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# The Logic of Nothingness

A STUDY OF NISHIDA KITARŌ

Robert J. J. Wargo



University of Hawai'i Press

HONOLULU

## 7 Appendix

### A Translation of Nishida's "General Summary" from *The System of Self-Consciousness of the Universal*

#### I

IN ORDER to help the reader understand what I have tried to say in this work, I think it advisable to clarify two crucial points where my position differs considerably from the mainstream of traditional philosophy. The first concerns my view of the universal that is the foundation of discursive knowledge (knowledge through judgments), and the other concerns my views on the way self-conscious experience is to be understood.

When we think that we predicate something with respect to an objectively existing thing by means of a judgment, the entity that becomes the grammatical subject is taken to be the foundation of discursive knowledge. Aristotle established the individual as that which could be a subject but never a predicate. Universals, since they are secondary substances, can become grammatical subjects, but a universal can also become a predicate that applies to something other than itself. Thus the truly real, that which

can be subject and never predicate, must be the individual. However, as long as it is possible to predicate something of the grammatical subject as the grammatical subject, this grammatical subject must be determined by a universal. The same is true of the individual when it is thought of as being a grammatical subject, for it is possible to predicate something of it only insofar as it is determined by a universal. In this sense then, judgment is established by the self-determination of a universal. Even Aristotle thought that *to ti en einai* (the being-what-it-is of a thing) had a definition, but that which has a definition must be determined by a universal. The same point can be made with respect to present-day object-logic.

If one makes a sharp distinction between problems of value and problems of existence, and seeks the foundation of truth in that which is objective (pure object), then one cannot avoid arriving at something like Lask's "unopposed object." However, in order for such an object, as the foundation of truth, to have a normative sense for our judging consciousness, it must come into being through something like Kant's synthetic unity of consciousness-in-general (apperception), i.e., it must be founded on the self-conscious determination of pure self. If such an object were completely transcendent with respect to our consciousness it could not have normative meaning for our judging consciousness. Just as there must be a universal that envelops and determines the individual insofar as something is predicable of it, so too must there be a self-conscious determination behind even a transcendent object insofar as it has a normative meaning. Yet it must be noted that this universal is not the so-called universal concept and that this self-conscious determination is not to be confused with so-called self-conscious determination.

If one takes the universal concept as one's point of departure, one can never, no matter how far one particularizes, reach the individual; the *infima species* is not yet an individual. One can reach the individual only by transcending these determinations. Thus, what determines the individual must be something that transcends the determinations of the so-called universal. But then how can one think of such a thing as being a universal? Mere transcendence of the determinations of the so-called universal (abstract universals) does not in itself yield an individual: an individual is determined with respect to an individual. As in Leibniz' monadology, what is unique is determined by universals. In order for one to be able to think of an individual there must be a universal that envelops and determines all individuals. My "transcendental predicate plane" or "topos" is just such a thing. Further, if our self transcends, in the direction of the grammatical

\*『一般者の自覚的体系』「総説」, NKZ V, 419-64. The translation is my own.



subject, the individual that is subject but never predicate, then the universal that determines the individual can be thought of as our plane of self-consciousness, and the transcendental predicate plane, or *topos*, is the plane of consciousness of Kant's transcendental self (consciousness-in-general). Combining Aristotle's logic and Kant's philosophy in this fashion makes clear, I think, the true foundation of discursive knowledge.

It was Hegel who thought of judgment as the self-determination of a universal, and it must be admitted that this logic is a systematic and exceedingly fruitful working out of that idea. However, even Hegel's logic does not explicate the meaning of what I have referred to as the universal that envelops and determines the individual. It does not clarify the relation between self-consciousness and the universal that forms the basis of discursive knowledge. Thus, no satisfactory foundation can be given to the transition from the object to that which is conscious; nor is it made clear why the Idea itself must be self-conscious. In this sense, Hegel's logic is still characterizable as a logic of the grammatical subject, an object logic. Of course, there is a sense in which as a logic it is quite natural for it to be objective and oriented to the grammatical subject. Even so, experiential content, that based on self-consciousness, cannot be merely objective. Further, the very fact that we can think of such content makes it imperative that we clarify the structure of this thought. Instead of trying to explain self-consciousness in terms of object logic, I take the form of self-consciousness to be the basic logical form, i.e., I argue that it is precisely because we are self-conscious that we are able to think logically.

What, then, is self-consciousness? Self-consciousness is the knower knowing the knower himself; in self-consciousness the knower and the known are one. But then what is knowing? The knower must always be of a higher dimension than the known; the knower and the known must be such that they can never be thought of as being on the same plane. The knower must in no way be objectifiable, for to the extent that it is objectified it is no longer the knower. In this sense, the knower is nothingness, i.e., non-being with respect to the known. This is, however, not to say that the non-being that is simply opposed to being is the knower, for knowing does not arise from the simple relation of being and non-being. Just as we are said to intend an object when it is in our consciousness, so too must the knower envelop the known and determine it within itself: the known must be that which makes itself nothing and determines being. In such a situation that which has form is the shadow of the formless.

When we think of the self as the unity of conscious phenomena, what we

have is the known self, not the knowing self. Even if one goes further and sees conscious phenomena as forming an infinite process and the self as a (substanceless) pure act, one is still left with something that is objectified and thus not the true knower. The true knower can never be determined categorically, but rather it is that which does the categorical determining. If one follows out this line of thought, then that which truly knows must be what I called earlier the transcendental plane of predicates, or *topos*. Knowing is usually thought to be an activity, but that which truly knows must envelop activity: it must be that which actively determines its content within itself. Since we usually take something objectified as activity to be the self, we cannot see that which envelops this, i.e., what I call *topos*, which is thought to be transcendent. However, speaking from the viewpoint of true knowing, *topos* is the true self and that which is active becomes immanent only as it approaches the *topos*: to be evident means to be immediately in *topos*. From this viewpoint it is that which acts that must be transcendent. That we conceive of conscious activity in terms of (substanceless) pure acts is due to the fact that, since acts are immediate to *topos*, they are immanent and thus substanceless; it is non-being that determines their being. The more clearly the acts are recognized as having their initial points in non-being, the more they are seen to take on the character of consciousness.

If we think of knowing in this fashion, then self-consciousness means that *topos* determines itself in itself; thus *topos* and that which is in *topos* are identical. To say that the knower and the known are the same is not just to say that a certain thing is identical with itself, nor is it the unity of a continuous activity as when what acts and what is acted on are one. All these senses of identity refer to the unity of objects and, as such, do not make clear the sense of identity that is meant when the knower is said to be identical to itself.

How is it that we are able to think of self-identical things? The self-identical is thought to be characterized by the fact that it becomes its own predicate, but how is this possible? It may be thought that when the universal is radically particularized and the individual is reached by transcending the *infima species*, then we have self-predication, for the individual is identical to itself. However, as I have indicated above, the individual is the self-determination of the transcendental predicate plane of the universal, i.e., of *topos*. The individual is situated in the *topos* of the universal and can be thought of as the self-determination of *topos* itself. When one takes the individual as a self-identical thing that becomes its own predicate, there are



two ways of looking at the matter. The first is that the predicate unites with the subject, and the second is that the subject unites with the predicate. The former self-identity is obtained by thinking of the predicate as being absorbed into the subject and it thus has the sense of an objective self-identity. However, if one takes the position that judgment is formed by the self-determination of a universal, then, from this point of view, self-identity is obtained by thinking of the subject as approaching the predicate ever more closely and finally uniting with it. So-called individual self-identity is found in the confines of the determination of the universal of judgment that determines itself discursively. However, knowing is the universal determining the universal itself, and in the determination of a universal that transcends the determinations of the universal of judgment it is possible to see a self-identity that transcends individual self-identity. This is self-conscious self-identity. The knower, i.e., the universal that determines itself, cannot, of course, be logically determined, but if we conceptualize this universal while extrapolating on the notion of logical form, then we can say that self-consciousness is the identity of the enveloping and the enveloped, the identity of topos and "that which is placed within." Moreover, from this identity of whole and part we obtain the infinite process of self-consciousness.

