Table R1. Examination of Trends in Budget Variables, OLS

Dependent Variable	% Change in Appropriations	% Change in President's Request
Fiscal Year	-0.005	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.008)
Constant	9.283	-13.762
	(19.110)	(16.572)
N	607	607

Standard errors reported in parentheses.

Table R2. Allowing for a mixed category of domestic/foreign spending, Kiewiet-McCubbins (1991) data

Unmixed Foreign Affairs	0.055	0.054
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Mixed Foreign/Domestic	0.031	0.031
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Unified Government	0.032	0.041
	(0.027)	(0.030)
War	0.031	0.007
	(0.029)	(0.037)
Foreign Affairs×Unified Government	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Mixed Foreign/Domestic×Unified Government	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.026)	(0.026)
President Indicators		
Nixon	--	0.025
		(0.034)
Carter	--	Dropped due to collinearity
Reagan	--	0.035
		(0.035)
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant		
Deficit	-0.001	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.023)
Constant	-0.104	-0.096
	(0.033)	(0.041)
N	669	669
X^2	30.13 (p<0.01)	30.64 (p<0.01)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|. Panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford. A few features of the Kiewiet-McCubbins data are worth highlighting. First, a unit can be either a bureau or agency in order to maintain some equality of size across the panels; thus the Department of Defense is represented by multiple bureaus (e.g., procurement, personnel) while the Environmental Protection Agency is represented at the agency level. The full list of agencies/bureaus, including the years for each, is given in Table 6.2 (pp. 146-7) of their book. Second, a few of the agencies in the KM data employed a high proportion of mandatory spending. Our analysis includes all of their panels in which at least 80% of the spending in each year was discretionary.

Table R3. Instrumental variables analysis

	1st Stage Equation Predicting Presidential Proposal		2nd State Equation Predicting Enacted Appropriations	
	Domestic Sample	Foreign Sample	Domestic Sample	Foreign/Defense Sample
Predicted Presidential Proposal	– – –	– – –	0.697 (0.340)	0.830 (0.304)
Congressional Election Year	0.129 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.367 (0.164)	0.082 (0.111)
Median House CS Score	0.360 (0.157)	-0.220 (0.091)	0.114 (0.045)	0.028 (0.021)
Change in Gross Domestic Product	0.003 (0.024)	-0.025 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.009)
Change in Unemployment	-0.148 (0.304)	-0.391 (0.169)	0.051 (0.157)	0.007 (0.122)
Inflation	0.004 (0.011)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.007)	0.008 (0.005)
Deficit	-0.010 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.015)	0.008 (0.011)
Presidential CS Score	-0.013 (0.088)	0.141 (0.049)	– – –	– – –
Presidential CS Score × Scandal	0.049 (0.113)	-0.183 (0.065)	– – –	– – –
Scandal	-0.041 (0.051)	-0.019 (0.029)	– – –	– – –
2nd Term	-0.085 (0.065)	0.009 (0.036)	– – –	– – –
Presidential Election Year	-0.056 (0.057)	0.040 (0.032)	– – –	– – –
Constant	-0.075 (0.148)	0.134 (0.084)	0.212 (0.107)	-0.062 (0.073)
N	526	81	526	81
X^2	26.00 ($p<0.01$)	35.00 ($p<0.01$)	55.88 ($p<0.01$)	23.65 ($p<0.01$)

Estimates are from generalized two-stage least squares for panel-data models.

