perception of various aspects involving municipal governments.

One subject is related to trust that people expressed in their municipal government. Figure IV.1 shows the average of trust in each country. The scale goes from 0 (no trust) to 100 (high trust). The data show that Bolivia is located in the middle, not only in relation to other countries, but also because of the fact that the population’s average of trust in municipal governments barely passes the average point in the scale (53,4%), in other words, in general, citizens are cautious in their trust of this institution.




Figure IV. 1. Trust in the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2008

It is interesting to note that the Bolivian population supports more intensively the decentralization of public services to the municipalities than other countries (Figure IV.2). Through la Ley de Participación Popular, Bolivia has undergone a profound transformation of municipal decentralization since 1994. This was possible through budgetary allocations from the State proportional to each municipality's population with respect to the national total. In this sense, we can say that, in Bolivians, tacitly accept and appreciate the rapprochement of the State to the people (in the local context) as a result of this Law.




Figure IV. 2. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Regarding the administration of Bolivia's economic resources, Figure IV.3 shows that Bolivia is one of the countries where people have a high support toward the idea that municipalities should manage a higher percentage of such resources than they currently do, which corroborates Bolivians support for municipal decentralization.




Figure IV. 3. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective, 2008

On the other hand, the following figure shows that satisfaction with services provided by municipalities in Bolivia is among the highest in the region; on average, Bolivians rate them in the middle of a scale between very bad and very good. However, the results shown in previous figures seem to suggest that there is a perception that a higher allocation of resources and responsibilities to municipalities will result in a higher quality of services provided to the population.




Figure IV. 4. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Citizen Participation in Bolivian Local Government

The 1994 Ley de Participación Popular generated a process through which citizen participation at the local level has grown. In spite of that fact, Figure IV.5 shows that, on average, Bolivians' trust is shared by both the local and national governments. Nonetheless, it is important to note that trust in municipalities has been continuously increasing in the last ten years; in the 1998 report, this figure was considerably lower (43,9) than that of this year (53,4).




Figure IV. 5. Comparisons between Trust in the Local Government versus Trust in the National Government, Bolivia 2008

The following figures show that only 12,5% of the population participated in town meetings or other gatherings called by the executive or town councils. In relation to the results in previous reports, this evidence shows that participation has decreased moderately (See Figure IV.6).




Figure IV. 6. Participation at the Local Level by Year, Bolivia

In addition, the percentage of the population that reports having sought assistance or presented a request to the local government during the last year is low (See Figure IV.7). In relation to previous studies, this figure tends to be lower.




Figure IV. 7. Requests for Assistance to the Local Government by Year, Bolivia

The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for a Stable Democracy in Bolivia

The analyses and data presented in this section are focused in the relationship between satisfaction with local services and local citizen participation on support for a stable democracy. In the following figure we present the results of a multivariate linear regression related to the decentralization of public services toward municipalities. Keeping in mind that the statistically significant relationships correspond to cases in which confidence intervals do not cross the line with a value of “zero,” we observe here that satisfaction with local services does not help to explain citizens’ preferences regarding the decentralization of responsibilities. In fact, the only variable that affects these preferences, and in a negative way, is the approval of the president’s performance, which will be detailed next.




Figure IV. 8. Predictors of Support for Municipal Decentralization of Responsibilities, Bolivia 2008

To reiterate, in Bolivia a higher or lower preference for decentralization of public services is not related to the quality of municipal services. Instead, President Evo Morales’ job approval rating appears to be a factor that explains it. Figure IV.9 shows clearly that the higher the approval of the president’s performance, the lower the probability that they favor decentralization for public services. This is an indicator of the degree of politization that the decentralization has acquired in the last few years.




Figure IV. 9. The Impact of the Approval of the President on Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities, Bolivia 2008

Figure IV.10 presents the results of a multivariate linear regression of support for decentralization of economic resources in the country. The effects that are statistically significant are those that show confidence intervals different from “zero”, meaning that they do not cross the line that represents this value.

In this case, we observe that the satisfaction that people express with local services and the size of the city or town where people live have a positive effect on support for decentralization of resources. On the other hand, citizens who give the president high job performance ratings those who identify themselves as indigenous showed lower support for decentralization.




Figure IV. 10. Predictors of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008

When we try to measure the impact that place of residence has on any variable, generally it is divided as urban - rural. In this case, and others, differences were found not only by geography, but also by type of city. More specifically, Figure IV.11 shows that decentralization of economic resources in Bolivia is supported less in the main cities (Santa Cruz-Cochabamba-La Paz) than in medium sized cities, where support is considerably higher, and in smaller cities and rural areas in which support is moderate. In order to understand this, we need to remember that the process of decentralization brought about by la Ley de Participación Popular allowed for direct allocation of economic resources from the General National Treasury to municipalities in proportion to the number of inhabitants in each. The main impact was felt by medium and small municipalities, which for the first time could rely on permanent resources to carry out public projects. On the other hand, bigger municipalities, including the main cities which have received a larger share of resources due to the number of inhabitants, do not perceive the impact of this Law given that these municipalities have always had considerable resources of their own.




Figure IV. 11. The Impact of Size of Place of Residency on Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008

According to the results shown in Figure IV.12, approval of President Morales’ job performance has had a negative impact on support for decentralization of economic resources in favor of

municipalities. In other words, the more favorably people rate the president’s performance, the lower the probability that they will favor this type of decentralization.




Figure IV. 12. The Impact of the Approval of the President’s Job on Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008

The impact of satisfaction with local services was measured in relation to diverse indicators of support for a stable democracy.⁴ In each case, a multivariate linear analysis was carried out and controlled for other variables.⁵ The results indicate that the degree of satisfaction with these services has a statistically significant impact on the belief in the political legitimacy of institutions as well as on people’s interpersonal trust.

In this sense, Figure IV.13 indicates that the more unsatisfied people are with the quality of local services, the lower their belief in the political legitimacy of institutions. This is not surprising, given that Bolivians have a generalized perception that the quality and coverage of municipal services are not equal and that they favor certain sectors, generally the elite, before the majority.

⁴ The variables incorporated were: democracy is preferable to other form of government, right of opposition, political tolerance, belief in the political legitimacy of institutions, and interpersonal trust.

⁵ In general, control variables are: approval of the president’s job, political interest, education, sex, age, squared age, wealth, perception of personal economy, and size of city.




Figure IV. 13. The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008

On the other hand, the data also show that the less satisfied citizens are with local services, the lower their degree of interpersonal trust.

The Degree of Local Civil Society Participation in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.14 shows that slightly more than six in ten Bolivians participate in meetings of any religious organization. This figure is the fifth highest among the countries where LAPOP carried out this type of study.




Figure IV. 14. Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization in Comparative Perspective, 2008

In relation to other countries (Figure IV.15), Bolivia has one of the highest rates of participation in parents’ associations, with approximately 53% of respondents indicating that they had attended this type of meeting at least once.






Figure IV. 15. Participation in Parents' Associations in Comparative Perspective, 2008

According to the data shown in Figure IV.16, the Bolivian population is, comparatively, one of the most active with regard to attendance at community committee meetings or participation in associations for community improvement. These results are explained from the organizational structure of Bolivian society, where these groups (agrarian labor unions, etc.) are institutions are active in communities all over Bolivia and which play a central role, not only when channeling to the municipality the demands of the population, but also in issues related to the administration of justice and other collective interests.



FigureIV. 16. Participation in Meetings of a Committee or Association for Community Improvement in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Figure IV.17 shows that in Bolivia women are more active in community organizations compared to other countries in the sample. Nonetheless, only 22,8% of the female population has attended meetings of associations or groups of women or homemakers.



FigureIV. 17. Participation in Associations or Groups of Women or Home Makers in Comparative Perspective, 2008

The Impact of Local Civil Participation on Support for a Stable Democracy in Bolivia

One of the indicators of support for a stable democracy is the degree to which citizens agree with the right of opposition.⁶ The results of the multivariate linear regression for the impact on support for the right of opposition by different forms of local civil participation considered in this study indicate that the only factor that has a positive effect on support for this right is participation in meetings of any religious organization.

Figure IV.18 shows that Bolivians who attend meetings of any religious organization tend to express higher support of the people’s right of opposition. However, the figure also shows that support decreases among more active participants. We conclude, therefore that both extremes, between ardent believers and non believers, in terms of attendance to any religious organization, have a negative effect on support for the right of opposition, while moderate positions strengthen it.




Figure IV. 18. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization on Support for the Right of Opposition, Bolivia 2008

⁶ The explanation of the construction of this variable is developed in Chapter I of this report.

Another indicator of support for a stable democracy is political tolerance, as discussed in previous sections of this study. The results of the regression suggest that the degree of people’s political tolerance is positively affected by participation in meetings of any religious organization. In other words, Bolivians who attend meetings of any religious organization tend to be a little more politically tolerant than those who do not attend or attend less frequently.

A third indicator of support for a stable democracy is belief in the political legitimacy of institutions. The results of the multivariate linear regression analysis show that belief in the political legitimacy of institutions is affected independently and in both cases positively, by two factors: one of them concerns participation of individuals in meetings of any religious organization and the other is participation in meetings of parents’ associations at the schools where their children study.

Also the data shows that the belief in the political legitimacy of institutions tends to be higher among those who attend meetings of any religious organization with moderate or higher frequency than those who do so sporadically or not at all.

Additionally, there is a positive correlation between the frequency of people’s attendance to meetings of parents’ associations at their childrens’ schools and their belief in the political legitimacy of institutions (See Figure IV.19).




Figure IV. 19. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Parents’ Associations on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008

The fourth and last indicator of support for a stable democracy considered in this analysis refers to the level of interpersonal trust among members of a community. The multivariate linear regression analysis that links this variable with different forms of civil participation studied in this report shows that the level of interpersonal trust is affected only, and positively, by the frequency in which Bolivians attend any religious organization.

Figure IV.20 indicates that the extent to which people trust another member of their community is higher among those who attend meetings of any religious organization than those who do not attend. This tendency is higher among those who attend this type of meetings more frequently.




Figure IV. 20. The Impact of Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Organization on Interpersonal Trust, Bolivia 2008

Conclusions

Local society has a central role in Bolivian social and political life; this happens at the level of civil society as well as in relation to state institutions. Levels of participation in organizations of civil society in Bolivia are higher than those registered in the majority of the countries surveyed by the AmericasBarometer in 2008; Bolivians participate actively in local organizations such as parents associations, womens' groups, and religious organizations. The data show that social capital of Bolivians, at least at the local level, is high and that social networks are strongly linked to local society.

Although Bolivians do not have on average a high level of satisfaction with the services provided by local governments, their expectations in relation to the job of local governments are high. Bolivians are convinced that municipalities are good places for state administration and that they should manage a fair proportion of public resources. However, the approval of the current government's job is negatively related to support for decentralization of resources and responsibilities toward municipalities; supporters of President Morales tend, on average, to favor a more centralized public administration.

Participation in local organizations also has a positive effect on the indicators of support for a stable democracy, particularly on the legitimacy of institutions, although the magnitude of these relationships is not particularly high.

Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical Framework*

The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the question of the impact of government performance perception on support for a stable government. It has become commonplace in the field of democratic governance when talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates are voted out of office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption); also, they have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s that researchers began to take note. During this time, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions, principally in the developed world, especially in the United States. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam or corruption scandals during the Nixon administration, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as people’s perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did opinions of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support—political community, the regime, and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton’s three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, negative economic outlooks and perceptions affected

* This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

“peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat in doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance, which according to Dalton “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government; however according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government accountable for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones in that “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (127) within the OECD nations¹.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions, which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58). They caution, however, that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, individuals’ assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system; citizens who evaluate both the national as well as their personal economic situations at a higher level will be more likely to support the political system than citizens whose perceptions are lower.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic

¹ International Organization that groups the 30 most industrialized countries in the world.

performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

According to the theory, we should expect that in Bolivia, compared to what occurs in the rest of the countries that are included in these studies, citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital. In the following section, we test these hypotheses using the data of the Bolivian 2008 survey.

Government economic performance

As in all surveys of previous years, the 2008 round asked interviewees what is the main problem in the country. As we expected, citizens' responses and opinions vary a lot, but in spite of their diversity, the problems which respondents are most concerned with can be clustered in general categories.

The five main categories of problems identified by the survey are: basic services, economy, politics, and other diverse problems identified by the respondents.²

Figure V.1 represents opinions of respondents in relation to the main problems that the country faces currently. The percentages represent the total of people whose responses belong to one category or another.

² Details of the contents of each of the main problems in the country can be seen in a table that describes the classification of the problems in the Appendix section of this Chapter.




Figure V. 1. Main Problem in the Country, Bolivia 2008

As we observe in the figure, the problems that concern the majority of Bolivians are related to the national economic situation. Forty seven percent of interviewees said that the main problem of the country has to do in one way or another with the national economy, specifically inflation, unemployment, poverty, or external debt.

The second largest group of interviewees expressed that the main problem of the country is politics (29,8%); among the subtopics mentioned are corruption, politicians, the Referendum, and the Constituent Assembly.

Finally, the third largest group of citizens (18,3%) expressed concern with diverse problems (“others”), such as discrimination, drug trafficking, migration and popular protests.

Because the main concern of the majority of Bolivians is economic problems of one sort or another, it is logical to ask how the government performs when devising solutions to these problems. Thus, in the following section we analyze citizens’ opinions of the Bolivian government’s economic performance, given that, as explained in the theoretical portion of this chapter, satisfaction with economic performance is related to support for a stable political system and democracy.

Measuring perception of government economic performance

An index of perception of government economic performance was created using two items in the survey that measures the evaluation that citizens have toward government economic performance in two main areas in the national economy: the fight against poverty and unemployment. The items that were used to measure this evaluation are:

- N1.** To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?
N12. To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment?

Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

We start the analysis of the data with regards to citizens' evaluations of government economic performance comparing these results with other countries. Government economic performance is measured by the index of economic performance described in the previous section on a scale of 100 points in which an average close to zero indicates a negative evaluation and an average close to 100 indicates a positive evaluation of the government economic performance.

As we can see in Figure V.2, Bolivians in 2008 evaluate the economic performance of the government in relation to fight against poverty and unemployment in a positive way, with an average of 51,9 points on a scale from 0 to 100. In comparison with other countries in the sample, Bolivia has the second best evaluation of economic performance in the region, similar to levels of satisfaction in Costa Rica and only exceeded by Uruguay, the most satisfied in the sample. On the other hand, Paraguay presents the worst evaluation, with an average of only 14,4 points, lower than Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas.

The data in this section suggest that, in general, the evaluation of economic performance of the governments of Latin America tend to be more negative than positive. As a matter of fact, from the 21 countries studied, only four have evaluations that average more than 50 points, a considerable distance for the ideal 100 point score.. In other words, even with the higher scores compared to Paraguay, Haiti or Honduras, the evaluations of economic performance of Latin American governments in general tend to be very low.




Figure V. 2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

We have established that in 2008, in general, Bolivians evaluate their government’s economic performance more positively than citizens in other Latin American countries, even though they continue to say that Bolivia’s main problems are economic in nature.

In the following section, the analysis focuses specifically on the economic performance of Bolivian governments between the year 2000 and 2008. Figure V.3 illustrates the perceptions of respondents in the last four rounds of public opinion by LAPOP.




Figure V. 3. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Year, Bolivia

The results of this analysis indicate that in the year 2000 the evaluation of the government economic performance was very low--only 22,9 points on a scale from 0 to 100, in which an average closer to zero indicates a negative evaluation. These results suggest that in 2000, Bolivians were very unsatisfied with the government’s economic performance under President Hugo Bánzer Suárez. In the following years, the evaluation of government economic performance was notably more positive during the presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (46,4) and reached its highest point of approval during the first year (2006) of President’s Evo Morales’ government, reaching an average of approval that almost triples that of during the Bánzer administration. However, between 2006 and 2008 the upward swing stopped, and the

average of approval of the Morales administration’s economic performance dipped almost 10 points on our scale.

There are two important elements to be considered regarding these results. In the first place, Bolivians are less satisfied with their government’s economic performance in 2008 than they were in 2006. On the other hand, the average of approval of government economic performance in 2008 remains high compared to 2004, during the government of President Sánchez de Lozada, which could be interpreted as a more positive evaluation of the performance of the current government given that it is higher than the average point in the scale.

In the following section, we analyze in more detail the main elements that affect the individual evaluation of government economic performance.

Main Factors that Explain the Evaluation of Government Economic Performance

In this section, we focus on exploring the main characteristics of individuals who tend to evaluate positively the government economic performance in 2008. In order to do that, a multivariate linear regression analysis will be employed, taking into account socio-economic characteristics of the respondents such as sex, age, level of education, level of wealth³ and place of residency.

To these variables we add two more that are key in academic studies of public opinion about individual perceptions of government economic performance: such perceptions of the national economy (called “sociotropic” perceptions) and individual perceptions about the personal economic situation of the respondents (called “idiotropic” perceptions). These perceptions are measured by the following questions:

<p>SOCT1. How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know</p>
<p>IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know</p>

It is worth noting that these variables measure the individual perception of the national economy without establishing a direct link between perception and the possible role of the government in its results.

Generally, academic studies on this subject have established that individuals tend to hold the current government accountable (at the time of measurement) for the national economy (sociotropic perception) but do not necessarily hold the government accountable for their own

³ Measured by capital items in the household.

personal economy (idiotropic perception). However, this generalization is not applied in the same way in all cases, and for this reason it is necessary to include both measures as predictors of the evaluation of the government’s economic performance.

Figure V.4 illustrates the results of the multivariate linear regression employed for the statistical analysis of the government economic performance.




Figure V. 4. Predictors of the Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008

In this figure we can observe that sociotropic perceptions are statistically significant and that the relationship between this variable and the evaluation of the government’s economic performance is positive. This suggests that individuals who have a positive perception of the national economic situation tend to also evaluate positively the government economic performance.

This result holds independently of the president’s job approval rating, which indicates that when President Morales’ job approval rises, the perception that the government performs well in economic terms also rises.

On the other hand, among the socio-economic variables, only the level of education and age of the respondents are statistically significant in this analysis. In the case of these three variables, the relationship with the evaluation of government economic performance is negative, which

suggests that young people tend to evaluate the government economic performance more positively than older people and that individuals with higher levels of education tend to evaluate the government economic performance more negatively than those with basic levels of education. Similarly, individuals with higher levels of wealth (measured in terms of material possessions) have a poorer opinion of the government economic performance than those with lower levels of wealth.

In the following section, we will analyze in more detail the relationship between sociotropic and idiosyncratic perceptions and the perception of the government economic performance.

Relationship Between Government Economic Performance and the Perception of the National Economic Situation

Figure V.5 shows the positive relationship between the perception of the national economic situation and the evaluation of the government’s economic performance, demonstrated in the regression analysis of the previous section. The line in the graph shows how the evaluation of the government economic performance notably decreases as the perception of the national economic situation becomes more negative.




Figure V. 5. The Impact of the National Economic Situation on the Perception of Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008

Relationship Between Government Economic Performance and Approval of the President's Job

As the previous section, Figure V.6 illustrates the positive relationship between the president's job approval rating and individual perceptions of the government economic performance. Also in this case, we can observe that the figure confirms the relationship established in the regression analysis: individuals who are more satisfied with the way the president does his job tend to perceive the government's economic performance more positively.




Figure V. 6. The Impact of the Approval of the President's Job on the Perception of the Government Economic Performance, Bolivia 2008

These results point to an evident disparity between individuals who approve of the president's performance and those who do not. The distance between those who consider that the president does a "very bad" job and those who say that he does a "very good" job, is almost 70 points in a scale from 0 to 100.

The Perception of the Government Economic Performance and its impact on Support for a Stable Democracy

At the beginning of this chapter we took into account the theoretical and empirical considerations of academic studies in other countries that establish a relationship between individual evaluations of government economic performance and individual willingness to support the political system; more specifically, the democratic system and its conditions for a stable democracy.

In this section, having established that Bolivians evaluate positively the government's economic performance, we continue with the analysis of the relationship between this performance and support for a stable democracy in the specific reality of the context of Bolivia in 2008. With this objective, we have developed a series of statistical analyses to establish what type of relationship exists between the evaluations of the government's economic performance and some specific conditions that may foster the development of a stable democracy in Bolivia.

We are interested particularly in studying the effect that individual evaluation of the government's economic performance has on the explicit support for a democracy as a political system, the right of opposition, political tolerance, the perception of the legitimacy of democratic institutions and interpersonal trust, all of which are necessary elements for the construction of a stable democracy.

The results of the regression analysis indicate that individual evaluations of the government's economic performance have a significant effect only on the major elements for the construction of a stable democracy: the legitimacy of political institutions and political tolerance.

In the case of the legitimacy of political institutions,⁴ the relationship is positive, which suggests that people who evaluate the government's economic performance more positively tend to perceive their institutions as more legitimate than those who have a negative perception of such performance. This relationship is illustrated in Figure V.7, in which it can be seen clearly that as the evaluation of the government's economic performance becomes more positive, the perception of the legitimacy of political institutions also increases.

⁴ The index of legitimacy of political institutions consists of trust measures of the judicial system, National Congress, Supreme Court of Justice, National Government and political parties.




Figure V. 7. The Impact of the Government Economic Performance on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008

The relationship with political tolerance⁵ has the opposite effect: individuals who evaluate the government's economic performance positively have less political tolerance than those who have a poorer opinion of this performance.

⁵ The index of political tolerance is based on the variables that measure the respect toward the rights of individuals to freedom of expression, voting, p and running for public office.




Figure V. 8. The Impact of the Government Economic Performance on Political Tolerance, Bolivia 2008

The individual level of political tolerance is affected in the same way by the president's job performance rating. In view of these results, it could be said that individuals who show higher approval of president's job performance and who have a positive perception of the government's economic performance believe firmly in the president and his/her policies and are less willing to consider different positions than their own than those individuals who express less approval of the president's job performance and the government's economic performance. In terms of the consequences for Bolivian democracy, these results suggest a tendency toward the consolidation of a regime with authoritarian characteristics. This idea is developed more extensively in the following chapter.

It is noteworthy at this point of the analysis that the statistical correlation between the variable that measures the approval of the president's job and the index of the evaluation of the government's economic performance ($r=0,628$) is high. A statistical correlation of this nature indicates a very close measurement of both and the difficulty of the interpretation of its effects, in the sense that it is difficult to establish effects that are completely independent from each other. In other words, this correlation between the president's job performance and the government's economic performance makes it difficult to determine whether the respondents

like what their president is doing because they approve of their government's economic performance or vice versa.

This type of statistical correlation is not totally unexpected in political contexts such as Bolivia's, in which the figure of the president is a very popular or charismatic figure whose influence transcends to other components of the political system. However, to disentangle this correlation and determine the causal relationship could require specific research.

Conclusions

This chapter analyzes the impact of individual evaluations of the government's economic performance on support for a stable democracy. This analysis is pertinent from the empirical point of view, given that the majority of respondents declared that the main problem that the country faces in this moment is the economy. At the same time, the analysis is pertinent from the theoretical point of view given that academic studies have established a connection between what happens in the economic context and the quality and stability of democracies.

The statistical analyses of the data from the AmericasBarometer in this section reveal that Bolivians consider, generally, that government economic performance is positive and that although the 2006 level of satisfaction with this performance was higher than in 2008, compared to other Latin American countries, citizen satisfaction with the Bolivian government's economic performance is high, exceeded only by the level of satisfaction in Uruguay.

The results obtained in this section indicate that sociotropic perceptions have a positive relationship with evaluations of the Bolivian government's performance; in addition, as individual satisfaction with Bolivia's national and personal economic situation increases, so does approval of the government's economic performance.

Finally, the data from the AmericasBarometer present evidence that the way in which individuals perceive their government's economic performance has an effect on some of the necessary elements for the existence of a stable democracy. In Bolivia, the perception of the government performance affects the perception of the legitimacy of the principle political institutions as well as citizens' levels of political tolerance; however, it does not seem to affect other major components needed for a stable democracy. This influence is strongly linked to President Morales' job approval ratings.

Third part:
Beyond
Governance

Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

Theoretical background

The legitimacy of a political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.¹ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson, forthcoming; Gilley, forthcoming). Political legitimacy is a vital element for the political process “a democratic political system cannot survive for a long time without the support of the majority of its citizens” (Miller 1974).

The legitimacy of the political system is mainly a product of citizens’ satisfaction with institutions and political actors and their performance. The consequences of long-term dissatisfaction with a government and its institutions could generate, as Miller suggests “(...) empty power feelings and the absence of regulations that will probably be accompanied by feelings of hostility toward political and social leaders, government institutions and the regime as a whole” (Miller 1974).

One of the major elements of political legitimacy is trust received by institutions that make up the political system, given that trust plays a central role in the perception of the legitimacy of norms and processes within the political field. A positive perception of both the performance and the nature of such institutions foment citizen support of the government and the regime in the country. For this reason, trust in political institutions vital for the strengthening of the legitimacy of the system. “The consideration that the government and politicians are worthy of trust affects, among other things, levels of political participation and the probability that individuals will become politically active as well as their electoral preferences, levels of social cooperation and individual support for government policies and the political regime” (Schwarz-Blum 2008).

Academics dedicated to the study of the dynamics of system support or political legitimacy (Easton 1975; Easton 1976; Hetherington 1998; Schwarz-Blum 2006; Weatherford 1992) have provided evidence of political trust as a fundamental part of system support. Thus, the LAPOP instrument that measures levels of system support in a country is based on an index of 5 items established as valid and intended to capture the levels of trust of the interviewees of their political system. These items are measured on a 7 point scale that has been transformed into a scale from 0 to 100 to facilitate understanding of the analysis. On this scale, an average close to 0 indicates a very low level of system support, and an average close to 100 indicates an extremely high level of system support. The questions used to determine system support are discussed in chapter I of this study.

In the preceding chapter, we examined political legitimacy as a major element of democratic stability; our focus has been narrow as we were examining several other key elements in the

¹ Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, the ultimate recourse is coercion. In democracies, governments that resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our examination of political legitimacy by first returning to research in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. In the second part of this chapter, we examine the levels of trust in the principle institutions of the political system that make up the index of political legitimacy as we do other important institutions in Bolivia's political arena.

The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In previous studies of the AmericasBarometer, we used a combination of the measure of system support and political tolerance as an indicator that a democratic system either has the potential to stabilize or that it finds itself at risk of instability. The objective of this indicator is to act as a "warning sign" for democracies at risk and as a sigh of relief for those that show signs of stability.

The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions must be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule and minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000).

For the construction of this indicator, political tolerance attitudes and system support of political legitimacy has been divided into "high" and "low" levels. Citizens' attitudes are classified as high tolerance or low tolerance and high system support or low system support. The combination of these four possible attitudes provides four different categories of democratic regimes: stable democracy, unstable democracy, authoritarian stability, and democracy at risk. Table VI.1 presents the four possible combinations between levels of system support (legitimacy) and political tolerance.

Table VI. 1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support

System Support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the idea that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Stable systems, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under such conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

On the other hand, when system support is high but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

When system support is low we can expect that political regimes type represented by both lower boxes of the table will be politically unstable. Such instability does not necessarily translate directly into a reduction of civil liberties; a period of instability could be a period of change leading to deepening of levels of democracy, especially when citizens tend to be politically tolerant. For example, in a situation of low system support (legitimacy) and high political tolerance (lower left box) it is difficult to predict whether instability will lead to higher democratization or violence and conflict.

On the other hand, low system support and low political tolerance (lower right box), point to the possibility of democracy at risk. Evidently, public opinion is not to the ultimate predictor of a breakdown in the democratic system of a country, given the multiple factors such as the role of elites, military positions and support or opposition for international actors that are crucial for this process. However, systems in which public opinion neither supports basic institutions of the political system nor the guarantees of the rights of minorities are vulnerable to a democratic

breakdown. In these cases, public opinion surveys offer information that works as a warning sign about a possible development of these political events.

Two caveats apply here: First, these relationships apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same tendencies in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the general public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown that in Nicaragua, incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Support for stable democracy in Bolivia

Once the theoretical relationship between political legitimacy, measured by system support, and political tolerance, is understood we continue to examine the evidence obtained from public opinion surveys in the specific case of Bolivian democracy with data from the 2008 round of AmericasBarometer. Table VI.2 shows, once again, the theoretical model described in the previous section together with empirical evidence from Bolivia.

Table VI. 2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

System Support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 18,3%	Authoritarian Stability 35,8%
Low	Unstable Democracy 13,9%	Democracy at Risk 32,1%

The most important element from the results of our public opinion surveys is that the majority of the interviewed population tends to express low levels of political tolerance. In total, 68% of the respondents in 2008 reveal some degree of unwillingness to tolerate those who express different political opinions. As it has been established, this is a worrisome element from a democratic point of view; political tolerance is a fundamental element in any democracy.

Regarding levels of system support, the results suggest that 54% of the respondents express high levels of system support and, consequently, it is understood that a solid majority considers the Bolivian political system to be a legitimate system.

According to the logic of the theoretical framework, the results of the analysis indicate that the attitudes of a majority of Bolivians (35,8%) tend toward a shift from democracy to a situation of authoritarian stability, in which the legitimacy of the system is high, but political tolerance is low, putting at risk guarantees of minority rights.

The evidence demonstrates that the proportion of people in the box corresponding to low political tolerance and high system support, the box of authoritarian stability, has been growing in the country. The change in these figures is statistically significant between 2004 and 2006. Figure VI.1 shows this tendency.




Figure VI. 1. Population that Express a High Political Legitimacy of Institutions and Low Political Tolerance and Population that Express High Political Legitimacy of Institutions and High Political Tolerance By Year, Bolivia

The analysis of the attitudes of legitimacy and political tolerance is developed with the objective of offering a diagnostic for the prospects of building a stable democracy; and it is in this context that the results obtained are discouraging for the hopes of democratic stability in the short-term. These results can reflect a moment of change in the political direction of the country and could be a real warning sign of the orientation of the Bolivian democracy in the future. However, it is

noteworthy, once again, that public opinion is just one element from a group of factors that affect the democratization process. It should not be taken as conclusive but rather as a useful element for a dialogue and public reflection of a national democratic project.

Figure VI.2 presents a comparison of the proportion of people with attitudes that support a stable democracy in countries of the American continent; the data presented corresponds to the proportion of people in the category of high tolerance and high system support.




Figure VI. 2. Support for a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Compared to the other countries studied, the data from the Americas Barometer suggest that a relatively small percentage of the Bolivian population is in the category of support for a stable democracy, with similar proportions to those in Nicaragua, Guatemala, or Peru. The similarity of the data for countries such as Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador could be a sign that these countries are undergoing changes not only at the national level but also at the regional level. If this is correct, a comparative study of the political processes in these three countries would be useful to better understand the factors that are pushing citizens away from necessary attitudes for building more stable democracies in the region.

Political Tolerance and Stable Democracy

The analysis of citizens' attitudes toward support for a stable democracy in Bolivia reveals that low levels of political tolerance toward those who have different opinions than their own is a major problem. Next, we will analyze in more detail the elements that determine these observed low levels of tolerance.

The items used to create the index of political tolerance refer to the respect for the political rights of people that have different opinions of the political system of the country. These items are described in more detail in Chapter I in this study. Figure VI.3 shows the averages in 2008 for each of the indicators that make up the index of tolerance




Figure VI. 3 Elements of Political Tolerance, Bolivia 2008

As it can be observed in the figure, the levels of political tolerance toward the rights of those who do not agree with the form of government in the country are low in general; they exceed the middle point in a scale from 0 to 100, which means that, on average, respondents tend to disapprove of the exercise of political rights of individuals that do not agree with the form of government.

The results of this analysis suggest that Bolivians are more tolerant of the rights of others' to participate in peaceful demonstrations to express their points of view than their right to participate directly in public decision-making through voting. The average Bolivian has low tolerance toward the right of freedom of expression of individuals to give a speech in television expressing disapproval of Bolivian's form of government; similarly, an average Bolivian is even less tolerant of the right of individuals to run for public office.

These data confirm the discouraging results in the previous section--low tolerance toward the exercise of essential political rights, in this case of people who are critical of the form of government. This has important implications for the democratization process, for without the exercise of these rights, the political participation of citizens as well as their access to the public sphere and the voice of political minorities, is constrained..

Next, we analyze whether the low levels of political tolerance among Bolivians is a recent phenomenon, or if it is, on the other hand, a constant element of the political culture of Bolivians.




Figure VI. 4. Political Tolerance by Year, Bolivia

In the first chapter of this report we see that the level of political tolerance in Bolivia is the lowest among all countries studied (including Canada and the United States). The results in Figure VI.4 demonstrate clearly that this is not a recent phenomenon in Bolivia, given that the levels of political tolerance of the Bolivian population have not changed significantly in a period of 10 years. These data are indicators that low levels of tolerance do not stem directly from the Bolivian context or from its political situation, but rather that low tolerance is a permanent element of the political culture in the country that is probably determined by factors not necessarily from the political arena.

Figure VI.5 offers an interesting example of the dynamic of political tolerance in the last years in the country, in which it seems that there has been a shift in the attitudes of the population between 2006 and 2008; levels of tolerance have been influenced by their place of residence.




Figure VI. 5. Political Tolerance by Place of Residence, Bolivia 2008

In 2006, the levels of tolerance among people who live in rural areas of the country were not significantly different from those who reside in medium or large cities. However, in 2008 these differences are significant and clear. People who reside in Bolivia’s large cities express higher levels of political tolerance than those who live in medium or smaller cities, and considerably higher than individuals who reside in rural areas of the country.

On the other hand, Figure VI.6 suggests that the levels of tolerance are also changing in 2008 in relation to 2006 when related to the political preference of individuals. As the figure shows, in 2006, the political tolerance shown by citizens who consider approve of President Morales’ job performance was much higher than those who who expressed disapproval. In 2008, in contrast, the differences between those who evaluate the job of the president positively and those who evaluate him negatively suggest that citizens who are more satisfied tend to be less tolerant than those who criticize Morales’ performance.




Figure VI. 6. Political Tolerance According to the Approval of the President’s Job, Bolivia 2008

It is necessary to clarify that job approval rating of the president has a relationship with intolerance only when related to tolerance toward those who criticize Bolivia’s current form of government. Other measures of tolerance, such as respect of the rights of homosexuals to participate in politics, do not seem to be influenced in any way by approval of the government’s performance.

In conclusion, while levels of political tolerance have remained low during the last 10 years in Bolivia, and that they seem not to be a direct result of political processes from which the country has undergone of late, the data offer evidence of changes between 2006 and 2008 that are marking differences in the levels of political tolerance among groups of the population that did not exist in 2006.

Legitimacy of Institutions

The legitimacy of institutions of a political system is critical for the survival and the quality of democracy. In this section, we analyze the level of the legitimacy of the main institutions of the political process in Bolivia, measured by the index of legitimacy based on trust that these institutions deserve. The institutions that make up the index are the main institutions of the three

powers of the state: the National Government (the executive power), the National Congress and the political parties² (the legislative power); and the Supreme Court of Justice and the judicial system in general (judicial power).

Trust in institutions is measured on a scale from 0 to 7, which has been transformed into a scale from 0 to 100 points in order to facilitate the understanding of the results, in which a score closer to 0 means less trust in an institution and a score closer to a 100 means a higher trust.

Figure VI.7 shows the levels of legitimacy of institutions. In general, we can observe that the majority of institutions have a fairly high level of legitimacy, scoring above or close to the middle of the 100 point scale shown. Bolivians give a high legitimacy rating to such institutions as the Catholic Church, the Ombudsman, and the media, while the institutions that are seen as the least legitimate are political parties and the National Police.

² Political parties are considered along with Congress as part of the Legislative Power since it is through political parties that elected candidates by the population gain access to the Legislative Power.



Figure VI. 7. Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008

In a short-term perspective, the legitimacy of political parties has always been low in Bolivia and with few variations (See Figure VII.2 in the following chapter). In the case of the legitimacy of Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice the opposite occurs, as it can be seen in Figures VI.8 and VI.9 respectively.




Figure VI. 8. Trust in Congress by Year, Bolivia

As it can be seen in the previous figure, the legitimacy of the Bolivian congress has increased since 2006, and although the increase between 2006 and 2008 is not statistically significant, this institution has maintained a general tendency to increase its legitimacy according to citizens' perceptions and is rated significantly higher than years prior to 2006.

The Supreme Court of Justice has also continues to show increases in its levels of legitimacy, particularly between 2006 and 2008 compared to previous years.