I think that the relation between self-consciousness and the self-determination of the universal has been made sufficiently clear from what has been said. If one thoroughly and consistently exploits the position of predicate logic, where judgment is established by the self-determination of a universal, one can think of the self-determination of a universal that transcends the determination of the individual. It is our awareness of self-consciousness that reveals this determination. This is not to say that one can go beyond the transcendental predicate plane and still think of the determination of the universal in logical terms alone. Purely logical determination is completely exhausted within the determinations of the transcendental predicate plane. Our self-conscious experience, which determines being while it itself is nothingness, proves the existence of a universal that goes beyond the universal of judgment. Self-consciousness is not something simply known as fact but rather, as has been shown, it is thought through logical form. If we reflect on this, then what was previously termed the determination of the universal is essentially nothing more than objectified self-conscious determination. That discursive knowledge is thought to be the determination of the universal is due to its being a self-conscious determination in the sense of the self-conscious determination of consciousness-

in-general. If we think of the form of self-consciousness from the standpoint of logical form, then in predicate logic there is already the sense of self-conscious determination present in that determination of the universal. Further, if we can think of this form of self-conscious determination as the basic form of the determination of the universal, then, since the form of our self-conscious determinations becomes ever richer and deeper, we can go beyond the determinations of the universal of judgment and think of the self-determination of a universal that is immeasurably deep and rich.

The shallowest level of self-conscious awareness is representational or ideational consciousness. Self-conscious determination is not yet apparent in ideational consciousness since that which is situated is merely intentional. It is only upon reaching intellectual self-consciousness that self-conscious determination can be clearly seen. The determinations of the universal of judgment are simply the objectifications of intellectual self-conscious determination. But the meaning of self-conscious determination, wherein nothingness determines being, is not exhausted in mere intellectual self-consciousness. In intellectual self-consciousness the self is still determined as an objective being. In volitional self-consciousness, however, not only is the meaning of self-conscious determination much deeper, but also we are conscious of our self in a much deeper sense. Even volitional self-consciousness is, however, not the ultimate level of self-consciousness. We reach the consummation of self-consciousness when we reach the level of seeing without anything that does the seeing.

On the other hand, if we move in the opposite direction and minimize the sense of noetic determination in self-conscious determination, which is to say objectify self-conscious determination, then it approximates discursive determination. Intellectual self-conscious determination becomes discursive determination when it loses the sense of noetic determination. It is for this reason that the transcendental predicate plane of the universal of judgment corresponds to the noematic plane of intellectual self-consciousness, to the objective plane of determination. The plane of predicates is the plane of consciousness that no longer has the sense of self-conscious determination. But how is it possible to think of self-conscious determination losing its sense of noetic determination and becoming objectified? As self-conscious determination becomes deeper, determining being while remaining non-being is, when seen from the rear so to speak, like the following. The content of the noetic determination of the shallow self is, when seen from the standpoint of the noetic determination of the deeper self, noematically determined.



Having made the universal of judgment the point of departure for this exposition, I was able to say that what goes beyond its transcendental predicate plane and determines itself, i.e., that which determines being while being itself nothingness, is self-consciousness. Speaking from the point of view of self-consciousness itself, however, self-consciousness is the self seeing the self in the self. Seeing without a seer is the "self (as subject)" becoming "in the self," i.e., it becomes topos itself. Now, once one transcends this topos where the "self (as subject)" unites with "in the self" (for example, seeing the volitional self behind intellectual self-consciousness) the "self (as subject)" is seen, and as self-consciousness accordingly becomes deeper, one is inevitably led to see once again a topos where this "self (as subject)" unites with "in the self." When we reach that which truly sees and which can no longer be seen by a deeper self, then "in the self" is all that remains. In such a topos, the entire content of the noetic determination of the self is reflected and objectified.

Since I wanted to clarify the nature of the internal relations obtaining between logical determinations and self-conscious determinations as well as elucidate the logical structure of the latter, I began my investigations with the study of the self-determination of the universal of judgment. And I said that by transcending in the subject and predicate directions one will come upon a universal that encompasses this. This will no doubt engender certain apprehensions and questions such as "Does this not lead to an infinite number of universals each of which is enveloped by another?" or "Precisely what is it that determines the universal?" At this point, however, one must keep in mind that my "self-determination of the universal" essentially has the meaning of self-conscious determination. As I have indicated, when one thinks of judgment as being established through the self-determination of the universal of judgment this sense of self-conscious determination must already be present. These doubts and apprehensions are perceived from the viewpoint of a logic that is oriented to the grammatical subject. Thus, if one thinks of a transcendence of a transcendence purely in terms of objects, it is possible to continue this series abstractly as far as one wishes. From this viewpoint it is also reasonable to claim that when there is a determination there must be something that affects the determination. However, my "self-determination of the universal" has the meaning of self-conscious determination, and so to speak of a determination of nothingness over and above the determination of nothingness is like speaking of a zero over and above zero. Moreover, one can ask what determines it only if it somehow has the sense of objective being.

What I call the self-determination of the universal is a form of cognition in the broad sense, and further, I think it is the deepest and most comprehensive form of cognition. What were heretofore taken to be the forms of cognition were such that their relation to self-consciousness was not at all clear; something active survived in the depths of subjectivity. I, however, see logical form as the form of self-consciousness and, conversely, the form of self-consciousness as logical form. Just as the individual is thought of as the self-determination of the universal of judgment, so too the self is nothing more than an object (a being that is a grammatical subject) that is determined in a universal that transcends the universal of judgment. When the "in the self" unites with the "self as grammatical subject," there appears something like Kant's consciousness-in-general. Here, I am not saying that first one has a universal and that it is then either determined by something or determines itself. Nor am I saying that the content of the universal is determined and that from this the particular is deduced. That which is most concrete and immediately given is given to the self. To be immediately given means to be given to the self. That which is in the deepest level of our self-consciousness is that which is most concrete and immediate. However, if self-conscious determination has a logical meaning, then that which is most concrete and immediate must be given in the topos of nothingness. What many people refer to casually as the immediately given must necessarily be given in some form or other. Even those who start with immediate experience think of immediate experience as some form of givenness, e.g., Bergson's pure continuity. But since the logical form is not immediately apparent, these thinkers are led to speak of it as a reality that transcends thought, i.e., they fall into metaphysics. My "determination of the universal," whose fundamental form is found in self-conscious determination, is a form that also determines immediate experience, but more than that, it is a form that determines all "being." All being is located in what I call the topos of the universal.

Descartes can be considered the first to take self-conscious determination as a form of cognition in opposition to those who espoused a more metaphysical view that saw the self-conscious self as a metaphysical reality. Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* is my transcendental predicate plane determining itself. But when Descartes took this as the fundamental cognitive form of certain knowledge, it immediately acquired a metaphysical meaning for him. It was Kant who made self-conscious determination the cognitive form of the objective world, but in Kant's "I think" there still remains the sense of self-consciousness as activity. Present-day phenomenology can also



be said to take some sort of conscious self to be the basic form of cognition. However, this cognitive self is nothing more than a purified internally perceived self and, as such, it has not yet attained the form of the true self-conscious self. Even if one speaks of intention as being grounded in given objects, it is nonetheless the case that because the form of that intending is imperfect, it is not possible to intend the content of full-blooded concrete experience. To be sure, self-conscious experience is immediate and indubitable, but it can be thought of only as the starting point of an academic discipline if it has already been conceived of under various forms.

## II

Since what I call the self-determination of the universal has the meaning of self-conscious determination, if one wants to clarify the structure and levels of the universals, one must start by giving an accurate account of the structure and levels of self-consciousness. To say that the knower and the known are one while at the same time taking knowing to be a type of activity is no more than taking the viewpoint of objectified self-consciousness. For objects to be known by me they must be immanent in me; I must be the topos in which these things are situated. In this sense then I am utter nothingness with respect to things and merely reflect them. Yet, insofar as I know things, these things must be determined by me; what is in the self must be what is determined by the self. The self knows by determining and reflecting its content within itself. One can say that by making itself nothing it determines being. This is the sense in which self-consciousness can be said to be the self seeing its own content in itself. Further, this self-conscious determination must form the foundation for all knowing.