Table R4. Alternative specifications of war

Foreign Affairs	0.080	0.080	0.077
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Vietnam[1]	0.260	-----	-----
	(0.099)		
1st Gulf War	0.002	-----	-----
	(0.054)		
War including Kosovo, Haiti, and Panama	-----	0.032	0.024
		(0.028)	(0.023)
Unified Government	0.084	0.110	0.074
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.047)
Foreign Affairs×Unified Government	-0.037	-0.037	-0.035
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.049)
President Indicators			
Nixon	-0.262	-0.090	-----
	(0.117)	(0.100)	
Carter	-0.020	-0.046	-----
	(0.113)	(0.113)	
Reagan	0.037	0.041	-----
	(0.090)	(0.090)	
G.H.W. Bush	0.077	0.065	-----
	(0.099)	(0.095)	
Clinton	0.061	0.037	-----
	(0.093)	(0.093)	
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant			
Deficit	-0.016	-0.021	-0.015
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.152	-0.145	-0.115
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.021)
N	607	607	607
X^2	38.19	29.08	22.23
	(p<0.01)	(p<0.01)	(p<0.01)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|. Panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford.

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[1] We do not present the results for a specification that separates Vietnam and the 1st Gulf War, but does not include president indicators, because in this case the impact of Vietnam would be conflated with that of Nixon. The results for foreign affairs in such a specification are nearly identical to those presented, and remain highly statistically significant.

Table R5. Analysis without weighting the standard errors

Foreign Affairs	0.158	0.158
	(0.042)	(0.039)
Unified Government	0.136	0.094
	(0.152)	(0.078)
War	0.239	-0.074
	(0.122)	(0.087)
Foreign Affairs×Unified Government	-0.099	-0.100
	(0.088)	(0.082)
President Indicators		
Nixon	-0.356	---
	(0.156)	
Carter	0.009	---
	(0.203)	
Reagan	0.154	---
	(0.115)	
G.H.W. Bush	-0.037	---
	(0.162)	
Clinton	0.067	---
	(0.144)	
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant		
Deficit	-0.037	-0.004
	(0.042)	(0.020)
Constant	-0.232	-0.206
	(0.119)	(0.045)
N	607	607
X^2	28.86	29.08
	(p<0.01)	(p<0.01)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|. (Unweighted) panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford.

Table R6. Proposed increases versus proposed cuts

	Proposed Increase		Proposed Cut	
Foreign Affairs	0.047	0.045	0.161	0.145
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.078)	(0.051)
Unified Government	0.090	0.043	0.178	0.115
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.153)	(0.106)
War	0.009	0.007	0.242	-0.009
	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.132)	(0.089)
Foreign Affairs×Unified Government	0.001	-0.013	-0.127	-0.074
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.141)	(0.105)
President Indicators				
Nixon	-0.044	---	-0.362	---
	(0.054)		(0.335)	
Carter	-0.096	---	-0.023	---
	(0.062)		(0.334)	
Reagan	0.002	---	0.136	---
	(0.039)		(0.304)	
G.H.W. Bush	0.021	---	0.110	---
	(0.054)		(0.309)	
Clinton	-0.014	---	0.090	---
	(0.047)		(0.286)	
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant				
Deficit	-0.019	-0.011	-0.047	-0.026
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.024)
Constant	-0.075	-0.086	-0.213	-0.143
	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.283)	(0.053)
N	390	390	217	217
X^2	26.75	18.99	15.59	11.41
	(p<0.01)	(p<0.01)	(p=0.11)	(p=0.04)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|.
Panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford.

Table R7. Congressional Budget Act and Common Space scores

	Congressional Budget Act	House CS Score		Senate CS Score	
Foreign Affairs	0.080 (0.022)	0.073 (0.020)	0.068 (0.019)	0.073 (0.020)	0.070 (0.019)
Unified Government	0.070 (0.047)	---	---	---	---
War	0.066 (0.034)	0.061 (0.046)	0.014 (0.038)	0.060 (0.047)	0.005 (0.031)
Foreign Affairs×Unified Government	-0.038 (0.052)	---	---	---	---
Post-Congressional Budget Act	0.160 (0.052)	---	---	---	---
|Presidential CS Score – Median House CS Score|	---	-0.206 (0.127)	0.063 (0.071)	---	---
|Presidential CS Score – Median Senate CS Score|	---	---	---	-0.053 (0.341)	-0.154 (0.115)
President Indicators					
Nixon	---	-0.120 (0.104)	---	-0.103 (0.107)	---
Carter	---	0.041 (0.108)	---	0.045 (0.117)	---
Reagan	---	0.033 (0.089)	---	0.031 (0.093)	---
G.H.W. Bush	---	-0.046 (0.106)	---	0.029 (0.108)	---
Clinton	---	0.151 (0.095)	---	0.088 (0.108)	---
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant					
Deficit	-0.022 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.007)
Constant	-0.260 (0.054)	-0.061 (0.112)	-0.014 (0.056)	-0.134 (0.238)	-0.017 (0.061)
N	607	607	607	607	607
X^2	27.03 ($p<0.01$)	29.19 ($p<0.01$)	15.31 ($p<0.01$)	26.58 ($p<0.01$)	17.66 ($p<0.01$)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|. Panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford.

