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5 Costa Rica and Jamaica

MITCHELL A. SELIGSON

For the past 200 years the Caribbean basin[1] has been characterized by foreign intervention, repressive government, civil unrest, and political instability. Beginning shortly after their independence from Spain in the early 1820s, the so-called banana republics of the Central American isthmus were subjected to a succession of foreign interventions perpetrated first by Britain and later by the United States in the form of "gunboat diplomacy."[2] For the most part, governments in the isthmus have repressed civil rights as well as human rights. In the Caribbean Islands a long history of slave uprisings and brutal governmental retribution has resulted in a pattern of racial tension and violence persisting to the present day. These islands, colonized by European powers at the onset of the age of imperialism, were among the last to throw off the colonial yoke; indeed, they compose one of the few areas of the world in which the United States, Britain, and France still retain colonial possessions.

Given this background, it is not surprising that free and open competitive elections have not taken root in most parts of the Caribbean basin. Indeed, three primary, interrelated factors that have been found by researchers of empirical democratic theory to militate against the establishment of democratic rule—namely, economic underdevelopment, dependency, and diminutive size—are all characteristic of the countries of the Caribbean basin. In spite of this background and the presence of these three factors, some countries in the region do not fit the pattern and have managed to develop a tradition of competitive elections.

This paper examines some of these anomalous cases, "outliers" if you will, in an effort to broaden and refine our understanding of democratic theory. The paper begins by looking briefly at empirical democratic theory and the primary factors that have been found to militate against democratic rule. Then it presents data for Latin American nations that draw attention to the anoma-

lous cases in the Caribbean basin. The paper examines two of these cases, Costa Rica and Jamaica, by tracing the development of competitive elections, the origins of the modern party system, and the social basis of voting and nonvoting in these two countries. The paper concludes by distilling the elements common to both cases, which might help improve our understanding of democratic theory.

Empirical Democratic Theory

Economic underdevelopment has long been seen as the principal factor inhibiting the formation of democratic polities. Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal work on the subject led him to predict a linear relation between economic development and democracy, a prediction that his limited data strongly confirmed.[3] Phillips Cutright's refined data and more sophisticated statistical techniques supported Lipset's hypothesis.[4] Later, however, Deane E. Neubauer found that, although economically more advanced countries were usually democratic, at the upper levels of economic development a threshold is reached at which further increases in development do not produce higher levels of democracy.[5] Neubauer's data, however, were limited to twenty-three nations. Robert W. Jackman, consequently, subjected Neubauer's findings to a more rigorous test.[6] Using data from sixty nations Jackman found that Neubauer was essentially correct, although the clearest relation holds for the poorest 50 percent of nations. Jackman's analysis, the most sophisticated of all the analyses to date, supported, by the best data available, Lipset's early insight about the link between economic development and democracy.

The link between economic development and democracy has long been apparent within the Latin American region. Martin C. Needler found a strong relation ($r = 0.72$) between his measure of economic development (life expectancy) and democracy (defined as an index based on the number of years of constitutional rule and the proportion of the population voting).[7] Similar findings emerged from a study conducted by C. Wolf, Jr.[8] There seems little doubt, based on these studies, that among the poorer nations in the Latin American region, as, indeed, in the world as a whole, democratic rule is unlikely.

Recently, however, researchers have begun to look more closely at the economic links to democratic rule in an effort to understand better why these two variables are systematically linked. Moreover, researchers have begun to disentangle the causal dynamics involved. In doing so, they have recognized two key variables: size and dependency. Although research linking size, dependency, economic development, and democratic rule is thus far only fragmentary, a pattern is emerging, especially with reference to the Latin American region. The following diagram summarizes what is known:



In a seminal essay, Roland H. Ebel explains some of the relations depicted in the diagram.[9] He argues that "other things being equal, the size of a country will have a direct bearing upon the kind of power structures that will develop there. To be more specific, the smaller the country, the more concentrated [that is, authoritarian] its power structure is likely to be."[10] The link between smallness and authoritarian rule, Ebel suggests, is a function of three economic factors: dependency, social and economic inequality, and economic underdevelopment. Empirical studies have begun to confirm some of these links.

Small size has been found to be directly linked to economic dependency. Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte found a strong ($r^2 = 0.48$) relation, on a worldwide basis, between population size and proportion of gross national product (GNP) made up of foreign trade.[11] Dahl and Tufte state that "the economies of scale tend to erode the independence and autonomy of the smaller democracy by making it dependent—officially or not—on the action of peoples outside the country."[12] The dependent economies of the small nations, therefore, make these nations much more sensitive to external pressures and fluctuations in world economic conditions than more independent economies make the larger nations.

Dependency, in turn, has been found to be closely linked to economic underdevelopment and to social and economic inequality. The theoretical and descriptive treatments given to dependence theory by Andre Gunder Frank, Celso Furtado, and Samir Amin[13] have recently been put to rigorous empirical tests.[14] The results of these tests suggest that, over the long term, dependency results in slowed economic growth and exacerbates social and economic inequality.[15] Moreover, as Michael Hout has established in regard to Latin America, dependence and inequality are "self-generating" and are "linked in a cycle in which each is important for the reproduction of the other. . . . There is

a cycle of dependence and inequality that reproduces itself in a classic feedback loop."[16] Finally, inequality and economic underdevelopment are frequently found to be reciprocally linked, especially in developing countries, and hence to reinforce each other.

The causal chain ends as economic underdevelopment is linked to authoritarian rule. James Torres has found in Latin America a rank order correlation of 0.72 between these two variables: The more economically underdeveloped the country, the more power is concentrated in the hands of a few.[17]

The preceding evidence suggests that small countries are likely to be dependent; that dependent countries suffer from reciprocal patterns of economic underdevelopment, social inequality, and further dependency; and, finally, that economic underdevelopment favors authoritarian regimes.[18] Although the full specification of the relation will have to await the results of major comparative, longitudinal studies, such as the Yale project, now under way, generalizing that small, dependent, poor countries are unlikely to be ruled by democratic regimes holds little risk.[19]

Yet the examination of the data from Latin America reveals some startling anomalies. Using only the criterion of economic development (measured in terms of energy consumption per capita), one sees that thirteen of the nineteen Latin American nations for which Jackman presents data were, in 1960, about as democratic as predicted or less democratic than predicted by their level of economic development (see table 5.1).[20] Six countries, however, were exceptions, with democracy scores considerably higher than predicted. In those six countries, however, several changes have occurred since 1960. Uruguay has recently been ruled by a military dictatorship and now would likely have lower democratic index scores than those presented in table 5.1. Ecuador has undergone many years of military rule and is only recently once again experimenting with democracy. Trinidad and Tobago, although considerably more democratic than predicted, is by no means a poor country; with vast oil wealth it achieved a GNP per capita in 1980 of $4,370. Finally, although in 1960 Barbados was much more democratic than predicted, like Trinidad and Tobago it can no longer be considered an underdeveloped nation. Even in 1960 tiny Barbados had one of Latin America's most developed infrastructures; and by 1979 it had achieved per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $2,040 (in 1978 prices), exceeding that of highly industrial Argentina ($2,003) and coming close to that of oil-rich Venezuela ($2,427). Hence, of the six exceptions only two, Costa Rica and Jamaica, remain anomalies.

Four other countries, not included in the Jackman study, merit mention in this survey of democracy in the Caribbean basin: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and Grenada. Two of these, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, although independent in 1960, were both ruled by authoritarian regimes. According to Kenneth Bollen's political democracy scale of 114 na-

Table 5.1 Economic development and democratic performance in Latin America, 1960

Country	Energy consumption per capita[a] (in kilograms of oil equivalent)	Democratic performance		
		Jackman index[b]	Jackman prediction[c]	Residual
More democratic than predicted				
Barbados	362	90	62	+28
Trinidad and Tobago	1,935	90	72	+18
Costa Rica	215	77	61	+16
Uruguay	851	79	68	+11
Ecuador	186	70	60	+10
Jamaica	521	74	64	+10
About as democratic as predicted				
Nicaragua	189	66	58	+ 8
El Salvador	128	60	57	+ 3
Panama	493	68	67	+ 1
Mexico	915	70	70	0
Peru	494	60	60	0
Brazil	337	61	61	0
Venezuela	2,623	73	75	− 2
Chile	839	60	65	− 5
Less democratic than predicted				
Paraguay	87	28	45	−17
Argentina	1,088	47	66	−19
Honduras	170	37	57	−20
Guatemala	915	35	58	−23
Colombia	516	41	64	−23
Mean entire world	928	66		
Mean Latin America	677	62		

[a]Data from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 326–28, as used by Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 219. The Taylor and Hudson book contains only the 1965 energy consumption data. The 1960 data, as reported here, come from the computer tape upon which the *World Handbook* is based. The tape is also the source of Jackman's data. Jackman does not include Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guyana, or Bolivia, and hence these countries are excluded from this table.
[b]From Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality*, 216–18, based on (1) the number of adults voting as a proportion of voting-age population, (2) competitiveness of party voting, (3) electoral regularity, (4) freedom of the press.
[c]Interpolated from Jackman, 72, figure 4-2, curve 4.4 (i.e., threshold interpretation as suggested by Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61 (Dec. 1967):102–109.

tions, these countries scored 13.9 and 20.6 respectively, on a scale that ranges, as does Jackman's, from a theoretical low of 0 to a high of 100.[21] Cuba today retains its authoritarian political structure, at least at the national level, although there has been a move to democratize decision making in recent years.[22] The Dominican Republic has had regular competitive elections since 1966, but the 1978 election was the first time in this century that the transfer of power from one president to another was peaceful. The attempt by the military to intervene in that election, although frustrated, adds to the evidence that democratic rule in that nation is exceedingly fragile.

The Bahamas and Grenada became independent in 1973 and 1974 respectively, after the calculation of Jackman's index. On the one hand, the Bahamas, with a GNP per capita of $3,310, could hardly be classified as an underdeveloped country. Grenada, on the other hand, is exceptionally poor (GDP per capita, $380); but in 1979 it underwent a leftist coup, and for a period it was in the throes of a major social revolution.

Of all the countries examined, therefore, only two, Costa Rica and Jamaica, emerge as clear-cut exceptions to the economic-development-democracy link. As shown in table 5.1, in 1960 both had a democratic performance index higher than predicted by their level of economic development, and both remain today nations that have had an unbroken chain of competitive elections for at least two decades. What makes these two cases especially irregular is that they also exhibit the other two characteristics that have been shown to militate against democratic rule: Both are quite small in territory (Costa Rica is 51,000 sq km, and Jamaica is 11,000 sq km) and in population (approximately 2.1 million in 1980 for both nations), and both are highly dependent on foreign trade (exports as a percentage of GDP in 1979 were 35.8 percent for Costa Rica and 41.9 percent for Jamaica).

Costa Rica and Jamaica, then, present all three characteristics that the preceding theory and data suggest as favoring authoritarian rule. Yet by any standard they are democratic republics. Of the 114 nations in the Bollen index for 1960, only 23 ranked higher than Costa Rica or Jamaica, and, among Third World nations, only Chile and Uruguay had a higher democratic performance score. Both Chile and Uruguay, however, have subsequently undergone exceedingly brutal military coups from which only Uruguay appears to be emerging.

For the purposes of comparative analysis, Costa Rica and Jamaica present anomalous cases that deserve study. The many similarities between these two countries further encourage analysis: They have similar population sizes (2.1 million), they have similar levels of economic development (GDP in 1979 of $1,297 for Costa Rica and $1,290 for Jamaica in 1978 prices), and they are identical in their degree of political democracy (90.1) as measured in 1965 by Bollen's index. Curiously, the two nations are linked culturally because, as a

result of historical factors that played an important role in the economic development of both nations, Jamaicans constitute the largest ethnic minority in Costa Rica. Finally, both countries are presently undergoing exceptionally serious and protracted economic crises that have resulted in some civil unrest. This paper, then, will focus on the origins, development, and functioning of competitive elections in Costa Rica and Jamaica in an effort to explain why democracy survives in these two Caribbean basin nations.

Because empirical democratic theory does not predict democracy in either Costa Rica or Jamaica, this paper will focus on other factors, not included in the empirical theoretical work, that may explain why these two countries have developed as they have. In the introductory chapter in this volume Myron Weiner suggests that "tutelary democracy under British colonialism appears to be a significant determinant of democracy in the Third World." Although Jamaica was a British colony, Costa Rica was not; yet both have remained democratic. Is one to view Jamaica as a case that fits the rule and Costa Rica as an inexplicable exception? Perhaps a more productive approach would be to move away from directly linking British colonialism to democratic rule and to focus instead on those elements in the British tradition that are conducive to democratic rule but that might also be produced by other circumstances. Weiner states that tutelary democracy inculcated two important elements: (1) "a commitment to the creation of bureaucratic structures," and (2) "the commitment of the political elite to adversarial politics within the bounded rules." By examining historical factors that produced these commitments in both Jamaica and Costa Rica, one may be able to test the notion that these are indeed key factors in helping to ensure democratic rule.

In an effort to test this broadened conceptualization of Weiner's hypothesis, this paper focuses on the development of a system of open and fair elections and a system of competitive parties. In both countries the electoral system evolved slowly and experimentally, moving with stops and starts toward open, competitive elections. The party systems as they exist today are products in both nations of critical events in the twentieth century. These critical events did not, however, polarize the population along class or ethnic lines, but instead gave birth to transclass parties, which have played a major unifying role. Therefore, the argument to be pursued here follows the logic developed by Alexander Wilde in his discussion of Colombian democracy: "A democracy is created and maintained by people who, for a variety of reasons, are committed to its rules of competition and consent. In a given case that commitment is to a series of historical, often quite specific memories, understandings, symbols, and experiences. They represent modifications or qualifications to the more general rules of democracy that permit *that* democracy to operate."[23] These rules to which citizens are committed can be violated to such an extent, however, that the consensus eventually breaks down, as happened in a number of

South American countries as well as elsewhere. The survival of democracy in Costa Rica and Jamaica depends critically on the strength of the peculiar historical consensus in each country.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica, like many other less developed countries, has been faced with increasing problems of economic growth because of its ever-increasing oil payments. In 1973 Costa Rica paid $31.5 million for petroleum imports, whereas in 1980 it spent $206 million, an increase of 550 percent. During the same 1973–1980 period, its domestic economy grew at an average of less than 6 percent per annum. The oil import bill has become more difficult to pay in recent years as the price of coffee, which hit an all-time high in the mid-1970s, has been dropping steadily. In 1980 alone the price of coffee dropped by 22 percent. Because Costa Rica depends on coffee for much of its export earnings, the problem has become acute. As the minister of economy is quoted as saying, "In 1970, one bag of coffee bought 100 barrels of oil. Today, one bag of coffee buys just three barrels of oil."[24] In 1980 Costa Rica suffered a $661-million deficit in the balance of payments, and all signs indicate that the problem is growing worse. Most economists predict that GNP per capita will not return to its pre-1980 level until sometime around 1990.[25]

Added to the economic problems facing Costa Rica is the atmosphere of crisis that runs throughout Central America. Although Costa Rica supported the Sandinista insurrection in its northern neighbor Nicaragua, it did so rather out of distaste for the Somoza dictatorship than out of support for the leftist revolutionary goals of the movement.[26] Consequently, the increasing radicalization of Nicaragua has produced strains in the relations between the two nations and has led to a polarization of domestic public opinion. Added to the strain of Nicaragua has been the civil war in El Salvador. Charges of public involvement in the lucrative and rapidly growing illicit arms trade in Central America rocked the government of Costa Rica.

