
Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas during Hard Times

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Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES	VII
LIST OF TABLES	XV
PREFACE	XVII
PROLOGUE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY	XIX
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xxvi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	XXIX
PART I. HARD TIMES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY	1
CHAPTER I. HARD TIMES IN THE AMERICAS: ECONOMIC OVERVIEW	3
<i>Introduction</i>	3
<i>Economic Overview</i>	3
<i>Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in the Dominican Republic</i>	7
<i>Trends in Democratic Development</i>	10
<i>Dimensions of Democracy in the Dominican Republic</i>	12
<i>The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy</i>	14
CHAPTER II. CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES DURING HARD TIMES IN THE AMERICAS	17
<i>Introduction</i>	17
<i>Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis</i>	17
<i>Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?</i>	20
<i>Personal Experiences with Economic Instability</i>	22
Job Loss	22
Reported Decrease in Household Income	25
Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?	27
Perception of Personal and National Economic Situations	29
<i>Conclusion</i>	31
CHAPTER III. DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN HARD TIMES	33
<i>Introduction</i>	33
<i>Support for Democracy</i>	40
<i>Support for the Political System</i>	44
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i>	50
<i>Support for Military Coups</i>	54
<i>Conclusion</i>	57
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter III</i>	60
PARTE II: RULE OF LAW, CRIME, CORRUPTION AND CIVIL SOCIETY	71
CHAPTER IV. RULE OF LAW, CRIME AND CORRUPTION	73
<i>Introduction</i>	73
Theoretical Background about Crime and Insecurity	73
<i>Perception of Insecurity and Crime</i>	74
Perceptions of Insecurity	74
Crime Victimization	79
<i>Corruption</i>	84
Theoretical Background of Corruption	84
Measuring Corruption	85
Perceptions of Corruption	86
Corruption Victimization	91
<i>The Influence of Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy</i>	95
<i>The Influence of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Civic and Political Participation</i>	97
The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Civic Participation	98
The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Electoral Participation	100
<i>Support for the Rule of Law and the Influence of Crime and Insecurity</i>	102
Impact of Crime Victimization and the Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law	103
<i>Conclusion</i>	105
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter IV</i>	107
CHAPTER V. LEGITIMACY, SYSTEM SUPPORT AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE	111
<i>Introduction</i>	111
<i>Theoretical Background</i>	111

The Equation of Legitimacy and Tolerance	111
<i>System Support</i>	113
Theoretical Background	113
Components of System Support	113
System Support in Comparative Perspective	114
System Support Over Time	115
<i>Political Tolerance</i>	116
Components of Political Tolerance	116
Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective	117
Political Tolerance Over Time	117
<i>Support for Stable Democracy</i>	118
Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective	119
Support for Stable Democracy Over Time	120
Who is More Likely to Support Stable Democracy?	121
<i>Institutional Legitimacy</i>	122
<i>Attitudes about Democracy</i>	124
Support for Democracy	124
Satisfaction with Democracy	126
<i>Conclusion</i>	129
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter V</i>	131
CHAPTER VI. CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION	133
<i>Introduction</i>	133
Theoretical Background	133
<i>Interpersonal Trust</i>	133
<i>Civic Participation</i>	138
<i>Participation in Protests and Demonstrations</i>	142
Participation in Demonstrations and Protests in Comparative Perspective	142
<i>Electoral Participation</i>	144
Electoral Participation in Comparative Perspective	145
Electoral Participation Over Time	146
Ideological Self-Identification and Electoral Preferences	146
<i>Political Interest and Activism</i>	147
<i>Political Activism</i>	149
<i>Conclusion</i>	152
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VI</i>	153
CHAPTER VII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT	155
<i>Introduction</i>	155
Theoretical Background	155
<i>Participation in Local Government Meetings</i>	156
Local Participation in Comparative Perspective	156
Participacion in Local Government Over Time	157
<i>Submission of Petitions to Local Government</i>	157
Submission of Requests to Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective	158
Submission of Requests to Municipal Government Over Time	159
Who is More Likely to Request Assistance from Local Government?	160
<i>Satisfaction with Local Government Services</i>	161
Satisfaction with Local Government in Comparative Perspective	162
Satisfaction with Local Government Services Over Time	163
Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services	164
Trust in Local Government	165
<i>Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on Support for the Political System and on Support for Democracy</i>	169
<i>Satisfaction with Specific Services</i>	171
<i>Conclusion</i>	173
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VII</i>	175
PART III: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS	179
CHAPTER VIII. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM	181
<i>Trust in the Justice System</i>	181
<i>Trust in the Police</i>	190
<i>Conclusion</i>	196

<i>Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VIII</i>	198
CHAPTER IX. POLITICAL PARTIES, GOVERNMENT EFFICACY, AND CLIENTELISM	201
<i>Partisan Sympathy</i>	201
<i>Attitudes about Political Parties and Reelection</i>	209
<i>Government Effectiveness</i>	214
<i>Clientelism</i>	217
Tarjeta de Solidaridad.....	222
<i>Conclusion</i>	225
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter IX</i>	227
CHAPTER X. GENDER, MIGRATION AND RACE	229
<i>Gender</i>	229
<i>Migration</i>	236
<i>Race</i>	247
<i>Conclusion</i>	254
<i>Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter X</i>	256
REFERENCES	259
APPENDIXES	265
APPENDIX I: TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE.....	267
APPENDIX II: INFORMED CONSENT LETTER.....	277
APPENDIX III: THE QUESTIONNAIRE.....	279

List of Figures

Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections.....	4
Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009, as Reported by the World Bank.....	5
Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010 (Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)	6
Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009.....	7
Figure I.5. Freedom in the World: Global Gains minus Global Declines from 2003 to 2010, by reporting year.....	11
Figure I.6. Free, Partly Free and Not Free Countries in the Americas	12
Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas (Percentage of Total Population)	18
Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population who Perceived there to be an Economic Crisis, 2010 (Full Sample)	19
Figure II.3. Perception of the Economic Crisis in the Dominican Republic, 2010	20
Figure II.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?, 2010 (Percentage of Full Sample).....	20
Figure II.5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?, Regional Overview, 2010	21
Figure II.6. Who is to Blame for the Crisis? D.R., 2010	22
Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample).....	23
Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost His or Her Job in the Past Two Years by Country, 2010 (Full Sample)	23
Figure II.9. Percentage of Dominicans who Lost Work, 2010	24
Figure II.10. Percentage of Dominicans Who Lost Work, by Sex, Age, Education, and Place of Residence, 2010	25
Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Change, 2008-2010, in the Americas (Full Sample)	26
Figure II.12. Has your household income decreased, remained the same or increased over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population).....	27
Figure II.13. Percentage of Individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010 (Full Sample) ..	28
Figure II.14. Percentage of Dominicans who Reported a Decline in Household Income, by Place of Residence and Wealth, 2010.....	28
Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences with Lost Income and their Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010 (Full Sample)	30
Figure II.16. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences with Lost Income and their Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times, D.R., 2010	31
Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008, by country	35
Figure III.2. Perceived Changes in Life Satisfaction in 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population) 36	
Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Retrospective Perception of Personal Economic Situation,, by country in 2010	37
Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)	39
Figure III.5. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, D.R., 2010	39
Figure III.6. Impact of Declines in Income, Perceptions of One's Current and Retrospective Economic Situation and Sex on Life Satisfaction, D.R., 2010	40
Figure III.7. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010.....	41
Figure III.8. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample).....	42

Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010.....	43
Figure III.10. Relationship between Perceptions of the Government’s Economic Performance and Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010	43
Figure III.11. Relationships of Age and Sex with Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010	44
Figure III.12. Average System Support in the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010	45
Figure III.13. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)	46
Figure III.14. Perception of Government Economic Performance, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010	47
Figure III.15. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis.....	48
Figure III.16. Changes in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Regional Level Analysis	48
Figure III.17. Determinants of System Support in the Dominican Republic, 2010.....	49
Figure III.18. The Impact of Perceptions of Economic Performance, Assessments of one’s Economic Situation, Corruption Victimization and Satisfaction with the President on System Support in the Dominican Republic, 2010.....	50
Figure III.19. Satisfaction with Democracy, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010	51
Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)	52
Figure III.21. Determinants of Satisfaction with the Democracy, D.R., 2010	53
Figure III.22. The Impact of Perceptions of Government Economic Performance, Education and Evaluations of National and Personal Economic Situations on Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2010	53
Figure III.23. Justification of a Military (or Police) Coup in the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010..	54
Figure III.24. Determinants of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)	55
Figure III.25. Determinants of Support for Military Coups, D.R., 2010	56
Figure III.26. Influence of Attitudes about the Crisis, Declines in Income, Loss of Work and Age on Support for a Military Coup, D.R., 2010	57
Figure III.27. Impact of Satisfaction with the President’s Performance and Perceptions of the National Economic Situation on Support for a Military Coup, D.R., 2010	57
Figure IV.1. Perceptions of Insecurity, by Country, 2010.....	75
Figure IV.2. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2010	76
Figure IV.3. Retrospective Assessment of Insecurity, 1994-2010	76
Figure IV.4. Perception that Crime Presents a Threat to the Country’s Future Well-being, 2010.....	77
Figure IV.5. Perception that Crime Presents a Threat to Future Well-being in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2010	78
Figure IV.6. Is your neighborhood affected by gangs?, by Country, 2010	79
Figure IV.7. Individual and Household Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic, 2010	80
Figure IV.8. Place and Type of Dominicans’ Experiences with Crime Victimization, 2010.....	81
Figure IV.9. Percent who were Crime Victims, by Country, 2010	82
Figure IV.10. Crime Victimization in D.R., 2004-2010.....	83
Figure IV.11. Who is most likely to be a crime victim in the Dominican Republic?, 2010.....	83
Figure IV.12. Crime Victimization, by Education, Region and Age, D.R., 2010	84
Figure IV.13. Perceptions of Corruption by Country, 2010	87
Figure IV.14. Dominican Perceptions of Corruption, 2004-2010	88
Figure IV.15. Percent of Latin Americans who think that how Things are Justifies Paying a Bribe, by Country, 2010	89
Figure IV.16. Percent of Dominicans who think that How Things are Justifies Paying a Bribe, 2006-2010	90
Figure IV.17. Dominican Attitudes about Politicians’ Corrupt Behavior, 2010	90

Figure IV.18. It is Corrupt for an Important Politician to Help a Family Member Obtain a Public Sector Job, D.R., 2006-2010.....	91
Figure IV.19. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	92
Figure IV.20. Index of Total Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010.....	93
Figure IV.21. Percentage of the Population that has been the Victim of Corruption, D.R., 2004-2010 ...	93
Figure IV.22. Who is more likely to be a corruption victim in the Dominican Republic?, 2010.....	94
Figure IV.23. Corruption Victimization, by Age, Sex and Education, D.R., 2010.....	94
Figure IV.24. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support, D.R., 2010.....	96
Figure IV.25. Impact of Political Interest, Satisfaction with the President’s Performance, Perceptions of Insecurity and Perceptions of Corruption on System Support, D.R., 2010.....	97
Figure IV.26. Impact of Place of Residence, Sex, Crime Victimization and Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010.....	97
Figure IV.27. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Community Participation, D.R., 2010.....	99
Figure IV.28. Impact of Corruption Victimization, Having a Member of the Household Lose a Job, Race, and Sex on Community Participation, D.R., 2010.....	99
Figure IV.29. Impact of Education, Age, Political Interest, and Size of Place of Residence on Community Participation, D.R., 2010.....	100
Figure IV.30. Determinants of Electoral Participation, D.R., 2010.....	101
Figure IV.31. Impact of Political Interest, Age and Personal Economic Situation on Electoral Participation, D.R., 2010.....	101
Figure IV.32. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, D.R., 2010.....	102
Figure IV.33. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	103
Figure IV.34. Determinants of Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, D.R., 2010.....	104
Figure IV.35. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, by Region and Age, D.R., 2010.....	104
Figure V.1. Components of the System Support Scale (Legitimacy), D.R., 2010.....	114
Figure V.2. System Support in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	115
Figure V.3. System Support, D.R., 2004-2010.....	116
Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance, D.R., 2010.....	116
Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	117
Figure V.6. Political Tolerance, D.R., 2004-2010.....	118
Figure V.7. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	119
Figure V.8. Support for Stable Democracy, D.R., 2004-2010.....	121
Figure V.9. Who is More Likely to Support a Stable Democracy in the Dominican Republic?, 2010...	121
Figure V.10. Impact of Perceived Insecurity and Satisfaction with the Current President on Support for a Stable Democracy, D.R., 2010.....	122
Figure V.11. Trust in Institutions, D.R., 2010.....	123
Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions, D.R., 2004-2010.....	124
Figure V.13. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	125
Figure V.14. Support for Democracy, D.R., 2006-2010.....	126
Figure V.15. Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2010.....	127
Figure V.16. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	128
Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2004-2010.....	128
Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010.....	134
Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	135
Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2004-2010.....	135
Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010.....	136
Figure VI.5. Impact of Place of Residence, Racial Identification and Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010.....	137

Figure VI.6. Impact of Perceptions about the Adequacy of Household Income and about Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010	137
Figure VI.7. Participation in Civic Association Meetings, D.R., 2010	139
Figure VI.8. Participation in Civic Association Meetings, D.R., 2006-2010	139
Figure VI.9. Participation in Religious Organization Meetings, by Country, 2010	140
Figure VI.10. Participation in Parents' Associations, by Country, 2010.....	141
Figure VI.11. Participation in Neighborhood Improvement Associations, by Country, 2010	141
Figure VI.12. Participation in Women's Groups, by Country, 2010.....	141
Figure VI.13. Participation in Professional Associations, by Country, 2010	141
Figure VI.14. Participation in Solving a Community Problem, by Country, 2010	142
Figure VI.15. Community Participation, by Country, 2010 (CP5 and CP8).....	142
Figure VI.16. Participation in a Demonstration or Public Protests in Comparative Perspective, 2010 ..	143
Figure VI.17. Who is more likely to have participated in protests in the past 12 months?, D.R., 2010 .	144
Figure VI.18. Impact of Sex and Corruption Victimization of Protest Participation, D.R., 2010.....	144
Figure VI.19. Percentage who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections, by Country, 2010.....	145
Figure VI.20. Percentage who Reported Voting the Last Presidential Elections, D.R., 2004-2010	146
Figure VI.21. Ideological Self-identification by Vote Choice, D.R., 2010	147
Figure VI.22. Political Interest, D.R., 2010	148
Figure VI.23. Political Interest, by Year, D.R.	148
Figure VI.24. Political Interest, by Country, 2010	149
Figure VI.25. Political Activism, D.R., 2010	150
Figure VI.26. Worked in the 2010 Campaign, D.R., 2010.....	150
Figure VI.27. Political Activism, D.R., 2006-2010.....	151
Figure VI.28. Percentage who Tried to Convince Others to Vote for a Party or Candidate, by Country, 2010	151
Figure VI.29. Percentage who Worked for a Candidate or Party in the Last Presidential Elections, by Country, 2010	151
Figure VII.1. Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	156
Figure VII.2. Participation in Local Government Meetings, D.R., 2006-2010	157
Figure VII.3. Presenting Requests to Local Government, D.R., 2010	158
Figure VII.4. Presenting Requests to Local Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	159
Figure VII.5. Presenting Requests to Local Government, D.R., 2006-2010	160
Figure VII.6. Who is most likely to present requests to local government?, D.R., 2010.....	161
Figure VII.7. Impact of Place of Residence, Wealth, Family Economic Situation and Attendance at Municipal Meetings on Making a Request of Municipal Government, D.R., 2010.....	161
Figure VII.8. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010	162
Figure VII.9. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective, 2010.....	163
Figure VII.10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2006-2010	164
Figure VII.11. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010	165
Figure VII.12. Relationship between Trust in Local Government and Satisfaction with Local Services, D.R., 2010	165
Figure VII.13. Trust in Local Government, by Country, 2010.....	166
Figure VII.14. Trust in Local and National Government, D.R., 2004-2010	167
Figure VII.15. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, D.R., 2010	168
Figure VII.16. Impact of Racial Identification, Perception of the Family Economic Situation and Attendance at Local Government Meetings on Trust in Local Government, D.R., 2010	168
Figure VII.17. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on System Support, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	169
Figure VII.18. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support, D.R., 2010	170

Figure VII.19. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010	170
Figure VII.20. Relationship between Satisfaction with Local Services and Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010	171
Figure VII.21. Evaluations of Various Public Services, D.R., 2010	172
Figure VII.22. Evaluations of Various Public Services, D.R., 2004-2010	173
Figure VIII.1. Scale of Trust in Justice and its Components: Trust in the Courts, in the Justice System and in the Supreme Court, D.R., 2010	182
Figure VIII.2. Trust in Justice, D.R., 2006 – 2010	182
Figure VIII.3. Trust in Justice, by Country, 2010	183
Figure VIII.4. Determinants of Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010	184
Figure VIII.5. Impact of Perceived Corruption and Insecurity on Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010	184
Figure VIII.6. Relationship between Partisan Sympathies and Trust in Justice Scale, D.R., 2010	185
Figure VIII.7. Relationships of Education and Wealth with Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010	185
Figure VIII.8. Trust in the Justice System to Punish the Perpetrator if the Respondent were the Victim of a Crime, 2010 (AOJ12)	186
Figure VIII.9. Trust in the Justice System to Punish the Guilty, D.R., 2004-2010	187
Figure VIII.10. Determinants of Confidence in the Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010	187
Figure VIII.11. Impact of Ethnicity, Crime Victimization and Party Affiliation on Confidence in Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010	188
Figure VIII.12. Impact of Education and Perceptions of Insecurity on Confidence in Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010	188
Figure VIII.13. Those Responsible for Lack of Confidence that the System would Punish the Guilty, D.R., 2010	189
Figure VIII.14. Why do you have little or no confidence?, D.R., 2010 (DOMAOJ12B)	189
Figure VIII.15. Average on the Trust in the Police Scale, by Country, 2010	191
Figure VIII.16. Trust in the Dominican Police, 2004-2010	191
Figure VIII.17. Determinants of Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010	192
Figure VIII.18. Impact of Crime Victimization and Partisan Affiliation on Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010	192
Figure VIII.19. Impact of Perceived Insecurity, Wealth, Education, and Age on Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010	193
Figure VIII.20. Perceptions Concerning the Role of the Police in Confronting Crime, D.R., 2010	194
Figure VIII.21. Scale of the Role of the Police in Confronting Crime, D.R., 2006-2010	194
Figure VIII.22. Determinants of the Perception that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010	195
Figure VIII.23. Impact of Perceptions of Insecurity and Age on Perceptions that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010	195
Figure VIII.24. Impact of Crime Victimization and Partisan Affiliation on the Perception that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010	196
Figure IX.1. Percent who Sympathize with a Political Party, by Country, 2010	202
Figure IX.2. Percent who Sympathize with a Political Party, D.R., 2006-2010	203
Figure IX.3. Party Membership and Sympathy, D.R., 2010	203
Figure IX.4. Determinants of Party Support, D.R., 2010	204
Figure IX.5. Impact of Ideology, Personal Economic Situation, Wealth and Age on Party Support, D.R., 2010	204
Figure IX.6. Impact of Ethnicity and Public Sector Employment on Party Support, D.R., 2010	205
Figure IX.7. Partisan Identification, 2010	206
Figure IX.8. Average Years of Education among those who Sympathizes with Each Party and Independents, 2010	206
Figure IX.9. Ideology of the Supporters of Each Party, 2010	207

Figure IX.10. Ideology Scale, by Country, 2010.....	208
Figure IX.11. Ideology Scale, D.R., 2006-2010.....	208
Figure IX.12. Democracy can Exist without Political Parties, by Country, 2010.....	209
Figure IX.13. Democracy can Exist without Political Parties, D.R., 2006-2010.....	210
Figure IX.14. Determinants of Attitudes about the Role of Political Parties in Democracy, 2010.....	210
Figure IX.15. Significant Determinants of Agreement with the Idea that it is Possible to have Democracy without Political Parties, D.R., 2010.....	211
Figure IX.16. Support for the Work of Parties: Scale and its Components, D.R., 2010.....	212
Figure IX.17. Determinants of the Scale of Support for the Work of the Political Parties, 2010.....	212
Figure IX.18. Influence of Ideology, Education and Age on Support for the Work Done by the Parties, 2010.....	213
Figure IX.19. Influence of Sex and Being a Party Sympathizer on Support for the Work Done by the Parties, 2010.....	213
Figure IX.20. Attitudes about Presidential Reelection, 2010.....	214
Figure IX.21. Government Effectiveness: The Scale and Individual Variables, D.R., 2010.....	215
Figure IX.22. Government Effectiveness Scale, by Country, 2010.....	215
Figure IX.23. Government Effectiveness Scale, D.R., 2006-2010.....	216
Figure IX.24. Perception of Government Economic Performance, D.R., 2006-2010.....	216
Figure IX.25. Government Effectiveness by Perceptions of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2010.....	217
Figure IX.26. Perceptions of Government Economic Performance by Perceptions of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2010.....	217
Figure IX.27. Average on the Clientelism Scale, by Country, 2010.....	218
Figure IX.28. Frequency of Clientelism in the D.R., 2010.....	219
Figure IX.29. Determinants of Receiving Clientelist Offers, D.R., 2010.....	219
Figure IX.30. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Age, D.R., 2010.....	220
Figure IX.31. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Sex and Partisan Sympathy, D.R., 2010....	220
Figure IX.32. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Party Membership, D.R., 2010.....	221
Figure IX.33. Reaction of People who Received Clientelist Offers, D.R., 2010.....	221
Figure IX.34. Percentage of Households who have a <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> , D.R., 2010.....	222
Figure IX.35. Amount of Money that Households Receive per Month through the <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> , D.R., 2010.....	223
Figure IX.36. Percentage of Households that have a <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> that Receive Money from the Four Different Programs, D.R., 2010.....	223
Figure IX.37. Which households have a <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> ?, 2010.....	224
Figure IX.38. Influence of Education, Wealth and Partisan Sympathies on having a <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> , D.R., 2010.....	224
Figure X.1. Components of the Support for Women in Politics Scale, by Year.....	230
Figure X.2. Scale of Support for Women in Politics, by Gender.....	231
Figure X.3. Regression of the Support for Women in Politics Scale, 2010.....	231
Figure X.4. Influence of Age and Education on the Scale of Support for Women in Politics, 2010.....	232
Figure X.5. Relationships between Attitudes about Women at Work and in the Home and the Support for Women in Politics Scale, 2010.....	232
Figure X.6. Support for Women in Politics Scale, by Party or Independents, 2010.....	233
Figure X.7. Support for Women at Work, by Gender, 2010.....	233
Figure X.8. How Household Decisions should be made, by Gender, 2010.....	234
Figure X.9. Attitudes about Abortion, by Sex, 2010.....	235
Figure X.10. Attitudes about Abortion, by the Importance of Religion, 2010.....	235
Figure X.11. Attitudes about Abortion, by Education, 2010.....	236
Figure X.12. Attitudes about the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2006-2010.....	237

Figure X.13. Determinants of Attitudes about the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010	237
Figure X.14. Relationship between Support for Democracy and Support for the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010	238
Figure X.15. Relationships between Political Tolerance, Wealth and Support for the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010	238
Figure X.16. Attitudes about Immigrants, D.R., 2010	239
Figure X.17. Who is more inclined to accept immigrants as people who do jobs that Dominicans do not want?, 2010	239
Figure X.18. Relationships of Wealth and Education with the Perception that Immigrants only do Jobs that Dominicans do not Want, 2010	240
Figure X.19. Who is more inclined to disagree with offering social services to immigrants?, D.R., 2010	240
Figure X.20. Relationships of National Economic Evaluations and Age with the Scale Measuring Disagreement with Providing Social Services to Immigrants, 2010	241
Figure X.21. Percentage who Receive Remittances, by Country, 2010	242
Figure X.22. Changes in the Quantity of Remittances Received in the Past Year, D.R., 2010	243
Figure X.23. Percentage with Close Family Members Living Abroad, by Country, 2010	243
Figure X.24. Where do family members abroad reside?, D.R., 2010	244
Figure X.25. Communication with Family Living Abroad, D.R., 2010	244
Figure X.26. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, by Country, 2010	245
Figure X.27. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, D.R., 2006-2010	245
Figure X.28. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, by Age, Wealth and Education, D.R., 2010	246
Figure X.29. Racial Self-identification, D.R., 2010	247
Figure X.30. Skin Color Classified by Interviewer, D.R., 2010	248
Figure X.31. Skin Color (classified by interviewer) by Racial Self-Identification, D.R., 2010	249
Figure X.32. Wealth of Self-Identified Ethnic Groups and Interviewer-Classified Skin Color Groups, D.R., 2010	249
Figure X.33. Years of Education by Ethnic Groups Classified by Self-Identification and by Interviewer-Identified Skin Color, D.R., 2010	250
Figure X.34. Attitudes about Racial Issues, D.R., 2010	251
Figure X.35. Support for the Idea that the Mixing of Races is Good for the Country, by Country, 2010	252
Figure X.36. Acceptance of a Child Marrying Someone with Darker Skin, by Country, 2010	252
Figure X.37. Attitude that the Respondent would like to have Lighter Skin, by Country, 2010	252
Figure X.38. Perception that People with Darker Skin are Treated Worse, by Country, 2010	253
Figure X.39. Scale of Living or Observing Situations in which others were Victims of Racial Discrimination, by Country, 2010	254
Figure X.40. Scale of Feeling Discriminated against because of Skin Color, by Country, 2010	254

List of Tables

Table I.1. Unemployment Rate (Average), Dominican Republic, 2002-2009	8
Table I.2. Exchange Rate (DR\$ to US\$), 2006-2010	9
Table I.3. Perceptions about the Impact of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2008-2009	10
Table I.4. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979 - 2009	11
Table I.5. Electoral Results for Senators, Deputies and Mayors, by Party, 2002-2010	14
Table V.1. Relation between System Support and Political Tolerance	112
Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: D.R. 2010	119
Table V.3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, D.R., 2006- 2010	120
Additional Table III.1. Analysis of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)	60
Additional Table III.2. Analysis of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the D.R., 2010 (Regression)	61
Additional Table III.3. Analysis of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)	62
Additional Table III.4. Analysis of Support for Democracy in D.R., 2010 (Regression)	63
Additional Table III.5. Analysis of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)	64
Additional Table III.6. Analysis of System Support in the D.R., 2010 (Regression)	65
Additional Table III.7. Analysis of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Regression) ...	66
Additional Table III.8. Analysis of Satisfaction with Democracy in D.R., 2010 (Regression)	67
Additional Table III.9. Analysis of Support for a Military Coup in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)	68
Additional Table III.10. Analysis of Support for a Military Coup in D.R., 2010 (Regression)	69
Additional Table IV.1. Analysis of Crime Victimization, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)	107
Additional Table IV.2. Analysis of Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)	107
Additional Table IV.3. Analysis of System Support (Regression)	108
Additional Table IV.4. Analysis of Community Participation (Regression)	108
Additional Table IV.5. Analysis of Participation in the Last Presidential Elections (Logistic Regression)	109
Additional Table IV.6. Analysis of Support for the Rule of Law (Regression)	109
Additional Table V.1. Analysis of Support for Stable Democracy, D.R. 2010 (Regression)	131
Additional Table VI.1. Analysis of Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	153
Additional Table VI.2. Analysis of Participation in Protests, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)	153
Additional Table VII.1. Analysis of Requesting Assistance from Municipal Government, D.R. (Logistic Regression)	175
Additional Table VII.2. Analysis of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	175
Additional Table VII.3. Analysis of Confidence in Municipal Government, D.R., 2010 (Regression) .	176
Additional Table VII.4. Analysis of System Support, D.R. ,2010 (Regression)	176
Additional Table VII.5. Analysis of Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	177
Additional Table VIII.1. Analysis of the Trust in Justice Scale, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	198
Additional Table VIII.2. Analysis of Confidence that the Justice System would Punish Someone Guilty of a Crime, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	198
Additional Table VIII.3. Analysis of the Trust in the Police Scale, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	199
Additional Table VIII.4. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Perceptions that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	199
Additional Table IX.1. Analysis of Partisan Affiliation, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)	227

Additional Table IX.2. Analysis of “Democracy can Exist without Political Parties,” D.R., 2010 (Regression).....	227
Additional Table IX.3. Analysis of Support for the Work of the Parties, D.R., 2010 (Regression)	227
Additional Table IX.4. Analysis of Receiving a Clientelist Offer, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)....	228
Additional Table IX.5. Analysis of having a <i>Tarjeta de Solidaridad</i> , D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)	228
Additional Table X.1. Analysis of Support for Women in Politics (Regression)	256
Additional Table X.2. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Attitudes about Haitians (Regression)	256
Additional Table X.3. Analysis of the Variables: Immigrants do Jobs that Dominicans do not want (Logistic Regression).....	257
Additional Table X.4. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Disagreement that the Government Offer Social Services to Immigrants (Regression).....	257

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high-quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Vanessa Reilly
Democracy Specialist
Bureau for Latin American & the Caribbean
US Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.,
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
and Associate Director of LAPOP,
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010, we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010, the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), York University and Université Laval in Canada, and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic downturn might influence democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009 and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior *AmericasBarometer* surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we place the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than 0.6, with a preference for 0.7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above 0.7, many reaching above 0.8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Chile (N = 1,965), Ecuador (N=3,000), and Brazil (N = 2,500).

(either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project's lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables' averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire database had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new database. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the *AmericasBarometer*. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector, and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.












³ All *AmericaBarometer* samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.








In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Surinam we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.LapopSurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendices for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone	
Argentina	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Chile	 
Colombia	 
Ecuador	 
Paraguay	
Peru	<p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-weight: bold;"><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
Uruguay	 
Venezuela	

The Caribbean	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. Margaret Sarles, formerly of USAID, was one of those who helped the project get off the ground in its early phases, and helped out again this round with the Haiti survey. At the UNDP, we thank Rebecca Grynspan, Luis Felipe López Calva and Juan Pablo Corlazzoli for their strong support. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Suzanne Duryea for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton helped introduce us to the complexities of ethnicity and provided strong support from his grant from the Ford Foundation to enhance that aspect of the project. We also thank François Gélinau at Université Laval in Canada for providing support from the Canadian SSHRC for the module on federalism. Simone Bohn of York University was able to find support for aspects of the Canadian version of the survey, and Nat Stone helped us with the French translation for Canada. Lucio Renno provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Scott Mainwaring at Notre Dame University was able to provide support for the Uruguay component of the research. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the databases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Vanderbilt University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department, Vanderbilt University ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP Central, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Diana Orcés, Research Analyst, LAPOP Central, Vanderbilt University
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados, Mexico ●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science, Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations, Costa Rica
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science, Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Clevel and Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
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Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago ●Mr. Niki Braithwaite, Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
 July 2010

Executive Summary

The *AmericasBarometer* is a survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which uses probabilistic national samples to measure democratic values and political behavior throughout the Americas. From 2004 to 2010, more countries have been included in the project, and currently the survey covers almost the entire region and includes more than 40,000 people.