Table R8. Percentage of congressional members in president's party

	House		*Senate*	
Foreign Affairs	0.073	0.070	0.075	0.069
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
% House Members in President's Party	0.180	0.215	---	---
	(0.386)	(0.160)		
% Senate Members in President's Party	---		0.190	0.239
			(0.402)	(0.260)
War	0.061	0.008	0.060	0.012
	(0.047)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.035)
President Indicators				
Nixon	-0.119	---	-0.112	---
	(0.113)		(0.107)	
Carter	-0.003	---	0.015	---
	(0.158)		(0.129)	
Reagan	0.017	---	0.009	---
	(0.091)		(0.096)	
G.H.W. Bush	0.017	---	0.020	---
	(0.097)		(0.097)	
Clinton	0.060	---	0.072	---
	(0.119)		(0.104)	
Subject-Specific Controls and Constant				
Deficit	-0.007	-0.011	-0.009	-0.017
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Constant	-0.222	-0.200	-0.234	-0.209
	(0.147)	(0.080)	(0.168)	(0.125)
N	607	607	607	607
X^2	29.19	17.55	26.93	16.11
	($p<0.01$)	($p<0.01$)	($p<0.01$)	($p<0.01$)

Note: Dependent variable = -|%Change President's Proposal - %Change Enacted Appropriations|. Panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Omitted president indicator is Ford.

Table R9. Presidential Administrative Control by Foreign/Domestic Policy, 1946-2000

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Foreign Affairs	0.451	0.518	1.579	0.949	0.764	0.773	0.793
	(0.204)	(0.243)	(0.273)	(0.231)	(0.206)	(0.204)	(0.225)
Unified Government	0.244	-0.062	0.086	-0.087	0.236	0.216	0.245
	(0.188)	(0.148)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.192)
War	-0.151	-0.038	-0.128	-0.048	0.017	-0.004	0.011
	(0.096)	(0.129)	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.140)
Foreign Affairs*Unified Government	-0.110	-0.347	-0.870	-0.508	-0.976	-0.931	-0.930
	(0.278)	(0.353)	(0.355)	(0.329)	(0.361)	(0.369)	(0.371)
Regulatory (0,1)	--	--	--	--	-0.237	--	--
					(0.213)		
Trend	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.004
							(0.005)
Subject Specific Controls and Constant							
Line in the Budget	0.386	0.189	-0.037	0.028	0.304	0.249	0.248
	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.100)
Adjudicative Agency	-1.351	-0.828	-1.400	-0.775	-1.307	-1.338	-1.289
	(0.182)	(0.208)	(0.171)	(0.216)	(0.163)	(0.157)	(0.179)
Created by Statute	-1.074	-0.583	-0.887	-0.440	-1.080	-1.060	-1.061
	(0.143)	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.136)
N	407	410	407	410	402	407	406
χ^2	149.94	66.50	233.70	65.19	244.16	206.4	264.25