Together these factors have created an atmosphere of uncertainty in Costa Rica that, by mid-1981, produced the first terrorist bombings in recent memory, along with the forced closure of a radio station and the deportation of political refugees, official actions unprecedented in more than thirty years of domestic tranquillity. Whether democratic rule could continue in light of these strains was a question openly discussed in Costa Rica. Yet it was widely acknowledged that democratic rule has an exceptionally firm base in this nation. The establishment of that base is the subject treated next.

Origins of Democracy in the Colonial Period. The colonial period in Costa Rica was markedly different from that of most of Latin America. In much of the area conquered by Spain and Portugal, an abundance of gold, silver, and Indian labor, at least in the early years of colonization, enriched the conquerors and their descendants, leaving the Indians (and later the *mestizos*) in abject poverty. As a result, in most of Latin America clear-cut social and economic stratification quickly came to be the central organizing principle of society, giving rise to a social duality that largely persists to the present day.

The economic duality that separated the elite from the masses in much of Latin America did not emerge in colonial Costa Rica. This little country had neither the precious metals nor the abundant Indian labor on which to base a sharply stratified system. Indeed, the Indians who were living in Costa Rica at the time of Columbus's discovery quickly disappeared as a result of disease, overwork, and general mistreatment by the Spanish settlers. By 1583 only 4,500 Indians were left, and by 1681 their numbers had shrunk to 1,600.[27]

The few Spanish settlers (no more than 200 by 1645), faced with the problems of a minuscule labor force and a near absence of precious metals, were forced to become yeomen farmers in order to survive. As a result, neither the colonial *hacienda* nor the *encomienda* prospered in Costa Rica. The conquerors and their descendants managed to retain their elite social status, but economic scarcity prevented that status from being underwritten by economic wealth. As a result, as one observer has stated, the colonial period produced a process of "downward leveling of social relations."[28]

In this atmosphere of relative equality, compared with other Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the New World, the seeds of democratic life were planted. Although the colony was far from the "rural democracy"[29] that some historians have called it, elements of egalitarian, participatory life emerged in Costa Rica earlier, and to a greater extent, than they did in most of Latin America.[30] The poverty of Costa Rica made the colony an entirely insignificant element in the Spanish colonial empire. As a result, a greater margin of self-rule than in the larger, richer colonies was allowed there. This greater flexibility, therefore, was a direct benefit of Spanish colonial neglect of what was for Spain an impoverished, scarcely populated backwater. Self-rule did not mean, however, that local government was particularly democratic, but the mere fact that many decisions were made at the local level began a tradition of participatory government.[31]

However fragile the colonial origins of participatory democracy were, on the eve of independence a fairly strong tradition clearly had already been established. Under the Spanish Constitution of Cadiz, in 1812 local *cabildos* (city councils) were established in Cartago, San Jose, Heredia, and Alajuela, Costa Rica's principal towns. Costa Rica, which had not fought for its independence, was informed of the Guatemalan declaration of September 15, 1821, on October 13. On October 25 a meeting of the *cabildos* was held to decide on the form of government the new republic would have. During this meeting the

delegates decided that the *cabildos* had not been created for the purpose of establishing a new government; therefore the delegates would have to ask for a popular election to name delegates to a new Junta de Legados de los Pueblos (Council of People's Delegates), which would then decide on the form of the new government. Hence, even at the outset, leaders respected popular sovereignty. Furthermore, the absence of a military struggle for independence meant that, in contrast to other countries in Latin America, there were no local *caudillos*, or strong men, who could have imposed their will on the embryonic republic.[32]

Establishment of the Electoral System. The work of the Junta de Legados de los Pueblos was to have a profound and lasting impact on the electoral system in Costa Rica. On December 1, 1821, the junta approved Costa Rica's first constitution, called the "Pacto Fundamental Interino de Costa Rica," but commonly known as "Pacto de Concordia." Based on the Constitution of Cadiz of 1812, the pacto established a rather complex system of indirect representative democracy that was based, nonetheless, on popular sovereignty. In each village voters elected members of the Junta de Parroquia (parish council), who in turn sent their representatives to vote in Juntas de Partido (party council), which in turn named electors to travel to Cartago, at that time the capital of Costa Rica. In Cartago the electors voted for a Junta Superior Gubernativa de Costa Rica (Supreme Governing Council of Costa Rica), a collegial ruling body composed of seven members (*propietarios*) and three alternates (*suplentes*). This body elected from among its members a president, a vice-president, and a secretary.

Presidential power under this system was severely circumscribed by the pacto, since the term of office was limited to three months, although reelection was possible. Rotation of power among the members of the Junta Superior was intended as a guarantee against executive tyranny.

Two other key provisions of the pacto reveal the commitment of Costa Rica's founding fathers to democratic rule. First, the residence of the junta member who held the presidency was rotated every three months between Costa Rica's four major towns (Cartago, San Jose, Alajuela, and Heredia), a device used to bring the rulers into closer contact with the ruled. Since the towns themselves were only a few hours' horseback ride from each other, clearly the framers wanted to establish that the government was obliged to go to the people rather than the other way around. This provision helped give rise to a political culture in Costa Rica of presidential approachability rarely found in other polities, where countless devices are used to separate the ruler from the ruled. Throughout Costa Rica's history, up to the present day, it has been common for citizens, rural and urban alike, to ask for and obtain an audience with the president to gain his support for a communal project.[33] Second, the

pacto established the right of any citizen to accuse any junta member of malfeasance (*crimen de acusacion popular*), which would lead to the formation of a Tribunal Supremo de Residencia to try the case. This provision further helped ensure executive accountability and, moreover, established the principle of citizen responsibility for and participation in maintaining governmental honesty.

Although the principles of democratic rule established by the pacto were to permeate Costa Rican political life from the 1820s onward, the pacto itself was an ephemeral arrangement. On January 10, 1822, barely a month after the signing of the pacto, Costa Rica was annexed to Mexico, a move favored by Cartago, a conservative, aristocratic enclave. As a province of Mexico, Costa Rica embarked on the preparation of a new constitution, which was promulgated on March 17, 1823. This "Primer Estatuto Politico" was almost a carbon copy of the pacto, with appropriate modification for Costa Rica's new provincial status.

The new government established under the 1823 document took power on March 20 of that year but lasted for only nine days; it was overthrown in a coup led by forces from Cartago. As a result, civil war broke out, the resolution of which was decided in the battle of Ochomogo, an event that still lives in the vicarious memory of every schoolchild in the country. Cartago was defeated in the war; and, as a result, the capital was moved to San Jose. Another constitutional assembly was called and on May 16, 1823, the "Segundo Estatuto Politico," a document that differed little from the ones that preceded it, was passed.

While the conflict between Cartago and San Jose raged, Costa Rica's connection with Mexico was being severed by forces beyond its control. On March 19, 1823, Agustin de Iturbide, emperor of Mexico, abdicated, and in July of that year the independence of Central America was formally declared in Guatemala.

On November 22, 1824, the little republics of the isthmus tried their hand at establishing a unified government with the creation of the Republica Federal de Centro America (Central American Federation). Under this system, three juntas were established in each of the five federal units. The Juntas Populares (People's Councils) were elected by the citizens at the local level. The Juntas de Distrito (District Councils) were composed of electors named by the Juntas Populares, and, finally, the Juntas de Departmento (Department Councils) were composed of electors named by the Juntas de Distrito. Representatives from the departmental juntas were sent to the federal congress. Within Costa Rica, as in the other federal units, governmental structures were established to attend to local affairs. The "Ley Fundamental del Estado Libre de Costa Rica" (Basic Law of the Free State of Costa Rica) became the new constitution, once again modeled on the pacto. This document stipulated qualifications

Table 5.2 Electoral participation in Costa Rica in presidential and vice-presidential elections, 1844–1982 (in percentages)

Election year (population base year)[a]	Abstention of registered voters	Population registered	Population voting
1844 (1844)	—	—	2.4
1897	—	—	8.9
1901	—	—	12.3
1905	—	—	16.4
1909	—	—	15.2
1914 (1915)	—	—	15.6
1917 (1915)	—	—	13.5
1919 (1919)	43.3	18.8	10.6
1924 (1920)[b]	28.9	20.4	14.5
1928 (1927)[c]	38.6	24.0	14.7
1932 (1930)	35.5	22.8	14.7
1936 (1940)	31.4	19.7	13.5
1940 (1940)	21.1	20.9	16.5
1944 (1944)	16.2	23.1	19.4
1948 (1948)	42.3	21.9	12.6
1953 (1953)	32.8	33.8	22.7
1958 (1958)	35.3	32.3	21.8
1962 (1962)[d]	19.1	36.6	31.3
1966 (1966)	18.6	37.9	29.8
1970 (1970)	16.7	39.5	32.9
1974 (1974)[e]	20.1	45.9	36.7
1978 (1978)	18.7	49.9	41.2
1982 (1982)	23.9	53.9	41.0

Sources: *Population data*: Government Office of Statistics and Census, *Estadistica Vital, 1976* (Vital Statistics, 1976), no. 43 (San Jose: Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Comercio, 1979), 11; *Poblacion de la Republica de Costa Rica por Provincias, Cantones, y Distritos* (Population of the Republic of Costa Rica by Province, Canton, and District), no. 44 (San Jose: Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Comercio, 1979), 1; and "Poblacion de la Republica de Costa Rica" (Population of the Republic of Costa Rica) (San Jose: mimeo, 1982). *Voting data*: Wilburg Mimenez Castro, *Analisis electoral de una democracia: Estudio del comportamiento politico costarricence durante el periodo 1953–1974* (Electoral Analysis of a Democracy: A Study of Costa Rican Political Behavior during the Period 1953–1974) (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1977), and "Las elecciones" (The Elections), in Chester Zelaya, ed., *Costa Rica contemporanea* (Contemporary Costa Rica), vol. 1 (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1979); Theodore S. Creedman, *Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970), 61–62; Romero Perez, *Partidos politicos, poder y derecho* (Costa Rica) (Political Parties, Power, and Law in Costa Rica) (San Jose: EdS. Syntagma, 1979), 95; Hermogenes H. Hernandez, *Divisiones Administrativas de Costa Rica y del Valle Central de los anos 1825–1848–1883–1892–1915–1927–1950–1963–1973 y 1979* (Administrative Divisions of Costa Rica and of the Central Valley for the years 1825–1848–1883–1892–1915–1927–1950–1963–1973 and 1979) (Heredia: Instituto de Estudios Sociales en Poblacion, Universidad Nacional, 1981); John A. Booth, "Representative Constitutional Democracy in Costa Rica: Adaptation to Crisis in the Turbulent 1980s" (paper delivered at the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, Glendale, Ariz., Feb. 25–27, 1982); and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica," in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, 1981–1982*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983). Note that different sources report slightly different vote totals in the pre-1953 period.

[a] Between 1920 and 1940 population data are available only at decennial intervals, as estimated by the Government Office of Statistics and Census, *Estadistica Vital, 1976* (Vital Statistics, 1976), 11. The year closest to the election is used for calculations presented here.

[b] The first election held under the required registration system.

[c] Although this was a census year, the Census Bureau's adjusted figures are used for it as well as for the years 1930–1966.

[d] Beginning with this election, voting was made obligatory after an amendment to the 1959 constitution.

[e] A constitutional amendment lowered the voting age from twenty to eighteen years.

for voting, such that voters had to own property worth 100 pesos or more and had to have reached eighteen years of age.

Despite the many factors favoring union, the federation soon broke down.[34] Costa Rica withdrew in 1829, rejoined briefly, and then definitively withdrew in 1838. Throughout this period, considerable political instability was in evidence, as the old dispute between Cartago and San Jose revived. A second civil war, called the Guerra de la Liga (War of the League), broke out in 1835; and in 1836 Costa Rica was invaded by Manuel Cuijano supported by imperialist elements in Cartago.

With the demise of the Central American Federation, Costa Rica found itself without a constitution. In 1838 Braulio Carrillo Colina, who had seized power in that year, decreed a new one. Called the "Ley de Bases y Garantia" (Law of Rights and Guarantees), the new constitution struck a major blow

against democratic rule by declaring Carrillo chief of state for life and by eliminating popular sovereignty and local government. The powerful office of *jefe politico* was created, combining the functions of mayor and justice of the peace.

Resentment of Carrillo surfaced almost immediately, and in 1842 he was overthrown by Francisco Morazan, a Honduran who had been elected to the presidency of the Federal Republic in 1830. Morazan declared Costa Rica once again to be a member of the federation and, as a consequence, was himself quickly overthrown (and shot) after only six months in office. As a result of these events, the Ley de Bases was voided in 1842, and the process of constitution-making was begun anew.

The constitution of 1844 represented a major departure in the electoral system that had been devised by the pacto. It not only reintroduced represen-

tative government, which had been abolished by the Ley de Bases, but also for the first time divided the government into three distinct powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. Moreover, it established for the first time the *direct* election of the president, senators, and judges. Finally, it set up the country's first voter-registration system. Perhaps because of fears of the consequences of direct election, however, voting rights were significantly restricted. Voters had to be married, male citizens of at least twenty-five years of age, and owners of property with a value of at least 200 pesos.[35] These restrictions on the vote limited the electorate to only 2.4 percent of the population, a tiny fraction of what it is today (see table 5.2).

These data are particularly valuable because the 1844 election was the only election during the nineteenth century for which data exist to measure the extent of popular participation. As far as this researcher has been able to determine, all other quantitative data for that century refer only to electoral representation, not to the popular vote. Hence, if the data for the 1844 election generally reflect the extent of popular participation of the nineteenth century in Costa Rica, clearly such participation was very restricted.

