

Supplementary Appendix 1 – Data Collection Procedures

Data collection proceeded in three stages. In the first stage a single researcher gathered the names and positions of all political appointments in the Obama Administration as of June 24, 2009 using the *Washington Post*'s [Head Count](#) and [WhoRunsGov.com](#) websites as well as information from the *Federal Leadership Directory* and the White House website. Along with information on the names, titles, and appointment information for each appointee, this researcher also collected biographical information from the *Federal Leadership Directory*.

In the second stage, the biographical information was coded by the initial researcher and two other researchers. Each of the three researchers was given a subset of appointee biographical entries to code. One researcher was responsible for all PAS and PA appointees. Another was responsible for all NA appointees. The final researcher was responsible for all SC appointees. Coders agreed upon coding rules prior to the start of coding. When problems arose regarding the proper coding of certain biographical information, researchers quickly discussed and made a decision as a group, so that the coding was executed as uniformly as possible. One example of such a question might be whether to categorize an appointee's last job as a congressional staffer as "politics" or "other." As soon as a questionable instance arose, we agreed to classify this as "politics," and proceeded to correct any misclassifications in our individual lists. After coding was complete, the researcher who compiled the initial list randomly selected 10 entries from each researcher's coded entries to ensure the coding was conducted consistently. When systemic discrepancies were found, the researcher adjusted the coding to be uniform across the lists.

In the final stage, two researchers added additional information on appointees and their agencies from a variety of sources (detailed below). Specifically, they added information on a variety of agency characteristics, including agency ideology, whether or not the agency or its

activities was mentioned in President Obama's first televised speech before Congress, details about agency programs, and agency employment data.

Biographical information was drawn from the *Federal Leadership Directory* (online at <http://www.leadershipdirectories.com/products/fldo.html>) unless otherwise indicated. The biographical information for appointees is more expansive the higher someone is in the hierarchy. Information on PAS appointees and appointees in the White House is the most expansive followed by NA appointees, Schedule C appointees, and other PA appointees. For many of the variables the coding indicates the presence of positive information compared to no information, rather than definitive information for a "yes" or "no" coding. In effect, all appointees are coded with a 0 or the lowest category to start and only changed out of that category in the presence of concrete information. For example, if someone is coded with a 1 on the Campaign (0,1) indicator, this implies that some information was in the bio about their work on the Obama campaign. If their biographical information has no information about their campaign work they are coded with a 0. Generally, the biographical information for higher-level appointees (e.g., PAS appointees) is quite detailed since most people appointed to these positions are public officials with public records. When higher-level appointees are announced or nominated the White House often provides biographical information along with their announcement. Top-level officials also have publicly available biographies that accompany their public speeches, appearances, and roles. The further down the hierarchy, however, the less information there is. This is due to the fact that lower level appointees have shorter resumes, but also because biographical information on these appointees is harder to obtain.

In order to address any concerns arising from the fact codings of '0' reflect the lack of positive information rather than the presence of negative information, we have replicated the

models presented in the main text with only the cases where biographical information was listed (N=957); the results confirm what is reported there with four exceptions. In the equation where the percentage of appointees with subject knowledge is the dependent variable, the coefficient on *Professionalism* is negative and significant, contrary to our theoretical expectations, and contrary to the results in the equations where the percentage of appointees with previous agency experience or PhDs are the independent variables. Conversely, *Workforce Size* is now negative and significant in the equations where the dependent variables are the percentages of appointees with PhDs and government experience, in support of our theory. Moreover, in the latent equations SUR model where the latent expertise dimension is the independent variable, the coefficient on *Professionalism* is positive and significant, in contrast to the positive but statistically insignificant result presented in the main text.

