The Bipartisan Path to Effective Lawmaking

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August 2022

Abstract

We confront the puzzle of why bipartisanship is alive and well in Congress, despite notable increases in party polarization and rising primary election threats. The answer is remarkably simple – bipartisanship unambiguously helps individual legislators who seek to advance their policy goals. We show that members of the House and Senate from the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016) who attract a larger portion of their bill cosponsors from the opposing party are much more successful at lawmaking. We show these patterns to be remarkably robust to both majority-party and minority-party lawmakers, under changing legislative and electoral conditions, and over time. Moreover, a clear path to attracting bipartisan cosponsors involves reciprocity, making cosponsoring others' bills across party lines attractive.

* The authors thank Larry Bartels, Jean Bordewich, Dan Diller, and Dave Lewis for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript, James Fowler for sharing his cosponsorship data, and Jack Cramer for his research assistance. Volden and Wiseman thank the U.S. Democracy Program of the Hewlett Foundation and the Democracy Fund for their continued support for the Center for Effective Lawmaking (www.thelawmakers.org).

The incidence of bipartisanship in the U.S. Congress is something of a puzzle. On the one hand, the parties in Congress have become increasingly polarized, leaving little middle ground in the ideological center. Members who try to stake out moderate positions or engage in compromise face primary election threats from the more extreme wings of their parties, often with the support of well-funded campaign contributors (Barber 2016) and energized ideologues among the primary electorate (Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong 2020).[1] Although legislators appear to be punished in general elections for being too partisan or ideological in their roll call voting (e.g., Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, Carson et al. 2010), recent research (Pyeatt 2015) points to how incumbents who fail to toe the party line on roll calls are more likely to face competitive primary challenges. Given that general elections have become increasingly less competitive in recent years (such that winning one's primary often maps directly into being elected into Congress), such findings suggest that the road to electoral security requires legislators to be highly partisan.

On the other hand, recent evidence suggests that, despite these electoral pressures to advance a partisan policy agenda, bipartisan coalitions still frequently form around initial legislative proposals (Harbridge 2015), and major legislation often passes with bipartisan supermajorities (e.g., Mayhew 1991, Curry and Lee 2020).

How do the individual electoral incentives against bipartisanship give way to the aggregate patterns of continued bipartisan lawmaking? We explore this question and offer a straightforward but important answer. Beyond members' electoral goals are their policy goals (Fenno 1973). And for the purposes of lawmaking, bipartisanship works, in that it

[1] See Carson et al. (2010) and Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) for the electoral considerations behind partisan and bipartisan activities in Congress.

unambiguously helps members achieve their policy goals, and continues to help despite increasing polarization and changing electoral conditions.

To advance our argument, we draw on a dataset of Representatives' and Senators' sponsorship and cosponsorship decisions on all public bills that were introduced into the U.S. Congress between 1973-2016, to examine the relationship between members' records of working across the aisle and their lawmaking effectiveness. Our findings indicate that those Representatives and Senators who attract a more balanced proportion of Democratic and Republican cosponsors to their bills are, indeed, more effective as lawmakers than are more partisan legislators, who mainly build cosponsorship support within their own party.

Moreover, despite the pervasive conventional wisdom regarding the scope of political polarization and electoral competition for control of the contemporary Congress, we find that cultivating a bipartisan coalition corresponds with enhanced lawmaking effectiveness consistently over time. We also find that both majority and minority party members benefit from such bipartisan activities. From a methodological perspective, we find that our results hold upon inclusion or exclusion of member fixed effects, indicating that we are not simply finding different patterns across legislators, but also capturing the effects of choices by the same legislators over time.

We also examine the correlates of legislators' abilities to build such helpful bipartisan coalitions in support of their bills, uncovering a significant positive reciprocity between how often a legislator cosponsors the bills of opposite-party members and the proportion of opposition-party cosponsors that she can attract to her own bills. Hence, by engaging in bipartisan cosponsorships, a legislator can contribute to a virtuous cycle whereby a larger

proportion of cosponsors on her bills will be drawn from members of the opposite party, enhancing her own lawmaking effectiveness.

How Might Bipartisanship Influence Lawmaking Effectiveness?

Research rooted in spatial models of lawmaking predicts that successful legislation will often be bipartisan, because only legislation that meets the policy goals of pivotal veto players can move forward (Krehbiel 1998). Given the frequency of divided government in the U.S., some buy-in from both parties is often required to achieve policy success. Moreover, even under unified government, it is rare for one party to be large enough (or unified enough) to overcome supermajoritarian hurdles in the lawmaking process by itself (Jones 2001). Therefore, most successful bills will be bipartisan, by construction, in line with Curry and Lee's (2020) recent findings. If bipartisan legislation is much more likely to pass, then, at an individual level, one would expect that legislators who develop and shepherd bipartisan bills will be more successful than legislators who advocate for a more partisan policy agenda.

But what, precisely, does it mean for a legislator to engage in bipartisan lawmaking? At the most fundamental level, when a Representative or Senator introduces a bill, she needs to determine how to structure her coalition to ensure its passage. In some cases, the bill is such an obvious improvement over the status quo that she can secure majority (and in some cases, supermajority) support without having to work to convince others of the merits of her proposal (e.g., Hitt, Volden, and Wiseman 2017). In most cases, however, moving bills through the lawmaking process requires sponsors to identify and recruit those legislators who are most predisposed towards their bills (i.e., Craig 2021); in some cases, they must alter the content of their bills to compromise or engage in other forms of coalition building (e.g., Snyder 1991). While it is generally easier (due to shared ideology) for a Representative or Senator to find

support for her bills among members of her party, reaching out to members of the opposite party can yield significant lawmaking payoffs.

Generating bipartisan support for a bill sends clear signals to pivotal gatekeepers in the lawmaking process, such as committee and subcommittee chairs, that a bill appeals to a broad cross-section of the chamber (i.e., Koger 2003).[2] While securing bipartisan support for one's bills is essential for minority party members (given their limited numbers), majority party members can likewise benefit from securing minority support for their bills. Doing so sends a signal that their bills are likely to experience a (relatively) smoother ride through their parent chamber and perhaps enjoy meaningful bipartisan support in the other chamber as well. To the extent that pivotal gatekeepers want to focus their scarce time and attention on legislation that has the greatest chance of ultimately becoming law, amassing bipartisan support for one's bills can help sponsors in advancing their agenda.

Indeed, profiles of some of the longest-serving and most successful legislators often highlight their abilities to work across the aisle and build coalitions for their bills, paving the way for lawmaking success. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), for example, was well known for proactively identifying Republican allies who could help him to advance his legislative priorities, including the 1982 Jobs Training Partnership Act, where he partnered with Dan Quayle (R-IN), and the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, where he worked in partnership with President George W. Bush. Similarly, Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) attributes his success in passing reforms of pesticide regulations in the 1990s to building a bipartisan coalition that began with Representative Thomas Bliley (R-VA) (Waxman and Green 2009, 137). Working across the

[2] Lorenz (2020) likewise shows the value of interest group diversity in moving legislation through committees.

aisle generates more refined proposals, often removing the elements found to be most onerous by the other side, contributing to greater levels of lawmaking success.[3] Such arguments motivate our first testable hypothesis:

Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis: Those legislators who exhibit higher levels of bipartisan activity in Congress will be more effective lawmakers.

In contrast to this perspective, legislators might choose to build their coalitions upon a strong base of partisan supporters, only rounding out their coalitions with opponents from the other side of the aisle when absolutely necessary. Congressman David Price (2021, 142) argues that President George W. Bush encouraged precisely this dynamic among Republican lawmakers during his time in the White House: governing "from the 'right in' rather than the 'center out,' and House Republican leaders put together their winning majorities in the same way." On its face, such a strategy would seem problematic for prospects of legislative success, in that it would likely alienate a substantial body of the chamber whose support might be necessary for passage. Depending on the scope of party leaders' influence over the lawmaking process, however, such a strategy might have a significant payoff in shifting the size and scope of government.

By generating enthusistic (and relatively one-sided) majority party support for a bill, a sponsor can convey to party leaders that her bill comports with the party's core policy agenda, the advancement of which will facilitate collective electoral benefits from partisan differentiation (e.g., Koger and Lebo 2017, Lee 2016, Snyder and Ting 2002). If majority party leaders have significant influence over how committee and subcommittee chairs engage with the lawmaking process (i.e., Cox and McCubbins 2005), they could direct those gatekeepers to advance such

[3] Research on legislative entrepreneurship (e.g., Wawro 2001) likewise suggests the importance of coalition building, including with those across the aisle, for achieving policy goals.

one-sided (partisan) measures further through the lawmaking process, especially in comparison to bipartisan bills seen by strong partisans as betraying the fundamental principles of the party (i.e., Baker 2015).[4]

Former Speaker Dennis Hastert's (R-IL) embraced such a mono-partisan perspective on lawmaking, with his innovation of the "Hastert Rule," whereby he would only allow bills to move forward if they had received at least the support of a majority of the majority party. Even more starkly, in the late-1990s, majority whip Tom DeLay adopted a strategy of starting "every initiative from as far to the political right as we could" (DeLay and Mansfield 2007, 103-104). And one can easily point to high-profile examples of when such partisan approaches to lawmaking influenced congressional politics – such as during Republican efforts to repeal Obamacare or Democratic efforts to advance President Biden's $2 trillion pandemic relief package.

To the extent that such sentiments (and high-profile examples) reflect a more general pattern of party leader engagement with the legislative process, sponsors who eschew bipartisan support for their bills may be expected to achieve greater success in committee, and perhaps on the floor. Recent research on *legislative style* (i.e., Bernhard and Sulkin 2018) provides suggestive evidence in line with this claim, showing that "policy specialists" (representatives with focused agendas, who typically exhibit partisan voting and cosponsorship tendencies) achieve greater legislative success. Taken together, these arguments suggest that the most effective lawmakers might actually be those who engage in more partisan coalition building strategies, motivating the following hypothesis:

[4] Majority party leaders might likewise seek to advance such bills even if they are unlikely to become law, because they help the party garner support from aligned interest groups (i.e., Gelman 2020).

Partisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis: Those legislators who exhibit lower levels of bipartisan activity in Congress will be more effective lawmakers.

Clearly these two hypotheses are in direct competition with one another. Support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* would thus be evidence against the *Partisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*. Putting aside these stark outcomes, it could be the case that there are more nuanced, conditional relationships between bipartisanship and legislative effectiveness.

For example, while engaging in bipartisan activities might generally contribute to legislative effectiveness, it might be especially valuable for members of the minority party who, by definition, need to cultivate support outside of their party. In contrast, members of the majority party (especially when it is a large majority) might not have to rely on minority party support to advance their bills. Thinking across the scope of congressional history, it also seems plausible that bipartisanship might have been quite valuable in the past, yielding more limited benefits in more recent, polarized Congresses. We explore each of these conditional possibilities below.