Direct democracy in the nineteenth century lasted, however, only two years; it was terminated abruptly by another coup. The constitution of 1847, which replaced the 1844 document, reflected for the first time the influence of the rising power of the coffee aristocracy. The poverty of the colonial period was sharply reduced as Costa Rica discovered "brown gold." Exports of the bean, which were initiated in 1832, began to skyrocket and by the 1840s reached over 1 million kilograms.[36] The wealth generated by coffee exports produced a powerful economic elite.[37] The 1847 constitution eliminated the direct vote of 1844, and replaced it with a modified version of the Juntas Populares of the 1824 Federal Republic system. Voting qualifications were further stiffened: Now a two-year period of residence in the electoral district, literacy, and the possession of property with a value of at least 500 pesos were required. The literacy requirement alone meant that the vote was restricted to less than 10 percent of the population.[38] The members of the Juntas Populares, who were elected by the citizenry, in turn voted for electors, under a proportional representation scheme. The electors selected the president, vice-president, *diputados* (legislators), and court justices. A further reform of the 1847 constitution was the elimination of the Senate and the reduction of the size of the Congress. Taken together, these changes in the electoral system produced a major restriction in popular sovereignty and a concomitant concentration of political power in the hands of the coffee elite.

The first elections held under the new constitution produced a regime that embarked on a further restriction of popular control. These reforms produced what has come to be known as the constitution of 1848, under which the

voting age, lowered to twenty-three in 1847, was again set at twenty-five. Furthermore, the most restrictive property qualifications to date were established by the requirement that voters had to own real estate valued at a minimum of 1,000 pesos.

In 1859 President Juan Rafael Mora Porras was deposed by coffee interests after he attempted to create Costa Rica's first private bank, an attempt the coffee aristocracy viewed as an economic challenge. A new constitution, approved that year, reduced the term of presidential office to three years and established limitations on presidential reelection. It did so as a reaction to Mora's ten-year control of the presidency. Property qualifications for voting were, however, reduced so that those with either property valued at 500 pesos or 200 pesos annual income could vote. Other qualifications, such as literacy and the voting age of twenty-five, were not altered, however.

The coffee oligarchy's heavy-handed operating in national politics continued over the next ten years until, as a result of competition among various coffee interests, Jesus de Jimenez was overthrown and a new constitution was approved in 1869. This constitution lowered the voting age to twenty-one and thus continued the trend of reducing voting requirements. It also established universal, obligatory, free primary education for both sexes. It went a step further by returning to local governments the right to propose constitutional reforms.

The expansion of popular sovereignty established by the 1869 constitution was stillborn, however, for in 1870 coffee interests again staged a coup. This time they installed a military man, Tomas Guardia, who established dictatorial control for a twelve-year period. In 1871 a new constitution was approved. This was the basic constitutional document until 1917, although until 1890 it was frequently suspended by coups and resignations. This constitution established a unicameral legislature, an arrangement which continues basically unchanged to the present. Qualifications for voting continued as in the 1869 constitution. In the election law of 1893, however, women were specifically excluded from the vote, a right that, in any event, they had not previously enjoyed.

Guardia's rule, which lasted until he died in office in 1882, made the coffee aristocracy aware of the need to seek popular support for its interests. As a result, the first parties, the Partido Liberal Progresista and the Partido Constitucional Democratico, were organized. These parties, although an invention of the elite, quickly found adherents among the voting public. Public involvement became so strong that in the first hotly competitive election (that of 1889) there was a popular uprising against a protest march led by policemen who were against the electoral victory of the opposition candidate. Thus in 1889 the public first became involved in defending the system of competitive

elections; and, although at this date the electorate still constituted only a small portion of the population, the uprising began a tradition of popular support for the system of elections. This tradition was to manifest itself in the crucial events of 1948, which will be discussed shortly.

The 1890 election began a period of political stability and electoral regularity that persisted through 1948, with the exception of the brief dictatorship of Federico Tinoco (1917 to 1919). In 1913 electoral politics underwent a major change when, for the first time since the abortive constitution of 1844, direct elections were reinstituted. At first the reform was a failure. In the 1914 elections three candidates ran, but none received the majority. Although the Congress was constitutionally empowered to select the victor, when two of the three candidates withdrew, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, who had not even run, was installed after the incumbent turned military power over to him. Then, in 1917, Gonzalez was overthrown by Tinoco, who called for a constitutional assembly and passed the constitution of 1917. This became Costa Rica's first modern constitution, providing social guarantees to workers and charging the state with the obligation to establish secondary schools. The public quickly became dissatisfied with Tinoco's dictatorial rule, however, and in 1919 forced him to resign.

With Tinoco out of the way, the government reinstated the constitution of 1871 and called new elections. It did so, however, under the aegis of the election law of 1918, which established for the first time the *cedula* (identification card) system of registration. Under this system all voters were to be issued an identity card, a procedure that forms the backbone of Costa Rica's present registration system. In addition, an election census was required prior to each election. Nonetheless, even with these reforms, less than 11 percent of the population voted in the 1919 election (see table 5.2).

Although the 1871 constitution remained in force until the 1948 Civil War, in 1925 and 1927 two electoral reforms were approved. The first of these reforms, the election law of 1925, required the secret ballot and created the Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Election Council), a body whose task was to supervise the elections. The *consejo* became the forerunner of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Supreme Election Tribunal), created after the Civil War and considered a central institutional prop of honest elections in Costa Rica. The second reform, the election law of 1927, established the Registro Civico General (General Civic Registry), later to become the Registro Civil (Civil Registry), the principal instrument employed for supervising registration.

Although the 1920–1948 period was central to the formation of modern political parties and to the establishment of strong voter allegiance to those parties, the events of this period are treated in the next section of this chapter because they relate more directly to that discussion. At this point it is necessary only to note the last major change in the system of Costa Rican politics, namely the change that occurred as a result of the post-Civil War constitution of 1949. The new constitution provided universal suffrage for the first time in Costa Rican history: All property, literacy, and sex qualifications for suffrage were eliminated. In addition the voting age was set at twenty, and the direct vote was established. The constitution gave the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones the responsibilities of supervising registration and elections and, perhaps more important, of declaring the outcome of the elections. Until 1949 the legislature had had the latter responsibility, and, as a consequence, politics had often interfered in its decision. Indeed, the politicized decision of the Congress in the 1948 elections was the catalyst that set off the Civil War. The 1949 constitution took two further steps important for democratic rule. First, it provided for free secondary schooling, which later was made obligatory. Second, it abolished the army, a provision that helped insulate Costa Rica from military coups over the following thirty years.

The impact of the 1949 constitutional reforms can be seen in table 5.2. Despite the earlier reforms, voter turnout remained quite low until 1953, the year of the first election held under the new constitution. In 1948, 12.6 percent of the population voted; in 1953 the number increased to 22.7 percent. It should also be noted, however, that, although the 1953 turnout was the highest until then, it exceeded the turnout of the 1944 election by only 3.3 percent. It is likely, however, that the 1944 data were inflated, as they reflect a considerable amount of ballot-box stuffing. Under the 1871 constitution, in force for the 1944 election, voters were not required to cast their ballots in their places of residence; and, as a result, widespread election fraud was reported because voters went from ballot box to ballot box casting their votes. The 1949 constitution corrected this difficulty by requiring voting in the place of residence. In addition, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones established a registration and voting system so carefully controlled that conceiving how it could be violated is difficult.

Turnout became a central concern of the post-Civil War governments, especially after the 1958 election, in which the percentage of the population voting dropped. As a result, in 1959 a constitutional amendment making the vote obligatory was approved. In the 1962 election, the first held under the obligatory rule, turnout jumped by almost 10 percent of the 1958 rate to 31.3 percent, and abstention of registered voters dropped by 46 percent of the 1958 rate to 19.1 percent. In 1974 the voting age dropped from twenty to eighteen, and turnout increased again, this time to 36.7 percent. Turnout increased once again in the 1978 elections, this time to 41.2 percent, as a result of an increase in the percentage of the population registered and a decrease in abstention. By

1978, therefore, turnout was close to its theoretical upper limit, since approximately 56 percent of the population was of voting age. By any standard, electoral participation in Costa Rica has been high.

Origins of the Modern Political Party System. Since 1953, elections in Costa Rica have been contests between the Partido Liberacion Nacional (PLN) and various parties and coalitions of parties known as the opposition. The forces that shaped the modern political party system, however, evolved many years before 1953 and crystallized in the 1948 Civil War.

The Partido Republican (PR), which appeared for the first time with this name in the elections of 1893, is the nucleus around which the opposition of the past three decades has formed. In 1893, however, the PR was not an opposition party; rather, it was the predominant political force and was led by the coffee oligarchy. The party managed to hold political power from 1901 to 1907 and from 1919 to 1948.[39] Until 1940 its ideology was liberal; that is, anticlerical and laissez-faire capitalist. It had no social-reform program; it systematically repressed labor organization; and, especially during the 1936–1940 administration of Leon Cortes Castro, it was fascist in orientation.[40]

In 1940, with the election of Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia, the PR radically altered its ideology and program and became Costa Rica's first populist party. How that change took place requires an examination of social and political forces developing among the working classes earlier in the century.

Although the first unionlike organizations were formed in 1854, they were little more than mutual-aid societies. These organizations, composed first of craft workers and later of bakers, construction workers, carpenters, and typographers, were only sporadically active until the 1920s.[41] Then, in 1923, Jorge Volio Jimenez established the Partido Reformista, advocating a major program of social legislation. Volio, influenced by Tolstoy and by the social Christianity of Cardinal Mercier, was a Catholic priest. In 1901 he had founded a newspaper, *Justicia Social*, the first to deal with social problems. In 1912–1913, he had fought in Nicaragua against U.S. occupation forces. After establishing the Partido Reformista in 1924, Volio ran for president of Costa Rica. Although he lost, he obtained a surprisingly strong 20.4 percent of the vote. As a result of this strong showing, he was made the second vice-president and given promises by the PR that some of his social programs would be implemented. In 1926, however, Volio became involved in a civil uprising in Liberia, a provincial capital, and was exiled to Europe. In 1934 he was defrocked by the Catholic church and afterward was politically and economically ruined. Despite the failure of his party, Volio managed to achieve some of its social objectives, such as the passage of a law dealing with work-related accidents. More important, however, he stirred the Costa Rican social conscience, placed the need for social reform on the political agenda, and stimulated workers to organize politically to achieve their objectives.[42]

The failure of Volio and his party to make any significant electoral gains forced the discontented to look in a different direction for a political solution. In 1929 the Communist party was organized, and in 1931 it was officially founded by a small group of intellectuals who were preparing for the 1932 municipal elections. The Congress, however, ruled the Communist party illegal. Consequently, to be allowed to participate in the campaign, the party changed its name, calling itself the Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos (Bloc of Workers and Peasants), and won two seats on the San Jose municipal council. The party, which had been critical of Volio's reformist efforts, took on much of his program and began to pick up electoral support. In 1933 May Day was celebrated for the first time in Costa Rica, and tensions generated that day eventually produced bloody street riots on May 23 of that year. As a result of this incident, the party gained the increased attention of the working class and stimulated greater fears among the ruling groups.[43]

The strength of the Communists continued to grow rapidly. In 1934 two Communist deputies to the Congress and eight municipal Communist councilmen were elected. In 1936 the Communist party won 5.1 percent of the national vote for president and vice-president, and in 1940 it succeeded in doubling that figure to 10.9 percent (see table 5.3).

The victor in the 1940 elections, Calderon Guardia of the National Republican party, before 1932 known as the Republican party, had to deal with the Communists as a major electoral force. As it turned out, despite Calderon's blue-blood origin and initial strong support from the coffee oligarchy, he was quite sympathetic to a number of the programs proposed by the Communists. Calderon was an exceptionally popular president, having developed his reputation when, as a physician, he attended the urban poor without charging a fee. His electoral victory of 86 percent of the votes cast in 1940 gave him a clear mandate, which he used to embark on a major program of social legislation. In 1942 he established a social security program and approved a minimum wage law, an eight-hour working day, and legal recognition of unions.[44] Then, in 1943 he took the unprecedented step of forming an electoral alliance with the Communists, who had renamed their party the Partido Vanguardia Popular (People's Vanguard party).[45] In the 1944 elections, the forces of the Communists ran in alliance with those of Calderon and won.

Several groups emerged in opposition to Calderon and his Communist coalition.[46] In 1942 the Partido Union Nacional (National Union party, or PUN) was founded around the personality of Otilio Ulate Blanco, who used his newspaper, *El Diario de Costa Rica*, as a podium from which to attack Calderon. Of greater importance, for the long term, was the formation of the

Table 5.3 Communist/Socialist voting strength in Costa Rica, in presidential and vice-presidential elections, 1936–1982 (percentage of total vote)

Year	Communist/Socialist vote
1936	5.1
1940	10.9
1944	—[a]
1948	—[a]
1953	—[b]
1958	—[b]
1962	0.9
1966	—[b]
1970	1.3
1974	2.9
1978	3.1
1982	3.3

Sources: Data from Wilburg Jimenez Castro, *Analisis electoral de una democracia: Estudio del comportamiento politico costarricence durante el periodo 1953–1974* (Electoral Analysis of a Democracy: A Study of Costa Rican Political Behavior during the Period 1953–1974) (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1977), and "Las eleccions" (The Elections), in Chester Zelaya, ed., *Costa Rica contemporanea* (Contemporary Costa Rica), vol. 1 (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1979); and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica," in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record, 1981–1982*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).
Note: The dashes for 1944 and 1948 indicate that the Communist votes were combined with the Calderon Guardia votes and hence are not separable. For 1958 and 1966 there were no Communist votes since the party was excluded from the ballot.
[a]Coalition with Calderon Guardia's forces.
[b]Excluded from elections.

Partido Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation party), or PLN. In 1940 a group of law students and young professionals organized the Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales (Center for the Study of National Problems). In its monthly journal, *Surco*, it began a dialogue over the central problems in Costa Rican economic and political life. It sought to do away with the personalist parties of the past and introduce an ideologically based reformist party that would increase suffrage, promote cooperatives, and expand public education. Out of this group in 1945, the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic party) was born.

In an open convention held to select the nominee to oppose Calderon for the 1948 elections, Ulate emerged the victor. Although his program was distasteful to the Social Democrats, in their desire to end the Calderon regime and the Communist influence in government, they united behind Ulate. Hence the 1948 election was a contest between the workers and the Communists

supporting Calderon, on the one hand, and the traditional oligarchy and the reformist social democrats supporting Ulate, on the other.

The campaign was bitterly fought, and there was much fraud in the election itself; but when the votes were counted, Ulate, with 54.2 percent of the votes, emerged the clear victor. The Calderonist-dominated Congress, which had the responsibility of announcing the victory, annulled the election. Costa Ricans, as they had done on previous occasions, reacted violently to this blatant interference with the electoral system. The coalition of forces arrayed against Calderon, including those who sought the elimination of Communist influence in government as well as those who sought a social democratic solution to Costa Rica's problems, united behind Jose "Pepe" Figueres Ferrer, who promised to rid the country of Calderon and his followers. Figueres led his forces to victory in an insurrection directed against the government and on May 8, 1948, set up a governing body, the Junta Fundadora de le Segunda Republica (Founding Council of the Second Republic), which ruled by decree until November 8, 1949, at which time Ulate was installed in the presidency.