Figure VI. 9. Trust in the Supreme Court of Justice by Year, Bolivia

As opposed to what happens with levels of political tolerance, healthy levels of legitimacy of Bolivian political institutions and the increase in levels of legitimacy of some central institutions of the political system are an encouraging signal for the survival of democracy. Figure VI.10 presents the results of the linear regression analysis focusing in predictors of the legitimacy of institutions in Bolivia.

The efficacy of the current government’s job, the approval of the job of Congress and the levels of interpersonal trust are factors that affect positively the legitimacy of institutions. In other words, the extent to which the job of Congress and the current government are perceived positively also increases the perception of the legitimacy of institutions; at the same time, as people gain trust in others, legitimacy also increases.




Figure VI. 10. Predictors of the Legitimacy of Institutions, Bolivia 2008

On the other hand, as was demonstrated in Chapter II, Figure II.10, that the more people are victimized by corruption, the lower their perception of legitimacy of institutions.. The results also show that people with low levels of education tend to perceive institutions as more legitimate than those with higher levels of education.

Conclusions

The evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that the legitimacy of Bolivian institutions has been growing; support for the political system is consistently higher than during the same time in previous years. A favorable perception of President Morales’ government seems to be linked to this increase in legitimacy. What has not been growing is political tolerance in the country; Bolivians are more intolerant of those who criticize the system of government than citizens in any of the other countries where the study took place.

The combination of these two factors shows that, following the same logic presented on the theoretical framework, the tendency in Bolivia points toward the consolidation of authoritarian stability, a society in which citizens show high support for government institutions, but low respect of the rights of other citizens who oppose the form of government and its policies.

Chapter VII. Political Parties in Bolivia*

This chapter presents citizens' opinions and perceptions in relation to political parties in Bolivia. As they are a structure that links the society and the State (Sartori 1980), political parties are a fundamental institution of modern democracies (Schattschneider 1942). Political parties are crucial for citizen's representation and for the channeling of their participation in State decisions, the existence of solid and institutionalized political parties allow for a higher degree of transparency in political processes and generate better conditions for *accountability*.

In this section we show the levels of trust that Bolivians have in political parties and we try to establish the most important characteristics of supporters of the most relevant political parties in the country; by making use of the available information, we compare Bolivian results with those obtained from the LAPOP surveys in other countries of the continent. The previous version of this study presents detailed information about electoral behavior in the country (Seligson, et al. 2006, Chap. V); in this survey, we focus closely on the perceptions about Bolivian political parties.

It is important to mention three elements in relation to the system of Bolivian parties. The first has to do with the recent crisis in Bolivia's the party system. During this crisis, which reached its peak between 2003 and 2005,¹ many of the so called traditional parties disappeared from the political sphere, allowing for the consolidation of Movimiento Al Socialismo as Bolivia's most important party, with PODEMOS as the main party of the opposition and only two other parties as forces with some parliamentary representation (Unidad Nacional – UN – and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario – MNR).

The second element is the short duration of political parties in the country. With exception of the MNR, the life of Bolivian political parties has been short in modern history of Bolivian democracy. The majority of key political parties during what has become to be known as “pact democracy” in Bolivia have lost their legal standing given the low voting percentages received during the last general elections in 2005.

Finally, the Bolivian political system recognized from 2004 the participation of civil groups, that is, political organizations that without having a status of political parties could still present candidates for municipal departmental, and national elections.

Trust in Political Parties

Levels of trust in political parties are low all over the world, particularly so in Latin America (WVS 2005).² Political parties are not among the democratic institutions that elicit the most

* This Chapter was written by Daniel Moreno.

¹ With relation to the crisis of Bolivian political parties, see Lazarte (2008).

² For the Latin American case, see Boidi (2008).

positive feelings among the citizenry, a phenomenon which is explained by their roles as visible political operators.

Figure VII.1 shows the average of trust in political parties in Bolivia compared to the same average obtained in other countries in the AmericasBarometer.³ As can be seen, the Bolivian average of trust in political parties is one of the lowest in the region, statistically similar to Argentina, Brazil and Peru. It is worth noting that even in Canada, where political parties receive the highest score, the average is below 50. While Bolivia is not rated the lowest among the countries studied, its 28.9 rating is an indication of the negative perception of political parties in in the region.

³ The question asked: To what extent do you trust the political parties? The original scale of 1 to 7 was recoded into a scale from 0 to 100 in order to facilitate its interpretation.




Figure VII. 1. Trust in Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Bolivian’ trust in their political parties has been relatively low during the past 10 years, despite significant changes over time. The data show a direct relationship between the average levels of trust in political parties and times of institutional crisis of the Bolivian political system. It could be inferred from Figure VII.2, which shows the average trust Bolivians have in their political parties during the six rounds of the surveys carried out by LAPOP since 1998.




Figure VII. 2. Trust in Political Parties by Year, Bolivia 2008

Trust in political parties decreases significantly in 2000 in comparison to 1998; it increases again in 2002, decreases in 2004, and increases substantially two years later, and decreases again in the 2008 survey. It is possible that the crises in the Bolivian political system in recent years have had an important effect on citizens’ perception of political parties. Therefore, the crisis of the Bolivian political system, The “Water War” in 2000, followed by “Black October” and the fall of Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, and concluding with the incapacity of the political system to find a solution to the current political crises probably account in part for the ups and downs in Bolivian’s trust in their political parties between years that are shown in the previous figure.

Even if the national average is relatively low over time, trust in political parties show important variations within Bolivia. The most important factor contributing to these differences is

department of residency. In the statistical multivariate model elaborated to model trust in political parties, the department of residency has a statistically significant effect, whereas other variables such as wealth, ethnicity or education do not. In other words, what determines trust in political parties in Bolivia is the department where a citizen lives.

Potosí, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca are the departments in which trust in political parties is low, closer to averages such as those in Ecuador and Paraguay; trust is much higher in Pando and Beni, where averages are similar to those obtained Uruguay, Mexico or Chile. Figure VII.3 shows this relationship.




Figure VII. 3. Trust in Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008

These differences existed even before the first time these surveys took place in 1998; this is illustrated in Figure IV.4, in which shows the averages of trust for three regions of the country⁴ since 1998.




Figure VII. 4. Trust in Political Parties by Region and Year, Bolivia

It is evident that trust in political parties has been higher in departments of the Oriente of the country than those in the South and the Occident from the first survey, and that tendencies have remained constant during the last 10 years. A relevant change in these tendencies is the one related to differences between the departments of the South, which until 2006 had an average trust higher than those in the Occident, but now shows the same average.

⁴ The regions that make up these departments are: Oriente: Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando; Occidente: Oruro, Cochabamba, La Paz; Sur: Tarija, Potosí, and Chuquisaca.

Democracy without Parties

Another way of investigating the value that citizens give to political parties is by asking them if they believe that democracy should operate without political parties. This is precisely what was asked in the round of 2008 by LAPOP surveys.⁵ In general, the intensity with which citizens of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer agree with the possibility that a democracy exists without political parties is moderate. With the notable exception of Haiti, national averages are between 32 and 54 in the scale from 0 to 100 of the variable discussed here. Figure VII.5 shows this relationship.

⁵ The question asks: Is it possible to have a democracy without the existence of political parties. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?




Figure VII. 5. Democracy Can Function Without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008

The Bolivian average, 50 points in scale of 100, is relatively high when compared to other countries. However, the fact that the average almost reaches half of the scale suggest that Bolivians are not truly convinced that it is possible to have democracy without political parties

Once again, it is shown the statistically significant differences between departments in relation to citizens' perception toward the possibility of having democracy without political parties (See Figure VII.6)




Figure VII. 6. Democracy Could Function Without Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008

Cochabamba is the department that once again has an extreme position in relation to political parties, as discussed in Chapter IX of this report. Individuals who live in Cochabamba are more convinced that it is possible to have democracy without political parties than the national average, and in Cochabamba along with Potosí, trust in political parties is the lowest in the country. Potosí, on the other hand, offers a different view: even though Potosinos express the lowest trust in political parties, they agree less with the idea that democracy does not need them.

The survey also asks if citizens believe that political parties are representative of the population, if they listen to people, and if they are corrupt.⁶ Figure VII.7 shows national averages for these questions in a scale from 0 to 100.




Figure VII. 7. Perception of Political Parties, Bolivia 2008

The only question out of the three that has a average relatively high average is the one that denotes a negative view of political parties. The national average of acceptance of Bolivians toward the idea that political parties are representative or that they listen to the people is relatively low.

Direct Involvement with Political Parties

Besides of asking citizens about their opinions in relation to political parties in general, the survey includes a question that inquiries whether a person identifies with any political party in

⁶ The questions are: Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [country's] political parties represent their voters well? How often do political parties listen to the average person? To what extent does corruption exist within [country's] political parties?

particular.⁷ Twenty-nine percent of Bolivians identify with a political party on average, and although it is not the lowest in Latin America, it is relatively low when it is compared to other countries, as shown in Figure VII.8.

⁷ The questions are: do you currently identify with a political party? If the interviewee responds affirmatively, then he/she is asked, which political party do you identify with?




Figure VII. 8. Identification with a Political Party in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Of the 29% of Bolivians that identify with a particular political party, the majority, almost three quarters identify with the political party of President Morales, the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). Other parties that have relevant proportions (higher than 2%) are PODEMOS and MNR. Figure VII.9 shows these proportions with respondents that identify with a political party.




Figure VII. 9. Identification with a Political Party, Bolivia 2008

Those who identify with different political parties have different characteristics in terms of their ideological position. Figure VII.10 shows the average of the ideological position of people that voted for MAS, for MNR and for PODEMOS⁸ in the national elections of 2005. Lower scores mean that the average of the ideological position of a person that identifies with a party is toward the left, while higher scores show an average more toward the right in a scale of ideology.




Figure VII. 10. Ideological Orientation According to Voting for a Political Party, Bolivia 2008

MAS voters, on average, lean ideologically more toward the left than those who identify with other political parties. People who identify with MNR, on the other hand, are, on average, more toward the right in scale of ideology from 1 to 10 in which 1 means “left” and 10 “right.”

A way to measure concrete attitudes in addition to perceptions is to ask citizens about how actively they participate in political activities. In order to establish how much citizens identify with a political party, we asked if they have tried to convince others to vote for the party of their

⁸ The question employed to measure ideology of the respondents is: Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

preference in elections.⁹ The average in Bolivia--17 points in a scale from 0 to 100-- is presented in comparative perspective in Figure VII.11.




Figure VII. 11. Active Participation in Political Activities in Comparative Perspective, 2008

As can be seen in Figure VII.11, Bolivians do not tend to try to convince others to vote for their candidate of preference. However, in countries such as Mexico or Chile, citizens' participation in this type of political activity is significantly lower than in Bolivia.

Conclusions

Although Bolivian averages are not extreme, in general, trust and identification with political parties tend to be low in the country. Bolivian political parties have not gained its citizens' trust, and the levels in which they identify with political parties are also low.

Despite their low popularity, the idea that democracy could function without parties does not show a strong support by Bolivians. In other words, the average Bolivian does not show a high trust in his/her political parties, but does not believe that they should be eliminated either; we

⁹ The question asks: During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate?

could say that the general idea is “we don’t trust them, but we need them.” This could be interpreted as a sign of maturity of the Bolivian political culture.

A practical conclusion derived from political parties’ low popularity in Bolivia, is that the active participation of citizens to convince others to vote for the party of preference is also low. Among those who identify with a political party, the great majority identifies with President’s Morales MAS party. Interestingly, on many occasions MAS leaders have rejected being a political party by asserting that MAS is more a social movement or a political instrument of social organizations; thus, the tendency to reject political parties is evident in Bolivia. Bolivian democracy faces a challenge to consolidate in a period of reforms in which citizens’ evaluation of political parties is low.

Chapter VIII. Support for a new wave of State Reforms*

At this time, Bolivia faces important challenges of transformation of its institutional structure, This Chapter presents information about the perception that Bolivians have toward various proposals for state reforms. The objective of such reform is to establish a level of support among different social sectors for the new proposal of the Constitution, departmental autonomies, and indigenous autonomies.

The Constituent Assembly and the Proposal of the New Constitution

After being on the table for many years, the Constituent Assembly (AC) was established in Bolivia on August 6, 2006, after citizens elected their representatives in this major event in the country. The Assembly was installed in Sucre, in the midst of a great expectation from the majority of Bolivians who considered that the constituent process would be the way to solve many of the country's problems.

Even though Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) and its allies had the absolute majority in the AC, a series of problems emerged that prevented its functioning as predicted. The conditions of installation of the AC required that agreements be reached with opposition parties and citizen organizations at the Assembly. But the members of the AC and the leadership of the political parties, civic and citizen organizations were unable to establish consensus which made deliberations more difficult than initially predicted.

After an extension granted by a Law of the Republic, and in the midst of controversial circumstances, the AC approved in Oruro the proposal of the new constitution without the participation of the main forces of the opposition in December, 2007. This proposal, which is unusually long and filled with unconventional concepts, is the product of almost a year and a half of work by the AC.

Additionally, the AC called for a referendum in which citizens would settle the text of an article of the proposed Constitution's upon which Assembly members in Oruro did not reach an agreement; this article established limits on estates termed *latifundio* (large and unproductive land property) considered unconstitutional in the proposal of the New Constitution.¹

At this writing (mid May, 2008), the referendum of the New Constitution has not taken place, after a proposal to call it was rejected by the National Electoral Court in January of 2008.

* This Chapter was written by Daniel Moreno.

¹ The proposal is to call for a referendum in which the sovereign agrees with the figure of 5.000 hectares or of 10.000 hectares as land surface from which a piece of land is considered latifundio.

What is, in this context, the general perception of the Constituent Assembly and the job that it has performed during its administration? The survey of 2008 included various questions about this subject, and its results are stated below.

In general, the degree of approval of the AC’s job in Bolivia is low. The 2008 survey asked whether citizens think that the job of the AC has been good for the country or if, on the other hand, they think that the AC has created more problems to Bolivians. Less than one fourth of respondents said that the Assembly has been positive for the country.

Despite the fact that overall approval is low, there are important differences among various social groups in the country. Among the most important differences is the geographic dimension, with levels of approval that vary substantially among departments. Even though the disapproval of the job of the Assembly is high across the country, it is stronger in the departments of Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca. Figure VIII.1 shows it. This difference is independent of other factors, such as wealth and the educational level.




Figure VIII. 1. Approval of the Job of the Constituent Assembly by Department, Bolivia 2008

It is also worth noting that females have a statistically lower favorable belief in the AC than males. The results from the binary logistic regression analysis indicate that women are 26% less likely to express a favorable opinion of the AC than men. Other factors that have an impact on the approval of the AC’s job are age (younger people tend express higher approval of the AC’s performance than older people), level of education (the more educated tend to disapprove of the job of the AC), and ethnicity (those who identify themselves as “white” in the question of self-ethnic identification). Figure VIII.2 shows the results of the multiple binary logistic regressions for a positive evaluation of the Constituent Assembly.




Figure VIII. 2. Results of the Logistic Regression for a Positive Evaluation of the Constituent Assembly’s Job, Bolivia 2008

One of the factors that may explain the poor evaluation of the AC's performance is the approval of a referendum related only to the amount of land that should be considered latifundio. The majority of Bolivians expected that the AC would hold more referendums related to the contentious issues on the table during the process of deliberation. Figure VIII.3 shows the proportion of people that responded to this question.²




Figure VIII. 3. Perception of the Need for Referendums, Bolivia 2008

² The question was: Do you believe that specific certain subjects should be treated by the Constituent Assembly, such as the reelection of the President, should they have been consulted by referendum, or do you think it is not necessary that citizens express their points of view on these subjects?

The expectations of the AC have changed significantly over time. The 2006 survey contained a question about expectations concerning the AC's performance that was repeated in the 2008 survey. The question contrasts an option of the solution by the AC of the problems of the country with another that sustains that the problems will remain despite their efforts.³ The proportion of people that believe that the AC will solve the problems of the country in 2006 and 2008 is shown in Figure VIII.4.




Figure VIII. 4. Expectations in Relation to the Constituent Assembly by Year, Bolivia

While in 2006 almost half of Bolivians expected that the AC would solve the problems of the country, two years later this proportion has not reached even a quarter of the population. Optimism among Bolivians has decreased, and more than three quarters of Bolivians believe that the problems of the country will continue despite the new Political Constitution of the State.

Bolivians high expectation of the AC has been registered by surveys carried out by the United Nations Program for Development (PNUD 2007) and the Democracy Audit of 2006 (Seligson, et al. 2006).

³ Do you believe that the New Political Constitution of the State will provide a direct solution to the problems of the country or do you think that despite the New Constitution the problems will continue?

In spite of the notably low approvals of the job of the AC, the approval of the New Political Constitution of the State drawn up by the Assembly is not clear. Moreover, during the collection of the data between February and March, 2008, both approval and rejection of the proposal by the AC as well as the New Constitution of the country demonstrated that proportions of the population technically equal. Respondents were asked if a referendum were held tomorrow in relation to the approval of the New Constitution would they approve it or reject it; four of every 10 Bolivians at the time expressed approval of the New Constitution, while the other four rejected it; a 5th of Bolivians did not give an opinion. Figure VIII.5 shows this relationship (approval and rejection percentages are statistically indistinct).




Figure VIII. 5. Approval or Rejection of the New Constitution, Bolivia 2008

Differences among the percentage of people who believe that the AC created problems for the country and the percentage that approves of the New Constitution suggests that citizens separate the institution (Constituent Assembly) from the results generated by it (New Constitution Proposal); consequently Bolivians seem unsatisfied with the job done by the AC in general, but do not necessarily disapprove of the New Constitution generated by this organism.

Which factors influence the probability of approving or rejecting the New Constitution? Results from a statistical test appropriate for this analysis (binary logistic regression) show, once again, the department of residence affects the probability of approving or rejecting the New Constitution proposal. Figure VIII.6 shows the percentage voters who would vote for the New Constitution in a referendum.




Figure VIII. 6. Approval of the New Constitution by Department, Bolivia 2008

The results in Figure VIII.6 indicate that the referendum of the New Constitution would win, according to the data from February and March, 2008, in two of Bolivia’s nine departments, namely La Paz and Oruro. In both departments, 55% of citizens would vote “yes.” In other departments, the “yes”percentage is between 40% and 50% (45% in Potosí and 43% in Cochabamba); in the departments of Pando (36%), Tarija (32%) and Chuquisaca (30%), the percentages in favor of yes are higher than 30% but less than 40%. In Beni and Santa Cruz percentages in favor of the text by the Assembly barely reaches 23% and 21% respectively. These data are relevant considering that about 20% of all Bolivians do not have a firm opinion of the proposed Constitution; the only departments that seem decided are Beni and Santa Cruz. Thus, in the other seven departments, campaigning in favor of one or the other option could turn the fifth of the undecided population in its favor and define the results of the referendum at the departmental level.

Other factors affecting the probability of approval or rejection of the Constitutional text approved by the Constituent Assembly are: the perception of the job of the Assembly as positive for the country, having voted for MAS in the last national elections in year 2005 and, to a lesser extent, wealth measured by material well-being that negatively affects approval of the text. It is noteworthy that ethnic identity has no relevant effect on the approval or rejection of the Constitution approved by the Constituent Parliament.

Departmental Autonomies

Departmental autonomies is another issue that has generated a lot of debate and strong waves of public opinion during the last decades. These autonomies have emerged from demands for higher decentralization vis-à-vis the existence of an excessively centralist State whose presence in areas away from the big cities is low. This explains why the demand of departmental autonomy has been traditionally greater in the country's eastern region, away from Bolivia's center of government in La Paz.

The process of municipal decentralization that took place in the country with La Ley de Participación Popular in the 1990s, partially appeased the demand for departmental autonomies; however, halfway this decade, this demand re-emerged with even greater strength. The victory for "Yes" in the departmental autonomies' referendum of July, 2006 in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija, as well as the massive concentrations in favor of this demand are obvious signs of its strength. More evidence of this strength is the victory for "Yes" in the departmental referendum in Santa Cruz in May, 2008 for the approval of departmental autonomous statutes..

One of the reasons for the renewed impetus of autonomist demands is, without doubt, the victory of MAS in the national elections of 2005. The regions in which an autonomist demand is stronger are precisely those where the political party of Evo Morales did not win the elections. Departmental autonomies are also a scenario of political dispute between the national government and the opposition, even though we clearly cannot affirm that this is the only reason.

Bolivians' perceptions of departmental autonomies are diverse. On average, it seem that there is a slightly negative perception about these autonomies, even though the differences between the total of people that reject the idea of departmental autonomies and the number of those who support is not substantial. We find from the responses to the question about departmental autonomies⁴ that 38% percent of Bolivians think that they will have a positive effect, 52% think that they will be negative, and about 10% do not express an opinion.

Figure VIII.7 shows the percentage of responses for different options.

⁴ The question asked: Do you believe that departmental autonomies will be positive or would they generate more problems for Bolivia?




Figure VIII. 7. Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

The department of residence produces important differences in relation to the average evaluation of departmental autonomies. While more than two thirds of Santa Cruz and Beni residents are convinced that autonomies are good for the country, less than a fifth of the residents of Potosi agree with this statement. Figure X.12 in the final Chapter of this study shows the proportion of people that think that departmental autonomies will be positive in each of the departments of the country.

Other factors that influence on the perception of autonomies as positive for the country are wealth (the better off economically, tend to favor departmental autonomies); gender, with females indicating a 25% lower probability than men regarding a positive opinion of autonomies; citizens with a higher level of education tend to favor autonomies; trust in the national government appears to reduce the probability of having favorable perceptions of autonomies; and trust in departmental prefectures, which increases a favorable opinion. It is noteworthy that ethnic identity, measured by the LAPOP survey question, does not have a relevant effect on this perception after controlling for other statistical factors.

The relation between trust in the central government and the perception of autonomies that is shown in Figure VIII.8 illustrates the high levels of politization in the debate about departmental autonomies.




Figure VIII. 8. The Impact of Trust of the National Government on the Average Evaluation of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

The term “departmental autonomies” is ambiguous and could lead to confusion if the content of such autonomies is not specified. In this Chapter two different survey questions were considered in the survey that looks at capturing more deeply what people expect from the National government and the Prefectures.

The first of the questions asks interviewees what they understand by departmental autonomies. One of the available options is the “division of the country,” which 37% of Bolivians agree with.⁵ The geographic dimension once again plays a central role in the perception of departmental autonomies as well as the division of the country. While 64% of residents of Potosí think that autonomies represent a potential division of the country, only 14% of those who live in Santa Cruz think the same.

Figure VIII.9 shows the results of the multiple logistic regressions for the perception of departmental autonomies as a division for the country. The lines that represent the confidence intervals are distinct from zero (they do not cross the line 0 in the figure) and are those that show a statistical significance. Living in Santa Cruz, Beni or Pando has, in general, a negative effect

⁵ The question is: For you, departmental autonomies refer to: a higher decentralization of the regions, certain capabilities of legislation and departments’ self-decision making.

on the idea of autonomies as a division for the country (the reference group is the western region of the country). Similarly, trust in government increases this tendency, while trust in the departmental prefecture reduces it.




Figure VIII. 9. Predictors of the Perception of Departmental Autonomies as a Division for the Country, Bolivia 2008

The second question asks about responsibilities for the management of natural resources that Bolivians want at the Central and Departmental levels.⁶ As can be seen in Figure VIII.10, the majority of Bolivians think that the prefectures should manage at least some of the natural resources of Bolivia (even though the question did not specify which natural resources should be managed by this level of government).




Figure VIII. 10. Perceptions of a Division of Responsibilities in Relation to the Management of Natural Resources, Bolivia 2008

⁶ The question asked: For you, prefectures should manage more some of the natural resources of the department, or only the Central government should manage the natural resources of the country.

Once again, there are important differences among departments. People who live in departments with higher support for departmental autonomies tend to favor management of some of the natural resources of the country by the prefectures. The differences are relevant; while 87% of the residents in Beni think that the prefecture should manage the natural resources, only one third of the residents in La Paz think that it is prudent to grant the prefecture responsibilities of this kind. Figure VIII.11 shows this.




Figure VIII. 11. Preference for the Prefectural Management of the Natural Resources by Department, Bolivia 2008

Other factors that have an impact on this perception are: levels of trust in the national government, which affects negatively this perception, and levels of trust in the departmental prefecture, which most likely affects it positively. People with higher levels of education also tend favor giving prefectures more responsibility. Wealth and self-identification as indigenous have a marginally significant effect on the question of ethnic identification by LAPOP.

Interviewees were also asked about their perceptions of taxation.⁷ Responses in relation to this subject are practically the same: of the 90% of people that gave a valid response to this question, a little more than half (51%) think that only the national government determine tax policy, while the remaining 49% think that prefectures should define tax policy. However, confidence intervals do not allow us to confirm that both averages are statistically different. Consequently, we can say

⁷ The question asked: For you, departmental prefectures should be in charge of defining taxes or tributes, or taxes should only be defined by the Central government.

that the proportion of Bolivians that think that prefectures should define taxes is equal to those who affirm the opposite.

The department in which a person resides is, once again, a factor that has a significant influence on the perception of this topic. At least eight of ten residents of Beni and Santa Cruz think that prefectures should collect taxes, while in La Paz less than a quarter of the population agrees with the same statement.

Support for prefectures to collect taxes is stronger in departments where the process of departmental autonomies is more advanced. Pando is an exception, given that only four of every ten residents of the “amazonian” department of Bolivia think that the prefecture should collect taxes.

Besides the department of residency, the only other variables that have a statistically significant effect on citizens’ perception of this topic are trust in the national government and having voted for the MAS in the 2005 elections, both of which reduce support for tax collection by prefectures; additionally, trust in the prefecture has a positive effect on this variable. Figure VIII.12 shows this relationship.




Figure VIII. 12. The Impact of Trust in Departmental Prefectures on the Preference for Prefectural Tax Collection, Bolivia 2008

Furthermore, there are differences from one department to another in relation to averages of perceptions of people about who should handle economic resources: the central government or the departmental prefecture.⁸ Figure VIII.13 shows the distribution of the results of the mentioned question in each of the nine departments of the country. If the Figure shows a higher number of cases on the left, the departmental tendency is to prefer that the National Government handle the resources whereas the higher columns to the right indicate a preference for the prefecture of the department to handle of resources.




Figure VIII. 13. Preference in Relation to the Administration of Economic Resources by Department, Bolivia 2008

In Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and to a lesser extent Chuquisaca, the columns on the right represent the frequencies of responses that favor the prefecture managing resources. On the other hand, La Paz, Pando, and to a lesser extent Cochabamba, show a clear preference for the handling of resources by the national government. The inhabitants of Potosí and Oruro prefer both levels of government to handle the resources.

⁸ The question was: And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? (1) Much more the central government (2) Some more the central government (3) The same amount the central government and the municipality (4) Some more the municipality (5) Much more the municipality

Separatism

In previous versions of the Democracy Audit, it was reported that only a small proportion of Bolivians think that the country should be divided. In the 2008 survey, the same question was asked,⁹ and the results are similar to those observed in previous years. Figure VIII.14 shows the percentage of people that chose the option “the country should be divided” remains very low (the averages across time are not statistically significant).




Figure VIII. 14. Opinions in Favor that the Country should be Divided by Year, Bolivia

⁹ With which of the following statements do you agree? It doesn't matter what happens, the country should remain united or...The differences in the country are very big, the country should be divided.

When we observe the results of the tests of the multiple statistical regressions, a few factors have a relevant effect on the probability that a person thinks that the country should be divided. One of those is the level of education: the more educated a person is, the less likely this person thinks the country should be divided because of its differences. The second is the department of residency, which appears as marginally significant. Figure VIII.15 shows the relationship between the level of education and the idea of separation in Bolivia.




Figure VIII. 15. The Impact of the Level of Education on the Opinions in Favor of the Country to be Divided, Bolivia 2008

Figure VIII.-16 shows the relationship between department of residence and the idea of separatism.




Figure VIII. 16. Opinions in Favor that the Country should be Divided by Departments, Bolivia 2008

Even though the preference for this option is much higher in Beni and Santa Cruz than in the rest of the country, the proportion of people who think that the country should be divided remains low even in the departments with higher averages for this variable.

Finally, it is important to clarify that there relationship between a favorable opinion toward departmental autonomies and the idea that the country should be divided is not a statistically significant. Questions about departmental autonomies shown at the beginning of this Chapter are not related with the higher tendency in favor to a “separatist” position discussed here.

Indigenous Autonomies

The survey also included a question about indigenous autonomies.¹⁰ The evaluation of indigenous autonomies is, in general, negative among the population, as Figure VIII.17 demonstrates. Two thirds of Bolivians think that indigenous autonomies generate more problems, while the remaining third think that they will be positive for the country.




Figure VIII. 17. Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

¹⁰ The question was: Do you think that indigenous autonomies are positive for this country or do they generate more problems to Bolivia?

Factors that explain a positive perception of indigenous autonomies are the belief that the administration of President Morales is good for the country, the department of residence, and identification as indigenous, even though the last is only marginally significant. Figure VIII.18 shows the relationship between positive perceptions of indigenous autonomies and trust in the government of Morales.




Figure VIII. 18. The Impact of the Approval of the Job of the President on the Positive Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

It is noteworthy that a favorable perception of indigenous autonomies is positively related to a favorable position of departmental autonomies. Once other factors are controlled for, the probability that a person affirms that indigenous autonomies are positive for the country is significantly higher among those who believe that departmental autonomies are good for Bolivia than those who believe they create more problems. Departmental and indigenous autonomies come together in the perception of Bolivians; however, it is possible that they are part of two different views of the country, as Chapter X in this study suggests.




Figure VIII. 19. The Impact of the Perception of Departmental Autonomies on the Positive Evaluation of Indigenous Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

As it can be seen in Figure VIII.19, the percentage of people who believe that indigenous autonomies are positive for the country is significantly higher among those who believe that departmental autonomies are positive for Bolivia (41,7%) than those who believe they are negative

Conclusions

The main institutional reform proposed for the country, the approval of the New Political Constitution of the State, does not have the support of the majority of Bolivians. The population seems to be divided between the approval and rejection of the proposed text by the Constituent Assembly, and does not seem to show a position with an emerging majority or which would allow the issue to be resolved through a clear victory at the ballot box. With a tied yes and no, the possibility of solving the issue only by referendum is uncertain.

Indigenous and departmental autonomies also present marked differences in this aspect. The department of residence seems as one of the most important factors to explain differences in perception of departmental autonomies in Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, Pando and Chuquisaca than in the other four departments of the country.

However, the solution to these disputes in relation to this subject seems less confusing when there is a positive relationship between a favorable perception of departmental autonomies and also a positive perception of indigenous autonomies. These two subjects, often perceived as opposites in the national political debate, emerge as complementary in this report.

In any case, the fact that there is a strong relationship between the discussed topics and trust in the national government or departmental prefecture, suggests that the solution to these topics in debate is through political negotiation among political leaders.

Chapter IX. Democracy and Politics According to Bolivians*

Background

Bolivia is undergoing a transition whose results are not yet defined. The polarization attributed to the national political arena arises from apparently incompatible “country visions” and alternative projects of democratic institutionality that look for ways to channel changes and to reshape the political system. In other sections of this report we present opinions of interviewees in relation to the project of the New Political Constitution of the State and the proposals of indigenous and departmental autonomies. This Chapter examines what Bolivian citizens about policymaking and its scope valid forms of political action to this end. Data on the Bolivian political system must be considered fluid because it is also affected by changes happening in this period. In this context, citizen opinion takes on added meaning—in that citizens are not be simply supporting the political system; they are also actively contributing to construct it.

In order to examine the global perception of Bolivians of the political system, we consider two elements that take into account the relationship between the population in general, on the one hand, and the representatives and institutionality, on the other. First, we examine the opinions of the population about the alternative between direct participation and representation and about the forms of representation considered more effective; secondly, we consider opinions about the relationship between “street policy” and institutional policy.

In the first case, we are interested in respondents’ opinions about who should participate in politics, if such participation should be limited to the election of representatives or if it could be extended beyond the suffrage margin. Regarding the tension between institutional policy and “street policy”, we examine the courses of political action that people consider valid and the contexts in which they could be put in practice. We will take into account as points of departure what people think about democracy, which will shed light on the two elements that are the focus of this Chapter.

What is Democracy?

This study is based on the premise that civil support is beneficial for democracy. Until now, however, what people understand by democracy has not been explored. A question about the meaning of democracy was included for the first time in the Bolivian survey of 2008. It was asked as an open question; in order to register the answers closely, we avoided giving choices to the interviewees; the answers were codified after the interviews. The question follows:

DEM13. In few words, what does democracy mean to you?

* This chapter was written by Eduardo Córdova Eguívar

It is noteworthy that the analysis of the responses is not conclusive given that democracy is at the same time an aspiration and an existent reality. In Bolivia, as in other countries, there are institutions, people vote, make demands, and protest to strengthen a “real” democracy but an ideal of what constitutes a democracy is not missing. Support for democracy is also related with this normative element. On the other hand, the term of democracy refers to a “system of government” with division of powers, representation, periodic election of authorities and representatives and a possible form of political action, characterized by elements such as tolerance, solidarity, transparency or respect.

The responses to the question “What is democracy?” are mixed: some interviewees referred clearly to an existent democracy, considering its defects and virtues; others, what, in their view democracy should be. Some focused on a “democratic system”; others, on democratic political action. Among the various criteria of possible interpretations, this report takes into account in the first place, *what democracy should relate to*, and, secondly, in relation with the respondent’s value, *the foundation that democracy should have*.

In the first case, it is not possible to distinguish positive answers that the population gives to democracy. In the group related to the economy, for example, the options were given of “work” and “lack of work”, “well-being” and “lack of well-being”. In the group of suffrage are included in an indistinguishable way “free elections” and “fraudulent elections”. Figure IX.1 shows the results. We initially observe a very high proportion of the population that do not respond to the question (one of every five respondents; in the specific case of women, the proportion reaches three of every ten). The most notable is the percentage of respondents that said that democracy is related to freedom (39,1% of the total of interviewees). Also it is noteworthy that there is not an immediate identification of democracy with some of the terminology that political authorities usually include in their discourses (decolonization, comunitarianism or autonomy that could indicate the materialization of their political views in contrast to the population).




Figure IX. 1. Elements with Which Democracy is Related, Bolivia 2008

Regarding the second criteria—expressing the foundation of democracy—negative answers were isolated (democracy as “lack of work”, “inequality”, “lack of well-being” or “fraudulent elections”) in only one group (problems and shortages) and priority is given to some basic principles answered positively; overall, equality, freedom and participation—this last point related with popular sovereignty. The results are shown in Figure IX.2.

Democracy is associated by a considerable proportion of the population with some sort of political freedom (emphasizing the political features, there are also excluded those answers related with the economy such as “economic freedom” and “free market”). With regard to gender, 42,4% of men and 34,0% of women coincide in this opinion.

The difference between Figures IX.1 and IX.2 is that the first figure groups thematic areas with those that citizens relate to democracy (such as “participation” and “lack of participation”); in the second graph, positive answers are separated from negative answers; it shows that only a very small percentage of people see democracy as something negative or problematic.




Figure IX. 2. What does democracy mean to you? , Bolivia 2008

The context that frames this analysis includes three unavoidable elements. First is the fact that the history of Bolivia has not had long periods of democracy (the period between 1982 and now, is Bolivia’s longest period of constitutional government). The second is the current public dispute over the meaning of democracy (media headlines reflect overall appeals to the right of the State and popular sovereignty). The third is the uncertainty about whether or not institutional changes will be adopted.

Democracy is not a static or permanent feature of Bolivia’s government. Less than three decades ago, the country was ruled by dictators. Currently, though, there are in place forms of representation, political arenas, and accepted political behaviors that have prevailed in the last two decades. While various meanings of democracy are publicly argued among the population, citizens’ responses do not reflect these meanings. No significant difference was found—for example, a large and similar proportion of respondents’ understanding of democracy included incompatible elements—that would reflect the conflicting opinions that political authorities publically offer (this postures would not come from popular views but from the dynamic of political confrontation).

The diversity of responses allows affirming that a single concept of the “politics” of democracy does not prevail. According to the respondents, democracy is not only a matter of elections or

conformation of the powers of the State. It also has to do with the population’s well-being, economic equality, job opportunity, economic freedom or gender equality. In relation to democracy as an identification with freedom, the multiple logistic regression analysis shown in Figure IX.3 indicates that, among many considered variables, only levels of education, wealth measured by material possessions and age affect positively the opinion that democracy is freedom (the higher the level of education, wealth or age, the higher the support for this option; those variables are found to the right and their confidence intervals do not overlap with 0). Self-identification as “white” or being female reduces the likelihood of identifying democracy as freedom.