In the Dominican Republic, LAPOP surveys have been conducted since 2006, but the report also incorporates data from the 2004 DEMOS survey on which LAPOP collaborated. The goal of the 2010 study was to once again measure the democratic values and political behavior of the population, while also examining a special theme: the impact of the economic crisis on the people and on politics. Who has been most affected by the economic crisis? What has been the nature of the crisis' impact on democratic values and support for democracy?

A general breakdown of democracy in Latin America seems unlikely, but the events in Honduras and authoritarian tendencies in other countries in the region illustrate democracy's fragility. Additionally, various perspectives in the academic literature suggest that tough economic times are likely to have political consequences.

In the Dominican case, we find a democracy that has been durable and stable for three decades. The transition occurred in 1978, and democracy has persisted without significant breaks through the present. The only deviation from democratic institutional order occurred during the post-electoral crisis in 1994, when in the face of electoral fraud charges Joaquín Balaguer had to agree to a reduced term from four to two years. But the change was made in the context of a constitutional reform, which was used to resolve the political impasse. Even accounting for the longest period of military government, which dates back to the 1960s, the Dominican Republic has not had military rule in more than 40 years, even though the Balaguer governments from 1966 to 1978 had some authoritarian characteristics. With this background of political stability, this study analyzes the impact of the economic crisis from the perspective of public opinion and also examines a series of political topics traditionally included in the *AmericasBarometer* surveys.

Economic Crisis and Support for Democracy. In the Dominican Republic, as in the rest of the region, a large portion of the population perceives that they are in the midst of an economic crisis, 97% in the Dominican case, and half of these consider the crisis to be very serious. Responsibility for the crisis is assigned to various sources, but the largest percentage blames the current Dominican government (25%), followed by the country's economic system (23.9%) and the previous government (11.1%). Sixty-six percent of the Dominican respondents said they had not lost their job, 7.8% said they had lost a job but found another, 14.9% lost their job and have not found a new one, and 11.2% did not work because they were unable or chose not to. In terms of the employment situation in entire households, 38% of Dominican respondents indicated that they or someone in their household had lost a job in the last two years. This percentage is among the highest in the region, only slightly surpassed by Colombia and Mexico. In addition, the Dominican Republic has the second highest percentage of people who reported declines in household income in the last two years (41.1%). This statistic, combined with the 38% of households where someone lost their job, is a sign of economic difficulty, despite relative macroeconomic stability.

The comparative surveys demonstrate that people across the region who perceive their personal economic situation to be very poor are more likely to have experienced loss of household income than those who consider their personal financial situation to be very good. These same trends, albeit less pronounced, are found when considering the relationship between loss of household income and current perceptions of the national economic situation, retrospective personal economic evaluations, and retrospective national evaluations. These comparative patterns are also present in the Dominican case.

In about half the countries, interviewees affirmed that they are happier than they had been in 2008. In the Dominican Republic, we do not observe a difference in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, despite the economic crisis. Viewed from another angle, in the Dominican Republic, the percentage of people who indicate more satisfaction and the percentage who said they were less satisfied than in 2008 is about the same, 40.1 and 40.4

respectively. In this sense, the economic crisis does not appear to have pushed the balance markedly toward dissatisfaction with life. But the Dominican Republic is ranked number 8 in dissatisfaction among the 25 countries surveyed.

Of all the variables included in the regional-level regression analysis of changes in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, the variable with the largest effect is perceptions of the government's economic performance. This means that even while people may perceive that they themselves are not doing well economically, if they think government is managing the economy well, their life satisfaction is higher. In the Dominican case, however, perceptions of government's economic management have no statistically significant effect on life satisfaction. The most important factors promoting life satisfaction in the Dominican context are positive evaluations of personal economic situation and being a woman. Declines in household income and negative retrospective evaluations of personal economic situation both undermine life satisfaction among Dominican respondents.

This round of the Americas Barometer provides evidence that, in spite of the economic crisis, support for democracy has not diminished dramatically across the region, even though some countries have experienced declines. The countries that experienced statistically significant drops in support for democracy between 2008 and 2010 are: Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Canada and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, Chile is the only country where support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010.

In region-wide regression analysis of support for democracy, the most important positive effect is education level. This finding is consistent with previous research about democracy in the Americas and reinforces the idea that education is one of the most effective ways of constructing a political culture that supports democracy. In general, the analysis does not find that individual experiences during the economic crisis reduced support for democracy. This is heartening news and suggests considerable resiliency in the region's democracies. The results also indicate that the "democratic recession" observed by *Freedom House* does not seem to have had a significant effect on public commitment to democracy in most of the region. In the Dominican case, the variables related to the economic crisis do not have a statistically significant impact on support for democracy. The variables that have significant positive effects are: a better perception of the government's economic performance, more education, greater age, and being a man.

Erosion of Democratic Stability. Some countries experienced changes in support for the political system. Canada, Belize, and the Dominican Republic suffered statistically significant albeit small declines in support for the political system from 2008 to 2010. Honduras, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay and Nicaragua saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. The other countries did not experience statistically significant changes. The perception that the economic crisis was very serious is negatively correlated with support for the political system. For the region, the greatest impact on system support, as observed with support for democracy, came from perceptions of the government's economic performance. This finding suggests that the impact of the economic crisis has been mitigated by governments that are perceived as effective in responding to the challenge the crisis presents. But in some countries, like the Dominican Republic, system support has declined more than we might expect given evaluations of government economic performance.

With respect to satisfaction with democracy, some countries experienced increases and others decreases between 2008 and 2010. The Dominican Republic is among those countries where satisfaction with democracy declined. But in the Dominican context, negative economic perceptions do not have adverse effects on satisfaction with the democratic regime, which is different from the relationship observed in the rest of the region. Government economic performance is the factor that contributes most to Dominicans' satisfaction with democracy: more positive evaluations of government economic performance are associated with greater satisfaction.

An extreme reaction in difficult times is for the military to take power through a coup. The results of the 2010 Americas Barometer demonstrate that support for a coup d'état is very low in the majority of the countries surveyed despite the economic challenges facing the region. However, unemployment and the perception that the economic crisis is very serious are associated with increased support for military coups. In addition, people who

have negative evaluations of the national economic situation are more supportive of military coups. Similar to the regional pattern, the perception that the economic crisis is very serious makes Dominicans more likely to support a coup, although other economic variables are not relevant in the Dominican context. Age and education have significant effects regionally and also in the Dominican Republic: people who are older and those who are more educated are less likely to support a coup d'état.

Since 2006, the *AmericasBarometer* surveys have used levels of system support and political tolerance with the goal of empirically evaluating the stability of democracy based on the opinions of the people. The rationale is based on theory that suggests both system support and tolerance are necessary for democratic stability in the long term.

The Dominican Republic has an average level of system support when compared to other countries in the region, and this support has varied slightly in the past six years. System support increased significantly from 45.7 points in 2004 to 57.6 in 2006, after overcoming the financial crisis that impacted the country in 2003 and 2004. It remained about the same from 2006 to 2008, and then declined to 52.9 points in 2010. On political tolerance, the Dominican Republic falls below the regional average in 2010, with a score of 49.4, slightly less than the 52 points scored in 2008 and significantly less than the 58.9 points in 2006. This means that in the last four years, political tolerance has declined 9.5 points on a 100-point scale.

With the goal of creating a typology, the system support and political tolerance variables were classified into “high” and “low” categories. Political systems that have a large percentage of citizens with high system support and high political tolerance will tend to have more stable democracies. This prediction is based on the logic that democratic contexts require high system support and high political tolerance in order to achieve stability.

Over time, comparison of the Dominican data reveals considerable increases in system support and political tolerance between 2004 and 2006, but after 2006 they experienced declines. Less system support and less political tolerance in 2010 translate into a smaller portion of the population located in the “stable democracy” category of the typology. The percentage of the population in this category declined from 38.2% in 2006 to 24.8% in 2010. Among the categories in the typology, the greatest increase occurred in the “stable authoritarian” and “democracy at risk” groups. In 2006, 23% of the Dominican population fell into the “stable authoritarian” category, but this group increased to 32.5% of survey respondents in 2010. For the “democracy at risk” category, the percentage of respondents in this group increased from 16% in 2006 to 23.4% in 2010. These figures suggest that Dominicans have become less tolerant in the past four years and that there has been erosion in the sort of public opinion that helps promote stable democracy. Regression analysis demonstrates that people in the stable democracy category of the typology are more satisfied with the president’s performance, while those who perceive less citizen security are less likely to fall into this category – perceptions of insecurity erode Dominican democracy.

With respect to institutional trust, like the previous surveys Dominicans trust the media and churches more than other institutions. In the 2010 round, respondents were asked for the first time about trust in neighborhood associations, which also registered high levels of trust. In the public sphere, trust in the president surpasses that for all government institutions, with an average of 61.8 points on a 100-point scale. Trust in the armed forces surpassed trust in the national police by more than 20 points. The two institutions with the lowest levels of trust are the police and political parties, which once again occupy last place in citizen trust. It is interesting to note that although 54.5% of Dominican respondents in 2010 said they sympathized with a political party, average trust in these organizations was only 33.1 on a scale from 0 to 100.

In recent years, there has been a systematic decline in Dominicans’ support for the idea that democracy is better than any other form of government, from an average of 78.7 points in 2006 to 68.6 points in 2010. The majority of the population said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the way in which Dominican democracy works, placing the country at an intermediate position among the countries surveyed. The Dominican data show some deterioration in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. From 2008 to 2010, the average declined from 54 to 50.7 points, a statistically significant difference.

The decline in support for democracy as the best form of government and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, together with decreases in system support, signal a growing discontent with democracy in the Dominican population. This discontent has increased from 2008 to 2010, although it is still not as low as observed in 2004.

Crime and Corruption. The feeling of fear in the Dominican population is high, and data from surveys over the past two decades suggest that the sense of insecurity has grown. After increasing consistently from 1994 to 2006, feelings of insecurity declined in 2008, but increased again in 2010. The data on crime victimization indicate that 16.5% of those interviewed in 2010 were the victim of some act of delinquency in the past 12 months, and when crime victimization in the interviewee's household is also included, 27.3% report that they or someone in their household was the victim of a crime.

The majority of the criminal acts were committed in the respondent's home or neighborhood, and the most common form of crime was robbery without weapons or physical threat. The social groups most likely to report being crime victims were those from the southern part of the country, those who evaluated their economic situation negatively, young people, more educated people, and those who live in large cities.

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is not among those countries with the highest levels of reported crime victimization, but it is among those with the highest perceived insecurity. The perception of insecurity declined between 2006 and 2008, from an average of 50.7 to 39.5 points, but increased in 2010 to 46.5 points. Dominicans also view crime as a significant threat to the country, averaging the second highest score in the region on this question, at 90 points. The country also has the fifth-highest score on an item asking about the presence of gangs in the respondent's neighborhood, with an average of 45.9 points.

In general, the data about insecurity show that in the Dominican Republic perceptions of insecurity increased between 2008 and 2010 on all the questions used to evaluate citizen security. Additionally, when compared to other countries in the region, the Dominican Republic has high levels of perceived insecurity. Both factors point to a worsening of the crime problem in terms of public perceptions.

Regarding corruption, 17.5% of Dominicans interviewed said they had been the victim of at least one act of corruption. This percentage places the Dominican Republic toward the middle of the countries surveyed. Nevertheless, the Dominican population perceives corruption to be a significant problem. In regional comparisons of corruption perceptions, the Dominican Republic is located above the regional median, with an average score of 77.6 points. And examining Dominican attitudes over time indicates that this average has remained similarly high from 2004 to 2010.

A relatively high percentage of the Dominican population believes that paying a bribe is justified, and in 2010 the country is located among those with the highest percentages of respondents who justify corruption (17.7%), although this percentage was higher in 2006 and 2008, at 22.2% and 24.8% respectively. Dominicans also have a high tolerance for nepotism, which is measured using a question about politicians acting on behalf of a family member: 75.6% of Dominican respondents do not think this type of action is corruption, or if it is corruption, they view it as justifiable. On a scale measuring rejection of nepotism based on this question, Dominican respondents average 38.4 points in 2010 compared to 50.2 points in 2008. That is, in 2010 there was a much higher tolerance for nepotism than in 2008.

With respect to the effect of crime and corruption on system support, we found less system support among those who had been the victims of crime, those who perceived greater insecurity, those who had been the victims of corruption, and those who perceived higher levels of corruption. However, with respect to the rule of law, 67.3% of the Dominicans interviewed said that one should respect the law in order to capture criminals, and the Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the highest percentage of respondents who support respect for the rule of law. Regression analysis shows that being a crime victim or feeling unsafe do not have statistically significant effects on respondents' willingness to support following the law in efforts to capture criminals. In other words,

people who reported being victims of crimes and who felt more unsafe were no more likely than the rest of the population to support breaking the law in order to capture delinquents.

Justice. The Dominican justice system is far from achieving a high level of public trust, and the data from 2010 show a slight decline from previous surveys. On a scale of trust in the justice system overall, the Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position when compared with the rest of the region, and considering only the Dominican case, average trust declined from 52 points in 2008 to 48.7 in 2010. On a scale measuring confidence that the justice system would punish someone guilty of a crime, the Dominican Republic is likewise located in an intermediate position in regional comparison, but Dominican confidence in punishment declined from 50.6 points in 2008 to 44.7 in 2010. That is, on both scales of confidence in the justice system, there was a slight decline from 2008 to 2010.

People that perceive higher levels of corruption and insecurity have less trust in the justice system. Being a victim of corruption also decreases trust in justice. However, having been the victim of a crime does not have a significant effect on trust in the justice system. In the case of confidence that the justice system would punish someone guilty of theft or assault, being a crime victim and perceiving more insecurity produce less confidence in the functioning of the justice system.

Respondents identify the police as having the primary responsibility for their lack of confidence in the ability of the justice system to punish the guilty, and they place judges and prosecutors together in second place. People blame low confidence in the justice system on corruption in these institutions. The Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the lowest levels of trust in the police, with an average of 38.9 points. Also some 60% of respondents consider the police to be involved in crime, rather than protecting the people, and on the scale of police protection, there was a decline from an average of 42 points in 2008 to 35.2 in 2010. In a general sense and in regional comparison, trust in the police is low. Regression analysis indicates that people who have been the victims of crime and those who perceive greater levels of insecurity tend to think that the police do not protect the people.

Civil Society. The Dominican Republic registered a decline in interpersonal trust from a 64.9-point average in 2004 to 52.7 in 2010, on a scale from 0 to 100. We found that people who feel less safe or who have been the victims of crimes are likely to have less interpersonal trust. This data supports the supposition that increases in delinquency have a negative effect on democracy by weakening social ties. Despite this, the data show a society with a high level of civic participation.

In the comparative data, the Dominican Republic leads the region in participation in meetings of religious organizations and neighborhood improvement groups and also registers high scores in relation to the other countries surveyed on participation in parents' associations, women's organizations and efforts to solve community problems. On the scale of community participation, which combines attendance at meetings of neighborhood improvement groups and participation in solving community problems, the Dominican Republic has an average participation of 24.7 points, higher than all the other countries surveyed. These data indicate that in the regional context Dominican society has a high level of community participation, although the country occupies a relatively low position in terms of participation in public protests. This suggests that there is strong associationalism but not strong mobilization in the Dominican Republic. As in 2008, the Dominican Republic leads the region in the percentage of respondents who said they had participated in a municipal meeting, at 27.3%. This finding solidifies the argument that Dominican society shows a significant level of involvement in community efforts.

Political Parties, Government Efficacy and Clientelism. Despite low trust in political parties, Dominican society continues expressing significant loyalty to these organization in their levels of partisan sympathies: 54.5% of respondents in 2010 said they sympathized with a party (the third highest among all the countries surveyed), although the level of partisan sympathy declined in 2010 in comparison to the 60% with partisan sympathies in 2006 and 70% in 2008. The people most likely to sympathize with a political party are those who place themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum, those who have positive assessments of their economic situation, public employees, older respondents, and whites.

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is among the countries with the highest levels of interest in politics and registers the highest level of people who say they have worked in electoral campaigns, with 19.9% campaigning during the 2008 presidential elections. At the beginning of 2010, when the survey was conducted, 14.8% said they had worked for a party or candidate during that year's campaign.

Dominicans continue placing themselves primarily on the right side of the ideological spectrum but, in 2010, there was a statistically significant move away from the right. In 2006, the average self-placement on the ideology scale was 69.2 points (where 100 means right and 0 means left) and, in 2010, the average was 59.7 points, which means that the population moved almost 10 points to the left on the 100-point scale. Those who sympathize with the PRSC and the PLD on average identify the most with the right, while those without partisan sympathies (46% of the population) are the group who identify least with the right.

With respect to the parties' performance, the population expressed a moderate evaluation, with an average of 44 points on a scale from 0 to 100. People with more right-leaning ideology and those who sympathize with a political parties tend to be more approving of the parties' performance. On the other hand, older people, those with more education and men are less satisfied with the parties' performance.

Regarding reelection, the Dominican population is divided in their preference: 40% expressed total opposition to reelection, while 60% support some form of reelection.

Government efficacy has a moderate evaluation in 2010, slightly less than 50 points on the 0-100 scale, and registered a statistically significant decline in the evaluation of government performance since 2008. The average government efficacy score in 2008 was 53 points, and in 2010 the average score was 48.3. We also observe a slight decline in evaluations of government's economic performance, from 49.9 points in 2008 to 46 points in 2010, although the difference is not statistically significant. A factor that affects evaluations of government's economic performance is perceptions of the economic crisis. Those who perceived a worse economic crisis evaluated government's performance more negatively.

For the first time in 2010, the *AmericasBarometer* included questions about electoral clientelism. The Dominican Republic leads the region with an average of 18.4 points on the scale of clientelist offers during the electoral campaign, or put differently 22% of those surveyed said they had received or been offered a clientelist benefit. Gender and age are the variables that have statistically significant relationships with clientelism: men and young people are more likely to report receiving clientelist offers than women and older people. Being a sympathizer with the PLD is a factor associated with a greater likelihood of receiving clientelist offers, but the statistical relationship is not as strong as that observed with gender and age.

Also for the first time in 2010, the *AmericasBarometer* incorporated questions about the social assistance program known as *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, provided by the Dominican government. A third of the population interviewed said they or someone in their home has a *tarjeta*. Of these, 76% said they receive 500 pesos or more per month and 65% benefit from more than one of the programs available. The households that benefit the most are those where the respondents have low levels of education and wealth. Additionally, sympathizing with or belonging to the PLD or the PRD increases the probability of having a *tarjeta*, with the effect being slightly higher for PLD supporters.

Gender, Migration and Race. Once again this study works with a scale of support for women in politics, which has been used in previous surveys and contains five items: agreement with the idea that politics is for men, agreement with the idea that women should participate more in politics, agreement that women should participate the same as men, having at least the same level of confidence in female candidates as male candidates, and thinking that women have at least the same capacity to govern as men. Between 1994 and 2001, there was a notable change favoring women's political participation, but between 2004 and 2010 the levels of support have stabilized, declined or been unstable, depending on the item. In 2010, there was a slight decline in support for the idea that women should participate more in politics, but there was a slight increase over 2008 levels on the other four items. The scale of support for women's political participation has a maximum of five points; on the scale in 2010 women average 3.5 points and men 3.0 points. While there were practically no gender differences on the scale during the

1990s, in the first decade of this century a statistically significant gender difference has emerged. This suggests that women are more inclined than men to accept women's rights to political participation and representation. In the domestic realm and in the workplace, women are also more likely to favor women's equality. Concerning reproductive rights, specifically abortion, there are no statistically significant differences by gender. But we do observe different views based on religiosity and education, with less religious and more educated people being more likely to accept women's access to abortion.

Regarding granting rights to Haitian immigrants, the data reveal general resistance, although the levels of acceptance increased slightly in 2010. The average level of support for the children of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic being given Dominican citizenship rights is 48.3 points on a scale from 0 to 100. Opinion is less favorable toward the government providing work permits to undocumented Haitians, at 42.4 points, although this average is higher than that which was registered in 2006 and 2008. In a general sense, the data show a slight change in favor of giving Haitian immigrants basic labor and citizenship rights, but the averages remain below 50 points on scales from 0 to 100. Political tolerance has a significant positive effect on support for the rights of Haitian immigrants: the most tolerant respondents have an average of 58.8 points on the scale of support for Haitians' rights. Sixty percent of the Dominican population indicates that immigrants generally do jobs that Dominicans do not want, although the level of support for providing public services to immigrants is only 42.9 points on a 0-100 scale. Older people and those who have negative evaluations of the national economy are more opposed to offering social services to immigrants.

Concerning Dominican migration abroad, the country is among those where a high proportion of citizens receive remittances: 22.5% of Dominicans surveyed said they receive remittances. Of these, 44% said that their remittance income has declined in the past year. The majority of respondents' family members living abroad reside in the United States, and the level of communication with family outside the Dominican Republic is high (55.1% of those interviewed said they communicate with family abroad at least once per week). Like previous surveys, about a third of Dominican respondents hoped to live or work abroad in the coming years. The intention to emigrate is greatest among younger and wealthier respondents.

On the topic of race, 68.6% of the interviewed population self-identifies as Indian, 11.2% as mulatto, 10.5% as black and 9.7% as white. To obtain another source of information about the skin color of the surveyed population, interviewers used a palette of colors to mark the color closest to the skin tone of the interviewee. The interviewers placed 92.2% of respondents between 3 and 8 on the skin palette scale, that is, neither white nor black, although there was a concentration of people classified between 3 and 6, i.e. toward lighter skin color. The statistical correlation between racial self-identification and interviewer identification was statistically significant. This means that there was a similarity in the way people self-identified and how they were categorized by interviewers. The data show a correlation between racial self-identification and wealth, but the relationship is not statistically significant, however the correlation between wealth and interviewer-identified race *is* statistically significant. The same pattern is observed with respect to years of schooling.

The tendency in the Dominican Republic is to consider the mixing of races as not good, but there is greater acceptance for the idea that one's children may marry someone with darker skin, and the desire to have lighter skin is not very pronounced. More Dominicans report having witnessed incidents of racial discrimination than in other surveyed countries, but Dominicans are less likely than their counterparts in other countries to say that they themselves have been victims of racial discrimination.

Part I. Hard Times and their Effects on Democracy

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the *AmericasBarometer* in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis took place in the context of what organizations like Freedom House were reporting a world-wide “democracy recession.” This economic crisis affected most nations in the world, and the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn. Then we turn to the core of our analysis, the *AmericasBarometer* survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering. Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September 2008; several months after the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still being felt, albeit unequally, around the globe.

In the previous study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the *AmericasBarometer* in 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal finances have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens’ support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and country-specific assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, “democracy recession,” and then discuss democracy at the country level in the Dominican Republic. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

Economic Overview

The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, world real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3% by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4% (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway (IMF 2009). Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a world-wide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered across the globe. Forty-three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 per day. Moreover, initial predictions were that more than 1 billion people were expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.¹ Again, these predictions and projections did not factor in successful counter-cyclical and pro-

¹ See, www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm and <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

poor policies that many nations implemented, so the final toll will have to await studies conducted after this one is published.




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections
(Source IMF, World Economic Outlook [2010])

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labour Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 was estimated at 6.6%, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has reduced work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009 (ILO 2010: 42). Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 and 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2% of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide (ILO 2010: 22).

All these figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was more uneven and not as severe in many countries.² Recent data from the World Bank indicate that, after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9% between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%) (World Bank 2010). Based on the latest projections available as of this writing, economic recovery seems to be underway and real GDP growth may increase to 3.1 and 3.6% in 2010 and 2011, respectively (World Bank 2010). On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced, industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen (Fernández-Arias and Montiel 2009).

The financial turmoil also had a clear negative impact on the Latin American labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5% in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8% during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010).

² Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis in 2009 (-5.4% growth) compared to other industrialized nations, is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal in this trend took place in 2009 (World Bank 2010). Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9% in 2009 (ILO 2010). These are just some examples of the serious “side-effects” that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced, industrial nations also affected the level of remittances (that is, money sent home by family members working abroad) on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.³ Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region’s nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008, the growth rates of remittances began to decline considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure I.2).




Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009, as Reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4% in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25% in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.⁴

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report show that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010, recovery was underway (Izquierdo and Talvi 2010). As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region’s GDP), growth in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.⁵

³ See, <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>

⁴ See, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

⁵ These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region’s GDP).




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
 (Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4% in 2007 to -6.5% in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2% between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9% in 2010-2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the *AmericasBarometer* suffered declines in GDP.

The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was -1%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009. Some of those declines, such as that in Ecuador, were very slight, whereas others, such as that in Mexico, were more severe.⁶ The Dominican economy grew slightly, 0.5%.

⁶ Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB’s latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable.... (Izquierdo and Talvi 2010: 1).

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems made the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in the Dominican Republic

Amidst the collapse of the United States financial system in 2008, President Leonel Fernández declared from New York City that the Dominican economy was “shielded” and would not suffer the ravages of the international economic crisis. In the subsequent months, he reiterated this idea, while sometimes recognizing the devastating effects of the economic crisis throughout the world and its potential impact in the Dominican Republic. He also adopted the idea, popularized in the United States with the rise of Barack Obama, that the crisis presented opportunities for change and improvement.

This optimistic discourse was accompanied by policies promoting macroeconomic stability, which have sustained the government’s economic program since Fernández became president in 2004, when the country was affected by a local banking crisis that exploded in 2003 and was followed by economic destabilization. The essential elements of Fernández’s economic policy have been exchange rate stability, moderate inflation, and agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to maintain stability and access to international credit lines.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) evaluated the Dominican economic situation in 2009 in the following way:

“Despite the recession in the United States and the financial difficulties that characterized the year, the Dominican economy managed to maintain positive growth in 2009 at about 2.5%. While this growth was significantly less than the 8.4% achieved on average between 2004 and 2008, it allowed an increase of 1.1% in GDP per capita. Annual inflation was around 6%, slightly higher than in 2008. Moreover, the central government and current account deficits were estimated at 3% and 5.2% of GDP respectively. For 2010, ECLAC projects growth over 3%. Inflation and the current account deficit are expected to be similar to 2009. In contrast, it is thought that the central government deficit will decline to 2.5%” (CEPAL 2009:145).

Amid the economic adversity, an agreement between PETROCARIBE and Venezuela helped by offering affordable oil, although it generates a growing bilateral debt. The relationship with Venezuela in the energy field has deepened with the sale of 49% of the shares of the Dominican Petroleum Refinery in Venezuela. This transaction was formalized at the beginning of May 2010, a few days before the Dominican legislative and municipal elections, which were won by the governing Party of Dominican Liberation (PLD). The sales agreement was criticized by Dominican business sectors and leaders of the opposition Party of the Dominican Revolution (PRD) for the lack of transparency in the negotiation and for the growing energy dependence of the Dominican Republic on the government of Hugo Chávez. Despite these critiques and Venezuela’s vagaries regarding the purchase agreement for the refinery, the sale was formalized during Chávez’s visit to the Dominican Republic on May 5, 2010.

Similar to what happened in other Latin American countries, the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 did not have a devastating effect in the Dominican Republic, but it did reduce levels of economic growth and therefore, had a pernicious effect on the income levels of the population. In addition, dependence on remittances from the United States and Europe places the country in a position of greater vulnerability, given that about 25% of households receive remittances.

Table I.1. Unemployment Rate (Average), Dominican Republic, 2002-2009

Year	Total	Men	Women
2002	16.1	9.5	26.6
2003	16.7	10.6	26.6
2004	18.4	10.5	30.7
2005	17.9	11.0	28.8
2006	16.2	9.2	27.0
2007	15.6	9.3	25.4
2008	14.1	9.8	23.2
2009	14.9	9.8	23.2

The unemployment rate includes those who were openly unemployed and said they were looking for work in the four weeks before the survey as well as those who were unemployed and were not actively looking for work but said they would accept a job if one were offered.

Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic

In terms of national employment, one of the hardest hit sectors has been the export processing zones (EPZ). This situation follows not only from the international economic crisis, but also from changes in international agreements that have favored increasing exports from China to the United States, damaging assembly economies like the Dominican Republic.

Despite these problems, the official unemployment rate declined slightly at the end of the decade when compared to the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the banking crisis in 2003 to 2004. As observed in Table I.1, the reduction of unemployment is more significant among women than among men, even though women have a higher overall unemployment rate (more than double that of men).

To address the global economic crisis, the Dominican government took several steps, but the most significant was an expansionary policy of the Central Bank that reduced interest rates. ECLAC (2009: 145) summarizes the government's anti-crisis strategy in the following way:

“Throughout 2009, public policies were determined by the evolution of the financial crisis. The anti-crisis plan announced by the government at the beginning of the year included, in the realm of fiscal policy, exemptions for agriculture, incentives for building affordable housing, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and expansion in public investment, which suffered major delays in implementation due to serious financial problems. Concerning social policy, the government announced the expansions of various programs targeted toward protecting the most vulnerable sectors.”

Despite President Fernández's optimistic argument that the Dominican economy would be shielded from the crisis, the government and the population felt its effects. At the government level, the most visible effect was the reduction in current income by about 14% in 2009 (CEPAL 2009). Also, growth in GDP per capita declined considerably in 2009 with respect to 2008, from 8.9% to 0.4% according to Central Bank estimates. However, the exchange rate remained relatively stable in recent years, as shown in Table I.2. This has helped provide stability in the economy.

Table I.2. Exchange Rate (DR\$ to US\$), 2006-2010

2006 Average	33.0
2007 Average	33.0
2008 Average	34.4
2009 Average	35.8
May 2010	36.6
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic	

In terms of perceptions, between 2008 and 2009 the Dominican population became more aware of the possible impact of the economic crisis, according to data from the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI). In 2008, people were asked about the possible impact of the economic crisis, and in 2009 they were asked about its real impact. The percentage of people who identified the crisis as affecting them increased between 2008 and 2009. In this sense, although President Fernández's optimistic rhetoric helped contain outbreaks of alarm and disenchantment, the population became increasingly aware of the magnitude of the economic problems. But according to consumer confidence surveys, confidence in the economy showed signs of recuperation in 2009, after deteriorations evidenced in October of 2008 and April 2009 under the influence of the international financial crisis.

Table I.3. Perceptions about the Impact of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2008-2009

	How do you think the international financial crisis is going to affect your income and your life? October 2008	How do you think the international financial crisis is affecting your income and your life? October 2009
Mucho or very much	54.6%	62.9%
Some	27.5%	24.3%
None	9.0%	9.5%
Don't know	7.8%	1.9%
Source: Secretaría de Estado de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo, "Sistema de Indicadores de Confianza del Consumidor en República Dominicana, 2007-2009 (Versión Preliminar)," Santo Domingo, December 2009, p.51.		

In summary, the Dominican economy has suffered the challenges of the international economic crisis, but indicators of relative macroeconomic stability, which reveal moderate levels of inflation and minimal devaluation of the peso, have enabled the Dominican economic system to remain free of major group conflicts over access to limited resources, despite the low income level of the majority of the population.