To bring the Civil War to a conclusion, Benjamin Nunez Vargas, a priest who represented Figueres, gave the leader of the Communists, Manuel Mora Valverde, guarantees ensuring "respect for the republican democratic system and assuring and respecting freedom of thought, conscience, meeting and of organization of all political parties which exist or are able to establish themselves in the country."[47] On July 17, 1948, however, the governing junta declared the Partido Vanguardia Popular illegal. Then, in 1949, the constitutional assembly, after a lengthy and heated debate, included article 98 in the draft of the 1949 constitution. This article prohibited, by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, the "formation or functioning of parties which, because of their ideological programs, forms of actions, or international linkages, tend to destroy the bases of democratic organization in Costa Rica, or which threaten the sovereignty of the country." The express purpose of article 98 was to exclude Communists from the political system. As one delegate of the convention explained: "In order to defend the liberty of democratic principles there is the necessity in certain moments to restrict the liberties of the same."[48]

The effect of article 98 was primarily electoral rather than organizational, since the Communists were allowed to operate (under different names) and print their weekly newspaper (*Libertad*). They were, however, excluded from running candidates for office in all elections until 1962. In that year two congressmen, elected in 1958 as PLN supporters but who were actually Marxist in orientation, fought a successful campaign to allow Communist participation. In 1975 Daniel Oduber Quiros managed to have the exclusionary clauses of article 98 dropped. Despite the elimination of the prohibition, Communist voting has remained low, reaching only 3.3 percent in 1982 (see table 5.3). The

Table 5.4 PLN voting strength in Costa Rica in presidential and vice-presidential elections, 1953–1979 (in percentages)

Year	PLN vote
1953	64.7[a]
1958	42.8
1962	50.3[a]
1966	49.5
1970	54.8[a]
1974	43.4[a]
1978	43.8
1982	57.3[a]

Sources: See table 5.3.
[a]PLN victory.

strength of the Communist vote in local elections is twice the strength of the Communist vote in presidential and vice-presidential elections.

In 1951 Figueres formed the PLN to enter the 1953 elections. The ideology of this party was based on the principles of anti-Communism, capitalist economic development supported by the state, and expansion of the state apparatus. The PLN emerged with a landslide victory in 1953, primarily because the Calderonist forces did not put up any candidates and the only opposition came from the personalist Partido Democrata of Fernando Castro Cervantes. In 1958, however, the PLN faced stiff competition from the combined forces of the opposition, and it was never again able to garner such a large proportion of the votes. Consequently, the party has gone in and out of power ever since (see table 5.4).

In the years in which the opposition has been able to coalesce in a united front combining the traditional oligarchy, the unions, and the Calderonists, victory over the PLN has been ensured. These coalitions, however, have generally been ephemeral and have broken down repeatedly because of the incompatibilities in the ideologies and the goals of the various groups. In 1978 Rodrigo Carazo Odio headed a coalition government of the opposition under the flag of the Partido Renovacion Democratica (Democratic Renewal party), founded in 1972 when its members broke away from the PLN.

By February 1982, however, the voters were thoroughly disenchanted with Carazo, whose government was viewed as inept, and the PLN was voted back into power. In a landslide election in which the PLN garnered a larger share of the votes than it had since its first victory in 1953, Luis Alberto Monge was elected president; and the PLN captured thirty-three of the fifty-seven seats in the legislature, giving the party a majority for the first time since 1970.

Social Basis of Voting and Nonvoting. Since the Civil War of 1948, elections in Costa Rica have been regular, free, open, and honest. As a result, more than a dozen studies have been conducted on the social basis of Costa Rican voting.[49] Unfortunately, four factors have prevented these several studies from drawing unequivocal conclusions; and, consequently, there are still considerable gaps in our knowledge on this subject. The first, and perhaps most significant, factor producing ambivalence in these studies is that nearly all have been based on ecological analysis of election data, and as such they suffer from various difficulties inherent in this type of analysis. Second, several of the studies have been plagued by serious methodological flaws, such as an unnecessary restriction on the number of independent variables (sometimes three or fewer), inappropriate categorization of parties, unsophisticated (sometimes erroneous) statistical analysis, and misinterpretation of results. Third, voting loyalties have been shifting in recent years, making it difficult to generalize about the social basis of voting. Finally, there has been virtually no systematic analysis of abstention, despite its prominence in Costa Rican public discourse on the subject of elections.

Despite the several limitations of the existing research, some generalizations would be supported by most if not all of the studies.[50] The populist Calderonist Republican party has traditionally been supported by blue-collar workers and the lower class in the San Jose metropolitan area along with the rural proletariat of the "banana zones." Since 1966, however, when the Calderonist forces joined with their archrivals in the conservative National Union party (PUN), support from these sectors has waned. Hence the coalition party, called Partido Unificacion National (UN) has presented a succession of conservative candidates who no doubt were perceived as unrepresentative of traditional Calderonist interests. In an effort to develop an electoral coalition sufficiently strong to defeat the PLN, the Calderonists have had to turn their backs on their traditional supporters.

PLN support, the studies have shown, has traditionally come from rural areas, excluding the banana zones along the Pacific and Caribbean coasts, and has been particularly strong in Guanacaste Province, the major cattle-raising area. Historically the PLN has been particularly weak in the city of San Jose and in the surrounding suburban cantons of the metropolitan area. Finally, what urban support there has been has come from "white collar workers, civil servants, small shopkeepers and businessmen, artisans, and other middle and lower class elements."[51] Two qualifications of these generalizations are appropriate, however. First, the ecological analyses have not clarified from which social sectors within rural Costa Rica PLN support has come. Specifically, although it has been suggested that small landowners are strong supporters of the PLN whereas landless peasants support the opposition, that two-thirds of the people economically engaged in agricultural pursuits are landless indicates

that rural support for the PLN should be a lot weaker than it actually has been. Second, studies conducted in recent years have shown that rural PLN support has decreased and urban support has increased. Apparently, the massive growth in jobs in the public sector, fostered by the PLN since 1953, has developed loyalties among urban middle-class groups who depend on the state for their livelihood.[52] At the same time, disenchantment on the part of blue-collar workers with a Calderonist party that is allied to the traditional conservatives has probably produced some defectors to the PLN side.

Party leadership of the PLN, although mostly coming from Costa Rica's upper class, draws a higher proportion from the non-upper-class strata, particularly from the middle class, than the Calderonist and Union Nacional parties draw. In a study modeled after Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* Arias Sanchez in *Who Governs in Costa Rica?* used social-background analysis to study Costa Rica's political elite, defined as those who occupy positions in the executive and legislative branches of government.[53] He found that among the Union Nacional members, 97 percent of Costa Rica's government ministers and 64 percent of its legislators define themselves as being upper class. Among the PLN leadership, however, these figures drop to 94 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Another study confirms this conclusion by demonstrating that twice as many opposition-party leaders as PLN leaders identified themselves as upper class, and fully 40 percent of the PLN leaders identified themselves as middle class, whereas only 27 percent of PUN leaders so identified themselves.[54] Using objective measures of class, the same study found that educational attainment and income were considerably higher among opposition leaders than among leaders of the PLN.

This summary, then, reflects the consensus of the several studies that have been conducted on Costa Rican elections; however, a major area of disagreement, which bears heavily on the interpretation of the election results, remains. Many analysts have approached the problem of Costa Rican voting from the perspective of socioeconomic analysis and, therefore, have sought to explain support for the PLN or for the opposition on the basis of these factors. Some others, however, have viewed loyalties developed before, during, and immediately after the 1948 Civil War as the primary determinant of voting preference, transcending socioeconomic factors. An early descriptive analysis came to the following conclusion: "Judging from the results of recent elections, it would seem that the electoral ties for and against PLN are based less on ideology or concrete program than on loyalties established during the 1940s and the Revolution [that is, the Civil War]."[55] In a rather sophisticated ecological analysis of the same election data, another analyst concluded that "socioeconomic conditions are therefore seen to be essentially unrelated statistically to voting patterns."[56] Another study,[57] however, using essentially the same

Table 5.5 Predictors of PLN voting and abstention in Costa Rica, 1974 election

Predictors	Beta	Simple r
Dependent variable: Vote for PLN[a]		
PLN party identification	.61	.62
Rural-urban residence	.07	.13
Age	.08	.14
Housing conditions	−.07	−.13
Dependent variable: Abstention[b]		
PLN party identification	−.21	−.22
Sex	.10	.10
Education	−.10	−.10
Age	−.09	−.07

Source: Roland E. Ebel, "Governing the City-State: Notes on the Politics of the Small Latin American Countries," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 14 (Aug. 1972): 325–46.

Note: This table represents the final step of stepwise multiple regressions.

[a] 0 = other than PLN, 1 = PLN vote (N = 1,125), $R = .62$, $R^2 = .40$, Sig $< .05$.

[b] 0 = voted, 1 = abstained (N = 1,374), $R = .27$, $R^2 = .07$, Sig $< .05$.

data analyzed by these investigators, concluded quite the reverse and explained 63 percent of the variance in PLN voting using socioeconomic variables.[58]

In an effort to obtain a clearer understanding of the social basis of PLN voting in Costa Rica and overcome the limitations of the prior ecological analyses, this paper employs survey data. The survey was conducted in 1976 and employed a sample of 1,707 respondents drawn from 359 sample segments in both urban and rural Costa Rica.[59] The data set permits an analysis of PLN voting strength in the 1974 election.[60] As can be seen in the top portion of table 5.5, four variables explain 40 percent of the variance in PLN vote. PLN voting is a function of party identification, rural residence, older age, and poor housing conditions. It is clear from the analysis (Beta weights) that party identification is by far the strongest predictor, far outshadowing the socioeconomic and demographic factors so often noted in the ecological analysis. Hence it seems clear that, as some have argued (for example, Robert Trudeau and Susanne Bodenheimer), historical party loyalties constitute the crucial factor explaining voting; once party loyalty is established, the remaining variables play only a small role in determining how an individual will vote. Unfortunately, no published studies on the development of party identification in Costa Rica exist, but to all indications, when such an analysis is undertaken, the events of the Civil War period will prove to be the determining factor.[61]

The analysis of nonvoting in Costa Rica has received very little attention,

despite that, as previously noted, a constitutional amendment making voting obligatory was passed to deal with what was perceived as unacceptably high abstention rates. Since the passage of that amendment, only about one in five registered voters has abstained (table 5.2). In one of the few discussions of the subject, Jimenez Castro says that it is the younger voters (eighteen- to thirty-year-olds) who stay away from the polls, because the nomination process largely ignores younger voters and, consequently, these voters feel excluded from the process of selecting candidates.[62]

The strongest predictor of electoral participation, as shown in the lower panel of table 5.5, is PLN party identification. Those who identify with the PLN are less likely to abstain than those who identify with other parties or those who have no party identification. The PLN, the only major party continuously active and organized since its entrance into politics in the early 1950s, is clearly more capable of getting out the vote than is the opposition. Although age, as suggested by Jimenez, does play a role, it is the weakest of the predictors that have a significant relation to abstention. Sex and education are also related to abstention, but not strongly. In sum, the results presented in the lower portion of table 5.5 show that those who are most likely to vote in Costa Rica are PLN identifiers, male, better-educated, and older. These variables together, however, explain only 7 percent of the variance, leaving the principal causes of abstention unexplained by the survey data. Factors other than individual characteristics must influence whether citizens will or will not vote. One needs to look further for an explanation.

Previous research in Costa Rica has shown that, although peasants exhibit higher levels of communal political participation than do urban dwellers, their voting levels are lower. This finding has led to the suggestion that

> lower voting among peasants than among urban dwellers in part may be explained by environmental factors. Peasants must usually travel long distances on rural buses (which charge a high per-mile rate because of the poor conditions of rural roads) to vote, while residents of the metropolis seldom have to travel more than a few blocks. The high costs of rural bus service must be borne by peasants who earn an average of only one sixth of the city dweller's income. Thus, high transportation costs incurred by the peasant stand between him and the exercise of the franchise.[63]

This suggestion was corroborated by a 1973 survey conducted among a sample of peasants, which found that as the level of cantonal economic development increased, voting levels increased.[64]

These findings, then, suggest that in order to fully understand abstention in Costa Rica one must look at both ecological factors and individual characteristics. This is done in the top of table 5.6, where an analysis of abstention in the 1974 election is presented. (The survey data reported in table 5.5 are based

Table 5.6 Ecological analysis of abstention and Communist voting in Costa Rica, 1974 presidential election

Dependent variable	Predictors	Beta	Simple *r*
Abstention[a]	Infant mortality rate[b]	.46	.72
	Banana cultivation[c]	.33	.56
Vote for PASO candidate (all cantons)[d]	Banana cultivation	—	.63
Vote for PASO candidate (agricultural, non-banana-exporting cantons)[e]	Land inequality[f,g]	.37	.33
	Tenancy[f,h]	.26	.26
	Infant mortality rate[b]	.26	.18

Source: Author.
Note: This table represents the final step of stepwise multiple regressions.
[a]Percentage of registered voters abstaining; ($N = 79$); $R = .78$; $R^2 = .62$; Sig $< .001$.
[b]1974 figures.
[c]Percentage of agricultural land in banana production.
[d]Percentage of valid votes cast; ($N = 79$); $R = .64$; $R^2 = .41$; Sig $< .001$.
[e]Defined as having 20 percent or more of the economically active population engaged in agricultural activities in 1973. ($N = 47$); $R = .49$; $R^2 = .24$; Sig $= .04$.
[f]1973 census figures.
[g]Gini index.
[h]Percentage of farmed land.

on the same election.) The most important predictor of abstention in the ecological analysis is the infant mortality rate, a variable generally used in Costa Rica as the most reliable indicator of geographic poverty.[65] Hence individuals who live in poor areas of Costa Rica are much less likely to vote than are those individuals who live in wealthier areas, a finding that supports the suggestions made on the basis of the survey data quoted above.

In the ecological analysis a second factor, predominance of banana cultivation, turns out to have a significant and strong relationship to nonvoting. The explanation of this finding is not readily apparent, since there appears to be no direct relationship between voting and banana cultivation. Further consideration, however, reveals that the banana zones are heavily populated by young men who leave their homes in other parts of the country to obtain work.[66] Therefore, because voters must cast their ballots in their places of residence, many migrants to the banana zones are effectively disenfranchised. As will later be demonstrated, the finding of higher abstention in the banana zones has significant implications for support for Communists. In sum, the ecological analysis explains 62 percent of the variance of abstention with just two variables: Individuals who live in areas of high infant mortality and those who live in zones where banana cultivation predominates are considerably less likely to vote than are those who live elsewhere.