Table SA1-1 – Alternative Data – Complete Individual Observations Only (N=957)

Robustness Checks – Aggregate Agency Characteristics (SUTR Model; Complete Individual-Level Observations Only)

Variable	Expertise Variables					Patronage Variables	
	% with agency experience	% with Ph.Ds	% with gov't experience	% working in Bush or Clinton Admins.	% with subject knowledge	% whose last job was in politics	% with campaign experience
	(E-1)	(E-2)	(E-3)	(E-4)	(E-5)	(P-1)	(P-2)
Professionalism	0.689*** (0.208)	0.209** (0.115)	0.261 (0.213)	-0.095 (0.176)	-0.264* (0.192)	-0.162 (0.191)	0.018 (0.151)
Priority Agency	0.076** (0.045)	0.078*** (0.025)	0.128*** (0.046)	0.087** (0.038)	0.081** (0.042)	-0.075** (0.041)	-0.048* (0.031)
Workforce Size	0.007 (0.011)	-0.008* (0.006)	-0.015* (0.011)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.007 (0.010)	0.015* (0.010)	0.018** (0.008)
Agency Conservatism	0.082*** (0.028)	0.039*** (0.015)	0.093*** (0.029)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.027* (0.020)
Constant	0.140 (0.119)	0.088 (0.068)	0.576*** (0.121)	0.236** (0.102)	0.449*** (0.109)	0.196** (0.109)	-0.071 (0.089)
<i>N</i>	57						
Log-Likelihood	262.940						
$\chi^2_{28} df$	75.02***						

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Each agency-level observation is weighted by the number of appointees to that agency in the data.

Table SA1-2: Latent Agency Characteristics
(Complete Individual-Level Observations Only)

Variable	<u>Seemingly Unrelated Regressions</u>		<u>OLS</u>
	Latent Expertise Only	Latent Patronage Only	Both Expertise and Patronage
Professionalism	2.563* (1.579)	0.078 (1.423)	1.980 (2.014)
Priority Agency	1.204*** (0.344)	-0.901*** (0.310)	1.448*** (0.439)
Workforce Size	-0.074 (0.083)	0.118* (0.075)	-0.117 (0.106)
Agency Conservatism	0.560*** (0.212)	-0.317* (0.191)	0.640*** (0.271)
Constant	-0.344 (0.897)	-0.644 (0.809)	0.017 (1.145)
<i>N</i>	57	57	57
$F_{4,52}$	4.49***	2.66**	3.71**
R^2	0.239	0.157	0.222
ρ		-0.579	-
Breusch-Pagan Test		19.132***	-

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Each agency-level observation is weighted by the number of appointees to that agency in the data.

Supplementary Appendix 2 – Description of the SUTR Model

As mentioned, our data consists of seven different outcome variables, each collected for appointees to 57 different agencies during the first six months of the Obama administration. Each outcome variable reflects the percentage of an agency's appointees that possess a particular characteristic; as percentages, they are constrained to lie within the [0,1] interval. Thus, we assume a latent-variable specification for each observed outcome variable $i = 1, 2, \dots, 7$ for each agency $j = 1, 2, \dots, 57$:

$$y_{i,j} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y_{i,j}^* < 0 \\ y_{i,j}^* & \text{if } y_{i,j}^* \in (0,1), \\ 1 & \text{if } y_{i,j}^* > 1 \end{cases}$$

where $y_{i,j}^*$ is the unobserved latent variable we are trying to estimate using the following regression specification:¹

$$y_{i,j}^* = \beta_0^i + \beta_1^i \text{Priority}_j + \beta_2^i \text{Ideology}_j + \beta_3^i \text{Professionalism}_j + \beta_4^i \text{Workforce}_j + \epsilon_{i,j}.$$

Since we are operating within the SUR framework, we assume the error terms are correlated such that $\epsilon_{i,j} \sim N(0, \Sigma)$, where

¹ Importantly, since we are estimating limited dependent variable models with identical regressors, estimation of the system as a whole results in efficiency gains over equation-by-equation estimation (Bhattacharya 2004).