The "in the self" is that ideational consciousness we take to be the ordinary plane of consciousness, and that which is placed in it reflects—that is to say intends—something. But just what is it to intend something? It seems clear that one cannot intend anything that is completely external to the self. In the sense that the self determines its own content in itself, what is intended must also be the content of a self that is reflected in the self. It is just that at the level of intention we have not yet arrived at an intuition in which the content of the self is directly apprehended within the self. If one takes the viewpoint of "in the self," then consciousness must be radically intentional. Further, since being "in the self" cannot be separated from self-

consciousness, intentionality is seen to constitute one of the most basic characteristics of consciousness.

Nonetheless, the self must be what determines the self in the self. But how is it possible to conceive of the self seeing the self in the self? It cannot be that we reflect the self in the self's ideational plane of consciousness, for the reflected self is the seen self and not the seeing self. At this point we may begin to think of the self as the unity of consciousness, but this unity is not at all something that can be reflected in the plane of consciousness. Even supposing that what is reflected is the content of consciousness, it is still not that which unifies. The self must always be thought of as being in the depths of the plane of consciousness, and when we think of it reflecting itself in itself, then this self is necessarily seen as an infinite process. It is in this way that the notion of conscious acts comes into being. (If this unreachably something that underlies the process is thought to be external, then this process is merely a causal activity. It is only when the goal of the process itself is enveloped by a plane of consciousness that there can be conscious acts.) But in the depths of a conscious act there must be something that sees the act itself; there must be something that envelops the conscious act within it. This something is the self-conscious self.

Now in order for us to be aware of this self-conscious self, it must be in some plane of consciousness, but this plane of consciousness cannot be the ideational plane of consciousness that we have discussed. No matter how one deepens the ideational plane of consciousness, it is impossible to reach a plane of self-consciousness where one is aware of the self itself. Normally the self-conscious self is taken merely to be an infinite process that simply reflects the self in itself, but awareness of the self does not emerge in this way. Seen from the ideational plane of consciousness, the self-conscious self is taken to be an infinite process, but this expression "from the ideational plane" means that the self-conscious self is always thought of as being behind the ideational plane, i.e., it is always thought of as transcendent. Nevertheless, the fact that I am self-conscious means that something transcendent in this sense is immanent in the self: it amounts to returning to the origin of the infinite process. The more intuitive our consciousness becomes the more this process fades from view; the active process approaches the plane of consciousness itself and ultimately submerges into it.

The plane of self-consciousness must be a plane of consciousness that differs from the ideational plane; in fact, it is only the former that is a plane of consciousness in the strictest sense. Consciousness without a self is inconceivable; self-consciousness is the fundamental form of conscious-



ness. Self-consciousness is the self seeing the self in the self, and when the "self (as subject)" is obscured, and further the "in the self," i.e., the plane of consciousness, is taken to be the "self (as object)," we have the ideational plane of consciousness. When the plane of consciousness that reflects the content of the self loses the character of self-determination and is thought of simply as the plane of the "self (as object)," we have nothing more than the reflection of external content. Of course, without the "self (as subject)" there is no "self (as object)" but even so it is possible to think simply of the "in the self" as the ideational plane of consciousness. Properly speaking, however, there is no "in the self" without the "self (as subject)." When the "in the self" is thought to be the "self (as subject)" or when, conversely, the "self (as subject)" is thought to be united with the "in the self," we have ideational activity, and all the elements in this plane of consciousness (i.e., the ideational acts) are conceived of as intentional.

In contrast, when the "in the self" unites with the "self (as object)," i.e., when it becomes a plane of the "self (as object)" it becomes a plane of self-consciousness that directly reflects its own content. What is in this plane does not reflect external content but is conscious of itself, i.e., it is self-conscious. The self-conscious self that is commonly spoken of is nothing other than the content of this plane of consciousness; it is the content of the self-determination of the plane of self-consciousness.

The so-called self-conscious self is a self conceived of as an infinite process that comes into being by thinking of the self reflecting the self in the ideational plane of consciousness. The plane of consciousness that is aware of this self must be something that envelops the process within it and that, further, sees this process-self as a determination of itself in itself. When I talk of self-consciousness as being the self seeing the self in the self, the notion of activity has already crept in. It is basic to the "self (as subject)" and the "self (as object)" that they are not thought of as "beings" in the ordinary sense. There is no plane of consciousness apart from the self, but by the same token there is no self apart from a plane of consciousness. It is not the case that there is first a self that then proceeds to determine itself. Rather, the plane of the "self (as subject)" determines the plane of the "self (as object)." Topos determines itself. In this sense, self-conscious determination can be thought of as a type of categorical determination. Just as the natural world is determined by judgments, the world of consciousness is determined by self-conscious determinations. From the point of view of the ideational plane of consciousness, that which is in the plane of self-consciousness is always taken to be noetic while its content is taken to

be noematic. Thus, instead of saying that the self sees the self in the self, it is possible to say that what is in the ideational plane of consciousness, i.e., what is located "in the self," has contrasting noetic and noematic vectors, assuming that one takes the plane of the "in the self" to be the central axis.

How does one proceed from this self-conscious determination to the self-determination of the universal? Normally, the self-conscious self means the intellectually self-conscious self. This self-conscious self is thought to be the limit of an infinite process that is engendered by thinking of the self reflecting itself in the ideational plane of consciousness. The topos that accommodates this sort of self-conscious self is what I have called "the plane of self-consciousness." However, our self-consciousness does not terminate here, for we are aware of a much deeper self in the form of our volitional self, and even more so in the form of our acting self. The plane of self-consciousness is endlessly deepened. Yet, even the volitional self and the acting self are still, like the intellectual self, objects of consciousness. They are in a plane of consciousness. They are perceived selves. They are basically thought of as things that transcend the processive intellectual self and they cannot escape being a form of active self. Properly speaking, what is really in our plane of self-consciousness must be the volitional self, for the intellectual self is at the boundary of this plane of self-consciousness and the ideational plane of consciousness.

Once we are at the level of the acting self, however, our self can be considered external to the so-called plane of consciousness, which is the noetic plane supposedly submerged in the depths of the ideational plane of consciousness. We get to the acting self when what is in the plane of self-consciousness transcends this plane in the noetic direction. It is only in the acting self that we reach a self that sees without a seer. One might be inclined to think that in such a case the self simply disappears, but actually it is only the objectively viewed self, the self as seen in the plane of self-consciousness, that disappears. The self as such becomes the truly seeing self. The so-called self-conscious self is a noetic self that determines its own content in the ideational plane of consciousness, but it has not yet freed itself of the sense of merely being an internally perceiving self. Further, from the viewpoint of the true self, which sees in the most profound and proper sense, this internally perceiving self is nothing more than a determined self and can thus, on the contrary, be called external.

When we reach the position of the acting self, just what is this plane of self-determination wherein the self determines its own content? It is possible to think of it as the expressive plane of consciousness in the wide sense,



so that everything in this plane expresses its own content. What is in its noetic plane can no longer be seen; only that which is in the noematic plane is visible. At the level of the acting self, the self has the sense of an intuition that objectively sees its own content. The content of expression may be thought of as the content of intuition in the wide sense, and given this position, that which has its noetic determinative aspect reduced to a minimum, i.e., the content of the most objective expression, is the object-world for consciousness-in-general. That which further excludes all sense of noetic determination from this transcendental self is what I call the self-determination of the universal of judgment.

How is it possible to remove noetic determination from the transcendental self? I have said that in the acting self we arrive for the first time at the self that truly sees (sees while making itself nothing), but even the acting self cannot be said to completely avoid being a sort of internally perceiving self. But when one reaches the level of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, there is no longer even the acting self. At the conclusion of "The Self-Determination of the Universal" I referred to the content of such a self as the content of internal life. At the level of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness even the noetic determination of the acting self is rejected. Thus what I have been calling the self-determination of the universal is more properly termed the determination of the noematic plane of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. Insofar as one can see the noetic determination of the acting self in this determination of the noematic plane, the content of this (noematic) determination must be construed as expressive. Further, insofar as that determination of the acting self is taken to be a determination of the transcendental self, that expressive content, the content of the universal of judgment, is truth.