Figure 5.1 Percentage of valid votes for PASO presidential candidate, 1974, in the Costa Rican cantons



The combined findings of the survey data and ecological analysis reveal that nonvoting is a fairly complex phenomenon in Costa Rica, especially when compared with nonvoting in the United States. In the United States most abstention can be explained by education and age, education being by far the most important factor.[67] In Costa Rica these factors play only a small role, whereas party identification and place of residence are much more powerful predictors.

Voting for the Communist party remains the final area of analysis. Most studies have found that votes for this party have been concentrated in the banana zones of the country. The explanation for this phenomenon is that, during the 1930s, the Communists scored their greatest organizational victories in these zones and became heavily influential in banana-worker unions. As banana workers have consistently achieved minimum wages that are considerably above those of all other agricultural workers in the country and, in addition, have been successful in their demands for improved housing, medical care, and social services, it is not surprising that they offer their political loyalty to the party that has been instrumental in achieving those gains for them.

As the vote for the Communists in 1974 amounted to less than 3 percent of the total vote, survey analysis is of little use in exploring the factors that motivate it; there would be too few cases, even in our survey of more than 1,700 individuals, on which to base sound conclusions. Hence one is compelled to rely on ecological analysis. That analysis reveals, as shown in table 5.6, that residence in the banana zones is strongly related to voting for the Communist party.[68] Indeed, this one variable, which explains 41 percent of the variance in the vote, is the only one that makes a significant contribution to the regression

Figure 5.2 Percentage of agricultural land in banana cultivation, 1973 census, in the Costa Rican cantons



equation. A comparison of figures 5.1 and 5.2 reveals how closely votes for the Communists are associated with the banana zones.

Historical loyalties, therefore, are largely determinant of Communist voting in Costa Rica, much as they were found to be in the voting for the PLN. It is possible to take the analysis a step further, however, by inquiring as to the factors that relate to support for the Communists outside their traditional strongholds in the banana zones. In India the most powerful explanatory variables in an ecological analysis of Communist voting strength were found to be landlessness in combination with high population density.[69] A similar finding was uncovered in Finland where Erik Allardt determined that "communism is strongest in milieus in which the social conditions make for insecurity and uprootedness."[70] Hence ecological factors creating insecurity were found, in these two countries, to stimulate Communist voting.[71]

In Costa Rica, insecurity has been found to be a central concern of peasants, since approximately two-thirds of them are landless and many of those who have land do not hold secure title to their land.[72] The ecological analysis of voting for the Communists in agricultural cantons excluding the banana zones reveals that insecurity indeed is a major motivating factor. As shown in table 5.6, land inequality, tenancy, and infant mortality have a close relation to Communist voting, inequality being the best predictor. That these three variables together explain 24 percent of the variance in Communist voting reveals that other important factors have yet to be uncovered. Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that, for Costa Rica as a whole, residence in banana zones is a strong predictor of the Communist vote, and, in other rural regions, insecurity brought on by inequality in land distribution, tenancy, and high infant

Table 5.7 Economic growth and stagnation in Jamaica, 1961–1979 (in percentages)

Year	Mean annual variation in GDP		Mean annual variation in value added by manufacturing	
	Jamaica	All Latin America	Jamaica	All Latin America
1961–1965	4.7	5.3	7.8	6.4
1966–1970	6.3	5.9	4.3	7.3
1971–1974	3.2	7.4	4.9	7.2
1975	−2.6	3.1		
1976	−8.3	4.8	−5.1	5.5
1977	−2.0	4.7	−9.6	3.8
1978	−1.0	4.6	−4.8	4.5
1979	−1.0	6.2	−2.0	7.5

Source: Comercio Exterior de Mexico (Foreign Commerce of Mexico), Oct. 1980, 365, 368.

mortality rates contribute to the Communist vote. As reported above, however, the lower turnout in the banana zones weakens the strength of this party and hence reduces its national impact.

Jamaica

Many political analysts have argued that the British colonial tradition and tutelary democracy are major factors explaining democratic rule in Britain's former possessions. The United States, India, Sri Lanka, Israel, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Bahamas are all cases that support that contention. Yet one would not want to argue that this tradition was a sufficient condition for democracy; many former British colonies, such as Uganda, have foregone democratic rule for dictatorship. Nonetheless, if tutelary democracy played any role in establishing democratic political culture, then Jamaica had a greater opportunity to be tutored than most other former colonies. Indeed, Jamaica was the first colony to be granted universal suffrage (in 1944) but was one of the last to achieve full independence (1962).

Whatever the role of the colonial experience in fostering a democratic political culture, democratic rule in Jamaica has been put to perhaps the severest test experienced by any former colony, with the possible exception of India, and yet at this writing has managed to survive. The economic deterioration suffered by Jamaica has been so severe as to destabilize even the most firmly established democracy. As is shown in table 5.7, after a fifteen-year period of steady growth that began in 1961, the Jamaican economy in 1975 took a nosedive from which it has yet to recover. Every year since 1975 the GDP has declined whereas for the rest of Latin America as a whole, growth

rates have averaged 3 to 6 percent a year. Indeed, signs of weakening in the Jamaican economy were already apparent in the 1971–1974 period, when growth averaged only 3.2 percent compared with 7.4 percent growth for the rest of Latin America. Lest one think that the overall growth rates for Latin America are deceiving because of spectacular growth in some nations and declines in others, one should note that no other Latin American country has experienced five consecutive years of GDP decline. Indeed, only Argentina, having negative growth in three out of five recent years, has come close. Nevertheless, Argentina has managed to end up with an average annual growth of 1.3 percent for the period, whereas Jamaica has averaged an annual 3 percent decline for those years (1975–1979). Guyana and Nicaragua have experienced two years of decline during the five-year period, and other countries have had either only one year of decline or five steady years of growth.

Jamaica's economic woes are not solely a result of declining export prices for its raw materials and commodities (bauxite, coffee, and sugar) but are also a result of its weakened manufacturing sector, as is shown in table 5.7. Between 1976 and 1979 there was unrelieved negative growth. In addition, food production, which directly affects the well-being of the poor, experienced the steepest per capita drop of any country in Latin America. If one uses 1961–1965 as a base, then in 1979 the Latin American average index was 113, whereas Jamaica had fallen to 65; and from 1971 to 1979 declines in per capita food production occurred practically every year.[73] Added to these economic woes has been spiraling inflation: Between April 1978 and April 1979 the consumer price index rose by 48 percent, more than two times the rate of Colombia, the country with the next highest increase in Latin America.[74] Finally, as early as 1973, when economic growth was still positive, 26 percent of the labor force of Kingston-St. Andrew, Jamaica's major urban center, was unemployed, giving this area the distinction of having, at the time, among the highest recorded unemployment rates in the world.[75]

The economic difficulties experienced by Jamaica appear to match the ideal "J curve" conditions hypothesized by James Davies as leading to revolution. According to Davies, when a period of steady economic growth is followed by a sudden and severe downturn, a widening gap between popular expectations and the ability of the system to satisfy those expectations is created. Under such circumstances, revolution is likely. Yet in Jamaica, despite considerable civil unrest in recent years, the system of competitive elections remains firmly established. As one observer commenting on these recent conditions has argued: "Disenchantment with the current government and its attempts to promote rapid economic and social change is not tantamount to questioning the legitimacy of the system. On the contrary, the Jamaican penchant for critical verbal attack on those in power is a form of participation which supports the Jamaican parliamentary democracy. It is a tacit acceptance

of a system requiring checks on power and the ability to compromise or alternate control."[76] Jamaica, then, is a country under severe protracted economic stress; it is impoverished, small, and dependent. Yet it survives as a democracy. The following pages will present a brief discussion of the development of democratic rule there, with particular reference to the institution of competitive elections, in order to account for the survival of the system.

Colonial Origins of Competitive Elections. The period of British colonial rule lasted so long in Jamaica (307 years) that it is easy to overlook the fact that before Jamaica became a British colony it had been a colony of Spain. Spain discovered Jamaica in 1494 and held it until 1655 when Britain, after landing troops there, took control. Most remnants of Spanish colonial rule were wiped out soon after the takeover.

From 1655 to 1661 Jamaica was ruled by the British military; but then, in order to stimulate migration to the new colony, three major changes were introduced. First, beginning in 1661, a local governing council was established, giving the colony a limited taste of local self-rule. Second, English citizenship was granted to all children born in Jamaica of British parents. Third, in 1677 a local assembly was established with a membership of forty-three representatives, two from each parish except Kingston and Spanish Town, each of which received three. The assembly was empowered to make laws "with the advice and consent of the governor." In effect, the assembly was a small-scale replica of the House of Commons, with the governor the functional equivalent to the crown, and the governing council, composed of twelve members, the equivalent of the House of Lords. Local offices were also established on the British model, with coroners, constables, and justices of the peace all taking up their respective positions in the colony. The judiciary, however, operated on insufficient funds, so local citizens served without pay as judges. Even though justice probably fell far from the mark on many occasions, this system did provide local citizens with invaluable experience in the administration of justice.[77]

Opinions as to the power and significance of these colonial institutions vary. On the one hand, some people argue that the entire arrangement was little more than an elaborate facade. Paul Singh states that in Jamaica, as elsewhere in the West Indies, the governors "busied themselves with applying the British forms but failed to give much attention to the spirit and content of the political institution as to their constitutional facade. They concentrated too much on clothing the local authorities with formal powers and too little on creating the conditions which would make their successful working possible."[78] On the other hand, Samuel and Edith Hurwitz hold that, despite its many limitations, local rule had a much more profound impact than Singh would allow:

> [The] local legislature had the last word in many disputes between themselves and the governor. Laws that were at variance with the wishes of both the governor and the Privy Council in England were frequently passed by the Assembly. Though the governor had the power to veto or could add a suspension clause so that the law could not take effect in Jamaica until it was approved in England, those powers were in fact rarely invoked. . . . As a result the Assembly and its subcommittee wielded powers that were usually delegated to independent national assemblies. This had the effect of taking away from the governor many of the powers that according to British Imperial theory were officially his.[79]

Apparently, then, on many issues local government prevailed, at least in those areas where there was not a direct clash of interests with Britain's economic or military concerns. Britain, however, repeatedly (1760, 1765, 1774) vetoed Jamaican laws that would have interfered with its slave-trade profits, whereas programs that Britain proposed to better the lives of Jamaican slaves were resisted successfully by the planters.

The existence of local autonomy, if only on those issues over which Jamaica and Britain were not at odds, did not necessarily mean, however, that solid foundations were being laid for democratic rule. Rather, the parliamentary system that Jamaica enjoyed provided the basis for what might be called an elite democracy, one in which only a tiny proportion of the population could play any role. Jamaica was a slave society, and members of the assembly had to be white Christians with an income of at least 300 pounds a year. As a result, the exercise of democratic rights was restricted to the landed aristocracy and the merchants, and the franchise was, as one observer has stated, "fantastically limited."[80]

Even through the abolition of the slave trade in Britain, Jamaican local upper classes solidified and reinforced elite control of the masses. Although by 1775 more than a million slaves had been brought to Jamaica, nothing was done to incorporate blacks into political life. Rather, repeated efforts were made to prevent the weakening of white rule. For example, when it became increasingly difficult to find sufficient numbers of white plantation owners willing to serve in the assembly, as many were absentee landlords living in Britain, the sons of indentured servants of Scottish and Irish settlers became members. At the same time, specific restrictions were imposed on blacks. Indeed, not only were blacks excluded from the assembly and denied the franchise, but also until 1795 they were excluded from testifying in the regular courts.[81] The law of 1711 barred manumitted slaves from holding any public office and from voting. Democratic rights were restricted for other, even white, minorities as well, so that by the same 1711 law, Jews were prohibited from

holding public office and were forced to pay a special Jews' tribute. As a result of all of these restrictions, "The assemblies were the tools of the creole ruling classes; and they were used as such."[82]

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, changes were under way in Britain that were profoundly to influence its colonies in the West Indies. As a result of the growing power of local industrialists and the corresponding declining power of those who earned their wealth from West Indian sugar, the balance of forces against the slave trade inexorably moved toward abolition. Anticipating abolition, the Jamaican Assembly in 1830 reluctantly granted the right to vote for the first time to all propertied freed blacks. Later that same year, manumitted slaves were given the same civil liberties as whites.

As emancipation grew closer, Jamaican slaves became restive. Hence in 1831 a slave rebellion broke out, but it was quickly and brutally suppressed. The reaction of the elite to this incident reflects both their lack of sympathy with the plight of the slaves and their own belief that they should be permitted to rule Jamaica without British interference. Thus a committee of the assembly that had inquired into the causes of the rebellion stated, "The primary and most powerful cause . . . arose from an evil excitement created in the midst of our slaves generally by the unceasing and unconstitutional interference of His Majesty's ministers with our local legislature."[83] The notion that the moves toward abolition constituted an "unconstitutional" interference in Jamaican local rule clearly reflects the extent to which self-rule, if only for the dominant class, had become a psychological reality on the island.

Abolition was passed in Britain in 1833 and in Jamaica in 1834. Unfortunately it did not bring with it the mass participation of blacks in Jamaican political life. Instead, the ruling elite devised a series of measures, not unlike the Jim Crow legislation passed in the American South after the Civil War, that restricted the rights of blacks. For example, in recognition of the abysmally low level of education possessed by the slave population, the Negro Education Act was passed in 1834. Designed to provide elementary education to the emancipated slaves, the act proved to have limited effect because it did not establish a system of public education. Rather, it left the education of freed slaves to a private-school system that was perennially starved of funds.[84] In 1835 the Sterling Report, prepared in Britain, strongly recommended public education for the emancipated masses; but the landed aristocracy strongly opposed the measure out of fear of strengthening black power, and therefore little was done in this direction.

The emancipation of 1834 was not intended to lead to an immediate freeing of the slaves. Rather, a seven-year apprenticeship was established to make the transition to freedom a smooth one. In 1836, however, Britain abruptly terminated this process when it became clear that the planters were

doing all they could to prevent reforms aimed at benefiting the emancipated slaves.[85]

The question of the political rights of emancipated slaves was first dealt with in 1840. The Voting Act of that year established four different methods of qualifying for the vote. Voters were to have a 6-pound sterling annual income from a freehold, to pay or receive a rent-charge of 30 pounds annually on real property, or to pay 3 pounds sterling direct taxes.[86] These restrictions on the vote were actually quite low; and, had they been adhered to in both spirit and letter, a large segment of the emancipated population soon would have been voting. Such a felicitous situation, however, was not to come about for another century.