Data

Testing these hypotheses requires metrics of legislators' lawmaking effectiveness and of the scope of their bipartisan activities. To measure lawmaking effectiveness, we employ Volden and Wiseman's (2014, 2018) Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES), which is a parsimonious summary metric that captures how successful a Representative (or Senator) is at advancing her legislative agenda items (i.e., Public Bills) through the lawmaking process from introduction until (possibly) becoming law. For the current study, we analyze the Legislative Effectiveness

Scores of every Representative and Senator who served between the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016). While the LES is a reasonably straightforward (and widely accepted) metric of lawmaking effectiveness, it is worth noting that it does not include a number of activities that members of Congress engage in, such as oversight, constituent service, or obstruction.[5] Rather, the LES captures the advancement of legislative proposals, in line with our hypotheses.

The concept of *bipartisanship* could refer to a variety of activities, ranging from consistently voting for bills that are offered by members of the opposing party to (in rare cases) helping to advance election (or reelection) efforts across party lines. For our analysis, however, we focus on legislators' propensity to engage in bipartisan activities on substantive policy issues, measured by how often legislators attract opposite-party cosponsors to their introduced bills, relative to attracting copartisans.

Cosponsorship data have been used to engage with questions related to policy support across different groups of legislators (e.g., Swers 2002), the determinants of network formation in Congress (e.g., Tam Cho and Fowler 2010), and the roles of signaling and cue-taking in lawmaking (e.g., Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). While it is debatable whether a legislator's decision to cosponsor a bill indicates that she will exert any meaningful effort to secure its passage, cosponsoring another legislator's bill represents a clear public endorsement of that legislative initiative (Koger 2003). Moreover, this endorsement is likely sincere (Desposato, Kearney, and Crisp 2011); once a legislator has signed on as a cosponsor, she rarely votes

[5] The LES also does not capture alternative pathways for legislators to leave an imprint on the lawmaking process, such as successfully adding amendments to bills that ultimately become law (e.g., Eatough and Preece 2020), or having portions of their bills attached to successful omnibus bills (e.g., Casas et al. 2020, Wilkerson et al. 2015). Below, we explore the robustness of our findings to the Casas et al. "hitchhikers" approach; future research on the role of bipartisanship for amendment success may also be valuable.

against that bill (Bernhard and Sulkin 2013). Hence, cosponsorship data serve as highly transparent indicators of legislators' bipartisanship, in that they allow an analyst to assess whether a legislator supports particular colleagues and their initiatives, regardless of whether agenda-setting or gatekeeping obstacles ultimately keep such bills from receiving a vote on the floor (Harbridge 2015).

Research using cosponsorship patterns has produced some evidence that larger and more diverse coalitions may contribute to lawmaking success. Wilson and Young (1997) show that larger cosponsorship coalitions can provide signals of expertise, contributing to success at the committee stage. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) posit that diverse cosponsors can provide signals of bill quality, Fowler (2006) points to how cosponsorship connections relate to amendment success, and Koger (2003) argues that leaders recognize that bills with bipartisan coalitions may be easier to pass.[6] No large sample research to date, however, has explored whether attracting and/or offering bipartisan cosponsorship on bills contributes to a legislator's success at advancing her agenda.

Drawing on cosponsorship data for all public bills that were introduced between 1973-2016, we capture how often legislators' bills attract bipartisan cosponsors.[7] More specifically, a legislator's *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* is the average proportion of all cosponsors on her sponsored bills in a given two-year Congress who are from the other party.[8] By construction, we restrict the calculation to those bills a member sponsored that drew in at

[6] Ringe, Victor and Gross (2013) and Ringe and Victor (2009) also explore the relationships between social networks in congress and legislative outcomes.
[7] Bill sponsorship and cosponsorship data for the 93rd to 110th Congresses were collected and shared by James Fowler (2006). We updated these data for the 111th to 114th Congresses. Independents are excluded from these calculations and from all analyses reported here.
[8] We first calculate the proportion of cosponsors from the opposing party on each bill and then calculate the mean across bills sponsored by each member.

least one cosponsor. This variable accounts for substantial changes over time in the frequency of cosponsorship,[9] and it exhibits considerable within-legislator and across-legislator variance for members of the House and the Senate across our sample.[10] Holding the number of bill cosponsorships constant, as a legislator attracts more cosponsors from the opposite party to her bills, her *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* value increases. As an example, Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-AL) sponsored five H.R. bills in the 113th Congress, two of which were cosponsored. Democrats were two of five cosponsors on the first bill, and two of three cosponsors on the second bill. His *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* is thus (0.4 + 0.667)/2 = 0.533.

It is important to characterize bipartisanship through cosponsorship as a proportion rather than as a count of such cosponsors from the other party; if we employed the latter measure, members with larger portfolios would receive more cosponsors and higher effectiveness scores, all else equal, simply by construction of these variables. Moreover, given that bills that move further through the lawmaking process attract more cosponsors as they progress, a simple count of cosponsors from the other party would therefore trivially be associated with higher lawmaking effectiveness. However, our fundamental question is not about accumulating more cosponsors

[9] For example, only 28 percent of House bills were cosponsored in the 93rd Congress compared to 61 percent of bills in 100th Congress. Additionally, the number of cosponsors who could sign onto any bill was capped at 25 in the House prior to 1979. Less than one percent of bills had exactly 25 cosponsors during this period (Harbridge 2015, 23), suggesting that it is unlikely that our measures of cosponsorship are significantly affected by members who wished to cosponsor being unable to do so. Nevertheless, below we show the robustness of our results to accounting for these changing dynamics of cosponsorship over time.

[10] More specifically, the within-member and across-member standard deviations for the House are 0.132 and 0.160, respectively; and the within-member and across-member standard deviations for the Senate are 0.130 and 0.155, respectively. These values approach the overall variance for the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* measure (with a standard deviation of about 0.19 in both the House and Senate).

(from either party), but rather about whether there is a greater return from growing the support of members of the opposing party or of one's own party, at the margins. If the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* is correct, we should expect a positive correlation between *LES* and the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted.* A negative correlation would offer support for the *Partisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Before diving into our analysis, however, it is useful to explore the scope of bipartisanship in the contemporary Congress. In Figure 1 we present the distribution of bipartisan cosponsors that are attracted to Representatives' and Senators' bills in each Congress; for each Congress, the line in the center of each box represents the median value of the data, and the lower and upper boundaries of each box represents the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution of the data, respectively.[11] Inspection of these data reveals that a meaningful degree of bipartisanship has existed across the last fifty years in Congress; and it continues to be found in contemporary Congresses, as well. More specifically, we see that the median *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* value has fluctuated between a high water mark of approximately 30% and 40% in the 1970s and 1980s in the House and Senate, respectively; and the general distributions of these data has remained reasonably consistent over time despite some decline.[12] The higher rate in the Senate may be due to less acrimonious partisanship in the Senate, or perhaps due to the need to reach across the aisle to gain 60 votes for cloture on most salient policy measures.[13]

[11] The endpoints of the "whiskers" show the most extreme data point within 1.5 times the interquartile range.
[12] We find no clear cohort effects in the data; specifically, it is *not* simply the case that bipartisanship today is limited to holdovers from a bygone era who are slowly fading away.
[13] In Supplemental Appendix Figure A1 we present a simplified view of the average *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* over time, which makes the decline over time somewhat more

Figure 1: Bipartisan Cosponsorship Over Time



evident. Figure A2 shows similar patterns when focusing only on the most major pieces of legislation, those labeled as "substantive and significant" by Volden and Wiseman (2014).

Note: The figure shows the distribution of bipartisan cosponsors attracted to lawmakers' bills within each Congress over time. The figure shows a greater level of bipartisanship in the Senate (bottom) than in the House (top) on average, as well as some decline in bipartisanship over the past half century.

One can find several examples of legislators who have high *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* scores, which comports with conventional wisdom regarding their lawmaking approaches. Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and John McCain (R-AZ), for example, established reputations of bipartisan lawmaking across their careers; and consistent with these perceptions, they both score quite high on our metric. In the 113th Congress (2013-2014), for example, Senator Murkowski introduced 43 public bills, 33 of which drew cosponsors; and the average proportion of bipartisan cosponsors attracted on these bills was a striking 0.85. In the 107th Congress (2001-2002), Senator McCain likewise attracted a significant proportion of bipartisan cosponsors to his bills: of the 45 public bills that he introduced, 31 drew cosponsors, and the average *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* for these bills was 0.67. It is also worth noting that both of these Senators had consistently high *Legislative Effectiveness Scores* over time.

On the other side of the spectrum, one can point to Senators such as Rick Santorum (R-PA) and Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), neither of whom cultivated reputations for bipartisan collaboration while in Congress; and these reputations find support in our data. In the 105th Congress (1997-1998), for example, Senator Santorum had an average *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* score of 0.03; and in the 114th Congress, Senator Mikulski had an average *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* score of 0.14. (Moreover, these Senators each had a relatively low LES within these Congresses.)

Analyses and Findings

Particular care is needed in analyzing the relationship between bipartisanship and legislative effectiveness, for a variety of reasons. For example, this relationship may simply be linked to legislators' ideologies, with centrists having an easier time attracting bipartisan cosponsors, and also being more likely to have their bills advance through the lawmaking process. Or, as suggested above, majority-party legislators may have less need to attract bipartisan cosponsors, while at the same time being advantaged in lawmaking. To address these concerns, we take two additional steps beyond our careful coding of bipartisanship described above.

First, we rely on cross-sectional time-series regressions with legislator fixed effects to account for the types of legislators who are naturally more active in moving bills forward, and in attracting cosponsors from the opposing party. This allows us to interpret the coefficient on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* as the within-member marginal impact of changes in the proportion of opposite-party cosponsors on that member's LES, holding underlying member-specific patterns fixed. Second, we control for the standard set of covariates that help to explain legislative effectiveness, as analyzed in the literature (e.g., Volden and Wiseman 2018). These variables account for ideology, party status, seniority, committee chair positions, electoral vote share, and a host of other considerations that otherwise might influence both bipartisanship and effectiveness. We also control for the average number of cosponsors that a legislator attracts to her bills, to account for differences across legislators who attract very few, or many, cosponsors to their bills. Finally, in our Senate analysis, we also control for whether a Senator is up for reelection in a particular Congress, as previous research (Volden and Wiseman 2018) demonstrates that U.S. Senators exhibit greater lawmaking effectiveness in the years that they run for reelection; and we want to control for these electoral-cycle induced differences in

policymaking behaviors. Descriptive statistics and sources for all variables can be found in Appendix Table A1.