Seen from the standpoint of the universal of judgment, the self-conscious self becomes the individual substance, and the self-determination of the self-conscious self becomes the act of judgment. Universal concepts refer to the various planes of determination. As the sense of a noetic determination of the acting self is added to the determination of the universal of judgment, this latter gradually acquires the sense of being a determination of the self-conscious universal. The internally perceiving self is, however, nothing more than the self-as-process based on expressive content. This expressive content, as the content of the acting self itself, is ideal content (in Plato's sense of *Idea*), and the self that actively intuits its own content is the intelligible self.

In this way, the determination of the universal that envelops all other

universals must be a noematic planal determination of the self that truly sees. That is to say, the ultimate universal has the sense of being the noematic plane of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. Our entire life is reflected here. In fact, all that is objectively reflected or seen is reflected or seen here. In this way, objective determination receives its deepest, most profound foundation. Since the ultimate self cannot at all be seen noetically, the noematic plane of this self must have the meaning of an objective determination with respect to the noetic determinations of all seen selves. Thus, even if one speaks of a noetic determination of the self, if one supposes that it can be seen as a noetic determination, then precisely to that extent it must be determined in the noematic plane mentioned above. By virtue of the fact that this plane of determination reflects life in its entirety, the noetic determination of the seen self can also be said to be reflected in it. Because of this, the universal has a plane of self-determination in itself and one can say that self-consciousness determines itself in itself. As long as self-conscious determination is reflected in this plane and insofar as it itself is a self-conscious determination, it must have its own plane of determination. This plane of determination is the plane of self-determination of the universal. To the extent that the universal determines self-conscious content, that is, to the extent that it is a concrete universal, it has a plane of self-determination within itself. From one viewpoint, the very fact that what is self-conscious has a plane of self-determination means that we have not yet reached that which truly sees itself, i.e., it is not yet true self-consciousness. Having this plane of self-determination implies that it is reflected in the noematic plane of that which truly sees.

By being reflected in the ultimate noematic plane, what is self-conscious has its own plane of determination; and by having its own plane of determination, what is self-conscious can be said to be the object of consciousness, to be what is thought of. Seen from this plane of determination, what is self-conscious is transcendent; it is what determines its content in this same plane of determination. However, the self-determination of the universal is essentially grounded in the noematic plane of the self that truly sees (sees while being nothing). Since it reflects what is self-conscious, the self-conscious is seen; and to the extent that this is so it is determined by a universal, it has its place in a universal. What envelops the noetic self is what I have called the *topos* of the universal, namely, the universal itself. If one looks at what is in the *topos* from the vantage point of what is in the plane of determination of the universal, it will be seen to be something that determines itself in the plane of determination, but that can in no way be



determined solely in this plane. This is the sort of thing the individual is. From the plane of determination, innumerable determinative processes can be seen in all directions, which is to say that an infinite number of individuals can be conceived. Thus topos envelops these individuals and can be thought of as the extensional determination of individuals.

This is not to say that what I here call topos is at all like a topos that merely has individuals in it. I mean only that it can be viewed in this fashion from the plane of determination. Since the self-determination of the universal is a determination of the noematic plane of the self that truly sees, its topos necessarily determines the noetic. In other words, it necessarily determines acts, and that which is in this topos must be actively self-conscious. Thus, to say that topos determines itself comes to mean that the elements of topos determine themselves, that they must be self-conscious. It is just this determination that one has in mind when one speaks of intuitive determination. To paraphrase, the "in the self" becomes the "self (as subject)."

The self's determining itself in this sense is the self seeing the nothingness of its self, the disappearance of the seen self, the inability any longer to see noetic determination. When this determination is carried out to the extreme, one can say no more than that topos determines itself. All that remains is something like the determination of the noematic plane of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. Its noetic determination cannot even be seen since it is simply our profound inner life. It is for this reason that topos determining itself is construed to be the self-determination of our deep inner life: the topos of the universal is a mirror wherein life reflects itself.

When we think of the self intuiting its own content, i.e., when the "in the self" becomes the "self (as subject)," this self still has the sense of a seen self, a noematic determination. When it becomes the true "self (as subject)," it is nothing other than the unfolding of our life. That is to say, the "self (as subject)" necessarily determines the "in the self" and sees the "self (as object)" in itself. From this standpoint then, to say that self-consciousness has a plane of self-determination within itself means that life determines itself, that it is conscious of itself. Therein is included the meaning of the universal determining itself, of topos determining itself.

Accordingly, this plane of determination also has the sense of being a self-conscious determination that in turn determines its own plane of determination. When this sort of self-conscious determination is brought about, the occupants of topos, when viewed from the plane of determina-

tion, are conceived of as innumerable recursively formed individual selves. The occupants of topos determine their content in the plane of self-determination, in other words, they are self-conscious. Further, the self-determination of topos itself can be seen in their depths as the deep flow of internal life.

A determination of the universal of judgment is nothing more than what remains when one excludes from such a self-conscious determination the sense of being a noetic determination. Its noematic plane of determination is the plane of abstract predicates, and what is in its noetic topos, i.e., the plane of transcendental predicates, is the individual that becomes subject but never predicate. Furthermore, depending upon how one thinks of topos determining itself, the predicate straightforwardly becomes subject and then finally something that cannot be determined as subject. In other words, together with becoming active, it leaves the domain of the universal of judgment. Conversely, even the plane of abstract predicates, which is the plane of determination of the universal of judgment, can itself be construed as a topos—the abstract universal—since it is an immediate self-determination of the topos referred to above. What is usually called a general concept refers to the content of a plane of determination of this universal.

Thus, the universal has its own plane of self-determination, and the occupants of topos (individuals) determine their own content in the plane of determination. As the universal determines itself, i.e., as topos determines topos, its occupants become things that determine themselves, and having finally become active, leave the domain of that universal. To say that the universal determines itself or that topos determines itself is to say that life determines itself. Thinking of a higher universal that envelops this universal is just to think of a hierarchy of noetic determinations of that which truly sees (sees while being nothing).

When, at the extreme limit of self-conscious determination, we reach the self-consciousness that is a seeing without a seer, the content of the noetic determination of this self is the content of our internal life. We should note, of course, that at the level of this self-consciousness of absolute nothingness there is neither anything that sees nor anything that is seen, since object is immediately mind and mind is immediately object. But such a state is beyond the realm of logical disputation, and in terms of rational thought one can say no more than what is stated above.

When the "in the self" merges with the "self (as object)" we have ideational consciousness, and when it merges with the "self (as subject)"



we have self-consciousness. However, when it truly arrives at the plane of the "self (as subject)" it can be conceived of only as the content of deep, rich life. In the depths of the self-conscious (intuitive) self a still deeper life flow is visible. That which determines the topos of all beings ("that which is placed within") must be the noesis of this life, since it determines the universal of universals. When this noesis determines itself, thereby making the determination of a noetic self visible for the first time, we have before us the acting self in the broad sense. The noematic determination of the acting self in this broad sense is also expression in the broad sense. The determinations of the acting universal are established here. However, since what I call the acting universal in the wide sense has the meaning of a self whose content cannot be seen noematically, from the point of view of its noematic determination it might be better to speak of the expressive universal. Since the occupants of this universal, i.e., the noematically seen content of the acting self, are Ideas (in a sense similar to Plato's), I have referred to the acting universal in the strict sense (characterized by the fact that its occupants see their own content) as the intelligible universal when speaking from the standpoint of its noematic determination.

The topological determination of this universal is such that the true and acting free ego is determined in it as the noetic determination of deep life. Its plane of determination can be regarded as the world of expression that houses all of that which has the character of an expression. Its plane of the "self (as object)" is best construed as the simple world of expressions. Yet, when the plane of the "self (as object)" becomes the plane of the "self (as subject)" it is the plane of intuition of the intelligible self, and its occupants are things that see ideal content. The world of Ideas is now just the plane of intuition of the intelligible self. The true "self (as subject)" that transcends this intelligible self can no longer be seen as a noetic determination in any sense, and the most that can be done is to think of it as an infinitely deep noetic determination in the depths of the acting self. In this sense, the content of the acting self as the content of the acting self is ideal, but it cannot be seen in the way Ideas are seen. I call this self the historical self.