Figure IX. 3. Predictors of Democracy as Political Freedom, Bolivia 2008

As observed in Figure IX.2, less than 10% of citizens identify democracy directly with equality. When we apply the same test to the concept of democracy as equality (results omitted due to space constraints), we observe that it is affected positively by the level of education and overall by living in a western department of the country. None of the variables influences negatively this concept. If we observe the responses comparing Bolivia’s nine departments, those who live in Cochabamba considered democracy less as freedom (29%) but more as equality (15,7%). In the first case, the differences are significant only in Santa Cruz, where, following Beni, interviewees express their view of democracy as liberty. In the case of equality, the differences are significant

with Pando, Potosí, Beni and Santa Cruz, departments in which the identification of democracy with equality is lower.

Besides this particular feature in Cochabamba, whose difference is statistically relevant only with some departments, in general there are no determinant differences regarding region or department. Thus, this element could be employed discursively in diverse ways; however, it is also possible that an apparent agreement about democracy hides profound disagreements.

Participation versus Representation

It is widely accepted that in Bolivia there is a solid participative tradition that places itself over political representation. On the other hand, there is tension between corporative and territorial representation through citizens' parties and associations. It is likely that in the country would coexist an inclination for direct participation, and a close manifestation to the institutionality and demands for the strengthening of the State (Crabtree 2005; Whitehead 2001).

In this study we will observe the opinions of the population about political participation, representation, and representatives. In order to determine popular opinion with regards to these issues, we employed a question about the need of representation through elected political personnel:

POP107. The people should govern directly and **not** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree?
8. DK/DR




Figure IX. 4. Preferences of a Direct Democracy, Bolivia 2008

Responses presented in Figure IX.4 are clear. Even though more than 19% of respondents agree or agree strongly that the people should govern directly (score 6 and the expression “strongly agree”), the majority of respondents are located in the center of the scale and toward the primacy of elected representatives. The department of Cochabamba has a higher proportion of opinions in both extremes than the other departments (this is also discussed in Chapter VII of this study). The lower probability of Cochabamba toward moderate opinions in relation to the rest of the country (although the results do not show statistically significant differences with the other departments) may be due in part to incident in January, 2007, when residents of the city and peasants clashed violently, resulting in three deaths. Another contributing factor may be the electoral behavior of cochabambinos; the results of the referendum about departmental autonomies in July 2006 in Cochabamba were the most peculiar in the country. It was the only department in which voting of the capital city—the victory of “Yes—contradicted the voting of the rest of the provinces—a clear victory for “No”.

Statistical tests reveal that there is a positive correlation between trust in the national government and the agreement with people’s assertion that the people should govern by itself. Figure IX.5 demonstrates that: the higher the trust in the government of President Evo Morales, the greater the support for direct government by the people.




Figure IX. 5. The Impact of the Preference of a Direct Democracy on Trust in the National Government, Bolivia 2008

We also considered the question about the need for the existence of political parties analyzed in Chapter VII of this study (see Figures VII.5 and VII.6). It is worth noting that when we ask if political parties are necessary for the existence and functioning of democracy,¹ the majority agrees that they are important, even if this tendency is moderate.

Responses reveal again that there are extreme opinions in the department of Cochabamba (there is a considerable proportion of cochabambinos are at the extremes). Differences are statistically significant in the option “strongly agree” and in relation with almost all the departments, with exception of La Paz and Beni. For the option “strongly disagree,” the margin of error indicates that the differences are not significant (Figure IX.6)

¹ Apart from this question and its responses, there are studies that conclude that in some societies stable democracies exist without political parties (Anckar y Anckar 2000).




Figure IX. 6. Preferences for a Democracy Without Political Parties by Department, Bolivia 2008

We observe that age slightly influences the opinion that political parties are unnecessary. While As respondents' ages increase, the less likely they are to agree with this statement. On the other hand, those who place higher trust in the national government tend to agree with the idea that democracy does not need political parties.

Questions about trust in political parties and their representative efficacy had unquestionable results (national averages are shown in Figure VII.7). Along with mistrust, there is a lower credibility of their capability in representing social interests.

The changing situation in the political party' system is expressed by the fact that those who trust parties tend to place more trust in the government political party performance, which does not recognize itself as a party (if we consider citizens that took into account the option "a lot" in relation to other questions about trust in political parties and the national government). In the following section, we will examine the process of change in relation to the valid forms of conducting politics.

“Politics of the Streets” and Institutional Politics

In the period of the current transition, all strategic actors of Bolivian politics turned to direct action in the streets. The sources of public protest are available as much as for the public in Sucre or Santa Cruz as for peasants or miners in Cochabamba. Protest is employed to express demands and adopt positions in view of a possible negotiation with occasional adversaries. Although this mode of action is apparently part of Bolivian political culture, it is also important to see if the opinion of individuals coincides with the statement of direct action or if they prefer institutional politics with its “regular channels”. What do people think of “politics in the streets”? Is it possible that the preference for direct action subordinates the action that takes into account institutional channels in the perceptions of the population?

First, we will consider the responses of the population about their participation in public protests and the option of state institutions that should formally be the appropriate venues to make demands and requests. We group the proportion of respondents that on at least one occasion went to any authority or employee of any level of the State: member of parliaments, town/city councilor, bureaucrats/civil servants, in addition to those who participated at least in one meeting of their respective Town/City Council.² The percentages are in Figure IX.7.

² The questions are: sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency. In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?

“A member of congress/parliament?” (CP2)

“A local public official (e.g, a mayor, municipal councilperson, provincial official)? (CPA4)

“Any ministry, public institution or state agency” (CPA).

“Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?”(NP1), and “Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality within the past 12 months?” (NP2).

For this analysis we excluded participation in annual meetings for municipal programs, given that they include simultaneously territorial organization and municipal employees.




Figure IX. 7. People who Went to Any State Office, Bolivia 2008

Figure IX.7 is sufficiently eloquent when we compare this proportion with those that correspond to respondents that have participated at least once in a public protest during the same period (30%, Figure XI.13). Taking into account the margin of error, *there were more respondents that participated in a public protest than those who went to a state agency.*

To investigate how Bolivians perceive channels that could be used to influence changes in the current situation (which many studies characterized as *a situation of change and crisis* (Calderón 2007; Lazarte 2008; Mayorga 2007),- we included a question about the option of electoral channels, collective mobilizations or other forms of action. The following question is:

VB21. What is the way that you think you can have the most influence to change things?

The proportions shown in Figure IX.8 show that, in contrast to what could be expected in a country with numerous and multiple protests as Bolivia, the majority of respondents (almost half, considering margin of error) choose the election of representatives that defend their interests and positions. The percentage of alternative modes of participation is also elevated (close to 20%), including protests and “other ways”. It is noteworthy that, without taking into account the margin of error, those who choose direct participation through social mobilization constitute a minor group compared to those who believe that it is not possible to influence the current situation.

Besides the question that assumes that the population is not conformist (the probability that the respondents agree that changes are not necessary is very low), it is worth noting that in Bolivia changes have occurred and that they are also promoted by the participation of the population, as much as by electoral processes (the latest electoral turn-out of more than 80% of those registered (Cf. CNE 2005, 2006) as in protests movements and other ways. The responses of the interviewed population should be interpreted within this frame.




Figure IX. 8. What is the way that you think you can have the most influence to change things? Bolivia 2008

In the Chuquisaca department, the population opted to a greater extent for more participation in the form of protest movements than in other departments (Gr. This difference is statistically significant in relation with the rest of the departments with the exception of Oruro) (See Figure IX.9). Notably, the majorities that chose the options “by voting” and that it is “impossible to exert influence in order to promote any change” are in Santa Cruz and Beni, respectively. The results of the statistical tests do not show relevant results in relation to the influence of other variables on participation or in protests movements. Even though the figures are not convincing, it is only apparent that the older the respondents, the lower the probability of opting for these activities.




Figure IX. 9. Participation in Protests as the Best Way to Change Things, Bolivia 2008

If a comparative perspective is carried out on a continental level, the option for protest in Bolivia is significantly lower than in Honduras, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Panama (Figure IX.10). It is noteworthy that there is probably no unique view of “protest” in all the countries, and that in Bolivia institutional change promoted through protest actions or mobilizations has taken place. Despite the resignations of presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2003) and Carlos Mesa (2005), the establishment of the “agendas” of October of 2003—that include the opening of the Constitutional process and the modification of the legislation related to hydrocarbons—and of January of 2005—related to the departmental autonomies—was the product of social mobilizations.




Figure IX. 10. Participation in Protests as a Better Way to Change Things in Comparative Perspective, 2008

In Bolivia the majority of respondents prefer to participate as voters in elections; however, this does not automatically allow elected representatives to govern at they chose. This is clear in the question about the relation of presidents with the people’s will (See national averages compared in Figure IX.11). According to respondents, presidents should follow the people’s will because in principle the people decide what is right for them. This recognizes the limited margins for discretionary executive action, in opposition to presidentialists’ ranks of the government regime. In any case, responses point to the control of elected representatives by electors.




Figure IX. 11. Average Agreement with “Presidents Should Obey the People’s Will” in Comparative Perspective, 2008

We do not observe significant differences if we compare departmental averages. However, when we examine extreme responses, residents of Cochabamba agree more than in any other department with the opinion that presidents should follow the people’s will. The differences are significant in almost all the departments (Figure IX.12).




Figure IX. 12. Population that Agrees that Presidents Should Follow the People’s Will by Department, Bolivia 2008

Respondents ideally opt for the election of representatives (that should be accompanied by the elected’s obedience to electors). As we will see later, the proportion of people that participated in any protest manifestation in the year before the survey is greater than the proportion of those who opt for movements. In relation to public protests, we consider the following question:

PROT2. And now thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never?




Figure IX. 13. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests, Bolivia 2008

It is not possible to examine the numbers in Figure IX.13 in comparison with those of previous years, since the question about the same topic was slightly different.³ However, it is possible to suggest a fundamental element in *the perception of protest*. The multiple demonstrations in 2007 (above all, the “*cabildo* of two millions” in the department of La Paz) would make one think that these figures do not closely reflect these facts, because *only one million* of the large demonstrations held in La Paz surpass the proportion that is included in this study. The explanation, however, is found in the fact that *the town council could have not been considered by all as “protest.”* Far from delegitimizing the results of this study, the difference indicates that certain practices of collective action in Bolivia, such as the attendance at town councils, instead of being considered by citizens as protests, they are seen as more or less institutionalized mechanisms for the channeling of their civil participation.

³ The question in 2006 was the following: “Have you ever participated...?” In 2008 the question was “in the last twelve months.”




Figure IX. 14. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests by Department, Bolivia 2008

If we focus on the figures from a departmental perspective (See Figure IX.14), we observe that Chuquisaca appears as the department with the highest number of participants in a public protests in during the year previous to the survey (included are the responses of those who participated “sometimes” or “almost never”). The proportions of 23,4% in 2004 and 22,0% of people that responded in 2006 that participated sometime in their lives in a protest manifestation increased to 29,5% in 2008 (no longer in relation to “sometime during their lives” but only to those previous twelve months). Without a doubt this has to do with the development of the Constituent Assembly in Sucre and the demands for a “full capitality” (that all State powers be physically moved to the city of Sucre) promoted by local authorities, universities, and civic boards of the city.

Comparing the responses with other countries (See Figure IX.15), we observe that Bolivia remains the country with the highest participation in protests, as previous studies have shown (Seligson et al 2006). The question employed here refers to participation in protests only during the last year.




Figure IX. 15. Population that Participated in Manifestations or Public Protests in Comparative Perspective, 2008

In addition, we asked if the population participated in protests and demonstrations in favor or against the national government. The proportion of protests resulting from the Database on Social Conflict in Bolivia that Roberto Laserna and Miguel Villaruel manage (from only 4 conflictive events in 2005, to 24 and 23 events in 2006 and 2007, respectively) to verify that mobilizations in favor of the national government are more common than those that correspond to previous governments. The LAPOP survey shows its results in Figure IX.16.




Figure IX. 16. Public Manifestations in Favor or Against the Government, Bolivia 2008

If we adopt again a departmental perspective, we observe that those who protest against the government in the greatest numbers reside in Chuquisaca (82,1% of protests of the department were against the government), Beni (60,8%), Santa Cruz (59,4%), Tarija (56,0%) and Pando (53,0%):. On the other hand, La Paz (50,8% of departmental protests), Cochabamba (41,2%) and Oruro (37,5%) show higher support for the government. In both cases the differences with other departments are significant. Finally, Potosí shows the highest number of protests “neither in favor nor against the government” (49,2%) and “sometime in favor and sometime against” (11,1%). Figure IX.17 shows these figures.




Figure IX. 17. Public Manifestations in Favor or Against the Government by Department, Bolivia 2008

Conclusions

At a time when opposing opposite political groups affirm that they are democratic and yet negate this character in their adversaries, there are no mutually exclusive visions of Bolivian citizens' concepts of democracy. The results show that there is a variety of elements related to descriptive and normative aspects of democracy, with its embodiment as an institutional organization and its concept of being a way to conduct politics. Nonetheless, the political dispute now taking place in Bolivia is not rooted in the conflicting conceptions of democracy but in other factors.

In terms of the responses as such, along with the fact that freedom reigns in all the departments, it is worth noting the limited references to popular sovereignty or the "people's will." Although the "people," are highlighted in the definitions of democracy, their importance in other examined topics in this Chapter are not necessarily antidemocratic.

The apparent tension between critics of political parties as real actors of representation and what representation should truly be does not express a contradiction. Responses lean toward the election of responsible representatives and not for condemnation of all representatives. The idea that parties are not necessary for democracy indicates instead that *parties that currently exist or existed* are not necessary. In that sense, the crisis of the political party system, the function of territorial representation exercised by civic organizations, the efficacy of political participation through organizations and movements, and the fact that the party of the government denies being a party should all be taken into account.

There is no preference for "politics in the streets" over institutional politics. The perceptions are clear, given that, for example, there is no unanimity as to as the definition of "protest." Effective participation in protests is not necessarily a result of popular preference. Those who see protests as the best option to influence change are less than those who participated effectively in protest demonstrations in the 12 months prior to this survey. In short, participation could be understood as a response to the insufficiency of institutional channels rather than as an expression that these are intrinsically negative and should not exist.

Chapter X. Political Controversies and the Model of the State*

Bolivia is undergoing a period of political and economic transition that will result in a different composition of the State from that of the beginning of the XXI century. This period is characterized by a continuing dispute among diverse political actors concerning fundamental issues of the future composition of the State, illustrated by the existence of political projects that express different visions for Bolivia. This is the nature of the relative positions about departmental autonomies and their content, the role of the State in public administration, particularly in economic administration, a more or less centralized administration of financial resources, and finally, the desire for the establishment of a *Plurinational* State included in the proposal of the new Political Constitution of the State.¹

The political debate over the various visions for the country is also reflected in citizen support for one or another position related to above-mentioned factors. The tendency of the Bolivian population to entrust the State with various aspects of public administration, such as ownership of enterprises and leading industries, principle responsibility for well-being of the people, creation of jobs and implementation of public policies that will reduce income inequality between rich and poor, has a broad approval. However, when asked about who should administer Bolivia's economic, the majority of the population opts for prefectures rather than the central government.

Regional and political controversies in today's Bolivia are characterized by the emergence and consolidation of indigenous and regional identities, and the approval or disapproval of the current government administration of President Evo Morales. Departmental autonomy is the axis around which diverse political projects are debated and where different citizens' opinions are expressed more clearly.² The role that the Bolivian State should play to solve relevant economic issues for the population with regard to strategic economic administration through State enterprises, job creation, and tax redistribution, and support for the new constitutional text are other fundamental themes that create disputes and influence citizens' approval or disapproval of political projects.

Two dimensions make up the focus of interest in this statistical analysis:

* This Chapter was written by Gonzalo Vargas Villazón

¹ We understand that the most important factor of the proposal of the New State included in the Official Version of the proposal of the New Political Constitution of the State is that Bolivia should be constituted as a Plurinational State. In Art 1° of the proposal, it is textually established: "Bolivia is a Social Unitary State of a Community Plurinational Lawt, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded in plurality and political, economic, judicial, cultural and linguistic pluralism, within the integrating process of the country."

² "The demand for departmental autonomies, for example, is currently the meaning related to grouping and polarizing the political arena with certain advantages for civic/regional movements since it allows traditional groups and sectors to reproduce and maintain their leaderships, making up a real alternative of representation and negotiation opposite MAS and the government in their respective regions", García Yapur, (cited in (Zegada, Tórriz y Cámara 2008).

- Ethnicity, to which important influence is attributed in the debated policies in today's Bolivia. Available data for 2008 indicate whether the ethnic component, expressed by self-identification of individuals, has or has not influenced the axis of the current political debate.
- Regionalism, in which affects the tenor of the debate and struggle for policies due to clear regional differences. We will analyze the data of departments that show high support for autonomy and those that do not, in order to determine the specific factors that play a role as along with the general tendencies of the country as a whole.

This Chapter attempts to characterize the attributes of the debate in relation to the departmental autonomy axis, support for the new Political Constitution of the State, and the opinion toward the role of Central State in public administration. These issues are the focus of the analysis, and have been identified as “niches” that serve to strengthen opposite visions of the country that put under strain Bolivian politics. We consider the consistency that these variables have with the following characteristics that could explain these tensions and debates: cultural self-identification, wealth, education, political tendency expressed by the support for President Morales, place of residency: urban or rural, degree to which people agree with common values that unify the country; and support for democracy and leadership.

Concurrently, we observe to which degree these issues relate to central aspects of support for a stable democracy in the country, such as the belief in fundamental values upon which democracy depends, belief in the legitimacy of institutions that are key for democracy, and interpersonal trust, which will allow to observe if there is an interdependency between debated country visions and democratic system support, and consequently, what kind of relationship exists.

Departmental Autonomy

We consider three dimensions of departmental autonomy that make up the nucleus of the current autonomic debate: citizens' positive or negative perceptions, perception of departmental autonomy as it relates to the division of the country, and support for the idea that prefectures should administer some natural resources.

Regarding citizens' perception of departmental autonomy, the axis that shows a growing degree of disagreement revolves around trust in the National Government, and particularly, with regard to the degree of approval of Evo Morales job performance as President of Bolivia.

Other factors that influence positively departmental autonomies are self-identification with the Camban culture, wealth measured by material possessions, and education (positive relationship), and Quechua self-identification (negative relationship).

The relationship of trust in the national government is inverse to the positive perception of departmental autonomies: the higher trust a citizen has in the national government, the lower the probability that this individual perceives departmental autonomy as positive. Figure VIII.8 clearly illustrated this relationship.




Figure X. 1. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on the Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

The tendency of this relationship is seen clearly when the question about the National Government refers concretely to President Evo Morales job performance: those who express higher of the President’s job performance are less positive about departmental autonomy; however, it is very probable that those who disapprove of the President’s job performance, have a favorable opinion toward the departmental autonomies (Figure X.1). We can say that the higher the approval of the Morales government, the more negative their opinion of departmental autonomy.




Figure X. 2. Impact of Self-Identification with Camban Culture on the Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies, Bolivia 2008

The more a person tends to self-identify with the *Camba* culture, the higher the probability that this person will perceive departmental autonomy positively (Figure X.2). However, about half of Bolivians do not self-identify with the Camban culture.

As discussed in Chapter VIII, both trust in departmental governments and wealth as measured by material possessions are statistically significant and directly correlated with a positive perception of departmental autonomies; consequently, even though less statistically significant, self-identification with Quechuan culture shows a negative correlation.

A positive relationship exists between the degree of approval of President Evo Morales' job performance and opinions about departmental autonomies as a factor that contributes to the division of the country (See Figure X.3). Those who have a positive opinion of the President's job performance are more likely to believe that departmental autonomies are potentially divisive for the country.




Figure X. 3. Impact of the President's Job Performance Approval on the Perception of Departmental Autonomies as Division for the Country, Bolivia 2008

Other factors influencing the view that departmental autonomies are divisive are: self-identification with the *Camba* culture, trust in departmental prefectures, and preference for democracy as a political system (with a negative effect on the perception of departmental autonomies as divisive); Regarding trust in the National Government, and, to a lesser degree, self-identification with the Quechuan culture, have a positive relationship.




Figure X. 4. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on Support for Prefectural Administration of Some Natural Resources, Bolivia 2008

Concerning the third criteria of departmental autonomy perception related to the administration of natural resources by the prefectures, a negative relationship between the degree of President Morales job performance approval and support for the idea that prefectures should administer some natural resources is clearly established(See Figure X.4)

As in previous cases, factors that negatively influence the opinion that some natural resources should be administered by prefectures are: trust in the national government and, to a lesser degree, self-identification of the Aymaran culture. The higher the trust in departmental government and the higher the self-identification with the Camban culture, the higher the probability of support for the idea of partial administration of natural resources by departmental prefectures.

The Role of the State in Public Administration

The historical cycle of revolutionary nationalism in Bolivia has imprinted the most relevant and permanent features in the prominence of the state in public administration. State prominence in

politics and the economy was interrupted in the 1980s by the emergence of liberal government administration, but has begun rebuild itself in President Morales' government.

One of the most notable consequences of state centralism was the difficulty that it caused in allowing Bolivian society to recognize their internal differences; the most important social groups arose and established an identity according to the degree of their State dependency--as corporate partners or as opposition groups (Laserna, Gordillo y Komadina 2006).

MAS presented and propelled in Bolivia a directed change to recover the State hegemony in the political and economic administration of the country; however, the regional opposition pushed for a remanagement of the State model from the establishment of departmental autonomies. These different visions for the country are also expressed in the different degrees of population perception regarding the role that the Bolivian State should play to solve relevant economic issues: strategic economic administration through state enterprises, job creation and tax redistribution. What is the statistical significance of populational characteristics such as cultural identity, support for democracy, support for the national government, and approval of President Morales' job performance related to the role of the state in the economic administration?




Figure X. 5. Impact of Trust in the National Government on the Preference for a Market State, Bolivia 2008

The clearest statistical relationship is trust in the national government and a higher probability of supporting the idea that the Bolivian State should be the owner of the the country's most important enterprises and industries (See Figure X.5).

The opinion of the role of the State as responsible for job creation is directly and positively influenced by the people's degree of trust in the national government. To a lesser extent, education also influences positively. Similar results are observed when the role of the State in the implementation of policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor is analyzed.

The analysis of different functions of the Bolivian State that could take on to achieve the best economic and social results allows a more precise determination of trust in the national government and the likelihood that citizens will favor a greater allocation of responsibilities to the Bolivian State in order to solve these issues. A recognized characteristic of Bolivian society is the general tendency of people to ask the State to solve their problems, from negotiation of demands to the capturing of corporative benefits.³

In a multivariate model we demonstrate a positive relationship between trust in the national government and the idea that the Bolivian state should implement policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. Other positive factors are levels of education and the president's job approval rating. This statistical test indicates decisive support for Evo Morales' government that s two fundamental functions of the State in the economy: the prominence of the economic administration through state enterprises and income redistribution policies.

The tendency of these variables as they relate to the role that the state should play in public administration, particularly its role in the economy, has to do with the statist phenomenon that is associated to *rentismo*. Statist means the group of attributes given to the State that, when exercised, plays a prominent role in the solution of economic and social problems of the country. It constitutes a defined vision of the role of the State which in turn generates citizen expectations of that role.

In terms of the four variables related to the role of the State, it is possible to create an index of "estabilidad" which complies with the needed empirical requirements (Cronbach alpha higher than 0,7). The items are:

³ For different tax issues in Bolivia, See (Laserna, et al. 2006).

ROS1. The Bolivian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Bolivian government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector, is the primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Bolivian government should implement firm policies to reduce inequality in income between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

This index allows us to see the citizens’ opinions about a key subject of the Bolivian political culture referred as support for statism.




Figure X. 6. Impact of the President’s Job Performance Approval on the Index of Statism, Bolivia 2008

The preference for a prominent role of the Bolivian State in the economy and growing expectationa of the population that derive from this, in other words, support for statism, has a direct relationship with the approval of President Morales’ job performance (See Figure X.7). A direct relationship is also shown with trust in the National Government.

Administration of Financial Resources

The administration of financial resources of the State is a clear related to the current debate in the Bolivian political arena about the best model for the State--departmental autonomy or a plurinational state. The recent dispute about the distribution of resources of IDH⁴ is an example of the close relationship between diverse visions and a defined state project and centralism. Figure X.7 shows the results of the multiple regressions for the variable that registers favorable perceptions to increase the proportion of public resources that departmental governments administer⁵.




Figure X. 7. Predictors for the Departmental Administration of Economic Resources, Bolivia 2008

⁴ The Law of the Republic, enacted at the end of November 2007, validates the concept of Renta Dignidad, which cut 30% of the income of nine Bolivian prefectures through collection of the Hydrocarbon Direct Tax (IDH).

⁵ The question is: LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money?

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Some more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the municipality
- (4) Some more the municipality
- (5) Much more the municipality

Self-identification with the Camban culture has a positive statistical significance with the opinion that economic resources should be administered mainly by prefectures. Citizens who self-identify with the Camban culture tend to favor the redistribution of financial resources of the Bolivian State toward prefectures, one of the most demanded features of the autonomic postures in the Bolivian debate. Similarly, trust in departmental prefectures shows the same tendency.

In addition, there is a negative correlation between trust in President's Morales job performance and citizens' opinions of the allocation of economic resources to departmental prefectures. This tendency indicates that, on average and after controlling for other factors, the higher President Morales' job performance rating, the less favorable the opinions in relation to the redistribution of economic resources from the federal government toward Bolivian departments.

Support for the Project of the New Political Constitution of the State

The constituent process has been characterized by a political debate, from the establishment of the Constituent Assembly in Sucre in August of 2006 to the approval of the project of the New Constitution in the city of Oruro in December of 2007. In a way, the New Political Constitution of the State expresses the project of the new State that the MAS government and its allies want for Bolivia. The results of 2008 reveal that people view the job of the Constituent Assembly (77%) unfavorably and that it will not solve the country's problems (64%). However, the vote for its approval indicate a tight race between those who approve it and those who do not. The factors explaining this support or rejection to the approval of the new constitutional text is an aspect that contributes to the clarification of the sources that exist in the political debate in Bolivia.⁶

⁶ This point is developed more extensively in Chapter VIII of this study




Figure X. 8. Impact of the President's Job Performance Approval on the Vote in Favor of the Approval of the New Political Constitution of the State, Bolivia 2008

Bolivians who approve of the job President Morales is doing are more likely to approve the proposal of the New Political Constitution of the State in the constituent referendum; in contrast, those who consider his government deficient are more likely to vote against its approval (See Figure X.8).

Other factors influencing a favorable vote for the New Political Constitution of the State are: degree of trust in the national government, voting for MAS in the last national elections and, to a lesser degree, self-identification with the Aymaran culture. On the other hand, the degree of trust in departmental government is statistically significant and has a negative effect on the probability of voting favorably in the referendum for approval of the new constitutional text.

Racial and ethno-cultural dimensions of Political Debate

When specific racial identity and cultural ethnicity questions are asked⁷, we observe concrete features that differentiate some responses from others. In fact, previous studies indicate that for the majority of the people it is simpler to self-identify themselves as *mestizo* rather than indigenous or white when asked about their race (Seligson et. al 2006); in contrast, the option offered by self cultural ethnic identification, in the sense of belonging to a common cultural community seems to facilitate the differentiation around more concrete references of regional or linguistic character, such as the belonging to the Aymaran, Quechuan or Camban cultures.

There are continuing temporal variations in racial self-identification and cultural ethnicity in Bolivia. First, we find significant percentage variations between 2004, 2006 and 2008 in self-identification corresponding to white and indigenous groups: while the percentage of whites decreases constantly between 2004 and 2008, the percentage of indigenous increases during the same period. Those who self-identify as *mestizos* constitute a highly significant proportion of the Bolivian population with percentages that fluctuate around two thirds of the national population⁸.

Even though we postulate that Bolivian politics, and in particular the current debate of opinions related to the future of the country, is influenced by racial aspects, the statistical analysis of the data of the 2008 survey does not fit with this thesis. In fact, we did not find any statistical significance between the issues related to departmental autonomies, the project of the new Political Constitution of the State, and the role of the Central State in the public administration and the racial character of identity, indigenous or white, with which citizens identify.

On the contrary, cultural self-identification constitutes a factor that influences whether or not people support departmental autonomies, the New Political Constitution of the State, and the prominent role of the state in the social and economic administration. However, the data suggest

⁷ Question in the 2008 survey are: ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-Bolivian (black), mulatto, or of another race? BOLETID3, 4 y 5. To what extent do you feel as part of the aymara(3), quechua (4), cambia (5) culture?, question that responses are in a scale from 1 to 7.

⁸ In its broad perspective, the mestizo category includes the majority of the population; in addition, it receives the increases or decreases in self-identification as indigenous or white that derives from the situation that encourages or discourages racial identities. For a more extensive analysis of this subject, See (Seligson et al 2006 Chapter II and Moreno 2008).

that the tendency of cultural self-identification of the population is to become less radical in 2008 in relation to 2004.⁹ This finding suggests a tendency to a more neutral opinion of the population with regard to their cultural ethnic membership.

Tendencies of the Political Debate by Departments

Is it possible to identify departments, understood as administrative political territorial units, that favor or reject the autonomies or whether they favor or reject the new Political Constitution of the State?

We observe clearly that the political debate in relation to autonomists and plurinational visions of the model of the State in Bolivia is closely related to citizen opinion the job performance of the President of the Republic. A departmental citizen opinion about this aspect shows that in La Paz, Oruro, Potosí and Cochabamba, the job of President Morales is generally considered good or very good; in contrast, in Santa Cruz and Beni, President Morales' job performance is considered relatively bad or very bad with regard to the rest of the country's departments. In the departments of Chuquisaca and Tarija both positions are evenly distributed.

Despite these departmental tendencies, it is noteworthy that neutral opinion, is substantial in all the regions of the country (See Figure X.11). In La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba, neutral opinion about the President's job performance is comparatively lower than in the rest of the departments and does not exceed 40% in all the cases. In departments where opinion favors departmental autonomies, a neutral opinion of the President's job performance exceeds 50%, with exception of Pando where this approval is substantial.¹⁰

⁹ In percentage people who least self-identify with the Aymaran culture increases from 30% to 49%; with the Quechuan culture from 26% to 37%; and with the Cambam culture from 44% to 54%.

¹⁰ From the support of the President's job performance, we cannot conclude a territorial relationship of how voting preferences were expressed in the last national elections. The prominence of voting in favor of a political party does not territorially correspond to citizen support for a project determined by the state. For an account of electoral geography, cf. Romero, *Atlas Electoral Latinoamericano*, http://www.cne.org.bo/centro_doc/cuadernos_var/atlas_electoral_latinoamericano2.pdf; Lazarte, "Derrumbe de la res-pública", La Paz, 2008.




Figure X. 9. Approval of the President's Job Performance by Department, Bolivia 2008

The statistical analysis of the departmental data is done by prioritizing extreme departmental cases of support and rejection of diverse projects, expressed in the opinion of departmental autonomies as positive and the affirmation to vote in favor of the approval of the new Political Constitution of the State (in the eventual case that the referendum will be held immediately).




Figure X. 10. Positive Perception of Departmental Autonomies by Department, Bolivia 2008

The Santa Cruz and Beni departments expressed a highly positive opinion of departmental autonomy, while Potosí and Cochabamba are at the other extreme (See Figure X.12). It is noteworthy that in departments that belong to the so-called “half moon” region such as Pando and Tarija, the positive perceptions of departmental autonomies are below 40%, not much more than La Paz and considerably less than Chuquisaca.

With regard to citizen support in favor of the approval of the new Political Constitution of the State in the referendum, La Paz y Oruro expressed their higher approval with percentages higher than 50%, while Santa Cruz and Beni are at the other extreme (See Figure VIII.5 in Chapter VIII of this study). It is worth noting that in four departments, citizen intention to approve the new Political Constitution of the State does is less than a third of the population.

This data suggest that it is not possible to support the thesis that a national political debate reflects a battle between the Oriente and Occidente, between regions that support departmental autonomy and those that do not. It is evident that the political debate appeals to a territorial dispute to reinforce country visions and their respective political projects; however, citizen opinion of the President’s job performance constitutes an element that could decisively influence the advancement of the autonomist project. In addition, we demonstrate that a considerable portion of the population in different departments do not have a clear opinion with respect to supporting or rejecting one project or another.

Table X. 1. Factors that Influence, by Department, a Positive Perception of Citizens With Regards to Departmental Autonomies

Departments	Factors of Influence	Correlation
Santa Cruz	Trust in the prefecture; wealth	Positive for both
Beni	Self-identification with Camban culture; wealth	Positive for both
Potosi	No significant	
Cochabamba	Support for President Morales Job Performance	Negative
La Paz	Indigenous Self-identification	Negative
Chuquisaca	Preference for democracy as a political system	Positive
Oruro	Education	Positive
Tarija	Trust in the prefecture	Positive
Pando	Trust in the prefecture; self-identification with Camban culture	Positive for both

Analysis of departmental data in Bolivia reveals marked variations with respect to a significant statistical relationship at the national level between support for President Morales job performance and the perception that autonomies will benefit the country.

In Santa Cruz and Beni, departments that support the establishment of autonomies, wealth measured by material possessions and self-identification with the Camban culture has a statistical significant positive effect on citizens’ perception that departmental autonomy will solve the problems of the country.

Among the departments that consider that autonomy does not solve the country’s problems, Potosi reveals diverse data that do not show a statistical significance, while in Cochabamba the political aspect of the President’s job performance approval has a great influence on the negative perception of departmental autonomy. Other notable regional characteristics are: in Tarija and Pando there is a direct correlation between trust in the prefecture and a positive perception of citizens toward departmental autonomies; in Chuquisaca, a direct correlation between the preference for democracy as a political system and a positive perception of departmental autonomy.

Table X. 2. Factors that Influence, by Department, the Voting Intention of Citizens in Favor of the Approval of the New Political Constitution of the State.

Departments	Factors of Influence	Correlation
La Paz	Support for President’s Morales Job Performance	Positive
Oruro	Support for President’s Morales Job Performance; self-identification with Aymaran culture	Positive for both
Santa Cruz	Trust in the National Government	Positive
Beni	No significant	
Cochabamba	Support for President’s Morales Job Performance; Trust in the National Government	Positive for both
Chuquisaca	Trust in the National Government	Positive
Potosí	Support for President’s Morales Job Performance; Trust in the National Government	Positive for both
Tarija	Trust in the National Government; Trust in the Prefecture	Positive; Negative
Pando	Vote for MAS in the last national elections; Trust in the National Government	Positive for both

When we consider the vote in favor of the approval of the new Political Constitution of the State we show that the higher the support, the more prevalent a statistically positive relationship between support for President’s Morales job performance and the intention to vote in favor of his approval in the eventual referendum.

This influence is verifiable in the departments of Cochabamba and Potosí when we evaluate the elements that influence the group of variables that are related to the actual support for the government. In that sense, the aspects of support for the national government and the vote in favor of MAS in the last national elections have a direct influence on the intention to vote in favor for the new constitutional text.

With regard to the new Political Constitution of the State, in Oruro, self-identification with the Aymaran culture has a statistical significance on the intention to vote favorably in the referendum of the Political Constitution of the State. Even more significant, is the fact that Oruro is a department in which the percentage of citizens that identify themselves as indigenous exceeds 40%.

Among the departments that tend toward voting “no” in the referendum of the new Political Constitution of the State is Santa Cruz, where a significant statistical relationship exists with a

direct correlation between trust in the national government and a vote in favor of the approval of the new Constitution.

The departments that support the political project leaded by President Morales that is expressed in the proposal of the new Political Constitution of the State are, in order of importance, La Paz, Oruro, Potosi and Cochabamba. The nucleus of the opposition to this political project has been concentrated in Santa Cruz and Beni. When we compare both sets of data to the departmental autonomy opposition positive-negative and the vote in favor or against the new Political Constitution of the State, we see a clear difference between the tendency in La Paz and Oruro, in which citizens seem to be more committed to supporting the project of the new Political Constitution of the State and the establishment of a Plurinational State; and in Potosi and Cochabamba, where citizens clearly express their opposition to departmental autonomies. On the other hand, when we consider support for the autonomist project and the rejection of the new Political Constitution of the State, we observe that in Santa Cruz and Beni both subjects are related; in other words, in these departments, citizen opinion that supports the establishment of departmental autonomies clearly indicates also their rejection of the new Political Constitution of the State.

Conclusions

Current debates about the new model of the State, particularly regarding the departmental autonomy, support for the new Political Constitution of the State, and the role of the state in the economy is clearly influenced by support or rejection for President Morales' job performance. The process of political polarization in the country is more a result of the tensions arising from the debate in the political arena of different projects and visions of the State and less a response to ethnic and regional factors.