Note: Dependent variable is count of characteristics enhancing presidential influence (0-4)—headed by administrator, no party balancing requirements for nomination, ability to fire, location inside the EOP or the cabinet. Cut point estimates omitted. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on years and reported in parentheses. DV in Model 1 counts only agencies in EOP as part of the measure of presidential control. DV in Model 2 is an ordinal variable that categorizes agencies according to their proximity to the president (5-EOP; 4-Cabinet; 3-Ind. Ag; 2-Ind Com; 1-Other). DV in Model 3 counts only agencies in EOP or inner cabinet as part of measure of presidential control. DV in Model 4 is an ordinal variable that categorizes agencies according to their proximity to the president (5-EOP; 4-Inner Cabinet; 3-Outer Cabinet; 2-Ind. Agencies; 1-Ind Com; 0-Other). Model 5 includes an indicator for whether the agency regulates. Model 6 includes a war variable coded to include Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Haiti. Model 7 is estimated with a trend variable.

Table R10. Models of Presidential Administrative Control by Foreign/Domestic Policy Using Different Measures of Disagreement Between Congress and the President, 1946-2000

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Affairs	2.773	2.461	0.276	0.251
	(0.989)	(1.288)	(0.184)	(0.189)
Size of Presidential Party	0.016	0.022	--	--
	(0.010)	(0.010)		
Abs (Pres CS Score-House/Senate Median)	--	--	0.523	-0.721
			(0.432)	(0.441)
War	-0.041	-0.048	0.012	-0.062
	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.161)	(0.148)
Size of Presidential Party*Foreign Affairs	-0.049	-0.043	--	--
	(0.020)	(0.026)		
Subject Specific Controls and Constant				
Line in the Budget	0.223	0.198	0.231	0.190
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Adjudicative Agency	-1.357	-1.325	-1.28	-1.306
	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.153)
Created by Statute	-1.105	-1.024	-1.006	-1.005
	(0.134)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.140)
N	407	407	407	407
χ^2	219.70	221.00	204.59	211.57

Note: Dependent variable is count of characteristics enhancing presidential influence (0-4)—headed by administrator, no party balancing requirements for nomination, ability to fire, location inside the EOP or the cabinet. Cut point estimates omitted. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on years and reported in parentheses. Model 1 includes size of the president's party in the House. Model 2 includes size of the president's party in the Senate. Models 3 and 4 include the distance in common space scores between the president and House/Senate rather than size of the president's party in Congress.

Table R11. Individual Models of Presidential Administrative Control, 1946-2000

	Administration	No Fixed Term	No Party-Balancing	Inside EOP or Cabinet
Foreign Affairs (0,1)	0.521	0.381	0.665	1.005
	(0.314)	(0.353)	(0.402)	(0.304)
Unified Government (0,1)	0.304	0.164	0.062	0.048
	(0.198)	(0.234)	(0.207)	(0.224)
Foreign Affairs*Unified Government (0,1)	-0.576	-0.228	--	-1.191
	(0.526)	(0.482)		(0.450)
War (0,1)	-0.300	-0.094	0.072	0.064
	(0.178)	(0.224)	(0.214)	(0.186)
Subject Specific Controls and Constant				
Line in the Budget (0,1)	0.465	0.111	-0.488	0.134
	(0.112)	(0.166)	(0.263)	(0.133)
Adjudicative Agency (0,1)	--	-0.685	-0.389	-1.122
		(0.320)	(0.535)	(0.234)
Created by Statute (0,1)	-1.213	-1.766	-1.232	-0.581
	(0.168)	(0.315)	(0.275)	(0.165)
Constant	1.097	2.171	2.642	-0.652
	(0.183)	(0.297)	(0.307)	(0.188)
% Correctly Predicted	80%	88%	94%	73%
N	384	407	360	410
χ^2 (7 df)	90.68	76.18	40.43	60.15

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models include robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on year. Model 1 drops judicial agencies since they perfectly predict the outcome. All adjudicatory agencies were commissions. Model 3 drops the interaction between unified government and foreign affairs since it perfectly predicts the outcome. During periods of unified government all foreign affairs agencies lacked party-balancing requirements.

Influence of Foreign Affairs on Probability of Falling in Each Ordered Category

Note: Based upon estimates from Model 2 in Table 2 in text