This panorama of relative macroeconomic stability is one of the factors that helps us understand the stability of Dominican politics and the capacity of the PLD to remain in power, despite the fact that its ascent to the presidency occurred in 2004 in the midst of an economic crisis.

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world (Puddington 2010). According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines in some places offset gains elsewhere in 2009 (Figure I.5). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.⁷ Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g., Iran, Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).

⁷ Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."




Figure I.5. Freedom in the World: Global Gains minus Global Declines from 2003 to 2010, by reporting year

Examining Freedom House’s specific classification of countries (Table I.4), 89 countries continue to belong to the “free” category, representing 46% of the world’s 194 countries as well as 46% of the global population. The number of countries that are considered “partly free” decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of “not free” nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24% of the world’s population, respectively. More specifically, in the “not free” category, more than 2.3 billion individuals reside in countries where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China, makes up 50% of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and among those nations considered not free, nine of the 47 countries in this category scored the lowest possible ratings in both indicators.⁸

Table I.4. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979 - 2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the “electoral democracy” category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.⁹ Figure I.6 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated “partly free” because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current “democracy recession” in the Americas, much as there is a “democracy recession” in the world as a whole.

⁸ See, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

⁹ *Ibid*




Figure I.6. Free, Partly Free and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, the emphasis of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that, over the long term, culture and institutions should be congruous with each other but, over the short term, significant incongruities can emerge (Almond and Verba 1963). For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 1994; Seligson and Booth 1993). So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes might only serve to strengthen anti-democratic political cultures.

Dimensions of Democracy in the Dominican Republic

Since 1998, Freedom House has placed the Dominican Republic among the “free” countries of Latin America. For this organization, a free country has broad political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, an independent civil society and a free press. With respect to these facets, Dominican democracy is classified as an electoral democracy. Freedom House also uses a rating system on a scale from 1 to 14 points, where lower values indicate more democracy. The political rights scale is from 1 to 7 as is the civil liberties scale. Since 2005, the Dominican Republic has received a score of 2 on the civil rights scale and a 2 on the political rights scale for a total score of 4. Given this relatively low score, Freedom House considers the Dominican Republic to be a free country.

Nevertheless, according to Freedom House itself, there are various problems that overshadow the Dominican political system. Corruption has been and continues to be a point of vulnerability. President Leonel Fernández has expressed on various occasions his intent to combat corruption, but the words do not translate into concrete actions that signal a clear change of course. In 2008, Transparency International placed the Dominican Republic 102 of 180 countries ranked on their Corruption Perceptions Index. The politicization and corruption of the justice system and the fact that the legal system does not offer real guarantees to those who lack financial resources present serious problems, as do injustices perpetrated by police officers, which go unpunished. Crime has increased over the last decade, which is a cause for concern, and the prisons are in a poor state of affairs, facing overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. Drug trafficking from South America to the United States and Europe, the mistreatment of Haitian immigrants and violence and discrimination against women are other frequently identified problems.

With this list of questions, we must then ask: How democratic is Dominican democracy? Although Freedom House put the country in the free category because it meets the basic requirements for political competition, it is clear from these problems that Freedom House itself identifies that there is a significant deficit in Dominican democracy, as it pertains to public law, institutions, and democratic rights and responsibilities.

In 2009, the Dominican Republic underwent a process, initiated by President Fernández, of approving a new Constitution, with the goal of modifying various aspects of the old constitutional text. With this end in mind, the President organized a popular consultation and appointed a commission of legal scholars to draft a reform. In the first phase, the opposition PRD opposed the reform if it was not carried out by a Constituent Assembly, a position also held by important civil society organizations. But in mid-2009, Fernández called Miguel Vargas, the 2008 presidential candidate for the PRD, to sign a pact for the reform, which did not yet have enough votes in the *Asamblea Revisora* to ensure a high level of political consensus.

Vargas, who wanted to displace others in the leadership of the PRD, saw the pact with Fernández as a mechanism for promoting his leadership within the party and the country and embraced the electoral reform, which modified the rules regulating reelection to permit more than two terms, which would favor Fernández as well as ex-President Hipólito Mejía in the future. With the pact, Miguel Vargas opened up electoral opportunities for Fernández and Mejía, who under the old Constitution would not have been able to run again for president.

The most controversial issue during the reform process was an article, which established that life begins at conception. Despite protests from women's groups and some sectors of the media, the great majority of legislators voted in favor of this article, propelled by the Catholic Church and other religious denominations. The constitutional reform process clearly revealed that not only had the PLD turned to the right, but the Vargas-led PRD openly took conservative positions with an eye toward winning future elections. In general during the constitutional reform process, the political elite imposed their will on the citizenry, in part because the people never asked for the reform and were never integrated into the process in any significant way and in part because the political parties have considerable power, which was also evidenced in the constitutional reforms of 1994 and 2002.

On May 16, 2010, the Dominican Republic held legislative and municipal elections, which the PRD once again lost to the PLD. These elections were the last mid-term elections, held two years after the presidential election. The new Constitution unified presidential, legislative and municipal elections beginning in 2016. With this goal in mind, the new constitutional text, promulgated on January 26, 2010, established a transitional article, which allows the legislators and municipal officials elected in 2010 to hold six-year terms instead of four. Presidential elections will be held in 2012, as previously planned, and then in 2016 there will be a joint election for President, Congress and the municipalities. The new Constitution also states that beginning in 2020, municipal elections will be held three months before the presidential and legislative elections – municipal elections will be held in February of each election year followed by presidential and legislative contests held concurrently in May.

In the 2010 elections, the PLD won 31 of the 32 seats in the Senate and the remaining seat was obtained by their electoral ally the Social Christian Reform Party (PRSC). The PLD also won 57.3% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 59.3% of the mayors. For the PRD, the explicit goal had been to make advances in 2010 in order to win in 2012, but their progress was small. They obtained more seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and made advances in the number of mayors and alderman from the party compared to 2006, but so did the PLD. The reason is that the PRSC has largely collapsed as an electoral option, and nearly all the contested seats went to the PLD or the PRD. Being without representation in the Senate for the first time since the 1978 transition is a significant setback for the PRD.

Table I.5. Electoral Results for Senators, Deputies and Mayors, by Party, 2002-2010

	SENATORS			DEPUTIES			MAYORS		
	2002	2006	2010	2002	2006	2010	2002	2006	2010
PLD									
#	1	22	31	42	96	105	7	67	92
%	3.1	68.7	96.8	28.1	53.9	57.3	5.6	44.3	59.3
PRD									
#	29	6	0	71	60	75	104	52	57
%	90.6	18.7		47.6	33.7	40.9	83.2	34.4	36.7
PRSC									
#	2	4	1	36	22	3	11	28	4
%	6.2	12.5	3.2	24.1	12.3	1.6	8.8	18.5	2.5
Total									
#	32	32	32	149	178	183	125	151	155
%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Junta Central Electoral

After the elections of May 2010, the Dominican political process focuses on the 2012 presidential contest.

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the *AmericasBarometer* of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought.

The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends” (Bermeo 2003), as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al. (1996) found that no democracy had collapsed where the country’s per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the “inoculation” protection of historically adequate levels of economic development (Córdova and Seligson 2010).

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al. also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries, placing most nations in Przeworski et al.’s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies (Muller and Seligson 1987). Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability (Córdova and Seligson 2009; 2010)? In this round of the *AmericasBarometer* surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-five countries, we have the data to explore that very question.¹⁰

In summary, this chapter examined the impact of the economic crisis on the populations of the surveyed countries, including the Dominican Republic, and discussed how democracy has fared during the economic crisis. We also analyzed trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the *AmericasBarometer* 2010. In Chapter III of this study, we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter, we will look at three main variables, namely at support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction as three key variables that will help us understand how the region as a whole and the Dominican Republic specifically have fared since 2008.

¹⁰ Twenty-six countries were included in the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer, but this report was written before the data from Haiti were available and therefore all the region-wide analyses exclude the Haitian data.

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

The previous chapter presented a general overview of the economic crisis in the world, in the Americas and in the Dominican Republic and summarized the trends in democracy since the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* study was conducted. In this chapter, we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times, with the goal of answering the following questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis?; 2) who did they blame for it?; and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We first present a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where the Dominican Republic is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer* survey.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items specifically for the 2010 round of surveys, and this is the first time that these items have been used in the *AmericasBarometer*. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was a crisis, we ask who is to blame for it. The text of the items is as follows:

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave
- (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o
- (3) No hay crisis económica

CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país? **[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

- (01) El gobierno anterior
- (02) El gobierno actual
- (03) Nosotros, los dominicanos
- (04) Los ricos de nuestro país
- (05) Los problemas de la democracia
- (06) Los países ricos **[Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]**
- (07) El sistema económico del país, o
- (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto
- (77) **[NO LEER]** Otro

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including the 25 countries in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*, we can see in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas (Percentage of Total Population)

Among all the countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica, Nicaragua, the United States and Honduras have the highest percentages with respect to citizens’ perceptions of the crisis. Nevertheless, in all the countries the percentage of the population who perceive a crisis is very high. This is clearly the case in the Dominican Republic where 97% of the population identified a state of crisis.

Gray Boxes in Bar Graphs. For purposes of comparison in Figure II.2 and many others in this report, it should be noted that the bars have a gray box at the end with a black dot in the center. The black dot refers to the point estimate produced by the sample of respondents used in the survey. The gray box indicates the 95% confidence interval around the black dot (the point estimate). This means that 95% of the time a representative sample will produce a point estimate that falls within this confidence interval. In other words, the gray part of the bar indicates the level of certainty we can have in the point estimate. When the gray box is large, there is less certainty concerning the point estimate, and when it is small, there is more certainty. The size of the gray box is determined by the variance in the answers of the respondents on each specific item as well as the size of the sample that falls into the category being analyzed. With more respondents and less variance in answers, the smaller the gray box. Finally, the gray boxes allow us to identify statistically significant differences between groups or between answers to different questions on the same scale. If the gray boxes overlap, this means there is no statistically significant difference. For example, in Figure II.2 there is no statistically significant difference between the Dominican Republic and Colombia because the gray bars overlap, but there is a statistically significant difference between the Dominican Republic and Uruguay or Brazil because the gray boxes do not overlap.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population who Perceived there to be an Economic Crisis, 2010 (Full Sample)

The specific answers in the Dominican Republic about perceptions of the economic crisis (Figure II.3) reveal figures slightly higher than those presented in Figure II.1, which summarizes the entire survey population across the region. In the Dominican case, nearly half the population said that the crisis was very serious, and only 3% said there was no economic crisis.




Figure II.3. Perception of the Economic Crisis in the Dominican Republic, 2010

Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first.




Figure II.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?, 2010 (Percentage of Full Sample)

The majority of citizens who perceive a crisis in the Americas blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Fewer than 10% of Latin Americans who perceive a crisis blame the rich

countries or advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Some people (13%) even blame themselves for the crisis. Figure II.5 displays these results by the major regions in the Americas.

The data indicate that the response patterns are most similar between the United States, Canada and the Caribbean on one hand, and Mexico, Central America, and South America on the other. We can see that in the United States, Canada and the Caribbean people blamed the economic crisis on the current government, while in Mexico, Central and South America people blamed the previous government the most. The U.S. and Canada and the Caribbean also registered a high percentage of people who blamed the citizens themselves for the crisis, 15.8% and 17.4%, respectively, while in Mexico and Central America and South America the percent who blame themselves is 10.4 and 11.8, respectively. In the United States and Canada and the Caribbean, around 5.5% blamed the crisis on wealthy countries, while in Mexico and Central America 9.7% blamed rich countries and in South America 8.2% did. In the United States and Canada and in the Caribbean, 2% and 2.9% blamed democracy for the crisis, while in Mexico and Central America 4.3% did, and in South America 4.9%. The data are clear in the sense that across all the major regions in the Americas a low percentage of people blame democracy for the economic crisis.




Figure II.5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?, Regional Overview, 2010

Figure II.6 displays the answers to this question for the Dominican case. The largest share of respondents blamed the current government. The second highest response was to blame the country's economic system. Few blamed the previous government, although it is worth emphasizing that the current Dominican government is in its second consecutive period – the PLD came to power in 2004 and was reelected in 2008 – six years in government. If by previous government people meant the PRD government that preceded the PLD, then it is clear with these data that despite the economic crisis that affected the country in the last year of the PRD government in 2003 and 2004, the people do not associate the current economic crisis with that government. Finally, few considered rich countries or democracy to be at fault for the economic crisis, 5.5% and 4%, respectively.




Figure II.6. Who is to Blame for the Crisis? D.R., 2010

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to blame for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

Job Loss

The questions used in this section are the following:

OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo.
- (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo.
- (3) No, no perdió su trabajo
- (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo

OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7 below. Although 84% of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7% did lose a job but found a new one, while 8.5% of the respondents lost jobs and did not find a new one. Analyzing the situation of entire households, over 16% reported lost jobs.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. These data appear in Figure II.8. In the Dominican Republic, 38% of those interviewed indicated that someone in their household had lost their job in the past two years. This is one of the highest percentages in the region, only slightly surpassed by Colombia and Mexico, and without statistically significant differences between these three countries.




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost His or Her Job in the Past Two Years by Country, 2010 (Full Sample)

With the more disaggregated information that appears in Figure 11.9, we can see that 14.9% of Dominican respondents said they had lost their job in the past two years and not found another, while 22.4% reported that someone in their household had lost a job in the past two years.




Figure II.9. Percentage of Dominicans who Lost Work, 2010

The data in Figure II.10 show how unemployment has affected distinct sectors of the Dominican population differentially. In the top left quadrant, we can see that men have suffered more job losses than women and that for men it has been more difficult to find new work. In the top right quadrant, 30% of young people lost their job and have not found a new one, while only 17% of those between 45 and 65 years of age have had this experience. This suggests that young people have suffered the effects of unemployment more than older people, because in the survey sample young people constitute only 30% of the sample while the 45 to 65 age-group make up 37%.

The bottom left quadrant shows that the group with secondary education is over-represented among those who lost jobs and have not found another: this group represents 33% of the sample, but make up 42% of those who have lost work and not found a new job. By contrast, the group with only primary education represent 45% of the sample, but they constitute 52% of the people who have lost jobs and been able to find a new one. In this sense, although unemployment has affected all the educational groups, those with secondary education have experienced greater job loss and more difficulty finding new work than those with only primary education. This is likely due to the fact that those with secondary education seek better jobs, which are more difficult to find than those that require few skills or qualifications. The people without any education and those with post-secondary education are proportionally represented across all four employment categories.

Finally, employment by place of residence appears in the bottom right quadrant. The urban population, which constitutes 73% of the sample, is over-represented in the categories of having lost work and not being able to find a new job and of choosing not to work. The rural population, which constitutes 27% of the sample, is slightly over-represented in the category of not having lost work and under-represented in the category of choosing not to work.




Figure II.10. Percentage of Dominicans Who Lost Work, by Sex, Age, Education, and Place of Residence, 2010

Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

- Q10E.** En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]**
- (1) ¿Aumentó? **[Pase a Q11]**
 - (2) ¿Permaneció igual? **[Pase a Q11]**
 - (3) ¿Disminuyó? **[Pase a Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole, which appear in Figure II.11, show that close to half the respondents say that their incomes remained the same, with 27.3% reporting that their incomes had declined and 22.8% saying that they had increased.




Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Change, 2008-2010, in the Americas (Full Sample)

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentages who say that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase in income.

These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas. The Dominican Republic shows the second highest percentage for the region of people who reported declines in household income in the past two years. This figure, combined with the 38% of households where someone lost work, is a sign of economic difficulty, despite relative macroeconomic stability and President Fernández’s argument that the economy was “shielded.”




Figure II.12. Has your household income decreased, remained the same or increased over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population)

Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

Figure II.13 shows that the majority of people living in rural areas across Latin America and the Caribbean reported that their incomes had declined in the past two years.

Moreover, Figure II.13 shows that as family wealth declines, the percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; in other words, the poorest individuals in the region are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income.

While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator, using the same survey items but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, which uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology enables ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.¹

¹ For more information about how this indicator is calculated and about its reliability, see Córdova (2009).




Figure II.13. Percentage of Individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010 (Full Sample)

For the Dominican Republic, the data about declining incomes appears in Figure II.14. In contrast with the regional situation, in the Dominican case, we do not observe a difference between urban and rural populations; both groups had similar proportions who reported lost income.

Concerning the wealth quintiles, the percentages reporting lost household income are higher in every quintile in the Dominican Republic than in the region as a whole. Similarity with the region occurs in the sense that a larger proportion of the poor said they had lost income than the rich. This means that people with the least wealth have suffered the most from the effects of the economic crisis in the region and in the Dominican Republic.




Figure II.14. Percentage of Dominicans who Reported a Decline in Household Income, by Place of Residence and Wealth, 2010

Perception of Personal and National Economic Situations

The *AmericasBarometer* traditionally reports on respondents' perceptions of personal and national economic situations. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

<p>SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?</p> <p>(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima)</p>
<p>SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor</p>
<p>IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?</p> <p>(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima)</p>
<p>IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor</p>

We now couple these items with the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.15, those interviewed across the region who perceive their personal situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced declines in household income in comparison with those who say their personal economic situation is very good. Similar findings hold, albeit less pronounced, for perceptions of the national economy, and they are also valid for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier. For example in Figure II.15, we see that 55% of people who said their economic situation was very bad, also indicated that they had lost income in the past two years. By contrast, only 10.8% of those who said their personal economic situation is very good indicated that their household income had declined. In the next quadrant, 47.1% of respondents who said their personal economic situation is worse than 12 months ago said they had lost income in the past two years. On the other hand, only 18.4% of people who indicated that their personal economic situation was better than 12 months ago said they had seen their household income decline. We can observe this same pattern in the quadrants about perceptions of the national economy.




Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences with Lost Income and their Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010 (Full Sample)

In Figure II.16, we present a replica of the previous graph, but now with respect to the Dominican Republic. Dominicans who perceive their personal economic situation to be very bad have a greater probability (63.9%) of having experienced a decline in household income in the past two years than those whose personal economic situation is very good (14.3%). In retrospective perspective, of those who said their economic situation was worse than before, 55.3% lost income in the past two years, while of those who indicated that their economic situation was better, 27.4% lost income in the past two years. We can observe the same pattern with respect to perceptions of the current and retrospective evaluations of the national economy.




Figure II.16. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences with Lost Income and their Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times, D.R., 2010

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on people's perceptions and experiences during hard times. We examined three questions: 1) how do people perceive the crisis?; 2) who is responsible for the crisis?; and 3) how have the people of the Americas experienced the crisis? The chapter presented a comparative regional analysis of the perceptions and experiences concerning the crisis and also examined the Dominican case.

The majority of the population in the 25 countries surveyed perceives that there is a serious or very serious economic crisis. This is also the case in the Dominican Republic where 97% of the population identified a state of crisis; nearly half the population said that the crisis is very serious, and only 3% said that there was no economic crisis at all.

Among those who perceive there to be an economic crisis, the majority blamed either the current government or the previous one. Less than 10% of Latin Americans said that rich or industrialized countries were responsible for the crisis, contrary to what one might expect in the Latin American context. Many people even blamed themselves for the economic crisis. In the United States, Canada and the Caribbean the most blame was placed on the current government, while in Mexico, Central and South America, the plurality blamed the previous government. The largest share of the Dominican population blamed the current government. The second most common response was to blame the country's economic system. Few blamed the previous government. If the previous government is interpreted to be the PRD, then it is clear from these figures that despite the economic crisis that affected the country during the last year of the PRD government in 2003 and 2004, the people do not associate the current economic crisis with that government. Finally, few blamed wealthy countries or democracy as the cause of the problems, 5.5% and 4.0%, respectively.

For all the countries surveyed, 74% of the entire population reported that they had not lost a job, 7.3% lost their job but found a new one, while 8.5% had lost work and not been able to find a new job. Analyzing respondents' entire households, more than 16% said someone in their household had lost a job. In the Dominican Republic, 22.4% of those interviewed indicated that someone in their household had lost a job in the past two years, and 38% of the

Dominican respondents said that they or someone in their household had lost a job. This is one of the highest percentages in the region.

Unemployment has affected different sectors of the Dominican population in distinct ways. Men have suffered more than women from lost employment, and men have found it more difficult to find new work. Young people have faced the challenge of unemployment at higher rates than older respondents. Although unemployment has affected people at all levels of education, those with secondary education are more likely to have lost work and been unable to find another job than people with only primary education. In the Dominican case, the urban population has encountered more lost work than rural respondents.

The results across the Americas show that close to half the respondents have seen their incomes remain constant, with almost 30% reporting declining incomes and about one-fifth saying that their household income had increased. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic has the second highest percentage of people who said their households had experienced declines in income over the past two years. This data, combined with the 38% of households where someone lost a job, points to economic difficulties, despite relative macroeconomic stability. The economy does not appear to have been “shielded” as President Fernández had indicated at the outset of the crisis.

Distinct from the regional situation, in the Dominican case there are not differences in lost incomes between the urban and rural populations; both groups reported losing income in similar proportions. Considering wealth quintiles, the percentages in each quintile who reported lost household income were greater in the Dominican Republic than in the rest of the region. We observe similarity with the rest of the region in the sense that poorer people were more likely to indicate that they had seen their incomes decline. This means that people with the fewest resources have suffered the effects of the crisis the most, both in the region as a whole and in the Dominican Republic.

Respondents across the entire region who perceived their personal economic situation as very bad tended to have a higher probability of having experienced a decline in household incomes than those who considered their personal economic situation to be very good. Similar results, although less pronounced, were observed with relation to perceptions of the national economic situation as well as perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to the year before. These regional patterns also manifest in the Dominican case.

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008, considering their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during these hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges for democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.¹ Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy while others show how poor national economic indicators may affect individuals' support for key components of democracy (Córdova and Seligson 2010; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Przeworski et al. 2000).

Given the severity of the most recent economic recession in many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent on Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the *AmericasBarometer* 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and paying special attention to the case of the Dominican Republic.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures, that of subjective well-being, which is commonly referred to "life satisfaction," or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness (Bruno and Stutzer 2002; Inglehart and Dieter-Klingemann 2000). On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness (Graham 2009; Graham, Lora and IADB 2009; Graham and Pettinato 2001).

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are the citizens of the Americas now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

¹ But see the work of Bermeo (2003), who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it.

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del cero al diez. El cero es la grada más baja y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es la grada más alta y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué grada de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja la grada que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98	
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible					NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué grada diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that, on average, there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average, that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. We observe that Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians and Paraguayans, on average, say that they are more satisfied with their lives in 2010 than in 2008. By contrast, Jamaicans reported that their happiness in 2010 was markedly lower than in 2008. Other countries in which average happiness declared for 2010 is less than in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras.² Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction. For the case of the Dominican Republic, we do not observe a difference in satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, despite the economic crisis.

² To clarify, we are not comparing the 2008 and 2010 surveys, rather we are comparing the two questions from the 2010 survey that asked about current happiness in 2010 and past happiness in 2008. We do not have a panel design in this survey, and therefore, we do not know what the reported levels of happiness would have been for our respondents in 2008.




Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008, by country

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to identify those who expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of their population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Uruguay, in contrast, less than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just less than one-half expressed an increase. The data in this graph show that in the Dominican Republic, the percentage of people who indicated more and less satisfaction is nearly equal, 40.1 and 40.4, respectively. In this sense, the economic crisis does not appear to have had a significant effect in changing the balance concerning life satisfaction. But the Dominican Republic is located among the bottom half of countries concerning life satisfaction; of the 25 countries surveyed. It occupies position number 8 in terms of declines in satisfaction.




Figure III.2. Perceived Changes in Life Satisfaction in 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes related to a respondent’s evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year. Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3, that there is a systematic link to respondents’ retrospective perceptions of their personal economic situation. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.

The Dominican case also shows that there is a systematic link with the respondent’s perception of their retrospective personal economic situation. Of the respondents who perceived that their personal economic situation had worsened since a year ago, 57.9% reported a decline in life satisfaction.




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Retrospective Perception of Personal Economic Situation, by country in 2010

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to the one that they reported possessing two years earlier.³ To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex, education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods,

³ We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.⁴ Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (country fixed effects) – the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter.

Regression Analysis. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The impact of each of those variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which, if located to the right of the vertical “0” line, indicates a positive contribution and, if to the left of the “0” line, a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”). The complete results for each regression figure are presented in tables that appear at the end of each chapter.

The results show that wealth does not have a significant effect on life satisfaction. We see that the demographic characteristics of education, age and sex matter to some degree. Females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents and those with more education are just the opposite, namely they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were 2008. This result concerning age, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and, in most cases, far stronger influence on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their personal economic situation have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s evaluation that the country is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

We also observe a strong positive impact for *the perception of government economic performance*.⁵ Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.

⁴ For more information on this indicator, see Córdova (2009).

⁵ This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondents’ evaluations of the government’s effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

Figure III.5 shows the determinants of changes in perceived life satisfaction for the Dominican Republic. The regression analysis here is also based on the variable created from the two questions LS6 and LS6A, which is obtained by subtracting LS6A from LS6 in order to obtain change in satisfaction between the moment the survey was taken and two years earlier. In this regression analysis, the factors that are negatively related to change in life satisfaction are declines in household income and negative retrospective evaluations of one's personal economic situation. On the other hand, positive perceptions of one's current personal economic situation and being a woman are positively associated with change in life satisfaction. The other factors considered in the regression do not have statistically significant effects, positive or negative, on change in life satisfaction. In contrast with the region, here the perception of government's economic performance has no statistically significant influence on life satisfaction.




Figure III.5. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, D.R., 2010

The statistically significant relationships are illustrated in Figure III.6. We see that not having experienced declines in household income and having a favorable view of one's personal economic situation are associated with higher levels of satisfaction. The average life satisfaction among people who did not lose income is 57.6 points on a scale from 0 to 100, while the average only reaches 46.3 points among those whose income declined. Those who feel that their economic situation is better now than two years ago have a higher level of satisfaction (an average of 61.1 points) than those who feel worse (45.9). The relationship is linear in the case of perceptions of one's current economic situation. The average life satisfaction among those who evaluate the economic situation as very good is 63.6 points, compared to only 34.6 points among those who consider their economic situation to be very bad. Finally, women have higher levels of life satisfaction than men, 55.0 and 50.8 points respectively.⁶




Figure III.6. Impact of Declines in Income, Perceptions of One's Current and Retrospective Economic Situation and Sex on Life Satisfaction, D.R., 2010

Support for Democracy

This round of the *AmericasBarometer* provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.7.⁷ The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bars show the average levels found in 2008.⁸ The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. The countries that experienced significant declines in support for democracy in 2010 when compared to 2008 are Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Canada and the Dominican Republic. The sharpest declines were in Canada and Venezuela. On the other hand, Chile is the only country where support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010,

⁶ The data in Figure III.6 are based on question LS6 because it facilitates the graphic presentation of the findings, and the bivariate relationships are essentially the same if we use LS6 or LS6-LS6A.

⁷ Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4**. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

⁸ Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname), we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.

at least as measured using this general “Churchillian” item that has been so widely used in comparative studies of democracy.




Figure III.7. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis, which appears in Figure III.8.

Figure III.8 shows that age and education are the most important predictors of support for democracy – older respondents and those with more education are more supportive of democracy. This result concerning education is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas and, once again, reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways for building a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture.

We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this again here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”), we find that higher wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 2008).

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.8 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who think there is a very serious economic crisis and who live in households where someone has lost a job have only slightly less support for democracy. But perceptions of economy play no significant role. And on the other hand, there is a weak *positive* relationship between reduction in income and support for democracy.

But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.




Figure III.8. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy.

This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the Americas.

The regression analysis of the factors that shape support for democracy in the Dominican Republic, which appears in Figure III.9, shows that the variables pertaining to the economic crisis, household income, unemployment, national and personal economic evaluations, and wealth have no significant effects on support for democracy. The following variables have a positive effect on support for democracy: a more positive perception of the government's economic performance, having more education, being older and being a man.




Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010




Figure III.10. Relationship between Perceptions of the Government's Economic Performance and Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010

Figures III.10 and III.11 illustrate the statistically significant relationships for the Dominican case at the bivariate level. People who have positive perceptions of the government's economic performance tend to support democracy more. Figure III.10 shows the values on the scale measuring evaluations of the government's economic performance in relationship with support for democracy (on the vertical axis). People who evaluate the government

more positively demonstrate more support for democracy, with a difference of 34 and 45.9 points on the scale measuring perceptions of government economic performance. In Figure III.11, support for democracy is located on the horizontal axis, and the data show that older people express more support for democracy, with a clear linear relationship that ranges from an average of 63.3 among young people and 75.5 points among the oldest people in the sample. Men slightly surpass women in support for democracy.




Figure III.11. Relationships of Age and Sex with Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010

Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of a country’s government (i.e. system support) is a key requirement for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data, John Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson (2008) found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that government performance in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central.⁹ Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the *AmericasBarometer* data, but we look at it in this year’s report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years, LAPOP has utilized an index of system support based in five variables, each measured on a scale from 1 to 7, but converted to the traditional LAPOP scale from 0 to 100 for a more clear understanding of the results:

⁹ System support is an index created from five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter 5 in this study (See Booth and Seligson 2009).

- B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)
- B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)?
- B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político (país)?
- B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?
- B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)?




Figure III.12. Average System Support in the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.12, some countries experienced important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the subsequent elections, support soared from a level less than 46.4 points before the coup to 60.4 points. It should be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was conducted a month after the inauguration of the new administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new governments usually receive. Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay and Nicaragua also experienced statistically significant increases in support for the system despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, only Canada, Belize and the Dominican Republic suffered statistically

significant, albeit quantitatively small, declines in system support from 2008 to 2010. The other countries did not experience statistically significant changes.

Turning now to the determinants of system support, perception of a very serious crisis is negatively correlated with system support among Latin Americans, as illustrated in Figure III.13. Additionally, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who have pessimistic views of their family and national finances. Older people and women had significantly less system support, but the effect is quite small. People in households that experienced unemployment express less system support than people whose households did not confront unemployment. *The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance.* Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views about how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.




Figure III.13. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

The evidence that many countries did not in fact perceive improved government performance appears in Figure III.14. Note that in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, the United States, Paraguay and Peru significant increases were found in terms of people’s evaluations of government’s economic performance. On the other hand, only in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Jamaica and Belize were there significant declines between the surveys of 2008 and 2010.




Figure III.14. Perception of Government Economic Performance, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010

Figure III.15 provides direct evidence at the national level that improvements in perceptions of government performance affect system support. Here, country averages are presented for both the change in average perceptions of government performance and changes in system support from 2008 to 2010. The results are very clear: the greater the change in satisfaction with governments’ management of the economy, the greater the change in system support. The blue points refer to a country’s average change in evaluations of the government’s economic performance from 2008 to 2010 (horizontal axis) and the change in system support between 2008 and 2010 (vertical axis). In countries like the Dominican Republic, which appear below the slope line in the figure, support for the system has declined more than expected given evaluations of government’s economic performance. In countries that appear above the blue line like Guatemala, system support has remained stable despite people registering worse evaluations of government performance.