A prominent role of the State in the economy is favored by those who approve the job of the president after two years of government. This suggests a connection between the government's performance and the role of the State in public issues. The direction established between the statist index and the President's job approval suggests that supporters of Evo Morales tend to favor statism and consequently, have higher expectations for the President to respond to their demands and solve their problems.

The hegemonic debate and current political participation in Bolivia are not an outcome of racial/ethnic tensions, which is explained by two important results.

Racial ethnic self-identity in Bolivia is less significant in quantitative terms than self-identification or cultural membership; thus, it is more appropriate to look for statistically significant relationships of support for autonomy or for the constituent project from cultural self-identification point of view, as was discussed in this Chapter.

Even when we consider the racial/ethnic variable in multiple regression models, we cannot prove statistically significant relationships regarding departmental autonomy, the new Political Constitution of the State, and the role of centralism in public administration.

The hegemonic debate and current political polarization in Bolivia are not a mistaken expression of the regional debate between the eastern lowlands and the western highlands, which is explained by the following results.

In the statistical analysis of the 2008 survey, we do not prove similar tendencies between what happens in the national context and what is observed in the departments favoring departmental autonomy or the project of the new Political Constitution of the State: in fact, in Santa Cruz and Beni, these tendencies of the relationship that defines a positive perception of departmental autonomies do not appear; while in La Paz and Oruro, we also do not prove the tendencies of the relationship that characterized the intention to approve the constituent project.

President Morales' proposed Political Constitution of the State has a greater popular support, in departmental terms than the regional project with departmental autonomy. President Morales' job performance is a key factor that influences the opinion of and support for different models of the State; the neutral evaluation of this performance is relatively large percentage-wise in the majority of departments, particularly in those that clearly favor the project of departmental autonomy.

Diverse support for the President's job performance, in the departmental context, negates the thesis of regional departmental polarization of the political debate about the different projects of the country. In fact, since the President's job approval constitutes a decisive factor that, in the national context, influences support or rejection of the political projects of departmental autonomy or the plurinational state, the undefinition of the departmental context with respect to this subject does not point toward a geographic character in political polarization.. In contrast, this degree of neutrality toward the President's job performance favors many regional scenes of political polarization.

For this reason, the debate that tends to polarize the political arena does not have a clearly defined territorial importance; that is to say that the extent to which the political polarization turns into an attribute that dominates the political arena is the result of the strategies applied to different political projects and not as a result of regional debates in literal terms. The frequent references to the tension between eastern lowlands and western highlands, or in more controversial terms, between the "half moon" (*media luna*) and "Upper Peru", to justify the differences of project to reestablish the state, seem instead a personal invention of a political struggle and those who play a role in it, as substantiated by the survey of 2008.

This character is still open to citizen opinion about the different visions of the country in each department, related to the fractioning and dispersion of support for the government's administration, which gives a decisive role to the regional dimension of the political debate. It seems that different visions of the country will free continuing regional debates in order to generate long-term political pacts at the negotiating table.

References

- Abramson, Paul, y Ada Finifter. "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978." *American Political Science Review* 25 (1981): 297-307.
- Acemoglu, Daron, y James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Aghón, Gabriel, Francisco Alburquerque, y Patricia Cortés. *Desarrollo económico local y descentralización en América Latina: un análisis comparativo*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL 2001.
- Almond, Gabriel A., y Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- , eds. *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little Brown, 1980.
- Almond, Gabriel, y Sidney Verba. *La cultura cívica*. Madrid: Euroamérica, 1970.
- Anckar, D., y C. Anckar. "Democracies without parties." *Comparative political studies* 5, no. 2 (2000).
- Armony, Ariel. *The Dubious link : Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Azpuru, Dinorah, Steve Finkel, Aníbal Pérez Liñán, y Mitchell A. Seligson. "U.S. Democracy Assistance: How Much, When and Where." *Journal of Democracy* (2008).
- Bardhan, Pranab. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16, no. 4 (2002): 20.
- Barr, Robert. "Parties, Legitimacy and the Motivations for Reform: Devolution and Concentration in Latin America." (2001): 27.
- BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia. *Memoria 1986*. La Paz: Banco Central de Bolivia, 1987.
- Boidi, María Fernanda. "Throw them All Out"? *Attitudes towards Political Parties in the Americas*. Compilador: Mitchell A. Seligson. *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-07*: Vanderbilt University, 2008.
- Boix, Carles. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Bollen, Kenneth A., y Robert W. Jackman. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (1986): 567-91.
- Bollen, Kenneth A., y Pamela Paxton. "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 1 (2000): 58-86.
- Booth, John A., y Patricia Bayer Richard. "Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization in Central America." *Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998): 780-800.
- Booth, John A., y Mitchell A. Seligson. "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." En *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*, compilado por Carlos E. Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, 628-81. México: FLACSO - Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991.
- . "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica." En *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, compilado por Larry Diamond, 107-38. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
- . "Political Legitimacy and Participation in Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping." *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (2005): 537-50.

- . *The Legitimacy Puzzle: Political Support and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, en prensa.
- , eds. *Citizen and State: Political Participation in Latin America*. 2 vols. Vol. I. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978.
- Bratton, Michael, y Eric C. C. Chang. "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (2006): 1059-83.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, y E. Gyimah-Boadi. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Bunce, Valerie. "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, no. 6/7 (2000): 32.
- Cai, Hongbin, y Daniel Treisman. "State Corroding Federalism." *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (2002): 819-43.
- Calderón, Fernando. "Oportunidad histórica. Cambio político y nuevo orden sociocultural." *Nueva Sociedad* 209 (2007).
- Camp, Roderic Ai, Kenneth M. Coleman, y Charles L. Davis. "Public Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico." Portland, Oregon, 2000.
- Carrión, Fernando. *La descentralización en Ecuador: opciones comparadas*. Quito: FLACSO, 2007.
- CEPAL. *Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe*. Santiago: CEPAL, 2007a.
- . *Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2006-2007*. Santiago: CEPAL, 2007b.
- Cleary, Matthew R., y Susan Carol Stokes. *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism : Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico. Russell Sage Foundation series on trust ; v. 11*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.
- CNE, Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia. *Resultados. Asamblea Constituyente y Referéndum sobre autonomías*. La Paz: CNE, 2006.
- Coppedge, Michael, Angel Alvarez, y Claudia Maldonado. "Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness." *Journal of Politics* (en prensa).
- Córdova Macías, Ricardo, y Mitchell A. Seligson. "Participación ciudadana en los gobiernos locales en América Central." En *Participación ciudadana y desarrollo local en Centroamérica*, compilado por Ricardo Córdova Macías y Leslie Quiñónez Basagoitia, 307-24. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, 2003.
- Córdova, Ricardo M., y Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización: I. Centroamérica*. San Salvador: FLASCO, 2001.
- Crabtree, J. *Perfiles de la protesta*. La Paz: PIEB - UNIR, 2005.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Dalton, Russell J. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

- Daughters, Robert, y Leslie Harper. "Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms." En *The State of State Reform in Latin America*, compilado por Eduardo Lora, 87 - 121. Washington: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Doig, Alan, y Stephanie McIvor. "Corruption and its Control in the Developmental Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature." *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1999): 657-76.
- Doig, Alan, y Robin Theobald, eds. *Corruption and Democratization*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Easton, David. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York,: Wiley, 1965.
- . "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-57.
- . "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 9, no. 3 (1976): 431 - 48.
- Edwards, Bob, y Michael W. Foley. "Social Capital, Civil Society, and Contemporary Democracy." *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (March/April) (1997).
- Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, y Norman Loayza. *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment*. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1998.
- Falleti, Tulia. "A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005): 327-46.
- Finkel, S.E., C. Sabatini, y G. Bevis. "Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic,." *World Development* 28 (2000): 1851-74.
- Finkel, Steven E, Anibal Pérez-Liñán, y Mitchell A. Seligson. "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003." *World Politics* 59 (2007): 404-39.
- Finot, Iván. *Descentralización en América Latina: teoría y práctica. Gestión pública*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2001.
- Gaviria, Alejandro, y Carmen Pagés. "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America." Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank Conference on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1999.
- Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, y Carola Moreno. "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective." *World Politics* 57 (2005): 323-64.
- Gibson, James L. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): 51-69.
- . "Challenges to the Impartiality of the State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and 'New Style' Judicial Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 59-75.
- Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, y Lester Kenyatta Spence. "Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment." *Political Research Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2005): 187-201.
- Gilley, Bruce. "The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries " *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 499-525.
- . *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, en prensa.

- Hadenius, Axel, y Jan Teorell. "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (2005): 87-106.
- Hardin, Russell. "Do We Want Trust in Government?" En *Democracy and Trust*, compilado por Mark E. Warren, 22-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Hawkins, Kirk A, y David R. Hansen. "Dependent Civil Society: The Círculos Bolivarianos in Venezuela." *Latin American Research Review* 41, no. 1 (2006): 102-32.
- Hayen, Goran, y Michael Bratton, eds. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Helliwell, John F., y Robert D. Putnam. "Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy." En *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, compilado por Partha Dasgupta y Ismail Serageldin, 253-68. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2000.
- Herreros, Francisco, y Henar Criado. "The State and the Development of Social Trust." *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 1 (2008): 53-71.
- Hetherington, Marc J. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 791-808.
- . *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Hiskey, Jon, y Mitchell A. Seligson. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 (2003): 64-88.
- Holmberg, Soren. "Down and Down We Go: Political Trust in Sweden." En *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, compilado por Pippa Norris editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Inglehart, Ronald. "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203-30.
- . *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Inglehart, Ronald, y Christian Welzel. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Kaufmann, Daniel. "Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption." En *Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006*, compilado por World Economic Forum. Washington: World Bank, 2006.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, y Massimo Mastruzzi. "Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006." Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2007a.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Arat Kraay, y Massimo Mastruzzi. "Growth and Governance: A Reply." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007b): 555-62.
- Kurtz, Marcus J., y Andrew Schrank. "Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and Mechanisms." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007): 538-54.
- Laserna, Roberto, José Gordillo, y George Komadina. *La trampa del rentismo*. La Paz: Fundación Milenio, 2006.

- Laserna, Roberto, y Miguel Villarroel. *38 años de conflictos sociales en Bolivia. Enero de 1970 - Enero de 2008. Descripción general y por períodos gubernamentales*. La Paz: CERES - COSUDE - Instituto para la democracia, 2008.
- Lazarte, Jorge. *Derrumbe de la "res-pública". Los procesos electorales en Bolivia: 2002, 2004 y 2005*. La Paz: Plural, 2008.
- Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza, y Ana Maria Menendez. "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?" *Economic Development and Social Change* 50, no. 3 (2002): 509-39.
- Leyva, Héctor M. *Delincuencia y criminalidad en las estadísticas de Honduras, 1996-2000*. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: United Nations Development Program and FIDE (Proyecto Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil), 2001.
- Linz, Juan, y Alfred Stepan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, y William Schneider. "The Confidence Gap during the Reagan Years, 1981-1987." *Political Science Quarterly* 102, no. 1 (1987): 1-23.
- Mattes, Robert, y Michael Bratton. "Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 192-217.
- Mayorga, Fernando. *Encrucijadas. Ensayos sobre democracia y reforma estatal en Bolivia*. La Paz - Cochabamba: Gente Común, 2007.
- Miller, Arthur H. "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970." *The American Political Science Review* 68, no. 3 (1974): 951-72.
- Mishler, William, y Richard Rose. "Five Years After the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe." En *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, compilado por Pippa Norris, 78-99. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Moore Jr., Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966.
- Moreno, Daniel. "La identidad de los bolivianos en la política." En *Auditoría de la democracia: Informe Bolivia 2006*, compilado por Mitchell Seligson, Abby Córdova, Juan Carlos Donoso, Daniel Moreno, Diana Orcés y Vivian Schwarz. Cochabamba: Ciudadanía - USAID - LAPOP, 2006.
- . "Ethnic Identity and National Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Identity and Political Participation in Bolivia and Guatemala." Ph.D. Dis. Vanderbilt University, 2008.
- Moreno, Daniel, y Mitchell Seligson. "Educación y tolerancia política en Bolivia." En *La cultura política de los bolivianos. Aproximaciones cuantitativas*, compilado por Mitchell Seligson y Daniel Moreno. Cochabamba: Ciudadanía - LAPOP - USAID, 2006.
- Muller, Edward N., Thomas O. Jukam, y Mitchell A. Seligson. "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (1982): 240-64.
- Muller, Edward N., y Mitchell A. Seligson. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of the Causal Relationships." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 635-54.

- Nickson, R. Andrew. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- Norris, Pippa, ed. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- O'Neill, Kathleen. *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in The Andes*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- O'Neill, Kathleen. "Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy." *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 9 (2003): 24.
- Otake, Hideo. "Political Mistrust and Party Dealignment in Japan." En *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, compilado por Susan J. Pharr y Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Paxton, Pamela. "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment." *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (1999): 88-127.
- . "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." *American Sociological Review* 67 (2002): 254-77.
- . "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model Across 31 Countries." *Social Forces* 86, no. 1 (2007): 47-76.
- Pharr, Susan J. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." En *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, compilado por Susan J. Pharr y Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000b.
- Pharr, Susan J., y Robert D. Putnam, eds. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000a.
- Piano, A., y A. Puddington. *Freedom in the World*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.
- PNUD. *El estado de la opinión: los bolivianos, la Constitución y la Constituyente. Encuestas para el Desarrollo Humano*. La Paz: PNUD - IDEA International, 2007.
- Power, Timothy J. and Jamison, Giselle D. "Desconfianza política na América Latina." *OPINIÃO PÚBLICA* 11, no. 1 (2005): 64-93.
- Pritchett, Lant, y Daniel Kaufmann. "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects." *Finance and Development* (1998).
- Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, y Fernando Limongi. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996): 39-55.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, y Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- . *Democracies in Flux: the Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Richard, Patricia Bayer, y John A. Booth. "Civil Society and Democratic Transition." En *Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America*, compilado por Thomas W. Walker y Ariel C. Armony. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000.

- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, y Christian Haerpfer. *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Rose, Richard., y Doh Chull Shin. "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001): 331-54.
- Rothstein, Bo, y Eric M. Uslaner. "All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust." *World Politics* 58, no. 1 (2005): 41-72.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*. Madrid: Alianza, 1980.
- Schattschneider, E. E. *Party Government*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.
- Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism : The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006.
- Schedler, Andreas, Larry Jay Diamond, y Marc F. Plattner. *The Self-restraining State : Power and Accountability in new Democracies*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
- Schwarz-Blum, Vivian. "Confianza en las instituciones: por que es necesaria? ." compilado por Daniel Moreno. Cochabamba: USAID Bolivia, 2006.
- . "Economic Performance and Support for the System: Economic Challenges for Latin American Democracies." En *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006 (en prensa)*, compilado por Mitchell A. Seligson, 2008.
- Selee, Andrew. "Exploring the Link between Decentralization and Democratic Governance." En *Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America*, compilado por Andrew Selee Joseph Tulchin, 35. Washington, 2004.
- Seligson, Amber L. "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999a): 342-52.
- Seligson, Mitchell. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002a): 408-33.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. "Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion." Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1997.
- . *La cultura política de la democracia boliviana. Así piensan los bolivianos, # 60*. La Paz, Bolivia: Encuestas y Estudios, 1999b.
- . *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1999c.
- . "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002b): 408-33.
- . "On the Measurement of Corruption." *APSA-CP* 13, no. 2 (2002c): 5-6, 30.
- . "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* 34, no. 2 (2006): 381-404.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., y Dinorah Azpuru, eds. *Las dimensiones y el impacto político de la delincuencia en la población guatemalteca*. Compilado por Luis Rosero, ed., *Población del Istmo 2000: Familia, migración, violencia y medio ambiente*. San José, Costa Rica: Universidad de Costa Rica, 2001.

- Seligson, Mitchell A., y John A. Booth. "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica." *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 777-92.
- , eds. *Politics and the Poor: Political Participation in Latin America*. 2 vols. Vol. II. New York Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., y Ricardo Córdova Macías. "El Salvador: Entre guerra y la paz, Una cultura política en transición." San Salvador: IDELA and FundaUngo, 1995.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., José R. López-Cáliz, y Lorena Alcázar. "Does Local Accountability Work? Tracing Leakages' in the Peruvian 'Vaso de leche' Program " En *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America: New Research on an Old Problem*, compilado por Charles Blake y Steve Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, en prensa.
- Seligson, Mitchell A., y Edward N. Muller. "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983." *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (1987): 301-26.
- Seligson, Mitchell, Abby Córdova, Juan Carlos Donoso, Daniel Moreno, Diana Orcés, y Vivian Schwarz. *Auditoría de la democracia. Informe Bolivia 2006*. Cochabamba: USAID - LAPOP - CIUDADANIA, 2006.
- Shifter, Michael, y Vinay Jawahar. "Latin America's Populist Turn." *Current History*, no. 104 (2005): 51-57.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Treisman, Daniel. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics*, no. 3 (2000a): 399-458.
- . "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, collective action or continuity." *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000b): 22.
- . "Fiscal decentralization, governance, and economic performance: a reconsideration." *Economics and Politics* 18, no. 2 (2006): 219-35.
- Treisman, Daniel, y Hongbin Cai. "Does competition for capital discipline governments? Decentralization, globalization and public policy." *American Economic Review* 95, no. 3 (2005): 817-30.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. "Bolivia." En *Countries at the Crossroads 2007 : A Survey of Democratic Governance*, compilado por FreedomHouse. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, y Jae-On Kim. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Study*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Weatherford, M. Stephen. "Measuring Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (1992): 149-66.
- Whitehead, Lawrence. "Bolivia and the Viability of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 2 (2001).
- World Bank. *World Development Report, 2000/2001*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- WVS, World Value Surveys. *Four-Waves Pooled Dataset 2005 2005* [cited. Available from www.worldvaluessurvey.org].
- You, Jong-Sung. "A Study of Corruption, Inequality and Social Trust: Why Inequality and Corruption Inhibit Development." Harvard University, 2006.
- Zegada, María Teresa, Yuri Tórriz, y Gloria Cámara. *Movimientos sociales en tiempos de poder*. La Paz: Plural, 2008.

Appendices

Appendix I: Sample Design Technical Description

The 2008 sample was designed paying special attention to keep a high degree of representation of the population characteristics in the selected sample. This means that the sample should have the same proportion of men and women that the real Bolivian population, that the sample should reflect the proportion of distribution of the population in urban and rural areas and that the sample should reflect the diversity of characteristics of education, ethnicities and cultures of the real population. From this point of view, the 2008 sample presents a readjustment with respect to previous studies.

The 2008 sample included a total of 3.003 people in urban and rural areas of all the departments in the country, men and women older than 18 years old, diverse ethnicities, different levels of education, and different occupations.

In order to get more precise results, the interviews LAPOP carried out in Bolivia took place in Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara, depending of the area of residency and the native language of interviewees. Therefore, the main questionnaire has been translated fully to Quechua and Aymara.

A Sample Design That Represents Bolivians In Voting Age

A study of democratic values needs to be designed in a way that collects data of every citizen, not only the most active, but those that are important or live in the main cities and towns. Surprisingly, many studies that say to represent the opinions of citizens are frequently based in samples that systematically sub-represent certain sectors of the population. Often times we hear of studies that talk about Bolivia but that only have been done in the four main cities.

Any serious study about democratic values in Bolivia faces two problems in the sample design: 1) the extensive dispersion of the population and 2) a plurilingual population. Bolivia has a population of only 9,4 million (according to predictions of INE, 2007); it occupies an extension of 1,1 millions of squared kilometers.¹ For example, La Paz has a population density of almost 17 people per squared kilometer, while the department of Pando, with a substantial bigger area than that of Costa Rica, has a lower density of 0.5 inhabitants by squared kilometer. The population density in Bolivia is only of 8 people per squared kilometer, compared to 20 in Brazil and 312 en Belgium.²

In a plurilingual country, it is important to avoid the exclusion of linguistic minorities in the participation in these studies that seek to reflect the national reality. Unfortunately, there is no

¹ The data come from a World Bank publication (World Bank 2000 274).

² World Bank (Op. Cit. p. 232)

current and relevant information about all the languages and where they are spoken. The information that INE provides with regards to this subject is not precise.

Even though a lot of languages are spoken in Bolivia (37 according to CIDOB), Spanish is the predominant language. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), in 1992 only 8,1% of the population older than 6 years old were monolingual Quechuan speakers and 3,2% of the population were monolingual Aymaran speakers (CNPV 1992). The data from el Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda of 2001 show that around 11% of the population speaks only one native language, being Quechua and Aymara the most predominant. In order to include the opinions of these people, it was necessary to prepare questionnaires in both languages and include bilingual interviewers in our survey teams.

In the sample design it was also necessary to consider the size of the population and its distribution through different regions of the country. A study that tries to be representative of a country should make sure to include each of its departments, taking into account that these differ extensively among themselves in relation to their population and area, and that each has their own demographic, social, and political profile and that these make up different regional dynamics. In order to achieve this objective, we decided that the sample should be designed to represent independently each of the nine departments in Bolivia, allowing at the same time to talk with confidence about the country as a whole.

Perhaps it is easier to understand the methodology employed of the sample design in this study by presenting an analogy of a winning tickets draw. Let's assume for instance that there are nine schools in a scholar district and that the district has decided to have a draw to collect money. Those who manage the draw want to make sure that there is at least one winner in each of the nine schools. If each ticket was randomly chosen, it could be that one or more schools do not have a winner. In order to avoid that, instead of placing all the tickets in one box and have nine tickets chosen randomly, the tickets of each school would be placed in different boxes and a ticket will be chosen from each box.

In Bolivia, if we want to make sure that citizens in each of the departments are interviewed, we have to divide the sample in nine "boxes." These boxes are the "stratum" of the sample. Consequently, we have nine separate strata in the Bolivian survey, one for each department. If we divide the country in separate stratum, it is possible that the majority of interviewees would be chosen from the most populated departments in Bolivia (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba) and that only few interviews would take place in the department of Pando, the department least populated. When we stratified the sample, we guarantee the distribution of interviews among the nine departments.

Going back to the analogy of the draw, what will happen if we want to guarantee a winner from each class in each school? We would follow the same procedure and use a box for each class within each school, choosing a ticket from each box. Of course, we will have to increase the number of tickets to be chosen in order to achieve this objective. For example, if each school had

three classes (10th, 11th and 12th), then a total of 27 tickets would have to be chosen (3 classes X 9 schools).

In Bolivia, it is important to subdivide even more the departments into cities, towns, and communities of different population sizes. Once again, if we would put the names of all the residents in each department in separate boxes, then would be very possible that in various departments we would choose the majority of tickets from bigger cities, given that these have the majority of the population. For the Bolivian sample, it is necessary to stratify each department in four groups: 1) cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants; 2) cities and towns that have between 2.000 and 20.000 inhabitants; 3) “compact rural” zones, with a population between 500 and 1.999 inhabitants; and finally 4) “dispersed rural” zones with at least 500 inhabitants. Our sample for each department was stratified as mentioned.

With the purpose of improving previous samples, in 2008 we made an adjustment of the percentages that each department has by size of the population. The basis of this adjustment was predictions of the 2007 Census. Consistent with this adjustment we increased and randomly selected new populations within each stratum. The results of this procedure show a better distribution by stratum of population size.

SEGÚN UNIVERSO					
Departamento	Mas de 20 mil	2 a 20 mil	500 a 1999	Menos de 500	Total
La Paz	64,24%	4,17%	3,49%	28,10%	100%
Santa Cruz	64,58%	14,00%	5,40%	16,03%	100%
Cochabamba	55,23%	7,67%	2,74%	34,36%	100%
Oruro	48,55%	9,38%	5,61%	36,46%	100%
Chuquisaca	41,58%	5,55%	4,15%	48,73%	100%
Potosí	28,69%	5,41%	5,60%	60,29%	100%
Pando	48,95%	0,00%	8,44%	42,61%	100%
Tarija	66,94%	1,87%	3,54%	27,65%	100%
Beni	48,84%	21,96%	3,32%	25,89%	100%

SEGÚN MUESTRA					
Departamento	Mas de 20 mil	2 a 20 mil	500 a 1999	Menos de 500	Total
La Paz	65,00%	10,00%	5,00%	20,00%	100%
Santa Cruz	57,50%	22,50%	5,00%	15,00%	100%
Cochabamba	52,50%	10,00%	5,00%	32,50%	100%
Oruro	53,33%	13,33%	6,67%	26,67%	100%
Chuquisaca	40,00%	5,00%	5,00%	50,00%	100%
Potosí	33,33%	6,67%	6,67%	53,33%	100%
Pando	46,67%	0,00%	10,00%	43,33%	100%
Tarija	60,00%	6,67%	6,67%	26,67%	100%
Beni	50,00%	23,33%	6,67%	20,00%	100%

But overall they show a better coverage of the national territory, given that from 65 provinces, we moved to cover 92 and from 84 municipalities, now we cover 131.

Cobertura/ Año	PROVINCIAS	MUNICIPIOS
2008	92	131
2006	65	84

Because the sample has been stratified at two levels, the first stage at the departmental level and the second stage within each department by size of the population, we have what we call “multiple stage stratified sample design.” But the question that emerges now is, how big has to be the sample and how it should be distributed among strata? It is a very common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But this procedure does not work well when the strata are very different among themselves in terms of population size, as it happens in the Bolivian case. This is the result that the smallest populated departments would have, because their samples are too small that it would be impossible to infer something about them with a high degree of confidence, unless the national sample would be big enough. For example, Pando has only 0,6% of the total Bolivian population, and if we have a national sample of 3000 interviews, only around 18 people would be interviewed in Pando.

To solve the problem, we decided to select a sample of 300 interviews by department, which means that 95% of the times, our sample would be no more than $\pm 5,8\%$ away from the real value for each question asked in the survey. This confidence level of $\pm 5,8\%$ is calculated using sample standard error formulas. In such a way that in the worst of the cases,³ at the departmental level, the survey would be a precise reasonable representation of citizens’ opinions, with a margin of error no more than 5,8% (95% of the times) from the results that we would obtain if we would interview all the adults that reside in each department. Under the most favorable conditions,⁴ the results could be precise at the $\pm 3,5\%$ departmental level. Given that the three most populated departments in Bolivia make up what is called the “central axis” (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba) and are very politically important, we decided to increase the precision of our sample in these departments carrying out 100 additional interviews in each of them, to achieve a total of 400 interviews in each of them. In these three departments, our “confidence interval” for each sample is no more than $\pm 5,0\%$, or almost 1% more precise than the other departments.

The samples of 300 and 400 interviews by department were designed to provide confidence intervals approximately similar for each one. But once we tried to generalize beyond the departmental level to the country level as a whole, it is vital to adjust the size of the sample in a way that it reflects precisely the relative size of the population in each department. For example, when we refer to Pando, and comparing it to La Paz, it is necessary to reduce the relative weight of Pando in the national sample and increase the relative weight of La Paz in a way that we could obtain a general view of Bolivians public opinion. In order to do this, once selected the sample, we assign post-hoc weights in a way that each department reflects correctly their total contribution to the national population. A more detailed discussion of weights appears in the following section.

³ The worst case emerges when the opinion is divided by half, and in a given question, 50% express an opinion and 50% express the other

⁴ For example, if the result presents a division of 90/10 in an item

The sample design for the nine departments in total, with 300 interviews in six departments and 400 in three departments, required a total sample of 3.000 interviews in the whole country. A sample of this size has a precision of no less than $\pm 1,7\%$ of confidence interval. Technically, our sample error is of $\pm 1,7\%$. In other words if we chose respectively samples of this size in Bolivia, 95% of these would reflect the opinion of the population with precision no less than $\pm 1,7\%$. Of course, other factors, in addition to the sample error, could reduce the precision of the results, including no answer, errors in the selection of interviewees, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of $\pm 1,7\%$ is very good.

The mentioned figures about the precision of the sample could remain as established if it was possible to carry out what is called “simple random sample” for each stratum in this study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be distributed randomly among all and each of the nine departments. But to do so, will imply very high costs due to high travelling costs. In almost all research surveys, the costs are reduced by implementing what is known as “clustering samples,” in other words that interview clusters are created in a relatively compact area, such as a zone. Clustering respondents reduces significantly the costs, especially in a country as Bolivia where population density at the national level is very low. Even then, clustering respondents normally increases the confidence interval of the sample, reducing then its level of precision.

It is not possible to know with precision how much the confidence interval will increase when clustering because everything depends on the degree of homogeneity that is a characteristic given to residents in blocks or residencies. For example, if all residents within a block receive a very similar salary, the impact of clustering respondents on the salary description would be higher than for age, which presumably varies a lot more than income and the variation would be more similar at the national level. In any case and to have a better control of these differences, we decided to carry out up to 10 interviews by each chosen zone to interview.

This experience suggests that the level of confidence of a stratified sample design by groups, with a total of 3.000 interviews will increase to around $\pm 2,0\%$ from the level of $\pm 1,7\%$ shown previously. However, the new distribution allows us to improve the confidence interval by 12,3%. In other words, we could say that with this new design for a total of 3.000 interviews, the confidence level will increase $\pm 1,96\%$ from a level of $\pm 1,7\%$ previously indicated. For the purpose of this study, we assumed a level of $\pm 2,0\%$

It is noteworthy that we used a probability criterion in each stage of selection down to the household level, in other words, those populated to interview were randomly selected, and the same took place in zones and households to be interviewed. Each respondent within a household was selected using a criterion of quotas for sex and age, in order to overcome the common problem of incorporating too many women or too many young or too old men in the sample. This bias at the household level is due to a high probability that women, younger and older people would be present at the time of the interview, more than people from other age groups. The sample by quota at the household level is a very inexpensive efficient way to overcome this problem.

This survey was carried out efficiently and professionally by Encuestas & Estudios, the main research enterprise in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this enterprise is affiliated to Gallup International. In the last 24 years, Encuestas & Estudios has carried out almost 1.800 surveys for more than 350 clients in 25 countries. Currently, it employs 106 people full-time and 83 interviewers as part-time, from which 40 are bilinguals (Quechua or Aymara). This organization implemented the sample designed previously described and it also was responsible for carrying out pre-test of the instrument of the survey as well as the translation of these instruments to Quechua and Aymara. In addition, it was responsible for data entry in the database.

The real number of interviews by the enterprise Encuestas & Estudios in the national sample of 2008 was 3.003; in other words, 3 more than the aim of 3.000. In 1998, a total of 2.997 people were interviewed, in 2000 the size of the sample was 3.006. In 2004 the total of interviews taken place were 3.070 and in 2006, 3.013. This is a high level of accomplishment of the sample and demonstrates the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors

On the other hand, LAPOP puts special emphasis in maintaining comparability among samples of different years in which the study was carried out in Bolivia. In 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 the interviews were carried out in the same departments and keeping the same sample methodology.

Age is an important characteristic in defining the attitudes and behaviors of citizens with regards to not only democracy but also politics in general, thus the interviews are implemented to people of all age groups older than 18 years old.

As was previously mentioned, sex is also another important feature when defining political attitudes and behaviors. The sample of LAPOP has constantly kept constant the proportion of interviewed men and women for the six studies until now. Therefore, any variation of attitudes due to gender differences are not the result of a higher or lower proportion of men or women but a variation in the opinions and attitudes of the real population.

A third important factor in these studies of political culture and overall public opinion is to have a representation of the population by area of residency proportional to the real distribution of the population. The proportion of the population distribution by area of residency has remained constant through five studies carried out by LAPOP in Bolivia. The variations—although small—reflect a natural increase in the Bolivian population in the last years and could be influenced by internal migratory movements, overall from rural areas to urban areas, even though these variations do not show significant changes in the population distribution.

Appendix II: Questionnaires (Spanish, Quechua and Aymara)

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: BOLIVIA, 2008 [1748]

Estratopri: La Paz [1001] Santa Cruz [1002] Cochabamba [1003] Oruro [1004] Chuquisaca [1005] Potosí [1006] Pando [1007] Tarija [1008] Beni [1009]

Localidad _____ **Dirección** _____

UPM: _____ **Distrito** _____ **Zona** _____ **Manzano** _____ **Vivienda** _____ **USM/Cluster** _____

UR: Más de 20 mil [1] entre 2 y 20 mil [2] de 500 a 1999 [3] menos de 500 [4]

Idioma del Cuestionario [IDIOMAQ]: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymará [3] **Hora de Inicio** ____:____ **Fecha** ____/____/2008

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR

Género [Q1]: Hombre [1] Mujer [2]
años [0= NS/NR]

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios			02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos			59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno			15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente			10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración			16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico			12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas			14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza			04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares [huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.]			06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio			22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro			31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad [falta de]			27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo			33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de			07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el			60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia			57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda			55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro			70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR			88

ENCUESTADOR: Anote la respuesta aquí y codifique cuando la entrevista termine

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Aceptar hasta dos respuestas]		
	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B
No tiene ningún significado	0	
Libertad:		
Libertad [sin decir que tipo]	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2
Libertad de expresión,	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6
Economía:		
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12
Sufragio:		
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16
Igualdad:		
Igualdad [sin especificar]	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22
Participación:		
Limitaciones de participación	23	23
Participación [sin decir que tipo]	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26
Estado de derecho:		
Derechos humanos, respeto a los	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia	28	28
Justicia	29	29
Obedecer la ley	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	32	32

Guerra, invasiones	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80
NS/NR	88	88
Código [si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B con 0].	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

ENCUESTADOR: Anote la respuesta aquí y codifique cuando la entrevista termine

Ahora, cambiando de tema con qué frecuencia... [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir "todos los días", "una o dos veces por semana", "rara vez", o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Ni buena, ni mala (regular) [3] Mala [4] Muy mala (pésima) [5] NS/NR [8]

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace 12 meses?

Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Ni buena, ni mala (regular) [3] Mala [4] Muy mala (pésima) [5] NS/NR [8]

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace 12 meses?

Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...

	Sí	No	NS/NR
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso Nacional?	1	2	8
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, concejal, o funcionario municipal)?	1	2	8
CP4. A alguna otra institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8

NP1. Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio. ¿Ha asistido a una asamblea municipal o una sesión del Concejo Municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son:*[Leer alternativas]*

Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Ni buena, ni mala (regular) [3] Mala [4] Muy mala (pésima) [5] NS/NR [8]

LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? *[Leer alternativas]*

NS/NR [88]

- [1] Mucho más al gobierno central
- [2] Algo más al gobierno central
- [3] La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad
- [4] Algo más a la municipalidad
- [5] Mucho más a la municipalidad

LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero?*[Leer alternativas]*

NS/NR [88]

- [1] Mucho más el gobierno central
- [2] Algo más el gobierno central
- [3] La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad
- [4] Algo más la municipalidad
- [5] Mucho más la municipalidad

LGL2C. Y hablando también de los recursos económicos, ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero? *[Leer alternativas]*

- [1] Mucho más el gobierno central NS/NR [88]
- [2] Algo más el gobierno central
- [3] La misma cantidad el gobierno central y las prefecturas
- [4] Algo más las prefecturas
- [5] Mucho más las prefecturas

CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos 12 meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.

Una vez a la semana [1] Una o dos veces al mes [2] Una o dos veces al año [3] Nunca [4] NS/NR [8]

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. *[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]*

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	NA
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general, ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: *[Leer alternativas]*

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Algo insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: *[Leer alternativas]*

Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: *[Leer alternativas]*

Confía plenamente [1] Confía algo [2] Confía poco [3] No confía nada [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás?

Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas [1] Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás [2] NS/NR [8]

ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

NS/NR[88]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

RECOGER TARJETA # 1

IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno de Bolivia ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país?
[Leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8]

Muy de acuerdo [1] Algo de acuerdo [2] Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo [3] Algo en desacuerdo [4] Muy en desacuerdo [5]

IMMIG2. En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los bolivianos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los bolivianos?

Hacen los trabajos que los bolivianos ya no quieren [1] Le quitan el trabajo a los bolivianos [2] NS/NR [8]

PROT2. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?

Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] Nunca [3] => Si respondió que no, pase a JC1
NS/NR [8]

BOLPROT3. ¿Y las manifestaciones o protestas en las que participó fueron a favor o en contra del Gobierno nacional?

A favor del Gobierno Nacional [1] En contra del Gobierno Nacional [2] Ni a favor ni en contra del Gobierno [3]
[No leer]

Alguna vez a favor y alguna vez en contra [4]/[No leer] NS/NR [8] Inap [9]

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	[1] Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[2] No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[8] NS/NR
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	[1] Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[2] No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[8] NS/NR
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	[1] Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[2] No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[8] NS/NR
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	[1] Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[2] No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[8] NS/NR
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	[1] Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[2] No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	[8] NS/NR

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?