Where topos is thought to determine itself, even the intuitive self disappears. When topos determines itself in the universal of judgment, the occupants of that topos can no longer be construed as grammatical subjects. Indeed, it is almost as if they were active things that had left the domain of the universal. Thus, even the intelligible self disappears in the plane of the true "self (as subject)." This state is what we ordinarily term religious experience, for in religious experience the seen self completely and utterly dis-

appears: we become truly selfless even as we are immersed in a profound and rich internal life.

As noted previously, when our profound internal life determines itself noetically, the acting self makes its appearance, and expression, in the broad sense, emerges as its noematic determination. Now the acting self is founded on that noetic determination while expression is founded on that noematic determination, but true life itself is something that fundamentally and essentially determines the universal, not something founded on the universal. Thus, we do not have here the self-determination of the acting self in the sense of seeing all expressive content as its own determination. We cannot be self-conscious of the noetic determination that determines all expressive content. Such a self-consciousness could only be said to be the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, but this is no longer something that could possibly be determined as a universal. Properly speaking, the acting self is the seeing of oneself while being nothing. But the self as seen cannot be the self that sees, for the latter, being nothing, could not possibly be seen. This is the contradiction inherent in the acting self. It is here that the distinction is drawn between the determination of the acting universal in the narrow sense that emphasizes the noetic determination of the acting self on one hand, and something like the expressive universal that emphasizes the noematic determination of the acting self on the other.

The acting universal in the narrow sense is established in the direction of the noetic determination of the self that truly sees (sees while being nothing) while the expressive universal is established in the direction of its noematic determination. The former can be construed as the self-conscious plane of the acting self where the "in the self" merges into the "self (as subject)." And insofar as the acting self sees its own content in this self-conscious plane, it can then be said to be the intelligible self. In contrast, the expressive universal, since it is the result of the merging of the "in the self" into the "self (as object)," can be regarded as the plane of self-determination of the acting universal in the wide sense. Further, if one excludes the "self (as object)" from this plane of determination and considers only the "in the self," then the result is precisely the simple world of meaning. Conversely, when it is regarded as simply the plane of the "self (as object)," it becomes the universal of judgment.

The acting self itself can never, properly speaking, be construed as the "self (as object)." The universal of judgment is established precisely as this plane of the "self (as object)." Accordingly, as this "self (as object)" takes on



the meaning of the "self (as subject)," as it acquires the sense of a noetic determination, the content of the expressive universal shifts from the universal of judgment to the universal of self-consciousness. This is the reason that in "The Self Determination of the Universal" I insisted that these universals are founded on expression.

The intellectual intelligible self, where noetic determination is minimized, i.e., the plane of determination of the transcendental self, lies on the border between the simple expressive universal and the acting self in the narrow sense, i.e., the intelligible universal. If the acting universal in the wide sense is thought of as the self-determination of the self that truly sees (sees while being nothing), in its noematic direction we have the expressive universal that encompasses both the universal of judgment and the universal of self-consciousness, while in its noetic direction we have the acting universal in the narrow sense, or the intelligible universal. This latter can be said to be the plane of self-consciousness of the expressive self. The plane of consciousness of the transcendental self can be regarded as the first of these planes of self-consciousness. Since it is a plane of consciousness of the intelligible self that is in the intelligible universal it can be considered as the plane of consciousness of the intellectual intelligible self that has minimized the sense of noetic determination. Further, regarded from the point of view of the expressive universal it is *topos*. This plane of consciousness of the transcendental self is characterizable as a plane of self-determination of the intellectual intelligible self, the sense of intelligible noetic determination having been minimized. For this reason it is regarded as lying directly behind the universal of judgment. Further, if its sense of noetic determination is completely excluded, we have the *topos* of the universal of judgment, that is to say, the transcendental predicate plane in which the natural world is determined. Thus, the natural world can be said to be expressive content seen through the noetic determination of the intellectual intelligible self. It is the noematic content of the intellectual intelligible self.

We must, however, take care at this point. Even though one asserts that the intellectual intelligible self is that which has minimized the sense of noetic determination, it still is an intelligible self and thus, to some extent at least, it intuitively its own content. By deepening this sense of noetic determination, it can be regarded as determining the noetic content contained in expressions, i.e., it can see the content of the "self (as object)." It is here that the universal of self-consciousness is established as its noetic determination. In this way, the determination of the self-conscious universal the "self (as object)" must be seen to correspond to expression. There must be

a self that is seen as the unity of expressive content. Of course, deepening the sense of the noetic determination of the intellectual intelligible self means that a transition has already been made from the intellectual intelligible self to the emotive-volitional self. Further, the self-determination of this emotive-volitional intelligible self must always underlie the determination of the self-conscious universal. That is, behind the self-conscious universal there must be something that always sees itself. This is the reason that we must think of the transcending of conscious acts and the arriving at the intelligible self as the transcending of the self-conscious universal in the direction of its noetic determination.

In short, the expressive universal is the plane of the "self (as object)" of the acting self in the wide sense and thus carries with it the sense of the acting "self (as object)." As we go deeper in the noetic direction, i.e., as the acting self becomes self-conscious, we reach the acting universal in the narrow sense or the intelligible universal. Thus the so-called world of conscious phenomena determined by the self-conscious universal is nothing other than the content of the acting self seen as (viewed on the analogy of) expression. The world of conscious phenomena can be construed only by placing the acting self behind the natural world. Transcending the conscious self and attaining the transcendental self is not simply a matter of transcending the intellectual self, but rather must be a transcendence in the noetic direction of the acting self. Once the determination of the intelligible universal is reached, the acting self intuitively its own content; that is, it sees *Ideas*. Moreover, since the self-determination of the acting self is founded on the noetic determination of our profound inner life, this ideal content can be said to be the direct effusion of this inner life, and it is here that we possess an eternal life that transcends time. In this sense, I fully appreciate the meaning and value of Plato's philosophy, provided we keep in mind that the acting self, as was said above, is nothing other than the noetic determination of the self that sees while being nothing itself.

As long as the noetic self can be seen, it remains the seen self and not the self that truly sees. As one continues to go deeper in the noetic direction of the self that truly sees (sees while being nothing), as one reaches the level of the historical self, both the noetic self and ideal determination can no longer be seen. Objectively speaking, a historical "idea" cannot be observed. All that can be seen are the forms, such as a historical period, on the analogy of expressions. These forms—"types" or "wholes"—are, in a word, nothing other than abstract "ideas." Thus, this historical form is something that cannot but be idealized and yet is material that cannot be



ideally determined. However, to attempt to determine the meaning or value of the ideal content from the historical form is as great a mistake as attempting to determine concrete individuality by abstract universals. The historical "idea" that has to be idealized even though it can never be seen as an "ideal," may be thought to change in an irrational manner, but that is only so because being abstract it cannot be seen as an "ideal." Yet this does not negate the eternality of the concrete "idea" that the abstract One suggests. After all, the history of art is not art and the history of philosophy is not philosophy. On the contrary, there can be a history of art only after there is art. The same applies to philosophy. History is the acting self trying to see "ideas" as noetic determinations of the profound life. The real matter of history is not sensation (sensual matter) but the deep flow of our life.

I began my analysis with the self-determination of the universal of judgment, but if we reason along the lines indicated above, this self-determination of the universal of judgment can be said to be the noematic plane of determination of the expressive universal. It is what remains after the sense of the "self (as object)" is eliminated from the noematic plane of determination of the acting self in the broad sense, i.e., the plane of the "self (as object)." Thus, viewed from behind as it were, it can be said to be founded on the noematic determination of the self that truly sees. Seen in this way, transcending in the depths of the transcendental plane of predicates—the topos of the universal of judgment—already has the sense of a noetic determination of the self that sees nothingness, of the self-consciousness of the acting universal in the broad sense. When the meaning of noetic determination of the expressive universal is added, the transition is made from the universal of judgment to the universal of self-consciousness; and when the acting self sees its own content, when it becomes self-conscious, the intelligible universal is established. This intelligible self can be construed as the noetic plane of determination of the acting self, in the depths of which one finds the content of a deep profound life. However, since this content can no longer be viewed as a noetic determination, it will be determined by the expressive universal, at least to the extent that it is viewed noematically. In fact, the expressive universal, which has the meaning of the noematic plane of the self that truly sees, comprehends all the self-determination of all the various universals. This is so even with regard to the self-determination of the acting universal, for insofar as this self-conscious determination is seen, it has its place in the intelligible universal as something that determines itself noematically. Thus it is that we are able to construe such things as self-determinations of a universal.