To prevent emancipated blacks from achieving full participatory rights as established under the 1840 legislation, two measures were introduced. First, qualifications for holding office in the assembly were set quite high. Candidates had to have an annual income of 180 pounds sterling from land, real property worth 1,800 pounds, or both real and personal property worth 3,000 pounds. Second, under the stipulations of the 1841 law, all taxes had to be paid prior to voting. Voters had to pay a hereditaments tax of 12 pounds on any 6-pound freehold, equivalent to an estimated 10 percent of income. These taxes, in combination with the 1841 law, effectively disfranchised almost all blacks. Thus in the 1849 election, 1,819 votes were cast; but, after the passage of heavier taxation, the electorate shrank to 753 in the election of 1854. By 1863, of a 300,000 population, including 50,000 freeholders who had satisfied the property qualifications of the 1840 law, only 1,475 people, or less than one-half of one percent of the population, voted.[87]

From time to time during the nineteenth century attempts were made to broaden the franchise, but all failed or had little effect because of the 1841 law. Then, under the influence of the City party, the Franchise Act of 1858 was passed despite the opposition of the Country party. The act repealed the hereditaments tax and lowered voting qualifications for many groups. Yet, as a result of a compromise, the act imposed a ten-shilling stamp tax for voting. The overall effect was nil; in 1863 only 1,457 votes were cast in the elections. Also, despite efforts to broaden the franchise, repeated attempts were made to tighten the requirements for office holding. In 1854, 1858, and 1863, bills were introduced to raise the financial requirements for membership in the assembly and to reduce the number of members. Although the resolutions were defeated each time, the margin of defeat narrowed. One assemblyman stated that "at times despotism is better than representation. Some countries do require despotism—countries in which education does not prevail; I ask if this is not the position of Jamaica?"[88] Of course, if education was seen as a primary requisite for democratic rule, one wonders why the assembly hesitated so to provide

education for those whom it claimed would most benefit. Obviously the white political elite had few thoughts of a genuine expansion of political rights to the black population.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, it became clear that the ruling elite was far more interested in controlling the masses of freed slaves than it was in maintaining (even on a highly restricted scale) representative democracy. This attitude is vividly demonstrated in the events of 1865-66, when the ruling elite abolished representative government entirely, thereby setting the clock back on Jamaican political evolution by over 200 years.

The Morant Bay Riots and the Establishment of the Crown Colony. By the early 1860s economic conditions had deteriorated to such a point in Jamaica that many blacks were voting with their feet and leaving Jamaica for other parts of the Caribbean region in search of work. Many went to Panama to help Vicomte de Lesseps build the canal; others went to Costa Rica where they helped construct a railroad from San Jose to the port of Limon.[89]

For those who would not, or could not, leave Jamaica, the situation worsened steadily as sugar plantations became exhausted and work became scarcer. In 1865 the most serious uprising to that point in Jamaica's history broke out. In the course of the violence, known as the Morant Bay Riots, fifteen white officials were killed and thirty-one were wounded. The landed aristocracy was deeply frightened by the incident, fearing "black anarchy."[90] To teach the blacks a lesson, the white elite carried out severe reprisals in the course of which 354 blacks were summarily executed and 600 were flogged.

The most significant outcome of the Morant Bay Riots for the purposes of this paper, however, was the decision of the assembly to abolish itself as of December 22, 1865, and to relinquish all ruling power to Britain. Thus, after having had local legislative control since 1677, the white minority abandoned it and sought refuge under Britain's protective wings. As a result, on June 11, 1866, the Queen established the Crown Colony form of government in Jamaica.

The Crown Colony brought Jamaica more firmly under British rule than it had been since 1677. The governor of the colony appointed his own legislative council whose opinions were merely advisory. In effect, the governor became both the legislature and the executive. Elections and democratic rule were dead.

After eighteen years of autocratic rule, and with the memory of the Morant Bay Riots fading, the government took limited steps in the direction of reestablishing representation. In 1884 a few seats in the legislative council were transferred from their appointive status to elected status; and thus in that year elections were once again held on the island. In 1895, after eleven years of

this experiment with a highly restricted form of representative government, popular control expanded, and nearly half of the legislative council seats became elective offices. Under this arrangement, fifteen seats remained appointed by the governor and fourteen became elective.

Although representative democracy remained largely frozen in this limited form until 1944, some subtle, yet important, demographic changes occurred, beginning at the turn of the century. In 1901 the first black man was elected to the council; in 1906 the second black man took a seat. Growth in black representation was painfully slow. By 1935, however, eight seats were held by blacks.

Despite the election of blacks to the council, popular participation of the masses in Jamaican politics was still limited. In the 1930 election, of a population of 1,022,152, only 78,611 voters, or 7.9 percent of the population, were registered. And, among registered voters abstention was high, so that only 35.4 percent of those registered actually voted. Hence, in 1930 only 2.7 percent of the population voted for the elective seats of the council. By 1935 the situation had not improved; and, although the proportion of registered voters who cast their ballots had increased slightly to 40.1 percent, the proportion of the population registered dropped to 6.1 percent, meaning that only 2.5 percent of the population voted in that year. Yet even this limited democracy was a substantial improvement over the situation that existed less than a century earlier when only 0.5 percent of the population voted.[91]

Moves Toward Independence and the Origin of the Modern Party System. Jamaica entered the period of the Great Depression with an extremely fragile economy. For years the country had survived as a monoculture agricultural-export system. In 1938 agricultural exports composed 91 percent of all foreign-exchange earnings, of which bananas composed nearly two-thirds and sugar one-fifth. Fully 61 percent of the labor force was employed in the production of these two crops. The price fluctuation of these crops on the world commodity markets brought untold pain and suffering to the laboring poor of the island.

In response to the harshness of economic conditions, labor began to organize. By 1919 trade unions were legalized, but the vital right of picketing was not allowed. Moreover, no legislation to protect working women or children existed. Thus unions were almost powerless to effect changes in the system.[92] The depression, however, galvanized labor into action. When in 1937 and 1938 the cost of living took a sudden upsurge, Jamaican labor reacted.

In 1938 Alexander Bustamante led a strike on the Frome Estate Sugar Plantation, an action that resulted from a wage-and-hours dispute. The excitement generated there quickly spread to dock workers and street cleaners;

ultimately it produced a general strike. Indeed, all over the West Indies labor disputes broke out. In response, Britain resorted to old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy and sent a destroyer to quench the fires of labor agitation.

The settlement of the strike, as it turned out, laid the foundations for the establishment of the modern party system in Jamaica. Bustamante himself was jailed for seventeen months; and as a result, he became a labor martyr. The strike was settled under the leadership of Bustamante's cousin Norman Manley. Manley's popularity grew so quickly that, by September 1938, he had organized the People's National party (PNP) with the support of the Trade Union Congress (later to become the National Workers' Union). Bustamante, once out of jail, began to organize his own party, and in 1943, with the strong backing of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, which he led, he founded the Jamaican Labor party (JLP).

Although both parties had a union base, the JLP was much more thoroughly a labor party, a political arm of the union, and as such saw its role primarily as obtaining economic improvements for its members. It became a conservative reformist party with leadership from the lower middle class. Its program emphasized free enterprise and capitalism. The PNP, on the other hand, became a radical reformist party, with leadership coming from the upper-middle-class intelligentsia. Its program was directed toward the establishment of democratic socialism.[93]

Although both parties favored a change in Jamaica's dependent colonial status and sought to challenge the power of the planters and merchants, the PNP, led by Manley, was clearly "the driving force behind the decolonization movement."[94] In 1944 the decolonization efforts proved successful, and a new constitution was approved. Although the governor retained veto power, a lower house, with thirty-two members to be elected by universal suffrage, was established. Hence, nearly eighty years after the elimination of local legislative authority, Jamaica once again was to be ruled by representative government. This time, for the first time in its four-and-a-half centuries of colonial rule, all adult Jamaicans, black and white, rich and poor, were permitted to take part in the selection of their leaders.

In the 1944 elections the PNP and JLP competed for the first time. The PNP drew its supporters from the urban middle class and professionals, but it was outdistanced by JLP's much broader based support, which came from the lower classes, especially sugar workers, in alliance with big business interests that feared the socialist program of the PNP. In that election the PNP won 23.5 percent of the votes cast, whereas the JLP took 41.4 percent (see table 5.8). Several other minor parties and nonparty candidates ran and, in total, took 35.1 percent of the vote. This election, however, was the last in which political forces other than the JLP and PNP played any major role. Thus the 1944 elec-

Table 5.8 Parliamentary voting in Jamaica, 1944–1980 (in percentages)

Year	Votes received[a]		Abstention of registered voters[b]	Population registered[c]	Population voting[c]
	JLP	PNP			
1944	41.4	23.5	41	53	31
1949	42.7	43.5	35	54	35
1955	39.0	50.5	35	51	33
1959	44.3	54.8	34	53[d]	35
1962	50.0	49.6	27	48	35
1967[e]	50.7	49.1	18	30	25
1972	43.2	56.1	21	31	25
1976[f]	43.0	56.8	15	42	36
1980	57.4	42.6	—	—	—

[a]Data from Carl Stone, *Latin American Weekly Report*, Nov. 7, 1980. Some percentages do not total 100 because votes for minor parties are not included, p. 13; Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems (ICSPS), *Jamaica Election Factbook*, Feb. 27, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Operations and Policy Research, 1967), 14.
[b]Data from Adam Kuper, *Changing Jamaica* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 112; and Carl Stone, "The 1976 Parliamentary Election in Jamaica," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 15 (Nov. 1977): 256.
[c]Calculated from Stone, "The 1976 Parliamentary Election in Jamaica," 256, and United Nations Statistical Yearbooks for population data.
[d]ICSPS, *Jamaica Election Factbook*, 14, reports 51.1 percent registered, but calculations from the raw data reported in that source produce 53.7 percent.
[e]A new, complex system of voter registration introduced in the Kingston-St. Andrew area produced significantly lower registration for 1967 and 1972.
[f]This year saw the elimination of a complex registration system and lowering of voting age from 21 to 18.

tion proved to be a watershed in Jamaican electoral politics, since it solidified a party system and the electoral alignments that have persisted into the 1980s.

From 1949 until 1955 the JLP held power. Although its popular vote fell below the PNP in the 1949 elections, it managed to stay in control of Parliament because of the "first-past-the-post" rule for allocating seats. In 1955, however, the PNP proved unstoppable, and it achieved a major electoral victory, winning slightly over half the votes. The PNP continued to win the votes of half, or nearly half, the electorate until the 1980 elections, when its support dropped to 42.6 percent of the vote (see table 5.8).

From 1955 to 1962 the PNP had to deal with increasing sympathy toward independence from Britain. In 1958 Jamaica joined the West Indies Federation, but after a plebiscite held in September 1961, in which 54 percent of the voters favored withdrawal, Jamaica abandoned the federation.[95]

On August 6, 1962, Jamaica at last achieved independence. The new

constitution provided for two houses. The Senate, which was given review functions, was to be made up of twenty-one members, thirteen appointed by the prime minister and eight by the opposition. The House of Representatives was to have sixty members elected from single-member districts. In addition, local government was established at the parish level, with each parish having a council comprising thirteen to twenty-one members. The maximum life of Parliament was set at five years.

The Social Bases of Voting and Nonvoting. Electoral participation, in all its forms, has become popular in Jamaica. Perhaps responsible for the increase in voting is the rapid expansion of the public-education system, which grew in enrollment from 23.2 percent of the total (that is, public and private) student body in 1936 to 66.9 percent in 1974.[96] It is likely, however, that a more important factor is the highly politicized nature of the contest in Jamaica, with the two major parties struggling to impose their different visions on the country.

For its part, the PNP has been fighting for a radical change in Jamaica, seeking to establish a largely socialist economic system, although with some capitalist elements. It has done so in light of the severe structural problems that the economy faces. Not only is the external economy heavily dependent on agriculture and raw-material (mainly bauxite) exports, but also its internal economy is characterized by serious inequities. One study found that 5 percent of the households earned 30 percent of the income, whereas 60 percent of the households struggled along on only 22 percent of the income.[97] Unemployment rose from 10 percent in 1960 to over one-quarter of the workforce in the 1970s, with urban unemployment going even higher.[98] As a result of these economic problems Jamaica has suffered periodic outbreaks of violence, like the Rodney Riots of October 1968, which "shook the society and revealed the fragility and potential instability that underlay the island's apparently stable two-party system."[99]

In response, the JLP has argued for an incrementalist set of reforms patterned along capitalist lines. Its position is that radical changes are impossible given the limited resource base on which the island is able to draw. Moreover, the forces of international capitalism, dominated by the United States, were seen as not permitting Jamaica to evolve a socialist economy, especially in the late 1970s.

The polarization of the populace over these pressing economic issues, along with the patron-client nature of the party system, it would seem, are largely responsible for the high levels of political participation.[100] In a survey based on the 1972 election, Stone found that 48 percent of the public attended mass political meetings, whereas only 10 percent in Britain and 13 percent in the United States attended such meetings.[101] An astounding 82 percent of the public listened to party speeches on radio, whereas in Britain 21 percent of

the public listened to such speeches. Personal contact with local candidates was reported by 40 percent of the respondents, whereas 7 percent in the United States had such contact.[102] Finally, 15 percent, compared with only 4 percent in Britain and 7 percent in the United States, reported working in a campaign.[103]

An analysis of the factors related to participation showed that sex and education are important. Stone found, in the 1972 election, that in all modes of political participation, males participated more than females.[104] Education through the fifth-grade level was positively linked to attending mass meetings, but the relation was shown to diminish for those educated beyond the fifth grade. Formal campaign activities also increased with education. Age was also related to participation in Jamaica, but the highest levels of participation were found in the thirty to forty-nine age bracket.

Unfortunately, no extensive analysis has been published on electoral abstention in Jamaica. Indeed, an examination of the data displayed in table 5.8 suggests that such analysis is needed. There has been a clear, nearly monotonic trend toward reduced abstention of registered voters since 1944. In that year, 41 percent of the registered voters stayed away from the polls, but by 1976 the number of abstainers had dropped to a mere 15 percent. The percentage of the population voting has not, however, demonstrated a clear trend. The proportion of the population voting in 1972 was basically unchanged from the proportion voting in 1959. The situation is confused because a new, complex registration system for Jamaica's largest urban area (Kingston-St. Andrew) was in force for the 1967 and 1972 elections; the new system seems to have caused a sharp decline in registration for those years. Despite the elimination of that system and the lowering of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen for the 1976 election, voting merely returned to its pre-1967 level. Apparently, therefore, some factors are keeping voters away from the polls, although it is not yet entirely clear what these factors are.