Sí puede haber razón [1] No puede haber razón [2] NS/NR [8]

JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?

Sí puede haber razón [1] No puede haber razón [2] NS/NR [8]

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

Sí [1] => *siga* No [2] => *pasar a VIC20* NS/NR[8] => *pasar a VIC20*

AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?

Sí [1] => *pasar a VIC20* No lo denunció [2] => *Seguir* NS/NR [8] => *pasar a VIC20* Inap [9] => *pasar a VIC20*

AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8] INAP [9]

[1] No sirve de nada

[2] Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias

[3] No tenía pruebas

[4] No fue grave

[5] No sabe en dónde denunciar

Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos 12 meses para responder las siguientes preguntas

VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos 12 meses?

¿Cuántas veces? _____ veces

NS/NR [88]

VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos 12 meses? ¿Cuántas veces? _____ veces NS/NR

[88]

VIC27. ¿En los últimos 12 meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente?

¿Cuántas veces? _____ veces

NS/NR [88]

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?

Deben respetar las leyes siempre [1] En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen [2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/zona donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

Muy seguro [1] Algo seguro [2] Algo inseguro [3] Muy inseguro [4] NS/NR [8]

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos

ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas]

Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4]
 NS/NR [8]

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...

Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4]
 NS/NR [8]

AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...

Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4]
 NS/NR [8]

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio [pueblo] protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas]

La policía protege [1] La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia [2]
 No protege, no involucrada en la delincuencia o protege e involucrada [3] NS/NR [8]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nada						Mucho

	Calificación	NS/NR
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político de Bolivia?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político de Bolivia?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Corte Nacional Electoral?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su Gobierno Municipal?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser boliviano?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Defensor del Pueblo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura departmental?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de	1 2 3 4 5	8

comunicación?	6 7	
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN)?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BOLB22B [B22B]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Usando la misma escala...

	Calificación	NS/NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales combate la pobreza?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales combate el desempleo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Bolivia y voy a pedirle su opinión. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Calificación	NS/NR
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos bolivianos representan bien a sus votantes?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos bolivianos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso estorba la labor del presidente?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados del Congreso discutiendo y debatiendo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso cumple con lo que usted espera de el?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

RECOGER TARJETA A

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Evo Morales es...?: *[Leer alternativas]*

Muy bueno [1] Bueno [2] Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) [3] Malo [4] Muy malo (pésimo) [5]
NS/NR [8]

M2. Hablando de todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados nacionales están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?

Muy bueno [1] Bueno [2] Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) [3] Malo [4] Muy malo (pésimo) [5]
NS/NR [8]

ENTREGAR TARJETA B

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS/NR [8]
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	

	Calificación	NS/NR
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones...	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP103. Cuando el Tribunal Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorado por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos.	1 2 3 4 5 6	8

¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	7	
Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre el rol del estado. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7	1 2 3 4 5 6	8
ROS1. El Estado boliviano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	7	
ROS2. El Estado boliviano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente.	1 2 3 4 5 6	8
ROS3. El Estado boliviano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos.	1 2 3 4 5 6	8
ROS4. El Estado boliviano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres.	1 2 3 4 5 6	8

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Bolivia?

Muy satisfecho [1] Satisfecho [2] Insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4] NS/NR [8]

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Bolivia es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

Muy democrático [1] Algo democrático [2] Poco democrático [3] Nada democrático [4] NS/NR [8]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	Calificación	NS/NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	88

o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	9 10	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Bolivia. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos		
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Bolivia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Bolivia ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo [lea las alternativas]:

NS/NR [8]

[1] A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o

[2] La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o

[3] En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?

Mano dura [1] Participación de todos [2] NS/NR [8]

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas]

Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido [1] La democracia electoral es lo mejor [2] NS/NR [8]

AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] NS/NR [8]

- [1] Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o
- [2] Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]

Frecuentemente [1] De vez en cuando [2] Rara vez [3] Nunca [4] NS/NR [8]

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2005?

Sí trabajó [1] No trabajó [2] NS/NR [8]

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son [1] corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; [2] corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o [3] no corruptas.

DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar un certificado de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 40 bolivianos de más al empleado público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora...? [Leer alternativas]

Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada [1] Es corrupto pero se justifica [2] No es corrupto [3] NS/NR [8]

DC13. Una persona desempleada es pariente de un político importante, y el político usa su influencia o muñeca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? [Leer alternativas]

Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado [1] Es corrupto pero se justifica [2] No es corrupto [3] NS/NR [8]

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima o soborno en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima o soborno en el último año?	9	0	1	8

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio [como un permiso, por ejemplo] durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos [del Estado] en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima?	9	0	1	8
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una coima para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	9	0	1	8
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?		0	1	8

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: [LEER]

Muy generalizada [1] Algo generalizada [2] Poco generalizada [3] Nada generalizada [4] NS/NR [8]

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...

GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush]

Correcto [1] Incorrecto [2] No sabe [8] No Responde [9]

BOLGI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Canciller de la República? [NO LEER: David Choquehuanca]

Correcto [1] Incorrecto [2] No sabe [8] No Responde [9]

GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene el país? [NO LEER: 9]

Correcto [1] Incorrecto [2] No sabe [8] No Responde [9]

GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Bolivia? [NO LEER: 5 años]

Correcto [1] Incorrecto [2] No sabe [8] No Responde [9]

GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también “Lula”]

Correcto [1] Incorrecto [2] No sabe [8] No Responde [9]

VB1. ¿Está inscrito para votar?

Sí [1] No [2] En trámite [3] NS/NR [8]

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005?

Sí votó [1] =>[Siga] No votó [2] =>[Pasar a VB10] NS/NR [8] =>[Pasar a VB10]

VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005? [NO LEER LISTA]

Ninguno/ blanco o nulo	[00]	FREPAB/Eliseo Rodríguez	[1001]	MAS[Evo Morales]	[1002]
MIP[Felipe Quispe “Mallku”]	[1003]	MNR[Michiaki Nagatani]	[1004]	NFR [Guido Angulo]	[1005]
Podemos [Jorge Quiroga]	[1006]	UN [Samuel Doria Medina]	[1007]	USTB[Néstor García]	[1008]
Otro [77]		NS/NR	[88]	Inap [No votó]	[99]

VB50. En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

Muy de acuerdo [1] De acuerdo [2] En desacuerdo [3] Muy en desacuerdo [4] NSNR [8]

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

Sí [1] =>[Siga] No [2] =>[Pase a POLI] NS/NR [8] =>[Pase a POLI]

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].

MAS[Evo Morales]	[1002]	MIP[Felipe Quispe “Mallku”]	[1003]	MNR	[1004]	NFR	[1005]
Podemos	[Jorge Quiroga]	[1006]	UN	[Samuel Doria Medina]	[1007]	Otro	_____ [1077]
NS/NR	[88] =>[Pase A GI1]	INAP	[99] =>[Pase A GI1]				

VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido[partido que mencionó en VB11]es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?

Muy débil [1] Débil [2] Ni débil ni fuerte [3] Fuerte [4] Muy fuerte [5] NS/NR [8]
INAP [9]

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4] NS/NR [8]

POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas?[Leer alternativas]

A diario [1] Algunas veces por semana [2] Algunas veces por mes [3] Rara vez [4] Nunca [5]
NS/NR [8]

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares?:

DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

DIS5. En lugares públicos [como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado?]

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [No leer]

NS/NR [8]

[1] No votaría

[2] Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente **Partido/Candidato**

[3] Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno.

[4] Ninguno [blanco o anuló]

VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas?[Leer alternativas]
NS/NR [8]

[1] Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición

[2] Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente

[3] Influir de otras maneras

[4] No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]

LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. ...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?[RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA]

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible										Mejor vida posible	NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ zona donde usted vive, está satisfecho[a] o insatisfecho[a] con...[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]	Satisfecho[a]	Insatisfecho[a]	NS/NR o No Utiliza
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8
SD9. El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?

Satisfecho [1] insatisfecho [2]

NS/NR [8]

Bolivia es un país muy diverso y por lo tanto cada uno de nosotros puede identificarse con diferentes aspectos de nuestro país. Por ejemplo, uno puede identificarse como boliviano y al mismo tiempo también como paceño o como cambia. En una escala, en donde 1 significa “nada” y 7 significa “mucho”...

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]	Escala						NS/NR
	Nada				Mucho		
ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
<i>Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la encuesta:</i>							
ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted... [paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuqisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano]?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8

BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BOLETID6 [BETID6]. Algunos periodistas se refieren a los departamentos de Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca y Tarija como la “región de la Media Luna”. ¿Ha oído usted hablar de esta idea? Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la siguiente ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la “Media Luna”?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	[9] 8

BOLCA5. Usted cree que una nueva Constitución Política del Estado proporcionará una solución directa a los problemas del país o que a pesar de la nueva Constitución los problemas continuarán?

Resolverá los problemas del país [1] Los problemas continuarán [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLANM1. Usted cree que las autonomías departamentales serán positivas para el país o que generarán más problemas para Bolivia?

Serán positivas [1] Generarán más problemas [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLANM2. Para usted, las autonomías departamentales se refieren a: 1) mayor descentralización para las regiones, 2) ciertas capacidades de legislación y decisión propia para los departamentos, o 3) una división del país. [Leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8]

- [1] Profundización de la descentralización
- [2] Capacidades de legislación y decisión para departamentos
- [3] Una división del país

BOLANM3. Para usted, las Prefecturas deberían tener atribuciones para administrar algunos recursos naturales del departamento, o sólo el Gobierno Central debería administrar los recursos naturales del país.

NS/NR [8]

- [1] Prefecturas administran algunos recursos naturales
- [2] Los recursos naturales deberían ser administrados solo por el Gobierno Central

BOLANM4. Para usted, las Prefecturas Departamentales deberían tener atribuciones para definir impuestos o tributos, o los impuestos sólo deberían ser definidos por el Gobierno Central

NS/NR [8]

- [1] Prefecturas con atribuciones para definir impuestos
- [2] Impuestos definidos por el Gobierno Central

BOLANM5. Usted cree que las autonomías indígenas serán positivas para el país o que generarán más problemas para Bolivia?

Serán positivas [1] Generarán más problemas [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLCA8. ¿Usted cree que, hasta ahora, el trabajo de la Asamblea Constituyente ha sido positivo para el país o que ha traído más problemas para Bolivia?

Ha sido positivo [1] Ha generado más problemas [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLCA9. ¿Si el referéndum para aprobar la Constitución Política del Estado producida por la Asamblea

Constituyente fuera mañana, usted votaría SÍ para aprobarla, o NO para rechazarla

SI [aprueba] [1] NO [rechaza] [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLCA10. Usted cree que ciertos temas específicos tratados por la Asamblea Constituyente, como por ejemplo la reelección del Presidente, deberían haber sido consultados por medio de referéndum, o que no es necesario que los ciudadanos se pronuncien sobre más temas?

Necesario referéndum para algunos temas [1] No es necesario hacer más consultas [2] NS/NR [8]

NEWTOL7. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o... Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse

El país debe permanecer unido [1] El país debería dividirse [2] NS/NR [8]

NEWTOL9. Sería mejor para el país que exista una sola cultura nacional para todos o que se mantenga la diversidad cultural del país.

Una sola cultura nacional [1] Mantener diversidad cultural [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLAUT11. ¿Usted cree que el Gobierno debería poder censurar a los medios de comunicación que lo critican, o que el Gobierno nunca debería interferir con los medios de comunicación?

Gobierno debería censurar a algunos medios [1] Gobierno nunca debería interferir con los medios [2]
NS/NR [8]

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza [educación, o escuela] que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ [primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria] = _____ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16		
NS/NR/	88					

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Católica

[2] Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).

[3] Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)

- [5] Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).
- [6] Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día
- [7] Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).
- [4] Ninguna

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? *[Leer alternativas]*

NS/NR

- [8]
- [1] Más de una vez por semana
- [2] Una vez por semana
- [3] Una vez al mes
- [4] Una o dos veces al año
- [5] Nunca o casi nunca

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? *[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]*

- | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Ningún ingreso [00] | Menos de 250 Bs. [01] | De 251 a 500 Bs. [02] | De 500 a 800 Bs. [03] |
| De 801 a 1,200 Bs. [04] | De 1.201 a 2.000 Bs. [05] | De 2.001 a 3.000 Bs. [06] | De 3.001 a 5.000 Bs. [07] |
| De 5.001 a 10.000 Bs. [08] | De 10.000 a 20.000 Bs. [09] | Más de 20.000 Bs. [10] | NS/NR[88] |

[RECOGER TARJETA E]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior?

- Sí[1] No[2] =>*[Pase a Q10c]* NS/NR [8] =>*[Pase a Q10c]*

Q10A1. Sólo si recibe remesas => ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? *[No leer]*
NS/NR [8]

- [1] Consumo [alimento, vestido]
- [2] Vivienda [construcción, reparación]
- [3] Gastos en educación
- [4] Comunidad [reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias]
- [5] Gastos médicos
- [6] Ahorro
- [7] Otro

Q10B. Sólo si recibe remesas => ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?

- Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4] NS/NR [8]
Inap [9]

Q10C. Preguntar a todos => ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? *Si dijo "Sí", preguntar => ¿dónde residen esos familiares?* *[No leer alternativas]*

- Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [1] Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [2]
Sí, en otros países no en Estados Unidos [3] No [4] =>*[Pase a Q14]* NS/NR [8] =>*[Pase a Q14]*

Q16. Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C => ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos?

Todos los días [1] Una o dos veces por semana [2] Una o dos veces por mes [3] Rara vez [4] Nunca [5]
NS/NR [8] Inap[9]

Q14. Preguntar a todos => ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

Q10D. Preguntar a todos => El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8]

[1] Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar
[2] Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades
[3] No les alcanza, tienen dificultades
[4] No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil?[No leer alternativas]

Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre/acompañado [3] Divorciado [4] Separado [5] Viudo [6]
NS/NR [8]

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ [00= ninguno => Pase a ETID] NS/NR [88]

Q12A. Si tiene hijos=>¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, INAP/no tiene hijos [99]

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originaria, negra o Afro-Boliviana, mulata, u otra?

Blanca [1] Mestiza [2] Indígena/originaria [3] Negra o Afro-Boliviana [4] Mulata [5] Otra [7]
NS/NR [8]

ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas?[leer todas las opciones]

Quechua [1] Aymara[2] Guaraní[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7] otros
_____ [especificar]

BOLETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originario, negra o mulata?

Blanca [1] Mestiza [2] Indígena/originaria [3] Negra [4] Mulata [5] Otra [7]
NS/NR [8]

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa?[acepte una alternativa]

Castellano [1001] Quechua [1002] Aymará [1003] Guaraní [1004] Otro nativo [1005] Otro extranjero [1006]
NS/NR [8]

BOLLENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? [Acepte una alternativa]

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Guaraní [4] Otro nativo [5] Otro extranjero [6] NS/NR [8]

LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían; ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban..... [Leer alternativas]:

[Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.]

Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3] Castellano e idioma extranjero [4] NS/NR [8]

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas]

Todos los días o casi todos los días [1] Por lo menos una vez por semana [2] Por lo menos una vez al mes [3]
Rara vez [4]
Nunca [5] NS/NR [8]

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer uno por uno]

R1. Televisor	[0] No	[1] Sí
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera]	[0] No	[1] Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo [no celular]	[0] No	[1] Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	[0] No	[1] Sí
R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?	[0] No [1] Uno [2] Dos [3] Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	[0] No	[1] Sí
R7. Microondas	[0] No	[1] Sí
R8. Motocicleta	[0] No	[1] Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	[0] No	[1] Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	[0] No	[1] Sí
R15. Computadora	[0] No	[1] Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8]

[1] Trabajando? [Siga]

[2] No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga]

[3] Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[4] Es estudiante? [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[5] Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a MIG1/ TERMINA]

[6] Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a MIG1/ TERMINA]

[7] No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? [Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?] [No leer alternativas]

NS/NR [88] INAP [99]

[1] Profesional, intelectual y científico [abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.]

[2] Director [gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor]

- [3] Técnico o profesional de nivel medio [técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.]
- [4] Trabajador especializado [operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.]
- [5] Funcionario del gobierno [miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública]
- [6] Oficinista [secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.]
- [7] Comerciante [vendedores ambulantes, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.]
- [8] Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
- [9] Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios [trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.]
- [10] Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero [propietario de la tierra]
- [11] Peón agrícola [trabaja la tierra para otros]
- [12] Artesano
- [13] Servicio doméstico
- [14] Obrero
- [15] Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad [policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.]

OCUPIA. En su ocupación principal usted es: *[Leer alternativas]*

- [1] Asalariado del gobierno?
- [2] Asalariado en el sector privado?
- [3] Patrono o socio de empresa?
- [4] Trabajador por cuenta propia?
- [5] Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?
- [8] NS/NR
- [9] INAP

OCUP 12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?

_____ *[Anotar número de horas]* NS/NR[88] INAP[99]

OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?

Menos [1] Igual [2] Más [3] NS/NR [8] INAP [9]

OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud o seguro social a través de su empresa o su empleador?

Sí [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] INAP [9]

Ahora nos gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situación laboral en diciembre de 2006

OCUP27. –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora?

- [1] Sí *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*
- [2] No *[Siga]*
- [8] NS/NR *[Siga]* INAP [9]

OCUP28. En esa fecha estaba usted: *[Leer alternativas]*

- [1] Desempleado? *[Siga]*
- [2] Trabajando? *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*
- [3] Estudiando? *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*
- [4] Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*
- [5] Otros [jubilado, pensionista, rentista] *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*
- [8] NS/NR *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]* INAP [9]

OCUP29. ¿ Cual era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas]

- [1] Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pase a OCUP31]
- [2] Fin de empleo temporal [Pase a OCUP31]
- [3] Buscaba empleo por primera vez [Pase a OCUP31]
- [4] Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Siga]
- [5] Despido o cese [Siga]
- [8] NS/NR [Pase a OCUP31] INAP [9]

OCUP30. ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba?

- [1] Sí [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]
- [2] No [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]
- [8] NS/NR [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA] INAP [9]

OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo?

- [1] Sí [Siga]
- [2] No [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]
- [8] NS/NR [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA] INAP [9]

OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha, cuanto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo?

- [1] Menos de un mes
- [2] Entre un mes y tres meses
- [3] Entre tres meses y seis meses
- [4] Más de seis meses
- [8] NS/NR INAP [9]

MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:

En el campo [1] En un pueblo [2] En una ciudad [3] NS/NR [8]

MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas]

En este mismo municipio [1] En otro municipio en el país [2] En otro país [3] NS/NR [8]

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración. Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: BOLIVIA, 2008 [VERSIÓN EN QUECHUA]

Estratopri: La Paz [1001] Santa Cruz [1002] Cochabamba [1003] Oruro [1004] Chuquisaca [1005] Potosí [1006] Pando [1007] Tarija [1008] Beni [1009]

Localidad _____

Dirección _____

UPM: _____ Distrito _____ Zona _____ Manzano _____
 Vivienda _____ USM/Cluster _____

UR: Astawan 20.000[1] 2-20.000[2] 500-1.999[3] Aswan pisi 500[4]

Simi lengua [IDIOMAQ]: Kasteallanu [1] Qeshwa[2] Aymará[3] Hora de inicio ____:__ Fecha ____ 2008

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR.

Género [Q1]: Qhari (1) Warmi (2)

Q2.Mashka watayoj kanki

años [0 NS/NR]

A4 [COA4].Qallarinapaj imataj qampaj Kankan aswan jatun problema kay jatun suyunchepi [AMA ÑAWIRICHU, UJLLATA]

A4

Mana yaku kanchu	19	Tukuy ima ancha valesqa	02
Yankuna mana sumajchu	18	Kay políticos	59
Ch'ajwas	30	Mana sumajtachu kamachinku gobierno	15
Anchata suwanku	13	Pachamama phiñasqa	10
Mana qolqe kanchu yanapanapaj	09	Waj runas jallp'asman ripunku	16
Junt'a sua	05	Narcotráfico	12
Mana runata rispitanakuchu	56	Pandillas	14
Mana llank'ana kanchu	03	Usunchej	04
Mana tukuy ujllajchu kanchej	58	Tukuy thutunku chakatanku yankunata, mana saqenkuchu llank'ayta, mana llaykayta munankuchu	06
Mana mikhunapaj kanchu	23	Mana doctores kanchu (midikus)	22
Waj llajtaman ripunanku tian	32	Secuestro	31
Llaytanchej ancha manu	26	Mana libreta purinchejchu, wasisninchejta ch'atananchej	27
Pisipi qhawakunku	25	Políticos runata manchichinku	33
Cocainatawan clefatawan upinku, marihuanata pitanku	11	Mana jallp'a kanchu llank'a napaj	07
Golqemanta usunchej jatun bolivianchejpi	01	Karrus apaykachajkuna, mana walejchu	60
Mana yachay wasis kanchu, nitaj sumajta yachachinkunchu	21	Maqanaku, suwanaku, phiñanakuy jun'ta	57
Mana k'anchay kanchu	24	Mana wasis kanchu	55
Ancha runa tian	20	Waj	70
Jap'inakuna runawan manchichejkunawan	17	MY/MK	88

TAPUJ: Qhelqey kutichiskata kaypi churaytaj tukukujtin tapuykunata

DEM13. Ima munam miyta qanpaj democracia kay llajtanchejpi. [PAJTA: Ama ñawiriychu kuticheykunata. Iskay kutichiykunallata jap'iy]

	1 ^o Kutichiy DEM13A	2 ^o Kutichiy DEM13B
Ni imata munachu niyta	0	
Qhespi kay:		
Qhespi kay [ama niychu ima laya]	1	1

Qollqeykita sapaykichu ruanki, qanpatachu	2	2
Imallatapis atinkichu th'autiyta	3	3
Mayllamanpis atinkichu riyta qanllamanta	4	4
Mana ni mayman atinkichu riyta imallatapis parlayta	5	5
Sapaykimanta tukuy imata ruanki	6	6
Qolqemanta parlaspá:		
Manchay sumaj kasanchej, tukuy imawan, pataman thaskisanchej	7	7
Tukuy ima mana walejchu, mana qolqe kanchu ni imapaj	8	8
Qollqeyoj kanchej llank'anapaj	9	9
Munasqaykiman jina atinki rantiyta qhatuyta imallatapis	10	10
Tukuytaj aswan llank'ana tian	11	11
Mana llankana kanchu, chaynejta tukuy ripunku	12	12
Voto:		
Atinchej, chijllayta kamachisninchejta	13	13
Eleccionespi votankichu	14	14
Llimphuchu elecciones	15	15
Mana llimphuchu elecciones	16	16
Tukuychu kikin kanchej:		
Tukuychu kikin kanchej (ni ima nispá)	17	17
Tukuy kikin qollqeyoj kanchej	18	18
Warmis kikin qharisjina kanku	19	19
Tukuy ujlla kamachisqa kanchij	20	20
Ujllachu kanchej aymarawan, quechuwawan, mojeñoswan, guaraniswan, wajkunawan ima	21	21
Mana tukuychu kikinchej kanchej	22	22
Participaciontaj:		
Mana tukuychu atinchej participayta	23	23
Participanapaj [ama niychu ima laya)	24	24
MinoríasParticipaciontaj	25	25
Runa masi atiynejoj	26	26
Jatun llajtanchej kamachisqawan:		
Kikin tukuy derechosnejoj kanchej	27	27
Mana derechosnejoj kay (mana justicia kanchu)	28	28
Michuj (justicia)	29	29
Kasunanchej kamachisqata	30	30
Jatun kamachij mana militarchu kanan	31	31
Kausananchej tian walejta mana ch'ajwaswan	32	32
Nipi atinchu llunp'iyta ayllunchejta	33	33
Waj kutichina	80	80
MY/MK	88	88
Código [Ujllata kutichijtin churay 13B wan 0].	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

TAPUJ: Qhelqey kutichiskata kaypi churaytaj tukukujtin tapuykunata

Kunanqa, wajmanta parlaspá mashkha kutitataj... [Tapuytawan sapa tapuykunata, ujtawan niy "sapa p'umchay", "sapa semana uj kutitachu iskay kutitachu", "wakin kutislla", "ni jayk'aj" yanapanapaj pimanchus tapunchej]

Mashkha kutita ...	sapa p'umchay	uj kutitachu iskay utitachu	wakin kutislla	ni jayk'aj	MY
--------------------	---------------	-----------------------------	----------------	------------	----

A1. Radiupu willaykunata uyarinkichu	1	2	3	4	8
A2. Qhawankichu willaykunata televisionpi	1	2	3	4	8
A3. Ñawirinkichu willaykunata periodikuspi	1	2	3	4	8
A4i. Ñawirinkichu uyarinichu willayjunata internetpi	1	2	3	4	8

SOCT1. Qolqemanta paslaspa... Imaynata niwaj kasqanta kay llajtanchejpi. Niwajchu: manchay sumaj, sumaj, as sumajlla, mana sumajchu, manapuni sumajchu.

Manchay sumaj [1] Sumaj [2] As sumajlla [3] Manasumajchu [4] Manapuni sumajchu [5]
MY/MK [8]

SOCT2. Pasaj watapi kay llajtanchejpi aswan qolqellojchu karqanchej, kikinichu aswan millaychu.

Aswan sumaj [1] Kikin [2] Aswan millay [3] MY/MK [8]

IDIO1. Imaynata niwaj kunitan qolqeyojchu kanki. Niwaj manchay sumaj, sumaj, as sumajlla, manasumajchu, manapuni sumajchu.

Manchay sumaj [1] Sumaj [2] As sumajlla [3] Manasumajchu [4] Manapuni sumajchu [5]
MY/MK [8]

IDIO2. Imaynata niwaj kunitan qolqeyojchu kanki. Niwaj manchay sumaj, sumaj, as sumajlla, manasumajchu, manapuni sumajchu.

Aswan sumaj [1] Kikin [2] Aswan millay [3] MY/MK [8]

Kunan, wajmanta parlanapaj wakinkutis ayllus ningupi, mana atinguchu sapankumanta imachus mana wallejchu wallejyachyta, wakinkutis mañakunqu yanapananquta autoridadesman. Jayka'ajllapis mañakorqankichu yanachikunaykipaj.

	Ari	Mana	MY/MK
CP2. Ima diputadullapis Congresomanta	1	2	8
CP4A. Ima autoridadllapis aylluykimanta (<i>alcalde, consejal, o funcionario municipal</i>)	1	2	8
CP4. Manqen institucionllapis	1	2	8

NP1. Kunan parlasunchej alcaldiamanta. Jaykajllapis rerqankichu qotuchakuyma ñaupaj watapi.

Ari[1] Mana[2] MY/MK[8]

NP2. Jaykajllapis imallatapis mañarqankichu ichapis imallatapis tapurikorqanki municipalidadpi ñaupaj watapi.

Ari[1] Mana[2] MY/MK[8]

SGL1. Niwajchu pichus purichisan kunan alcaldia yananpanchu ayllumasisman.

Manchay sumaj [1] Sumaj [2] As sumajlla [3] Manasumajchu [4] Manapuni sumajchu [5]
MY/MK [8]

LGL2A. Qhawarispa alcaldia yananpanquta prefecturasta Gobiernotawan piman astawan ruanata qowaj.[Ñawiriy tukuyta]

MY/MK [88]

[1] Astawan Gobierno centralman

- [2] Uj chhikatawan Gobierno centralman
- [3] Kikinta Gobierno centralman municipalidadmanpis
- [4] Uj chhikatwan alcaldiaman
- [5] Astawan alcaldiaman

LGL2B. Qhawarispataj yachaspataj mashkha qolqeyoj kanchej llajtanchejpi pitaj chay qolqeta mirachinman. Piman qowaj. *[Ñawiriy tukuyta]*

MY/MK [88]

- [1] Astawan Gobierno centralman
- [2] Uj chhikatawan Gobierno centralman
- [3] Kikinta Gobierno centralman municipalidadmanpis
- [4] Uj chhikatawan alcaldiaman
- [5] Astawan alcaldiaman Astawan Gobierno centralman

LGL2C. Parlaspa qolqemanta aswan sumajta wiñachinman, llankachinman kay qolqeta. *(Ñawiriy tukuyta)*

- [1] Astawan Gobierno centralman
- [2] Uj chhikatawan Gobierno centralman
- [3] Kikinta Gobierno centralman prefecturasmanpis
- [4] Uj chhikatwan prefecturasman
- [5] Astawan alcaldiaman

MY/MK [88]

CP5. Kunanqa wajmanta parlaspá, ñawpaj watapi yanaparqankichu aylluykipi masisniykita. Willariway mashkha kutitachus semanapi, ujta iskayta killapi iskaykutita watapi nijayk'ajchus.

Ujta semanapi[1] Ujta iskayta killapi [2] Iskaykutita watapi [3] Nijayk'aj [4] MY/MK[8]

Kunan ñawirisaj qotusmanta organizacionesmanta willariway mashkha kutitachus qotuchakuman rinki: ujta semanapi, ujta iskayta killapi, ujta iskayta watapi, nijayk'aj. (Ujtawan niy yanapanapaj tapukojman "ujta semanapi", "ujta iskayta killapi", "iskaykutita watapi", "nijayk'aj")

	Ujta semanapi	Ujta iskayta killapi	Iskaykutita watapi	Nijayk'aj	MY/MK	NA
CP6. Rinkichu qotuchakoj iglesiaman	1	2	3	4	8	
CP7. Rinkichu qotuchakoj escuelaman	1	2	3	4	8	
CP8. Rinkichu qotuchakoj aylluykipi.	1	2	3	4	8	
CP9. Rinkichu qotuchakoj qhatojkunaman, productoresman, organizaciones campesinasman.	1	2	3	4	8	
CP10. Rinkichu qotuchakoj sindicatuman.	1	2	3	4	8	
CP13. Rinkichu qotuchakoj partidos movimientos politicosman.	1	2	3	4	8	
CP20. (Warmisllapaj) Rinkichu qotuchakoj warmisllawan parlamaykichejpaj.	1	2	3	4	8	9

LS3. Wajmanta parlaspá. Tukuy imamanta, maykama kuisisqa kanki kawsayniykiwan. (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Ancha kuisisqa[1] Kuisisqalla[2] Mana kuisisqachu [3] Manapuní kuisisqachu [4] MY/MK[8]

IT1. Kunanqa ayllumasiykimanta parlaspá, imata niwaj ayllumasisniykimantaj: (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Anchata suyani[1] Suyallani[2] Pisita suyani[3] Mana suyanapaj jina[4] MY/MK [8]

IT1A. Runta rejsijiyki; niwaj: (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Suyanipuni[1] Suyallani[2] Pisita suyani [3] Manapuní suyanichu[4] MY/MK [8]

IT1B. Parlaspá runamanta imata niwaj atesumanchu runamasispi suyayta manchikusunchejchu waj mana rejsisqa runamanta.

Tukuypi atinchej suyayta[1] Manchikuna mana reqsisqa runamanta[2] MY/MK [8]

#1 TARJETATA QOY

L1. Lloq'emanta pañaman kay raphipi tian ujmanta chunkakama. Parlajtiyki politikamanta masisniykiwan runa astawan atikun llo'eman (izquierdaman) wakintaj atikun pañaman derecha. Imata numan niyta qampaj lloq'e pañawan, imata umallikunki politicosmanta parlaspá, maypi kay raphita rikuspa maypi kan churakuwaj. Rikuchiy aswan lloq'epichu pañapichu kanki.

NS/NR[88]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lloq'e									Paña

KUTICHI TARJETATA#1

IMMIG1. Uynisqachu kasanki kay gobiernowan yanapanampaj tukuy laya runasman karu llajtasmanda jamojkunaman astawan kay ayllunchejmanta qospa wasista chantataj khasimanta jampichispa yachachispa ima, karu llajtasmanda jamujkuna kay llajtanchejman tiakoj. (*Ñawiriy tukuyta*)

MY/M

K [8]

Uynisqa kani[1] Uynisqaya kani [2]
sumajchu [5]

Mana dakuwanchu[3]

Mana sumajchu[4]

Manapuni

IMMIG2. Waj llajtasman jamao kuna kay llajtapi tiakunankupaj qechuwanchej llank'anata boliviano masisan ruankuchus kay karu llajtasman llank'anata bolivianos masisnichej mana munankuchu llank'ayta.

Ruanku llajtamasis mana munasqankuta[1] Qechunku llank'anata llajtamisman[2] MY/M [8]

PROT2. Ñawpaj watapi rerqankichu ch'ajwasman, wakin kutis, ñaqha, ni jayk'aj.

Wakin kutis [1] Ñaqha [2] Ni jayk'aj [3] } *Mana nin chaqa ri JC1* MY/MK [8]

BOLPROT3. Jatun tantakuyma ch'ajwasman rerqanki gobiernoj contranpichukarqa gobiernoman yanapanaykimanchu.

Gobierno nacionalta yanapanapaj[1] Gobierno contranpi[2] Mana contranpi mana yanapaspa[3] (*Ama ñawiychu*)
Wakin yanapanapaj wakintaj contranpi[4] (*Ama ñawiychu*) MY/MK [8] Inap[9]

Kunanqa wajmanta parlaspa. Wakin runas parlanku nispa militares karkuchikunankutaj gobiernomanta golpeta ruaspa. Qanmanta umallikuspa golpe kanman chayqa sumajchu kanman kayta ñawirisp. (Ñawiriy kutichikunata tapujtiykikama).

JC1. Mana llank'anapaj kajtin.	[1] Sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[2] Mana sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[8] MY/MK
JC4. Ancha ch'ajwas kajtin	[1] Sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[2] Mana sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[8] MY/MK
JC10. Ancha suas kajtin.	[1] Sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[2] Mana sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[8] MY/MK
JC12. Anchata tukuyima walesqa kajtin.	[1] Sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[2] Mana sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[8] MY/MK
JC13. Anchata pierdechinku, suanku qolqeta.	[1] Sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[2] Mana sumajchu kanman militares poderpi kanankuta	[8] MY/MK

JC15. Qan ninkimanchu sumaj umayuj kananta gobierno ch'inyachinanpaj, wisk'anampaj congresota, manachus ni imarayku atinchu wisk'ayta congresota.

Ari atin[1] Ni imarayku[2] MY/MK[8]

JC16. Qan ninkimanchu sumaj umayuj kananta gobierno ch'inyachinanpaj, wisk'anampaj Corte Suprema Justiciamanta, manachus ni imarayku atinchu wisk'ayta Corte Justiciata.

Ari atin[1] Ni imarayku[2] MY/MK[8]

VIC1. Kunan wajmanta paslaspa. Juchachakukuna jayk'ajllapis pasajwatapi suasorqachu, t'ojsisorqachu maqasorqachu.

Ari [1] => *siqiy* Mana[2] => *Riy VIC20* MY/MK[8] => *Riy VIC20*

AOJ1. Kejanakorqankichu, willarqankichu policiaman

Ari [1] => *siqiy*

Mana[2] => *Riy VIC20*

MY/MK[8] => *Riy VIC20*

AOJIB. Imarayku mana willarqankichu policiaman. (*Ama ñawiriychu*)

- [1] Mana ni imata ruankuchu, qhasimanakaj
- [2] Manchichikunajina anchata atinku kutichiyta
- [3] Mana pruebas karkachu
- [4] Mana anchachu karqa
- [5] Mana yachanchu pimanchus atikun willayta

Kunanqa umallirikuy imatachus ñaupaj watapi ruarqanki kayta kutichinaykipaj.

VIC20. Mana aututa suaspi umallikuspa, pillapis suasorqachu kuchilluwan, escopetawan kay ñawpaj killaspi, mashkha kutita.

————— kutis

MY/MK[88]

VIC21. Wasiykiman suas yaykorqankuchu ñaupaj killaspi, mashkha kutita.

_____kuti

MY/MK[88]

VIC27. Ñaupaj killaspi mayqen policiallapis tratasorqachu, qhakaparisorqachu, maqasorqachu. Mashkha kutita.

_____kuti

MY/MK[88]

AOJ8. Sua kunata jap'inankupaj creenkichu leysta respetanankuta, asuan sumajchu kanman jinallata suasta jap'inakuta.