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & & & & & & & & \\ \rho_{1,2}\sigma_1\sigma_2 & \sigma_2^2 & & & & & & & \\ \rho_{1,3}\sigma_1\sigma_3 & \rho_{2,3}\sigma_2\sigma_3 & \sigma_3^2 & & & & & & \\ \rho_{1,4}\sigma_1\sigma_4 & \rho_{2,4}\sigma_2\sigma_4 & \rho_{3,4}\sigma_3\sigma_4 & \sigma_4^2 & & & & & \\ \rho_{1,5}\sigma_1\sigma_5 & \rho_{2,5}\sigma_2\sigma_5 & \rho_{3,5}\sigma_3\sigma_5 & \rho_{4,5}\sigma_4\sigma_5 & \sigma_5^2 & & & & \\ \rho_{1,6}\sigma_1\sigma_6 & \rho_{2,6}\sigma_2\sigma_6 & \rho_{3,6}\sigma_3\sigma_6 & \rho_{4,6}\sigma_4\sigma_6 & \rho_{5,6}\sigma_5\sigma_6 & \sigma_6^2 & & & \\ \rho_{1,7}\sigma_1\sigma_7 & \rho_{2,7}\sigma_2\sigma_7 & \rho_{3,7}\sigma_3\sigma_7 & \rho_{4,7}\sigma_4\sigma_7 & \rho_{5,7}\sigma_5\sigma_7 & \rho_{6,7}\sigma_6\sigma_7 & \sigma_7^2 & & \end{bmatrix}, \text{ such that } \sigma_i$$

are standard deviations of $\epsilon_{i,j}$ and $\rho_{i,i'}$ denotes the correlations between $\epsilon_{i,j}$ and $\epsilon_{i',j}$ for all $i' > i$.

Given this setup, the system-level likelihood is

$$L = \prod_{j=1}^{57} \int_{\underline{c}_{1,j}-\beta'_1 x_{1,j}}^{\bar{c}_{1,j}-\beta'_1 x_{1,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{2,j}-\beta'_2 x_{2,j}}^{\bar{c}_{2,j}-\beta'_2 x_{2,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{3,j}-\beta'_3 x_{3,j}}^{\bar{c}_{3,j}-\beta'_3 x_{3,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{4,j}-\beta'_4 x_{4,j}}^{\bar{c}_{4,j}-\beta'_4 x_{4,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{5,j}-\beta'_5 x_{5,j}}^{\bar{c}_{5,j}-\beta'_5 x_{5,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{6,j}-\beta'_6 x_{6,j}}^{\bar{c}_{6,j}-\beta'_6 x_{6,j}} \int_{\underline{c}_{7,j}-\beta'_7 x_{7,j}}^{\bar{c}_{7,j}-\beta'_7 x_{7,j}} \phi(\epsilon_j; \Sigma) d\epsilon_j,$$

where $[\underline{c}_{i,j} \times \bar{c}_{i,j}]$ defines the region of possible values (that is, the region of integration) for observation j 's error vector $\epsilon_j = y_j^* - \beta'_j x_j$, where y_j^* denotes the vector of latent unobserved values for observation j , and where y_j denotes the vector of observed outcome variables for the same observation, all of which take values within the $[0,1]$ interval; $\beta'_j x_j$ is defined analogously. Thus, if $y_{i,j} = 0$, $[\underline{c}_{i,j} \times \bar{c}_{i,j}] = (-\infty, -\beta'_i x_{i,j}]$; if $y_{i,j} = 1$, $[\underline{c}_{i,j} \times \bar{c}_{i,j}] = [1 - \beta'_i x_{i,j}, \infty)$; and if $y_{i,j} \in (0,1)$, $[\underline{c}_{i,j} \times \bar{c}_{i,j}] = y_{i,j} - \beta'_i x_{i,j}$.² To put this in context, consider the case where an observation's outcome vector consists of $y = (0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 1)$; in this case, the corresponding observation-level likelihood would be

² This final relation holds because when $y_{i,j} \in (0,1)$, we assume $y_{i,j} = y_{i,j}^*$.

$$L_j = \int_{-\infty}^{-\beta'_1 x_{1,j}} \int_{-\infty}^{-\beta'_2 x_{2,j}} \int_{-\infty}^{-\beta'_3 x_{3,j}} \int_{1-\beta'_6 x_{6,j}}^{\infty} \int_{1-\beta'_7 x_{7,j}}^{\infty} \phi \left(\begin{bmatrix} -\beta'_1 x_{1,j} \\ -\beta'_2 x_{2,j} \\ -\beta'_3 x_{3,j} \\ 0.2 - \beta'_4 x_{4,j} \\ 0.4 - \beta'_5 x_{5,j} \\ 1 - \beta'_6 x_{6,j} \\ 1 - \beta'_7 x_{7,j} \end{bmatrix}; \Sigma \right) d\epsilon_j.$$

Maximization of the system-level log-likelihood is computed via version 5.4.5 of Roodman's (2011) `cmp` module for Stata, which relies on the GHK algorithm (Geweke 1989; Hajivassiliou and McFadden 1998; Keane 1994) and maximum simulated likelihood methods to numerically approximate cumulative normal densities of more than two dimensions.