Figure III.15. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

The result found at the national level was also found at the regional level, as shown in Figure III.16. Here we examine the same relationship between change in perceptions of government performance and change in system support, but use the subnational strata. For example, in Bolivia each department is a separate sample stratum, whereas in other countries regions are used as the strata. Details of the sample design can be found in Appendix I. What we see is that even at the sub-national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as being more positive, average system support increases.




Figure III.16. Changes in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Regional Level Analysis

In the Dominican case, Figure III.17 presents the regression analysis of the determinants of political system support. The variables that are positively associated with system support are: positive evaluations of the

government's economic performance, satisfaction with the performance of the president, positive perceptions of one's personal economic situation, and being a woman. Having been the victim of corruption is negatively associated with system support.




Figure III.17. Determinants of System Support in the Dominican Republic, 2010

Figure III.18 provides bivariate illustrations of the statistically significant relationships identified in the multiple regression. People who have positive perceptions of government performance show an average system support of 72.5 points, compared to only 38.3 points in the case of those who have a very negative perception. People who have positive assessments of their personal economic situation demonstrate a level of system support at 58.3 points, compared to only 48.3 points for those with negative personal economic assessments. Those who have been victims of corruption have a level of support at 46.1 points, in contrast to 55.6 points among those who have not been victims. High satisfaction with the president's performance produces an average level of system support at 68.8 points, but those who are dissatisfied with the president average 35.9 points on the scale.




Figure III.18. The Impact of Perceptions of Economic Performance, Assessments of one's Economic Situation, Corruption Victimization and Satisfaction with the President on System Support in the Dominican Republic, 2010

We now move to considering the determinants of satisfaction with the way that democracy works.

Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy, in principle, as the best form of government but, in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered. The question thus becomes: Are Latin American citizens less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy when they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the *AmericasBarometer* suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III.19 shows that in various countries the average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially affected by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 to 44.6 points on our 0-100 scale, a statistically significant decline. Along the same lines, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were strongly felt, there has been a statistically significant decline in levels of satisfaction with democracy, from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period. Other statistically significant decays occurred in the Dominican Republic, Canada and Guatemala.

On the other hand, there were some countries where satisfaction increased in a pronounced way. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009 (Seligson and Booth 2009). In this country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8 points on the 0-100 scale. The largest change occurred in Paraguay, a country at the bottom of democracy satisfaction in 2008 with a score of 30.2, which saw satisfaction with democracy increase to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April 2008 election, which brought an end to the

decades-long period of dominant party rule. Without a doubt, this was a factor that promoted an important increase in democracy satisfaction in the 2010 survey.

An important increase occurred in El Salvador, where, like Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional) won power for the first time in 15 years. In Uruguay, Panama, Bolivia and Chile, we also observe significant increases in satisfaction with democracy. In many countries, however, there were no statistically significant changes in democracy satisfaction, despite the serious economic crisis that left its imprint worldwide.




Figure III.19. Satisfaction with Democracy, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010

With respect to the factors that determine satisfaction with democracy, we find that the perception of the economic crisis as very serious and declines in income are negatively correlated with satisfaction.

As observed in Figure III.20, we also see that negative current and retrospective evaluations of personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older people have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while wealthier and more educated individuals and those who live in urban areas show lower levels. Yet these effects are quite small. More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on

satisfaction with democracy comes from *perceptions of government economic performance in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president.*

Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views about how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its smaller impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the presidents' performance during hard economic times are also highly important.




Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

Figure III.21 displays the multivariate regression analyzing determinants of satisfaction with democracy in the Dominican Republic. Some economic variables have a statistically significant impact, but not so much as in the regional analysis presented in Figure III.20. In the Dominican case, the significant variables with a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy are: positive perceptions of the government's economic performance and positive perceptions of national and personal economic situations. Variables with negative effects are education and living in an urban area. The variables about the economic crisis did not have statistically significant effects.




Figure III.21. Determinants of Satisfaction with the Democracy, D.R., 2010

Figure III.22 illustrates some of the variables that had statistically significant impacts in the multivariate regression. Positive perceptions of the government’s economic performance considerably increase the average satisfaction with democracy from 41.8 points among those who have a negative perception to 65 points among those who have favorable perceptions. Education has the inverse effect: people with advanced education are more dissatisfied with democracy than those with lower levels of education. Positive evaluations of national and personal economic situations produce levels of satisfaction with democracy of 58.9 and 66.3 points respectively, while negative evaluations produce satisfaction levels of only 43 and 42.8 points respectively.




Figure III.22. The Impact of Perceptions of Government Economic Performance, Education and Evaluations of National and Personal Economic Situations on Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2010

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America’s history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens’ support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.¹⁰

The comparisons between 2008 and 2010 are shown in Figure III.23. We do not have comparative data for all countries since the two countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica and Panama) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, in Costa Rica and Panama, we did ask about a take-over by police forces, in order to create a hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.




Figure III.23. Justification of a Military (or Police) Coup in the Americas, by Country, 2008 vs. 2010

¹⁰ The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were: (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified; and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100 = a military coup is justified and 0 = a military coup is not justified.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries and especially low in Argentina, Panama, Suriname, Uruguay and Costa Rica. On our 0-100 scale, no country scored over 50 in 2010 and only three countries surpassed 50 in 2008. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, and, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal takeovers of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they see no reason for it; or, it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras. We also note that coup support increased significantly between 2008 and 2010 only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala. Coup support also declined significantly in 2010 from 2008 levels in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana. In the case of the Dominican Republic, there is no significant difference between 2008 and 2010, with neither an increase nor a decline in support for coups d'état.

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, we ask if support for military coups is higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed. We see in Figure III.24 that, unfortunately, this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among the Latin Americans interviewed. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups. This suggests that the citizens in the Americas do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk. Older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding and consistent with previous results is the positive effect of satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for authoritarian alternatives. Perceptions of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.




Figure III.24. Determinants of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Full Sample)

As in the region, a variable that makes the Dominican population more inclined to support a coup is the perception that the economic crisis is very serious, but other economic variables do not affect coup support in this same way in the Dominican Republic. Age and education are also associated with coup support across the region and in the Dominican Republic: more educated and older people are less inclined to support a coup d'état. It is worth emphasizing here the value of the historical memory of authoritarian times, which younger people did not experience. Also, satisfaction with the current president's performance has a significant effect in both the region and in the Dominican case: more satisfaction, less likelihood of supporting a coup. People who experienced a

decline in household income are less likely to support a coup in the Dominican case, although this variable does not have a significant effect in the regional analysis. This finding concerning the Dominican Republic is surprising, because we would expect those who lose income to feel more dissatisfied and therefore be more willing to support a coup. Wealth has a significant effect across the region but not in the Dominican Republic.




Figure III.25. Determinants of Support for Military Coups, D.R., 2010

Figures III.26 and III.27 illustrate the variables that had statistically significant effects on support for military coups in the Dominican case. The largest numerical contrast we observe is for age. Young people are more inclined than any other group to support a coup d'état. This may simply be a product of not being aware of the effects of a coup, or it could suggest resurgence in a political culture that is more in tune with the *golpista* practices of the past. Support for a coup is also high in the case of people who consider the government's performance to be very poor and among those who perceive a very bad national economic situation, averaging 45.4 and 41.6 points, respectively.




Figure III.26. Influence of Attitudes about the Crisis, Declines in Income, Loss of Work and Age on Support for a Military Coup, D.R., 2010




Figure III.27. Impact of Satisfaction with the President's Performance and Perceptions of the National Economic Situation on Support for a Military Coup, D.R., 2010

Conclusion

In Part I of this report, which contains three chapters, we presented an overview of the economic crisis at the global and regional levels and for the Dominican Republic. We also presented a description of the comparison between countries on key economic variables in the 2010 *AméricasBarometer*. The main objective was to determine who had been most affected by the crisis and how the crisis impacted their attitudes toward democracy, as tough

economic times have frequently been linked to challenges for democracy. The data show that the economic crisis affected the entire region, but not all the countries were touched in the same way.

In close to half the countries, respondents said that on average they were happier than they had been in 2008. In the case of the Dominican Republic, we do not see a difference in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, despite the economic crisis. Viewed from another angle, in the Dominican Republic the percentage of people who said they were more and less satisfied is similar, 40.1 and 40.4, respectively. In this sense, the economic crisis does not appear to have had a significant effect in pushing the balance markedly toward dissatisfaction with life. But the Dominican Republic is located among the bottom half of countries in terms of life satisfaction; of the 25 countries surveyed, it occupies 8th place in dissatisfaction.

In nearly all the countries, satisfaction with life declines when people say that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated. The Dominican case reveals a systematic link with the respondent's perception of their personal retrospective economic situation. Among those who perceived a decline in life satisfaction, 57.9% have a negative retrospective assessment of their personal economic situation. In regional-level regression analysis of changes in life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, the factor with the most important effect was perceptions of government economic performance. This means that even when people perceive that they are not as well off economically, if they think that government is managing the economic situation well, their life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy during difficult times. In the Dominican case, however, perceptions of the government's economic performance do not have a statistically significant impact. The most relevant factors for life satisfaction in the Dominican Republic are: positive perceptions of their current personal economic situation and being a woman. On the other hand, declining household income and negative retrospective evaluations of their personal economic situation are associated with lower levels of life satisfaction.

This round of the *AmericasBarometer* provides evidence that despite the economic crisis, support for democracy has not diminished in the region, even though some countries experienced declines. Countries that experienced significant decays in support for democracy in 2010 when compared with 2008 are Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Canada, and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, Chile is the only country where support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010. In regression analysis that incorporated data from the entire region, education level is a very important predictor of the level of support for democracy. This result is consistent with previous studies about democracy in the Americas and reinforces the idea that education is one of the most effective ways to construct a political culture supportive of democracy. We also found that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than rural residents, a result also found in previous studies. Women frequently demonstrate less support for democracy, and we corroborate this finding here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there are controversies about the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*, when including the entire region in the analysis (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, using country fixed effects), we find that increased wealth is positively associated with greater support for democracy.

The economic crisis only has a limited impact in reducing support for democracy. In households where someone lost a job, there was a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic evaluations do not play an important role in a general sense. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* relationship between lost income and greater support for democracy. But much more important is the effect of perceptions of the government's economic management. As with life satisfaction, when people perceive the government to be managing the economy well, they support democracy more.

In general, there is no trend toward a declining support for democracy, nor do individual perceptions of and experiences during the crisis play important roles in reducing democratic support. This is encouraging news that suggests a certain resilience in the region's democracies. The findings also suggest that the democratic recession observed by Freedom House does not appear to have affected the public's commitment to democracy in most of the region. In the Dominican case, the variables related to the economic crisis do not have a statistically significant

effect on support for democracy. More positive perceptions of government's economic performance, education, age and being a man had statistically significant positive relationships with support for democracy.

Some countries experienced changes in political system support. Canada, Belize and the Dominican Republic suffered statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) declines in system support between 2008 and 2010. Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay and Nicaragua experienced increases in system support. The other countries had levels of system support that remained statistically unchanged between 2008 and 2010. We found that the perception that the economic crisis is very serious correlated negatively with system support, which is measured with questions in the B-series as detailed above. The greatest positive impact of system support, as was the case with support for democracy, came from perceptions of the government's economic performance. This finding suggests once again that the impact of the economic crisis may be mitigated by governments that are viewed as effective in responding to the challenge. Nevertheless, in some countries, like the Dominican Republic, support for the system has declined more than we would expect given evaluations of government performance.

With respect to satisfaction with democracy, in some countries satisfaction increased and in others it decreased in relation to 2008 levels. The Dominican Republic is among those where satisfaction declined. Here, however, perceptions of the economic crisis and declines in household income do not have adverse effects on satisfaction with democracy, contrary to what we find in the region-wide analysis. But negative evaluations of national and personal economic situations do result in lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in the Dominican Republic. Perceptions of the government's economic performance is the factor with the greatest influence on satisfaction with democracy in both the region and the Dominican Republic. Education level is also a factor associated with dissatisfaction with democracy among Dominicans: more education, less satisfaction.

One extreme reaction in hard times is for the military to take power through a coup d'état. Historically, in Latin America coups have often been attributed to economic crisis, even though the military has also had to abandon power when economic crises exploded during their governments. The results of the 2010 *AmericasBarometer* show that support for coups is very low in the majority of the surveyed countries, despite the economic difficulties facing the countries. However, unemployment and perceptions that the economic crisis is very serious are both associated with support for military coups. In addition, the people who have negative perceptions of the national economic situation give greater support to possible coups. This suggests that Latin Americans take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish governments, even if it could jeopardize democracy. Older, wealthier and more educated people tend to be less supportive of the idea of military coups. An interesting finding that is consistent with previous results is the positive effect that satisfaction with the sitting president has on democratic values. Those who rated the president positively were less supportive of coups, which indicated the important role played by the president in reducing support for authoritarian alternatives. The perception of the government's economic effectiveness did not have a significant effect on attitudes concerning military coups.

Similar to regional trends, a variable that makes the Dominican population more inclined to support a coup is the perception that the economic crisis is very serious, but other economic variables are not associated with coup attitudes in this same way. Age and education have effects at the regional level and in the Dominican case: older and more education people are less likely to support coups d'état. It is also important to emphasize here the value of historical memory from authoritarian periods, which younger respondents did not experience. Also, the president's performance had a statistically significant relationship in the Dominican case: more satisfaction is correlated with less support for a coup. People who experienced declines in household incomes are, in the Dominican case, less likely to support a coup, but this variable did not have a statistically significant effect in the region. This finding from the Dominican Republic is surprising because we would typically expect those who lost income to feel more discontented and, therefore, more disposed to support a coup d'état.

Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter III

Additional Table III.1. Analysis of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.025*	(4.58)
Edad	-0.067*	(-10.98)
Urbano	-0.007	(-0.94)
Nivel educativo	-0.015*	(-2.09)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.013	(-1.90)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.027*	(3.25)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.001	(-0.09)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.020*	(-2.94)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.115*	(-14.37)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.151*	(-18.48)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.048*	(-7.52)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.104*	(-15.70)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.023*	(-3.54)
No hay crisis económica	-0.005	(-0.81)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	(6.20)
Guatemala	0.023*	(3.12)
El Salvador	-0.014*	(-2.08)
Honduras	-0.007	(-0.80)
Nicaragua	-0.013	(-1.40)
Costa Rica	-0.015	(-1.57)
Panamá	0.008	(0.96)
Colombia	0.036*	(5.16)
Ecuador	0.018	(1.92)
Bolivia	0.013	(1.14)
Perú	0.025*	(3.30)
Paraguay	0.027*	(2.99)
Chile	-0.002	(-0.20)
Uruguay	0.026*	(3.17)
Brasil	0.023*	(2.38)
Venezuela	0.006	(0.67)
Argentina	0.040*	(5.37)
República Dominicana	0.018*	(2.36)
Jamaica	-0.022*	(-2.54)
Guyana	0.043*	(3.94)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	(1.03)
Belice	-0.007	(-0.67)
Surinam	0.029*	(3.91)
Constante	0.003	(0.50)
R-cuadrado = 0.122		
Número de observaciones = 32699		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.2. Analysis of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.066*	(2.53)
Edad	-0.053	(-1.68)
Urbano	-0.037	(-1.35)
Educación	-0.015	(-0.53)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.017	(-0.50)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.033	(0.95)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.049	(1.37)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.003	(-0.08)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.096*	(2.51)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.226*	(-6.28)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.039	(-1.31)
Disminución en el ingreso del hogar	-0.098*	(-3.98)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.013	(-0.42)
No hay crisis económica	-0.001	(-0.06)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.011	(-0.26)
Constante	0.000	(0.00)
R-cuadrado = 0.129		
N. de casos = 1380		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.3. Analysis of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0.029*	(-5.09)
Edad	0.112*	(17.93)
Urbano	0.024*	(2.71)
Nivel educativo	0.080*	(10.41)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.044*	(5.84)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.036*	(4.40)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.006	(0.81)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.009	(-1.30)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	0.002	(0.22)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.010	(-1.47)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.017*	(-2.61)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.012	(1.81)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.026*	(-3.57)
No hay crisis económica	-0.011	(-1.59)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	(6.01)
Guatemala	-0.010	(-1.06)
El Salvador	-0.020*	(-2.42)
Honduras	-0.015	(-1.39)
Nicaragua	0.048*	(4.43)
Costa Rica	0.090*	(9.01)
Panamá	0.052*	(5.20)
Colombia	0.025*	(2.63)
Ecuador	0.004	(0.34)
Bolivia	0.014	(1.02)
Perú	-0.047*	(-4.77)
Paraguay	-0.018	(-1.67)
Chile	0.038*	(3.75)
Uruguay	0.100*	(10.71)
Brasil	0.046*	(2.60)
Venezuela	0.041*	(3.26)
Argentina	0.096*	(7.63)
República Dominicana	0.014	(1.66)
Jamaica	0.029*	(2.52)
Guyana	0.049*	(3.96)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.029*	(2.86)
Belice	0.052*	(4.91)
Surinam	0.073*	(8.55)
Constante	0.006	(0.75)
R-cuadrado = 0.070		
N. de casos = 32182		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.4. Analysis of Support for Democracy in D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0.071*	(-2.78)
Edad	0.251*	(8.18)
Urbano	-0.022	(-0.86)
Educación	0.201*	(6.08)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.020	(-0.77)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	-0.033	(-1.10)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.045	(1.26)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	0.011	(0.35)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.009	(0.24)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.005	(-0.14)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0.005	(0.15)
Disminución en el ingreso del hogar	0.008	(0.26)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.027	(-0.92)
No hay crisis económica	-0.024	(-0.99)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.136*	(4.42)
Constante	0.016	(0.66)
R-cuadrado = 0.082		
N. de casos = 1330		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.5. Analysis of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.022*	(4.62)
Edad	0.036*	(6.44)
Urbano	-0.036*	(-4.66)
Nivel educativo	-0.023*	(-3.38)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	(-0.91)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.134*	(17.87)
Víctima de la corrupción	-0.047*	(-7.69)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.058*	(-8.54)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.005	(-0.74)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.052*	(-7.62)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.008	(-1.35)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.020*	(-3.62)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.003	(-0.54)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.019*	(-2.84)
No hay crisis económica	0.006	(0.90)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.387*	(48.04)
Guatemala	-0.042*	(-5.57)
El Salvador	-0.032*	(-4.57)
Honduras	-0.009	(-1.39)
Nicaragua	-0.039*	(-5.23)
Costa Rica	0.018*	(2.17)
Panamá	-0.036*	(-3.67)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.16)
Ecuador	-0.146*	(-15.52)
Bolivia	-0.095*	(-8.08)
Perú	-0.061*	(-8.07)
Paraguay	-0.087*	(-11.05)
Chile	-0.119*	(-13.84)
Uruguay	-0.012	(-1.51)
Brasil	-0.156*	(-12.93)
Venezuela	-0.073*	(-8.62)
Argentina	-0.062*	(-5.91)
República Dominicana	-0.040*	(-5.79)
Jamaica	-0.014	(-1.44)
Guyana	-0.041*	(-3.74)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.098*	(-12.26)
Belice	0.006	(0.61)
Surinam	-0.009	(-1.16)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.73)
R-cuadrado = 0.308		
N. de casos = 32961		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.6. Analysis of System Support in the D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.076*	(3.74)
Edad	-0.005	(-0.19)
Urbano	-0.039	(-1.64)
Educación	-0.039	(-1.54)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.048	(-1.69)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.127*	(3.87)
Víctima de la corrupción	-0.071*	(-2.87)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.041	(1.48)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.031	(-1.25)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.043*	(2.00)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	0.002	(0.08)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0.002	(0.08)
Disminución en el ingreso del hogar	0.002	(0.10)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.032	(-1.15)
No hay crisis económica	-0.022	(-0.99)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.413*	(15.72)
Constante	0.004	(0.16)
R-cuadrado = 0.342		
N. de casos= 1392		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.7. Analysis of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.001	(0.20)
Edad	0.018*	(3.07)
Urbano	-0.024*	(-3.19)
Nivel educativo	-0.037*	(-5.56)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.005	(-0.73)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.207*	(26.47)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.080*	(-11.75)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.021*	(-3.18)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.067*	(-9.91)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.025*	(-4.23)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.009	(-1.66)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.018*	(-2.87)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.045*	(-7.27)
No hay crisis económica	0.018*	(3.08)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.183*	(24.34)
Guatemala	0.038*	(4.55)
El Salvador	0.046*	(5.86)
Honduras	0.073*	(7.84)
Nicaragua	0.039*	(4.51)
Costa Rica	0.096*	(9.67)
Panamá	0.083*	(9.79)
Colombia	0.022*	(2.56)
Ecuador	0.021*	(1.98)
Bolivia	0.073*	(6.32)
Perú	0.013	(1.58)
Paraguay	0.019*	(2.53)
Chile	0.005	(0.51)
Uruguay	0.080*	(9.75)
Brasil	0.020	(1.53)
Venezuela	0.009	(1.05)
Argentina	0.039*	(3.86)
República Dominicana	0.039*	(4.76)
Jamaica	0.070*	(6.43)
Guyana	-0.031*	(-3.22)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	(0.94)
Belice	0.075*	(7.55)
Surinam	0.035*	(4.05)
Constante	0.002	(0.30)
R-cuadrado = 0.233		
N.de casos = 32403		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.8. Analysis of Satisfaction with Democracy in D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	-0.032	(-1.22)
Edad	-0.008	(-0.27)
Urbano	-0.047*	(-2.01)
Educación	-0.077*	(-2.37)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.036	(-1.28)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	0.064	(1.68)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.080*	(3.24)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.075*	(2.50)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	-0.035	(-1.48)
Disminución en el ingreso del hogar	-0.028	(-1.07)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.019	(0.72)
No hay crisis económica	-0.005	(-0.24)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.213*	(6.13)
Constante	0.006	(0.26)
R-cuadrado = 0.122		
N. de casos = 1375		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.9. Analysis of Support for a Military Coup in the Americas, 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.009	(1.66)
Edad	-0.116*	(-17.97)
Urbano	-0.005	(-0.50)
Nivel educativo	-0.071*	(-9.33)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.027*	(-3.74)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	-0.016*	(-2.00)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.052*	(6.80)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	0.016*	(2.23)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.011	(-1.52)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.023*	(-3.32)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0.062*	(10.09)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.007	(-0.96)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.054*	(7.73)
No hay crisis económica	-0.014	(-1.73)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.013	(-1.58)
Guatemala	-0.010	(-0.98)
El Salvador	-0.031*	(-3.39)
Honduras	-0.095*	(-9.70)
Nicaragua	-0.066*	(-6.73)
Costa Rica	-0.081*	(-7.04)
Panamá	-0.101*	(-12.30)
Colombia	-0.062*	(-6.37)
Ecuador	-0.047*	(-3.34)
Bolivia	-0.065*	(-4.60)
Perú	0.008	(0.77)
Paraguay	-0.048*	(-4.92)
Chile	-0.074*	(-7.00)
Uruguay	-0.065*	(-6.23)
Brasil	-0.090*	(-5.87)
Venezuela	-0.070*	(-5.15)
Argentina	-0.132*	(-12.00)
República Dominicana	-0.063*	(-6.34)
Jamaica	-0.067*	(-5.43)
Guyana	-0.032*	(-2.16)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.056*	(-5.56)
Belice	-0.003	(-0.33)
Surinam	-0.093*	(-9.42)
Constante	0.011	(1.25)
R-cuadrado = 0.070		
N.de casos = 32376		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table III.10. Analysis of Support for a Military Coup in D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Mujer	0.038	(1.54)
Edad	-0.268*	(-9.73)
Urbano	-0.044	(-1.38)
Educación	-0.087*	(-2.68)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.018	(-0.52)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	-0.102*	(-3.28)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.089*	(-2.58)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	0.010	(0.35)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.036	(-1.32)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.049*	(-2.04)
Hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo	0.039	(1.39)
Disminución en el ingreso del hogar	-0.078*	(-2.48)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.072*	(2.47)
No hay crisis económica	-0.024	(-1.16)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.041	(1.21)
Constante	0.016	(0.43)
R-cuadrado = 0.117		
N. de casos = 1373		
* p<0.05		

Parte II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime and Corruption

Introduction

In Part I of this study, we presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *who are those most likely affected by the crisis?* We presented a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower democratic support. In Part II of this study, we attempt to test key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis are used as additional control or predictor variables in this part.

Theoretical Background about Crime and Insecurity

Crime is a problem in Latin America, and the increase in crime coincided with the democratization process of the past 30 years. Although democracy is not the cause of crime, the air of freedom that brought democracy is sometimes associated with lack of respect for the law. Greater crime can be linked to democratization when democracy is conceived as a system of little-regulation, or what Emile Durkheim called a state of anomie. When people feel insecure, they can take refuge in authoritarian solutions that prevent the consolidation of democracy, including cases of vigilantism outside the margins of the law.

As indicated in the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* report, it is very difficult to accurately measure crime. Official figures of crime collected and published by governments are based on cases that people have reported to the police (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito, y el Grupo del Banco Mundial sobre América Latina y el Caribe 2007: 3-4), but as demonstrated in previous *AmericasBarometers*, among those who claim to be victims of crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the incident to the authorities. On the other hand, official data may show exaggerated levels of crime in countries where crime is lower and lower crime rates where the level is higher. This complicates comparisons between different jurisdictions, as the exact rate of unreported crimes varies between countries. Moreover, in countries where the criminal justice system has greater trust, a lower percentage of crimes go unreported.

This study uses data from nationwide *AmericasBarometer* surveys, which, according to the United Nations and the World Bank study cited above, are the most reliable data source. But it is worth pointing out that despite the benefits, survey data face major limitations for several reasons, as explained in the 2008 *Barometer* report, the source upon which this explanation is based. First, victims of murder cannot be interviewed. Second, allegations of murder or other crimes in the survey reported by family members usually lead to an exaggeration of statistics on crime, in part because often there are only indirect data, in part because the definition of "family" varies from one individual to another (ranging from nuclear family to extended family), and in part because there is double counting, as members of an extended family in the same cluster of the sample may report the same crime. Third, the effectiveness of emergency medical services (EMS) at a given location may determine whether an assault ends in murder or injury. In areas where EMS systems are advanced, the victims of shootings or other assaults do not die, while in areas where such services are limited, rates of death from such injuries are higher. Fourth, the concentration or dispersion of crime is an issue. For example, in the 1970s in the U.S., there was a growing crime rate, but this increase was mainly an urban phenomenon related to gangs and drugs. Rural areas in the United States suffered no such increases. The national average, however, was strongly influenced by the events in urban areas. All this shows that accurately recording crime is difficult, and through surveys we seek only an approximate understanding of the problem and its magnitude.

The central questions guiding this study of crime are as follows: Are crime and the fear that it creates a threat to governance and democratic stability? What has a greater influence, the crime itself or the fear that crime fosters in

the victims and the general population? The victims are always fewer than the segments of the population who could be frightened by crime, hence the need to collect information on both victimization and perceptions of insecurity in the general population.

Previous research shows that public attitudes about the role of government in the economy are shaped by perceptions of insecurity. People who identify crime as a serious problem are more inclined to demand concrete action from the government to tackle problems such as poverty and inequality, which are generally associated with increased crime (Morgan and Kelly, forthcoming). This is an example of how perceptions of insecurity, rather than victimization itself, affect the attitudes and opinions of the population on issues relating to governance and democracy.

Perception of Insecurity and Crime

This chapter addresses two main topics: the perception of insecurity among the population and crime victimization. We want to know who is more likely to perceive insecurity and the impact of this feeling on support for democracy. The chapter also seeks to record the level of crime victimization in the surveyed population, to know who is more vulnerable to being victims of crime and the impact of victimization on support for democracy. Previous surveys of the *AmericasBarometer* have found that younger and better educated people report more crime victimization. This study, once again, seeks to identify such tendencies. It also seeks to understand the relationship between level of victimization and perceptions of crime. The 2008 *Barometer* showed that the Dominican Republic did not rank among countries with high reports of victimization. However, it was among the countries with the highest perceptions of insecurity. The 2010 data are shown below.

Perceptions of Insecurity

Crime rates have been increasing in the Dominican Republic over the last decade, and although statistics are not very accurate for the reasons set forth above, the number of homicides doubled between 2001 and 2005. The population has felt the adverse effects of this crime and, consequently, the level of dissatisfaction with this problem, as recorded in surveys, has increased. In 2006, there were even various social protests demanding that the government contain the rise in crime after the murder of a young student in Santiago for stealing a cell phone. In the past two years, there have been other relevant cases. Some are linked to drug trafficking and others affect ordinary citizens on the streets. The feeling of fear in the population is clear and the sense of insecurity has increased consistently as evidenced by 1994-2004 DEMOS and 2006 LAPOP survey data. The 2008 *Barometer* showed a reduction in the levels of insecurity, and the 2010 *Barometer* repeated several questions asked in previous surveys with the goal of maintaining comparative data on the subject. The four questions in the box below are the focus of our analysis of perceptions of insecurity.

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR
DOMAOJ11B Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años? (1) Más seguro (2) Igual (3) Menos seguro (88) NS (98) NR
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio (vecindad) está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

Figure IV.1 was created with data from question **AOJ11**. We built a scale from 0 to 100 with the potential responses, and on the scale the Dominican Republic scored 46.5 points. This places it among those countries in the region where perceptions of crime are highest (higher scores mean more insecurity). The lowest perceptions of insecurity are found in Canada and the United States and the highest in Peru and Argentina.




Figure IV.1. Perceptions of Insecurity, by Country, 2010

Figure IV.2 shows comparative data from the past four years in the Dominican Republic. Perceived insecurity declined between 2006 and 2008, but increased in 2010 compared to 2008. It is possible that the crime control programs that were established after 2006, including "Barrio Seguro," had a positive effect in reducing fear of crime and, therefore, there was less sense of insecurity in 2008 than in 2006. But it seems that the sometimes dramatic cases of crime, which continue to occur frequently and which draw national attention, have again increased the feeling of insecurity in the country.




Figure IV.2. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2010




Figure IV.3. Retrospective Assessment of Insecurity, 1994-2010

Figure IV.3 contains the longest trajectory of information on perceptions of crime in the Dominican Republic. Question **DOMAOJ11B** was in the DEMOS surveys and the *AmericasBarometer* has continued using it. The perception of insecurity as measured by this question reveals that, in 1997, the Dominican Republic exceeded 50% of respondents indicating that they felt less safe than five years ago, and in no subsequent year have crime perceptions fallen below this level. Moreover, in 2004, 2006 and 2010, more than 70% felt insecure, that is, the vast majority of the population felt less safe than five years prior. But as can be seen, in 2008, there was an odd situation with a significant decline in the proportion of people who felt more insecure than in the past. As previously indicated, it is possible that the 2008 figure was the result of the extensive campaign of "Barrio Seguro," an aid and policing program aimed at controlling crime in popular sector neighborhoods. But the

continuation of crimes after these programs were implemented may have once again increased the feeling of insecurity among a large segment of the Dominican population.