We begin our analysis in Table 1, where we present the results from a series of models exploring the relationship between *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* and *LES*. Models 1.1 and 1.4 show the basic results in the House and Senate, respectively, for regressions without the numerous control variables. We find a strong positive relationship between the proportion of cosponsors on a Representative's (or Senator's) bills who are drawn from the opposite party and her lawmaking effectiveness. Moreover, Model 1.2 (for the House) and Model 1.5 (for the Senate), show that this relationship holds even when we control for the usual (cross-sectional and time-varying) correlates of a member's lawmaking effectiveness, including the *Average Number of Cosponsors Attracted*, and whether a Senator is up for reelection in a particular Congress (Model 1.5). The decline in the size of the coefficient on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* shows the importance of adding these controls. That said, the effect of bipartisanship in these models remains positive, significant, and sizable. Specifically, each one-standard-deviation increase in *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* is associated with a 0.08-point rise in LES in the House and a 0.06-point rise in the Senate. Given the average value of 1.0 for the LES metric, this is equivalent to six to eight percent greater effectiveness, about equivalent to 2-3 additional terms of seniority.[14]

[14] Specifically, from Model 1.2 for the House, the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* (with standard deviation of 0.194) has a coefficient of 0.433. The effect of a one-standard-deviation increase is thus $0.433 \times 0.194 = 0.084$, a bit less than double the size of the coefficient on *Seniority* (0.058). For the Senate (Model 1.5), similar calculations yield $0.330 \times 0.190 = 0.063$, more than triple the *Seniority* effect (0.018).

Table 1: Lawmakers Attracting Bipartisan Cosponsors Are More Effective

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model 1.1: House	Model 1.2: House	Model 1.3: House	Model 1.4: Senate	Model 1.5: Senate	Model 1.6: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.986*** (0.128)*	*0.433*** (0.097)*	*0.446*** (0.097)*	*0.538** (0.189)*	*0.330* (0.147)*	*0.397** (0.148)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered			-0.234 (0.214)			-0.420 (0.273)
Seniority		0.058*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.009)		0.018 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
Majority Party		0.785*** (0.117)	0.717*** (0.125)		0.345*** (0.086)	0.236* (0.112)
Majority Party Leadership		0.360** (0.133)	0.360** (0.133)		0.141 (0.129)	0.143 (0.128)
Minority Party Leadership		-0.200* (0.095)	-0.210* (0.097)		0.074 (0.073)	0.059 (0.074)
Speaker		0.031 (0.279)	0.041 (0.279)			
Committee Chair		2.774*** (0.217)	2.773*** (0.217)		1.037*** (0.116)	1.031*** (0.115)
Subcommittee Chair		0.675*** (0.077)	0.677*** (0.077)		0.305*** (0.078)	0.301*** (0.078)
Power Committee		-0.192*** (0.051)	-0.190*** (0.051)		-0.093 (0.070)	-0.089 (0.070)
Distance from Median		0.463* (0.225)	0.453* (0.224)		0.273 (0.190)	0.247 (0.188)
Size of Congressional Delegation		-0.020 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.022)		-0.017 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.033)
Vote Share		0.027** (0.010)	0.026** (0.010)		0.005 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)
Vote Share^2		-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)		0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Up for Reelection					0.094*** (0.029)	0.099*** (0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Constant	0.744*** (0.037)	-0.918 (0.568)	-0.788 (0.552)	0.820*** (0.067)	0.043 (0.759)	0.232 (0.742)
N	9,202	8,997	8,997	2,192	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.40	0.40	0.02	0.41	0.41

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Consistent with the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, the models suggest that legislators who attract a greater proportion of their cosponsors from the other party are significantly more effective as lawmakers themselves.

In Models 1.3 and 1.6, we add *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered*, which is simply the proportion of bills that a legislator cosponsors that are introduced by a member of the other party out of all of the bills the member cosponsors in that Congress. Including this variable

allows us to assess whether it is the *attracting* or the *offering* of bipartisan support that influences legislative effectiveness. The coefficient on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered* is not statistically significant (when including all the control variables from the earlier models), indicating that it is the attraction of bipartisan cosponsors, rather than the offer of bipartisan cosponsorships, that matters.[15] However, the coefficient on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* remains positive and significant.

This support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* is robust to a variety of alternative specifications. For example, the findings from the models in Table 1 are largely unchanged if we exclude commemorative bills when constructing our measure of bipartisanship,[16] if we normalize our measure of bipartisanship by Congress (to account for this measure rising or falling systematically over time),[17] and if we control for different levels of cosponsorship over time.[18] Support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* is also robust to alternative measures of bipartisanship capturing the proportion of a legislator's bills that receive at least one cosponsor from the opposing party, as shown in Appendix Table A5.[19]

[15] Without these control variables, there is a significant (negative) relationship between offering bipartisan cosponsorships and a member's LES.
[16] Supplemental Appendix Table A2 shows the robustness of the main results upon excluding all commemorative bills from our construction of our bipartisanship measure.
[17] Supplemental Appendix Table A3 shows the robustness of the main results upon normalizing *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* to be a mean of zero and standard deviation of one with each Congress.
[18] Supplemental Appendix Table A4 shows the robustness of the main results upon controlling for the proportion of a legislator's bills that received no cosponsorships, as well as excluding eras in which the number of cosponsors was capped, or where less than 60% of bills received cosponsors.
[19] The findings are also robust to using the Lugar Bipartisanship Index (Lugar and Montgomery 2015) as an alternative measure.

The findings are also robust to models excluding member-level fixed effects. Such models, as shown in Appendix Table A6, feature even larger coefficients on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted.* This result suggests that there appear to be lawmaking benefits from attracting bipartisan cosponsors, whether that is a deviation from a member's typical behavior, or whether it is a way of life. As shown in Appendix Table A7, the results are also robust to controlling for legislators' relative electoral security. Specifically, regardless of whether members are electorally secure or vulnerable, attracting bipartisan cosponsors to one's bills is positively associated with lawmaking effectiveness. Finally, it is also worth noting that the support for the *Bipartisan and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* is not limited to evidence about the aggregate LES measure. As we show in Appendix Tables A8 and A9, increasing the proportion of bipartisan cosponsors increases the scope of a legislator's success in advancing her bills through the many intermediate stages of lawmaking in the House and Senate, respectively.

The Unwavering Value of Bipartisanship for Effective Lawmaking

While the results in Table 1 suggests that there are clear lawmaking benefits from engaging in bipartisan legislative strategies, the aggregated nature of the data raises several questions about whether these findings are robust to different time periods or political circumstances. For example, perhaps bipartisanship paid off in earlier Congresses (e.g., in the 1970s and '80s), but less so recently, with the parties being so polarized and the electoral stakes being so huge. Under such conditions, parties may be using the legislative agenda for partisan messaging rather than lawmaking (e.g., Koger and Lebo 2017). If such a scenario holds, then the benefit of bipartisan strategies might vary in response to changing political and electoral conditions (i.e., Lee 2016).

We engage with these considerations in three ways in Table 2, where we replicate our analyses from Models 1.2 and 1.5 for the House and Senate, respectively, controlling for several time-varying political circumstances. First, in Models 2.1 and 2.4, we include a Congress counter variable (set at 0 = 93rd Congress, 1 = 94th, and so on), and interact that variable with *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted*. Doing so tests whether attracting bipartisan cosponsors to one's bills might have paid off in earlier (perhaps, less contentious) eras more so than in contemporary Congresses (indicated by a negative interaction variable). In Models 2.2 and 2.5, we instead include *Majority Margin* (capturing the number of seats held by the majority party above a bare majority of 218 in the House and 50 in the Senate) and its interaction with *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted*. Doing so allows for an exploration of whether bipartisanship is a more effective strategy when party control is not at risk and when working with the other party is more or less necessary. Finally, in Models 2.3 and 2.6, we explore whether increasing political polarization has attenuated any lawmaking benefits of bipartisanship by controlling for the distance (in DW-NOMINATE space) between the majority and minority party medians in each chamber (and interacting that *Party Polarization* variable with *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted*).

Across all models in Table 2, we see that the coefficients on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* are consistently positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction variables in each of the specifications are relatively small in magnitude and fail to obtain statistical significance by conventional standards. Regardless of which time period one considers, the relative size of the majority party, and/or the scope of ideological polarization between the parties, attracting a larger proportion of bipartisan

cosponsors to one's bills is associated with greater lawmaking effectiveness.[20] The fact that bipartisanship is linked to lawmaking effectiveness across all of these conditions helps us understand why its usage has continued over time. Likewise, the results give us confidence that the value of bipartisanship will continue as Congress changes further along these lines in the future.

Table 2: Bipartisanship Benefits Are Robust to Changing Conditions

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model 2.1: House	Model 2.2: House	Model 2.3: House	Model 2.4: Senate	Model 2.5: Senate	Model 2.6: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.432*** *(0.171)*	*0.629**** *(0.182)*	*0.452**** *(0.099)*	*0.442** *(0.245)*	*0.358** *(0.201)*	*0.399*** *(0.150)*
Congress Counter	0.050** (0.018)			-0.042* (0.025)		
Congress Counter × Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	0.001 (0.015)			-0.004 (0.020)		
Majority Margin		-0.003* (0.001)			-0.002 (0.009)	
Majority Margin × Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted		-0.005 (0.004)			0.006 (0.022)	
Party Polarization			0.109* (0.057)			-0.016 (0.059)
Party Polarization × Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted			0.038 (0.096)			0.024 (0.124)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,997	8,997	8,997	2,167	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.36	0.39	0.38	0.42	0.41	0.41

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016), *Congress Counter* begins at 0 for the 93rd Congress. All control variables found in Table 1 are also included in these models. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Results show the robustness of support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, over time (Models 2.1 and 2.4), regardless of the size of the majority party (Models 2.2 and 2.5), and regardless of the degree of polarization between the parties (Models 2.3 and 2.6). In each case, the coefficient on the key interaction variable is insignificant and near zero, whereas that on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* remains positive and significant.

[20] As shown in Appendix Tables A12 and A13, support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* can also be found both before and after the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 in the House and the subsequent rise of "Gingrich Senators" (Theriault 2013; Theriault and Rohde 2011).

Seeking Optimal Levels of Bipartisanship

The above analyses provide support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* overall, and they likewise show bipartisanship contributing to lawmaking success across time and over changing political circumstances. That said, the logic discussed above in developing this hypothesis suggests that bipartisanship has its limits. In the extreme case, what benefit would come from neglecting one's own party and attracting cosponsors *solely* from the other party? Moreover, it might be plausible that the value of bipartisanship could vary across majority and minority parties.