Support for the two major parties continues to come from the groups that provided their early bases of support. Hence, on the one hand, the PNP is largely an urban-based party with white-collar workers overwhelmingly supporting it. Blue-collar workers and skilled labor, on the other hand, split their votes between the two parties. In rural areas the JLP predominates, especially among the lower classes; the JLP's urban support comes mostly from large business interests.[105]

In the election of 1980 there was a mass swing away from the PNP, probably in reaction to the serious economic failures of the preceding years. The JLP won fifty-two of the seats, leaving the PNP with only a tiny voice in Parliament. The elections took place in an environment of unprecedented violence and crime. In 1980 there were 745 murders in a population of only 2 million, and crime had reached such proportions that a climate of fear enveloped the

cities.[106] International pressures, moreover, raised the stakes in the election as the entire Caribbean area was wracked by the social forces unleashed by the Nicaraguan revolution and the ongoing insurrection in El Salvador. The left-wing takeover in nearby Grenada heightened the tension. Yet, despite all these factors, the 1980 election was held, and the electoral system survived another test.

Explaining the survival of competitive elections in Jamaica is difficult unless one recognizes that, despite the polarization in political discourse, the parties are firmly rooted in the mass public. Both parties are supported by groups ranging across the social spectrum, so that, on one hand, the JLP, which is heavily labor dominated, is sustained by strong support from Jamaica's wealthiest businessmen. The PNP, on the other hand, has strong middle-class and urban support but obtains the sympathies of those who are alienated by the failures of the economic system and are therefore searching for radical change. Moreover, as the two leaders of the two major parties, Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley, were cousins, rivalries have had the aura of a family quarrel, as Adam Kuper argues, and no one member of the family forceably suppresses the other.[107] Bustamante and Norman Manley, however, have passed from the electoral scene. Michael Manley, the present PNP leader, and Edward Seaga, the JLP victor in 1980, do not hold the long-standing loyalties their predecessors held. Whether competitive elections can survive this transition in the context of protracted economic crisis is anyone's guess. There are, however, few Jamaicans who are optimistic.

Conclusion: A Search for an Explanation

Costa Rica since 1953 and Jamaica since 1944 have had open, free, and comparatively honest elections based on universal adult suffrage. Empirical democratic theory would be hard pressed to predict such a development. These countries are largely dependent on agricultural and raw-material exports, and they have limited industrial bases. Their small populations and territories make them highly dependent on their trading partners and, therefore, targets of foreign control over their politics. And even though the British colonial tradition seems to have played a major role in encouraging democratic rule in its former colonies, not all have resisted the authoritarian temptation. And in the case of Costa Rica, as a former colony of Spain, an imperial power not noted for stimulating democratic polities, democracy has surprisingly flourished, despite the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in most other former Spanish colonies.

What are the common elements, if any, that have permitted competitive elections to flourish in Costa Rica and Jamaica?[108] Some analysts have argued that in Costa Rica the elimination of the army in 1948 has prevented military takeovers. But the Civil Guard has taken on much of the form and function of an army; and, moreover, that explanation cannot be used for Jamaica, which has a fully developed military establishment. The argument that democratic rule has survived because the fundamental issues have been resolved is also misleading. Indeed, vast inequalities in land distribution in Costa Rica and class conflicts intensified by elements of racial tension in Jamaica leave many fundamental questions unanswered for these two countries. A careful reading of the history of the development of the institution of competitive elections in Costa Rica and Jamaica does reveal, however, at least two common elements that seem to have augured well for democratic stability.

First, even though the Costa Rican system is presidential and the Jamaican system is parliamentary, both countries very early developed a relatively stable, broadly based party system. In Costa Rica the PLN had strong popular support by the time it first sought political office in 1953, and in Jamaica both the PNP and JLP developed strong electoral coalitions by the time they first competed in 1944. An extensive comparative survey of party systems in the period 1850–1950, conducted on a sample of twenty-six nations, found that the nature of the initiation of the party system was the fundamental common element explaining democratic stability. "During the early mobilization phase party systems of fewer, more or less evenly divided parties seem more conducive to democratic development than multiparty systems because the former aggregate and reconcile interests across a broad spectrum."[109]

In Jamaica both the political parties have a broad, transclass support base. Race and class divisions, two elements that could be seriously divisive, in Jamaica are fused, at least for the purposes of electoral politics. Moreover, the cyclical swing from one party to the other guarantees that the opposition party always has a fighting chance to be victorious. Finally, party patronage makes all groups dependent on the system for rewards.[110] In Costa Rica many of the same elements are found. The PLN incorporates a broad spectrum of the electorate, whereas the opposition has successfully used coalition politics to challenge PLN hegemony. As a result, in every election but one since 1948, power has alternated between the PLN and its rivals. The spoils of the PLN-created public bureaucracy have, therefore, been shared by the two groups, so that, as in Jamaica, both have an interest in maintaining the system.

The second element common to both nations is the long period of experimentation with democratic forms, albeit of limited scope. Costa Ricans spent nearly the entire nineteenth century adjusting their constitutional forms to fit a changing reality. Although in some cases those adjustments were imposed by undemocratic means, leaders always returned to the problem of refining the system. Moreover, despite the restricted nature of the suffrage, elections became part of the normal functioning of the political process. By the time universal suffrage was introduced in the twentieth century, elections had

become part of the political culture. Perhaps more importantly, citizens were willing to fight for the survival of the integrity of the election system. In Jamaica limited self-rule was granted by the colonial power as early as 1661, and elections were held regularly beginning in 1677. After universal suffrage was introduced in 1944, the colony had the opportunity to experiment with competitive elections for eighteen years before independence was finally achieved.

These two factors, then, are common to both cases and have helped ensure the survival of competitive elections. Yet clearly such a system has no guarantee of continued survival. Breakdowns of democratic rule, after long periods of democracy, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have shown, are common.[111] An example is Uruguay, which is a nation that for many years had a competitive party system not unlike the ones found in Jamaica and Costa Rica and that had a norm of alternating political control. Yet the inability of the major source of wealth (cattle) to underwrite a costly system of social-welfare benefits eventually resulted in economic chaos and brought a brutal, though perhaps temporary, end to Uruguayan democracy. Although the solution to Uruguay's economic crisis—namely, a radical intensification of cattle raising—was apparent for a long time, the political will with which to enforce such a solution did not exist.

Costa Rica and Jamaica today are facing an economic crisis in many ways similar to that confronted by Uruguay. Both countries have encountered increasing difficulty in achieving dynamic growth in their productive sectors while both have continued to increase public expenditures to satisfy demands made by the electorate. The party systems of both countries, perhaps because they rely on broad-based support, have not had the will to implement the fundamental changes that are required to revitalize the productive sectors. Hence it may be, ironically, that the very party systems that have ensured decades of competitive electoral politics may be the principal obstacles to solving the economic crisis.

Whatever the future has in store for Costa Rica and Jamaica, some revision of our understanding of democratic political theory is needed. These two cases do not suggest that the association between economic development and democracy is an entirely spurious one; neither do they contradict the thesis that dependency and diminutive size reduce the chances for democratic rule. What they do suggest is that other factors, such as the ones discussed in this chapter, need to be added to the equation.

Notes

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1. In this paper, the Caribbean basin is taken to encompass the independent republics of the Caribbean, the republics of Central America, and Panama.
2. The gunboats were last called out in 1965 when more than 20,000 U. S. Marines were landed in the Dominican Republic.
3. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (Mar. 1959): 65–105.
4. Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 28 (Apr. 1963): 253–64.
5. Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61 (Dec. 1967): 102–109.
6. Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).
7. Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America," *American Political Science Review* 63 (Sept. 1968): 889–97.
8. C. Wolf, Jr., "Political Effects of Economic Progress: Some Indications from Latin America," *Economic Development and Social Change* 14 (Oct. 1965): 1–20.
9. Roland H. Ebel, "Governing the City-State: Notes on the Politics of the Small Latin American Countries," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 14 (Aug. 1972): 325–46.
10. Ibid., 328.
11. Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1973), 113–15.
12. Ibid., 116. It should be noted, however, that Dahl and Tufte do not argue, as does Ebel, that size is linked to democracy as a result of the correlation of size with dependency. Their concern stems from the classical view, as expounded by Pericles, Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, that holds that democratic rule can best survive in small polities. They contrast that perspective with that of Madison, who believed that large size is a virtue in polities because it promotes pluralism, which in turn helps protect minority rights. Based on admittedly fragmentary evidence, Dahl and Tufte conclude that "no single type or size of unit is optimal for achieving the twin goals of citizen effectiveness and system capacity" (138).
13. A concise summary of this literature can be found in Steven Jackson et al., "An Assessment of Empirical Research on *Dependencia*," *Latin American Research Review* 14, no. 3 (1979): 7–28.
14. See Christopher Chase-Dunn, "The Effects of International Economic Dependency on Development and Inequality," *American Sociological Review* 40 (Dec. 1975): 720–38; Robert Kaufman, D. Geller, and H. Chernotsky, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 3 (Apr. 1975): 303–30; Richard Rubinson, "The World Economy and the Distribution of Income within States," *American Sociological Review* 41 (Aug. 1976): 638–59; Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, "Cross-National Evidence on the Effect of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality," *American Journal of Sociology* 84 (Nov. 1978): 651–83; James Lee Ray and Thomas Webster, "Dependency and Economic Growth in Latin America," *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (Sept. 1978): 409–33; David Snyder and Edward L. Kick, "Structural

Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955-1970," *American Journal of Sociology* 84 (Mar. 1979): 1096-1126; and Vincent A. Mahler, *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy: A Cross-National Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

15. See, however, Robert Jackman, "A Note on the Measurement of Growth Rates in Cross-National Research," *American Journal of Sociology* 86 (Nov. 1980): 604-17, and "Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World," *World Politics* 34 (Jan. 1982): 175-97.
16. Michael Hout, "Land Distribution and Trade Dependence in Latin America" (paper delivered at the Meetings of the American Sociological Association, Boston, Mass., Sept. 1979).
17. James F. Torres, "Concentration of Political Power and Levels of Economic Development in Latin American Countries," *Journal of Developing Areas* 7 (Apr. 1973): 397-409.
18. Authoritarian regimes are viewed as one end of a democratic-authoritarian continuum.
19. See Jackson et al., "Assessment of Empirical Research."
20. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality.*
21. Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 45 (June 1980): 370-90. Bollen provides data for both 1960 and 1965. Jackman, in a personal communication in 1980, stated that the Bollen measure is to be preferred to his own, as it is more refined and is available for many more nations, yet it still has the same relation to economic development as that found by Jackman.
22. William LeoGrande, "Mass Political Participation in Socialist Cuba," in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Participation in Latin America*, vol. 1: *Citizen and State* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978).
23. Alexander Wilde, "Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 33.
24. As quoted by Alan Riding in an article in the *New York Times*, Mar. 31, 1981, p. 14.
25. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica," in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record*, vol. 1: *1981-82* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), 398-465, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica," in Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record*, vol. 2: *1982-83* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984).
26. Mitchell A. Seligson and William Carroll, III, "The Costa Rican Role in the Sandinista Victory," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
27. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Notes on the Etiology of Poverty in Rural Costa Rica," memorandum prepared for USAID, Costa Rica and Cornell University Rural Development Committee (San Jose, Costa Rica: 1981), 4.
28. Carlos Joaquin Saenz, "Population Growth, Economic Progress and Opportunities on the Land: The Case of Costa Rica" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1969), 17.
29. Carlos Monge Alfaro, *Historia de Costa Rica* (History of Costa Rica), 13th ed. (San Jose: Imprenta Trejos Hnos, 1966), 137.
30. Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, "Costa Rica: Evolucion historica de una democracia" (Costa Rica: Historical Evolution of a Democracy), in Chester Zelaya et al., *Democracia en Costa Rica? Cinco opiniones polemicas* (Democracy in Costa Rica? Five polemic opinions), 2d ed. (San Jose: Editorial Universidad Estatala Distancia, 1979), 28-33, provides an excellent critique of the earlier work and presents a much more accurate picture of the supposedly bucolic life of the colonial period. Nonetheless, he concludes, "However, the foregoing [evidence] does not mean that the true bases of our democratic system do not depart from the colony" (33).
31. Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, "Costa Rica," states that local government positions were sold to the highest bidder during the colonial period (33-34).

32. This paragraph and the following discussion of constitutional development rely on these sources: Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, *Evolucion politico-constitucional de Costa Rica (Sintesis historical)* (The Political-Constitutional Evolution of Costa Rica [An Historical Synthesis]) (San Jose: Lehmann, 1978); Theodore S. Creedman, *Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970); Ricardo Fernandez Guardia, *Cartilla historica de Costa Rica* (A Short History of Costa Rica), 43d ed. (San Jose: Lehman, 1967); Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, *El sufragio en Costa Rica ante la historia y la legislacion* (Suffrage in Costa Rica before Its History and Legislation) (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1978); Nelson Chacon Pacheco, *Resena de neustras leves electorales* (A Succinct Description of our Electoral Laws) (San Jose: Litografia e Imprenta LIL, S. A., 1975); and Carlos Monge Alfaro, *Historia de Costa Rica* (History of Costa Rica).
33. John A. Booth, "Political Participation in Costa Rica" (title tentative, unpublished, 1981).
34. Thomas L. Karnes, *The Failure of Union: Central America 1824-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), points out that these were countries with the same language, history, and colonial past, and they were relatively similar in size and population. Transportation and communication routes, however, were oriented rather toward Spain than toward intra-Central America. All the many subsequent attempts to establish a Central American union were to fail. The Central American Common Market, a highly successful arrangement throughout most of the 1960s, was unsupported by a fundamental political consensus and sense of "we-feeling" and has today been all but abandoned. See Mitchell A. Seligson, "Transactions and Community Formation: Fifteen Years of Growth and Stagnation in Central America," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 11 (Mar. 1973): 173-90.
35. The information concerning voting qualifications for this constitution and the ones discussed below is contained in Jorge Enrique Romero Perez, *Partidos politicos, poder y derecho (Costa Rica)* (Political Parties, Power, and Law in Costa Rica), (San Jose: Eds. Syntagma, 1979), and in Cachon Pacheco, *Succinct Description.*
36. Mitchell A. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 19-20.
37. See Samuel Stone, *La dinastia de los conquistatores: La crisis del poder en las Costa Rica contemporanea* (The Dynasty of the Conquistadors: The Crisis of Authority in Contemporary Costa Rica) (San Jose: EDUCA, 1975). This outstanding study shows that the coffee barons of the nineteenth century were descendants of the conquerors of the sixteenth century.
38. Rodolfo Cerda, "Costa Rica: Problemas actuales de una revolucion" (Costa Rica: Current Problems of a Revolution), in Chester Zelaya et al., *Democracia en Costa Rica?* (Democracy in Costa Rica?), 134.
39. Jacobo S. Schifter, "Los partidos politicos" (The Political Parties) in Chester Zelaya, ed., *Costa Rica Contemporanea* (Contemporary Costa Rica), vol. 1 (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1979), 77-79.
40. Theodore S. Creedman, "Leon Cortes y su tiempo" (Leon Cortes and His Era), in *Anales de la Academia de Geografia e Historia de Costa Rica* (1967-1969) (Annals of the Costa Rican Academy of Geography and History [1967-1969]), 149-67; and "The Political Development of Costa Rica, 1936-1944: Politics of an Emerging Welfare State in a Patriarchal Society" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1971).
41. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica*, 66.
42. Marina Volio, *Jorge Volio y el Partido Reformista* (Jorge Volio and the Reformist Party), (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1973).
43. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica*, 70.
44. See Creedman, "Political Development of Costa Rica"; and Mark Rosenberg, *El Seguro Social en Costa Rica* (Social Security in Costa Rica), (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1980).