Supplementary Appendix 3 – Alternative Model Specifications

Table SA3-1: Robustness Checks – Aggregate Agency Characteristics (Tobit Models; Individually Estimated)

Variable	Expertise Variables					Patronage Variables	
	% with agency experience	% with Ph.Ds	% with gov't experience	% working in Clinton or Bush Admins.	% with subject knowledge	% whose last job was in politics	% with campaign experience
	(E-1)	(E-2)	(E-3)	(E-4)	(E-5)	(P-1)	(P-2)
Professionalism	0.634*** (0.203)	0.202* (0.154)	0.196 (0.217)	-0.035 (0.204)	-0.197 (0.183)	-0.101 (0.267)	-0.060 (0.186)
Priority Agency	0.055 (0.043)	0.080*** (0.033)	0.083** (0.048)	0.075** (0.044)	0.045 (0.040)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.026 (0.038)
Workforce Size	0.014 (0.011)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.008 (0.010)	0.029** (0.015)	0.031*** (0.011)
Agency Conservatism	0.069*** (0.026)	0.034** (0.020)	0.076*** (0.029)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.054* (0.035)	-0.047** (0.025)
Constant	-0.007 (0.118)	-0.066 (0.094)	0.424 (0.124)	0.058 (0.119)	0.311*** (0.105)	0.015 (0.160)	-0.226** (0.122)
<i>N</i>	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Log-Likelihood	-3.761	-1.779	-7.578	-5.715	-0.868	-17.027	-5.878
C^2_{4df}	14.03**	9.74**	8.31*	4.13	4.92	5.27	11.20**
Pseudo- R^2	0.651	0.733	0.354	0.265	0.739	0.134	0.488

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Each agency-level observation is weighted by the number of appointees to that agency in the data.

Table SA3-2: Robustness Checks – Aggregate Agency Characteristics (OLS Models; Individually Estimated)

Variable	Expertise Variables					Patronage Variables	
	% with agency experience	% with Ph.Ds	% with gov't experience	% working in Clinton or Bush Admins.	% with subject knowledge	% whose last job was in politics	% with campaign experience
	(E-1)	(E-2)	(E-3)	(E-4)	(E-5)	(P-1)	(P-2)
Professionalism	0.483*** (0.164)	0.129* (0.084)	0.178 (0.196)	-0.076 (0.152)	-0.196 (0.160)	-0.088 (0.181)	0.022 (0.084)
Priority Agency	0.046 (0.036)	0.051*** (0.019)	0.082** (0.043)	0.058** (0.033)	0.043 (0.035)	-0.070** (0.040)	-0.043** (0.018)
Workforce Size	0.004 (0.009)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)	0.007* (0.004)
Agency Conservatism	0.063*** (0.022)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.075*** (0.026)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.046** (0.024)	-0.020** (0.011)
Constant	0.131 (0.093)	0.108 (0.048)	0.440*** (0.112)	0.195** (0.087)	0.327*** (0.091)	0.224** (0.103)	0.042 (0.048)
<i>N</i>	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
<i>F</i> _{4df}	3.51**	3.65**	2.72**	0.88	1.43	1.51	2.16*
<i>R</i> ²	0.213	0.219	0.173	0.064	0.099	0.104	0.142

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Each agency-level observation is weighted by the number of appointees to that agency in the data.

Table SA3-3: Robustness Checks – Including Interaction Term (SUTR Model)