Of course, the noetic determinations of the acting self, being founded on the noetic determination of the self that truly sees, must transcend the determinations of the expressive universal. The acting self in the deep sense must be something that cannot be determined, not even expressively. Intellectual determination and practical determination are always in opposition, and neither can contain or comprehend the other. However, that which is an intellectual determination must always be a determination of the expressive universal. Moreover, since the expressive universal is essentially and properly something founded on the noematic determination of the self that truly sees (sees while being nothing), the determinations of the universal of judgment that are determinations of the noematic plane of this expressive universal can then be considered the basic pattern of our intellectual determinations. However, since a determination of the expressive universal is a noematic determination of the self that truly sees, it must have its own life content. Intellectual determinations themselves are nothing other than a current of life. From the vantage point of the noetic determination of the self that truly sees, all currents converge to form a single flow of life.

#### *The self-consciousness of absolute nothingness*

This is the religious experience in which form is seen as void and void as form, i.e., the state in which there is neither a seer nor that which is seen.

#### *Internal life*

When the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness determines itself, its noematic plane is the topos of the final universal that determines all that exists, and in its noetic direction we find the flow of infinite life. At this point one might question how absolute nothingness can possibly determine itself. In reply it must be stated that absolute nothingness is not simply not-being-anything but is rather the ultimate noetic determination; it is the essence of spirit. It is both absolute nothingness and absolute being, and as such it transcends the limits of our understanding. This is the very origin of the question.

#### *The acting universal in the broad sense or the expressive universal in the broad sense*

The most basic universal established through the noematic determination of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness is the acting or expressive universal in the broad sense. In its noetic direction there is seen the acting



self, and in its noematic direction there is seen expression. However, since the acting self has the sense of being the noetic determination of the self that sees while making itself nothing, its content cannot be noematically determined. For this reason the acting universal is divided into two universals—one based on the noematic aspect and one based on the noetic aspect.

*The acting universal in the narrow sense or the intelligible universal*

In the sense that the acting self sees its own content, the plane of noetic determination of the acting universal is the intelligible universal. The historical self transcends in the direction of noesis that which is in this intelligible universal, and thus it already has the sense of being in the universal in the broad sense.

*The expressive universal*

The expressive universal, while being the noematic plane of the acting self, also colligates in its noetic aspect those things that cannot be seen in the noetic determination of the acting self. Within this universal, the universal of judgment and the universal of self-consciousness can be distinguished. Although an objective self such as the intelligible self cannot be discerned in the expressive universal, one can see the determination of the abstract self, the subjective self, as a noematic determination of the acting self in conformity with expressions. Thus, the noetic and noematic planes confront each other in the expressive universal, the former being the universal of self-consciousness, and the latter, the universal of judgment. Moreover, since, properly speaking, the determinations of the expressive universal have the sense of self-determinations of the acting self, one can think of a profound flow of life lying hidden in the depths of what are taken to be simply determinations of the universal of judgment.

III

As I have stated repeatedly, in contrast to previous philosophies that considered the structure of consciousness in terms of acts or processes, I conceive of it topologically, in terms of planes. Thus, I take the structure of self-consciousness to be the fundamental structure of all consciousness and conceive of its center of gravity as being in the plane of consciousness. The plane of the "self (as object)" is usually taken to be the ideational con-

scious plane, and the occupants of this plane to be things that in some sense intend objects. Objects, however, are occupants of the plane of the "self (as subject)," which is to say that they are the content of the self-conscious. When the plane of the "self (as subject)" is regarded as being the result of the plane of the "self (as object)" being absorbed into the "self (as subject)" it is a plane of self-consciousness in which objects are intuited. Given this, even the things that are in the plane of the "self (as object)" must be regarded as self-conscious entities that should be, but are not yet, self-conscious. The act of intention itself is nothing but a self-conscious act that should be, but is not, self-conscious. Instead of starting from the intentional character of consciousness, I would rather begin from its self-conscious character. Consequently, I think of representational or ideational consciousness as being the result of minimizing the self-conscious character of full-blooded consciousness. When the self tries to reflect itself in the plane of ideational consciousness, an infinite process is invariably set in motion, in the depths of which this self-conscious self must lie.

Conscious acts are thought of in just this way, for construing consciousness as acts always involves taking such a process as the nucleus. Even so-called self-consciousness is nothing more than a process-self of this sort. It is merely something seen in the plane of self-consciousness. However, this process-self must be submerged in that which truly sees itself. The more intuitive our consciousness becomes, the more activity is transcended. The true plane of self-consciousness must be a plane of intuition. It is for this reason that to consider the self seeing the self in the self as the basic structure of consciousness implies that what is in the plane of intuition casts its shadow on the ideational plane. Determination as an infinite process comes about by intuition reflecting itself in the ideational plane, the so-called self-conscious self being that which one is conscious of at the extreme limit of such a process, i.e., in the plane of intuition. The so-called self-conscious self is conceptually grounded in the self-determination of the plane of intuition. Thinking emerges when the occupants of the ideational plane are regarded as self-determinations of that which is in the plane of intuition, and the act of thinking appears when the objects of the intentional acts are thought to determine themselves. Thus, speculative consciousness is the recognition that there is a plane of intuition immediately behind ideational consciousness and that what is in the plane of intuition determines what is in the ideational plane. Seen from the ideational plane, speculative consciousness is always a process linked to the self-conscious self. This is why thought is considered to be spontaneous and active.



However, this self-conscious self is not merely found in combination with speculative consciousness, for as long as one can think of non-being determining being, the self-conscious self will necessarily be found to underlie that infinite process. This process is merely something that can be characterized as lying in the plane of the "self (as subject)" and is thus necessarily submerged in that which truly sees. Fundamentally, the plane of ideation or the plane of consciousness is nothing more than the plane of the "self (as object)." The plane of the "self (as subject)," i.e., the plane of intuition, cannot be conceived of without at the same time conceiving of the plane of the "self (as object)." It must have the meaning of the plane of self-determination of the self that sees while being nothing, the noematic plane.

Ideational consciousness, in contrast, arises from viewing the "self (as object)" in the abstract. This is equivalent to thinking of an abstract universal. But just as there is no abstract universal that is not a plane of determination of the concrete universal, so, too, there is no plane of ideational consciousness that is not a plane of determination of that which is self-conscious. This being the case, why is there always a plane of the "self (as object)" found in opposition to the plane of the "self (as subject)," and why must ideation be thought to be the most fundamental characteristic of consciousness?

The noetic determination of the self that truly sees cannot itself be seen, and even self-conscious determination is something determined by the noematic determination of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. In other words, it is determined by the expressive universal in the broad sense. All self-conscious determinations are necessarily reflected in the noematic plane of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. In this sense, then, the plane of the "self (as object)" must always be in opposition to the plane of the "self (as subject)." The representational plane and the planes of consciousness, for example, must fundamentally be seen to have this sort of meaning. Thus, in the same sense that one can think of a plane of consciousness of internal perception, one can also think of a plane of consciousness of the transcendental self because the ideational or representational conscious plane itself has transcendental meaning.

It is true, of course, that we intend things in the plane of consciousness, but it must be remembered that the word "things" has various meanings and that there are various modes of intending. Representations lie in different planes of consciousness, depending on whether they are perceptual representations, imaginative representations, or merely signs. Just as the abstract universal has discursive significance by virtue of its being a plane of

determination, and a contraction of a concrete universal, so too the intentional conscious plane can be thought of as intentional by being the plane of determination of that which is self-conscious.