45. As elsewhere in Latin America, Moscow-line Communist parties were instructed, after the termination of the Russo-German nonaggression pact, to unite behind the antifascist struggle. As allies in the struggle against the Axis, the Costa Rican Communists had an interest in seeking an alliance with Calderon.
46. The events of the 1940s, which play such a crucial role in Costa Rica's history, can only be touched on here. Good treatments of the PLN are the following: Carlos Araya Rochet, *Historia de los partidos politicos: Liberacion Nacional* (History of Political Parties: The National Liberation Party), (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1968); Susanne Bodenheimer, "The Social Democratic Ideology in Latin America: The Case of Costa Rica's Partido Liberacion Nacional," *Caribbean Studies* 10 (Oct. 1970): 49-96; and Burt English, *Liberacion Nacional of Costa Rica: The Development of a Political Party in a Traditional Society* (Gainesville: University of Florida Latin American Monographs, 1970). The best history of Calderon is Creedman, "Political Development of Costa Rica." The Civil War itself is impressively treated in Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, *Costa Rica y sus hechos politicos de 1948* (Costa Rica and Political Developments of 1948), (San Jose: Lehmann, 1969); John Patrick Bell, *Crisis in Costa Rica* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971); and Jacobo S. Schifter, *Populismo versus Transformismo: Fase oculta de la Guerra Civil en Costa Rica* (Populism versus Transformism: The Clandestine Phase of the Civil War in Costa Rica), (San Jose: EDUCA, 1980). The brief account presented here draws on these sources.
47. Quoted by Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, *La Constitucion de 1949: Antecedents y proyecciones* (The Constitution of 1949: Antecedents and Projections), 6th ed., (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1979), 124, from a letter written by Figueres addressed to Mora.
48. Aguilar Bulgarelli, "Costa Rica: Historical Evolution," 126. A full discussion of article 98 is contained in Romero Perez, *Political Parties*, 72-85.
49. These studies include the following: Harry Kantor, *The Costa Rican Election of 1953: A Case Study* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958); James L. Busey, *Notes on Costa Rican Democracy* (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1962); Mario Carvajal Herrera, *Actitudes politicas del costarricense: Analisis de opinion de dirigentes y partidarios* (Political Attitudes of Costa Ricans: Analysis of Opinions of Leaders and Followers), (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1978); John D. Martz, "Costa Rican Electoral Trends," *Western Political Quarterly* 20 (Dec. 1967): 888-909; Carlos Araya Rochet, *History*; Robert D. Tomasek, "Costa Rica," in Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, eds., *Political Forces in Latin America* (Los Angeles, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1968), 131-57; Robert Trudeau, "Costa Rican Voting: Its Socioeconomic Correlates" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971); Jerome R. Bidinger, "The Ecological Basis of Costa Rican Voting Patterns, 1958-1966" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1972); Jorge Mario Salazar Mora, "El Partido Republicano" (The Republican Party), (Graduate thesis, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1974); Wilburg Jimenez Castro, *Analisis electoral de una democracia: Estudio del comportamiento politico costarricense durante el periodo 1953-1974* (Electoral Analysis of a Democracy: A Study of Costa Rican Political Behavior During the Period 1953-1974) (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1977), and "Las elecciones" (The Elections), in Chester Zelaya, ed., *Costa Rica contemporanea* (Contemporary Costa Rica), vol. 1 (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1979); and Jacobo S. Schifter, "La democracia en Costa Rica como producto de la neutralizacion de clases" (Democracy in Costa Rica as a Product of the Neutralization of Classes), in Chester Zelaya et al., *Democracia en Costa Rica?* (Democracy in Costa Rica?), and "Los partidos politicos" (The Political Parties). The earlier studies (those by Kantor, Busey, and Tomasek) used Costa Rica's seven provinces as the unit of analysis, whereas most of the ones after 1970 have used the canton, of which there were eighty during the 1978 election. The presence of substantial variation within provinces (for example, San Jose Province contains the largest urban population of the country as well as many remote villages) restricted the utility of the studies, which used the province as the unit of analysis.
50. The ecological analyses have usually been based on votes for the president and vice-president, although some studies have also examined legislative election results. Virtually no attention has been paid to elections at the local (that is, municipal) level. With the exception of votes for minor, regional parties, however, the pattern of results obtained from an analysis of presidential and vice-presidential voting is paralleled by that of the legislative elections.
51. Bodenheimer, "Social Democratic Ideology in Latin America," 63.
52. Between 1953 and 1973 central government employment tripled, and employment in the nearly 200 semi-autonomous agencies (publicly funded, special-purpose organizations, such as the water works and the electric company, which have limited government control) increased by 5.4 times.
53. Oscar Arias Sanchez, *?Quien gobierna in Costa Rica?* (Who Governs in Costa Rica?), (San Jose: EDUCA, 1976), 53-54.
54. Carvajal Herrera, *Political Attitudes*.
55. Bodenheimer, "Social Democratic Ideology in Latin America," 64.
56. Trudeau, "Costa Rican Voting," 196.
57. Bidinger, "Ecological Basis of Costa Rican Voting Patterns."
58. Bidinger, it should be noted, is highly critical of Trudeau's conclusions. Although at first glance Bidinger's analysis seems more convincing than the latter's because of the considerably more sophisticated statistical approach taken, his results are at best ambiguous and, I would argue, rather confused. Hence he finds that the two variables that best predict PLN voting (that is, have the highest Beta weights in his multiple-regression equations) are the percentage of the population having bathrooms and the percentage of the population having radios. Since both of these variables are normally interpreted as SES indicators, one would expect them to be positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with PLN voting (that is, poorer voters are more likely to support the PLN). He finds, however, that, whereas the bathroom variable is negatively correlated with PLN voting, radio ownership is positively correlated. His interpretation of these paradoxical results departs from the standard socioeconomic model and is based on the rather dubious assertion that "the possession of one of the most frequently mentioned items in the PLN campaign (bathroom facilities) apparently offsets the awareness of the Liberacionalista campaign provided by the ownership of radios" (Bidinger, "Ecological Basis of Costa Rican Voting Patterns," 195).
59. This national probability sample, known as the Segunda Enquesta Periodica de Opinion Publica, was supervised by Miguel Gomez of the University of Costa Rica and included a series of questions prepared by Mitchell A. Seligson.
60. It does not offer, however, a clear picture of opposition voting because, as in some previous elections, the opposition candidate was supported by a coalition of parties of widely diverse ideological and social backgrounds.
61. Schifter, "Political Parties," 85, under way at the Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Nacional.
62. Jimenez Castro, "The Elections," 143.
63. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Peasants as Activists: A Reevaluation of Political Participation in the Countryside," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (Apr. 1979): 43.
64. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Development and Participation in Costa Rica: The Impact of Context," in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. I: Citizen and State* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 145-54.
65. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica*, 49-77, 93-95.

66. Ibid.
67. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).
68. The Communists have run candidates under parties of several names, in part because of the earlier prohibitions against Communist parties and in part because of recent ideological differences among the parties, which have split their ranks. In 1962 the party was called Accion Democratica Popular (Popular Democratic Action party), whereas in 1970 and 1974 it went under the name of Partido Accion Socialista (PASO) (Socialist Action party). In 1974, the election year analyzed in table 5.6, there also existed a Communist party called Socialista Costarricense (Costa Rican Socialists), but it received only 0.5 percent of the total votes. Hence, for the ecological analysis, the PASO party, the traditional party of Manuel Mora founded in the 1930s, is the focus of analysis. In 1978 there were two Communist parties competing, Pueblo Unido (United People's party) and Organizacion Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Organization of the Workers).
69. Donald S. Zagoria, "The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India," *American Political Science Review* 65 (Mar. 1971): 144–60.
70. Erik Allardt, "Social Sources of Finnish Communism: Traditional and Emerging Radicalism," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 5, no. 1 (Mar. 1964): 71.
71. Contradictory findings have been reported on the extent to which insecurity contributes to insurrectionary behavior. Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics* 16 (Apr. 1964): 442–54, found a significant relation between inequality in land distribution and domestic violence; but Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics* 20 (Apr. 1968): 421–37, and "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion," *American Political Science Review* 63 (Dec. 1969): 1159–71, found that tenancy and inequality contributed rather to the government than to the rebel cause in Vietnam and the Philippines.
72. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica*, 93–95.
73. *Comercio Exterior de Mexico* (Foreign Commerce of Mexico), Oct. 1980: p. 367.
74. *Caribbean Basin Economic Survey* 6, no. 3 (1980): 26.
75. Guy Standing, "Aspiration Wages, Migration, and Urban Unemployment," *Journal of Development Studies* 14 (Jan. 1978): 235.
76. Richard S. Hillman, "Legitimacy and Change in Jamaica," *Journal of Developing Areas* 13 (July 1979): 405.
77. Samuel J. Hurwitz and Edith F. Hurwitz, *Jamaica: A Historical Portrait* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), 1–20.
78. Paul Singh, "Problems of Institutional Transplantation: The Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean Local Government System," *Caribbean Studies* 10 (Apr. 1970): 31.
79. Hurwitz and Hurwitz, *Jamaica*, 20.
80. Gordon K. Lewis, "British Colonialism in the West Indies: The Political Legacy," *Caribbean Studies* 17 (Apr. 1967): 3.
81. Hurwitz and Hurwitz, *Jamaica*, 64.
82. Lewis, "British Colonialism," 4.
83. As quoted in Hurwitz and Hurwitz, *Jamaica*, 111.
84. Sherry Keith, "An Historical Overview of the State and Education Policy in Jamaica," *Latin American Perspectives* 5 (Spring 1978): 39.
85. Graham Knox, "British Colonial Policy and the Problems of Establishing a Free Society in Jamaica, 1838–1865," *Caribbean Studies* 2 (Jan. 1963): 3.
86. Phillip D. Curtin, *Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas in a Tropical Country, 1830–1865* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 180.
87. Hurwitz and Hurwitz, *Jamaica*, 127.

88. As quoted in Curtin, *Two Jamaicas*, 189.
89. Douglas Hall, *Free Jamaica, 1838–1865: An Economic History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), 242–88.
90. Knox, "British Colonial Policy," 4.
91. Maurice St. Pierre, "The 1938 Jamaica Disturbances: A Portrait of Mass Reaction against Colonialism," *Social and Economic Studies* 27 (June 1978): 173.
92. St. Pierre, "The 1938 Jamaica Disturbances," 173–74.
93. Carl Stone, "Class and the Institutionalization of Two-Party Politics in Jamaica," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 14 (July 1976): 182–83.
94. Ibid., 183.
95. James B. Kelly, "The Jamaican Independence Constitution of 1962," *Caribbean Studies*, Apr. 1963, pp. 18–83.
96. Keith, "Historical Overview."
97. E. Ahiram, "Income Distribution in Jamaica, 1958," *Social and Economic Studies* 13 (Sept. 1964): 333–69.
98. Carl Stone, "Race and Nationalism in Jamaica," *Caribbean Studies* 13 (Jan. 1974): 5–32.
99. Carl Stone, *Electoral Behavior and Public Opinion in Jamaica* (Mona, Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1974).
100. Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Books, 1980).
101. Stone, *Electoral Behavior.*
102. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, "The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison," *Comparative Politics Series*, vol. 1, no. 01-013 (Sage Professional Papers, 1971).
103. Stone, *Electoral Behavior.*
104. Ibid.
105. Carl Stone, "Social Class and Partisan Attitudes in Urban Jamaica," *Social and Economic Studies* 21 (Mar. 1972): 1–29; "Social Stratification and Political Change in Trinidad and Jamaica," *Comparative Politics Series*, vol. 3, no. 01-026 (Sage Professional Papers, 1972); "Two-Party Politics in Jamaica"; and "The 1976 Parliamentary Election in Jamaica," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 15 (Nov. 1977): 250–63. See also Adam Kuper, *Changing Jamaica* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). Basing his evidence largely on observation and description, Kuper disagrees with Stone, stating that "support for one party or the other is not closely related to race, class, region or any obvious social indicator" (115). Stone's several careful empirical analyses would seem to refute this contention, however.
106. *Latin American Regional Reports*, Dec. 5, 1980.
107. Kuper, *Changing Jamaica*, 143.
108. Theories attempting to explain Costa Rican democracy abound. For some of them, see the following: Jose Francisco Trejos Quiros, *Origen y desarrollo de la democracia en Costa Rica* (Origin and Development of Democracy in Costa Rica), (San Jose: Editorial Trejos, 1939); Engenio Rodriquez Vega, *Apuntes para una sociologia costarricense* (Notes Toward a Costa Rican Sociology), (San Pedro de Montes de Oca: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1953); Harry Kantor, "Tambien hay democracia en el Caribe" (There Is Also Democracy in the Caribbean), *Revista Combate* 9 (1960); Leon Pacheco, "Evolucion del pensamiento democratico de Costa Rica" (Evolution of Democratic Thought in Costa Rica), *Revista Combate* 15 (Mar.–Apr. 1961): 31–42; Busey, *Notes on Costa Rican Democracy*; Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, "Fundamentos democraticos del sistema politico costarricense" (Democratic Foundations of the Costa Rican Political System), *Revista de ciencias sociales*, no. 7 (1970); Santiago Lopez Guitierrez, "Origin y caracteristicas de la democracia

costarricense" (Origin and Characteristics of Costa Rican Democracy), *Revista de Costa Rica*, no. 3 (1975); and Chester Zelaya et al., *Democracia en Costa Rica?*

109. Richard A. Pride, "Origins of Democracy: A Cross-National Study of Mobilization, Party Systems, and Democratic Stability," *Comparative Politics Series*, vol. 1, no. 01–102 (Sage Professional Papers, 1970), 744.
110. Stone, "Two-Party Politics in Jamaica."
111. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

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