To engage with these considerations, in Table 3 we explore whether a nonlinear relationship between bipartisanship and legislative effectiveness exists by adding *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared* to the main models from Table 1. In Models 3.1 and 3.4 we see that such nonlinear effects are present and strong across the entire sample. The findings suggest that, in both the House and the Senate, the effect of bipartisanship rises until about half of all of a member's cosponsors are from each party, and then falls again when too few of one's own party members serve as cosponsors.[21] The positive linear effects discussed above occur due to most legislators attaining bipartisan support below these peak levels, and thus benefiting from greater efforts on this front. Additionally, the smaller effects uncovered above in the Senate likely emerge due to the average level of bipartisanships being already closer to the peak level of bipartisanship in that chamber.

[21] Calculus reveals that this peak occurs at $-(1.828)/(2 \times -1.844) = 0.496$ in the House and that it occurs at $-(1.666)/(2 \times -1.626) = 0.512$ in the Senate.

Table 3: Support for Bipartisanship Hypothesis Robust to Nonlinear Models and Party Control

Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model 3.1: House All	Model 3.2: House Majority	Model 3.3: House Minority	Model 3.4: Senate All	Model 3.5: Senate Majority	Model 3.6: Senate Minority
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*1.828****	*2.322****	*0.526****	*1.666****	*2.268***	*0.472**
	(0.245)	*(0.383)*	*(0.112)*	*(0.437)*	*(0.760)*	*(0.260)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared	*-1.844****	*-2.404****	*-0.501****	*-1.626****	*-2.392***	*-0.397*
	(0.284)	*(0.488)*	*(0.126)*	*(0.459)*	*(0.951)*	*(0.309)*
Seniority	0.058***	0.090***	0.029***	0.019*	0.037*	0.016*
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Majority Party	0.787***			0.356***		
	(0.117)			(0.086)		
Majority Party Leadership	0.343**	0.445**		0.150	0.191	
	(0.132)	(0.164)		(0.131)	(0.159)	
Minority Party Leadership	-0.184*		-0.038	0.095		0.015
	(0.095)		(0.051)	(0.074)		(0.057)
Speaker	0.031	0.226				
	(0.287)	(0.400)				
Committee Chair	2.759***	2.445***		1.030***	0.791***	
	(0.216)	(0.229)		(0.114)	(0.139)	
Subcommittee Chair	0.661***	0.511***		0.290***	0.251**	
	(0.076)	(0.093)		(0.077)	(0.091)	
Power Committee	-0.206***	-0.294***	-0.065*	-0.093	-0.134	-0.056
	(0.051)	(0.090)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.103)	(0.046)
Distance from Median	0.486*	0.499	-0.135	0.320*	0.448	-0.039
	(0.226)	(0.436)	(0.115)	(0.189)	(0.447)	(0.196)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.019	-0.045	0.010	-0.016	-0.047	-0.007
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.009)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.046)
Vote Share	0.025**	0.035*	0.016*	0.005	-0.016	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.017)
Vote Share^2	-0.0002**	-0.0002*	-0.0001*	-0.0000	0.0002	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.00004)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Up for Reelection				0.093***	0.111*	0.060*
				(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.0001	-0.0006	0.0004	0.003	0.004	0.009*
	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Constant	-1.036*	-0.329	-0.549*	-0.179	0.973	-0.232
	(0.562)	(0.881)	(0.328)	(0.767)	(1.156)	(0.711)
N	8,997	5,167	3,830	2,167	1,193	974
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.28	0.04	0.42	0.22	0.05

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Models 3.1 and 3.4 contain all members of the House and Senate, respectively; Models 3.2 and 3.5 are limited to majority-party members; Models 3.3 and 3.6 are limited to minority-party members. All models show nonlinear effects from the proportion of bipartisan cosponsors. Specifically, lawmakers' Legislative Effectiveness Scores are rising for higher values of *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted*, until that proportion reaches about 0.5, after which their effectiveness declines. This pattern supports the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* for the vast majority of members (whose cosponsors are mostly from their own party).

From this perspective, the greatest opportunity to benefit from bipartisanship exists for those Representatives or Senators who rarely reach across party lines when building support for their bills. Viewing every member of the chamber – rather than only one's own party members – as a potential collaborator can yield huge dividends with respect to lawmaking success. The marginal impact on lawmaking success from cultivating additional bipartisan support, however, decreases for those who are already quite bipartisan. Put another way, relative to the average level of bipartisanship, movement in a partisan direction is more costly in advancing legislation than movement toward greater bipartisanship is beneficial. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation *decline* in the proportion bipartisan (coupled with changing its squared value also) is associated with an LES drop of 22% in the House and 16% in the Senate. Yet a one-standard-deviation *increase* in bipartisanship from the mean values is associated with a rise in LES of only 8% in the House and 4% in the Senate.

In Table 3 we also explore whether bipartisanship is especially valuable for minority, in comparison to majority, party members. While such a conjecture seems entirely plausible, given the numerical disadvantages minority party members face in building winning coalitions, Models 3.2 and 3.5 show similar nonlinear effects for majority-party lawmakers to those found overall; and Models 3.3 and 3.6 show that substantively similar patterns emerge for the minority party. While the coefficient sizes on the bipartisan measures in the majority party are relatively larger than those for the minority party, these findings are likely an artifact of the differences in the dependent variable's size for these two groups, as those in the majority party score about three times higher in their LES than do minority-party members, on average. Put another way, the

proportional benefit of increased bipartisanship on legislative effectiveness is about equal across parties.[22]

Similar to our baseline analysis, we also find that the support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis,* here through these nonlinear models, is not limited to evidence from the aggregate LES measure. As we show in Appendix Table A10, increasing the proportion of bipartisan cosponsors on one's bills up to about 50% is associated with a legislator producing more laws overall, among both Representatives and Senators. This finding extends to the case where we set aside commemorative laws to focus only on substantive laws. And it also extends to focusing solely on what Volden and Wiseman (2014) characterize as "substantive and significant" laws, those high-profile or important pieces of legislation that attract media attention.[23] Thus, the extent to which a legislator builds bipartisan support matters for her lawmaking success, even on substantively important legislation.[24]

How Do Legislators Attract Bipartisan Cosponsors?

Throughout the analysis above, we have addressed the puzzle of why, despite party polarization and the fear of primary threats, bipartisanship endures in Congress. The evidence points to the dog that doesn't stop barking: across eras, parties, and changing conditions, attracting bipartisan cosponsors helps legislators achieve their lawmaking goals. Yet, this

[22] The patterns are also similar for Democrats and Republicans. In analyzing Models 1.2 and 1.5 on these partisan subsets, we find that Democrats receive somewhat larger benefits from attracting bipartisan cosponsors than do Republicans. However, the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* receives support in both parties.

[23] These auxiliary findings suggest that "important" legislation (e.g., Clinton and Lapinski 2006) benefits from bipartisan coalition building.

[24] Moreover, these findings are also robust to adding credit to legislators for laws that contain a significant amount of their proposed language, but which are sponsored by another legislator. For results based on the data from Casas, Denny, and Wilkerson (2020), see Appendix Table A11.

answer does leave one lingering question. It makes sense to try to attract bipartisan cosponsors, but what is the value in *being* a bipartisan cosponsor on other legislators' bills? In other words, what are the benefits from actively contributing to a bipartisan environment in Congress? Here we argue for the value of reciprocity, whereby offering cosponsorships across the aisle helps cultivate such cosponsorships on one's own legislation, which in turn is linked to greater lawmaking effectiveness.

To advance this argument, we turn to Table 4, in which we report the results of linear regressions where the dependent variable is *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted*. We control for the independent variables found across the models above, as well as *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered*. Once again, we explore these patterns for both the House and the Senate; and we also show models both excluding and including member fixed effects.

Looking across the House and the Senate, we see that certain institutional factors are clearly correlated with the ability to attract cosponsors from the other party. Members of the Majority Party, Committee Chairs, and (at least in the House) Subcommittee Chairs all attract greater proportions of bipartisan cosponsors to their bills. Interestingly, we also see that there is a relationship between a member's ideological position and the propensity to attract bipartisan cosponsors (as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficients on *Distance from Median*). As one might expect, moderates attract more bipartisan cosponsors, all else equal. However, this effect declines (and disappears in the House) upon including member fixed effects. In other words, while moderates attract greater bipartisan cosponsors simply by being moderate, there is no evidence that House members who become more moderate over time gain cross-party support from such movement, all else equal. Model 4.1 also suggests that women and African American legislators attract a lower proportion of cosponsors from the other party.

Table 4: Those Who Offer Bipartisan Cosponsorships Attract More Bipartisan Cosponsors

DV: Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	Model 4.1: House	Model 4.2: House	Model 4.3: Senate	Model 4.4: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan	*0.626***	*0.317***	*0.739***	*0.547***
Cosponsorships Offered	*(0.039)*	*(0.036)*	*(0.045)*	*(0.047)*
Seniority	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Majority Party	0.091***	0.087***	0.133***	0.091***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Majority Party Leadership	0.028*	0.013	-0.034*	-0.033*
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Minority Party Leadership	0.004	0.004	-0.013	-0.014
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Speaker	-0.029	-0.019		
	(0.035)	(0.027)		
Committee Chair	0.084***	0.062***	0.046***	0.036**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Subcommittee Chair	0.030***	0.034***	0.005	0.022*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Power Committee	0.005	0.035***	0.006	0.017
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Distance from Median	-0.154***	0.005	-0.114***	-0.096**
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Female	-0.020**		-0.015	
	(0.009)		(0.018)	
African American	-0.034**		-0.032	
	(0.011)		(0.049)	
Latino	-0.023		0.018	
	(0.016)		(0.040)	
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.0003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Vote Share	0.003*	0.002	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Vote Share^2	-0.00002*	-0.00001	0.00003	0.00001
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Up for Reelection			-0.023***	-0.023***
			(0.006)	(0.005)
Average Number Cosponsors	-0.00002	-0.00001	0.001	0.0001
Attracted	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.015	0.079	0.193	0.173
	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.136)	(0.151)
Lawmaker Fixed Effects?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	8,997	8,997	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.18	0.29	0.34

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by lawmaker in Models 4.1 and 4.3; lawmaker fixed effects in Models 4.2 and 4.4.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Observations are members of Congress from the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).
Dependent Variable *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* captures the average proportion of cosponsors of a lawmaker's sponsored bills who are from the other party (among bills with at least one cosponsor). *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered* captures the proportion of a lawmaker's cosponsorships that are supporting bills sponsored by members from the other party. On the whole, the results show a high level of reciprocity across lawmakers and for those who change their behavior across Congresses (in the fixed effects Models 4.2 and 4.4).