Figure IV.4 is based on question **AOJ11A**: And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think the level of crime we have now represents a threat to our future welfare? Keep in mind that the general question is not about future crime, but asks how the current crime rate, at the time of the survey, might affect future well-being. The answers were transformed into a scale ranging from 0 to 100, and the Dominican Republic scored 90 points on the scale. That is, many people think the current level of crime threatens the country's future. All countries have a high average on this question, which means that in all countries surveyed there is a perception that the current level of crime poses a threat for the future. Even in Canada, which recorded the lowest score, the average exceeds 50 points.




Figure IV.4. Perception that Crime Presents a Threat to the Country's Future Well-being, 2010

Data for the Dominican Republic from 2006-2010 in Figure IV.5 show that, after a decline in 2008 to 84.3 points on this scale of the future threat posed by crime, the average increased again in 2010 to 90 points. Changes from one survey year to the next are statistically significant, suggesting that the perceptions of insecurity within the Dominican population have varied significantly in relatively short, two-year periods. This variability coupled with the fact that perceptions of insecurity are high, indicate that crime is an important issue in Dominican society.




Figure IV.5. Perception that Crime Presents a Threat to Future Well-being in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2010

Figure IV.6 is based on question **AOJ17**. To what extent would you say your neighborhood is affected by gangs? The answers were transformed into a 0-100 scale, and the Dominican Republic scored 45.9 points, among the highest in the regional comparison, indicating that many Dominicans believe that gangs are a problem in their neighborhood. The average on this question for 2006 was 39.6 points, which is to say the perception that the neighborhood is affected by gangs has slightly increased, although not statistically significantly.




Figure IV.6. Is your neighborhood affected by gangs?, by Country, 2010

The previous graphs about perceptions of insecurity in the Dominican Republic show that such perceptions have increased in 2010 compared to 2008 on the four questions used to assess public safety. In addition, the Dominican Republic has greater perceived insecurity in relation to many other countries in the region. Both factors point to a worsening of the crime problem from the perspective of the public.

Crime Victimization

Measuring Crime Victimization

The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* incorporated new questions to measure crime victimization with greater precision and modified the general question about victimization to introduce examples of criminal acts. In previous surveys respondents were asked: have you been a victim of crime in the last 12 months? In the 2010 round, the questions used are the following:

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?
 (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencia sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física
 (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física
 (03) Robo con arma
 (04) Agresión física sin robo
 (05) Violación o asalto sexual
 (06) Secuestro
 (07) Daño a la propiedad
 (08) Robo de la casa
 (10) Extorsión
 (11) Otro

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) En su hogar
 (2) En este barrio
 (3) En este municipio
 (4) En otro municipio
 (5) En otro país

VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?
 (1) Sí (2) No

The left side of Figure IV.7 is based on the question VIC1EXT. The data indicate that 16.5% of the surveyed population reported being the victim of a crime in the past 12 months. The right side of the figure combines questions VIC1EXT and VIC1HOGAR and indicates whether the respondent was the only victim, another member of their household, both, or neither. With this information, the level of victimization increases to 27.3% as it includes cases of crime victimization in the household, even if the victim is not the interviewee.

Figure IV.8 specifies the location and type of crime of which respondents were victims, and as the data show, most crimes were committed at home or around the home, as 61.4% of respondents responded that their home or neighborhood was where the crime occurred. The most common crime is robbery without a weapon and without physical aggression, although there is a diverse range of incidents.




Figure IV.7. Individual and Household Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic, 2010




Figure IV.8. Place and Type of Dominicans' Experiences with Crime Victimization, 2010

Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is not among the countries with the highest levels of crime victimization, unlike the perceived threat of crime, which was presented earlier. With a 16.5% level of victimization, the Dominican Republic is placed closer to the lowest level of victimization recorded in Guyana 9% than it is to the highest level of 31.1% in Peru.




Figure IV.9. Percent who were Crime Victims, by Country, 2010

Crime Victimization over Time

Despite the change in the way question VIC1EXT was asked in 2010, no statistically significant difference was observed in the 2010 data as compared to the 2008 or 2006 surveys. As illustrated in Figure IV.10, the largest increase in crime victimization occurred from 2004 to 2006, but, since 2006, the percentage has remained relatively stable, with the changes not achieving statistical significance. This leads to the conclusion that crime itself does not appear to have increased significantly in the Dominican Republic since 2006, but the perception of insecurity is high, although it fell slightly in 2008 only to increase again in 2010.




Figure IV.10. Crime Victimization in D.R., 2004-2010

Who is most likely to be a Crime Victim?

There are certain groups of people in society who are more vulnerable to becoming victims of crime. Determining who is most affected is important for establishing more effective measures to combat crime. Figure IV.11 presents the results of a regression analysis of question VIC1EXT, which shows the social groups most vulnerable to becoming victims of criminal acts. The bars in the graph indicate that the people most likely to report having been crime victims are as follows: those in the south of the country, those with a more negative assessment of their economic situation, the young, the educated, and those living in larger cities (the variable is coded from larger to smaller).




Figure IV.11. Who is most likely to be a crime victim in the Dominican Republic?, 2010

Figure IV.12 illustrates the key, statistically significant variables from the regression analysis: education level, region of residence and age. People with more education, those in south of the country and metropolitan Santo Domingo, and the young are more likely to report being victims of crime. Only 8.6% of people with no schooling reported being crime victims, compared to 23.9% of people with higher education. While 23.3% of people in the south of the country reported being victims of crime, only 13.1% in the north did. Of persons aged 66 or older, 9.3% reported having been victims of crime, while 20.2% of people between 26 and 35 years of age reported victimization. The data on the effect of educational level and age in reporting victimization reflect the same trends as in the 2008 *Barometer*.




Figure IV.12. Crime Victimization, by Education, Region and Age, D.R., 2010

The data presented in this section show that the level of crime victimization as measured by the percentage of people self-reporting has not changed substantially in the Dominican Republic from 2006 or 2008 to 2010. The country also does not rank among those with the highest reported crime victimization rates in the region. However, the perception of insecurity in the Dominican Republic is high in regional comparison, and it also increased in 2010 compared to 2008. This gap between the facts reported and people’s perception should draw the attention of policymakers in the area of security, because while actual victimization is essential and is the most damaging from the human point of view, perceived insecurity is negative from the social point of view because it creates distrust in other people and in institutions.

Corruption

Theoretical Background of Corruption

In countries with strong clientelist traditions, as in Latin America, corruption has occupied the attention of many analysts and civil society organizations interested in promoting public transparency. The issue is controversial and the problem is difficult to combat. Creating transparency in governments and societies where corruption has been an essential component of the economic and political context is complex. Governments are reluctant to change, as are the segments of the population who benefit from the corruption. On the other hand, without significant progress in fighting corruption it is very difficult to advance the democratization process. The reason is that corruption prevents the institutionalization of the state and impedes more efficient and equitable distribution of public resources.

The analysis of political culture and democracy, which is the goal of LAPOP in conducting the *AmericasBarometer* studies, compels the inclusion of this theme because of its relevance. Corruption is not only a very uneven and ineffective mechanism for distributing wealth, but it also tends to produce political irritation in segments of the population that do not benefit from the corrupt system. Several economists have noted the negative impact of corruption on growth and income distribution because it transfers public resources to private hands, resulting in lower quality services and less efficiency. It has also been shown that corruption has a negative effect on democracy by eroding public trust in the legitimacy of public institutions. There is a growing appreciation of the harmful effects of corruption on economic development and democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

Measuring Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were originally tested in Nicaragua (Seligson 1999; Seligson 1997) and have been refined and improved in various studies since then. Because definitions of corruption vary from culture to culture, to avoid ambiguity, the survey items specifically mention corrupt practices, such as: In the last year have you had to pay a bribe to a government officer? Similar questions are asked about bribes in the local government, public schools, the workplace, courts, health centers and other places. This series offers two types of information. On the one hand, we can determine where corruption is more common and, on the other, victimization scales can be built that distinguish between respondents who had encountered corrupt practices in only one environment, and those who have been victims of corruption in many institutional settings. As in studies of crime victimization, it is assumed that being a victim once or having had multiple experiences with corruption have different implications.

Our study of corruption focuses on several aspects: 1) the quantity of corruption victims, which is a dichotomous variable because it measures whether the respondents have been victims of corruption or not; 2) the number of times a person has been victimized by corruption; 3) the institutions where corruption occurs; 4) any complaints made by the population about corruption; and 5) perceptions about the extent of corruption. These issues are addressed with several questions.

The complete series of questions related to corruption is as follows:

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98

Two other questions measured respondents' attitudes about what constitutes corruption and justification of corruption:

DOMDC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su influencia o cuña para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un macuteo/soborno? (0) No (1) Sí

Public opinion polls are an appropriate tool to measure citizen views regarding corruption and the level of corruption in everyday life. This type of study seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to measure the incidence of corruption in society, both in the public perception and in its practical effects. As was stated in the 2008 report, when estimating corruption with survey data, it is necessary to point out that, despite its usefulness, there are important sources of potential error. For example, the respondent may be mistaken in reporting specific incidents they cannot remember exactly, or corrupt actions may not be identified as such by the respondent. This might happen in the case of paying of bribes to obtain a service. Often this practice is so widespread and accepted in society that it is not seen as a form of corruption. Therefore, studies of the incidence and cost of corruption serve more as a first step in understanding the problem and accurately measuring its occurrence and impact.

In the Dominican state there is a long tradition of corruption, including onerous contracts, payment of commissions to officials, and bribery by the public to obtain or facilitate a public service. Moreover, corruption scandals appear quite often in the press but are rarely investigated and almost never punished.

Perceptions of Corruption

Surveys of Dominican political culture have consistently shown that people perceive corruption to be high. The same is true in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*. In regional comparison of question EXC7, the Dominican Republic is above average with a corruption perception of 77.6 points, as shown in Figure IV.13.

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR
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


Figure IV.13. Perceptions of Corruption by Country, 2010

In the comparing Dominican surveys over time, average perceptions of corruption remain high and similar from 2004 to 2010. More specifically, the data in Figure IV.14 show that perceived corruption declined from 2004 to 2008, but increased slightly in 2010 compared to 2008. Given that the debate about corruption is always strong in the country, it is important to pay attention to these numbers, because there has been a small setback in 2010 compared to the downward trend from 2004 to 2008, when the general perception of corruption fell 5.5 points, from 80 to 74.5 points. The increase from 2008 to 2010 is 3.1 points, but this change is not statistically significant.




Figure IV.14. Dominican Perceptions of Corruption, 2004-2010

An important aspect in assessing perceptions of corruption is to better understand what people consider to be acts of corruption and to examine if actions that could be categorized as corrupt are seen as justified or not. The graphs below display the results of two questions that seek to capture the feelings of respondents about whether bribery is justified and if nepotism is corrupt. For the justification of bribery, question **EXC18** was used and, for nepotism, we used question **DOMDC15**.

EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un macuteo/soborno?

(0) No (1) Sí

DOMDC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su influencia o cuña para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado
- (2) Es corrupto pero justificado
- (3) No es corrupto

Figure IV.15 shows the percentage of people who responded positively to question EXC18, indicating that they believe it is sometimes justified to pay a bribe. The Dominican Republic ranks among the highest percentages of respondents who justify paying bribes (17.7%), although there are several countries with higher percentages. The question is very general, but gives an indication of the level of acceptance of bribes. On the other hand, in comparison to recent years, there has been a decrease in the percentage of people saying that paying bribes is acceptable, and the decline from 2008 to 2010 is statistically significant.




Figure IV.15. Percent of Latin Americans who think that how Things are Justifies Paying a Bribe, by Country, 2010




Figure IV.16. Percent of Dominicans who think that How Things are Justifies Paying a Bribe, 2006-2010

Figure IV.17 shows that the Dominican population has a high tolerance for nepotism, that is, the intervention of a politician to benefit a family member, which is the situation described in question DOMDC13. In the Dominican Republic, 75.6% of respondents considered this sort of action to not be corrupt or corrupt but justifiable. When we use this question to create a scale of accepting nepotism that ranges from 0 to 100, the average rejection of this practice is 38.4 (higher values in Figure IV.18 mean greater rejection of nepotism). In comparison to data from past years, rejection of nepotism has decreased: the average on the scale dropped from 50.2 points in 2008 to 38.4 points in 2010. In other words, there is now more endorsement of nepotism in Dominican society than in previous years. This is a negative piece of evidence that suggests lack of progress in the fight against corruption.




Figure IV.17. Dominican Attitudes about Politicians' Corrupt Behavior, 2010




Figure IV.18. It is Corrupt for an Important Politician to Help a Family Member Obtain a Public Sector Job, D.R., 2006-2010

Corruption Victimization

Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

As discussed in the 2008 *Barometer* and in this report at the beginning of this section on corruption, it is difficult from a methodological point of view to accurately measure corruption. Unlike crime, where official figures are still incomplete or rigged and people more clearly identify criminal acts, in the case of corruption, public figures are virtually nonexistent, and many people are inclined to pay bribes and not see it as corruption. For these reasons, corruption data are not reported by public bodies nor gathered easily in public opinion polls. In addition, estimates of corruption derived using survey data contain important sources of error when the informant does not remember or when actions that would be considered corrupt are not identified as such by the respondent.

With these qualifications in mind, we next show the data on corruption victimization. The data in Figure IV.19 were developed with the series of questions shown earlier. The percentages reflect the number of people who have been involved in at least one incident of corruption from the following list: requests to bribe a policeman, a civil servant, someone in the workplace, in the municipal government, in a public hospital or public school. A total of seven questions correspond to the seven situations outlined: **EXC2, EXC6, EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15 and EXC16.**

In the Dominican Republic, 17.5% report having been victims of at least one of the above acts of corruption. With this percentage, the country is toward the middle of the countries surveyed. Countries with the least corruption victimization are Canada, Chile and the United States, and those with the highest victimization rates are Mexico, Bolivia and Peru. The three countries with the lowest victimization have the highest levels of economic development and institutional strength in the region.




Figure IV.19. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Corruption Victimization over Time

Figure IV.20 shows the number of times that respondents reported having been victims of corruption in 2010. A high percentage did not report being a victim, and of those who did report being a victim, the majority indicated that it occurred only once.

Figure IV.21 shows a downward trend in corruption victimization from 2004 to 2008, but a slight increase in 2010 compared to 2008, although this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure IV.20. Index of Total Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010




Figure IV.21. Percentage of the Population that has been the Victim of Corruption, D.R., 2004-2010

Who is most likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

Figure IV.22 shows the results of a regression analysis of corruption victimization. These data show who is more likely to report being victims of corruption. Variables with a statistically significant effect are the number of children, age, gender and education. People with more children, those who are younger, men, and more educated people are the most likely to report being a corruption victim. The other variables in the regression analysis did not show a statistically significant association with victimization.




Figure IV.22. Who is more likely to be a corruption victim in the Dominican Republic?, 2010

Figure IV.23 illustrates the significant effects from the regression analysis. The bars that correspond to younger people show a higher percentage of victimization; this is also the case for the bars representing men and those with higher education. Men are twice as likely as women to report corruption victimization, and people with higher education are three times more likely than those without any schooling. The reason may be that people with more education have more resources and, therefore, may receive more requests for bribes than the poor, or it could be that people with more education are more willing to report incidents of corruption when they were the victims.




Figure IV.23. Corruption Victimization, by Age, Sex and Education, D.R., 2010

The Influence of Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy

The empirical relationships between crime and democracy and corruption and democracy have been studied extensively in recent years because evidence suggests that victims of crime and corruption are less likely to trust public institutions. Using data from LAPOP surveys, various authors have studied the subject in several Latin American countries, pointing to the ways in which victimization by crime and corruptions erode public trust in the legitimacy of the political system.

The belief that democracy is the best form of government may decrease if a large portion of citizens are victims of crime or if crime generates a collective fear. Under these conditions, citizens may become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital. Additionally, victimization by crime and fear of crime have impacts in terms of loss of trust in political institutions, especially in the police and the judicial system. Evidence is accumulating, which argues that the factor that shapes these attitudes is not only victimization but also the state of insecurity that people feel. Even in countries with high homicide rates, the likelihood that a person is killed or is the victim of a serious crime is relatively low. Therefore, the impact of victimization may be less than the fear of crime that affects a much larger portion of the population.

With respect to corruption, there has been a long debate in the Dominican Republic. Corruption was instrumental in the process of capital accumulation during the authoritarian regimes, and, since the democratic transition in 1978, social groups and politicians have demanded that the problem be addressed, while others have focused on self-enrichment when they enter the government. It is known that public corruption devalues the functioning of government because it violates the popular charge for leaders to ensure the common good and represent the interests of all citizens. Despite this, Dominican governments have been reluctant to take up the banner of controlling corruption, preferring to leave this resource available to politicians, even though they know the discontent that it causes in large segments of the population who are excluded from the unlawful distribution.

Without a doubt, corruption is a serious problem for economic development and the functioning of Dominican democracy because it prevents or delays the process of modernization and institutionalization. But low social investment, inefficient bureaucracy, high unemployment and limited social mobility represent optimal conditions for the existence and spread of corruption.

The results of various surveys show that corruption that is directly felt by the population has a significant impact on two components of support for stable democracy: the legitimacy of basic political institutions and interpersonal trust. Corruption reduces confidence in both in statistically significant ways. This means that there is a negative statistical relationship between being a victim of corruption and institutional support for the political system and trust in other people.

Figure IV.24 displays the results of a regression analysis of support for the political system in relation to crime, insecurity and corruption. The bars indicate that people who have more political interest, greater satisfaction with the president's performance, residents of small towns, and women express the greatest support for the system. On the other hand, lower system support is expressed by those who perceive more corruption, those who have been the victim of corruption, those who feel more insecure, and victims of crime. The other variables in the regression analysis are not statistically significant.




Figure IV.24. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support, D.R., 2010

Figures IV.25 and IV.26 illustrate statistically significant relationships from the above regression analysis. Satisfaction with the performance of the president is particularly important in increasing the level of system support. People who consider the president’s performance very good show an average system support of 68.8 points, compared to only 35.9 points in the case of those who evaluate the president’s performance as very poor. In other words, there is a variation of 32.9 points, while in the case of the other variables, differences between the extremes are around 12 points or less.

This suggests that support for the president is the key factor shaping the level of support for the political system. Perceived corruption, corruption victimization, perceived insecurity, and crime victimization clearly tilt the balance in the negative direction of less support for the system. People who perceive a lot of corruption and insecurity register a level of system support that is about 10 points less than those who do not have these perceptions. The difference, though statistically significant, is less than 10 points in the case of victims of corruption or crime in relation to those who have not been victims. The data are clear on the negative impact that crime, the perception of insecurity, corruption, and the perception of corruption have on support for the political system.




Figure IV.25. Impact of Political Interest, Satisfaction with the President's Performance, Perceptions of Insecurity and Perceptions of Corruption on System Support, D.R., 2010




Figure IV.26. Impact of Place of Residence, Sex, Crime Victimization and Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010

The Influence of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Civic and Political Participation

One of the pillars of democracy is citizen participation, and studies about social capital indicate that a key factor in participation is interpersonal trust (Putnam 1993, 1995). Crime, insecurity, and corruption can generate distrust among people, which is why it is important to assess their impact on civic participation. The idea of social capital is that the organization of citizenship in a democracy is crucial for communities to establish and achieve their individual and collective goals. It argues that a higher level of social organization leads to greater social capital formation, a more effective political community, improved public policies, and therefore greater trust in political

institutions and legitimacy of the democratic system. By contrast, lower levels of social capital undermine citizens' ability to achieve their political goals, and therefore, produce less effective and reliable government.

The *AmericasBarometer* includes a set of questions to estimate the level of citizen participation in the population, which are analyzed in Chapter VI. In this section the aim is only to assess whether crime, insecurity and corruption have an impact on levels of citizen participation. From the set of questions asked in the survey, we use two (**CP5** and **CP8**) to build an index of community participation. This variable is used in a regression analysis shown in Figure IV.27. Immediately afterwards, a similar analysis is reported with respect to voter turnout based on the question **VB2**.

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4
Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.				
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4

The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Civic Participation

The values on the community participation scale range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater community participation (the specifics of this scale appear in Chapter VI). Regression analysis shows that interest in politics, place of residence, age, gender, educational level, racial identification and family job loss have a statistically significant effect on community participation. Specifically, people who participate most express more interest in politics, live in small towns or rural areas, are older, are men, have higher education levels, identify themselves racially as indigenous or mulattoes, and had a member of their household who lost a job. Women and those not working by choice reported participating less. As for the main variables in this section on crime and corruption, the regression analysis shows that the only factor having a statistically significant impact on community participation is being a victim of corruption, with these people reporting more participation. Being a victim of crime, the perception of insecurity and the perception of corruption do not have statistically significant effects.




Figure IV.27. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Community Participation, D.R., 2010

The data in Figures IV.28 and IV.29 depict the relationship between statistically significant variables. Interest in politics is the variable that has the biggest impact on the level of community participation: those who have no interest recorded an average of 18 points on the scale of community participation, while those who claim to have a lot of interest recorded an average of 31.1 points on the participation scale.




Figure IV.28. Impact of Corruption Victimization, Having a Member of the Household Lose a Job, Race, and Sex on Community Participation, D.R., 2010




Figure IV.29. Impact of Education, Age, Political Interest, and Size of Place of Residence on Community Participation, D.R., 2010

The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Electoral Participation

Voting is considered a basic form of citizen political participation in a democracy. Because of this, we are interested in assessing whether crime and corruption have a negative impact on electoral participation. In this analysis, we use **VB2**.

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2008?
 (1) Sí votó
 (2) No votó

The regression analysis shown in Figure IV.30 indicates that the factors that encourage greater voter participation are: interest in politics, living in a small town, being older, female, and greater level of schooling. The factors that have a statistically significant negative impact are positive perceptions of family economic situation and blaming the previous government for the economic crisis. The other variables are not statistically significant, and it is worth noting that none of the variables related to crime or corruption were found to have a significant impact on turnout.




Figure IV.30. Determinants of Electoral Participation, D.R., 2010

Figure IV.31 illustrates the statistically significant effects on electoral participation. In the upper left quadrant, the positive impact of interest in politics is clear: those who are interested in politics are more likely to vote. Age shows a significant difference between the youngest and the rest, but not between any of the groups over 25 years of age. This is probably because many people in the 18 to 25 category were not entitled to vote in the 2008 presidential election. The right quadrant shows that people with worse household economic situations vote more.




Figure IV.31. Impact of Political Interest, Age and Personal Economic Situation on Electoral Participation, D.R., 2010

Support for the Rule of Law and the Influence of Crime and Insecurity

The 2008 *AmericasBarometer* found that crime has a significant negative effect on institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. People who reported being the victim of a criminal act express less belief in the legitimacy of political institutions and less interpersonal trust (Morgan and Espinal 2009). We also found a relationship between personal insecurity and distrust in political institutions: the greater the insecurity, the more distrust. That is, the feeling of personal insecurity appears to discredit political institutions because people feel vulnerable and do not find support or a solution in the institutional framework, like the police or judicial system. This report examines the impact of crime and insecurity on the support for the rule of law with the question **AOJ8**.

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?
 (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR

Figure IV.32 shows that 67.3% of the population surveyed in 2010 felt that the law should always be respected, even to capture criminals. This percentage is significantly higher than the 59.4% in 2006, although similar to the 66.3% in 2008.




Figure IV.32. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, D.R., 2010

Figure IV.33 indicates that the Dominican Republic ranks among those countries with the highest percentage of people who said that one should always respect the law.




Figure IV.33. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Impact of Crime Victimization and the Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law

Figure IV.34 shows the regression analysis of support for the rule of law. The bars on the positive side indicate factors that increase the likelihood of support for the rule of law. These factors include the region where the respondent lives and their age. Being the victim of a crime or feeling unsafe have no statistically significant impacts on support for the rule of law. In other words, people who reported being the victim of a crime and feeling more insecure are no more or less likely than the rest of the population to support the rule of law with respect to question **AOJ8**.




Figure IV.34. Determinants of Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, D.R., 2010

Figure IV.35 illustrates the statistically significant relationships in the regression. There is more support for the rule of law in the eastern region than in metropolitan Santo Domingo, and the elderly show more support for the rule of law.




Figure IV.35. Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, by Region and Age, D.R., 2010

Conclusion

In summary, the feeling of fear in the Dominican population is high and the sense of insecurity has increased, as revealed by data from surveys in the past two decades. After increasing consistently between 1994 and 2006, perceived insecurity declined in 2008, but increased again in 2010. On the other hand, the data indicate that 16.5% of the population surveyed in 2010 reported being the victim of a crime in the last 12 months, but, when data is included for people who were victims of crime in the home of each respondent, the percentage of victims in the Dominican case increased to 27.3%. Most crimes were committed in the respondent's home or neighborhood and the most common crime was robbery without a weapon and without physical aggression. The social groups most likely to report criminal acts in this survey were those in the south, those who have a more negative assessment of their economic situation, younger people, the better educated, and those living in larger cities.

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic does not appear among the countries with the highest level of crime victimization, but is among the highest in perceptions of insecurity. Perceived insecurity declined between 2006 and 2008 from 50.7 to 39.5 points, but increased in 2010 to 46.5 points. On the item measuring the perception that crime is a threat to the country, the Dominican Republic has the second-highest average in the region, with 90 points, and recorded the fifth-highest average on the question of whether the respondent's neighborhood is affected by gangs, with an average of 45.9 points.

In general, the data show that perceptions of insecurity in the Dominican Republic increased in 2010 compared to 2008, based on questions that assess public safety. In addition, the Dominican Republic ranks high relative to other countries in the region on perceptions of insecurity. Both factors point to a worsening of the crime problem from the perspective of public perceptions.

It is possible that the crime control programs that were established after 2006, including "*Barrio Seguro*," had a positive effect in reducing fear of crime, and therefore, there was less sense of insecurity in 2008 than in 2006. But it seems that the cases of sometimes dramatic crimes that continue happening in the country have generated an increased sense of insecurity.

Regarding corruption, 17.5% of those interviewed in the Dominican Republic said they had been victims of at least one act of corruption. This percentage places the Dominican Republic around the average of countries surveyed; however, the population has a high perception of corruption. In regional comparison of the perception of corruption, the Dominican Republic is above average at 77.6 points and, comparing the Dominican surveys over time, the average remains high and similar from 2004 to 2010.

A high percentage of the Dominican population justified paying a bribe, and the country in 2010 was among the highest compared to other countries in the percentage of people willing to make justifications (17.7%), although this percentage was higher in 2006 and 2008, with 22.2% and 24.8%, respectively. The Dominican population has a high level of tolerance for nepotism, as measured by the intervention of a politician to benefit a family member: 75.6% of respondents believed that such an action is not corruption or, if it is corrupt, viewed it as justifiable. When the answers to these questions are converted to a scale measuring rejection of nepotism, the average rejection of this practice in 2010 is 38.4 points. In comparison to recent years, the rejection of nepotism decreased from 50.2 points in 2008 to 38.4 points in 2010. That is, there is now higher endorsement of nepotism than before.

Regarding the effect of crime and corruption on political system support, we found that those who have been crime victims, have higher perceptions of insecurity, have been corruption victims, and have higher perceptions of corruption expressed statistically significantly less support for the system. The data show that people who perceive a lot of corruption and insecurity recorded an average system support about 10 points less than those who do not have those perceptions. The differences between those who have been victims of crime and corruption and those who have not, though statistically significant, are less than 10 points.

On the other hand, the variables that positively impact system support are interest in politics, satisfaction with the performance of the president, being female, and living in a small town. But satisfaction with the performance of the

president is particularly important in increasing the level of system support. People, who view the president's performance as very good have system support that averages 68.8 points, compared to only 35.9 points in the case of those with poor presidential performance evaluations. In other words, there is a variation of 32.9 points, while in the case of the other variables, differences between the extremes are around 12 points or less. This suggests that support for the president is the key factor that shapes support for the political system.

With respect to community participation, regression analysis showed that the only factor relating to crime or corruption that has a statistically significant impact is corruption victimization, with corruption victims reporting greater community participation. The reason could be that these individuals interact more intensely with public institutions, or are more aware of the culture of bribery and tend to report more incidents, or that their experiences of corruption victimization encourage more participation in an effort to confront it. Crime victimization, the perception of insecurity and the perception of corruption do not have statistically significant effects on community participation. The regression analysis shows that interest in politics, place of residence, age, gender, education, racial identification and loss of employment in the household have statistically significant effects on community participation. Specifically, those who participate most express more interest in politics, live in small towns or rural areas, are older, are men, have higher levels of education, identify themselves as indigenous or mulatto, and indicated that a family member had lost his or her job. Women and those not working by choice participated less.

Voter turnout is considered a basic form of citizens' political participation in a democracy. So we assessed whether crime and corruption have a negative impact on the level of electoral participation. Regression analysis indicates that the factors that encourage greater voter participation are the following: interest in politics, living in a small town, older age, being female, and education. Factors with statistically significant negative effects are positive perceptions of the family economic situation and blaming the previous government for the economic crisis. The other variables are not statistically significant, including the variables related to crime and corruption.

Finally, with regard to support for the rule of law, 67.3% said they respected the law even with regard to catching criminals, and the Dominican Republic is placed among the countries with the highest percentage with respect for the law. Regression analysis showed that being a victim of a crime or feeling insecure had no statistically significant impact on support for the rule of law. In other words, people who reported being the victim of a crime and who feel more insecure are no more likely than the rest of the population to indicate support for violating the law in order to apprehend criminals.

Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter IV

Additional Table IV.1. Analysis of Crime Victimization, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Educación	0.295*	(3.49)
Mujer	-0.042	(-0.60)
Edad	-0.196*	(-2.64)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.037	(0.40)
Indio	-0.028	(-0.25)
Mulato	-0.115	(-1.15)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.008	(0.10)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.342*	(-3.22)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.198*	(-2.74)
Región Norte	0.097	(0.91)
Región Este	0.035	(0.22)
Región Sur	0.366*	(4.35)
Constante	-1.722*	(-20.80)
F = 5.86		
N. de casos = 1465		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IV.2. Analysis of Corruption Victimization, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.100	(-1.53)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.127	(1.27)
Mulato	0.109	(1.03)
Indio	0.100	(0.81)
Educación	0.164*	(2.10)
Mujer	-0.449*	(-7.03)
Edad	-0.412*	(-3.80)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.098	(1.04)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.139	(-1.74)
Número de hijos	0.178*	(2.17)
Región Norte	-0.000	(-0.00)
Región Este	-0.014	(-0.08)
Región Sur	0.120	(1.27)
Constante	-1.661*	(-18.10)
F = 5.66		
N. de casos = 1465		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IV.3. Analysis of System Support (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Víctima por crimen	-0.072*	(-2.88)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.075*	(-2.88)
Víctima de la corrupción	-0.079*	(-2.64)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.099*	(-3.80)
No crisis económica	0.012	(0.40)
Gobierno anterior es el culpable	0.036	(1.20)
Sistema económico es el culpable	0.019	(0.60)
Otros son los culpables	0.044	(1.33)
Temporalmente desempleado	-0.012	(-0.42)
Desempleado	-0.003	(-0.16)
Por decisión propia no trabaja	0.040	(1.55)
Miembro de la familia perdió el trabajo	0.007	(0.30)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.044	(1.49)
Educación	-0.048	(-1.50)
Mujer	0.105*	(3.88)
Edad	-0.053	(-1.88)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.040	(-1.49)
Tamaño del lugar	0.059*	(2.18)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.324*	(10.75)
Interés en la política	0.187*	(7.08)
Constante	-0.018	(-0.69)
R-cuadrado = 0.258		
N. de casos = 1307		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IV.4. Analysis of Community Participation (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Víctima de crimen	0.022	(0.83)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.009	(-0.32)
Víctima de la corrupción	0.058	(1.97)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.020	(0.83)
No crisis económica	-0.007	(-0.24)
Gobierno anterior es el culpable	0.065*	(2.46)
Sistema económico es el culpable	0.049	(1.57)
Otros son los culpables	0.051	(1.51)
Temporalmente desempleado	0.038	(1.11)
Desempleado	-0.044	(-1.53)
Por decisión propia no trabaja	-0.060*	(-2.18)
Miembro de la familia perdió el trabajo	0.057*	(2.12)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.010	(-0.38)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.060	(1.69)
Mulato	0.094*	(2.87)
Indio	0.099*	(2.65)
Educación	0.079*	(2.11)
Mujer	-0.098*	(-4.17)
Edad	0.103*	(2.66)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.018	(0.55)
Tamaño del lugar	0.142*	(4.00)
Interés en la política	0.146*	(5.13)
Constante	0.031	(0.86)
R-cuadrado = 0.088		
N. de casos = 1300		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IV.5. Analysis of Participation in the Last Presidential Elections (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Víctima de crimen	-0.035	(-0.56)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.031	(0.46)
Víctima de la corrupción	0.044	(0.55)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.010	(0.13)
No crisis económica	0.059	(0.88)
Gobierno anterior es el culpable	-0.168*	(-2.39)
Sistema económico es el culpable	-0.097	(-1.07)
Otros son los culpables	-0.010	(-0.11)
Temporalmente desempleado	0.098	(1.49)
Desempleado	0.028	(0.47)
Por decisión propia no trabaja	-0.055	(-0.80)
Miembro de la familia perdió el trabajo	-0.068	(-1.00)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.198*	(-2.91)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.098	(-1.02)
Mulato	0.018	(0.17)
Indio	-0.029	(-0.24)
Educación	0.252*	(2.76)
Mujer	0.196*	(2.59)
Edad	0.877*	(7.57)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.042	(-0.46)
Tamaño del lugar	0.159*	(2.17)
Participación en la comunidad	0.139	(1.55)
Interés en la política	0.384*	(5.10)
Constante	1.477*	(16.83)
F = 8.56		
N. de casos = 1299		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IV.6. Analysis of Support for the Rule of Law (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Victimización por crimen	-0.053	(-0.78)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.091	(-1.43)
Confianza en el sistema de justicia	-0.016	(-0.29)
Educación	0.017	(0.27)
Mujer	0.084	(1.47)
Edad	0.242*	(3.17)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.088	(-1.29)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.078	(-1.41)
Tamaño del lugar	0.016	(0.29)
Región Norte	0.057	(0.66)
Región Este	0.197*	(2.46)
Región Sur	0.003	(0.03)
Constante	0.724*	(11.80)
F = 3.06		
N. de casos = 1417		
* p<0.05		

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support and Political Tolerance

Introduction

The legitimacy of the political system has been conceived of as an essential element of democratic stability.²⁵ Recent research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson et al. 2005) for many aspects of democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Gilley 2009). In this chapter, we study political legitimacy with the model used in previously published LAPOP studies, particularly the studies that focus on the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as predictors of future democratic stability. In this sense, greater legitimacy and political tolerance are seen as favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

Theoretical Background

The Equation of Legitimacy and Tolerance

In previous *AmericasBarometer* studies, political legitimacy, defined in terms of "system support," and tolerance for political opposition were used together to create a sort of warning concerning those democracies that could be particularly vulnerable. The theory suggests that both attitudes are necessary to maintain long-term democratic stability. Citizens must believe in the legitimacy of political institutions and also be willing to tolerate the rights of others. It is in these contexts that there can be majority rule together with minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). Ideally, a political system should have high levels of system support and high levels of political tolerance; however, several combinations can occur, depending on precisely the degree to which a society gives legitimacy to its institutions and guarantees the right of opposition to minorities. Table V.1 presents all the theoretically possible combinations between system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided into levels of high and low.

Before presenting the results, it is useful to explain the construction of the indicators of system support and tolerance. System support is a summary measure indicating the degree to which people trust, respect and feel supported by the country's political institutions. In concrete terms in this study, support for the political system is measured by averaging the responses to the following questions:

- | |
|--|
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio) |
| B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)? |
| B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político del (país)? |
| B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)? |
| B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)? |

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven, which was used when the questions were asked of respondents, was converted into a new scale of 0 to 100, in which zero represents the least support for the system and 100 the maximum support.

To construct the index of political tolerance, the following questions were asked to determine the extent to which respondents were willing to support a series of political rights for people who oppose the country's system of government:

²⁵ Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

- D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas?
- D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?
- D3.** Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de República Dominicana ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?
- D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

The original responses were on a scale of 1 to 10, where one indicated strong disagreement and 10 was strong agreement. Thus, low values indicate low tolerance for the rights of those who oppose the system of government or low political tolerance. The original values for each question were recoded into the usual scale of 0 to 100, and the index is created by a simple average of the answers to the four questions.

From a theoretical point of view, we analyze the relationship between system support, or legitimacy, and tolerance. In order to do so, we divide both scales into "high" and "low."²⁶ Table V.1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

Table V.1. Relation between System Support and Political Tolerance

	Tolerance	
System Support (Legitimacy)	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Stable Authoritarian
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Political systems where many people have a high level of system support and high political tolerance are those predicted to have a more *stable democracy*. This prediction is based on the logic that non-coercive contexts require a high degree of legitimacy for the system to be stable. If the public does not support its political system, a change of system could eventually be an inevitable outcome. But stable systems are not necessarily democracies, unless the rights of minorities are guaranteed. Such security may come from constitutional guarantees, but unless the public is willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be few opportunities for minorities to compete and win positions of power. Under these conditions, the majority will always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are politically legitimate and have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities are most likely to enjoy a stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high but tolerance is low, that is when there is a context of *authoritarian stability*, the system tends to remain stable (high support), but the democratic government could be in danger in the medium term. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarianism (oligarchy) in which democratic rights would be restricted.

A situation of low support for the system is expressed in the two bottom boxes in the table, and both cases could be directly linked to situations of instability. The instability, however, need not result in a reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to deepen the level of democracy in the system, especially when values move toward tolerance. Therefore, in a situation of low support and high tolerance it is difficult to predict if the instability

²⁶ Each of these scales goes from 0 to 100 the average point selected is 50. In this case, system support values of 50 points or less have been classified as "low", and system support values from 50 and up have been considered as "high". Political tolerance has been classified the same way.

will lead to greater democratization or a protracted period of instability possibly characterized by considerable violence. This is described as a scenario of *democratic instability*.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the eventual outcome. Obviously we cannot predict the breakdown of democracy based solely on opinion polls, as this process involves many other crucial factors such as the role of elites, the position of the military and support or opposition of international actors. However, systems in which public opinion supports neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities are vulnerable to democratic breakdown, and therefore are described as *democracies at risk*.

It is important to note two caveats. First, the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionalized democracies. That is, they are systems where there are regular competitive elections and allow wide participation. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have totally different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Secondly, the assumption being made is that in the long term the attitudes of citizens as well as elites produce a difference in the type of regime. Attitudes and regime type may remain incongruent for a long time. In fact, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, this incongruity could have helped promote the fall of the Somoza regime. However, Nicaragua's case was one in which the existing system was authoritarian and repression was used for a long time to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

System Support

Theoretical Background

While criticism and dissent are part of a democracy, no political system, not even democracy, could be sustained over time without a significant segment of the public showing support. Political systems where a high percentage of the public express support for the system are more likely to be stable than those where support is weak. But the democratic system would not be stable if the rights of minorities are not guaranteed, as noted above.

Components of System Support

Figure V.1 shows averages for the Dominican Republic for each item in the B-series, which are the questions that compose the political system support scale, ordered from highest to lowest. For three questions, the average exceeds 50 points, but two did not reach that level. The lowest scores refer to the view that the courts do not guarantee a fair trial and that the basic rights of citizenship are not well protected. Higher scores refer to respect of or support for the system. This suggests that citizens have more general adhesion to the system than belief in the ability of the system to protect fundamental rights.




Figure V.1. Components of the System Support Scale (Legitimacy), D.R., 2010

System Support in Comparative Perspective

Figure V.2 compares the countries surveyed on the scale created by combining the five B-series questions. The Dominican Republic has a medium level of support compared to the other countries. The difference between Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago, which are at the extremes, is more than 20 points. These data show that countries with more and less consolidated democracies may show similar or very different levels of support. For example, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Honduras show a high level of system support, but Honduras does not have a consolidated democracy. The United States and Canada, which have consolidated democracies, do not show high levels of system support. It is worth mentioning that lower levels of system support may be due not only to a rejection of the system, but also to a critical attitude toward government institutions, which is healthy in a democracy.




Figure V.2. System Support in Comparative Perspective, 2010

System Support Over Time

Support for the political system in the Dominican Republic has changed slightly over the past six years. It increased significantly from 2004 to 2006 after overcoming the financial crisis, which hit the country between 2003 and 2004 and which produced a decay in support for the system. It remained the same in 2006 and 2008, averaging 57.6 points, but declined slightly but in a statistically significant way in 2010 to 53.9 points. In other words, while levels of support for the system have remained relatively similar between 2006 and 2010, there has been a slight but significant decrease.




Figure V.3. System Support, D.R., 2004-2010

Political Tolerance

Components of Political Tolerance

Figure V.4 shows the mean responses for each of the D-series questions on political tolerance. The level of support for the rights of people who reject the system of government varies depending on the question. In the cases of the rights to participate in peaceful demonstrations and to vote, the average exceeds 50 points, but not in the cases of freedom of expression or running for public office.




Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance, D.R., 2010

Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

To make regional and temporal comparison, we constructed a scale of political tolerance with the four D-series questions. On this scale, the Dominican Republic is located below the regional average, with a score of 49.4. Scores range between 70.4 for the United States and 45.1 for El Salvador. Here the Dominican score is closer to El Salvador than to the United States. The countries that show the highest political tolerance are the United States, Argentina and Costa Rica, and the lowest levels of political tolerance are in Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador. It is noteworthy that Costa Rica is among the top three in system support and political tolerance, which are considered the foundation of a stable democracy.




Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Political Tolerance Over Time

Comparing across time in the Dominican case, we see that from 2004 to 2006 there was a significant increase in the level of political tolerance, as with many political indicators after the economic crisis of 2003 to 2004, but, since 2006, the average tolerance has decreased each survey year. The decline from 2008 to 2010 is from 52 to 49.4 points and is not statistically significant, but the decline between 2006 and 2010, from 58.9 to 49.4 points, is statistically significant. This means that in the last four years, Dominican society has become less tolerant of political dissent, which is what the D-series measures.




Figure V.6. Political Tolerance, D.R., 2004-2010

Support for Stable Democracy

As indicated earlier in this chapter, from the point of view of theory, the LAPOP studies analyze support for stable democracy by examining the relationship between system support and political tolerance. With the objective of classification, the system support and political tolerance variables are divided into "high" and "low" categories. Table V.1, which was presented above, showed four possible combinations of support and tolerance to indicate possible situations in distinct democratic political systems.

In the Dominican case, we find a democracy that has shown durability and stability for three decades. The transition occurred in 1978 and has remained unbroken to date. The only deviation from institutional order came with the post-electoral crisis of 1994, when, under accusations of electoral fraud, Joaquín Balaguer had to agree to reduce his term from four to two years. But the change was made in the context of a constitutional amendment, which resolved the political impasse through an institutional mechanism. Moreover, even taking into account a longer period, the Dominican Republic has not had a military government in more than 40 years, although the Balaguer governments from 1966 to 1978 had many authoritarian features.

In this context of a relatively stable political system, the *AmericasBarometer* surveys have measured levels of support for the political system and political tolerance since 2006 in order to empirically assess the levels of stability based on the views of the population. Table V.2 shows the results for the system support and political tolerance scales for the year 2010, with respondents' scores on both variables categorized as high or low. The table indicates that 24.8% of the Dominican population falls in the stable democracy box with high system support and a high level of political tolerance, both essential components of a stable democracy; 32.5% are in the stable authoritarian box, with high system support and a low level of political tolerance; 19.3% are located in the unstable democracy box, with low system support and high tolerance; and 23.4% are in the democracy at risk box, with low system support and low political tolerance.

Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: D.R. 2010

System Support (Legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 24.8%	Stable Authoritarian 32.5%
Low	Unstable Democracy 19.3%	Democracy at Risk 23.4%

Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with low percentages of the population with high system support and high tolerance. This contrasts with the data from 2008 when the Dominican Republic was near the regional average.




Figure V.7. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Support for Stable Democracy Over Time

Comparing the data for the Dominican Republic between 2004 and 2010 shows that from 2004 to 2006 there was a significant increase in system support and political tolerance. Note that the 2004 survey was conducted at the beginning of that year amid the economic crisis that shook the country. After increases in 2006, there have been declines. The reduction in the percentage that fall into the stable democracy category between 2006 and 2008 is statistically significant, but not the decline from 2008 to 2010. In any event, we must emphasize the continued decline in the percentage of the citizenry falling into this category, which is so vital for sustaining a stable democracy. A lower level of system support and less political tolerance are the causes of this decline in the percentage of the Dominican population in the stable democracy box. While, in 2006, the average score on the system support scale was 57.6 points, in 2010, the average was 53.9 points (Figure V.3). And, in 2006, the average on the political tolerance scale was 58.9 points but, in 2010, it was 49.4 points (Figure V.6). As shown in Table V.3, from 2006 to 2008, the largest percentage increase occurred in the cells of authoritarian stability and democracy at risk. In 2006, 23% of the Dominican population was located in the authoritarian stability box, but the percentage increased to 31.2 in 2008 and 32.5 in 2010. For the democracy at risk box, the percentage increased from 16.1 in 2006 to 19.3 in 2008 and 23.4 in 2010. These data suggest that the Dominican population has become less tolerant in the past four years. A portion of those with low tolerance supports the system and another larger portion does not support. In any case, the data suggest an erosion of democratic stability from 2006 to 2010. The stable democracy category has been reduced by 13.4 percentage points, while the authoritarian stability category has increased by 9.5 points and democracy at risk by 7.3 points.

Table V.3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, D.R., 2006-2010

System Support (Legitimacy)	Tolerance			
	High		Low	
High	<u>Stable Democracy</u>		<u>Stable Authoritarian</u>	
	2006	38.2%	2006	23.0%
	2008	29.0%	2008	31.2%
	2010	24.8%	2010	32.5%
Low	<u>Unstable Democracy</u>		<u>Democracy at Risk</u>	
	2006	22.7%	2006	16.1%
	2008	20.5%	2008	19.3%
	2010	19.3%	2010	23.4%

Figure V.8 shows the changes in the percentage of the population falling into the stable democracy category from 2004 to 2010, and, later, we present a regression analysis of those located in the stable democracy box in the 2010 survey, a group that amounts to 24.8% of the population.




Figure V.8. Support for Stable Democracy, D.R., 2004-2010

Who is More Likely to Support Stable Democracy?

Figure V.9 shows the regression analysis of support for stable democracy, comparing the 24.8% who show support for the political system and political tolerance versus the remaining respondents. There are two statistically significant relationships. People in the stable democracy category tend to be more satisfied with the performance of the president, and people who perceive high levels of insecurity are not as likely to be in this category. No other variables included in the regression show a statistically significant relationship.




Figure V.9. Who is More Likely to Support a Stable Democracy in the Dominican Republic?, 2010

Figure V.10 illustrates the statistically significant relationships from the regression analysis. The relationships are clearly linear. Only 18.3% of people who feel unsafe fall into the stable democracy category, compared with 31.9% of people who feel safe. Only about 15% of people who believe the president's performance is poor or very poor are located in the stable democracy box, compared with 38.3% of people who consider the president's performance to be good.




Figure V.10. Impact of Perceived Insecurity and Satisfaction with the Current President on Support for a Stable Democracy, D.R., 2010

Institutional Legitimacy

The different rounds of the *AmericasBarometer* have measured the evolution of trust in a range of institutions. This section compares the legitimacy of all the institutions that were covered in the 2010 survey. We measure the "confidence" the population has in each of the institutions included in the study, using scales of 1 to 7, which were transformed into 0 to 100 scales for the purposes of statistical calculations and presentation. It should be noted that assessments of trust in two types of civil society organizations were included for the first time in the 2010 survey: neighborhood associations and business organizations. In the list of questions below the institutional spectrum is broad, including political, government, private, and religious institutions as well as civil society and the media.

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en la JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas?
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?
DOMB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las organizaciones empresariales?
DOMB50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las juntas de vecinos?

Figure V.11 displays average trust in each of the institutions included in this analysis. As in previous surveys, the media and churches get the highest levels of institutional trust, and this time the newly included neighborhood associations also appear with a high average. Trust in the president surpasses the average of all public institutions, with a score of 61.8. The armed forces exceed the police by about 20 points. The two institutions with averages under 50 are the police and political parties, which again are last in average trust. It is interesting to note that although 54.5% of the population surveyed in this study reported being party sympathizers, the average trust in these political organizations reached only 33.1 points.




Figure V.11. Trust in Institutions, D.R., 2010

Figure V.12 shows the average trust in institutions for each year that the survey included the relevant questions. Recall that neighborhood associations and business organizations were included for the first time in the 2010 survey so they are not presented in this figure. The most striking results of this graph are the following: there is more than a five-point decline in trust between 2008 and 2010 in elections, the Supreme Court, the Armed Forces and the Police. In the case of the national government, there was a decline in trust from 2006 to 2010. In the other institutions, any observed change, in a positive or negative direction, is less than five points, and in no case is there a statistically significant increase in confidence between 2008 and 2010. Levels of confidence in the president and the national government are similar, 61.8 points and 59.2 points respectively, for 2010.




Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions, D.R., 2004-2010

Attitudes about Democracy

Support for Democracy

Believing in democracy is essential to maintaining a democratic political system. Lack of such belief would facilitate the emergence of other political alternatives. In this study, belief in democracy is measured with questions developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose et al. 1998; Rose and Shin 2001), also known as the "Churchillian concept of democracy." This comes from the famous speech that Winston Churchill gave in the House of Commons in 1947, when he said (quoted in Mishler and Rose 1998: 81): "Many forms of government have been tested and will be tested in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other forms that have been tried from time to time."

The *AmericasBarometer* has the following question based on this idea:

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

The Dominican Republic has an average of 68.8 points on the scale constructed from this variable and, in the regional comparison, in Figure V.13, it is below the average. The scores range from the lowest of 60.1 in Peru to the highest of 88.2 in Uruguay. The Dominican Republic is closer to the low of Peru than the high in Uruguay.




Figure V.13. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Over-time comparison within the Dominican Republic appears in Figure V.14, which reveals a systematic decline in support for the idea that democracy is better than any other form of government, from 78.7 in 2006 to 68.6 in 2010. The declines from 2006 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2010 are both statistically significant and, above all, the decline from 2006 to 2010. This fact deserves attention because it means the citizens have less commitment to democracy and, therefore, may be tilted toward undemocratic regimes that seem better. Decay in support for democracy is likely to occur when people do not feel that democracy is functioning, which increases rejection of this system. A decline of 10.1 points in average support for democracy in just four years (2006 to 2010) is very marked, although an average of 68.6 points still reflects a majority opinion in support of democracy. These data, combined with the decline in the percentage of the population in the stable democracy category in the table showing system support and political tolerance (Table V.3), point to an erosion of public support democracy in the Dominican Republic.




Figure V.14. Support for Democracy, D.R., 2006-2010

Satisfaction with Democracy

Besides providing knowledge concerning abstract citizen support for democracy through questions like **ING4**, the survey asked several more specific questions about evaluations of the democratic system as it pertains directly to the respondent. Question **PN4** is intended to capture the feeling of the citizens regarding their satisfaction with the democratic system.

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en la República Dominicana?
 (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)

Figure V.15 shows the distribution of answers to question **PN4**. The majority, 54.6%, said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy works in the Dominican Republic, while the rest said they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.




Figure V.15. Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2010

In Figure V.16, which shows regional comparisons, the Dominican Republic is toward the middle on the scale of satisfaction with democracy, with a score of 50.7 points. Then, in Figure V.17, which shows over-time progression in the Dominican Republic, we observe some deterioration of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy from 2008 to 2010, when average satisfaction dropped from 54 points to 50.7. The difference was statistically significant.

The decline in support for democracy shown above and the decline in satisfaction with democracy that these graphs show signal a growing unease with the functioning of democracy in the Dominican population over the past four years, although it not has reached the level of strong dissatisfaction that was recorded in 2004 amid the economic crisis.




Figure V.16. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010




Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy, D.R., 2004-2010

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the legitimacy of the political system, a crucial factor for democratic stability. In the *AmericasBarometer* studies, political legitimacy has been defined in terms of "system support" and "political tolerance," in order to produce a categorization: stable democracy, authoritarian stability, unstable democracy and democracy at risk, which may permit warning about democracies in the region that may be particularly fragile. The theory is that both factors (system support and political tolerance) are necessary for democratic stability in the long term, thus serving as pillars of the analytical model.

The Dominican Republic has a medium level of support for the political system relative to the other countries surveyed, and this support has varied slightly over the last six years. It increased significantly between 2004 and 2006 after overcoming the financial crisis that hit the country between 2003 and 2004, remained the same in 2006 and 2008, then declined in 2010. Regarding the level of political tolerance, the Dominican Republic is below the regional average, with a score of 49.4, slightly lower than 2008, which was 52 points, and significantly lower than 2006, when the average was 58.9 points. This means that in the last four years, there has been a drop of 9.5 points in political tolerance.

With the goal of creating a typology, we have classified the variables of system support and political tolerance in "high" and "low" categories. Political systems that have a large share of citizens with high system support and high political tolerance tend to be more stable democracies. This prediction is based on the logic that in non-coercive systems, such as democracies, high system support and tolerance is needed for stability. If the public does not support and appreciate the political system and if freedoms to act and reform the situation are restricted, a change of system could be the eventual outcome.

The comparison of data within the Dominican Republic over time shows that from 2004 to 2006 there was a significant increase in system support and political tolerance. But after 2006, there have been declines. Lower levels of system support and political tolerance have resulted in a decline in the percentage of the Dominican population in the stable democracy category. From 2006 to 2008, the largest percentage increase occurred in the categories of authoritarian stability and democracy at risk. While in 2006, 23% of the Dominican population was located in the authoritarian stability category, the percentage increased to 32.5% in 2010. In the democracy at risk category, the percentage increased from 16% in 2006 to 23.4% in 2010. These data suggest that the Dominican population has become less tolerant in the past four years, and of those who are not tolerant some support the political system and others do not. In any case, the data suggest an erosion of democratic stability from 2006 to 2010. Regression analysis showed that people who are in the stable democracy category tend to be more satisfied with the performance of the president, while those who had negative perceptions of security tend not to fall into that category. The other variables in the regression analysis of stable democracy with 2010 data are not statistically significant.

With regard to institutional trust, as in previous surveys, the media and churches receive the highest levels of institutional trust. The 2010 round included for the first time neighborhood associations, which also enjoy a high average level of trust. In the public sphere, trust in the president is higher than the all the government institutions, with a score of 61.8. The armed forces exceed the national police in average trust by about 20 points. The two institutions with averages under 50 points are the police and political parties, which once again occupy the last places. It is interesting to note that, although 54.5% of the population surveyed in this study identifies with a party, the average trust in these political organizations reached only 33.1 points.

We also showed respondents' average trust in institutions for all the surveys over time. The most striking results are declines in trust of more than five points between 2008 and 2010 for the following institutions: elections, the Supreme Court, the Armed Forces and the Police. In the case of national government, there was a decline in confidence from 2006 to 2010. In other institutions, the change is less than five points, positive or negative.

In regional and temporal comparisons, we observe among Dominicans a systematic decline in support for the idea that democracy is better than any other form of government, with the 100-point support for democracy scale

averaging 78.7 points in 2006 and 68.6 in 2010. The majority, 54.6%, said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy works in the Dominican Republic, but in regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is toward the middle on the scale of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, with 50.7 points. The Dominican data show a certain decline in satisfaction with the functioning of democracy; from 2008 to 2010, the average fell from 54 to 50.7 points, a statistically significant difference.

The decline in general support for democracy, combined with a decline in satisfaction with democracy, indicates a growing unease with the functioning of democracy in the Dominican population. Discontent has been growing over the past four years, but has not reached the level of deterioration that occurred in 2004, amid the economic crisis affecting the country that year.

Appendix of Regression Tables for Chapter V

Additional Table V.1. Analysis of Support for Stable Democracy, D.R. 2010 (Regression)

	Coefficientes	t
Víctima de crimen	-0.068	(-1.00)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.202*	(-3.08)
Víctima de la corrupción	-0.073	(-0.96)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.092	(-1.58)
No crisis económica	-0.112	(-1.72)
Gobierno anterior es el culpable	-0.084	(-0.99)
Sistema económico es el culpable	-0.094	(-1.19)
Otros son los culpables	-0.152	(-1.89)
Temporalmente desempleado	0.040	(0.62)
Desempleado	-0.035	(-0.52)
Por decisión propia no trabaja	0.114*	(2.07)
Miembro de la familia perdió el trabajo	0.081	(1.21)
Percep. de situación económica familiar	-0.025	(-0.32)
Educación	0.079	(0.86)
Mujer	-0.113	(-1.61)
Edad	0.004	(0.05)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.068	(1.01)
Tamaño del lugar	0.002	(0.03)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.106	(-1.28)
Indio	-0.114	(-1.17)
Mulato	-0.075	(-0.85)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.327*	(3.30)
Interés en la política	0.123	(1.68)
Constante	-1.176*	(-18.26)
F = 2.78		
N. de casos = 1293		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

Theoretical Background

In recent decades, social scientists have shown great interest in studying the quality of democracy in societies with old democracies as well as those with new ones. In consolidated democracies, attention has been paid to the apparent decline in civic and political participation. In new democracies, as in the case of Latin America, the emphasis has been on understanding the possibilities of democratic survival and stability amid economic and institutional hardship.

The concept of "social capital" has been a mainstay in the analysis of the role of citizen participation in politics. The central argument, which is derived from the work of Robert Putnam (1993 and 1995) and from much earlier work by Alexis de Tocqueville (2000 [1840]), is that civil society is crucial in a democracy so that communities can effectively establish and achieve their collective and individual goals. Specifically, higher levels of civil society organization are thought to lead to more social capital formation, greater political efficacy in communities, better public policies and, as a result, produce greater trust in political institutions and democratic legitimacy. By contrast, lower levels of social capital reduce communities' political capacity to achieve their objectives, and in turn, less effective and reliable governments (Putnam 1993, 1995). At the foundation of this system of capacity formation is interpersonal trust, which motivates and supports social participation.

In advanced democracies it became clear that in the 1970s citizens were paradoxically participating less in politics and social organizations after the period of the great social movements started in the late 1950s. These movements had introduced new and diverse social groups to the political scene, with specific demands for social transformation. As a result of their pressure, these democracies became more inclusive.

Because of its relevance for the quality of democracy, the *AmericasBarometer* includes a series of questions that seek to capture the level of social and political participation in the countries surveyed. This set of questions measures the various themes discussed in this chapter.

Interpersonal Trust

Just as trust in political institutions is important for democracy, it is also important to trust in other people. The reason, according to several studies, is that there is greater likelihood of maintaining democracy in countries with high levels of social capital formation, and this requires interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). If people do not trust each other, they are less likely to associate with others in activities that improve the standard of living for themselves and the collectivity. On the contrary, if interpersonal trust is high, citizens will be more likely to join together and seek collective solutions to community problems. In addition, social networks provide support to individuals and families that make up a community. In this sense one could say that interpersonal trust operates in two positive ways that strengthen social capital: it facilitates support for members of the community and enables communities to find solutions to their problems collectively.

The Americas Barometer utilizes a classic item to measure interpersonal trust:

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

Figure VI.1 shows the results of this question in percentages. Most of the surveyed population, 61.3%, falls in the categories of viewing others as somewhat trustworthy or very trustworthy.



Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010

Figure VI.2 shows interpersonal trust converted to a 0-100 scale for each country. Here the Dominican Republic is in a middle position with an average of 57.7 points. The country with the highest score on interpersonal trust is Costa Rica with 70.2 points and Peru is lowest with 48.2. In a comparison over the last six years within the Dominican Republic, which appears in Figure VI.3, we see that there was a systematic decline in interpersonal trust from 64.9 points in 2004 to 57.7 in 2010. The decline is not statistically significant from one poll to the next, but the difference between 2004 and 2010 is significant, with a reduction from 64.9 points in 2004 to 57.7 in 2010, representing a decline of 7.2 points.




Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2010




Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2004-2010

Figure VI.4 presents a regression analysis of the determinants of interpersonal trust, identifying who is more or less likely to trust others according to responses in question IT1. The people most inclined to trust others live in small towns and rural areas, are older, and have more negative views of their family's economic situation. People who are less trusting of others are those who identify as mulattoes and blacks, those who feel more unsafe, and those who have been victims of crime. The other variables in the regression analysis showed no statistically significant effects on interpersonal trust.




Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010

Figures VI.5 and VI.6 illustrate the statistically significant effects from the regression. People living in rural areas score more than 10 points higher on interpersonal trust than those living in Santo Domingo, with the difference being 63.6 points on the 0-100 scale compared to 52.9 points. People who self-identify as white have an average interpersonal trust of 62.0 points, more than any other racial group, and blacks and mulattos have levels of interpersonal trust that are statistically lower than for whites. There is no statistically significant difference between whites and Indians. People who have been victims of crime show an average interpersonal trust of 49.9 points, while non-victims reported an average of 59.3, nearly a 10-point difference. Regarding the perceived adequacy of the household income, there is a difference of 15.4 points between the two extremes of positive and negative perceptions. Finally, people who feel unsafe trust others much less. The average difference in interpersonal trust between those who feel very safe and very unsafe is 19.7 points.