Variable	Expertise Variables					Patronage Variables	
	% with agency experience (E-1)	% with Ph.Ds (E-2)	% with gov't experience (E-3)	% working in Bush or Clinton Admins. (E-4)	% with subject knowledge (E-5)	% whose last job was in politics (P-1)	% with campaign experience (P-2)
Professionalism	0.501*** (0.156)	0.160** (0.096)	0.177 (0.186)	-0.062 (0.156)	-0.195 (0.155)	-0.107 (0.182)	0.033 (0.107)
Priority Agency	0.024 (0.036)	0.065*** (0.022)	0.072* (0.048)	0.057* (0.036)	0.038 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.024)
Workforce Size	0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.010)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.015* (0.010)	0.014*** (0.006)
Agency Conservatism	-0.004 (0.038)	0.047** (0.024)	0.018 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.038)	-0.058* (0.044)	0.070*** (0.027)
Agency Conservatism x Priority Agency	0.085** (0.040)	-0.019 (0.026)	0.072* (0.048)	0.021 (0.041)	0.022 (0.040)	0.137*** (0.047)	-0.124*** (0.029)
Constant	0.120* (0.090)	0.053 (0.058)	0.447*** (0.106)	0.159** (0.090)	0.325*** (0.088)	0.147* (0.105)	-0.075 (0.063)
<i>N</i>	57						
Log-Likelihood	348.07						
$\chi^2_{35\ df}$	110.17***						

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$


Each agency-level observation is weighted by the number of appointees to that agency in the data.

Supplementary Appendix 4 – Additional PCA Information

Table SA4-1: Summary Statistics – Latent Dimensions of Expertise and Patronage


Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Latent Expertise	0.12	0.36	2.35	-4.41	9.30
Latent Patronage	-0.67	-1.04	1.64	-2.26	4.56
Both	0.48	0.65	2.28	-5.49	8.93

Figure SA4-1: Correlation Circle Plots




(a) Expertise Components Only

(b) Patronage Components Only




(c) Joint Estimation


Figure SA4-2: Principal Component Plots of Agency Characteristics



(a) Expertise Components Only



(b) Patronage Components Only



(c) Joint Estimation

Supplementary Appendix 5 – Bush Administration Analyses

To evaluate the predictions from the model we have also examined the opinions of thousands of top executives across the federal government during the Bush Administration. We use data from a 2007-8 survey of 7,448 federal administrators and program managers during the Bush Administration (Clinton et al. 2012). The survey includes responses from 2,225 career (1,953) and appointed (266) federal program managers and administrators across the various departments and agencies of the federal government. Respondents were asked a variety of questions about their backgrounds, political views, and work experiences. Importantly, the survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement:

“Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/ connections.” (mean 3.28; SD 0.77; Min 1; Max 4)

The question assesses the extent to which competence, as opposed to connections influenced the selection of appointees in each agency. We analyze whether respondents strongly agree (1; 3%), agree (2; 10%), disagree (3; 41%), or strongly disagree (4; 46%) with the claim that appointees are selected more on the basis of competence as opposed to campaign experience or political connections by agency. Since competence and patronage factors have been set up in opposition to each other in the question, it is reasonable to interpret “disagree” and “strongly disagree” answers as support for the claim that appointees are selected at least as much for campaign experience and political connections as competence and we interpret such answers in this manner. Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected more for political experience and connections rather than competence.

Caveats

There are a few limitations associated with using this data that we acknowledge up front. First, the phrasing of the question forces respondents to suggest whether appointees were selected for “competence” *or* “connections” when it is entirely possible that persons were selected for both. The question may force a false division. Second, responses to the survey are perceptions of persons who may or may not know why someone was selected. Finally, when the question asks about appointees in the respondent’s agency we do not know what appointees they are thinking about. This may vary by agency since agencies have different distributions of types of appointees. In some agencies all appointees are high level Senate-confirmed appointees. In other agencies, appointees in the Senior Executive Service and lower level Schedule C appointees work alongside career executives.

Independent Variables

We estimate models using the same measures of the key concepts as in the paper with a few exceptions. First, in calculating the measure of professionalism and agency size we use Office of Personnel Management data from September, 2007 to correspond with the timing of the survey. In the paper we use data concurrent with the Obama Administration. Second, to measure whether an issue was on Bush’s agenda we use the president’s 2007 State of the Union Speech and a 2006 evaluation of his agenda by the *New York Times*. We coded all agencies mentioned in the *Times* article or were responsible for a policy or issue raised in the speech with a 1 and all other agencies with a 0 (40%).