In addition to these findings about the personal and institutional drivers of attracting bipartisan cosponsors to one's bills, the coefficient on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered* is positive and statistically significant in all specifications across both chambers. This finding emerges from a simple linear regression analysis (Models 4.1 and 4.3), and it is robust to the inclusion of legislator fixed effects (in Models 4.2 and 4.4). In other words, even controlling for whatever idiosyncratic legislator-specific features might be correlated with the ability to attract cosponsors from the other party, as a Representative or Senator increases the proportion of cosponsorships that she offers to bills that are introduced by members of the opposite party, she appears to attract a higher level of cosponsorship from members of the opposite party to her own bills.[25]

The findings from Model 4.1 are illustrated graphically in Figure 2, where we plot out the proportion of bipartisan cosponsors that a Representative attracts to her bills, as we vary her ideological distance from the legislative median for three categories of lawmakers: those who never cosponsor bills that are introduced by oppose partisans, those who are at the high end of bipartisan cosponsorship offers (50%), and those whose cosponsorships go to members of the other party 25% of the time.[26] For each of the three categories, we see that more ideologically extreme Representatives attract smaller proportions of bipartisan cosponsors to their bills. Representatives who consistently offer their support to members of the other party on their initiatives, however, are able to secure support from opposite-partisans on their own bills, in a manner that dominates the relative impact of ideology. For example, some ideologically extreme Representatives who cosponsor bills that are introduced by members of the other party 25% of

[25] As shown in the Appendix (Table A14), these results hold even when we exclude commemorative bills from our analysis.
[26] An analogous Figure for the Senate is presented in Supplemental Appendix Figure A3.

the time secure a greater proportion of bipartisan cosponsors on their own bills than ideologically centrist Representatives who never cosponsor bills offered by opposite-partisans. These effects are even more pronounced for those Representatives who cosponsor bills from members of the other party 50% of the time.

Figure 2: Those Who Offer Bipartisan Cosponsorships Attract Bipartisan Cosponsors (House)



Notes: Based on predicted values and 95% confidence intervals from Model 4.1, the figure shows that moderates attract more bipartisan cosponsorships than do those who are more extreme ideologically. Such an effect, however, is smaller than the sizable reciprocity effect shown across curves from the bottom to the top of the figure.

These findings imply that one way to increase the scope of bipartisan cosponsors who are drawn to one's bills is for legislators to engage in more bipartisan cosponsorship themselves; and proactively reaching out to members of the other party can help one overcome whatever

disadvantages that they might have in securing support for their own measures, given their ideological extremity. While the findings in Table 1 suggest that there is no direct relationship between the act of cosponsoring across party lines and one's lawmaking effectiveness, the findings in Table 4 point to how legislators who cosponsor more bills across party lines, in turn, attract more cosponsors on their own bills from members of the opposite party, contributing to greater lawmaking effectiveness. As shown in Appendix Tables A15 and A16, this reciprocity is evident both in the majority and minority parties, as well as across congressional eras, in both the House and the Senate.

Conclusion

With increasing polarization across the parties, tenuous control of Congress making lawmaking a zero-sum contest for party leaders, and many legislators facing tougher challenges in their primaries than in general elections, the case against bipartisanship has been on the rise. And yet, bipartisanship continues in Congress, albeit somewhat diminished and often behind the scenes. But why do members of Congress even bother being bipartisan anymore? Here we offer one important answer. To the extent that members have well-defined policy goals, bipartisanship helps them to achieve those goals. Members who can attract support from across the aisle have a greater chance of moving their agenda further in the lawmaking process. In conjunction with recent research (i.e., Treul et al., forthcoming) demonstrating that more effective lawmakers face less competitive primary elections (and perform better in their primaries), our results likewise suggest that bipartisanship in lawmaking can have an indirect (positive) electoral payoff as well. Bipartisan lawmaking can contribute to greater lawmaking success, which can (perhaps) attenuate any negative consequences that incumbents might

normally experience in their primaries due to their bipartisan legislative activities (i.e., Pyeatt 2015).

In his final State of the Union address in 2016, President Barack Obama noted the importance of bipartisanship in bringing about legislative accomplishments and addressing policy problems:

> "The future we want – all of us want – opportunity and security for our families, a rising standard of living, a sustainable, peaceful planet for our kids – all that is within our reach. But it will only happen if we work together. It will only happen if we can have rational, constructive debates. It will only happen if we fix our politics."[27]

He then noted that "a better politics doesn't mean we have to agree on everything," but by reaching out to the other side of the aisle in good faith, legislators can help create policies to engage with the biggest problems facing America and advance the collective interests of the country.

We have sought to engage directly with President Obama's claims about the efficacy of bipartisan lawmaking, at the level of the individual legislator. In so doing, we explore whether increasing the scope of bipartisanship in Congress can map into greater lawmaking success among its members. Our results present a stark counterpoint to those who argue that Congress is dominated by partisan interests, such that bills will only move forward if they benefit one party over the other. In contrast to this perspective, we find that Representatives and Senators who are able to attract a significant portion of cosponsors to their bills from members of the opposite party are more successful at advancing their bills through the legislative process. This is true for both minority *and* majority party members and across a large range of political conditions.

[27] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address

Although cosponsoring more bills of members of the other party does not lead a legislator to experience greater levels of success in advancing her own bills, *per se*, doing so seems to generate a helpful level of reciprocity. Hence, being a bipartisan cosponsor puts a Representative or Senator in the position of experiencing more bipartisan support for her own agenda, helping to overcome the wide range of hurdles that emerge between the time that a bill is introduced and when it (possibly) advances to the President's desk for signature.

Regardless of era or institutional position, for Representatives and Senators who seek to become effective lawmakers in Congress, our results suggest that one ingredient in the recipe for lawmaking success is for them to become more bipartisan in their legislative activities.

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Supplemental Appendix (to be made available online)

Figure A1: Average Proportion of Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Over Time



Notes: Figure shows the average values of Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted across all lawmakers. Similar to Figure 1, these lines show some decline in bipartisanship over time as well as greater bipartisanship in the Senate than the House.

Figure A2: Average Proportion of Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted (Substantive and Significant Bills)



Notes: Figure shows the average values of Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted calculated based only on the Substantive and Significant bills (as defined by Volden and Wiseman 2014) across all lawmakers. Similar to the case considering all bills, these lines show some decline in bipartisanship over time as well as somewhat greater bipartisanship in the Senate than the House.

Figure A3: Those Who Offer Bipartisan Cosponsorships Attract Bipartisan Cosponsors (Senate)



Notes: Figure shows the same reciprocity patterns from Figure 2, based on results for the Senate. Once again the results show that moderates attract more bipartisan cosponsorships than do those who are more extreme ideologically. Such an effect, however, is smaller than the sizable reciprocity effect shown across curves from the bottom to the top of the figure.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics, Variable Definitions, and Sources

Variable	Description	House Mean (S.D.)	Senate Mean (S.D.)
LES[a]	Legislative Effectiveness Score, described in text	1.030 (1.578)	1.011 (1.017)
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted[b]	Average proportion of cosponsors on member's bills (with at least one cosponsor) from opposing party	0.290 (0.194)	0.354 (0.190)
Proportion Bipartisan Cospons. Offered[b]	Proportion of member's cosponsorships occurring on bills sponsored by member of opposing party	0.277 (0.174)	0.332 (0.168)
Average Number of Cosponsors Attracted[b]	Average number of cosponsors attracted to member's bills	21.84 (20.65)	6.987 (4.170)
Seniority[a]	Count of number of two-year Congresses that member served in	5.275 (4.051)	6.142 (4.630)
Majority Party[a]	1 = Majority Party Member; 0 = otherwise	0.575 (0.494)	0.552 (0.497)
Majority-Party Leadership[a]	1 = In majority party leadership position; 0 = otherwise	0.018 (0.134)	0.053 (0.224)
Minority-Party Leadership[a]	1 = In minority party leadership position; 0 = otherwise	0.021 (0.142)	0.047 (0.213)
Speaker[a]	1 = Speaker of the House; 0 = otherwise	0.001 (0.031)	N/A
Committee Chair[a]	1 = Committee chair; 0 = otherwise	0.052 (0.222)	0.163 (0.370)
Subcommittee Chair[a]	1 = Subcommittee chair; 0 = otherwise	0.248 (0.432)	0.458 (0.498)
Power Committee[a]	1 = member sits on one of the top committees; 0 = otherwise	0.249 (0.432)	0.726 (0.446)
Distance from Median[c]	Absolute distance from member's first-dimension DW-NOMINATE Score to that of floor median	0.377 (0.250)	0.333 (0.221)
Size of Congressional Delegation[a]	Number of House seats from member's home state	18.73 (14.33)	8.719 (9.291)
Vote Share[a]	Percent vote share in most recent election	68.00 (13.51)	59.75 (9.45)
Up for Reelection[a]	1 = Senator's term ends at the completion of the current Congress	N/A	0.332 (0.471)
Majority Margin[a]	Number of seats controlled by majority party in excess of 50% (above 218 in House or 50 in Senate)	34.57 (19.77)	5.952 (4.170)
Polarization[c]	Normalized absolute distance between Republicans and Democratic medians (DW-NOMINATE)	0.00 (1.00)	0.00 (1.00)

Sources:
[a]Constructed by authors from data available at www.thelawmakers.org.
[b]Constructed by authors as described in the text.
[c]Constructed by authors from data available at www.voteview.com.

Table A2: Results Robust to Excluding Commemorative Bills from Cosponsorship Measures

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A2.1: House	Model A2.2: House	Model A2.3: House	Model A2.4: Senate	Model A2.5: Senate	Model A2.6: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted^{nc}	*1.029*** (0.129)*	*0.430*** (0.097)*	*0.440*** (0.096)*	*0.605** (0.191)*	*0.361** (0.149)*	*0.429** (0.148)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cospons. Offered^{nc}			-0.174 (0.206)			-0.433 (0.267)
Seniority		0.058*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.009)		0.017 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
Majority Party		0.786*** (0.118)	0.734*** (0.126)		0.346*** (0.086)	0.229* (0.114)
Majority Party Leadership		0.358** (0.133)	0.358** (0.133)		0.142 (0.129)	0.142 (0.129)
Minority Party Leadership		-0.190* (0.095)	-0.197* (0.097)		0.075 (0.073)	0.059 (0.074)
Speaker		0.190 (0.325)	0.190 (0.326)			
Committee Chair		2.768*** (0.217)	2.767*** (0.217)		1.036*** (0.115)	1.031*** (0.114)
Subcommittee Chair		0.677*** (0.078)	0.678*** (0.077)		0.304*** (0.078)	0.301*** (0.078)
Power Committee		-0.194*** (0.051)	-0.192*** (0.051)		-0.092 (0.070)	-0.089 (0.070)
Distance from Median		0.469* (0.227)	0.462* (0.226)		0.276 (0.189)	0.243 (0.188)
Size of Congressional Delegation		-0.020 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.022)		-0.017 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.033)
Vote Share		0.026** (0.010)	0.026** (0.010)		0.004 (0.019)	0.003 (0.019)
Vote Share^2		-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)		0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Up for Reelection					0.094*** (0.029)	0.098*** (0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Constant	0.740*** (0.037)	-0.903 (0.569)	-0.805 (0.551)	0.798*** (0.067)	0.050 (0.756)	0.261 (0.735)
N	9,158	8,961	8,961	2,191	2,166	2,166
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.40	0.40	0.02	0.41	0.42

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

In these models, the bipartisan cosponsorship variables are reconstructed only considering non-commemorative (nc) bills (where commemorative bills, such as naming post offices and minting commemorative coins, are characterized by the method used by Volden and Wiseman 2014).