Figure VI.5. Impact of Place of Residence, Racial Identification and Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010




Figure VI.6. Impact of Perceptions about the Adequacy of Household Income and about Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010

In summary, data on interpersonal trust show that the Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position in the regional context, averaging 57.7 points on the scale of trust based on question IT1. Moreover, from 2004 to 2010, there has been deterioration in the levels of interpersonal trust in the country. In that period, the average dropped from 64.9 to 57.7 points. According to regression analysis based on the 2010 data, factors that negatively affect interpersonal trust are crime victimization, perceptions of insecurity and perceptions of the adequacy of household income. This suggests that crime has a negative impact, direct or indirect, on democracy. As postulated in the introduction to this chapter, less interpersonal trust tends to produce more isolation and less citizen participation, which are both detrimental for the formation of social capital. However, the Dominican Republic

shows a high level of civic engagement, as shown in the next section. The question, then, is why there is high participation if interpersonal trust is not high. One factor to consider is that interpersonal trust is not actually so low. Another factor is that in the Dominican Republic civic participation is correlated with political participation. That is, people involved in civic activities tend to participate more in partisan political activities than those who do not register civic participation. This means that Dominican civic participation might be related more to the political than the personal.

Civic Participation

The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* repeats a series of questions about civic participation that had been used in previous surveys. This provides a basis to analyze changes over time in order to evaluate the performance of Dominican democracy. This section includes data on direct participation in a number of social organizations listed in the questions below and also data from a question about participation in solving community problems. Questions **CP5** and **CP8** were introduced in the chapter on crime and corruption in a regression analysis, but here we present the comparative data.

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98
Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]						
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98 INAP 99

Figure VI.7 shows averages for the Dominican Republic on the participation scale by type of organization. Based on the possible answers to each question, we created 0-100 scales that reflect the extent of participation in these organizations, with the scales reflecting both whether or not people participate and the intensity of participation. The highest average across the scales is for attendance at meetings of religious organizations, and the following places in level of participation are occupied by participation in parents associations and neighborhood organizations. The question of women's participation in organizations was asked only of women, and among them the average level of participation is 13.3. Professional associations had the lowest levels of participation.




Figure VI.7. Participation in Civic Association Meetings, D.R., 2010

Figure VI.8 shows changes in the level of social participation over time. In all cases, except in professional associations, there is a slight increase from 2008 to 2010, but the increase is statistically significant only in the case of school parents' associations, and only when considering the full increase from 2006 to 2010.




Figure VI.8. Participation in Civic Association Meetings, D.R., 2006-2010

Figure VI.9 shows participation in religious organizations for all countries surveyed. The Dominican Republic ranks among those with the highest average, along with Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay. By contrast, Chile, Suriname, Argentina, Canada and Uruguay recorded the lowest rates of participation in religious organizations.




Figure VI.9. Participation in Religious Organization Meetings, by Country, 2010

The Dominican Republic also recorded a high average relative to other countries in participation in school parents' associations (Figure VI.10), in women's organizations (VI.12), and in solving community problems (Figure VI .14), and it recorded the highest rate of participation in neighborhood improvement associations (Figure VI.11). Figure VI.15 shows country averages on a scale of community participation built with questions CP5 and CP8. Here the Dominican Republic has the highest average. These data indicate that Dominican society has a high level of citizen participation in a regional context, especially participation in the local community.




Figure VI.10. Participation in Parents' Associations, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.12. Participation in Women's Groups, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.11. Participation in Neighborhood Improvement Associations, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.13. Participation in Professional Associations, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.14. Participation in Solving a Community Problem, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.15. Community Participation, by Country, 2010 (CP5 and CP8)

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations

In a democracy, social participation can be channeled through institutions, such as the social organizations, presented in the previous section, or through public demonstrations and protests seeking to draw attention to specific issues. Societies where many public protests occur are thought to have high levels of social mobilization.

The *AmericasBarometer* seeks to capture the level of this mobilization with the question **PROT3**:

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?
 (1) Sí ha participado [**Siga**] (2) No ha participado [**Pase a JC1**]

Participation in Demonstrations and Protests in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.16 shows the percentage of respondents who said they participated in a demonstration or public protest in the previous 12 months by country. The Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with a low percentage. Only 5.4% of Dominican respondents said they participated in such activity. Argentina and the United States recorded the highest percentages, and Guyana and Jamaica the lowest. This finding about the Dominican Republic contrasts with the greater level of participation in social organizations presented in the previous section and suggests that while the level of organizational participation in Dominican society is relatively high, the level of mobilization is not.




Figure VI.16. Participation in a Demonstration or Public Protests in Comparative Perspective, 2010

The logistic regression analysis presented in Figure VI.17 shows that people in the south and north are more likely to participate in protests than those in the Santo Domingo metropolitan region. Victims of corruption, men and those living in big cities are also more likely to participate. Evaluations of the economic situation do not significantly affect participation in public protests. Figure VI.18 shows the effects of gender and corruption victimization. While 7.1% of men said they had participated in public protests, only 3.7% of women said they had, and for victims of corruption the percentage is 11.5% compared with 4.1% among those who have not been victims of corruption.




Figure VI.17. Who is more likely to have participated in protests in the past 12 months?, D.R., 2010




Figure VI.18. Impact of Sex and Corruption Victimization of Protest Participation, D.R., 2010

Electoral Participation

Elections are particularly important in the Dominican Republic. In the 1960s and 1970s, electoral fraud prevailed and, in the 1980s and 1990s, civil society and international organizations made great efforts to clean up the Dominican electoral system. These political struggles centered on the electoral process and solidified an ideology in favor of electoral participation, which has resulted in high levels of voting in presidential elections, although not in legislative and municipal elections, which have been held on different dates than the presidential election since 1998 (while the average abstention in presidential elections is around 26% it amounts to about 45% in legislative and municipal elections). A second reason for electoral participation is that in previous decades the Dominican

political system was characterized by the dynamism and polarization of the political parties and strong identification with *caudillo*-like leaders such as Joaquín Balaguer, Juan Bosch and Jose F. Peña Gómez. On the other hand, the political parties have been co-participants in a vast clientelist system that has maintained or rebuilt party identification (Morgan, Hartlyn and Espinal, forthcoming). In addition, Dominican civil society made voting rights an important cause in the 1990s, to the point that the struggle for electoral transparency defined activism in an important segment of civil society in those years. As a result, a politicized citizenry has focused on turning out to vote.

To capture the level of electoral participation, the *AmericasBarometer* asked the following question in all countries surveyed:

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de [año]?
 (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10]

Electoral Participation in Comparative Perspective

Turnout data for the countries surveyed is displayed in Figure VI.19, which shows diversity in levels of electoral participation. It is worth mentioning that question VB2 does not perfectly capture variation in voter turnout because the time between the survey date and the last presidential election varies, and this may have some effect on the responses. In regional comparison of voter turnout, the Dominican Republic is located towards the middle, but it should be noted that voting is not compulsory in the Dominican case while it is in some other Latin American countries. Nevertheless, 76.1% said they had voted in last presidential elections, which in the case of the 2010 survey refers to whether or not they voted in the 2008 presidential election.




Figure VI.19. Percentage who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections, by Country, 2010

Electoral Participation Over Time

In the over-time comparison of voter turnout appearing in Figure VI.20, the surveys conducted between 2004 and 2010 show no significant differences in electoral participation in the Dominican Republic. It is worth mentioning that the 2004 survey was conducted early in the year, therefore the question concerning turnout in the last elections referred to 2000. For the 2006 survey, the question referred to the 2004 presidential election, and the same goes for the 2008 survey, which was conducted at the beginning of that year. Data from the 2010 survey relate to turnout in the 2008 presidential election.




Figure VI.20. Percentage who Reported Voting the Last Presidential Elections, D.R., 2004-2010

Ideological Self-Identification and Electoral Preferences

Figure VI.21 shows respondents' ideological self-identification by the candidate they voted for in the 2008 presidential election. The blue line indicates the average ideological self-identification for the entire Dominican population surveyed. The average of those who said they voted for the PRD is to the left of the general average, but this difference was not statistically significant. This means that though PRD voters are slightly to the left, they are not significantly different from the average ideological placement of the entire sample. Those who said they voted for the PLD located themselves to the right of the sample average, and the difference is statistically significant. This means that PLD voters self-identified further to the right than the overall average. In the case of the PRSC, there is no statistically significant difference with the sample mean. The sample of people identified with the PRSC is very small and the answers given by the respondents are too varied to obtain statistical significance. So the PRSC line crosses the blue line in Figure VI.21.




Figure VI.21. Ideological Self-identification by Vote Choice, D.R., 2010

Political Interest and Activism

Interest in politics is an essential ingredient for political participation. Interest motivates action, and also helps citizens have more political information and involvement in the discussions that contribute to citizens' political socialization.

To capture the level of interest in politics, the *AmericasBarometer* asked the following question:

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada

Figure VI.22 shows the distribution of answers to question **POL1**. Forty-seven percent said they were very or somewhat interested in politics, while 53% said they had little or no interest. On the scale that was built with the answers to this question, there has been no significant change in recent years, as shown in Figure VI.23. In regional comparison, which appears in Figure VI.24, the Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with the highest interest in politics, but does not reach the scale midpoint of 50. It is worth recalling here that the Dominican Republic was among the top countries in various forms of social participation that were discussed in this chapter, and the level of electoral participation is also relatively high, which makes sense given the relatively high interest in politics in this cross-country comparison.




Figure VI.22. Political Interest, D.R., 2010




Figure VI.23. Political Interest, by Year, D.R.




Figure VI.24. Political Interest, by Country, 2010

Political Activism

In the LAPOP comparative surveys, the Dominican Republic has a history of occupying the top places with regard to political activism. In the 2008 survey, the country led the region in the percentage of people who had worked or were working for a party or candidate in elections that year.

This section incorporates three questions that seek to capture the level of political activism in 2010:

- PP1.** Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca
- PP2.** Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales?
 (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó
- DOMPP3** ¿Está trabajando usted en esta campaña electoral de 2010 para algún candidato o partido?
 (1) Sí (2) No

Figure VI.25 shows the answers to questions **PP1** and **PP2**. Since most people do not participate in political activism, and this is the case in virtually all societies, the results in the chart are not particularly low when viewed in this context. Figure VI.26 shows the percentage (14.8%) who said in early 2010, when surveyed, that they had been working for a party or candidate in the 2010 elections.




Figure VI.25. Political Activism, D.R., 2010




Figure VI.26. Worked in the 2010 Campaign, D.R., 2010

The data in Figure VI.27 show that over time the Dominican population has significantly reduced its practice of trying to convince others to vote for a candidate or party. This finding could suggest that there is not a great affinity for politicians and parties so the population does not work to lobby for them, or it could mean that the population is less divided on electoral choices, which creates less interest in trying to convince others of their position. In either case, the data suggest less intense identification with candidates and parties. The figures concerning working on behalf of candidates and parties are similar in the 2006, 2008 and 2010 surveys.




Figure VI.27. Political Activism, D.R., 2006-2010

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is in the middle with regard to trying to convince people to vote for a party or candidate, at 33.5% engaging in this activity. In the regional comparison concerning work for parties or presidential candidates, the Dominican Republic is higher than all the other countries, with 19.9% working for a party or candidate in the last presidential election campaign.




Figure VI.28. Percentage who Tried to Convince Others to Vote for a Party or Candidate, by Country, 2010




Figure VI.29. Percentage who Worked for a Candidate or Party in the Last Presidential Elections, by Country, 2010

Conclusion

In Chapter V, the Dominican Republic evidenced a weakening of democratic values used in this study to assess the stability of democracy: support for the political system and political tolerance. In this chapter, the country shows a decline in interpersonal trust from 2004 to 2010, with a reduction of 64.9 points to 57.7, equivalent to a 7.2 point reduction in interpersonal trust over six years. But the information provided also shows a society with a high level of participation in civil society and political activism, despite the decline in interpersonal trust, which is considered a basic ingredient of social participation.

The regression analysis of interpersonal trust finds that people who are less inclined to trust others are those who feel less safe and those who have been victims of crime. This finding supports the supposition that an increase in crime has a negative effect on democracy through weakening social ties.

In the comparative data, the Dominican Republic leads the region in participation in neighborhood improvement associations. It also has high averages relative to other countries on participation in religious organizations, school parents' associations, women's organizations, and solving community problems. On the scale of community participation that combines attending neighborhood improvement associations and involvement in solving community problems, the Dominican Republic has the highest average of all countries surveyed, with 24.7 points. The lowest is Brazil with an average score of 10. These data indicate that, in a regional context, Dominican society has a high level of citizen participation. However, the country ranks relatively low on participation in public protests, with only 5.4% participation. This suggests that there is strong associationalism but not strong mobilization.

Logistic regression analysis of participation in public protests shows that people in the south and north are more likely to participate in protests than those in metropolitan Santo Domingo. Victims of corruption, men, and those living in big cities are also more likely to participate. Evaluations of the economic situation do not significantly impact participation in public protests.

There is also a strong level of electoral participation. Ideological self-identification of respondents categorized by the candidate they voted for in the 2008 presidential election shows that PLD voters place themselves to the right of the average ideological self-identification for the full sample. The average of those who said they voted for the PRD is to the left of the overall average, but this difference is not statistically significant.

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with the highest interest in politics, but does not reach 50 points on the 100-point scale. It is worth recalling here that the Dominican Republic was among the highest in various forms of social participation and the level of electoral participation is also relatively high, so it is understandable that it registers a relatively high level of interest in politics in cross-national comparisons.

Finally, the data indicate that the Dominican population has significantly reduced its practice of trying to convince others to vote for a candidate or party. This could be an indicator that there is not great enthusiasm for politicians and parties, so people do not actively make recommendations. Or it could be that the population is less polarized electorally and does not feel the need to convince others to vote for certain candidates or parties. However, the Dominican Republic has the highest regional level of people saying they had worked on campaigns in support of candidates or parties, with 19.9% for the 2008 presidential election. In addition, 14.8% reported working on the midterm election campaigns when the survey was conducted in early 2010.

Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VI

Additional Table VI.1. Analysis of Interpersonal Trust, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Participación en la comunidad	0.055	(1.87)
Victimización por crimen	-0.067*	(-2.86)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.179*	(-6.37)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.085*	(2.70)
Educación	0.050	(1.70)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.072*	(-2.13)
Mulato	-0.073*	(-2.38)
Indio	-0.047	(-1.36)
Mujer	-0.044	(-1.55)
Edad	0.065*	(2.55)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.015	(0.49)
Tamaño del lugar	0.097*	(2.09)
Región Norte	0.027	(0.54)
Región Este	0.008	(0.18)
Región Sur	-0.017	(-0.33)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.19)
R-cuadrado = 0.086		
N. de casos = 1385		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VI.2. Analysis of Participation in Protests, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Víctima de la corrupción	0.298*	(2.75)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.004	(0.03)
Victimización por crimen	-0.059	(-0.44)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.154	(1.56)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.211	(-1.52)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente	-0.182	(-1.52)
No crisis económica	-0.143	(-1.11)
Gobierno anterior es el culpable	-0.057	(-0.40)
Sistema económico es el culpable	0.108	(0.91)
Otros son los culpables	-0.222	(-1.36)
Educación	0.078	(0.54)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.099	(-0.72)
Mulato	0.096	(0.74)
Indio	-0.124	(-0.72)
Mujer	-0.340*	(-2.88)
Edad	-0.240	(-1.74)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.063	(-0.49)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.447*	(-2.72)
Región Norte	0.536*	(2.46)
Región Este	0.129	(0.58)
Región Sur	0.523*	(3.10)
Constante	-3.135*	(-18.84)
F = 4.16		
N. de casos = 1316		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

During the process of democratization in Latin America, the need to decentralize public functions in order to achieve greater administrative effectiveness and efficiency has been emphasized. The need to strengthen and provide resources to local government has been at the center of this debate and the resultant reforms. The argument starts from the assumption that if government is close to the citizenry, or put another way, if the public has more access to decision-making, governments can better respond to community needs. The history of centralization and authoritarianism in Latin America has been, without doubt, an obstacle to achieving progress in decentralization, and also presents the problem of clientelism rooted in political culture and in transactions between state and society. This means that the decentralization of public functions, with more funds and responsibilities for local governments, does not alone guarantee that government will be more efficient and effective. The purpose of this chapter is to present public opinion on matters relating to local government and to serve as a reference to policymakers and scholars of this subject. It also seeks to understand the impact of satisfaction with local services on support for the political system and democracy.

Theoretical Background

The majority of the population in any country is more likely to have contact with local officials than national ones. Many people participate in local parent and community development organizations, but few are involved in national-level organizations. Despite this, Latin America has a long history of centralized government and, as a result, local governments have been historically neglected in the allocation of funds and ignored politically. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, local governments in the region faced a severe shortage of income and authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). As a result, citizen contact has traditionally been with local officials who have little power and few resources for solving problems. On the other hand, civil society organizations at the national level have frequently been elitist, excluding much of the public, especially those located outside the capital.

Various development agencies and many social organizations in the region have been promoting governmental decentralization in the past decade. The idea is to provide greater power and control to local governments together with the promotion of civil society organizations in order to improve the functioning of democracy. Nevertheless, in Latin America there is considerable debate about the definition and impact of decentralization (Barr 2001; Daughters and Harper 2007; Falleti 2005; Morgan forthcoming; O'Neill 2003 and 2005; Selee 2004; Treisman 2000).

Is decentralization good or not? One of the main advantages of decentralization is to bring government closer to the people as previously noted (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007; Finot 2001). Several researchers argue in favor of decentralization by indicating that it promotes local development, which improves the effectiveness of resource distribution, promotes accountability because of greater proximity between government and citizens, and strengthens social capital by promoting civic participation and interpersonal trust (Aghón, et al. 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). However, critics of decentralization claim that this process promotes authoritarianism at the sub-national level, increases regionalism due to competition for resources, and stimulates local clientelism (Morgan forthcoming; Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown a mixture of positive and negative results (Lopez-Calix, Seligson and Alcazar 2009; Hiskey and Seligson 2003).

From the standpoint of social participation, it could be assumed that when citizens participate in local activities and positively evaluate local government, they would be more willing to embrace the idea that democracy is the best system. Indeed, there is evidence that confidence in local government spreads to promote the legitimacy of national institutions (Booth and Seligson 2009; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003 and 2005; Seligson and Córdova Macías

1995). In addition, satisfaction with and trust in local governments could encourage greater participation, and thus help build social capital.

This chapter examines the participation of citizens in local government, their perceptions of local government and the services offered, and the impact of these perceptions on support for the political system and democracy.

Participation in Local Government Meetings

It is not easy to measure the level of citizen participation in local government as there are different forms of involvement. To address this issue, the *AmericasBarometer* uses several questions, and one of them refers to participation in meetings sponsored by the municipal government.

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal/asamblea municipal/sesión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?
 (1) Sí (2) No

Local Participation in Comparative Perspective

As in 2008, the Dominican Republic leads the region in the percentage of respondents (27.3%) who said they participated in a town meeting, which is shown in Figure VII.1. This information solidifies the results of the previous chapter in the sense that Dominican society shows a significant level of associational life and political involvement in comparison with other countries in the region.




Figure VII.1. Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Participación en el Gobierno Local a lo Largo del Tiempo

Comparando la participación municipal a lo largo de los últimos cuatro años, se puede observar diferencias significativas, especialmente entre 2008 y 2010. Es posible que las elecciones municipales en 2010 hayan llevado a un mayor nivel de activismo y participación a nivel local, y esto se refleja en un mayor porcentaje de participación en 2006 y 2010, ambos años en los que se celebraron elecciones locales.




Figure VII.2. Participation in Local Government Meetings, D.R., 2006-2010

Entrega de Peticiones al Gobierno Local

Con el mismo propósito de medir el nivel de participación pública en los organismos de gobierno local, la encuesta también incluyó preguntas sobre la presentación de una petición al gobierno municipal. Este es el propósito de las preguntas **NP2** y **MUNI10**.

- NP2.** ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?
 (1) Sí [**Siga**] (2) No [**Pase a SGL1**] (88) NS [**Pase a SGL1**] (98) No responde [**Pase a SGL1**]
- MUNI10.** ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición?
 (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

15.1% of the Dominican population surveyed said they had made a request of a local government body and, of those, 27.8% said they resolved the issue or request. These data show that the responsiveness of local authorities is precarious, since only 15.1% presented a petition and of these only a quarter said the problem was resolved as a result of this action.




Figure VII.3. Presenting Requests to Local Government, D.R., 2010

Submission of Requests to Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with the highest percentages of citizens making requests of a municipal governing body, with a rate of 15.1%, closer to Uruguay, which has the highest percentage with 18.9%, than to Panama, which has the lowest rate at 5.1%. Moreover, the difference between the Dominican Republic and Uruguay is not statistically significant.




Figure VII.4. Presenting Requests to Local Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Submission of Requests to Municipal Government Over Time

The percentage of those petitioning the municipal government for aid has changed little in the Dominican Republic from 2006-2010. This contrasts with earlier data showing greater involvement in local government meetings, particularly in the 2006 and 2010 surveys. It may be that the greater activism in meetings is not translating into more petitions and that the involvement is inherently civic, or it could be that respondents are more inclined to respond positively in the case of participating in meetings, but not in petitions. The underlying reason is impossible to ascertain from the available data, but the important thing to note is that the Dominican Republic seems to have a significant level of societal involvement in local government, compared with other countries of the region.




Figure VII.5. Presenting Requests to Local Government, D.R., 2006-2010

Who is More Likely to Request Assistance from Local Government?

Figure VII.6 shows a logistic regression analysis of the question about petitioning the municipal government. The factors that increase people’s likelihood of making such requests are living in small towns or rural districts, having a negative perception of one’s family economic situation, and attending meetings of municipal government. Those who are less likely to make requests are people with more wealth. These data indicate that greater local participation increases citizen ties to local government.

Next, Figure VII.7 illustrates the significant relationships from the regression analysis. Those living in metropolitan Santo Domingo, where only 9.4% said they made requests of local government, are less likely to do so than those who live in small towns, where the request rate is 20.5%. While 9.2% of the most wealthy said they made requests, 23.1% of those with little wealth report making petitions. Additionally, 5.3% of those with positive perceptions of their family's financial situation said they had made a request, while 20.2% of those who have negative perceptions petitioned local government. The most significant difference in percentage terms is between those who reported having attended a municipal meeting or those who did not, with 29.8% and 9.5%, respectively, reporting that they made requests. This confirms that those most involved are most likely to make requests. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to determine whether the requests are for personal purposes or for community improvement.




Figure VII.6. Who is most likely to present requests to local government?, D.R., 2010




Figure VII.7. Impact of Place of Residence, Wealth, Family Economic Situation and Attendance at Municipal Meetings on Making a Request of Municipal Government, D.R., 2010

Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The reform processes that have been implemented in Latin America in recent decades have had decentralization as an important point of emphasis, devolving power to the local level as an ideal way to bring government closer to citizens, and the same thing has happened in the Dominican Republic. In order to facilitate decentralization, Ley 166-03 of 2003 established a significant transfer of funds from the national budget to the municipalities. The assumption is that the decentralization of government functions can solve many problems that electoral democracy has failed to address, in part, because of excessive centralism.

This perspective assumes that decentralization processes increase citizen participation and, in turn, increased citizen participation leads to more efficient public administration. In this sense, it is predicted that decentralization increases the chances of developing a better democracy through increased social participation and improved administrative capacity.

To capture the general feeling of the population regarding services offered by the municipal government, *AmericasBarometer* asked the following question:

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: Leer alternativas]
(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos)

Figure VII.8 shows that the Dominican population is divided in its opinion regarding the services provided by municipalities. About a third felt that municipal services are good or very good, another third considered them neither good nor bad, and one-third considered them bad or very bad.




Figure VII.8. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010

Satisfaction with Local Government in Comparative Perspective

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is among the countries with the lowest average satisfaction with local government services in the 2010 round of surveys, with 48.8 points on a scale of 0-100 points. This contrasts with the 2008 round, when the Dominican Republic was located in the second place on satisfaction, with 56.9 points.




Figure VII.9. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Satisfaction with Local Government Services Over Time

In the period from 2006 to 2010, satisfaction with local government services declined, and significantly from 2008 to 2010, with a reduction of 8.1 points (see Figure VII.10.) This is the reason why the Dominican position deteriorated in the regional comparison presented in Figure VII.9.




Figure VII.10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2006-2010

Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Figure VII.11 shows regression analysis of the determinants of satisfaction with local government services. Residents of small towns and rural districts are slightly less satisfied with local government services than residents of large cities. But the factor that has the most significant effect on satisfaction with services is trust in municipal government. No other variable included in the regression analysis has a statistically significant effect.

Next, Figure VII.12 illustrates the relationship between trust in local government and satisfaction with public services. While people who have a great deal of trust showed a satisfaction level of 71.7 points on average, those without trust only show a satisfaction level of 24.4 points on a 0-100 scale. We assume that greater satisfaction with services results in greater trust, and not vice versa, because usually people develop trust in government as a result of tangible benefits they receive.




Figure VII.11. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010




Figure VII.12. Relationship between Trust in Local Government and Satisfaction with Local Services, D.R., 2010

Trust in Local Government

In the previous chapter we presented data on trust in various public and private institutions. One of the evaluated institutions was the national government in general, which earned an average score of 59.2 on the trust scale. Below in Figure VII.13, we present data for Dominican local government in regional comparison. The level of trust in municipal government for the Dominican Republic in the 2010 survey is 50.0 points. This places the country in a middle position between those scoring the highest and lowest on the scale. In 2008, however, the Dominican Republic took first place in the regional comparison, with an average of 63.7 points.

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su ayuntamiento?




Figure VII.13. Trust in Local Government, by Country, 2010

Figure VII.14 shows a significant decline between 2008 and 2010 in the level of trust in local government. Trust in the Dominican national government has also declined, but not as much as in local government. This fact deserves attention because it raises questions about the ability of local governments to respond to community problems. Certainly there is a long history of presidentialism and state centralization in Dominican society, however, in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, local government enjoyed more public trust than in 2010. In addition, in 2006 and 2008, there were no significant differences between levels of trust in the national and local government, but, in 2010, the difference in levels of trust accorded the national government is significantly higher than trust in local government.




Figure VII.14. Trust in Local and National Government, D.R., 2004-2010

Figure VII.15 displays regression analysis of trust in local government. People with positive evaluations of their family's economic situation and those who participate in municipal meetings express greater trust. Nonwhites expressed less trust. The remaining variables have no statistically significant impact on trust in local government. It should be emphasized that people who attend local government meetings not only have more confidence in municipal government, but also make more requests of these governments, as documented earlier in this chapter.

Figure VII.16 illustrates the significant effects from the regression analysis. While those who self-identified as white have an average trust in local government of 57.5 points, those who self-identified as black average 44.4 points. While those with favorable perceptions of their economic situation have a trust level of 52.3 points, those who have negative perceptions of their economic situation score 47.4 points on the trust scale. Those who attended a local government meeting have a confidence level of 55.6 points, and those who did not attend average 47.9 points. It is likely that greater participation in meetings translates into greater contact with public officials, which in turn, can increase confidence. Or, it may happen that people who trust the most tend to participate more. The statistical analysis cannot specify the precise causal relationship, although the analytical intuition suggests that participation, which is a specific activity, has an effect on the more abstract concept of trust.




Figure VII.15. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, D.R., 2010




Figure VII.16. Impact of Racial Identification, Perception of the Family Economic Situation and Attendance at Local Government Meetings on Trust in Local Government, D.R., 2010

Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on Support for the Political System and on Support for Democracy

This section presents statistical information on how the evaluation of local government services affects support for the political system and for democracy as the best form of government. It is worth remembering that a central objective of the LAPOP study is to determine the effect of various variables on the functioning and stability of the democratic system.

Figure VII.17 displays the regression analysis designed specifically to show the relationship between evaluations of services offered by the municipality and support for the political system. The data show that satisfaction with local services and satisfaction with the performance of the president produce greater system support. This finding supports the argument that the government's performance is key to institutional trust and system support. The graph also shows that people with more interest in politics, women, those who live in smaller places, and those with less education express more support for the political system. Paradoxically, the critical perspective promoted by education produces less support for the political system. Figure VII.18 illustrates the relationship between satisfaction with local services and system support. There is a difference of 17.3 points in the level of system support between those who hold positive and negative evaluations of local government services, at 63.9 and 46.6 points respectively.




Figure VII.17. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on System Support, D.R., 2010 (Regression)




Figure VII.18. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support, D.R., 2010

Figure VII.19 shows regression analysis examining the impact of satisfaction with local government services on support for democracy, using the question **ING4**. Satisfaction with local services increases support for democracy, which is measured using the idea that democracy is better than another system of government. The other variables that have statistically significant effects on supporting democracy are positive assessments of the president’s performance, higher education levels, older age, and being male.

Figure VII.20 shows that those who are very satisfied with local services score 10 points higher on support for democracy compared with those who evaluate local services as bad or very bad, although the relationship is not perfectly linear.




Figure VII.19. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010




Figure VII.20. Relationship between Satisfaction with Local Services and Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010

Satisfaction with Specific Services

This section presents information on satisfaction with specific services in the Dominican Republic, which are not necessarily local. The purpose is to capture the feeling of the population concerning a variety of vital services.

The detailed set of questions is below, and then Figure VII.21 presents the results of the evaluations for each of the eight services listed.

<p>Cambiando de tema para hablar de los servicios públicos generales, DOMSER1 ¿Cómo usted evalúa en la actualidad los siguientes servicios públicos? ¿El transporte público, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER2 ¿La educación pública, considera usted que es muy buena, buena, mala, o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Mala (5) Muy mala/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER3 ¿Los hospitales públicos, considera usted que son muy buenos, buenos, malos, o muy malos? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER4 ¿El seguro social médico, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>

<p>DOMSER5 ¿El servicio de electricidad, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER6 ¿El servicio de la recogida de basura, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER7 ¿El servicio de agua potable, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>
<p>DOMSER8 ¿El servicio de la construcción de viviendas populares, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>(1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo</p>

The data in Figure VII.21 shows the values on 0-100 scales developed based on answers to each of the above questions. The most positively evaluated services include social health insurance, public education, garbage collection and clean water. The worst evaluated are public hospitals, public transport, electricity and public housing construction. For these last four services, average assessments did not reach 50 points.




Figure VII.21. Evaluations of Various Public Services, D.R., 2010

In the over-time comparison shown in Figure VII.22, the average assessment of public services declined in all cases from 2008 to 2010, except public education which increased slightly from 57.9 to 58.3 points.²⁷

²⁷ The data from the health sector are not included because there was a change in the name of the social health insurance program in the survey, which prevents direct comparison.




Figure VII.22. Evaluations of Various Public Services, D.R., 2004-2010

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the participation of citizens in local government, their perceptions of local government and the services offered, and the impact of these perceptions on supporting the political system and democracy.

