

China, or to ethnic and family networks in Asia and Africa? At all stages of democratization, how is corruption linked to political contributions? Are corrupt governments and economies less able to adapt in a global world?

Some of the most active developments have to do with reform. Powerful, well-funded anti-corruption agencies—many modeled on Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption—have been established in many countries. (Others have had much more difficulty mounting credible reforms.) Transparency International, an anticorruption organization based in Berlin and launched in 1993, now has chapters in over seventy countries. Thailand's new constitution is strongly oriented toward the prevention of corruption. The OECD nations and several others have negotiated a comprehensive antibribery treaty regulating the "supply side"—firms from wealthy nations that buy influence in developing countries—and ending the tax deductions long allowed by many affluent countries for bribes paid abroad. The Organization of American States is forging an anticorruption treaty for the Americas. Transparency International and the World Bank have helped the major forces of society to draw up "national integrity systems" in countries such as Tanzania.

There is no single best way to control corruption and no precise measure of progress toward that goal. Appropriate reforms will differ from one society to the next and will require long-term support. A thorough understanding of corruption will require continued research, but may yield both promising reforms and important insights into the new global system.

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COSTA RICA. Many Costa Ricans believe that they are victims of a geographical error. Costa Rica, according to this view, is a European nation that by mistake found itself located in Central America. There is a grain of truth to this idea because Costa Rica is so different from its neighbors. Central America has suffered from brutal military rule, political instability, economic underdevelopment, and extremes in the distribution of income, wealth, and land. Costa Rica, while having experienced all of these symptoms of political and economic underdevelopment, has done so to a far more limited extent than other countries in the region and has made considerable progress in overcoming all of them.

No single feature of Costa Rica sets it apart from the rest of Central America more than its system of political democracy. Like its neighbors, Costa Rica was a colony of Spain until it was granted independence in 1821. Of all of the Spanish colonies in Central America, Costa Rica was probably the poorest and certainly the most isolated. This geographic isolation, however, may have proved to be an advantage because it seems to have helped to insulate the country from the politics of violence and military rule that came to dominate the rest of the region. Throughout the nineteenth century there was some domination by military strongmen, but at the same time, there were also signs of the growth of representative government.

It was not until the twentieth century, however, that the last vestiges of instability and authoritarian rule were fully overcome. With one brief exception, the first half of the century was characterized by elected, civilian governments dedicated to social and economic development. While the right to vote remained restricted to property-owning males, in 1925 the secret ballot was institutionalized, and in the years that followed an increasingly sophisticated voter-registration system was developed that has become the envy of even highly advanced industrialized nations. Perhaps the major turning point occurred in 1940 with the election to the presidency of Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia. Despite having been selected by the coffee-growing economic elite, once in office Calderón instituted a series of reforms that granted rights to workers (e.g., social security protection, minimum wages, eight-hour day). He proved to be a very popular president, but began to run into serious opposition from both the economic elite as well as sectors of the middle class when he formed an electoral alliance with the Costa Rican Communist Party in 1943. The alliance helped elect Calderón's handpicked candidate in the 1944 elections, but in the 1948 election, when Calderón ran again, he was defeated. The pro-Calderón legislature reacted by annulling the election, an act that enraged the populace and was the catalyst for a popular uprising led by José (Pepe) Figueres Ferrer. A brief but violent civil war erupted, thereby marring the tradition of domestic peace that had been developing. The rebels were victorious and under Figueres' guidance rewrote the constitution, which granted universal suffrage and other key rights and, perhaps most importantly, abolished the army. Unlike other victors in Latin American uprisings, Figueres voluntarily relinquished rule after holding dictatorial power for eighteen months. He successfully ran for election in 1953 under the banner of his newly established Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN). In time, the PLN became institutionalized as the nation's best-organized, most electorally successful political party.

Since the 1948 Civil War, political stability and democracy have not been seriously threatened in Costa Rica. Every four years the PLN has competed against opposition forces, especially the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, and has won more often than it has lost. It appears that the losses are more a function of the electorate's demand for "a new broom" to sweep out politicians who seem to have become corrupt or incapable than they are of any deep discontent about the way the system of government is run. There has emerged a broad consensus that democratic politics is desirable and that human and civil rights must be respected by those in power.

Political democracy has not protected Costa Rica from economic hardships, however. Although economic development was impressive throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, with the emergence of modern infrastructure in the form of roads, a nationwide telephone system, and the widespread availability of health and education facilities, by the late 1970s the economic model of state-promoted development seemed to run out of steam. Beginning in the early 1980s a severe economic crisis developed: high inflation, unemployment, economic contraction, and the explosive growth of foreign debt. Costa Rica seemed to be slipping into the pattern experienced so often by its neighbors in the region. To some extent the economic crisis can be attributed to external factors, especially the destabilization of Central America resulting from the

Nicaraguan Revolution, the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the breakdown of the Central American Common Market. But a large factor in the equation was that Costa Rica, with a total population of less than 3 million inhabitants, was not economically capable of financing the state-supported social services established since the 1940s.