Consistent with the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, the models suggest that legislators who attract a greater proportion of their cosponsors from the other party are significantly more effective as lawmakers themselves.

Table A3: Results Robust to Normalizing Bipartisanship Measure by Congress

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A3.1: House	Model A3.2: House	Model A3.3: House	Model A3.4: Senate	Model A3.5: Senate	Model A3.6: Senate
Normalized Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.223*** (0.025)*	*0.084*** (0.018)*	*0.086*** (0.018)*	*0.127*** (0.036)*	*0.064* (0.028)*	*0.075** (0.028)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cospons. Offered			-0.226 (0.214)			-0.394 (0.277)
Seniority		0.056*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.009)		0.016 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
Majority Party		0.781*** (0.117)	0.715*** (0.125)		0.342*** (0.086)	0.240* (0.113)
Majority Party Leadership		0.360** (0.133)	0.359** (0.133)		0.142 (0.129)	0.144 (0.128)
Minority Party Leadership		-0.200* (0.095)	-0.209* (0.097)		0.076 (0.073)	0.063 (0.074)
Speaker		0.035 (0.281)	0.045 (0.281)			
Committee Chair		2.775*** (0.217)	2.774*** (0.217)		1.038*** (0.116)	1.033*** (0.115)
Subcommittee Chair		0.676*** (0.078)	0.678*** (0.077)		0.305*** (0.078)	0.302*** (0.078)
Power Committee		-0.193*** (0.051)	-0.191*** (0.051)		-0.093 (0.070)	-0.089 (0.070)
Distance from Median		0.457* (0.225)	0.447* (0.224)		0.269 (0.189)	0.243 (0.187)
Size of Congressional Delegation		-0.020 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.022)		-0.016 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.033)
Vote Share		0.027** (0.010)	0.027** (0.010)		0.005 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)
Vote Share^2		-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)		0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Up for Reelection					0.095*** (0.029)	0.099*** (0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Constant	1.030*** (0.000)	-0.798 (0.571)	-0.669 (0.554)	1.011*** (0.000)	0.169 (0.744)	0.370 (0.726)
N	9,202	8,997	8,997	2,192	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.40	0.40	0.01	0.41	0.41

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

In these models, the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* variable is now normalized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within each Congress, to account for any potential effects from changes over time.

Consistent with the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, the models suggest that legislators who attract a greater proportion of their cosponsors from the other party are significantly more effective as lawmakers themselves.

Table A4: Results Robust Upon Accounting for Low Cosponsorship Rates

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A4.1: House	Model A4.2: House	Model A4.3: House	Model A4.4: Senate	Model A4.5: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.433*** (0.097)*	*0.423*** (0.107)*	*0.468*** (0.125)*	*0.337** (0.147)*	*0.362** (0.165)*
Proportion Bills with No Cosponsorships	-0.143* (0.080)			-0.217 (0.132)	
Seniority	0.055*** (0.009)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.016* (0.011)	0.014 (0.014)
Majority Party	0.789*** (0.118)	0.793*** (0.121)	0.763*** (0.109)	0.344*** (0.086)	0.318*** (0.099)
Majority Party Leadership	0.356** (0.133)	0.389** (0.137)	0.458*** (0.149)	0.144 (0.127)	0.128 (0.135)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.203* (0.094)	-0.203* (0.103)	-0.190 (0.149)	0.069 (0.073)	0.022 (0.086)
Speaker	0.039 (0.287)	0.062 (0.292)	-0.144 (0.317)		
Committee Chair	2.774*** (0.217)	2.813*** (0.236)	2.982*** (0.254)	1.044*** (0.117)	1.049*** (0.135)
Subcommittee Chair	0.676*** (0.078)	0.639*** (0.082)	0.598*** (0.077)	0.303*** (0.078)	0.237** (0.085)
Power Committee	-0.190*** (0.051)	-0.190*** (0.060)	-0.183** (0.062)	-0.093 (0.069)	-0.090 (0.071)
Distance from Median	0.476* (0.227)	0.444* (0.240)	0.406* (0.222)	0.284 (0.190)	0.173 (0.205)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.020 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.033)	0.010 (0.051)
Vote Share	0.026** (0.010)	0.026** (0.011)	0.021 (0.013)	0.002 (0.019)	0.037 (0.021)
Vote Share^2	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0001* (0.0001)	0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)
Up for Reelection				0.095*** (0.029)	0.123*** (0.031)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.006 (0.004)	0.014** (0.005)
Constant	-0.840 (0.570)	-0.756 (0.651)	-0.717 (0.697)	0.211 (0.778)	-1.230 (0.931)
N	8,997	7,817	6,218	2,167	1,475
Adj. R^2	0.40	0.36	0.41	0.41	0.43

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Models A4.1 and A4.4 control for the proportion of the legislator's bills that received no cosponsorships. Model A4.2 removes observations from the 93rd to the 95th Congresses (1973-78), during which the number of cosponsors on any bill introduced in the House were limited in number. Models A4.3 and A4.5 limit the sample to the 100th-114th Congresses (1987-2016), after the rise in cosponsorships led to more than 60% of House and Senate bills receiving cosponsorships. In all cases, consistent with the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, the models show the results from Table 1 to be robust to controlling for different degrees of cosponsorship, based on the positive and statistically significant coefficients on the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* variable.

Table A5: Results Robust to Alternative Measures of Bipartisanship

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A5.1: House	Model A5.2: House	Model A5.3: Senate	Model A5.4: Senate
Proportion of Cosponsored Bills Attracting Bipartisan Cosponsor	*0.213*** (0.056)*		*0.250* (0.130)*	
Proportion of All Bills Attracting Bipartisan Cosponsor		*0.283*** (0.076)*		*0.385** (0.158)*
Seniority	0.060***	0.056***	0.019*	0.017
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Majority Party	0.783***	0.788***	0.337***	0.335***
	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Majority Party Leadership	0.365**	0.358**	0.140	0.140
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.128)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.189*	-0.193*	0.080	0.076
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Speaker	0.026	0.034		
	(0.283)	(0.293)		
Committee Chair	2.788***	2.788***	1.038***	1.042***
	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Subcommittee Chair	0.684***	0.688***	0.307***	0.304***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Power Committee	-0.181***	-0.178***	-0.092	-0.092
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.068)
Distance from Median	0.476*	0.496*	0.276	0.283
	(0.226)	(0.228)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.020	-0.020	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Vote Share	0.027**	0.026**	0.004	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Vote Share^2	-0.0002**	-0.0002**	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Up for Reelection			0.092**	0.092**
			(0.029)	(0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.0000	0.0002	0.003	0.003
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.933*	-0.889	0.048	0.154
	(0.564)	(0.568)	(0.765)	(0.753)
N	8,997	8,997	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.41

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Models A5.1 and A5.3 include *Proportion of Cosponsored Bills Attracting Bipartisan Cosponsor*, capturing the proportion of the legislator's cosponsored bills that included a member of the opposite party among the cosponsors (mean of 0.67 in House and 0.61 in Senate). Models A5.2 and A5.4 instead include *Proportion of All Bills Attracting Bipartisan Cosponsor*, capturing the proportion of all of the legislator's bills (with or without cosponsors) that included a member of the opposite party among the cosponsors (mean of 0.40 in House and 0.38 in Senate). The results show further support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis* under these alternative measures of bipartisanship.

Table A6: Results Robust to Excluding Member Fixed Effects

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A6.1: House	Model A6.2: House	Model A6.3: House	Model A6.4: Senate	Model A6.5: Senate	Model A6.6: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.980*** (0.128)*	*0.552*** (0.092)*	*0.637*** (0.096)*	*0.616*** (0.134)*	*0.440*** (0.125)*	*0.540** (0.129)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered			-0.596*** (0.173)			-0.497* (0.244)
Seniority		0.062*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.008)		0.027*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.009)
Majority Party		0.564*** (0.051)	0.347*** (0.080)		0.307*** (0.081)	0.145 (0.118)
Majority Party Leadership		0.504*** (0.161)	0.486** (0.161)		0.031 (0.160)	0.029 (0.160)
Minority Party Leadership		-0.126** (0.049)	-0.156** (0.052)		-0.008 (0.064)	-0.025 (0.066)
Speaker		-0.384* (0.228)	-0.389* (0.227)			
Committee Chair		2.986*** (0.227)	2.969*** (0.227)		1.102*** (0.118)	1.098*** (0.118)
Subcommittee Chair		0.718*** (0.072)	0.717*** (0.072)		0.288*** (0.078)	0.291*** (0.078)
Power Committee		-0.201*** (0.050)	-0.207*** (0.050)		-0.091 (0.065)	-0.089 (0.065)
Distance from Median		0.241** (0.102)	0.082 (0.113)		0.124 (0.127)	-0.018 (0.147)
Female		0.085* (0.050)	0.075 (0.050)		0.047 (0.090)	0.039 (0.092)
African American		-0.271*** (0.081)	-0.284*** (0.080)		-0.221* (0.097)	-0.216* (0.098)
Latino		0.042 (0.102)	0.033 (0.103)		0.018 (0.224)	-0.001 (0.211)
Size of Congressional Delegation		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)		0.010** (0.004)	0.011** (0.004)
Vote Share		0.014 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)		0.050* (0.022)	0.048* (0.022)
Vote Share^2		-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)		-0.0004* (0.0002)	-0.0003* (0.0002)
Up for Reelection					0.090*** (0.030)	0.097 (0.030)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted		-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)		-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
Constant	0.746*** (0.034)	-0.580 (0.369)	-0.183 (0.378)	0.793*** (0.054)	-1.500* (0.736)	-1.199 (0.755)
N	9,202	8,997	8,997	2,192	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.42	0.42	0.01	0.39	0.40

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares regressions, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Consistent with the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*, the models show the results from Table 1 to be robust to exclusion of member fixed effects, based on the positive and statistically significant coefficients on the *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* variable.