The problem is that we inadvertently think of things like the noematic determination of the acting self in the broad sense, even when speaking ostensibly of the representational conscious plane, and as a result we think it possible to go in the opposite direction as well, from the ideational conscious plane to the plane of intuition. In other words, insofar as the acting self sees its own content, it is thought of as the plane of intuition. For this reason, the ideational plane of consciousness that includes various modes of intending must in reality be the expressive plane of consciousness, and the plane of internal perception must, conversely, be determined by this expressive plane. The expressive plane, where everything in it expresses itself, must be said to be the most concrete plane of consciousness. Thus things in the plane of consciousness are thought to intend something, and as long as the acting self sees the content of its self-determination, its self-conscious content, these things are thought to intend objects. But when self-conscious content is seen merely as the self-determination of the expressive universal, it is thought simply to intend meaning. The former is a meaning-fulfilling act, and the latter, a meaning-bestowing act.

Taken this way, consciousness essentially has the sense of being a plane of expression, and as a plane of self-conscious determination of the acting self, it has both a noematic and a noetic direction. At the outer limits of its noematic direction speculative intuition is established by intellectual self-consciousness, while in its noetic direction there is established feeling-willing intuition. In short, various planes of intuition are established as the self-consciousness of the acting self that sees while being nothing. Accordingly, various conscious acts can be conceived of in relation to the expressive plane of consciousness. To think of the plane of ideation as simply intentional is to take this to be an intellectual plane of determination, and the intuitive plane that is behind this can then be thought of as the plane of intellectual intuition referred to above.

Even from the plane of ideation in the sense of the noematic plane of the acting self there is a plane of intuition to be seen in the noetic direction. It is precisely because of this that what is felt and what is desired can be thought to be reflected ideationally. Moreover, the true ideational plane is the expressive plane. By deepening this position we ultimately come into contact noematically with the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, and thus we can conceive of something like the neutralizing act of con-



sciousness. In contrast, the more our self becomes something that truly sees, the more consciousness becomes intuitive. Acts are enveloped and necessarily become reflected (that is, they become objects). It is in this sense that noesis has to be seen in self-conscious determination. Furthermore, it is in this sense that the noetic plane needs to be seen as a plane of intuition. If one thinks of going deeper in this direction and ultimately coming in contact noetically with the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, one can conceive of a level of intuition of the pure self to which all active positions can be reduced. Such a position is the foundation for an intuition of essences established on an intuition that includes activity.

The notion of self-consciousness as a process arises from the noematic determination of self-consciousness where the self sees the self in the self. Since the result of this noematic determination is an expressive determination, objects must be recognized as expressive determinations in which noetic determination can no longer be seen. Insofar as noetic determination can be seen, objective cognition of objects is established as a self-conscious determination. This is why one thinks one is truly seeing the objective world of facts in the self-consciousness of Kant's transcendental self, a self that lies on the boundary between the determination of the expressive universal and the determination of the intelligible self.

Moreover, when that which is in the depths of this process-self-consciousness sees its own content, i.e., when what is located in the noetic plane of the expressive universal sees noetic content, it has "experience" (*Erlebnis*) in the sense that it sees its own world. But intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*) is not experience in this sense. Intuition of essences is not merely something that lies in the plane of intuition seeing its own content; it must rather be an intuition of the plane of intuition itself. It must be an intuition of that very self that determines itself actively; it must be a state of being conscious of so-called self-consciousness. Thus true intuition of the pure self must be similar to the noetic determination of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness.

Of course, there is neither noesis nor noema in the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, but when it is said to see itself, we must think of it as the confrontation of noesis and noema. The ultimate universal is thus determined as its noematic plane and our world of cognition is established through the determinations of such a universal. In contrast, our internal life can be seen as its noetic determination. The content of this internal life can no longer be seen cognitively. Seen from the position of internal life, however, cognitive determination is nothing more than the flow of inter-

nal life in which noetic determination has been reduced to a minimum. This noetic self-consciousness of our internal life is the position of true intuition of the pure self; it can be called the self-consciousness of internal life itself. From one point of view we can say that the acting universal in the broad sense is the topos of the expressive universal, which in turn is the self-consciousness of the plane of intuition itself, all three of which can be said to be equivalent. I have said that the deep content of the acting self cannot be determined cognitively and that even the historical self cannot be brought to consciousness noetically. However, from the position of a still deeper noetic determination, the topos of the universal of judgment can be thought to be a plane of self-determination of the intellectual intelligible self. Even though its noetic determination is minimal, it is still a self and as such it must be capable of self-consciousness. Thus it is possible to establish the self-consciousness of self-consciousness, just as it is possible to speak of "reason reflecting on itself."

The self-consciousness of self-consciousness is the seeing of self-consciousness-as-process in the plane of intuition of the "self (as subject)." It is seeing in the plane of the selfless self. From the position of the noetic determination of still deeper life, the acting universal in the broad sense, or the topos of the expressive universal, can be thought of as the determination plane of intellectual life that has minimized the sense of noetic determination. Even if the noetic content of life itself cannot be reflected intellectually, we can think of the intellectual self-consciousness of life in the same way that we can think of the self-consciousness of Kant's transcendental self on analogy with the topos of the universal of judgment. True self-consciousness of the pure self must be something like this. Intellectual life is a topological determination of the acting universal and a noematic determination of the noetic content of life. As such, this noematic plane of determination is reflected in life's noetic plane of intuition, which implies that the self-consciousness of intellectual life is established.

Still, there is no intellectual self-consciousness without a willing self-consciousness, and just as we think of intellectual self-consciousness as the noematic determination of willing self-consciousness, so too we can think of the intellectual self-consciousness of life as the noematic plane of determination of the self-consciousness of internal life. Willing self-consciousness can further be considered to be the noematic determination of the acting universal, but there is no further noematic plane that can determine life itself. The self that sees while being nothing cannot be seen, and therein lies



the limit of knowledge. Only things like the self-consciousness of intellectual life remain and retain an intellectual or cognitive sense.

To say that we are thinking of something refers to a fact about an individual self. Something thought is always considered to have its origin in the individual self. But then this active self that is thought to be the point of origin for all things in this sense must, in fact, be the individual self that is in the final noetic plane of determination; it must be the acting self. Thus, the plane of consciousness that is its plane of determination cannot be the ideational plane of consciousness but must rather be the expressive plane of consciousness. Conscious space is not two-dimensional but multi-dimensional. The tendency to think otherwise is due to the fact that we consider thinking a temporal fact, and when the self is thought to be based on temporal facts, then that self, namely, the plane of consciousness of the perceiving self, is regarded as the so-called ideational plane of consciousness. However, the direction and significance of the various intentions cannot be ascertained in the ideational plane of consciousness.

In contrast, since the plane of self-determination of the active self is a plane of expression, intention is to be found in various directions and in various senses in this plane. A plane of expression has both a noematic and a noetic direction. In its noematic direction objective cognition is constituted self-consciously; experience (*Erlebnis*) is constituted in its noetic direction. I feel that this is the proper method of distinguishing objective cognition and "experience."

I cannot help doubting the phenomenologists' claim that what has the character of an object is intuited in perception. What is seen "corporeally" (*leibhaftig*) must be the content of experience seen in the noetic direction. The first objects we make contact with in this direction must be something like artistic "ideas." From this direction it is impossible corporeally to come into contact with objects that determine themselves noematically. The objects of objective cognition must be seen as determinations of the expressive universal where noetic self-consciousness cannot be seen. Perceptions are fundamentally noematic determinations of acting self-consciousness, while impulses are its noetic determinations. Although the acting self is thought of as a noetic determination, it also has in its noematic direction a sense of having transcended noetic determination. Consequently, that noematic content must have a meaning that cannot be grasped corporeally. These are the sorts of unchanging relations we find in self-consciousness.

It is clear, then, that experience must be distinguished not only from

objective cognition but also from the intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*). This can be done only from the level of the plane of intuition that reflects the relation of noesis and noema.

What I call the standpoint of internal life is the standpoint of the noetic determination of the self that sees without a seer; it refers to the noesis of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness. Thus, its noematic plane of determination is supported by the noematic determination of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness, and the last thing I referred to as a universal, namely, the acting universal in the broad sense, must be the topos of the expressive universal. This universal of the noematic plane of internal life is determined, and it is in this plane that various worlds and individual selves can be thought. But, of course, there still must be a plane of intuition in the direction of the noetic determination of internal life, and there that the determination of the universal itself is reflected. I said previously that the universal itself is determined by internal life, but it is in this plane of intuition that the intellectual self-consciousness of internal life is established.