The collapse of the economy was prevented by a large dose of foreign aid, most of it coming from the United States. This assistance enabled Costa Rica to begin a process of structural adjustment. The democratic nature of the system initially limited the capacity of the government to impose adjustment measures, such as the reform of the banking system, but as Costa Rica moved into the 1990s many of the reforms had been put in place. Economic growth and diversification continued as government spending was limited and the production of nontraditional exports was stimulated.

Costa Rica's traditional aloofness from events in Central America was affected as a result of the regional political and military crisis of the 1980s. President Oscar Arias (1986–1990) played a major role in the efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in the region, for which he won the Nobel Prize. Once the peace process was well along, Central American leaders turned to the issue of restructuring the moribund Central American Common Market and creating durable regional institutions that would both help avoid international conflicts and stimulate regional economic growth. Many Costa Ricans, however, were reluctant to join this process for fear of being drawn into regional conflicts. Symptomatic of that fear was the reluctance of the Costa Rican legislative assembly to ratify the agreement to establish a Central American Parliament even after all of the other nations of the region had done so. The current challenge for Costa Rica is to maintain its democratic system while joining its neighbors in the search for sustained economic growth.

(See also U.S.–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS.)

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CÔTE D'IVOIRE. Thirty-nine years of civilian rule over Côte d'Ivoire came to an abrupt halt when after a series of divisive political gaffes and rampant corruption the regime of Henri Konan Bedié, the nation's second president, was overthrown in a nonviolent and bloodless coup on 24 December 1999. General Robert Guei, who had served as the head of the joint chiefs of staff under Félix Houphouët-Boigny, assumed leadership of the military junta, named the Comité National de Salut Public (CNSP), and pledged his commitment to dialogue and a return ultimately to civilian rule. He selected a transition cabinet composed of military and civilians, the latter representing a cross-section of political parties, and proposed that a referendum be held to approve a new electoral code and constitution giving all Ivoirians an equal opportunity to participate in multiparty democracy.

Under the hegemony of the Parti Démocratique de la Côte

d'Ivoire (PDCI), the multiethnic party that Houphouët founded in 1945 and led until his death in 1993, the territory had remained relatively stable. The fact that the PDCI had ably defended French political and economic interests in Côte d'Ivoire explains French support for the party leadership until recently—a commitment backed by financial support and an unassuming French military presence of about 500 French marines stationed at Port-Bouët, near the main airport. France did not intervene to maintain Bedié in office, though they have allowed him to take up residence there in exile. The groundwork for a close working relationship with France began when Houphouët represented Côte d'Ivoire in the 1945 First Constituent Assembly. Houphouët endeared himself to Africans throughout the French-speaking territories by initiating the Houphouët-Boigny Law abolishing forced labor in 1946. He extended his influence by founding the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), an umbrella organization for political parties throughout francophone Africa. He held the minister of health portfolio for all of France in 1956. By referendum, in 1958, Côte d'Ivoire declined independence, in favor of semi-autonomy within the French Union, though full independence was granted, anyway, on 7 August 1960.

Under pressure from opposition groups and the international financial community (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Paris Club), in addition to worldwide trends toward democratization, Houphouët was forced to implement constitutional provisions for a multiparty system (30 April 1990). The transformation of electoral politics came on the heels of the severe 1989 economic recession and the ensuing breakdown of the patron-client system. Côte d'Ivoire's liberal economy had been fueled by cash crop growing *peasants who had been guaranteed a minimum price for coffee and cocoa regardless of market fluctuations and whose productivity had placed Côte d'Ivoire among the world's top three producers of coffee, cocoa, and cotton. Other export crops include pineapples, oil palm, coconuts, timber, latex, and sugar. Petroleum production from two offshore wells was insufficient to alleviate strains on the budget or prevent the rescheduling of international debts. The "miracle" of Ivoirian economic development had disguised a weak industrial sector.

Under the one-party regime, national elections held at five-year intervals had confirmed into office the incumbent president and a single list of PDCI candidates for the National Assembly—a process justified as a means, according to Houphouët, to preserve unity within diversity. During the economic crisis, massive street demonstrations led by teachers, students, doctors, and workers in crucial sectors of energy and communications marked widespread dissatisfaction. They were disrupted by state police with a force that sometimes resulted in death; however, this repression did not match the level of violence used in several previous incidents (i.e., the Bogus Plot of 1963; the 1970 repression of the Parti Nationaliste (PANA) resulting in 3,000–4,000 deaths among the Bété in Gagnoa).

Among opposition parties that arose in the 1990 multiparty elections to challenge the PDCI, the frontrunners were the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and the Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), winning ten seats in the National Assembly. Laurent Gbagbo (FPI), the only candidate to oppose Houphouët in the presidential elections, won 18 percent of the