Table A7: Results Robust to Different Levels of Electoral Safety

DV: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A7.1: House	Model A7.2: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.443*** (0.097)*	*0.398** (0.148)*
Normalized Vote Share	0.335** (0.132)	0.053 (0.178)
Normalized Vote Share × Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	0.106 (0.074)	-0.027 (0.094)
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered	-0.228 (0.214)	-0.415 (0.274)
Seniority	0.057*** (0.009)	0.017 (0.011)
Majority Party	0.717*** (0.125)	0.238* (0.112)
Majority Party Leadership	0.361** (0.133)	0.141 (0.129)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.209* (0.097)	0.058 (0.073)
Speaker	0.039 (0.277)	
Committee Chair	2.772*** (0.217)	1.032*** (0.114)
Subcommittee Chair	0.677*** (0.077)	0.300*** (0.079)
Power Committee	-0.188*** (0.051)	-0.090 (0.070)
Distance from Median	0.448* (0.224)	0.247 (0.188)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.020 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.033)
Vote Share^2	-0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Up for Reelection		0.099*** (0.029)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.001 (0.001)	0.006 (0.004)
Constant	1.013* (0.533)	0.491 (0.559)
N	8,997	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.40	0.41

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Models explore interactions between bipartisan lawmaking and electoral safety, using *Normalized Vote Share* (normalizing the *Vote Share* variable from the main body of the manuscript to take a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, to allow for ease of interpretation of effect sizes). The interactions show that there is no statistically significant different effect from bipartisanship for Senators or Representatives who hold safer seats. The remaining positive coefficients on *Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted* offer further support for the *Bipartisanship and Legislative Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Table A8: Bipartisanship Helps Across Later Stages of Lawmaking (House)

	Model A8.1: # Bills	Model A8.2: # AIC	Model A8.3: # ABC	Model A8.4: # PASS	Model A8.5: # LAW
Proportion Bipartisan	*0.427*	*0.894***	*0.853***	*0.800***	*0.485***
Cosponsors Attracted	*(0.883)*	*(0.204)*	*(0.166)*	*(0.143)*	*(0.088)*
Seniority	-0.400**	0.059**	0.096***	0.066***	0.016*
	(0.110)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Majority Party	5.707***	1.280***	1.161***	1.012***	0.470***
	(1.064)	(0.227)	(0.211)	(0.173)	(0.089)
Majority Party Leadership	1.543	0.577*	0.559*	0.551**	0.255*
	(0.981)	(0.273)	(0.245)	(0.205)	(0.124)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.575	-0.346*	-0.300*	-0.266*	-0.140*
	(1.443)	(0.196)	(0.173)	(0.160)	(0.080)
Speaker	-2.376	-0.841	-0.325	-0.195	0.432*
	(2.304)	(0.560)	(0.544)	(0.335)	(0.212)
Committee Chair	2.764*	4.630***	5.112***	3.728***	1.750***
	(1.452)	(0.357)	(0.394)	(0.306)	(0.172)
Subcommittee Chair	2.392***	1.675***	1.106***	0.809***	0.328***
	(0.677)	(0.178)	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.056)
Power Committee	2.539***	-0.403***	-0.506***	-0.341***	-0.141***
	(0.729)	(0.117)	(0.098)	(0.075)	(0.041)
Distance from Median	9.219***	0.656	0.081	0.311	0.344*
	(2.052)	(0.411)	(0.403)	(0.345)	(0.193)
Size of Congressional	-0.008	-0.109*	-0.045	-0.038	-0.021
Delegation	(0.205)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.016)
Vote Share	0.635***	0.081***	0.080***	0.055***	0.030***
	(0.118)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Vote Share^2	-0.004***	-0.0005***	-0.0005***	-0.0003***	-0.0002**
	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Average Number	-0.067***	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cosponsors Attracted	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-11.489*	-0.974	-2.221*	-1.513*	-0.786*
	(6.099)	(1.298)	(0.999)	(0.842)	(0.472)
N	8,997	8,997	8,997	8,997	8,997
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.26	0.35	0.30	0.22

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses. Observations are members of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Dependent variables are: the number of bills introduced by the lawmaker (Model A8.1); the number of their bills receiving action in committees (Model A8.2); the number receiving action beyond committee (Model A8.3); the number passing their home chamber (Model A8.4); and the number becoming law (Model A8.5). On the whole, the results show that lawmakers who attract a greater proportion of bipartisan cosponsors have greater success at each lawmaking stage starting in committee. These findings offer further support for the *Bipartisanship and Lawmaking Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Table A9: Bipartisanship Helps Across Later Stages of Lawmaking (Senate)

	Model A9.1: # Bills	Model A9.2: # AIC	Model A9.3: # ABC	Model A9.4: # PASS	Model A9.5: # LAW
Proportion Bipartisan	*5.508**	*1.767*	*2.464***	*1.606***	*0.589**
Cosponsors Attracted	*(3.131)*	*(1.312)*	*(0.829)*	*(0.567)*	*(0.321)*
Seniority	-0.068	-0.056	0.085	-0.098**	-0.033*
	(0.331)	(0.108)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.017)
Majority Party	0.766	0.713	2.632***	1.391***	0.667***
	(1.922)	(0.906)	(0.456)	(0.298)	(0.185)
Majority Party Leadership	3.171	1.486	0.294	0.055	0.190
	(2.942)	(1.283)	(0.673)	(0.479)	(0.252)
Minority Party Leadership	3.350	1.540	0.076	0.158	0.039
	(2.969)	(1.681)	(0.412)	(0.324)	(0.152)
Committee Chair	9.300***	7.660***	5.842***	2.841***	1.337***
	(1.691)	(1.196)	(0.583)	(0.404)	(0.207)
Subcommittee Chair	6.875***	2.347***	1.024*	0.787**	0.468**
	(1.632)	(0.669)	(0.451)	(0.272)	(0.162)
Power Committee	1.450	0.002	-0.941*	-0.551*	-0.166
	(1.540)	(0.856)	(0.405)	(0.277)	(0.143)
Distance from Median	1.750	0.006	1.872*	2.205***	1.185**
	(4.705)	(2.515)	(1.090)	(0.659)	(0.395)
Size of Congressional	-1.452*	1.172**	-0.101	-0.070	-0.046
Delegation	(0.434)	(0.403)	(0.152)	(0.099)	(0.065)
Vote Share	-0.053	-0.214	0.051	0.004	0.033
	(0.434)	(0.252)	(0.101)	(0.080)	(0.036)
Vote Share^2	0.001	0.001	-0.0001	0.0003	-0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)
Up for Reelection	5.654***	1.171***	0.569***	0.303**	0.090
	(0.696)	(0.296)	(0.157)	(0.121)	(0.074)
Average Number	-0.180*	0.134*	0.025	0.020	0.003
Cosponsors Attracted	(0.097)	(0.059)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Constant	34.553*	0.782	-1.352	0.294	-0.826
	(17.064)	(8.657)	(3.913)	(2.836)	(1.508)
N	2,167	2,167	2,167	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.16	0.21	0.44	0.25	0.19

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses. Observations are Senators of the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Dependent variables are: the number of bills introduced by the lawmaker (Model A9.1); the number of their bills receiving action in committees (Model A9.2); the number receiving action beyond committee (Model A9.3); the number passing their home chamber (Model A9.4); and the number becoming law (Model A9.5). On the whole, the results show that lawmakers who attract a greater proportion of bipartisan cosponsors have greater success at each lawmaking stage starting with the passage out of committee. These findings offer further support for the *Bipartisanship and Lawmaking Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Table A10: Support for Bipartisanship Hypothesis in Law Production (Nonlinear Models)

	Model A10.1: House # Laws	Model A10.2: House # Non-Comm Laws	Model A10.3: House # S&S Laws	Model A10.4: Senate # Laws	Model A10.5: Senate # Non-Comm Laws	Model A10.6: Senate # S&S Laws
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*1.685*** (0.198)*	*1.312*** (0.174)*	*0.398*** (0.119)*	*2.342** (0.907)*	*2.270** (0.891)*	*1.148** (0.575)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared	*-1.586*** (0.242)*	*-1.248*** (0.216)*	*-0.307** (0.159)*	*-2.135** (1.017)*	*-2.103** (1.007)*	*-1.272** (0.632)*
Seniority	0.017*	0.020***	0.003	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.055***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Majority Party	0.471***	0.454**	0.213***	0.682***	0.717***	0.362***
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.049)	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.103)
Majority Party Leadership	0.240*	0.232*	0.166*	0.201	0.169	0.265*
	(0.124)	(0.109)	(0.085)	(0.255)	(0.237)	(0.157)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.127	-0.101	-0.054	0.067	0.089	0.096
	(0.081)	(0.064)	(0.034)	(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.098)
Speaker	0.432*	0.396*	0.308			
	(0.218)	(0.197)	(0.221)			
Committee Chair	1.737***	1.749***	0.860***	1.327***	1.290***	0.612***
	(0.172)	(0.166)	(0.094)	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.135)
Subcommittee Chair	0.316***	0.345***	0.268***	0.449**	0.422**	0.237**
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.161)	(0.158)	(0.096)
Power Committee	-0.152***	-0.161***	-0.014	-0.165	-0.163	-0.118
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.099)
Distance from Median	0.364*	0.392*	0.324***	1.246***	1.349***	1.002***
	(0.193)	(0.178)	(0.098)	(0.396)	(0.388)	(0.192)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.021	-0.010	-0.003	-0.045	-0.027	-0.008
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.036)
Vote Share	0.028**	0.019*	-0.001	0.034	0.027	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.024)
Vote Share^2	-0.0002**	-0.0001*	0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Up for Reelection				0.089	0.077	0.039
				(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.044)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.0001	0.0001	0.0005	-0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.888*	-0.881*	-0.150	-1.117	-1.182	-0.007
	(0.471)	(0.430)	(0.256)	(1.504)	(1.441)	(1.002)
N	8,997	8,997	8,997	2,167	2,167	2,167
Adj. R^2	0.23	0.36	0.33	0.19	0.19	0.13

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Dependent variables for Models A10.1 and A10.4 are the number of bills sponsored by the legislator that become law; Models A10.2 and A10.5 exclude commemorative laws; Models A10.3 and A10.6 include only "substantive and significant" laws, according to Volden and Wiseman's (2018) coding. On the whole, the results show an increase in law production among those who grow the proportion of bipartisan cosponsors attracted to their bills up to about 50% bipartisan cosponsors, with diminishing law production thereafter. Because the vast majority of members of Congress have less than 50% bipartisan cosponsors, these findings offer further support for the *Bipartisanship and Lawmaking Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Table A11: Support for Bipartisanship Hypothesis in Law Production (Including Hitchhikers)

	Model A11.1: House Laws Linear	Model A11.2: House Laws Nonlinear
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.691*** (0.137)*	*2.018*** (0.323)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared		*-1.883*** (0.427)*
Seniority	-0.001	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Majority Party	0.761***	0.752***
	(0.130)	(0.129)
Majority Party Leadership	0.260*	0.240
	(0.156)	(0.154)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.266*	-0.258*
	(0.128)	(0.129)
Speaker	0.246	0.222
	(0.292)	(0.300)
Committee Chair	2.514***	2.497***
	(0.372)	(0.370)
Subcommittee Chair	0.121	0.112
	(0.078)	(0.078)
Power Committee	-0.208**	-0.215***
	(0.070)	(0.070)
Distance from Median	0.673**	0.672**
	(0.284)	(0.283)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.022	-0.022
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Vote Share	0.009	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Vote Share^2	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.310	-0.364
	(0.997)	(0.991)
N	4,494	4,494
Adj. R^2	0.22	0.23

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Dependent variables for Models A11.1 and A11.2 are the number of laws either sponsored by the legislator or containing significant amounts of language from the legislator's sponsored bills, based on the "hitchhikers" analysis of Casas, Denny, and Wilkerson (2020). These data are available for the 103rd to the 113th Congresses (1993-2014). They exclude "minor" bills and appropriations bills. They also exclude any legislators who did not sponsor bills beyond those excluded categories. (That said, the results reported here are robust to including those inactive lawmakers along with a value of "0" for the dependent variable in such cases.) The results show that the findings from the analyses of law production are robust to accounting for those whose language is incorporated in the laws sponsored by other legislators, thus offering further support for the *Bipartisanship and Lawmaking Effectiveness Hypothesis*.