This, I believe, represents the true philosophic position. Kant sought the foundation of knowledge in the synthetic unity of consciousness, but his critical philosophy as such cannot be erected securely on this synthetic unity of the self. As the self-consciousness of reason itself, it can refer only to the intellectual self-consciousness of internal life. The phenomenological pure self that rejects all standpoints must also be something like this intellectual self-consciousness of internal life. Husserl's pure self, however, does not avoid reduction to a purified, internally perceiving self. From such a position there is nothing more to be seen than Husserl's so-called essences, and this is not sufficient to provide a foundation of the objective cognition of objects that determine themselves.

Since the phenomenological position was, from the start, the standpoint of the intellectual self-consciousness of internal life, the transition from Husserl's phenomenology to Heidegger's interpretive, hermeneutical phenomenology or fundamental ontology was an understandable one. Even so, we still have nothing more than the purification of the self-consciousness of the acting self in the noetic direction; the basis for the objective determination of expressive content is not yet made clear. In other words, the notion of what I call the self-determination of the expressive universal is not yet apparent.

When I speak of internal life, I do not intend a contrast with external life. Internal life refers merely to the intuitive plane of determination where the



self that is in any way seen noematically has disappeared. Since we usually take the self to be the process-self, we can think of the self only as either disappearing or uniting with objects. The true self as such does not disappear. Rather, everything that *is* becomes something located in the self. The self that truly sees must be a plane of intuition that includes this process-self-consciousness. Thus we can say that we feel our own life in the shining moon and in the insects crying in the fields.

Even Hegel's dialectical development must have the sense of what I call the self-consciousness of internal life. Everything that is in a topos is, when seen from the standpoint of the plane of self-determination of the universal, self-contradictory. Insofar as the universal is determined, contradictions are seen everywhere, and that which envelops the development of the dialectic must be something like the plane of intuition of internal life.

When I say that intellectual self-consciousness of internal life is the true standpoint for philosophy, I am not saying that I agree with so-called "life philosophy"; the content of experience (*Erfahrung*) is no more than the content of the acting self noematically determined, and since the depths of the acting self can never be made visible, the content of experience can thus never be more than historical knowledge. Philosophy as the self-reflection of reason itself must have validity in and of itself. History may determine what sort of philosophy will appear in what age, but philosophical development must be the self-conscious development of reason itself. As such, it is grounded in the plane of intuition that includes historical development, not the other way around.

## Notes

### 1. NISHIDA'S PREDECESSORS

<sup>1</sup> MIYAKAWA 1961.

<sup>2</sup> NISHIMURA 1887, cited in FUNAYAMA 1959.

<sup>3</sup> The possible exception is the term *sohen* 即, which means "at once, immediately, identical," but this term is generally used in Buddhist works and thus cannot be ascribed to the direct influence of the Inoues. Still, there are other factors to consider in assessing their influence on Nishida.

<sup>4</sup> Until rather recently, it was common practice in Japanese academic circles to omit reference to other Japanese scholars in one's field unless one was directly criticizing their views. This was especially true if the scholar in question were still alive, no matter how deeply indebted one might be to that person for one's ideas or basic orientation. Watsuji Tetsurō, for example, makes almost no reference to Nishida in his works, although the influence is strong and unmistakable. Tanabe Hajime makes no reference to Nishida in his published works, except for an article that is a direct criticism of Nishida's thought. Murai Risaku was a student of Nishida and even wrote an exposition of Nishida's philosophy after Nishida's death, but he does not mention Nishida in his major work. 『場所の論理学』 [The Logic of Place].

<sup>5</sup> INOUE Enryō, 1886–1887.

<sup>6</sup> TAKEUCHI 1966, 54, citing KIMURA 1932. Takeuchi builds a strong case for the influence of this volume on Nishida, citing passages from his letters that closely resemble closely Inoue's statements. Kōsaka Masaki also refers to Nishida's appreciation of *An Evening of Philosophical Conversation* (KōSAKA 1947, 19).

<sup>7</sup> FUNAYAMA 1959; see also FUNAYAMA 1956, 81–4. FUYESANNA 1968 contains material on the role of the two Inoues in Meiji philosophical thought.

<sup>8</sup> A rather interesting and amusing feature of this work is that the Master who



his position or a disenchantment with the notion of basho, which continues a crucial role in any number of later works, such as "The Philosophical Foundations of Mathematics" and "The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview." He is inclined to treat his logic of basho in a more dynamic sense in his later writings, equating it with a logic of historical constitution (NKZ XII, 265); but this represents a development of the concept, not its rejection. For this reason, the present essay restricts itself to the structure developed by Nishida in *The System of Self-Consciousness of the Universal*.

<sup>2</sup> 判断の一般者.

<sup>3</sup> 有るもの.

<sup>4</sup> NKZ V, 60; cf. KōYAMA 1935, 48.

<sup>5</sup> NKZ V, 61.

<sup>6</sup> Nishida uses only one term 超越的 to mean both transcendental and transcendent. Normally *transcendental* is the more appropriate sense, but in phrases such as "x is seen to be 超越的 from y," *transcendent* seems the better choice.

<sup>7</sup> NKZ IV, 274.

<sup>8</sup> 推論の一般者.

<sup>9</sup> NKZ V, 427; Appendix, 191.

<sup>10</sup> KōYAMA 1935, 55.

<sup>11</sup> This treatment of time as object yields the various temporal paradoxes.

<sup>12</sup> See his essay 「知るもの」 NKZ IV, 324-88.

<sup>13</sup> NKZ V, 22-3.

<sup>14</sup> NKZ V, 53.

<sup>15</sup> KōYAMA 1935, 60-77.

<sup>16</sup> NKZ V, 24.

<sup>17</sup> Spatial character can be said to belong to the level of the universal of judgment in the sense that the determination of an individual as an individual necessarily implies the determination of a multiplicity of individuals.

<sup>18</sup> NKZ V, 37.

<sup>19</sup> NKZ V, 28.

<sup>20</sup> NKZ V, 52.

<sup>21</sup> NKZ V, 35.

<sup>22</sup> 有の場所.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. NODA 1955, 345-59; NKZ V, 124.

<sup>24</sup> NKZ V, 41.

<sup>25</sup> NKZ V, 422; Appendix, 188.

<sup>26</sup> NKZ V, 18.

<sup>27</sup> 自覚の一般者.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. NODA 1955.

<sup>29</sup> NKZ V, 425-6; Appendix, 190.

<sup>30</sup> NKZ V, 430; (See also Appendix, 194).

<sup>31</sup> NKZ V, 123ff.

<sup>32</sup> 叡知の一般者.

<sup>33</sup> NKZ V, 167.

<sup>34</sup> NKZ V, 161.

<sup>35</sup> 良心.

<sup>36</sup> NKZ V, 172.

<sup>37</sup> NKZ V, 163.

<sup>38</sup> 行為の自己.

<sup>39</sup> NKZ V, 478.

<sup>40</sup> NKZ V, 444; Appendix, 201.

<sup>41</sup> NKZ V, 451; Appendix, 207.

<sup>42</sup> NKZ V, 456; Appendix, 201.

<sup>43</sup> NKZ V, 440; Appendix, 200.

## 6. CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup> Cf. NKZ IV, 6.

<sup>2</sup> NKZ VI, 112.

<sup>3</sup> The word here translated as *anthropology* is 人間学, literally the study of human beings. The discipline of anthropology is 人類学 in Japanese.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. KōYAMA 1935, Chapter 2, passim. See also Chapter 5 on the point that all theoretical constructions, including this one, are in the universal of expression.

<sup>5</sup> Note the frequency with which the phrase "on the analogy of..." appears in the translation in the appendix. The original Japanese is 比喩として, which can also mean "based on..." As noted in Chapter 1, note 10, the term 即 is used frequently by the two Inoues, and by Buddhist writers in general, to signify something like "dynamically identical."

<sup>6</sup> NKZ V, 451; Appendix, 207.

<sup>7</sup> NKZ V, 477.