Respetanankupuni [1] Wakinkutis mana leyeswan[2] MY/MK[8]

AOJ11. Aylluykimanta parlaspam maypichus tiakunki atiwaychu pillapis atisunkimanchá suayta wañuchiya. Seguruchu kanki, as segurulla, mana ancha seguruchu, manchay mancharisqa

Seguruchu kanki [1] as segurulla [2] mana ancha seguruchu [3] manchay mancharisqa [4] MY/MK[8]

AOJ11A. Boliviamanta paslaspa, maykama niwaj suas junt'a junt'alla kasanchej chay chchikata miranku manchachinapaj jina, ñaupajman qhawaripa manchichikunkichu. (Ñawiriy)

Seguruchu kanki [1] as segurulla [2] mana ancha seguruchu [3] manchay mancharisqa [4] MY/MK[8]

AOJ12. Qanman suasunkuman chayqa qan confiankimanchu justicia jasut'inanta juchallikojkunaman. (Ñawiriy) Suyankimanchu

Seguruchu kanki [1] as segurulla [2] mana ancha seguruchu [3] manchay mancharisqa [4] MY/MK[8]

AOJ12A. Qanman suasunkuman chayqa qan confiankimanchu policia jasut'inanta, wisk'ananta juchallikojkunaman. (Ñawiriy) Suyankimanchu

Seguruchu kanki [1] as segurulla [2] mana ancha seguruchu [3] manchay mancharisqa [4] MY/MK[8]

AOJ18. Wakin runamasis ninku mana policiapi confianachu (suyanachu) paykuna suasta jark'akunku, wakintaj ninku policia sat'isqa, ujlla suaswan. Imata qan niwaj. (Ñawiriy)

Pociaqa runata qhawan[1] Poliaciaqa ujlla suaswan[2] Mana runata qhawanchu [3] MY/MK[8]

[QOY TAJETATA A]

Lloq'emanta pañaman kay raphipi tian ujmantam qanchiskama. Uj munan niyta ni ima qanchistaj ancha. Nisuman, qanman gustasunki televisionta qhawayta jina kajtin apuntankiman 7, mana gustasunkimanchu televisionta qhawayta churawaj ujta. Kunanqa qhawaripa mayqentaj khuskan kanman. Gustasunkichu televisionta qhawayta. Ñawiriy numerota (Qhawariy sumajta intindinanta)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ni ima				Ancha		

	Califique	MY/MK
B1. Maykama ininki justiciapi Bolivia llanjtanchejpi cheqanta kananta. (Tapuriy: Paychus inin justiciapi manachus inin, inin chaqa chijllay 7, manchus inin chijllay)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B2. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) instituciones politikasman.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B3. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) qhawanku cheqanta runaj derechosninta sistema politikupi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B4. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) kallpachakunki kawsaymanta sistema politiku boliviamanta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B6. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) atinki kallpachayta usunta politiku boliviamanta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B10A. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) usunta justiciamanta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B11. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Corte Electoral manta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B12. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Fuerzas Armadaspi.		
B13. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Congreso nacional manta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B14. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Gobierno nacional manta	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B18. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Policia nacional manta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B20. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Inlechia Catolikapi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) partidus politikuspi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21A. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Presidentepi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B31A. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Corte Suprema Justiciamanta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B32. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Gobierno Municipal manta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B43. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) kallpachakunki bolivianu kasqaykimanta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B17. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Defensor del Pueblo.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B33. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) prefectura Departmentalpi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B37. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) medios de comunicacionpi	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B40. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) llajtayoj oqharikoj t'ojpa	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B42. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Impuestospi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B50. Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) Tribunal Constitucionalpi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B47 Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) eleccionespi (chijllay, ajllay).	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BOLB22B [B22B] Maykama ininki (payman atinikuy jinalla) paqarichiy kamachej.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Churaspa kikin escalata....

	Califique	MY/MK
N1. Maykama niwaj Presidente Morales yanapan wajcha, usuri runasta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N3. Maykama niwaj Presidente Morales tanqan jamach'antaj riglas demokratikasta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N9. Maykama niwaj Presidente Morales jark'akun ama suanamkupaj gobiernopi sajra kayninta chinkachinchu.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N11. Maykama niwaj Presidente Morales qhawan runamasisman seguru purinankupaj.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N12. Maykama niwaj Presidente Morales llank'an llank'ana kanapaj tukuypaj, ama usunapaj.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Kunanqa ñawirisaj imatachus partidus politikus Boliviamanta ninku tapusajta imatachus chaywan umallikunkichij. Rillasanchejpuni ujmant qanchiskama maypichus 1 ch'usaj 7 ancha.

	Califique	MY/MK
EPP1. Umallikuspa partidus politikuspi maykama rikuchinku pikunatachus paykunapaj votanku.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP2. Maykama pierdechinku (suanku) partidus politikus.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP3. Partidus politikus uyarinkuchu runamasista qan jinata.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC1. Kunanga Congreso nacionalpi umallikuspa maykama Congreso mana saqenchi llank'ayta presidenteman.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC2. Diputados usuchinku t'awtispa tukuy imata.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC3. Dakusunkichu diputadus chinpachinakuta (pasachinankuta) leyesta ni piman yanapaspa.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC4. Maykama junt'achin ruanasninta imanaytachus qan suyawaj.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

KUTICHISUCHUN TARJETATA A

M1. Parlaspa kay Evoj Morales gobiernomanta, qanpaj sumajtachu ruananta ruasan, sumajtachu llank'asan... (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Manchay sumaj[1] Sumaj[2] Sumajlla[3] Mana sumajchu[4] Manapuni sumajchu[5]
MY/MK[8]

M2. Tukuy diputadusmanta parlaspa, mana dakuwanchejchu ima partidomantapis , qan niwajchu sumajta llank'asanku, ruasankuchu ruanankuta manchay sumajta, sumajta, sumajllata, mana sumajta, manapuni sumajtachu.

Manchay sumaj[1] Sumaj[2] Sumajlla[3] Mana sumajchu[4] Manapuni sumajchu[5]
MY/MK[8]

QOY TARJETATA B

Kunanqa rich'akoj tarjetata qosayki maypichus uj 1 “manapuni uynisqachu kani” qanchistaj 7 munan niyta uynisqa kani. Ajllanki khuskanmanta chayqa khuskanpi kanki. Ñaurisaj qantaj niriwanki maykamachus uynisqa kasanki manapunichus usnisqa kasanki.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS/NR [8]
Manapuni uynisqachu kani							Uynisqa kani

	Califique	MY/MK
Qhawarispa maypichus kuninkitan llajtanchej kasan, niriway tarjetata ñawirispa maykamachus uynisqa kanki manapuni uynisqachu kanki kayta uyarispa...		
POP101. Lljajtanchejta pataman apanapaj qolqechakunanpaj, Qhapajyananpaj, presidentesninchej ch'inyachinankuchu, ayphuchaynankuta ñiqenkunata (opositores). Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP102. Congreso mana saqejtin ruayta gobiernoman munaqanta, presidentesninchej gobernanku (llank'ananku) mana congresowan. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP103. Tribunal Constitucional mana saqejtin ruayta gobiernoman	1 2 3 4 5 6	8

munaqanta, presidentesnincej kamachinanku ch'inyachispa, mana kasuspa tribunalta. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	7	
POP106. Presidentes ayllu munayninta khatinanku, imaraykuchus ayllu munanpuni cheqantapuni purichinanta mana pantayniyojwan. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP107. Aylluchu payllamanta cheqanta atinchu kamachiyta, manataj ajllasqa representantesninpichu. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP109. Kunan kaypachapi jap'inakunsanku allinyanwan sajra yanwan (supay yan), runataj ajllanan mayqentataj kay iskaymanta munanman. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki jap'inakuspa allin kaywan sajra kaywan, mayqenta ajllanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP110. Ayllu nijtin imachus sumaj mana saqanachu pisi kajkuna mana saqenankuta (niqanankuta). Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP112. Pikunachus mana saqewanchejchu oqharikuyta wiñaspa ayllu jina oligarkia jat'alliwan. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

POP113. Chaykuna manakajkuna tukuywan atinkuchu manchachiyta llajtanchejta. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF1. Kamachijkunaman dakunchu imatachus umallikun runas qanjina, noqajina. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF2. Inini sumajta yachasqayta umallikusqaymanjina imachus aswan sumaj llajtanchejpaj kay politikapi. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ING4. Atinkayta kay democracia mana ancha sumajchu, chayraykutaj aswan sumaj wajlaya gobiernomanta. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
PN2. Ichapis mana tukuy kikinchi kanchej bolivianus ukhu manchay sumaj kanchej, uj songolla kanchej. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
DM23. Maykama atinkayta democracia mana partidus politikuswan. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
Kunanga tapurisqayqi imatachus estado ruanan tian. Kikinllataj 1 – 7kama.		
ROS1. Aswan sumajtachu Estadu boliviano apaykachanman tukuy kay empresasta, industriasta llajtanchejmanta jap'ikapunantataj, aswan sumajtachu pejpatachus chay empresas karqa apayqachanqa. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ROS2. Astawan runasmantachu Estadu bolivianuchu yupaychanan tian qhawarinantaj tian runamasis sumajta kawsanakupaj. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ROS3. Astawan runasmansismanta Estadu bolivianu mask'anan kanman llank'ana kananpaj tukuyupaj. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ROS4. Astawan Estadu bolivianu qhawanantaj tian imaynatachus tukuyupaj kikin kananpaj, mana wakin qhapaj kanankupaj wakintaj usunankupaj. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

PN4. Tukuy imamanta parlaspa qan niwaj Ancha kusionqa, kusionqalla, mana kusionqachu, manapuni kusionqachu imaynatachus democracia kay Bolivia suyunchejpi purin.

Ancha kusionqa[1] Kusionqalla[2] Mana kusionqachu[3] Manapuni kusionqachu[4] MY/MK[8]

PN5. Opinonniyki Bolivia suyunchej ancha demokratikuchu, demokratikullachu, pisi demockratikuchu, manapuni demokratikuchu.

ancho demokratikuchu [1]demokratikullachu, [2] pisi demockratikuchu [3]manapuni demokratikuchu [4] MY/MK[8]

[KUNAN WAJ TARJETATA C]

Kay mosoj tarjeta rin 1 – 10kama rikuchispa manpuni uynisqachu kani chay ujkaj chunkataj niska sinchi uynisqa kani. Nawirisqayki ruanasta wakin runamasis atinku ruayta chayanankupa metasninman obejtivus politikusuninman ima, munayman niwanaykita sinchitachus uynisqa kanki mana uynisqachu kanki runamasis kayta ruanankuta.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Manapuni uynisqachu kani							Sinchi uynisqa kani			MY/MK

	Califique	MY/MK
E5. Runakuna jatun tantakuyma renankuta (ch'ajwas). Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E8. Runakuna rinankuta qotuchakusman ayllumantan parlanankupaj. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

E11. Runakuna llank'ankuta jatun tantakuyman politikusmanta renankuta. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E15. Runakuna chakatanankuta yankunata. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E14. Runakuna qechunankuta, jallp'a salteas kanankuta, runaj jallpasninman waykunankupaj. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E2. Fabrikasta, oficinasta, wasista, qechunankuta, jap'ikapunankuta. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

E3. Runakuna qotuchakunankupaj urmachinankupaj sonqo tiachikuspa ajllasqa gobiernota. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E16. Runakuna makisninwan justiciata ruanakuta Estadu mana chupachijtin juchallikojkunata. Maykama uynisqa kanki manapunitaj uynisqachu kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
Qhepa tapuykunaj munaykuman yachayta tukuylaya umallikuykunata Bolivia runamasismanta. Churay chunka puntusta.		
D1. Wakin runas mana sumajtachu parlallankupuni imaynatachus kamachinku boliviapi, mana ujallatachu sinoqa tukuy laya gobiernosqa. Imayna sinchitataj uynisqa kanki manapuni uynisqachu kanki. Votanankupaj derechosninta. Ñawirway numerota escalapi (maykama chayan)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D2. Imayna sinchitataj uynisqa kanki manapuni uynisqachu kanki runamasis atinku tantakuyta qhasiqhespi, rikuchinankupaj mana kusisgas kasqankuta. Ñawiriy numerota.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D3. Umallikuspapuni runas mana sumajtachu parlallankupuni imaynatachus kamachinku boliviapi. Imayna sinchitataj uynisqa kanki manapuni uynisqachu kanki, kay parlajkuna tukunankuta gobiernowan llank'aspa.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D4. Imayna sinchitataj uynisqa kanki manapuni uynisqachu kanki kay runas televisionpi parlawananchejta.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D5. Kunanqa wajmanta parlaspa, q'ewasmanta, qharimachusmanta parlarispa. Imayna sinchitataj uynisqa kanki manachu uynisqa kanki kay laya runas kanakuta gobiernopi.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

[KUTICHIKUY TARJETATA C]

Wajmanta parlaspa.....

DEM2. Mayqen palabraswantaj astawan uynisqa kanki[ñawiri tukuytu]

[1] Qanjina runata kikillantaj rijch'an uj demokratiku gobiernu wajmanta mana demokratikumanta.

[2] Democracia aswan sumaj waj gobiernumanta.

[3] Wakin kutis aswan sumaj uj gobiernu militar waj gobiernu demokratikuman.

DEM11. Ininkichu kay llajtanchejpi kosa kanman sinchi makiyoj kamachij, ichapis tukuy ima wallejlla llojsiman tukuy yanapajtinchej.

Sinchi maki[1] Tukuy yanapaspa[2]

MY/MK[8]

AUT1. Wakin runas ninku sumaj kanman kananta kallpayoj mallkuta nitaj kananta votowan ajllasqa. Wakintaj nin pipajchus votanchej chaypuni aswan wallej. Imata qan ninki chaymanta (ñawiry tukuyta).

Nicisitanchej kallpayoj mallkuta mana ajllasqata[1] Aswan sumaj votowan ajllasqa[2] MY/MK[8]

AUT2. Mayqentaj kay nisqamanta aswan walej kanman qanpaj. (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

MY/MK[8]

Ayllumasijina astawan tapunanchej yachananchejpaj mallkusmanta[1]

Ayllumansijina astawan rikuchinanchej, respetananchej autoridadesta mallkupata[2]

PP1. Eleccionespi, jayk'ajllapis uma wakin runas umata muyuchinku votanankupaj uj partidupaj kandidatupaj ima. Mashkha kutitata qan umas ninta muyuchirqanki wajpaj votanankupa. (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Sapakuti[1] Wakin kutis [2] Mana anchatachu [3] Ni jayk'ay[4] MY/MK[8]

PP2. Wakin runas llank'ayku, yanapanku uj partiduman eleccionespi. Llank'arqankichu maqen partidullapajpis 2005 elecciones presidencialespi.

Ari llank'arqani[1] Mana llank'arqanichu[2] MY/MK[8]

Kunanqa munayman nirinawaykita imatachus, nisayki runata pierdechinchus manachus, (1) runata pierdechi jasutinkunan tian, (2) pierdechi atintaj yanapayta wakinman, (3) mana pierdechinchu.

DC10. Uj mamajpata ashkha wawasniyoj uj certificaduta orqhonon ujpaj. Ama suyanampaj, empleaduman jaywan 40 bolivianusta empleaduman. Imaynata iniwaj kay warmi ruasqanta. (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Runata pierdechin paytataj jasutinanku[1] Runata pierdechi atintaj kayta[2] Mana pierdechinchu [3] MY/MK [8]

DC13. Runa mana llank'ayniyu, nitaj llank'anataj tariyta atinchu ayllu masintaj sumaj politiku paytaj qon llank'anapaj gobiernopi. Kay politiko ruasqan sumajchu... (Ñawiriy tukuyta)

Runata pierdechin paytataj jasutinanku[1] Runata pierdechi atintaj kayta[2] Mana pierdechinchu [3] MY/MK [8]

Kunanqa kawsayniykimanta munaykuman parlayta...	INAI Mana atergachu	Mana	Ari	MY/MK
EXC2. Maqen policiallapis qolqeta, t'inkata mañasorqachu pasaj watapi.	9	0	1	8
EXC6. Uj empleado publico qoqeta, tinkata mañasorqachu pasaj watapi.	9	0	1	8
EXC11. Ima tramitetallapis alcaldiaipi ruarqankichu pasaj watapi. <i>Mana → Churay 9</i> <i>Ari → Tapuy:</i>	9	0	1	8
Tramite ruanaykipaj alcaldiaipi uj permisuta nispa pasaj watapi, astawan qolqeta mañasorqankuchu kasqanmanta.				
EXC13. Llank'ankichu <i>Mana → Churay 9</i> <i>Ari → Tapuy:</i>	9	0	1	8
Llank'anaykipi jayk'ajllapis qolqeta tink'ata mañasorqankuchu pasaj watapi.				
EXC14. Pasaj watapi imallatapis jusgaduspi ruarqankichu. <i>Mana → Churay 9</i> <i>Ari → Tapuy:</i>	9	0	1	8
Jusgaduspi qolqeta tink'ata mañasorqankuchu pasaj watapi, qorqankichu.				
EXC15. Rerqankichu hospitalman doctoreswan qhawachikunaykipaj pasaj watapi. <i>Mana → Churay 9</i> <i>Ari → Tapuy:</i>	9	0	1	8
Qhawachikunaykipaj hospitalpi pasaj watapi qolqeta tink'ata mañasorqankuchu pasaj watapi, qorqankichu				
EXC16. Pasaj watapi wawayki escuelapichu colegiopichu karqa. <i>Mana → Churay 9</i> <i>Ari → Tapuy:</i>	9	0	1	8
Pasaj watapi escuelapi colegiopi qolqeta tink'ata mañasorqankuchu, qorqankichu.				
EXC17. Pillapis t'inkata manasorqachu mana lusta k'utunakupaj.	9	0	1	8
EXC18. Tukuy imata qhawarispa rijch'asunkimanchu wakin kutis yanapan qonanchejta t'inkata, qolqeta.	9	0	1	8

EXC7. Qanllamanta yachaspa runajparlasqanmanjina funcionarios publicos ancha pierdesqachu kasanku.

Tukuy[1] Tukuylla [2] Pisilla [3] Manapuni tukuychu[4] MY/MK[8]

Kunanqa munaykuman yachayta mashkhatachus yachanku runamasis politikamanta llaytanchejmanta runamasisman willanku.

G11. Imataj sutin Estados Unidos presidentenpata (*Ama ñawirichu: George Bush*).

Kosa[1] Mana kosachu[2] Mana yachanchu[8] Mana kutichinchu [9]

BOLG12. Imataj sutin Cancillerninchekepata (*Ama ñawirichu: David Choquehuanca*).

Kosa[1] Mana kosachu[2] Mana yachanchu[8] Mana kutichinchu [9]

G13. Mashkha departamentosniyoj Bolivia llajtanchej (*Ama ñawirichu: 9*)

Kosa[1] Mana kosachu[2] Mana yachanchu[8] Mana kutichinchu [9]

G14. Mashkha unaytataj uj presidente Boliviamanta llank'anan tian (*Ama ñawirichu: 5 wata*).

Kosa[1] Mana kosachu[2] Mana yachanchu[8] Mana kutichinchu [9]

G15. Imataj sutin Rasilpaj presidentenpataj. (*Ama ñawirichu: Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, kikillantaj Lula*)

Kosa[1] Mana kosachu[2] Mana yachanchu[8] Mana kutichinchu [9]

VB1. Apuntachisqachu kanki votanapaj.

Ari[1] Mana[2] [3] MY/MK[8]

VB2. Votarqanqichu pasaj eleccinespi 2005.

Ari votarqani[1] =>Rillay Mana votarqanichu [2] =>Ry VB50[3] MY/MK[8] =>Ry VB50

VB3. Pipaj votarqanki Presidentepaj pasaj eleccionespi 2005 (*Ama ñawirichu*)

Ni mayqenpaj/ yurajpi[00] **FREPAB** Eliseo Rodriguez [1001] **MAS** Evo Morales [1002]
MIP Felipe Quispe [1003] **MNR** Michiaki Nagatani [1004] **NFR** Guido Angulo [1005]

PODEMOS Jorge Quiroga [1006] **UN** Samuel Doria Medina [1007] **USTB** Néstor García [1008]
 Waj_____ [77] MY/MK[88] Inap Mana votancho [99]

VB50. Karischu aswan sumaj mallkus kanku warmismanta.

Uynisqa kani[1] Uynisqaya knai[2] Mana uynisqachu kani[3] Manapuni uynisqachu[4] MY/MK[8]

VB10. Kunitan, piman sonqoyki aysasunki, ima partidunam.

Ari[1] =>(Riy) Mana [2] =>(Riy *POLI*) MY/MK[8] =>(Riy *POLI*)

VB11. Mayqen partidutaj gustasunki (*sonqoyki aysasunki*).

MAS Evo Morales [1002] MIP Felipe Quispe [1003] 00] MNR [1004] NFR [1005]
 PODEMOS Jorge Quiroga [1006] UN Samuel Doria Medina [1007]
 Waj_____ [1077]
 MY/MK[88] =>Riy *G11* INAP [99] =>Riy *G11*

VB12. Qan niwaj sonqoyki aysakun chay partidupaj.... (*partidu nisqanta VB11*) **mana anchachu, anchalla, nitaj anchachu nitaj pisichu, ancha, anchapuni.**

Mana anchachu[1] Anchalla[2] Nitaj anchachu Nitaj pisichu [3] Ancha [4] Anchapuni [5] MY/MK[8] INAP [9]

POL1. Mashkhatataj gustasunki kay politika: anchata, pisillata, pisi, mana dakuwanchu.

Anchata[1] pisillata[2] Pisi[3] Mana dakuwanchu[4] MY/MK[8]

POL2. Mashkha kutita masisniykiwan politikamanta parlanki (*Nawiriy*).

Sapa p'unchay[1] Uj chhikata semanapai[2] Wakin kutista killapi[3] May chaylla[4] Ni jayk'aj[5]
MY/MK[8]

**Kunanka wajmanta parlaspa. Jayk'ajllapis pisipi qhawasorqankuchu manataj sumajta
parlapayasorqankuchu imajtinchus mana sumaj p'achallisqa kasqaykirayku nitaj sumajta parlankichu kay
lugarespi.**

DIS2. Gobiernoj oficinaspi (*jusgaduspi, ministeriospi, alcaldiaspi*).

Ari[1] Mana [2] MY/MK[8]

DIS4. Gotuspi raymispi

Ari[1] Mana [2] MY/MK[8]

DIS5. Kallispi lazapi, recowapi.

Ari[1] Mana [2] MY/MK[8]

VP20. (Tukuan tapuy). Kay domingo elecciones presidenciales kankuman chayqa mayqenpaj votawaj (Ama ñawirichu)

MY/MK[8]

[1] Mana votaymanchu

[2] Votayman kikin partidupaj presidentejpataj.

[3] Votayman waj candidatuspaj waj partiduspaj ima.

[4] Ni mayqempaj (yurajpi, ch'usaj)

Partidu/Candidatu _____

VP21. Imaynatata qan atiwaj yanapayta mana ñawpajina kananpaj, wajlaya kanampaj. (Ñanwiriyo)

MY/MK[8]

[1] Votana chijllanapa jamach'aj kunapaj yachankutaj ka'llpachakuytataj llanuchaytataj.

[2] Ch'ajwasman riyta chantataj sapankuanta cambiasta mañayka

[3] Wajlayata umata sat'ispa

[4] Mana umata atinchejchu sat'iyta tukuyima wajlaya kananpaj, kikillantaj imatachus ruanchej.

(Ama ñawirichu: D)

LS6. Umallirikuy wicharinata sapa wicharinapi numerososnoij ceromanta chunkakama maypichus 0 aswan urapi chunkataj aswan patapi. Nisuman chayqa aswan patapi kaj munan niyta aswan sumaj kawsayniyki kanman, urakajtaj aswan millay kawsay kanman qanpaj.... Patakaj chunka urakaj 0, mayqen wicharinapi kunitan qan kanki. (UJLLATAKUTICHINANKU/SONQONMANTAPACHA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	
Millay Kausay										Manchay sumaj kausan		MY/MK

[QOCHIKUY TARJETATA D]

Kusisqachu llankisqachu kasanki kay llajtapi "ayllupi" kausakuspa ... (Ujtawan niy kuisisqa, mana kuisisqachu tapuytawan).	Kuisisqa	Mana kuisisqachu	MY/MK Mana usanchu
SD1. Transporte publiku	1	2	8
SD2. Yankuna	1	2	8
SD3. Yachay huasis, escuelataj	1	2	8
SD4. Llinphu wayra	1	2	8
SD5. Llimphu yaku	1	2	8
SD6. Kanchu hospitales, medikus, postas, sumaj	1	2	8
SD7. Sumaj huasis kanchu atikunchu perqachiyta mana ancha qolqeyoj wan	1	2	8
SD8. Manchay k'achituchu aylluyki	1	2	8
SD9. Anchata autus puriykachankuchu	1	2	8
SD10. Kanchu yankunapi chakipi runa purinanpa	1	2	8
SD11. Kanchu parkes, lazay y q'omerakuna	1	2	8

SD12. Piluta jayt'ana kanchas	1	2	8
-------------------------------	---	---	---

LS4. Qhawarispa parlasqanchejmanta kay llajtamanta, qan niriwaj manchay kusionqachu mana kusionqachu llajtaykiwan kanki.

Kusionqachu[1] Mana Kusionqachu[2] MY/MK[8]

Bolivia llajtanchejpi tukuytaya runas kawsanchej chayrayku noqanchej yachananchej ima aylluyujchu kanchej, nisunman noqa kayman boliviano chantataj kikillantataj kani paceño (chukuta) cambia. Kaypitaj uj 1 munan niyta ni ima qanchistaj munan niyta “ancha”.

[QOY TARJETATA A]	Escala		MY/MK
	Ni ima	Ancha	
ETID1 [BETID1]. Maykama boliviano kanki.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
<i>Tapuj: Ujnin tapuykunapaj qhawari ima departamentopichus ruasanki tapuykunata.</i>			
ETID3 [BETID2]. Maykama kanki.. (paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuquisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
BOLETID3 [BETID3]. Aymaranchu kanki	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
BOLETID4 [BETID4]. Qheshwachu kanki	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
BOLETID5 [BETID5]. Cambachu kanki	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
BOLETID6 [BETID6]. Wakin willaykuna (periodistas) parlajtinku Santa Cruzmanta, Wenimanta, Pandumanta, Chuquisakamanta, Tarijamanta nispa “región de la Media Luna”. Uyllarinkichu kay jinata parlayta. Tapuj: mana nijtin churay 9, ritaj qhepanman. Maqenwan kan atikunkinman “Media Lunaman”.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		[9] 8

BOLCA5. Ininkichu mosoj Constitucion Politica del Estado yanapawasunmanchu manaña problemas kanankupa, kikin mosoj constitucionwanpis kikillantataj kanqa.

Problemas tukukonqanku[1] Kikin kanqa [2] MY/MK[8]

BOLANM1. Ininkichu autonomias departamentales yanapawasunchej ichapis astawan problemas kanqankun.

Sumaj kanqankun[1] Aswan kanqankun[2] MY/MK[8]

BOLANM2. Qanpaj autonomias departamentales munan niyta: 1) manaña La Pazman atinikusunchejchu, 2) atinchej ruayta imachu sumaj sapa departamentopaj, 3) Bolivia raq'ikaponqa. (Ñawiri)

MY/MK[8]

[1] Kikinyanta alcaldias jina purinanchej tian libre kayta, qolqenchejta qhawananchejpaj.

[2] Sapa departamento leyesninta qhawanka sapankumantataj dicidenqankun.

[3] Bolivia raq'ikaponqa.

BOLANM3. Qanpaj recursos naturalesninchej (petroleo, qhoya, jallp'as, monte) gobiernochu La Pazpi qhawana sapa prefecturamantallachu.

MY/MK[8]

[1] Prefecturas qhawanqanku wakin recursos naturalesla

[2] Q'alitun recursos naturaleskan gobierno centralla atin qhawayta.

BOLANM4. Imp'uestosqa gobierno centrallachu atin churayta aswan impuestosta prefecturaschu atinku churayllaytataj ima.

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Prefecturas atinku churayta impuestosta
- [2] Impuestosta gobierno centralla churanan

BOLANM5. Qhawasqayki jina autnomias indigenas wallejchu kanman Bolivia llajtanchejpaj, astawanchus jap'inaku kanqa.

- [1] Sumaj kanqa Astawan jap'inaku kanqa [2] MY/MK[8]

BOLCA8. Ninki manchu kunankaman Asamblea Constituyente llank'asqan sumajchu kasqa astawanchus jap'inakuta Boliviapi tian.

- Sumajchu karqa[1] Astawan jap'inaku[2] MY/MK[8]

BOLCA9. Q'ayapacha votacion referendupaj kanman mosoj Constitucionpaj Asamblea Constituentemanta, qan votawaj ARI – MANA

- Ari[1] Mana[2] MY/MK[8]

BOLCA10. Qhawarispá jina qan niwajchu Asamblea Constituentemanta, runakunaman tapunaku tian ujtawanchus presidente atinman kayta presidente ujtawan (referendum), manachus sumaj runakuna parlanankuta wajmanta.

Sumaj referendum wakín temaspa[1] Mana ruakunanchu astawan tapuykuna (consultas[2]
MY/MK[8]

NEWTOL7. Mayqen nisqamanta aswan sumaj rijch'asunki (ñawiri): Imapis kachu Bolivia llajtanchej ujlla kanan... Ancha karunchasqa llajtanchej khuskanchakunan tian.

Ujlla kanan[1] Khuskanchakunan tian[2] MY/MK[8]

NEWTOL9. Aswan sumaj kanman uj usulla kananta Boliviapi tukuypaj ichapis sapa runajpata usunta qhawachu.

Uj usulla[1] Ashka usus[2] MY/MK[8]

BOLAUT11. Gobierno ch'inyachinanchu willakunaman paypij contranpi parlajkunaman, gobiernochus saqenan sapankumanta willakunata willanankuta.

Gobierno ch'inyachinan[1] Gobierno ni jayk'aj ch'inyachinanchu[2] MY/MK[8]

Tukunapaj tapurisqayki.....

ED. Imawatakama rerqanki esculaman (educación, escuela) .

_____Wata (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ watas (usar tabla para código)

Ni magen	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16		
MY/MK	88					

Q3. Maqentaj religioniyki (ama ñawirichu)

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Católica
- [2] Protestante tradicional, protestante no evangélico (adventista, bautista, calvinista, ejército de Salvación, luterano, metodista, nazareno, presbiteriano).
- [3] Judíos, musulmanes, budistas, hinduistas, taoístas
- [5] Evangélico y pentecostal, pentecostas, carismático no caloticlo, luz del mundo
- [6] Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día
- [7] Candomble, Vudu, Rstafarian
- [4] Ni mayqen

Q5A. Nashkha kutita rinki ingleshiaman (cultuman) (Ñawiri)

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Ashkha kutita semanapi
- [2] Ujta semanapi
- [3] Ujta killapi
- [4] Ujta iskayta watapi
- [5] Ni jayk'aj

[QOY TARJETATA E]

Q10. Mashkha qolqeta sapakilla jap'inkichej wasiykipi q'alituykichejmanta chantataj mashkha qolqetaj apachimusunkichi waj llasmanta. (Mana yachajfin tapuy mashkha qolqeta wasinpin sapa killa tian)

Mana kanchu[00]	Pisi 250 Bs [01]	251-500 Bs [02]	500-800 Bs [03]
801-1.200 Bs [04]	1.201-2.000 Bs [05]	2.001-3000 Bs [06]	3001-
5.000 Bs [07]			
5.001-10.000 Bs [08]	10.001-20.000 Bs [09]	Astawan 20.000 Bs [10]	
MY/MK[88]			

[QOSUCHUN TARJETATA E]

Q10A. Qampis pillapis wasikipi kawsajkuna qolqeta apachimusunkichejchu waj llajtasmenta.

Ari[1] Mana[2]>Riy Q10c MY/MK[8] >Riy Q10c

Q10A1. Qolqeta apachimullanku chayqa => Imapi gastanki qolqeta apachimususqankuta. (Ama ñawirichu)

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Mikhunapaj, p'achapaj
- [2] Wasipaj
- [3] Yachanankupaj
- [4] Ayllupaj (escuelaspa igleshiapaj, raymipaj)
- [5] Medikuspaj
- [6] Jallch'anapaj
- [7] Wajpaj

Q10B. Qolqeta apachimusunku chayqa => Chay qolqellawanchu kawsankichij.

[1] Anchata [2] Pisillata [3] Pisita [4] Ni imata MY/MK [8] [9] Inap

Q10C. Tupuy tukuyman => Qankunajpata tiapusunkichejchu yawar masisniyki ñawpaj khuska tiakorqanku qankunawan kunantaj tiankunku karu llajtapi. Ari nijtin tapuy maypichus => tiakunku (ama ñawiriyichu)

Ari Estadus Unidusllapi[1] Ari Estadus Uniduspi waj llajtaspi ima[2] ari wajllajtaspi mana Estadus Uniduspichu[3]
 Mana => (Riy Q14)[4] MY/MK [8] =>Riy Q14

Q16. Ari nijtinkulla Q10C =>Mashkha kutita paykunawan parlanki.

Sapa p'unchay[1] Ujta iskayta semanapi[2] Ujta iskayta killapi[3] Wakin kutis[4] Ni jayk'aj[5] MY/MK [8] INAP[9]

Q14. Tapuy tukuyma => Qhepan kinsa watapi munawajchu ripuyta llank'aj waj llajtaman.

Ari[1] Mana[2] MY/MK [8]

Q10D. Tapuy tukuyma =>Q'ala qolqe jap'isqaykichej: (Ñawiri)

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Alcansanchu, atinkichejchu waqaychayta.
- [2] Alcansallanchu mana usunkuchejchu
- [3] Mana alcansanchu, pisita usuyku
- [4] Manapuni alcansanchu, usuyku

Q11. Estado civil (Ama ñawiriyichu)

Solterochu[1] Casaduchu[2] Tantachu[3] Divorciaduchu[4] T'aqansqa[5] Viuduchu[6]
 MY/MK[8]

Q12. Wawasniyojchu kanki. Mashkha _____ [00=Ni uj =>riy ETID] MY/MK[88]

Q12A. Wawasniyoj chayqa => Mashkha qanwan khuska kawsanku. _____00= ni uj. INAP/mana wawasniyojchu [99]

ETID. Qanmanta niwajchu yuraj kasqaykita, mestiza,indigena (originaria), yana (Afro boliviana), mulata, waj.

Yuraj[1] Mestiza[2] Indijena[3] Yana[4] Mulata[5] Waj[7] MY/MK[8]

ETID2. (*Censo*) **Qanmanta niwajchu kasqaykita** (*Ñawiri tukuyta*)

Qeshwa[1] Aymara[2] Guarani[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Waj[6] Ni mayqen[7] Wajkunan _____ [sut'ita churay]

BOLETIDA. Mamaykipi umallikuspa mamaykita qhawaspa pay yurajchu, mestisachu, indijenachu, yanachu, mulatachu.

Yuraj[1] Mestiza[2] Indijena[3] Yana[4] Mulata[5] Waj[7] MY/MK[8]

LENG1. Imata parlanki, wawamanta wasiykipi imapi parlaj kanki. (*Chijllay ujta*)

Kastellanu[1001] Queshwa[1002]Aymara[1003]Guarani[1004]Waj[1005]Waj karu llajtanta[1006]
MY/MK[8]

BOLLENG1A. Wasikipi wajta parlajchukanki wawakaspa mayqenta. (*Chijllay ujta*)

Kastellanu[1] Queshwa[2] Aymara[3] Guarani[4] Waj[5] Waj karu llajtanta[6]
MY/MK[8]

LENG4. Imapi tatasniyki parlanku, parlaj karqanku.... (*Chijllay ujta*): (*Tapuj: tatasnin parlajtinku iskay idiomasp* (*Kastellanu-Queshwa*) *churay iskayta*)

Kastellanullata[1] Kastellanuta wajwan [2] Solo idioma nativo[3] Kastellanu Waj karu llajtanta[4]
MY/MK[8]

WWW1. Wajmanta parlaspa. Internetman yachankichu yaykuyta (*Ñawiri*)

Sapa p'unjay[1] Ujta semanapi[2] Ujta killapi[3] Wakin kutis[4] Ni jayk'aj[5] MY/MK[8]

Tujunapaj, wasiykipi kanchu: (*ñawiri ujta*)

R1. Televisor	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R3. Refrigeradora	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R4. Telefono	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R4A. Telefono celular	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R5. Autu. Mashkha	[0] Mana	[1] uj [2]iskay [3] kinza astawan
R6. Lavadora	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R7. Microondas	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R8. Motocicleta	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R12. Pila yaku wasiykipi	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R14. Baño wasiki ujupi kanchu	[0] Mana	[1] Ari
R15. Computadora	[0] Mana	[1] Ari

OCUP4A. Imapi llank'anki. (*Ñawiri*)

MY/MK[8]

- [1] Llank'aspa (Rillaypuni)
- [2] Manachu llank'asanki (Rillaypuni)
- [3] Mask'asankichu llank'anata (Riy MIG1/Tukuy)
- [4] Yachakojchu kanki (Riy MIG1/Tukuy)
- [5] Wasillapichu kakunki (Riy MIG1/Tukuy)
- [6] Jubilaskachu, Pensionaduchu, incapasituduchu, llank'anapaj kanki (Riy MIG1/Tukuy)
- [7] Mana llank'anichu nitaj mask'asanichu (Riy MIG1/Tukuy)

OCUP1. Imapi llank'anki (*Ama mawirichu*)

MY/MK[88] INAP[99]

- [1] Profesional, intelectual y científico (qhelqeri, yachachej, midiku, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
- [2] Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, superior)
- [3] Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, yachachej primariamanta secundariamanta, artista, deportista, etc.)
- [4] Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
- [5] Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública).
- [6] Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)

- [7] Comerciante (vendedores ambulantes, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado (qhatu), etc.)
- [8] Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados.
- [9] Empleado fuera de oficina en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)
- [10] Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (jallp'ayojkuna)
- [11] Peon agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
- [12] Artesano
- [13] Servicio doméstico
- [14] Obrero
- [15] Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)

OCUPIA. Imata ruanki: (Ñawiriy)

- [1] Gobiernopa llank'ani
- [2] Empresa privadapi
- [3] Empresasniyoj kani
- [4] Noqallamanta llank'ani
- [5] Llank'ani nitaj qolqeyojchu kani
- [8] MY/MK
- [9] INAP

OCUPI2A. Mashkha urata llank'anki semanapi.