Table A12: Support for Bipartisanship Hypothesis Across Eras (House)

Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A12.1: House 1973-94	Model A12.2: House 1973-94	Model A12.3: House 1995-2016	Model A12.4: House 1995-2016
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.470***	*1.626***	*0.380***	*1.653***
	(0.120)	*(0.285)*	*(0.138)*	*(0.315)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared		*-1.438***		*-1.800***
		(0.328)		*(0.425)*
Seniority	0.087***	0.087***	0.018	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Majority Party	-0.106**	-0.158***	0.522***	0.529***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Majority Party Leadership	0.315	0.313	0.529***	0.505***
	(0.290)	(0.292)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.171*	-0.145	-0.025	-0.010
	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Speaker	0.340**	0.335**	0.644*	0.632*
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.289)	(0.292)
Committee Chair	1.971***	1.965***	3.093***	3.081***
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.326)	(0.324)
Subcommittee Chair	0.863***	0.849***	0.376***	0.370***
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Power Committee	-0.179***	-0.188***	-0.224***	-0.231***
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Distance from Median	0.086	0.100	-0.019	0.008
	(0.359)	(0.358)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Size of Congressional Delegation	0.015	0.014	-0.032	-0.032
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Vote Share	0.017	0.015	0.033*	0.032*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Vote Share^2	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002*	-0.0002*
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	-0.001*	-0.002**	0.002*	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.721	-0.776	-0.293	-0.394
	(0.599)	(0.599)	(0.792)	(0.786)
N	4,409	4,409	4,588	4,588
Adj. R^2	0.45	0.45	0.34	0.34

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Models A12.1 and A12.2 contain House members from the 93rd-103rd Congresses (1973-1994); Models A12.3 and A12.4 contain House members from the 104th-114th Congresses (1995-2016). Results show the robustness of the main results to both earlier and later congressional eras.

Table A13: Support for Bipartisanship Hypothesis Across Eras (Senate)

Dependent Variable: Legislative Effectiveness Score	Model A13.1: Senate 1973-94	Model A13.2: Senate 1973-94	Model A13.3: Senate 1995-2016	Model A13.4: Senate 1995-2016
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	*0.332**	*1.960****	*0.307**	*0.712**
	(0.169)	*(0.586)*	*(0.173)*	*(0.417)*
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted Squared		*-1.947***		*-0.507*
		(0.648)		*(0.455)*
Seniority	0.045***	0.044***	0.005	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Majority Party	0.420**	0.439**	0.215*	0.213*
	(0.142)	(0.140)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Majority Party Leadership	0.025	0.031	0.096	0.099
	(0.268)	(0.271)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Minority Party Leadership	0.012	0.034	-0.012	-0.009
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.101)	(0.103)
Committee Chair	0.952***	0.962***	1.104***	1.100***
	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.159)	(0.159)
Subcommittee Chair	0.248**	0.229*	0.285**	0.283**
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Power Committee	-0.048	-0.053	0.067	0.066
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Distance from Median	-0.411	-0.351	0.052	0.062
	(0.505)	(0.487)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.046	-0.043	-0.039	-0.039
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Vote Share	-0.042*	-0.038	0.059	0.057*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Vote Share^2	0.0003*	0.0003*	-0.0004*	-0.0004*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Up for Reelection	0.043	0.044	0.146***	0.145***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	-0.002	-0.006	0.018**	0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	1.941**	1.514*	-1.458	-1.462
	(0.824)	(0.861)	(1.460)	(1.459)
N	1,087	1,087	1,080	1,080
Adj. R^2	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.43

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Models A13.1 and A13.2 contain Senators from the 93rd-103rd Congresses (1973-1994); Models A13.3 and A13.4 contain Senators from the 104th-114th Congresses (1995-2016). Results show the robustness of the main results to both earlier and later congressional eras.

Table A14: Bipartisan Cosponsorship Reciprocity Excluding Commemorative Bills

DV: Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted^{nc}	Model A14.1: House	Model A14.2: House	Model A14.3: Senate	Model A14.4: Senate
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered^{nc}	*0.590*** (0.040)*	*0.313*** (0.036)*	*0.703*** (0.044)*	*0.518*** (0.046)*
Seniority	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Majority Party	0.086***	0.092***	0.127***	0.091***
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Majority Party Leadership	0.028*	0.018	-0.033*	-0.031*
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.002	0.006	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Speaker	-0.048	-0.041		
	(0.044)	(0.038)		
Committee Chair	0.090***	0.066***	0.045***	0.035**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Subcommittee Chair	0.031***	0.035***	0.004	0.023*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Power Committee	0.007	0.035***	0.005	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Distance from Median	-0.164***	0.004	-0.126***	-0.086**
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Female	-0.020**		-0.015	
	(0.008)		(0.019)	
African American	-0.052**		-0.039	
	(0.009)		(0.050)	
Latino	-0.028*		0.024	
	(0.017)		(0.043)	
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.0002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.0002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Vote Share	0.003*	0.002	-0.003	-0.00004
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.0041)
Vote Share^2	-0.00002*	-0.00001	0.00002	0.00001
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Up for Reelection			-0.022***	-0.021***
			(0.006)	(0.005)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted^{nc}	0.0000	0.0000	0.001	-0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0009)
Constant	0.017	0.066	0.192	0.135
	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.139)	(0.149)
Lawmaker Fixed Effects?	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	8,961	8,961	2,166	2,166
Adj. R^2	0.24	0.16	0.29	0.38

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by lawmaker in Models A14.1 and A14.3; lawmaker fixed effects in Models A14.2 and A14.4.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).
Observations are members of Congress from the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).
In these models, the bipartisan cosponsorship variables are reconstructed only considering non-commemorative (nc) bills (where commemorative bills, such as naming post offices and minting commemorative coins, are characterized by the method used by Volden and Wiseman 2014). Results show robustness of reciprocity findings from Table 4.

Table A15: Bipartisan Cosponsorship Reciprocity in Majority and Minority Parties

DV: Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	Model A15.1: House Majority	Model A15.2: House Minority	Model A15.3: Senate Majority	Model A15.4: Senate Minority
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered	*0.371*** (0.056)*	*0.329*** (0.060)*	*0.636*** (0.084)*	*0.537*** (0.081)*
Seniority	0.005***	-0.006	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Majority Party Leadership	-0.004		-0.033	
	(0.015)		(0.022)	
Minority Party Leadership		0.022		-0.013
		(0.020)		(0.025)
Speaker	-0.017			
	(0.041)			
Committee Chair	0.049***		0.019	
	(0.014)		(0.016)	
Subcommittee Chair	0.022***		0.011	
	(0.007)		(0.014)	
Power Committee	0.037**	0.032*	-0.007	0.027
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Distance from Median	0.064	0.134***	-0.085	-0.043
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.074)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.002	-0.006*	-0.003	-0.012
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Vote Share	0.003*	0.002	0.001	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Vote Share^2	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Up for Reelection			-0.022**	-0.025**
			(0.007)	(0.010)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	0.063	0.147	0.167	0.290
	(0.080)	(0.127)	(0.171)	(0.242)
N	5,167	3,830	1,193	974
Adj. R^2	0.12	0.05	0.26	0.14

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Observations are members of Congress from the 93rd-114th Congresses (1973-2016).

The results show that the reciprocity found in Table 4 holds for both the majority and minority parties in both the House and the Senate.

Table A16: Bipartisan Cosponsorship Reciprocity across Congressional Eras

DV: Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsors Attracted	Model A16.1: House 1973-94	Model A16.2: House 1995-2016	Model A16.3: Senate 1973-94	Model A16.4: Senate 1995-2016
Proportion Bipartisan Cosponsorships Offered	*0.272*** (0.054)*	*0.290*** (0.050)*	*0.422*** (0.093)*	*0.616*** (0.060)*
Seniority	-0.005**	0.003**	0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Majority Party	0.289***	0.068**	0.072	0.086***
	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Majority Party Leadership	-0.008	0.023	-0.026	-0.041*
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.020)
Minority Party Leadership	-0.051*	0.034*	-0.062*	-0.004
	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Speaker	0.143***	-0.080***		
	(0.017)	(0.020)		
Committee Chair	0.102***	0.039**	0.027	0.049**
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.016)
Subcommittee Chair	0.050***	0.017*	0.004	0.033**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Power Committee	0.043**	0.025*	0.007	0.027
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Distance from Median	0.280***	-0.049	-0.152	-0.072*
	(0.060)	(0.031)	(0.118)	(0.036)
Size of Congressional Delegation	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Vote Share	0.004*	0.001	-0.000	0.006
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Vote Share^2	-0.00003*	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Up for Reelection			-0.016*	-0.028***
			(0.008)	(0.007)
Average Number Cosponsors Attracted	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.145	0.149	0.234	-0.171
	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.215)	(0.183)
N	4,409	4,588	1,087	1,080
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.14	0.31	0.37

Notes: Results from cross-sectional time-series least squares regressions, with legislator fixed effects and standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed).

Observations in Models A16.1 and A16.3 are members of the 93rd-103rd Congresses (1973-1994); and Models A16.2 and A16.4 include members of the 104th-114th Congresses (1995-2016).

The results show that the reciprocity found in Table 4 holds for across these congressional eras in both the House and the Senate.