Finally, we estimate some models with additional controls to account for perceptual biases from respondents, including frequency of contact with appointees, years of experience working in the agency, whether respondents work in Washington, D.C. or a regional office, and

appointment authority. We include the agency average of respondents' self-reported frequency of contact with agency appointees (Never (1)-5%; Rarely (2)-16%; Monthly (3)-14%; Weekly (4)-20%; Daily (5)-45%). The survey also asks respondents how many years they have worked in their current position (mean 6.76; SD 6.12; min 0; max 45) and whether they work in Washington, DC or a regional office (0,1; 21%). Respondents with more experience and contact should also be able to give a better evaluation of the factors influencing appointment. Finally, some respondents are career executives and others are appointees themselves (0,1; 10%). The position of respondents may influence their own perceptions of what factors are influential in selection. We include agency averages for these variables.

We have responses from executives working in 72 agencies, although we lack personnel data from OPM or agency ideology measure for a few of these agencies which explains why models are estimated with 52 agencies. We estimate tobit models on the average agency responses to the question about competence vs. connections since responses are censored at 4 and a number of agency averages are 4. We also estimate ordered logit models on the median agency response. All models are weighted by the number of respondents in each agency.

Results

The models provide some interesting results. One result that is robust across models is that respondents in conservative agencies were significantly more likely to report that appointees in their agencies were selected for connections rather than competence. This is consistent with the Obama Administration finding that liberal agencies were more likely to receive appointees with political experience. In general, it appears that agencies that share the president's policy views are more likely to receive patronage appointees based upon both the content of their resumes and the perceptions of their colleagues.

While professional agencies were estimated to be less likely to receive appointees with lower levels of demonstrated expertise in the Obama data, here the evidence is less clear. While the coefficient estimates are generally negative, suggesting professional agencies get fewer appointees selected for connections, the estimates are small and we can only reject the null in models of median responses (Model 5).

Similarly, agencies that are presidential priorities are estimated to be no less likely to receive patronage appointees on average. When we dig a little deeper, however, it appears that agencies on the president's agenda are always less likely to receive appointees selected for connections except in very large agencies (agencies above the 75th percentile in employment). The interaction on agency size and priority agency is positive, substantively large, and significant, reversing the effect of priority agency except for the largest agencies. For most agencies, then, being on the President Bush's agenda meant that respondents were more likely to be selected for competence. Only in the largest agencies did being a priority agency not decrease the influence of connections in finding a job.

Contrary to what we found in the Obama Administration, survey respondents in larger agencies were less likely to report that appointees in their agencies were chosen because of connections rather than competence. Our expectation was that appointees with less direct influence on agency outputs would be less likely to be chosen for competence. We do not know what appointees come to respondents' minds when surveyed. It is possible that in larger agencies respondents were more likely to think of senior appointees rather than those that fill public affairs offices or staff positions which reflects one of the drawbacks of this data.

Table SA 5-1. Perceptions of Whether Appointees are Selected for Competence or Campaign Experience or Political Connections

Variable (Standard errors in parentheses)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Professionalism	-0.01 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.18)	0.01 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.18)	-7.94** (4.09)
Priority Agency	0.03 (0.06)	0.08* (0.06)	-0.78** (0.39)	-0.44 (0.37)	1.57 (1.38)
Workforce Size	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.57* (0.37)
Agency Conservatism	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	2.01*** (0.62)
Workforce Size*Priority Agency			0.08** (0.04)	0.05* (0.04)	
Average Frequency of Contact w/ Appointees		-0.23** (0.07)		-0.21*** (0.07)	-4.22** (1.81)
Years Worked in Agency		0.01 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)	1.31** (0.66)
Percentage in Regional Office		-0.54 (0.48)		-0.44 (0.47)	-47.58*** (18.09)
Percentage of Appointee Respondents		0.77** (0.39)		0.58* (0.40)	5.24 (7.15)
σ	0.18*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	
Constant	3.55*** (0.18)	4.49*** (0.44)	3.69*** (0.18)	4.51*** (0.43)	
Number of agencies	52	52	52	52	52
Log-Likelihood	-6.83	-0.67	-4.65	0.32	20.35
X ² (4, 8, 5, 9, 8)	16.46**	28.79***	20.82***	30.76***	43.73***

Notes: One-tailed tests of significance: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Question wording: "Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting [strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don't know]: *Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/ connections.*" Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected more for political experience and connections rather than competence.

Cut points in model 5 omitted.