(Churay orasta) MY/MK[88] INAP[99]

OCUPI2. Munawajchu yank'aita astawan, kikinta aswan pisitachu.

Pisita[1] Kikinta[2] Astawan[3] MY/MK[88] INAP[99]

OCUPI3C. Tiapusunkichu seguro de salud (Caja) seguro social (AFP) maypichus llank'anki.

Ari[1] Mana[2] MY/MK[88] INAP[99]

Kunanqa munaykuman tapurisuyta diciembrepí 2006pi imaynata llank'aj kanki.

OCUPI27. Chay fechapí kikin llank'anayojchu karqanki.

- [1] Ari (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [2] Mana (*Riy*)
- [8] MY/MK (*Riy*) INAP[9]

OCUPI28. Chay fechapí kan karqanki (Ñawiriy).

- [1] Mana llank'anayoj (*Riy*)
- [2] Llank'anayoj (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [3] Yachakuspa (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [4] Wasi ruwanapi (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [5] Waj (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [8] MY/MK (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*) INAP[9]

OCUPI29. Imarayku mana llank'anayuj chay fechapí karqanki (Ama ñawiriychu)

- [1] Qanmanta saqerparinki (*Riy OCUP31*)
- [2] Tukurparipun chaykamalla karqa (*Riy OCUP31*)
- [3] Recienlla llank'anata qallarínaj mask'asarqani (*Riy OCUP31*)
- [4] Wiskakorqa empresa (*Riy*)
- [5] Kachapuwanku (*Riy*)
- [8] MY/MK (*Riy OCUP31*) INAP[9]

OCUPI30. Arregloykita qopusorqankuchu.

- [1] Ari (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [2] Mana (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)
- [8] MY/MK (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*) INAP[9]

OCUP31. Chay fechapi mask'asarqankichu llank'anata.

[1] Ari (*Riy*)

[2] Mana (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)

[8] MY/MK (*Riy MIGI/TUKUNA*)

INAP[9]

OCUP31A. Chay fechapi mashkha unayña mask'asarqanki llank'anata.

[1] Killamanta pisi

[2] Ujkillamanta kinsa killaman

[3] Kinsa killamanta sojta killaman

[4] Astawan sojta killamanta

[8] MY/MK

INAP[9]

MIG1. Wawa kasaspa maypitaj astawan tiakorqanki. Campupi, ranchupi, llajtapi.

Campupi[1]

Ranchupi[2]

Llajtapi[3]

MY/MK[8]

MIG2. 5 wata ñawpajta maypi tiakoj kanki (*Ñawiri*)

Kay kikin municipio[1]

Waj municipio[2]

Waj llajtapi[3]

MY/MK[8]

Ima urata tukukun entrevista _____: _____

T1. Mashkha unayta (*minutos ver página 1*) _____

Kay kamalla chayani kay tapuykunawan pachillikuyki yanapawasqaykimanta. Juro kikin personawan kay entrevista ruakorqa.

Firma del entrevistador _____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios: _____

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

LA CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA BOLIVIA, 2008
[VERSIÓN EN AYMARA]

Estratopri: La Paz [1001] Santa Cruz [1002] Cochabamba [1003] Oruro [1004] Chuquisaca [1005] Potosi [1006] Pando [1007] Tarija [1008] Beni [1009]

Localidad _____ **Dirección** _____

UPM: _____ **Distrito** _____ **Zona** _____ **Manzano** _____ **Vivienda** _____ **USM/Cluster** _____

UR: Patunka waranga jila[1] paya ukhamaraki patunka waranga [2] phisqa patakak ukat waranga llatunka pataka llatuntunka llatunkani[3] phisqa patakak jukhuqaña [4]

Idioma del Cuestionario [IDIOMAQ]: Castellano[1] Quechua[2] Aymara[3] **Hora de Inicio** _____ : _____ **Fecha** ____/____/2008

UÑXATAMA: AKAX MA REQUISITO ULLARAÑA PUNIWA AKA LAPHIX JAYSAÑATAKI JANIRA QALLTKASA

GENERO [Q1] Chacha [1] warmi [2] **Q2. ¿Qawqha maranaka phuqatasa** _____ mara [0=NS/NR]

A4[COA4] Qalltañataki, amuyt' awimana, kuna jan walt' awina kansa jikxatusi markasaxa? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SOLO UNA OPCION]			A4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Umaw jan utjkiti	19	Inflación jita chaninaka			02
Thakhinakax janiw askikiti	18	Politikunaka			59
Conflicto armado	30	Gobiernos janiw			15
Sallqa qawinaka	13	K'uma samanata			10
Crédito janiw utjkite	09	Migración			16
Lunthasiñanaka jwayaña	05	Narcotráfico			12
Phiskasiñanaka derechos humanos	56	Pandillas			14
Janiw utjkiti irnaqawex	03	pisinjakawi			04
Janiw kikipakiti	58	Markachirin sartasitapa[manq' at mutuña, thakhi jist' antawi, sayt' a winaka			06
Janiw k'umar jakawixa utjkiti	23	K'umar jakawixa(falta de servicio)			22
Munas jan munasaw sarxata	32	Secuestro			31
Manutanwa anqa markanakaru	26	Seguridad			27
Jisk' achawi	25	Terrorismo			33
Drogadicción	11	Janiw usaqix utjiti yapuchaña taki			07
Qullqituqinxax jan walt' awiw utji	01	Jan walt' awina kaw transporte ukan utji			60
Educunax janiw askikiti	21	phiskasiña			57
Luza qhanax janiw utjkiti	24	Uta			55
Explosión demografica	20	Yaqa			70
Ch'axwañawa terrorismo tuqi	17	NS/NR			88

ENCUESTADOR: Anote la respuesta aquí y codifique cuando la entrevista termine

DEM13. ¿Juk'a arunakana kunas jumataki democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Aceptar hasta dos respuestas]		
	Nayrir jaysawi DEM13A	Payir jaysawi DEM13B
Janiw Kunatas amuyaskiti	0	
Qhispiyaña		
Qullqi tuqinxa libritanwa	1	1
Arsusiñanxa janiw jark'ataktanti	2	2
Unxtasiñanakanxa janiw jark'ataktanti	3	3
Janiw libertad utjkiti	4	4
Janiw khithis unch'ukistuti	5	5
Qullqi tuqina	6	6
Askina, jiltañawa qullqi tuqina		
Janiw aski jakawi utjkiti, qullqi tuqinxa	7	7
Janiw jiltatakiti	8	8
Qullqiniña	9	9
Libre aljasina, libre qullqi mirtayañawa	10	10
Utjiwa irnaqawixa	11	11
Janiw utjkiti irnaqawix	12	12
Sufragio		
Derechunitanwa chixllañataki	13	13
Irpirinakasa	14	14
Chixllañataki libretanwa	15	15
Chixllawinakaxa sallqhasiñanakawa	16	16
Kikipata		
Kikipata (sin especificar)	17	17
Kkipaña qullqi tuqina	18	18
Kkipa chacha warmi	19	19
Kkipa kamachinaku	20	20
Igualdad de razas o etnias	21	21
Kkipa, janiw kikipattanti	22	22
Participación		
Limitaciones de participación	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24
Participasipapxiw juk'anakaki	25	25
Markachirinaku ch'amani	26	26
Estado de derecho		
Yäqañaw derechos humanos	27	27
Janiw justicia utjkiti	28	28
Justicia	29	29
Jaysaña kamachiru	30	30

Gobiernux janiw militarakiti	31	31
Suma jakawini jan ch'axwasa	32	32
Ch'axwanaka, yaqanakaxa mantapxaki	33	33
Yaqa jaysawinaka	80	80
NS/NR	88	88
Código [si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B con 0].	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

ENCUESTADOR: Anote la respuesta aquí y codifique cuando la entrevista termine

Jichax turkasa amtawinaka kunapachanakasa...[fullarasa jist'awinaka, mayampi mayampi arsuña "sapuru", "maya jan ukax paya kuti semanana", "yaqipacha", janipuni yanapañataki jist'ataru]

Kunapachanakasa	Taqi urunaka Sapa urunakasa	Maya jan ukax paya Kutu semanana	Yaqip pacha	Junipuni	NS
A1. Ist'ati yatiyawinaka radio tuqi	1	2	3	4	8
A2. Unch'ukiritati yatiyawinaka TV tuqi.	1	2	3	4	8
A3. Ullariritati yatiyawinaka periodico tuqi	1	2	3	4	8
A4. Ullariritati, jan ukax ist'iri tacha yatiyawinaka internet tuqita	1	2	3	4	8

SOCT1. Jichax arsuña qullqita ... kunxamsa amuyta qullqi tuqit markasana ¿jumax sasmati askipuniwa, askiwa, janirakiw askikisa, jan walikisa?

Askipuni [1] Askikiwa [2] janirakiw askikisa jan walikisa (regular) [3] jan wali [4] jan walipuni (pésimo) [5] NS/NR [8]

SOCT 2. ¿jumax amuytati, qullqi tuqinx a kunxamastansa, askikistanti markasanxa kikipakistanti jan ukax jan walicha tunka payani phaxsinakanxa?

Askipuni [1] Kikipa [2] jan wali [3] NS/NR [8]

IDIO 1. ¿kunxamsa amuyta taqinit qullqi tuqita?, ¿Jumax sasmati askipuniwa, askikiwa, janirakiw askikisa jan walikisa, jan wali, juk' ampi jan wali?

Askipuni [1] Askikiwa [2] janirakiw askikisa jan walikisa (regular) [3] jan wali [4] jan walipuni (pésimo) [5] NS/NR [8]

IDIO 2. ¿Jumax amuytati jichha pachax qullqi tuqitxa askikitati, kikipaki jan ukax jan waliti tunka payani phaxsinakanxa?

Askipuni [1] Kikipa [2] jan wali [3] NS/NR [8]

Jichkax arsuñataki yaqanakata, yaqip pachax jaqinakax ukhamaraki comunidadanakana jan walt'awinakapxa janiw askichaskaspati jupanakapachpa ukhamaraki askichañatakix mayiptati yanapt'anaka mä funcionariu jan ukax mä oficinaru gobierno uksaru ¿askichañataki jan walt'awinakama jumax mayiritati yanapt'awi...

	Jisa	Janiw a	NS/NR
CP2. Mä diputaduru Congreso Nacional uksaru	1	2	8
CP4A. Mä autoridad local (alcalde concejal o funcionario municipal)	1	2	8
CP4 Jan ukax yaqa Institución pública ukhamaraki oficina del Estado ukaru?	1	2	8

NP1. Jichhax arsuñaniw municipiomata ¿sariritati asamblea municipal jan ukax mä sesión del Consejo Municipal ukaru tunka payani qhipa phaxsinakana?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

NP2. ¿Mayiritati yanapa jan ukax jaytacha mayiwi mä oficinaru funcionario jan ukax concejal municipalaru aka tunka payani qhipa phaxsinakana?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

SGL1. Jumax sasmati servicios municipalididax jaqiru churaskiti [leer alternativas]

Askipuni [1] Askiki [2] janiw askikisa jan walikisa (regular) [3] jan wali [4] Jan walipuni (pésima) [5] NS/NR [8]

LGL2A. Uñxasa qawqa servicios públicos utji markasana, ¿khittirus churaña juk'ampi responsabilidad? (leer alternativas)

[1] juk'ampacha gobierno centralaru
NS/NR [88]

[2] mä juk'pachakicha gobierno centralaru

[3] qawqakitix gobierno centralaru ukhamaraki municipalidadaru

[4] mä juk'pachakicha municipalidadaru

[5] juk'ampachacha municipalidadaru

LGL2B. Uñxasa qawqapunisa recursos económicos utjaski markasana khithipunisa uñxañapa, apnaqañapa juk'ampi qullqi (leer alternativas)

[1] juk'ampacha gobierno centralaru
NS/NR [88]

[2] mä juk'pachakicha gobierno centralaru

[3] qawqakitix gobierno centralaru ukhamaraki municipalidadaru

[4] mä juk'pachakicha municipalidadaru

[5] juk'ampachacha municipalidadaru

LGL2C. Arsusapuni recursos económicos ukata, ¿khithipunis uñxañapa apnaqañapa juk'ampi qullqi? (leer alternativas)

[1] juk'ampacha gobierno centralaru
NS/NR [88]

[2] kunampis gobierno centralaru

[3] qawqatix gobierno centralaru churaski ukhamaraki prefecturaru

[4] kunampis prefecturaru churasispa

[5] juk'ampacha walxa prefecturaru

CP5. Jichhax turkañataki amtañawinaka ¿qhipha tunka payani phaxsinakanxa jumax askichtati jan walt'awinaka comunidadamana jan ukax zonamana? Amp suma sitay maya kuti semanana lursta, maya jan ukax paya kuti phaxsina ukhamaraki maya jan ukax paya kuti marana, ukhamaraki janipunis.

Maya kuti semanana [1]maya jan ukax paya kuti phaxsina [2]maya jan ukax paya kuti marana [3] janipuni [4] NS/NR [8]

Jichhax ullarawa mä lista grupos ukat ukhamaraki organizaciones ukat may kutis semanana, maya jan ukax paya kutis phaxsina, maya jan ukax paya kutis marana, janipunis, yanapañapaw jist'st'ataru. [Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Maya kuti semana	Maya jan ukax paya kuti phaxsina	Maya jan ukax paya kuti marana	janipuni	NS/NR	N/A
CP6. Tantachawinakax utjki, organizacionanakana ukarux sariritati?	1	2	3	4	8	
CP7. Tantachawinakax utjki asociaciones padres de familiata, escuelaru, colegio yatiqan utana, ukarux sariritati.?	1	2	3	4	8	
CP8. Tantachawinakax utjki cometé jan ukax comunidadan askipataki ukarux sariritati?	1	2	3	4	8	
CP9. Tantachawinakax utjki asociacion de profesionales, comerciantes productores jan ukax organizaciones campesinas ukarux sariritati?	1	2	3	4	8	
CP10. Tantachawinakax utjki sindicatuta ukarux sariritaki?.	1	2	3	4	8	
CP11. Tantachawinakax utjki partido jan ukax movimiento político ukarux sariritaki?	1	2	3	4	8	
CP20 (warminakaki)Tantachawinakax utjki	1	2	3	4	8	9

asociacionanakata jan ukax grupos, warminakata jan ukax amas de casa ukarux sariritaki?.									
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

LS3. Arsusa yaqanakata. Taqita, kunxamasa jikxatasta kuisita jakawimana? Jumax sasmati kumxamsa jikxatasta. (leer alternativas)

Wali phuqt'ata chuymamaru [1] mä juk'a kuisita [2] mä juk'a jan kuisita [3] Janipuniw kuisiñax utjkiti [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1. Jichhax arsusa akankiri jaqinakata, jumax sasmati comunidadankiri jaqinakaxa ukhamaw (leer alternativas)

Wali confianza churi [1] janiw confianza utjkiti [2] juk'aki confianza churi [3] janiw chuimamaru purkiti [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1A. jumax kunxamsa nayrirpacha confiansa jaqiru churta ? Jumax sasmati (leer alternativas)

Taqi chuymati [1] mä juk'a payachastacha [2] juk'akiti [3] janipunicha purktama [4] NS/NR [8]

IT1B. Arsusa taqinita ¿jumax sasmati jilpacha jaqinakaruti Chuymamaru purisma jan ukax maynexa wali asnuyumpicha uñxañapa mayninakampi?

Confiansati jilpacha jaqinakaruti [1] jan ukax wali amuyumpicha uñxañapa mayninakaruti? [2] NS/NR [8]

ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. Aka laphinxä utjiw mä escala mayat tunkakama ch'iqat kupiru. Jichurunakax walja jaqiwa aruskipastana politikat ukhaxa jaqit arsupxtana jaqix muniw ch'iqampiña ukhamaraki jaqix muniw kupimkaña, jumax junxamaya amuyta aka arunakata“ ch'iqata” ukhamaraki “kupita” kunapachati lup'ista politica tuqit, ¿jumax kawkhankasmas aka escalana? Chimt'ama mä casilla kawkhankasmasa amuyatamatxa.

N

S/NR[88]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Ch'iqä

Kupi

RECOGER TARJETA # 1

IMMIG1 ¿Jumax kunxamsa jaysta Bolivia markankiri gobiernusat churaniwa servicios sociales, mä unacht'awi k'umar jakañataki, educación, uta, anqa markanakata qamasiri jan ukax irnaqiri jutapki jupanakataki? (ullarapxama kawkirispasa)

N

S
/
N
R

[
8
]

walti jaysta [1] majuk' pachakti jaysta [2] janiw jaystasa janiw jiskaraktasa jisa [3] janiw takpacha jaystati [4] janipuniw jaystati [5]

IMMIG2 Taqpachat, ¿Jumax sasmati jaqinakax anqa markanakata jutapki qamasiri jan ukaj irnaqañataki jutapxi jupanakax, akanxa lurapxiw bolivianunaka jan irnaqaña munapkiti ukanaka, jan ukax aparapxiw bolivianunakana irnaqawipa?.

Irnaqapxiw bolivianunak jan munapkiti irnaqaña ukanakana [1] Aparapxiw bolivianunakan irnaqawipa [2] NS/NR [8]

PROT2 ¿aka tunka payani qhipha phaxsinakaxa participati unxtawinakana jan ukax protesta publica ukanakansa? ¿sariritati yaqip pachax, jan ukax janipunicha?

Yaqip pachanaka [1] maya kuti [2] janipuni [3] => *si respondió que no pase a JCI* NS/NR [8]

BOLPROT3 ¿Unxtasiwinakana jan ukax protestas ukanakana participatamax yanapañatakiti jan ukax jan yanapañatakiti gobierno nacional ukaru?

yanapañatakiti gobierno nacional ukaru [1] jan yanapañatakiti gobierno nacional ukaru [2] janipki janirakiw sallqkarakisa gobiernuru [3] [no leer] Yaqipachax yanaptana ukhamaraki, yaqip pachax sallqkarakisa [4] [no leer] NS/NR [8] Inap [9]

Jichax arsuñani yaqa amtawinakata. Yaqip jaqinakax sapxiwa yaqipachaxa justifikasipawa militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru mä golpe de estado ukampi. Amuyatamatxa utjaspati golpe de estado militaranakata amuyasa jichha urunakata.? [leer alternativas despues de cada pregunta].

JC1. Yatisa jan irnaqawi utjxatapa	[1] justifikasipawa militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[2] janiw justifikaskaspati militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[8] NS/NR
JC4. Yatisa walja sartasiwinaka utxatapa organizaciones sociales ukata	[1] justifikasipawa militaranakana	[2] janiw justifikaskaspati militaranakana	[8] NS/NR

	makhatañaapa poderaru	makhatañaapa poderaru	
JC10. Yatisa walxa luntatasirinaka uxjatapata	[1] justifikasispawa militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[2] janiw justifikaskaspati militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[8] NS/NR
JC12. Utjiw alta inflacion chaninakax jilt'atapuniwa makhatañaki	[1] justifikasispawa militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[2] janiw justifikaskaspati militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[8] NS/NR
JC13. Walja sallqasiñanakawa utji	[1] justifikasispawa militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[2] janiw justifikaskaspati militaranakana makhatañaapa poderaru	[8] NS/NR

JC15 ¿jumax jaystati yaqip pachaxutjaspati razon suficiente presidente irpiri jist'antañaapa congreso, jan ukax janicha jaysta ?

Utxaspati razon [1] junicha utjkaspa razon[2]

JC16 ¿ jumax yayjstati yaqip pachax utjaspati razon suficiente presidente jaltayañapataki corte suprema de justicia jan ukax janicha razon suficiente utjkaspa.

Utxaspati razon[1] janicha utjkaspa razon[2]

VIC1. Jichhax turkasa amtawinaka, ¿jumax ñanqachatatati lunthatanakampi aka qhipa tunka payani phaxsinakana?

Jisa[1] => arkana janiwa [2] => pasar a VIC20 NS/NR [8] => pasar a VIC 20

AOJ1 ¿yatiytati uka lurawinaka ,kawhiri Institucionarusa ?

Jisa [1] => pasar a VIC 20 janiw yatiyti [2]=> arkana NS/NR [8]=> pasar a VIC 20
Inap[9]=> pasar VIC 20

AOJ1B ¿Kunatsa jan yatiyta uka lurawinaka? *(No leer alternativas)*

NS/NR [8]

Inap [9]

- [1] Janiw askikiti kunatakisa
- [2] Peligrosuwa ukhamaraki jan wali lurawinaka
- [3] Janiw utjkiti unacht'ayiripa uka lurawinaka
- [4] janiw ancha wakiskirikiti
- [5] Janiw yatkiti kawkiru yatiyaña

Jichhax ampi suma lup'ina kunati makhipaski aka tunka payani phaxsinakana jaysañataki aka jist'anaka

VIC20. Jan jakhusa autunaka lunthatatata: khitis lunthatama armampi aykatasa aka qhipa tunka payani paxsinakana ¿qawqa kuti? _____ veces
NS/NR [88]

VIC21. ¿Mantapxiti lunthatañaki utamaru aka qhipa tunka payani phaxsinakanxa qawqa kuti? _____ veces
NS/NR [88]

VIC27. ¿Aka qhipa tunka payani phaxsinakanxa policiax arunakampi usuchxtamti jan ukax nuwtamcha, jan ukax xanchimcha chux rintama? qawqa kuti _____ veces
NS/NR [88]

AOJ8. Lunthatanaka katxañataki. ¿jumax jaystati autoridadanakax wiñayati yaqapxi kamachinakaru, jan ukax jan kamachina karxama lurapxaspacha?.

Yaqapxañapati wiñaya kamachinakaru [1] jan ukax jan kamachinakarxama
lurapxaspacha[2] NS/NR [88]

AO11. Arsusa uraqimat jan ukax barrio zona kawkhanti jumax jakasta ukhamaraki amuyt'asa jumax ñanqachataasma lunthatanakana, ¿ jumax segurutati jakawimana, ma juk'a seguro, janiw jaqitwa sañakiti, inseguridadaw utji?

Wali seguro [1] Ma juk'a seguro [2] algo inseguro [3] Wali inseguro [4] NS/NR [8]

AO11A Ukhamaraki aruskipasa markasat ¿jumax kunxamsa jaysta aka lunthatañañanaka utjxi ukax axsaranti churtama suma qamawiru jichhapachama? [leer alternativas]

Waljapuni [1] ma juk'apacha [2] juk'aki[3] janipuni [4]] NS/NR [8]

AO12. Jumarutix ñanqachapxiristama lunthatanaka ¿Qawsa confiasma sistema judicial juchanchaspati juchaniru? [leer alternativas] confiaria...

Waljapuni [1] ma juk'apacha [2] juk'aki[3] janipuni [4]] NS/NR [8]

AOJ12a. Jumax ñanqachatasma lunthatanaka jan ukax asaltapxiristama ¿kunxamsa confiasma policiaru katxapxaspati juchaniru? [leer alternativas] confiaria...

Waljapuni [1] ma juk'apacha [2] juk'aki[3] janipuni [4]] NS/NR [8]

AOJ18. Yaqipa jaqinakaxa sapxiwa policianakax zonapana [markapana] jaqirux lunthatanakatxa arxatiw, yaqanakasti sapxakiwa policianakaxa lunthatanakampiwa chikachasi,¿jumax kunxamsa amuyta? [leer alternativa]

Policiaxa arxatiwa[1] Policiaxa chikachasiwa lunthatana kampi [2] janiw arxatkiti, janiw chikachaskisa lunthatanakampi, jan ukax arxaticha chikachasicha [3] NS/NR [8]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Aka machaq tarjetanxa utjiwa mä escala paqallqu punto sari mayaxa janiw KUNAKISA, paqallkama uka chimpuxa WALJAWA. Mä unacht'awi ,nayax jist'irista kuna punto kamas uñxta televisión, jumatix Jan unch'uksta kunsä, chixllasitawa mä puntaje mayata, sitix walipuni unch'uksta televisión churitaspawa paqallqu jakhu. Amuyumax janiw kunakisa ukhamaraki waljawa chixllasma mä puntaji chikata. ¿Jichhax jumax kuna puntu kamasa unch'ukta televisión? Ullaram jakhu. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Janiwa				Waljawa		

	Calificación	NS/N
B1. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumana amuyatamanxa Tribunales de justicia satapkisa ukanakaxa askinjama phuqhayapxi kunjamti phuqhasiñapaki ukhamarama juicio ukxa? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B2. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumaxa yaqta instituciones publicas de bolivia ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B3. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumana amuyatamanxa derechos basicos del ciudadano ukhama sataxa askinjama jaysata sistema politico boliviano ukata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B4. ¿kuna puntukamasa jumaxa askinajama yaqata uñjasta jakawimana sistema politico utjki aka markasana uka taypina?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B6. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumana amuyatamanxa ch'amanchañaxa wakisipa sitema politico utjki ukaru aka Bolivia marrana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B10A. ¿ Kuna puntukamsa yaqata jumatakixa sistema boliviano ukaxa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B11. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumatakixa jaysañaspa corte nacional electoral ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B12 ¿ Kuna puntukamasa jumaxa yasista fuerzas armadas ukanakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B13. ¿Kuna puntukaamsa jumatakixa jaysañaspa congreso nacional ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B14. ¿Kuna puntukaamsa jumatakixa jaysañaspa gobierno nacional ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B18. ¿kuna puntukamasa jumatakixa jaysata policia nacional uksakirinakaruxa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B20. ¿kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa yaqaña igesia catolika ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21. ¿kuna puntukamasa jumatakixa jaysaña partidos politicos jupanakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B21A. ¿ kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa jaysataspa jiliri mallkusaru aka Bolivia marka iptkipana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B31. ¿kuna puntukamasa juamatakixa jaysaña corte suprema de justicia ukaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B32 ¿ Kuna puntukamasa jumaxa iyaw sista Gobierno Municipal kaukhanti jacta uksankirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B43. ¿Kuna puntukamasa jumaxa wali kuisita jiqhatasta boliviano ukhamatamata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B17. ¿ Kuna puntukamsa jumaxa iyaw sañaxa utji Defensor del Pueblo uksankirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B33. ¿Kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa iyaw sañaspa prefectura	1 2 3 4 5	8

departamental uksankirinaakru?	6 7	
B37.¿Kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa iyaw sawixa utji mediso de comunicación uksankirnakataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B 40. ¿ Kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa jaysaña movimientos indígenas uksankirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B42.¿ Kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa iyaw sañaspa servicio impuestos nacionales (SIN) uksankirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B50. ¿ Kuna puntukamasa jumatakixa iyaw sañaspa Tribunal Constitucional uksankirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
B47. ¿kuna puntukamsa jumatakixa iyaw sañaspa chijllawinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BOLB22B(B22B)¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sañaxa utjaspa autoridades originarias ukanaakru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Uka pachpa amtawi phuqhasa jaysawiru.....

	Calificación	NS/NF
N1. ¿kuna puntukamasa jumaxa sasma jiliri irpirisa Morales jupaxa piscina jakaña utji marrana ukaru thurkataski?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N3. ¿ Kuna puntukamasa jumana amuyatanxa Jiliri mallkusa evo morales ch’amnchi arxati principios democraticos ukanaka?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N9 ¿ Kuna puntukamasa sasma jiliri mallkuxa t’unjaña muni qulqi juk’uchaña gobierno uksana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N11.¿ Kuna puntukamsa sasma Jiliri mallkusa irpirixa ch’amnchawayi ma aski jakawi utjañapataki markasana, jani pa kayuni chakunaksa ukhamaraki ñanqhachiri jaqinaksa utjañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
N12. ¿Kuna puntukamsa sasma jiliri mallkuxa thurkataski jani irnaqawi utjatapru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Jichhaxa ullrt’awa ma juk’a qilqata Partidos Politicos aka Bolivia marrana uksata arunchiri. Ukatxa mayimawa amuyuma. Pachpa jaysawiwa phuqt’atani nayriri jiskt’anakakixa ukanakampi.

	Calificación	NS/N
EPP1. Lup’isina Partidos Politicos ukanakampi. ¿Kuna puntukamsa partidos politicos aka blivia marrana utjirinakaxa askinjama khitinakatixa voto ukampi ch’amncht’awayapki jupanakatjama irnaqasipki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP2.¿kuna puntukamsa utjpacha qulqi juk’uchañaxa partidos politicos aka bolivia marrana utjirinakana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EPP3. ¿Kuna puntukamsa partidos politicos ukanaakaxa ist’apacha markachirinakaru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

EC1. ¿Jichhamanxa congreso nacional uksata amuyañani. ¿kuna puntukamsa congreso nacional ukaxa jani walt'aykpacha gobierno central uksankiriru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC2. ¿kuna puntukamsa pacha ukhamaki apt'apcha congreso nacional uksankirinakxa ch'axwasina?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC3. ¿Qauqhakamasa yaqtapacha kaukiri kamachinbakatixa congreso nacional uksankirinakata iyaw Sataqui ukanakaxa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EC4. ¿Kuna puntukamsa congreso nacional uksankirinakaxa phuqhapacha kuntixa suyataki ukampi?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Jichhaxa arusiñaniwa taqpachata gobierno ukasata, ¿jumaxa sasmati jiliri mallkusana irnaqawipaxa ...? (leer alternativas)

Wali aski [1] wali [2] jani askisa jani jan walisa (tantiyuki) [3] jani wali [4] Wali jan wali (aynacht'ata) [5] NS/NR [8]

M2. Arusisa taqpacha diputados jupanaakta, Jani yaqasina partidos políticos ukanaakru jaysapxatapata, jumatakixa askinajamti irnaqasipkapcha diputados jupanakaxa, aski, jani aski jani jan aski, jan wali, jan ukaxa wali jani aski?

Wali aski [1] wali [2] jani askisa jani jan walisa (tantiyuki) [3] jani wali [4] Wali jan wali (aynacht'ata) [5] NS/NR [8]

ENTREGAR TARJETA B

Jichhasti, ma tarjeta naraqata apnaqatakana uka kipkarjamawa apnaqatani, ukampisa nayriri puntuxa saña munaniwa “ wali jani iyawsata” ukatxa punto 7 ukaxa saña munaniwa “ wali iyaw sata”. Ma jakhuwi mayata niya paqalqukama, saña munaniwa ma punto tantiyu. Nayaxa ullsrt'awa walja iyawsawianaka ukatxa jumaxa sañamawa qauqhakamasa iwawata, jan ukaxa janicha.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS/NR [8]
Wali iya sata						Wali jani iyaw sata	

	Calificación	NS/R
Amuyt'asina kunasa maykipki markasana, sitasma tarjeta apnqasapuni kuna puntukamasa iyawata jan ukasti jani iyawata aka amtawinakampi...		
POP101. Markasa nayraru sartañapataki, wasisiriti irpirinakasaxa sit'antapxañapa yaqha partidos jupanaakna markana iyaw satapxañaspa uka ¿kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Pop102. Congreso uksankirinakaxa jani walt'ayapxaspa gobierno uksankirinakaru ukaxa gobierno uksankirinakaxa wakisispati irptapxañapa jani uka irpirinakampi. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
Pop103. Tribunal constitucional uksankirinakatixa jani walt'ayapxaspa gobierno uksankirinakana irnaqawipxa, janiti yaqañakaspaspa gobierno uksata. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP106. Irpirinakaxa sarantapxañapawa ch'amanchasiña markana mayiwiparjama. Kunatixa markaxa mayki ukaxa wali askiwa. ¿ ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
Pop 107. Markawa chiqapata irptaspa, ukatxa janiwa irptkaspati irpirinaka chhijllataki uka taypi. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP109. aka markanxa utjiwa ma ch'axwawi aski jakawi jikqhatañataki ukhamaraki jani aski jakawi jikqhatañataki. Ukatxa jaqixa chhijllañapawa kawkirsa. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP110. Ma tixa markaxa iyawsi askiwa sasina, aynacht'ayaspawa ma juk'a jaqinakana amtaparu. . ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP112. jani Bolivia markasa nayraru sartañapataki qamirinakawa markata aprovechasiri. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
POP113. kawkirinakatixa jani iyaw sapki waljani iyaw sapki ukaruxa uñacht'ayiwa. Jani walt'ayaña markataki ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF1. Khitinakatixa irptapki marka kuntixa amuyki markaxa ukaxa wali yaqañawa ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
EFF2. Nayatakixa taqi jani walt'awinaka utjki markasanxa nanxa mamuyatawa, ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ING. 4. Democracia ukxa jani walt'awininakaspawa, ukampisa walikiskiwa kawkiri gobierno apnaqawisa. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
PN2. Jan iaski amtawi utjatapatsti, bolivianos jupanaknxa utjiwa walja amtawinaka sarawinaka mayachistu ukanakaa. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
DEM23. Democracia ukaxa utjaspawa jani utjatapata partidos politicos ukanaka. ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
Jichhaxa jiskt'arakimawa ma qauqha jiskt'anaka estado ufana irnaqawipata.		
ROS1. Bolivia marka estado, serctor privado uñt'ata uksana empresas ukanakana irpirinakanakñapawa ukhamaraki industrias wali askinaka markasana utjki uka. . ¿ kuna puntukamsa iyawata jan ukaxa jani iyawata?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ROS2. Estado boliviano juk'ampi jaqinakata hispana, wali aski	1 2 3 4 5 6	8

ch'amnchiriñapwa markachirinakana aski jakawi jikqhatapxañapataki.	7	
ROS3. Estado boliviano juk'ampi empresa ukanakata hispana juk'ampi ch'amanchiriñapawa irnaqawinaka utjayasina.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
ROS4 Estado boliviano ukxa ch'amnchañapawa uskusa politicas ukhamata khuskhachasiñapataki ma aski jakawi, jani utjañapataki Camiri piscina jakiri.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

PN4. Taqpachata hispana ¿jumaxa sasmati askiwa sasa jan ukasti jani askikiti sasmacha, jan ukaxa wali askiwa sasmacha democracia ch'amanchataki ukaru aka Bolivia markasana?

Wali askitapa [1] walliki [2] jani wali aski [3] wali jani aski [4]NS/NR [8]

PN5. Jumana amuyumana. Bolivia markaxa ma markawa wali aski democracia ch'amanchritapata, ¿Bolivia markaxa ma marka democracia ch'amnchiriwa, ma juk'a democratico, wali juk'a democratico, jani kunsu democracia ch'amnchiri?

Wali askitapa [1] walliki [2] jani wali aski [3] wali jani aski [4]NS/NR [8]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Jichhaxa turkañaniwa yaqha tarejeta ukaru. Aka tarjetaxa jakhuwinakaniwa mayata tunkakama, mayampixa saña munatawa janipuniwa akch'asa askikiti, ukatxa tunkaxa uñacht'ayatawa wali askiwa sasa. Ullarañaniwa ma qauqha amtawinaka jaqinakaxa lurapkasa ch'amanchañataki amtawinaka politica tuqina. Nayaxa sañama muntwa kunjamsa iyaw sista jan ukaxa janiwa iyaw sista jaqinakaxa iyaw sapxi.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Janiwa askikiti siwa							Wali askiwa siwa			NS/NR

	Calificación								NS/NR
E5. Jilanakaxa ch'amancht'asipxi arsusiwinakana nayrapacha utjkana ukanakana kamachi layku. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
E8. Jilanakasa kullakanakasa chikancht'asipana kunaymana tamanakana ukhamata aksichañataki jani walt'awinaka utjki ukanaka comunidadananakana. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
E11. Jilanakasa kullakanakasa irnaqappana campañas uka	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88

ch'amanchawinakanba chhijllawinakataki ma partido politico ukataki jan ukasti ma candidate ukatkaisa. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	9 10	
E15. Jilanakasa kullakanakasa ch'amnchasipana ma sit'antawi callinakana jan ukxa thakhinaknsa, uka pachpa iyaw sawi phuqhasina. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E14. Jila kullakanakaxa maynina uraqiparu mantaspawa ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E2. Jila kullakanakaxa qhipharapxaspawa oficians, fabricas, yaqha edificaciona. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E3. Jilanakaxa kullakanakaxa ch'amanchasipana ma tamana ma gobierno central jaqina chhijllataru jaqsuña munapki jupnakampi. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
E16. Jilanaaksa kullakanakasa justicia ukxa phuqhayapxaspawa amparanakapampi kunapachatixa estado ukaxa jani taripayki uka ñanqhachiri jaqinaakru. ¿kuna puntukamsa iyaw sista janiwa iyaw sistasa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
Jichha jiskt'awinakaxa yatiñatakiwa kunjamsa amuyta bolivia matkana qamasirjama. Escala 10 jakhuwirjamapini iyaw sisma.		
D1. Utjiwa yaqhipa markachirinaka jani walikiti sapxi aka jiliri mallkusaxa irpxarki uka tuqita, ¿kunjamsa jumaxa iway sasma aka amtawi utji uka tuqiru?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D2. ¿Kunjamsa jumaxa iyaw sasma jan ukasti janiwa sasmasa aka jaqinakaxa unxtasipspa mayisina jupnakana mayiwinakapa iyaw sasiñataki? Ma jakhu uskt'am.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D3. Juk'ampi uñakipasa khtinakatixa janiwa askikiti sapxi gobierno central uksankirinakana irnaqawipata ¿qauqhakamasa iyaw sasma aka amtawinaka jilanakaxa jan ukaxak ullakanakasa jutiri urunakaxa matapxañapa irpiripxañapataki cargos publicos ukanakana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D.4. ¿qhauqhakamasa jumaxa iyaw sasma aka jilanaka kullakanakasa qhananchapxaspa kuntixa amtapki ukxa televisión tuqixa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D5. Jichhasti, yaqha amtawita arusisasti, ukatxa amuyt'asina homosexuales jupnaaktxa, ¿qauqhakamasa iyaw sasma aka amtawinaka jilanakaxa jan ukaxak ullakanakasa jutiri urunakaxa matapxañapa irpiripxañapataki cargos publicos ukanakana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Jichhaxa yaqha amtawita aruskipañani.....

DEM2. Kaukiri amtawimpisa aka qilqt'ata tuqixa jumaxa iyawata (ullart'am uka qilqt'atanaka)

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Jqiruxa maynisapa uñaña, pachpakiwa jupatakixa ma regimen democratico janisa ukaxa utjpana ukaxa,

[2] Democracia ukaxa wali askinjama yaqatawa kaukirita sipansa.....

[3] Yaqhi amtawinkanxa ma gobierno autoritario ukaxa walispawa ma gobierno democratico sipanxa.

DEM11. ¿Jumana amuyumanxa ma gobierno qhuru ukaxa wali wakiskiriti utjañaapa aka markasana jan ukasti jani walt'awinakaxa askichaspacha taqinina yanapapampi?

Wali qhuru [1] taqinina yanapt'apampi [2] NS/NR [8]

AUT1. Yaqhipa jilanaka kullakanakaxa amuyapxiwa sasina yapaspawa markasataki ma qhuru irpiri jani marrana chhijllata. Yaqhipanixa amuyt'apxarakiwa janiwa sapxarakiwa ukatxa jupanaaktakixa chhijllawipiniwa wali aski ¿jumaxa kunjamsa amuyta? (ullart'am ch'amancht'añataki)

Munasiwa ma wali qhuru irpiri [1] democracia electoral watu jaquntaña ukawa aski [2] NS/NR [8]

AUT2. ¿Kaukiri amtawi qilqantatakisa ukampisa jumaxa iyawata? (ullart'am amtawinaka iyaw sañataki)

NS/NR [8]

[1] Markachirinakhamaxa wakisispati irpirinakaruru jisqhataña inrnaqawinapakata jan ukaxa..

[2] Markachirinakjamaxa wali yaqaña ukacha utjañapaxa wakispacha irpirinakasataki.

PP1. Chhijllawinaka utjki uka pachasti, yaqhipa jaqinakaxa amtapxiwa amuyt'ayaña ma partido jan ukasti ma chhijllayasiñataki sarki juparu watu jaquntañataki. ¿Jumaxa qauqhakamasa mayni jilaru ch'amanchta ukhamata jupaxa watu jaquntañapataki ma candidato ukaru jan ukasti partido politivo ukarusa (ullart'am ch'amancht'añataki)

Sapurutjama [1] yaqhipa pacha [2] samkanjama [3] aniwa kunapachasa [4] NS/NR [8]

PP2. Utjiwa yaqhipa jila kullakanakaxa irnaqapxiri ma partido politico uka ch'amanchasina, ¿jumaxa kawkiri partido politico ukaru ch'amnchasinsa irnaqawaytati? 2005 uka marana utjkana uka chhijllawinakanxa?

Jisa irnaqawaytwa [1] janiw irnaqawaykti [2] NS/NR [8]

Jichhaxa mayirismawa qhanancht'añama ka sutinchatakani ukanakaxa [1] lunthatapxi ukatxa taripatapxañapawa wakisispa [2] Lunthatanaka ukampisa jani juchani aka marrana kunati utji ukhamarjama [3] jani juchani

DC10. Ma taykaxa walja wawanakanixa amsuñapawa sapa maynitaki certificado de nacimiento uka,, jani pacha apt'asiñataki ukhama suyasinakxa jupaxa qulqi chilti 40 ukha ukhamaraki empleado publico irnaqirirusa ¿jumaxa kunjamsa aka amtawi phuqhawxa amuyta? (ullart'am ch'amancht'añataki)

Qulqi Lunthatasiña Yatichi Taripatañapawa [1] lunthatasiña yatichiwa ukampisa p'anpachatawa juchapaxa [2] janiwa lunthata yatichkiti [3] NS/NR [8]

DC13. Ma jaqixa jani irnaqawinixa ma politico wali mintatana wila masipawa, ukatxa politico jupaxa uka ch'amapa apnaqi ukhamata jiqhatañataki ma irnaqawi sector publico ufana ¿jumatakixa uka Malawi phuqhatapaxa askiti?(ullart'am ch'amancht'añataki)

Corrupto ukhamawa ukatxa jupaxa taripatañapawa [1] corrupto ukhamawa ukampiusa juchapaxa p'anpachataspawa [2] janiwa corrupto ukhamakiti [3] NS/NR[8]

Jichhaxa arusiña munatawa kunanakasa utji jakawimana.	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR
EXC2. ¿Kaukiri pallapalalsa ma yanpt'awi maytampi qulqi chilltasa aka qhipha marana?	9	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Ma empleado publico ukaxa maytamti ma qulqi chillatawi aka qhipa marnaxa?	9	0	1	8
EXC11. ¿kuna tramitsa jumaxa aka qhipha maranxa lurawaytatati? <i>Janiwa → chimt'aña 9</i> <i>Jisa → jiskt'aña</i> Kuna tramite uka ch'amanchañatakixa municipio tuqinxaxa (ma licencia pasusiñataki amuyt'kasina) aka qhipha marankasina ¿qlqixa pallayañatati kamachinaka siski ukhamrjama phuqhasinxaxa?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. ¿jumaxa irnaqtati? <i>Janiwa → chimpuntaña 9</i> <i>Jisa → jiskt'aña</i> Irnaqawimana ¿ma qulqi chilltawi lurañama mayiptamti aka qhipha marana ?	9	0	1	8

Jichhaxa arusiña munatawa kunanakasa utji jakawimana.	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR
EXC14. ¿aka qhipha marana, jumaxa chikañcht'astati anat'irinakaru? <i>Janiwa → chimpt'aña 9</i> <i>Jisa → jiskt'aña</i> ¿ma qulqi chilltawsa lurañamaxa wakt'ayasiwayiti aka qhipha maranxa?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. ¿jumaxa yanapt'asiwaytati medicos publicos uka qullirinakampi (markata payllata) aka qhipha maranxa? <i>Janiwa → chimpt'aña 9</i> <i>Jisa → jiskt'aña</i> Ma centro medico ukansa jan ukasti ma jach'a qullayasiña utanxa ak qhipamaranxa payllañamaxa uñstawayiti qulqi chilltawi?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. Aka qhipha marana ¿utjawaytamti ma wawasa yatiqaña utanxa ¿ <i>Janiwa → chimt'aña 9</i> <i>Jisa → Jiskt'aña</i> Kaukiri yatiqaña utansa aka qhipha marana ¿ payllañamaxa uñstawayiti qulqi chilltawi?	9	0	1	8
EXC17. ¿Khitisa Maytamti Ma Qulqi Chilltawi Jani Luz Qhanaxa Khuchuqtañapataki?	9	0	1	8
EXC18. ¿jumaxa kamsasma wqulqi chilltawi utjañapa aka urunakaxa jani walt'awinki ukaxa?		0	1	8

Exc7. Amthapisa kunati jakawimana utjkana jan ukasti ist'asinxa wakispawa qhananchaña, ¿ funcionarios publicos uka irnaqirinakanxa qulqi juk'uचाñaखा jikqhatawi... (ullaraña)

Wali jach'ana [1] ma juk'a jach'aña [2] wali juk'a jach'ana [3] jani kunasa [4] NS/NR [8]

Jichhaxa yatiña amtataraki qauqha yatiyawisa yatiyata politica tuqita ukhamaraki markata markachirinaakru...

G11. ¿Kaukirisa aka urunakana irpxarki anqaxa marka Estados Unidos jupana sutipaxa ¿ (Jani ullaraña: George Busch)

Chiqa [1] jani chiqa [2] Jnaiwa yatkiti [8] janiwa qhananchkiti [9]

BOLGI2. ¿Kamsatasa canceller de la republica jupaxa? (jani ullaraña David Choquehuanca)

Chiqa [1] jani chiqa [2] Jnaiwa yatkiti [8] janiwa qhananchkiti [9]

GI3. ¿Qauqha Departmaentos Ukanakasa Utji Markaxa? (Jani Ullaraña 9)

Chiqa [1] jani chiqa [2] Jnaiwa yatkiti [8] janiwa qhananchkiti [9]

GI4. ¿Qauqha pachanakasa mayni irpirixa irptaspa aka Bolivia marrana? (jani ullaraña 5 maranaka)

Chiqa [1] jani chiqa [2] Jnaiwa yatkiti [8] janiwa qhananchkiti [9]

GI5. ¿kamsatasa Brasil anqaxa marrana irpiripaxa? (jani ullaraña Lula Da Silva)

Chiqa [1] jani chiqa [2] Jnaiwa yatkiti [8] janiwa qhananchkiti [9]

VB1. ¿Qilqatatati voto jaquntañataki?

Jisa [1] janiwa [2] jichhawa sarnaqataski [3] NS/NR [8]

VB2. ¿Jumaxa chhijllawaytati aka qhipha chhijllawinakanxa 2005 marnaxa?

Jjisa chhijllawayiwa [1] =>(sarantaskakim)janiwa chhijllawaykiti [2] =>[maykipaña VB50]NS/NR [8] => [maykipam VB50]

VB3. ¿Khititakisa watu jaquntawayta irpiriñapataki 2005 marana? (jani ullaraña qilqantata)

Jani kawkirsa/ janqu jan ukasti jani kunasa [00] FREPAB/Eliseo Rodríguez [1001]

MAS[Evo Morales] [1002]

MIP[Felipe Quispe “Mallku”

[1003] **MNR[Michiaki Nagatani] [1004]**

NFR[Guido Angulo] [1005]

PODEMOS[Jorge Quiroga]

[1006] **UN[Samuel Doria Medina][1007]**

USTB[Nestor Garcia] [1008]

Otro [77]

NS/NR [88]

Inap [No votó]

[99]

VB50. Ma jach’ata, chachanakaxa wali aski irpirixaspawa warminakata hispana, ¿jumaste askiwa sistati, walikiwa sistati, janiwa askikiti, wali jani askiwa?

Wali iyaw sata [1] iyaw sata [2] jani iyaw sata [3] ancha jani iyaw sata [4] NS/NR [8]

VB10. ¿anchhitanakaxa kawkiri partido politico ukampisa chikañchastati?

Jisa [1]=>[sarantaskakim] janiwa [2]=> [Saram a POLI] NS/NR (88)=>[Saram a POLI]

VB11. Kawkiri partido politico ukampisa jumaxa chikañcht'asta? (jani ullarasa qilqantata)

MAS [Evo Morales] [1002] MIP [Felipe Quispe "Mallku"] [1003] MNR [1004] NFR [1005]

Podemos [Jorge Quiroga] [1006] UN [Samuel Doria Medina] [1007] Otro _____

[1077]

NS/NR [88] =>[Saram A GII] INAP [99] =>[Saram A GII]

VB12. ¿Ukatsti jumaxa sasmati aka partido tuqiruxa jaysatama

Wali jani yaqata [1] jani yaqata [2] jani yaqata janiraki yaqata [3] wali ch'ulqhi [4] wali ch'ulqhi [5] NS/NR [8] INAP [9]

POL1. Qauqhasa jumatakixa yaqañama utji politica tuqiru wali, ma juk'a, jani kunasa ma juk'a?

Añcha [1] ma juk'a [2] Juk'a [3] jani kunasa [4] NS/NR [8]

POL2. ¿Qaqhasa jumana arusita yaqha jilanakampi politica tuqita?(ullart'aña qilqata)

Sapuru [1] yaqhipa pacha [2] yaqhipa pacha paxsita [3] yaqhi pacha [4] janiw kunapachasa [5] NS/NR [8]

Jichhaxa turkasa aruskipawi, ¿kunapachasa jani jaqirjama uñjataxa jikqhatastati jan ukaxa ukhamaki isthapitamata ukatsti mayja patana jakasirjama uñtasitamatsa aka tuqinakana?

DIS2. Aka oficinas ufana gobierno central uksata (juzagados, alcaldías, municipios)

Jisa [1] janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

DIS4. Tantachawinakana jan ukasti walja jaqinaka tantachaski uka taypinakansa.

Jisa [1] janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

DIS5. Publicos uñt'ataki ukanakna (callina, plazana, mercado ukansa)?

Jisa [1] janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

VB20. (jiskt'aña taqiru) ¿Aka dominguspa chhijllawinakaxa jiliri mallku chhijllañataki khitakisa watu jaquntasma? (jani ullaraña)

NS/NR [8]
 [1] janiwa chhijllkiristi
 [2] chhijlliristwa jichhurunaka irpxarki jupataki

Partido/Candidato

[3] chhijlliristwa oposición uka partiduta
 [4] Janiw kawkirisa (janq'u jan ukasti jai kunasa)

VB21. ¿jumatakixa kunasa mayjt'ayaspera turkakipawinaka? (ullart'aña qilqata)

NS/NR [8]
 [1] jaquntaña arxatañataki oposición uksankirinaka
 [2] chikañcht'asiña ch'axwawinakana ukhamata mayisa turkakipawinaka
 [3] mayjata turkayaña
 [4] janiwa kunjamatsa ch'amanchañjamakiti turkakipawitaki

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]

LS6. mayitaptawa 0 ukaxa saña muniwa jani kunsu yaqatatapa ukatsti 10 ukasti saña munaraki wali yaqatatapa.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Juni kunsu yaqata										Wali aski yaqatatapa	NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

Ak marrana/ kawkhanti jumaxa kata wali askiwa jumataki jan ukas janiraki	Aski jumataki	Jani aski jumataki	NS/ R o No Utili a
SD1. Transporte publico uka sitemata	1	2	8
SD2. thakhinaka, llusk'a thakhinaka, auto pista ukanaka	1	2	8
SD3. sistema educativo yatigaña utanaka	1	2	8
SD4. Kunjamskisa samanaxa	1	2	8
SD5. kunjamskisa musa	1	2	8
SD6. kujmaskisa k'umara jakaña tuqita	1	2	8

SD7. Uta tuqit hispana	1	2	8
SD8. kunjamasa uka chiqaxa jiwakiti jan ukasti janicha	1	2	8
SD9. Kunjamsa unqtasipxi k'añaskuñakaxa	1	2	8
SD10. kunjamsa jikqhatasi thakhinaka	1	2	8
SD11. kunjamaskisa plazas, parques areas verdes ukanakaxa	1	2	8
SD12. Kunjamsa uñjataski sitios publicos ukanakaxa ukhamata jaqixa anat'awinakmpi ch'amnchasipxañapataki	1	2	8

LS4. Amthapisina taqi kuna arusitakana ukanakatxa aka markata, zona, jumaste samati jikqhatasitama wali askiwa sasa jan ukasti jani askiwa sasa jikqhatasta kawkhanktati ufana?

Aski iyaw sawi [1]

jani aski iyawsawi [2]

MS/NR [8]

Bolivia markaxa ma walja sarawini markawa ukhamakasinxa taqiniwa khithiptansa uka amtawxa uñachtayañasa kunaymani amtawinaka tuqi aka markasana maykipki ukana.

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]	Escala						NS/ NR
	Jani kunasa			Añcha			
ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿Qhauqhakamasa jumaxa amuyasta bolivia markatata?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
<i>Jiskt'iri: aka jutiri jiskt'awi ch'amanchañatakixa amuyañamawa kaukiri Departamento ukantasa ukhamarjama jiskt'añataki:</i>				7			
ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿Qhauqhakamasa jumaxa mauyasta...? [paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuquisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarijeño, beniano]?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
				7			
BOLETID3. [BETID3] ¿Qauqhakamasa jumaxa amuyasta ma aymara ukhama?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
				7			
BOLETID4. [BETID4] ¿Qauqhakamasa jumaxa amuyasta qhichwa uksankiri?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
				7			
BOLETID5 [BETID5] ¿Qauqhamakasa jumax amuyasta kamba ukhama?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8
				7			
BOLETID6. [BETID6] ¿Yaqhipa periodistas jupanakaxa arusipxiwa santa cruz, beni, pando, chuquisaca, ukhamaraki tarija media luna uksankirinakjama ¿jumaxa aka amtawi tyuqxa amuytati?	1	2	3	4	5	6	[9]
¿Qhauqhakamasa jumaxa amuyasta media luna uksankirita?				7			8

BOLCA5. Jumana amuyumanxa machaqa cpe tayka kamachi utjirixa askichaspati jani walt'awinaka utjki aka markasana jan ukaxa janicha ukaxa ukhamakaspaspa?

Askichaspawa jani walt'awinaka utjki ukanaka aka markasana [1] jani walt'awinakaxa tukusispawa [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLANM1. Jumax amuytati autonomias departmaentales ukanakaxa askinaka apanispati bolivia markasaru jan ukasti jani askinaka apanispa aka Bolivia markasataki?

Askinakaspawa [1] juk'ampi jani walt'awinaka apanini [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLANM2. jumatakixa, autonomias departmanetales ukanakaxa qhananchaspati: 1) juk'ampi t'acaqtaawi regiones ukanakataki 2) jupanakakama apnaqasiñapa 3) ma t'axtawi markasana

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Juk'ampi descentralizacino t'acaqtaawi utjañapa

[2] Aski ch'amnchawi kamachinaka ch'amanchañataki ukhamaraki departamentos ukanakaxa jupana amuyuparjama sarantapxañapataki

[3] Ma t'aqtaawi markasana

BOLANM3. Jumatakixa prefecturas ukanakaxa atribuciones ukanipxaspati ukhamata kunaymani yanaka utjki ukanaka apnaqañataki, jan ukasti gobierno central uksankirinakakicha apnaqapxaspa

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Prefecturas uksankirinakawa apnaqapxaspa yaqhipa recursos naturales ukanaka

[2] Kuna yanakati utji aka markasanxa apnaqatañapawa gobierno central uksankirinakataki.

BOLANM4. Jumatakixa, prefecturas departmaentales jupanaakxa uñakipxaspati impuestos uksanaka tuqita sipanxa jan ukasti gobierno central uksankirinakakicha uñakipxaspa

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Prefecturas uksankirinakaxa uñakipxaspawa impuestos ukasa tuqita sipana

[2] impuestos ukxa uñakipataspawa gobierno central uksata

BOLANM5. Jumatakixa autonomias indígenas ukaxa askinakti markaru apanispa jan ukasti janicha juk'ampi jani walt'awinakcha apanispa?

Askiskinaka apanispa [1] juk'ampi jani wat'awinaka apanispa [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLCA8. ¿Jumana amuyumanxa jichhakamaxa asamblea constituyente jach'a ulaqaxa askinakti apanpacha aka Bolivia markasataki jan ukasti juk'ampi jan walt'awinakcha panpacha?

Askinakwa apaniwayi [1]juk'ampi jani walt'awinaka apani [2]NS/NR [8]

BOLCA9. ¿Qharuruspa uka jach'a referéndum jiskt'awi wakicht'ataki aka machaqa tayka Karachi iyaw sañataki jan ukaxa janiw sañatakisa jumaxa iyaw sasmati jan ukasti janiw sasmacha?

iyawsawi [1] janiw sawi [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLCA10. Jumana amuyatamanxa yaqhipa amtawinaka aruskipasiwayki aka asamblea constituyente jach'a ulaqanxa , kunjamatixa wastmapi chhijllaña jiliri irpirisaru , ukaxa ma jiskt'awi tuqicha ukaxa uñjt'atañapa wakisispana jan ukaxa janicha markachirinakaxa uka tuqitxa wakiskaspa arsusipxañapa?

Wakisispawa ma jiskt'awi yaqhipa aruskipawinakataki [1] janiwa juk'ampi juskt'awinakawa wakiskiti [2] NS/NR [8]

NEWTOL7. ¿Kawkiri amtawinakampisa jumaxa iyawata? Kuasa utjpana markaxa mayakiskañapawa.....juk'ampi jani walt'awinakawa utji markaxa t'unjtañapacha wakisispa

Markaxa mayakiwa sarantañapa [1] markaxa t'aqxtañapawa wakisispa [2] NS/NR [8]

NEWTOL9. ¿Jumana amuyatamanxa gobierno central uksankirinakati uñakipapxañapaxa wakisispa aka medios de comunicación ukanaka amukt'ayañataki?

Gobierno central uksankirinakaxa amukt'ayaña wakisispawa yaqhipaxa [1]
Gobierno janiwa kunapachasa medios jupanakaru amukt'aykaspati [2] NS/NR [8]

BOLAUT11. ¿Usted cree que el Gobierno debería poder censurar a los medios de comunicación que lo critican, o que el Gobierno nunca debería interferir con los medios de comunicación?

Gobierno debería censurar a algunos medios [1] Gobierno nunca debería interferir con los medios [2]
NS/NR [8]

Jichhaxa t'ukt;ayañatakixa jiskt'amawa jiskt'anaka ukaxa jakthapt'añatakiwa

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza [educación, o escuela] que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ [primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria] = _____ años total [Usar tabla

abajo para código]

Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16		
NS/NR/	88					

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? *[No leer alternativas]*

NS/NR

[8]

[1] Católica

[2] protestante tradicional o protestante no evangelico

[3] yaqha jani cristiano

[5] evangelico ukatxa pentecostal

[6] mormon, testigos de Jehová, espiritualismo, adventista del septimo dia

[7] nayra markanakata chiqá sarawi

[4] janiw kawkirisa

Q5A. ¿Kunjamsa jumaxa sarta chikañcht'asiri servicios religiosos ukanakaru?

NS/NR

[8]

[1] maykutitxa jila sapa semananza maykuti

[2] maykuti sapa semanaza

[3] sapa phaxsina maykuti

[4] maykuti jan ukasti paykuti ma marana

[5] Janiwa kunapachasa

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]

Q10. ¿Kawkiri amtawi qilqataki ukanakansa familia taypiru qulqi mantirixa utji sapa phaxsina, amthaphisina taqinina yanapt'apapampi? ¿qhauqha qulqisa sapa phaxsinxa manti qulqixa?

Ningún ingreso [00] a 800 Bs. [03]	Menos de 250 Bs. [01]	De 251 a 500 Bs. [02]	De 500
De 801 a 1,200 Bs. [04] 3.001 a 5.000 Bs. [07]	De 1.201 a 2.000 Bs. [05]	De 2.001 a 3.000 Bs. [06]	De
De 5.001 a 10.000 Bs. [08] NS/NR[88]	De 10.000 a 20.000 Bs. [09]	Más de 20.000 Bs. [10]	

[RECOGER TARJETA E]

Q10A. Jjumasa jan ukaxa jumana utamana utjirinakaxa katuqaptati qulqi anqaxa markata?

Jisa [1] janiwa [2] => [Pase a Q10c] NS/NR [8] => [Pase a Q10c]

Q10A1. juk'aki katuqaspa ukhaki => ¿kunansa uka qulqha chhaqtayta?

NS/NR

- [8]
- [1] isina, manq'añana
- [2] utjawitaki (utataki)
- [3] yatxatawinakataki
- [4] Comunidad taypiru yanapt'añataki
- [5] K'umar jakañataki
- [6] Imañataki
- [7] Yaqhanaka

Q10B. Sólo si recibe remesas => ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?

Mucho [1] Algo [2] Poco [3] Nada [4] NS/NR [8]
Inap [9]

Q10C. (Todos) ¿jumanxa utjtamti wila masinaka anqhaxa marrana utjirinaka ukampisa nayraxa jumanakampina ukatxa jichhaxa sarawayxi uka anqaxa markaru?

Jisa, Estados Unidos ufana [1]
markanakana [2]

Jisa, Estados Unidos ukatxa yaqha

Jisa, yaqha markanakana jani Estados Unidos ufana [3] Janiwa [4] => [Pasea Q14] NS/NR
[8] => [Pasea Q14]

Q16. ¿Kunapachata kunapacharusa jupanakampi aruskipapta?

Sapuru [1] maykuti jan ukasti paykuti sapa semanaza [2] maykuti jan ukasti paykuti
phaxsina [3] samkanjama [4] janiwa kunapachasa [5] NS/NR [8]

Q14. ¿jumaxa amtati akata kimsamararu sarxaña yaqha anqaxa markaru irnaqiri?

Jisa [1]Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

Q10D. ¿qhaqxti katuqta qulqha familia tuqina yanapt'añatakixa....

NS/NR

[8]
[1] Jikt'aptamti, imayjamati
[2] Jikt'iwa munatarjama
[3] Janiwa jikt'kiti pisiwa
[4] Janiwa jikt'kiti jani walt'awinakawa utji

Q11. kawkirisa estado civil ukaxa jumana?

Soltero (1) casado (2) maynimpi (3) divorciata (4) jaljtata (5)
ijma (6) NS/NR (8)

Q12. ¿wawanakanitati? ¿qauqha?.....[00= ninguno => Pase a ETID] NS/NR [88]

**Q12A. Si tiene hijos=>¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, INAP/no
tiene hijos [99]**

**ETID. ¿jumaxa kunjamsa amuyasta, janq'ulla, meztiza, indígena jan ukasti originario,
ch'iyar janchini jan ukaxa afro boliviano ukata jan ukaxa yaqha tuqita?**

janq'ulla [1] mestiza [2] indígena/originaria [3] negro o afro boliviano [4]
mulata [5] yaqha [7]

**ETID2. [Census] ¿jumaxa amuyastati kawkiru pueglos indígenas uka tamanakatatamatsa? [leer todas las
opciones]**

Quechua [1] Aymara [2] Guaraní [3] Chiquitano [4] Mojeño [5] Yaqha nativo [6] jani kawkirsa [7]
yaqhanaka_____ [especificar]

BOLETIDA. Jumana amuyumanxa kunjamasa taykamaxa janq'u janchini, mestiza , indígena jan ukasti originaria, ch'iyara janchini, mulata ukacha?

Janq'u janchini [1]Mestiza [2]Indígena/originaria [3]Ch'iyara janchini [4] mulata [5] yaqha [6] NS/NR
[8]

LENG1. ¿Kaekirisa tayka laxra arusiñamaxa jisk'atpacha aruskayata ukaxa utamana? [accepte una alternativa]

Castellano [1001] Qhichua [1002] Aymarará [1003] Guaraní [1004] Yaqha laxra [1005] Yaqha anqaxa markata aru [1006] NS/NR [8]

BOLLENG1A. ¿Yaqha arutxa arusitanti kunjamatixa jumaxa jisk'alalakayata ukhaxa utjawimanxa? ¿kawkiri?[Acepte una alternativa]

Castellano [1] Qhichua [2] Aymara [3] Guaraní [4] Yaqha nativo [5] yaqha anqaxa markata jutiri aru[6] NS/NR [8]

LENG4. Arusisina kawkiri fruti aruskipasipxirina Auki taykanakamaxa ¿ Auki taykapaxa arusipxirinwa jan ukasti arusipxiwa?.....[Leer alternativas]:[Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el

otro más de uno, anotar 2.]

NS/NR [8]

Solo castellano [1] Castellano jan ukasti idioma nativa uka [2] Tayka aruki [3] Castellano jan ukasti anqhaxa markata maykipiri aru [4]

WWW1. Yaqha tuqinakata arusisina ¿qaqhakutisa jumaxa Internet qua apnaqta? [Leer alternativas]

Sapurru jan ukasti sapurjama [1] may kutsa ma semanaza [2] maykuti ma phaxsina [3] may samkanjama [4]
Janiwa kunapachasa [5] NS/NR [8]

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer uno por uno]

R1. Televisor satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R3. Refrigeradora [nevera] satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo [no celular] uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R4A. Teléfono celular satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R5. Vehículos satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Uno	[2] Dos	[3] Tres o más
R6. Isi t'axsiña	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R7. Microondas satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R8. Motocicletas satakisa uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R12. Q'uma uma uta manqhana	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R14. Litrina sataksia uka uta manqhana	[0] No	[1] Sí		
R15. Computadoras sataksia uka	[0] No	[1] Sí		

OCUP4A. ¿Kuna lurawimpisa jumaxa jilapachxa ch'amnchasta? [Leer alternativas]

NS/NR [8]

[1] Irnaqasa [Siga]

[2] Jichhaxa janiwa irnaqkiti ukampisa irnaqawiniwa [Siga]

[3] Thaqhasiwa irnaqawi[Pase a MIGI / TERMINA]

[4] Yatxatawimpiwa sarantaski[Pase a MIGI / TERMINA]

[5] Utana kuna lurawinaaksa utji ukanakampiwa ch'amnchasi[Pase a MIGI/ TERMINA]

[6] Jubilado ukhamawa ukampisa janiwa irnaqañatakixa aski k'umarakiti[Pase a MIGI/ TERMINA]

[7] Janiwa irnaqkiti ukatxa janirakiwa irnaqae;wi thakiti[Pase a MIGI / TERMINA]

OCUP1. ¿Kawkirisa jumana irnaqawimaxa?[Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?] [No leer alternativas]

NS/NR[88]

INAP[99]

[1] Ma askinjama yatxatata [abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.]

[2] Director ukhama [gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor]

[3] Técnico nivel medio ukata [técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.]

[4] Especializado ukhama irnaqiri [operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.]

[5] Gobierno uksana irnaqiri [miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública]

[6] Oficina ufana irnaqiri [secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.]

[7] Almacenes ukanakana alxiri [vendedores ambulantes, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.]

[8] Alxasiri

[9] Empleado, fuera de la oficina, en el sector de servicios [trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.]

[10] Yapumpi uywampi irnaqiri [propietario de la tierra]

[11] Peono ukhama irnaqiri yapumpi uywampi [trabaja la tierra para otros]

[12] artesano k'achañcht'iri

[13] empleada domestica ukhamana irnaqiri

[14] Obrero

[15] Fuerzas armadas ufana irnaqiri [policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.]

OCUP1A. Irnaqawimanxa jumaxa:*[Leer alternativas]*

[1] Gobierno central uksata payllata

[2] Mayni empresario ukataki irnaqiri

[3] Ma empresa ukani

[4] Jani khittaksia irnaqiri

[5] Jani khittaksia irnaqiri

[8] NS/NR

[9] INAP

OCUP 12A ¿Qhauqha pachanakasa irnaqta uka irnaqawimana?

_____ *[Anotar número de horas]* NS/NR[88] INAP[99]

OCUP12. ¿Kunjmasa irnaqaña munasma?

Juk'aki [1] pachpa [2] juk'ampi [3]

NS/NR [8]

INAP [9]

OCUPIC. Seguro social jan ukasti seguro de salud ukaxa utjtamti irnaqawimanxa?

Jisa [1]

Janiwa [2]

NS/NR [8]

INAP [9]

Jichhxa jiskt'appxamawa irnaqawimata aka diciembre maykipawaykipana 2006 uka marna

OCUP27. –¿Aka pachnaxa jumaxa kunti irnaqta aka urunakaxa pachpa irnaqawiniyatati?

[1] Jisa[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[2] Janiwa[Siga]

[8] NS/NR [Siga]

INAP [9]

OCUP28. Uka pachanxa jumaxa akankaskayatati?[Leer alternativas]

[1] Jani irnaqawini [Siga]

[2] Irnaqasa[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[3] Yatxatasa[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[4] Utana lurawinaka utjki uka irnaqasa[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[5] Yaqha lurawinakampi[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

[8] NS/NR [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]

INAP [9]

OCUP29. ¿Kawkirinsa razones ukanakaxa uka urunakana jani irnaqañataki? *[No leer alternativas]*

[1] Ukhamaki amtamapi yatatata irnaqawima *[Pase a OCUP31]*

[2] Tucusxi irnaqawimaxa *[Pase a OCUP31]*

[3] Thaqhaskanwa irnaqawi *[Pase a OCUP31]*

[4] Sit'antaxi irnaqawixa *[Siga]*

[5] Irnaqawita jaqsuyasi *[Siga]*

[8] NS/NR *[Pase a OCUP31]*

INAP [9]

OCUP30. ¿Kuna payllawsa katuqtati irnaqawimatxa jaqsuniptam ukhaxa?

[1] Jisa *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*

[2] Janiwa *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*

[8] NS/NR *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*

INAP [9]

OCUP31. ¿Aka pachanxa qauqha pachasa irnaqawi thaqhayata?

[1] Jisa *[Siga]*

[2] Janiwa *[Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA]*

[8] NS/NR [*Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA*]

INAP [9]

OCUP31A ¿Aka pachanxa qauqha pachasa irnaqawi thaqhayata?

[1] Ma pasita pisi

[2] Ma pasita ma kimsa phaxsiru

[3] Kimsa pasita jan ukasti suxta pasita

[4] Suxta pasita jila

[8] NS/NR

INAP [9]

MIG1. Wawakayata ukhaxa ¿kauwkhansa utjayata?, patana? Ma marrana? Jan ukasti aka jach'a markanakancha?

Patana [1]

Ma marrana [2]

Ma jach'a marrana [3]

NS/NR [8]

MIG2. Phisqha marta nayraqatarusti, kawkhankayatasa?*[Leer alternativas]*

Aka pachpa municipio ufana [1]

yaqha municipio ufana [2]

yaqha marrana [3]

NS/NR [8]

Jiskt'awixa tukusxiwa _____ : _____

TI. jiskt'awixa utjañapawa ma qauqha pacha*[minutos, ver página # 1]* _____

Ukaspawa jiskt'anakaxa yuspagara

Firma jiskt'atana _____

Supervisor de campo ufana firmapa _____

Yaqha arunaka:


Khititi qilkki aka jiskt'anakana firmapa _____

Aka jiskt'anaka uñakipki jupana firmapa _____


Tarjeta #1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta A



Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C

Aprueba firmemente

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3


2

Desaprueba firmemente

1

Tarjeta D

Mejor vida posible



Peor vida posible

Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 250 Bs.
- (02) De 251 a 500 Bs.
- (03) De 500 a 800 Bs.
- (04) de 801 a 1,200 Bs.
- (05) De 1.201 a 2.000 Bs.
- (06) De 2.001 a 3.000 Bs.
- (07) de 3.001 a 5.000 Bs.
- (08) De 5.001 a 10.000 Bs.
- (09) De 10.000 a 20.000 Bs.
- (10) Más de 20.000 Bs.