As in 2008, the Dominican Republic leads the region in the percentage of respondents who said they participated in local government meetings, with 27.3%. This information solidifies the argument that Dominican society shows an important level of involvement in social organizations and local government compared with other countries in the region. In the over-time comparison of municipal participation in the past four years, we see significant differences, with a shift from 22.9% in 2006 to 16.8% in 2008 and 27.3% in 2010. It is possible that the municipal elections in 2006 and 2010 led to higher levels of activism and participation at the local level, and this is reflected in a higher rate of participation in municipal meetings in those years.

15.1% of the surveyed population said they had requested assistance of a local government body and, of those, 27.8% said the issue or request was resolved. This means that the responsiveness of local authorities is precarious. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic ranks among countries with the highest percentages of requests submitted by citizens to a municipal governing body. The percentages of respondents who requested help from municipal government varied little in the Dominican Republic over the 2006-2010 period, which contrasts with greater involvement of people in local government meetings, especially in 2006 and 2010. It may be that greater participation in meetings does not lead to more requests and involvement has an eminently civic character, or it could be that respondents are more motivated to answer positively to questions about participating in meetings, but not to the one about making requests of local government. The important thing is that the Dominican Republic seems to have a significant level of societal involvement in local government compared with other countries of the region.

The Dominican population is divided in its opinion regarding the services provided by municipal governments. About a third evaluated local services as good or very good, another third considered them neither good nor bad, and one-third considered them bad or very bad. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is among the countries with the lowest average satisfaction with local services, averaging 48.8 points. In the temporal comparison for the period 2006-2010, satisfaction with local government services declined, and significantly from 2008 to 2010, when it went from 56.9 points to 48.8 on a 0-100 scale.

The level of trust in municipal government for the Dominican Republic in 2010 is 50 points, which places the country in a middle position between countries that recorded the highest and lowest scores. But in 2008, the Dominican Republic was in first place in the region on trust in local government, with 63.7 points. This fact deserves attention because it raises questions about the capacity of municipal governments to respond to community problems. Trust in the Dominican national government has also declined, but not as much as in the case of municipal government.

In the regression analysis of trust in local government, people express greater trust when they have positive evaluations of their family's economic situation and when they participate in municipal meetings. Nonwhite respondents express less trust. The remaining variables have no statistically significant impact on trust in the local government. The people who attend local government meetings are not only more trusting of municipal government, but they also make more demands.

Since the focus of the LAPOP studies is to determine the effect of a set of variables on the functioning and stability of the democratic system, we conducted regression analysis designed specifically to show the relationship between the evaluation of services offered by the municipality and support of the political system. The data show that satisfaction with local services produces greater support for and, also, greater satisfaction with government performance. There is a difference of 17.3 points in the level of system support between those with positive and negative assessments of local government services: 63.9 and 46.6 points respectively. This finding supports the argument that the government's performance is key to institutional trust and political system support. The analysis also shows that people with greater interest in politics, women, and those with less education express more support for the political system. Paradoxically, the critical perspective that education promotes produces less support for the political system.

The regression analysis of the impact of satisfaction with local government services on support for democracy shows that satisfaction with local services increases support for democracy, defined as the idea that democracy is better than other systems of government. The other variables that have statistically significant effects on support for democracy are positive assessments of the president's performance, higher education levels, older age, and being male. Those who are very satisfied with local services score more than 10 points higher on support for democracy compared with those who perceive local services as bad or very bad, although the relationship is not perfectly linear.

Finally, it is worth reiterating that the data show that the functioning of government is key to institutional trust and system support.

Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VII

Additional Table VII.1. Analysis of Requesting Assistance from Municipal Government, D.R. (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.037	(0.46)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.554*	(6.97)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.253*	(-2.81)
Educación	0.105	(1.02)
Mujer	0.042	(0.55)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.050	(0.53)
Mulato	0.092	(1.05)
Indio	0.046	(0.46)
Edad	0.124	(1.53)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.235*	(-2.59)
Tamaño del lugar	0.230*	(2.18)
Constante	-1.950*	(-17.85)
F = 10.83		
N. de casos = 1445		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VII.2. Analysis of Satisfaction with Local Government Services, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	-0.001	(-0.04)
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.604*	(25.70)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.019	(0.81)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.015	(0.67)
Educación	-0.010	(-0.35)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.027	(-1.04)
Mulato	-0.023	(-0.90)
Indio	-0.023	(-0.73)
Mujer	-0.021	(-0.96)
Edad	-0.039	(-1.78)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.034	(1.17)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.071*	(-2.32)
Constante	-0.013	(-0.44)
R-cuadrado = 0.382		
N. de casos = 1406		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VII.3. Analysis of Confidence in Municipal Government, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	0.013	(0.45)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.119*	(4.21)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.077*	(2.49)
Educación	-0.007	(-0.19)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.093*	(-2.65)
Mulato	-0.082*	(-2.89)
Indio	-0.082*	(-2.15)
Mujer	0.048	(1.83)
Edad	0.029	(0.77)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.025	(0.70)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.121	(-1.62)
Región Norte	0.103	(1.10)
Región Este	0.060	(0.71)
Región Sur	0.070	(0.93)
Constante	-0.008	(-0.17)
R-cuadrado = 0.032		
N. de casos = 1445		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VII.4. Analysis of System Support, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios de los gobiernos locales	0.113*	(4.07)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.354*	(12.02)
Interés en la política	0.163*	(6.44)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.049	(1.67)
Educación	-0.059*	(-2.15)
Mujer	0.130*	(4.73)
Edad	-0.013	(-0.47)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.030	(-1.06)
Mulato	-0.026	(-0.96)
Indio	-0.026	(-0.83)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.045	(-1.70)
Tamaño del lugar	0.082*	(3.11)
Constante	0.001	(0.04)
R-cuadrado = 0.229		
N. de casos = 1387		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VII.5. Analysis of Support for Democracy, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Satisfacción con servicios de los gobiernos locales	0.052*	(2.03)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del Presidente actual	0.059*	(2.11)
Interés en la política	0.028	(0.93)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.004	(-0.11)
Educación	0.180*	(5.71)
Mujer	-0.058*	(-2.17)
Edad	0.222*	(7.90)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.023	(0.53)
Mulato	0.048	(1.19)
Indio	0.016	(0.40)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.009	(-0.29)
Tamaño del lugar	0.021	(0.93)
Constante	0.008	(0.33)
R-cuadrado = 0.065		
N. de casos = 1323		
* p<0.05		

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. The Justice System

A society with guaranteed rights is the essence of democracy. Without rights it is impossible to construct a citizenry and establish reliable rules to organize social life, economic transactions, and political competition. Therefore, the institutionalization of the justice system is fundamental to democratic consolidation.

For most of Dominican history, the judiciary was subordinate to political power in ways typical of authoritarian regimes. But from the early 1990s, major reforms have been enacted with the objective of making justice more independent, transparent and competent. The most important change occurred with the constitutional reform of 1994, which established the *Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura* to oversee appointing judges to the *Suprema Corte de Justicia* (SCJ), who in turn would appoint other judges. In 1997, the first SCJ was appointed under this system. Without a doubt, the 1994 constitutional reform and the change in the selection mechanism for judges gave the Supreme Court a new air of independent power. Later, the National Judicial College was created with the goal of training judges who would enter the system. The motive of these and other reforms has been to improve the supply of judicial services, making justice more accessible to citizens and building greater public trust in the judicial system.

This chapter examines the level of trust in the justice system from different vantage points. We utilize questions concerning general perceptions about justice and others that capture more specific information. Some refer to the judicial system as a whole and others to the police.

Trust in the Justice System

The *AmericasBarometer* included a set of questions to evaluate the sentiment of the population with respect to the Dominican judicial system and the services it offers. The first three questions presented below address the issue of public trust in the justice system.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?

Figure VIII.1 shows that the SCJ has a trust level of 50.2 points on a scale of 0-100. Trust in the courts and the judicial system in general is slightly lower. The fourth bar in the graph is a scale of trust in justice built with the three questions above. The data from the scale indicate that the overall assessment of justice does not reach 50 points. This suggests that despite the changes that have occurred in the last decade, Dominican society does not have a high regard for the judicial institutions of the country.




Figure VIII.1. Scale of Trust in Justice and its Components: Trust in the Courts, in the Justice System and in the Supreme Court, D.R., 2010

Figure VIII.2 shows the scale of trust in justice across three Dominican surveys. The data reveal that in 2010 there has been a slight decrease in the levels of trust in justice compared to 2008, from 52 to 46.7. The same is true when comparing each of the three questions above for the period 2006-2010, although these data are not shown. These findings should be cause for reflection, given the efforts that have been made to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system. With regard to citizen perceptions, the assessment of justice still remains far from ideal. Given the consistency of these data over the past four years, it is a challenge for the justice system to produce a qualitative improvement in the provision of services, which translates into better public perceptions of the system.




Figure VIII.2. Trust in Justice, D.R., 2006 – 2010

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is not among the countries with high levels of trust in justice. Although no country is very high in trust, the average country surpasses 50 points on the scale. The difference in trust for the whole region is close to 25 points, with Suriname showing the highest average of 60.1 points and Ecuador the lowest with 37.2 points. The Dominican Republic is placed below the median, with 46.7 points.




Figure VIII.3. Trust in Justice, by Country, 2010

Figure VIII.4 presents a regression analysis where the dependent variable is the level of trust in justice. The results show that people who perceive more corruption and crime express less trust in the justice system, and having been a victim of corruption reduces trust in the justice system, while being a victim of crime is not a significant effect. On the other hand, supporters of the PLD have greater trust in the judicial system than independents or supporters of other parties. The socio-demographic variables showed no significant effect on the level of trust in the justice system, although education and wealth show statistically significant effects in bivariate analysis.




Figure VIII.4. Determinants of Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010

Figures VIII.5, VIII.6, and VIII.7 show the effects of variables that proved statistically significant in the regression analysis.

Figure VIII.5 clearly shows the inverse relationships that perceived corruption and perceived crime have with trust in the justice system. Higher perceived corruption and insecurity reduce trust in the system. This means that widespread perceptions of corruption or insecurity have a negative effect on public trust in the justice system. Therefore, it seems that the technical improvement of the judicial system is not sufficient to improve the public perception concerning functioning. Evaluations of the system are more positive when judicial services improve, but also when people feel safe and perceive a prevailing rule of law in general.




Figure VIII.5. Impact of Perceived Corruption and Insecurity on Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010

In the case of partisan sympathy, Figure VIII.6 demonstrates that supporters of the ruling PLD showed greater trust in the justice system than supporters of other parties or independents. The difference is higher between PLD supporters and those who sympathize with the PRD. PRD supporters show the lowest level of trust in the justice system, with an average score of 12 points less than PLD sympathizers.




Figure VIII.6. Relationship between Partisan Sympathies and Trust in Justice Scale, D.R., 2010

Although education and wealth showed no statistically significant effects in the regression analysis above in Figure VIII.4, these relationships are statistically significant in bivariate analyses. Because of this, we include education and wealth in Figure VIII.7. As educational level and wealth increase, trust in the justice system declines. This relationship is striking because those with more education and more wealth are usually those who have greater access to justice services; however, they have less trust in justice. One possible explanation is that people with more education and wealth tend to be more critical of the government.




Figure VIII.7. Relationships of Education and Wealth with Trust in Justice, D.R., 2010

The following questions explore the theme of the justice system in more detail. The purpose was to move from abstract evaluations to more concrete situations that could produce these attitudes, such as being the victim of a crime, and also to learn who the public blames for their low trust in the justice system.

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada	
DOMAOJ12A. Usted respondió que tiene poca o nada de confianza en que el sistema de justicia castigaría al culpable. ¿Cuál de los siguientes es el responsable para que usted tenga poca o nada de confianza: (1) La policía (2) Los fiscales/Ministerio Público (3) Los jueces/cortes (4) Las leyes (5) [No leer] El sistema	
DOMAOJ12B. ¿Por qué usted siente poca o nada de confianza en [Respuesta a DOMAOJ12A]	
La policía es corrupta	En el país no se respetan las leyes
Los fiscales son corruptos	La policía es inefectiva
Los jueces son corruptos	Los fiscales son inefectivos
El sistema es corrupto	Hay discriminación en el sistema
Las leyes favorece a los criminales	Otro

In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is at an intermediate position with regard to people’s level of trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty, in the hypothetical case that the respondent was a victim of a robbery or assault. This is an interesting question to measure trust in the justice system because it puts the interviewee in the position to imagine their degree of trust if they were a crime victim. Although hypothetical, the question offers the possibility to capture from another angle the sentiments of the population relating to the judicial system. At the regional level, the Dominican Republic is placed near the middle with an average of 44.7 points. The highest score is in the United States and the lowest is in Ecuador.




Figure VIII.8. Trust in the Justice System to Punish the Perpetrator if the Respondent were the Victim of a Crime, 2010 (AOJ12)

Examining over time the question about trust in the justice system if the respondent were a crime victim, Figure VIII.9 shows that in the Dominican Republic trust has fluctuated between 2004 and 2010, with the highest score being 53.8 points in 2004 and the lowest being 41.4 points in 2006.




Figure VIII.9. Trust in the Justice System to Punish the Guilty, D.R., 2004-2010




Figure VIII.10. Determinants of Confidence in the Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010

The regression analysis of confidence that the justice system would punish criminals in cases of robbery or assault, which appears in Figure VIII.10, shows that being a crime victim and have a greater perception of insecurity produces less confidence that the guilty will be punished. On this question, having been a crime victim has a significant effect on confidence. As illustrated in Figure VIII.11, those who have been a victim of a crime have less trust that the justice system will punish the guilty. The regression also shows that affiliating with the PLD increases levels of confidence. People with more education and those who self-identify as mulattoes have less confidence than people with less education and those who self-identify as white.

Figures VIII.11 and VIII.12 illustrate the statistically significant relationships in the regression analysis. The graphs show lower confidence among victims of crimes, mulattoes, those with more education and those who feel more insecure. We find more trust among PLD supporters, those who self-identify as white, people who have not been crime victims, those with less education and those who perceive less insecurity.




Figure VIII.11. Impact of Ethnicity, Crime Victimization and Party Affiliation on Confidence in Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.12. Impact of Education and Perceptions of Insecurity on Confidence in Punishment of Criminals, D.R., 2010

The next question concerns identifying those responsible for the weaknesses in the judicial system. People who said they had little trust or no trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty were asked who was responsible for their lack of trust. The response options were: (1) police, (2) prosecutors/Attorneys General, (3) judges/courts, (4) the laws, and (5) [Do not read] the system. The responses expressed in percentages are displayed in Figure VIII.13. The

highest percentage corresponds to the police, with 31.4% of those people who had little or no trust that the justice system would punish the guilty identifying the police as responsible for their low confidence. The second most common response was the system in general with 26.2%. There were no significant differences between the responses of people who were actual victims of crimes and those who were not.




Figure VIII.13. Those Responsible for Lack of Confidence that the System would Punish the Guilty, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.14. Why do you have little or no confidence?, D.R., 2010 (DOMAOJ12B)

Depending on the answer to the question assigning responsibility for the low trust, respondents were also asked why they had low trust in those people or institutions. Figure VIII.14 shows the distribution of responses. The highest percentage corresponds to the belief that the police are corrupt. The fact that police represent the highest percentage in Figures VIII.13 and VIII.14 suggests that confidence in the judicial system is being significantly hampered by negative perceptions of the police. Also, 28.5% identified judges or prosecutors as responsible, which suggests the court system is not absolved of responsibility. Discrimination does not reach a high level as an explanation for distrust, which suggests that the population identifies corruption in the system as the main element that makes them lack trust in the justice system.

To summarize, the analysis of the *AmericasBarometer* questions about trust in justice shows that the public has a mid-level rating of the system. In general questions about trust in the courts, the justice system and the Supreme Court, trust is placed around 45 points, except for confidence in the Supreme Court which just reaches the midpoint of 50.2. In regional comparisons of the level of trust in the justice system, the Dominican Republic does not rank among the countries with the highest level of trust. Although no country is very high, more than half exceed 50 points on the scale. With regard to confidence that the justice system would punish the guilty, the Dominican Republic also scores below 50 points, and Dominican respondents identified the police as primarily responsible for their low trust due to the corruption that permeates the police and judicial system. The following section discusses specific questions about the police.

Trust in the Police

Trust in the police is important in order to understand citizen perceptions about the judicial system not only because police service is usually the first point of contact in cases of ordinary crime but also because its main function is to provide public order and protect citizens. If the police fail in their role of protecting the population or providing support to victims of crime, levels of insecurity increase and, over time, levels of institutional distrust rise. In the previous section we showed that people who feel more insecure express less confidence in the justice system.

The *AmericasBarometer* posed several questions to ascertain the level of trust in the police and the opinion the public has of this institution. As shown in Figure VIII.15, which presents comparative regional data, the Dominican Republic is among the countries with the lowest levels of trust in the police, with an average of 39.8 points, very distant from Canada, which ranks in first place with 62.6 points, and nearer to Guatemala which has the lowest average of 31 points.

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?




Figure VIII.15. Average on the Trust in the Police Scale, by Country, 2010

In comparing levels of trust in the police in the Dominican case over recent years, we see that from 2004 to 2008 confidence increased, but in 2010 there was a decrease of 6.8 points compared to 2008. The data in Figure VIII.16 show that from 2004 to 2010, confidence in the police has not been high, because in no year did it reach 50 points, and in addition, the level of trust began to rise but then fell again in 2010.




Figure VIII.16. Trust in the Dominican Police, 2004-2010

Figure VIII.17 shows the regression analysis of trust in the police. Being the victim of a crime and having a greater perception of insecurity is statistically related to low trust in the police. Being a supporter of the PLD is associated with greater trust in the police. People with more education and more wealth have less trust in the police, and older people have more trust. The other variables in the regression analysis have no statistically significant effects.




Figure VIII.17. Determinants of Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010

Figures VIII.18 and VIII.19 illustrate the effects of variables that had statistically significant relationships with trust in the police in the regression analysis presented in Figure VIII.17. The victims of crime express a much lower level of confidence in the police than those who had not been victims, with the difference in average trust 8.7 points between groups. PLD supporters express a level of trust about 11 points higher than PRD supporters or independents who do not sympathize with either party. In Figure VIII.19, the statistical relationship is almost linear for the four variables.




Figure VIII.18. Impact of Crime Victimization and Partisan Affiliation on Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.19. Impact of Perceived Insecurity, Wealth, Education, and Age on Trust in the Police, D.R., 2010

The next question is aimed more specifically at capturing the views of citizens regarding the police.

DOMAOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted?

(1) La policía protege, o
 (2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia
 (3) **[No leer]** No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada

The data in Figure VIII.20 show that most of the surveyed population, 59.2%, thinks that the police are involved in crime, while only 29.6% said that the police protect the public. This opinion may be a determinant of the low level of trust that the people expressed in this institution, and, as discussed above, seems to also affect public perceptions of the justice system.

Figure VIII.21 shows a scale of opinion about the police constructed with question **DOMAOJ18**. Higher values mean that more people responded that the police protect people. In 2010, there was a slight decline in this response, although the difference between 2008 and 2010 is not statistically significant.




Figure VIII.20. Perceptions Concerning the Role of the Police in Confronting Crime, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.21. Scale of the Role of the Police in Confronting Crime, D.R., 2006-2010

The regression analysis in Figure VIII.22 shows that people who have been victims of crime and have higher perceptions of insecurity tend to believe that the police do not protect people. On the other hand, supporters of the PLD and older people tend to think that the police do provide protection. The other variables considered in the regression analysis have no statistically significant effect. Figures VIII.23 and VIII.24 show the effects of those variables that have statistically significant effects on views of police protection.




Figure VIII.22. Determinants of the Perception that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.23. Impact of Perceptions of Insecurity and Age on Perceptions that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010




Figure VIII.24. Impact of Crime Victimization and Partisan Affiliation on the Perception that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010

Data about police in the *AmericasBarometer* reveal the low level of trust in this institution among the Dominican population. Although there was a moderate overall increase in trust from 2004 to 2010, a decline was recorded between 2008 and 2010. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic does not rank among the countries where the population expressed trust in the police. In addition, nearly 60% believe that the police are involved with crime. Having been the victim of a crime or feeling insecure are two factors that reduce confidence in the police, while being sympathetic to the ruling PLD increases levels of trust.

Conclusion

In general, the data presented in this chapter show that the Dominican justice system still remains far from achieving a high level of trust. Data from 2010 even show a slight decline from previous surveys. On a scale of overall trust in the justice system, the Dominican Republic is in the middle compared to other countries in the region, and taking into account only the Dominican case, the average confidence declined from 52 points in 2008 to 48.7 in 2010. On a scale measuring confidence that the justice system would punish the guilty, the Dominican Republic also stands in a middle position within the regional context, but there was a decrease for the Dominican case from 50.6 points in 2008 to 44.7 in 2010. That is, on both scales of trust in the justice system there is a slight decline in confidence. These data should be cause for reflection, because efforts have been made to make the judicial system more effective and efficient, but have not produced much fruit from the perspective of public opinion. From the perception of citizens, evaluations of the justice system remain far from ideal.

People who perceive more corruption and crime and who have been victims of corruption expressed less trust in the justice system. However, having been the victim of a crime does not have a significant negative effect. In the regression analysis of confidence that the system would punish the guilty of a crime in case of theft or assault, being the victim of a crime and increased perceptions of crime lead to less trust that the guilty will be punished. On this question, having been the victim of a crime significantly affects the response of trust that the justice system will punish the guilty.

Respondents identified the police as primarily responsible for their lack of trust in the ability of the system to punish the guilty. In second place were judges and prosecutors combined. At a fundamental level, people blame corruption for their low trust in the justice system. The Dominican Republic is among the countries with the lowest level of trust in the police, with an average of 39.8 points, very distant from Canada, which ranks first in trust with

62.6 points, and closer to Guatemala, which records the lowest score of 31 points. Moreover, 59% of respondents felt that the police are involved with crime instead of protecting people, and on this perception of police protection, there was a slight decline from 42 points in 2008 to 35.2 points in 2010 on a 0-100 scale. Trust in the police is low in general and also in regional perspective. Regression analysis indicates that people who have been victims of crime and who have a greater perception of insecurity tend to believe that the police do not protect people. On the other hand, supporters of the PLD and older people tend to think that the police do provide protection.

Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter VIII

Additional Table VIII.1. Analysis of the Trust in Justice Scale, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	-0.061	(-1.77)
Educación	-0.037	(-1.10)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.046	(-1.39)
Urbano	-0.006	(-0.23)
Mujer	0.033	(1.33)
Indio	-0.019	(-0.52)
Mulato	-0.031	(-0.90)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.026	(-0.72)
Simpatizante del PLD	0.167*	(6.91)
Recibió oferta clientelista	-0.031	(-1.34)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.089*	(-3.13)
Victimización por crimen	-0.046	(-1.94)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.210*	(-8.29)
Víctima de la corrupción	-0.104*	(-3.41)
Constante	-0.011	(-0.36)
R-cuadrado = 0.133		
N. de casos = 1334		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VIII.2. Analysis of Confidence that the Justice System would Punish Someone Guilty of a Crime, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	-0.006	(-0.22)
Educación	-0.158*	(-5.94)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.038	(-1.28)
Urbano	-0.045	(-1.77)
Mujer	0.028	(1.17)
Indio	-0.035	(-0.80)
Mulato	-0.086*	(-2.24)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.047	(-1.36)
Simpatizante del PLD	0.131*	(5.25)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.063*	(-2.43)
Victimización por crimen	-0.078*	(-2.91)
Constante	0.008	(0.32)
R-cuadrado = 0.082		
N. de casos = 1404		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VIII.3. Analysis of the Trust in the Police Scale, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	0.059	(1.93)
Educación	-0.066*	(-2.10)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.110*	(-3.36)
Urbano	-0.029	(-1.12)
Mujer	0.039	(1.31)
Indio	0.007	(0.18)
Mulato	-0.026	(-0.71)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.014	(-0.37)
Simpatizante del PLD	0.125*	(5.04)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.104*	(-3.90)
Victimización por crimen	-0.059*	(-2.46)
Constante	0.001	(0.02)
R-cuadrado = 0.075		
N. de casos = 1425		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table VIII.4. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Perceptions that the Police Protect People, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	0.115*	(3.34)
Educación	-0.066	(-1.97)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.011	(-0.27)
Urbano	-0.002	(-0.05)
Mujer	0.008	(0.32)
Indio	0.046	(1.16)
Mulato	0.043	(1.30)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.040	(1.26)
Simpatizante del PLD	0.056*	(2.14)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.135*	(-5.41)
Victimización por crimen	-0.059*	(-2.90)
Constante	0.015	(0.36)
R-cuadrado = 0.056		
N. de casos = 1273		
* p<0.05		

Chapter IX. Political Parties, Government Efficacy, and Clientelism

In the last decade, Latin America has been characterized by two trends in the dynamics of political parties: the collapse of party systems in countries like Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, and greater ideological differentiation of political parties or movements after an apparent convergence in the eighties. The most important feature of this process has been the emergence of political movements and governments of the left, that reflect a variety of programmatic and policy positions ranging from Chilean institutionalized socialism to the populist and personalistic socialism of Hugo Chávez.

The Dominican Republic has been characterized, however, by different trends. The party system has remained relatively stable, and no major political alternative offering socialism has arisen. In 1960s and 1970s, the Dominican parties differed ideologically, with a strong political polarization between the *caudillos* who were fighting in the political arena, but from the 1980s onward, the parties converged towards a fundamentally clientelist model, with little programmatic and ideological differentiation.

The PLD, which has governed 8 of the last 12 years, has shifted to the right and augmented its electoral base with Balaguer's traditional voters. The PRD has oscillated between intra-party struggles and inefficient governing performance. The PRSC has broken up since 2004 and reduced its electoral support to single digits. As a result of these dynamics, there has been a realignment of electoral forces in the country. The PLD has strengthened its position as the majority party, the PRD has remained the second largest political force, and the PRSC has suffered electoral meltdown. Thus, the Dominican political system has again become a true two-party system with two major parties surrounded by many smaller parties that form alliances in order to participate in clientelist networks.

The historical legacy of the three great leaders of the post-Trujillo era, together with the patronage that has expanded during democratization, have given stability to the Dominican party system, despite the weakening of the PRSC and the low level of democratic institutionalization. Data on partisan sympathies shown in this study sustain a view of strong party attachment, although the 2010 survey registered a decline in partisan sympathy. In the first section of this chapter we discuss key questions concerning political parties.

Another crucial factor in building democratic processes is government effectiveness. In the second section of this chapter, we include an analysis of the main questions posed by the *AmericasBarometer* on this issue. Presumably, the greater government effectiveness is, the higher trust in the governing parties and public institutions will be. By contrast, lower government effectiveness should reduce support for governing parties and public institutions. The importance of this argument for the Dominican case was tested with data from previous surveys in an article published by Rosario Espinal, Jonathan Hartlyn and Jana Morgan (2006). In this edition of the *AmericasBarometer*, we return to this issue because of its importance for building democracy.

The third and final section of this chapter addresses the issue of clientelism. Historically, corruption and clientelism have been essential components of state-society relations in the Dominican Republic, because through them the government can allocate resources to segments of the population who are supporters. At election time, clientelist practices and controversies surrounding them reach their highest point. The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* survey added two questions that can address these issues with greater specificity.

Partisan Sympathy

During the past two decades, political surveys have revealed that a high percentage of the Dominican population expresses sympathy for political parties. In all the years surveyed since the early nineties, more than 50% of the population has indicated sympathy with a political party. The consistency over time is notable, as is the high level of partisan sympathy in the Dominican Republic as compared to other countries. Figure IX.1 shows the responses by country to the following question:

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
 (1) Sí (2) No

As we can see in Figure IX.1, the Dominican Republic ranks third in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer* on party sympathy rates, among only four countries that exceeded rates above 50%. In most countries, the level of sympathy lies between 25% and 45%. In previous surveys in 2006 and 2008, the Dominican Republic held the top spot in the region, with partisan support at 60% and 70%, respectively.




Figure IX.1. Percent who Sympathize with a Political Party, by Country, 2010

It appears that there has been some erosion in the level of partisan sympathy when we compare 2006 with 2010, two similar years because there were no presidential elections. The level of sympathy tends to increase when presidential elections are held, as in 2008, which is demonstrated in Figure IX.2. Although no statistically significant difference in partisan sympathy exists when comparing 2006 and 2010, there is a reduction of 5.9% in the level of sympathy between the two non-presidential election years.




Figure IX.2. Percent who Sympathize with a Political Party, D.R., 2006-2010




Figure IX.3. Party Membership and Sympathy, D.R., 2010

The regression analysis that appears in Figure IX.4 shows that those most sympathetic to the parties tend to express right-wing ideology, have a more positive perception of their economic situation, be civil servants and be older. By contrast, people with higher education levels and those who do not identify as white are less sympathetic to parties. Gender and place of residence do not have statistically significant effects on party sympathy.




Figure IX.4. Determinants of Party Support, D.R., 2010




Figure IX.5. Impact of Ideology, Personal Economic Situation, Wealth and Age on Party Support, D.R., 2010

Figures IX.5 and IX.6 illustrate the effects of statistically significant variables from the above regression analysis. Figure IX.5 shows the relationship of the following variables with the level of partisan sympathy: ideology, perceptions of personal finances, wealth and age. A stronger identification with the right, more positive economic perceptions and increasing age are associated with higher levels of party identification.

Figure X.6 shows partisan sympathy by racial identification and public sector employment. People who self-identified as black expressed lower levels of partisan sympathy than any other racial group. Eighty percent of public employees expressed sympathy for a political party, compared with 52.5% of those who were not government employees. This figure is particularly telling, as it supports the notion that patronage operates in the

Dominican state: public employees are more likely to identify with a party. Of those who identified themselves as government employees, 65% said they sympathize with the PLD, and among public employees who identified as *members* of a party, 82.9% identified the PLD as the party to which they belonged.




Figure IX.6. Impact of Ethnicity and Public Sector Employment on Party Support, D.R., 2010

Figure IX.7 indicates the percentage of respondents who identified with the three main parties, either as a supporter or member. The highest percentage of party identification is for the PLD, the PRD is much lower, and the PRSC has a miniscule level of identification. These data on party identification should not be confused with election results because many people vote in elections who do not identify as supporters of a party in a survey but they end up voting for one at the polls and sometimes people vote for a party distinct from the one with which they identify. The data in Figure IX.7 only reflect partisan sympathy expressed at the time of the survey. It should also be clarified that percentage calculations for this figure exclude those who said they sympathize with a party but were unable or unwilling to identify which party they sympathize with (13 people) and those who identified with other parties (5 people). For that reason the percentage of independents in this figure is slightly different from the box "*ni simpatiza, ni pertenece*" in Figure IX.3.




Figure IX.7. Partisan Identification, 2010




Figure IX.8. Average Years of Education among those who Sympathizes with Each Party and Independents, 2010

These data show that the educational level of PRSC supporters is significantly lower than that of the PRD and PLD sympathizers and demonstrate that independents have the highest level of education.

Figure IX.9 shows mean ideology by party identification. The ideology scale ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 is the extreme left and 100 is the extreme right. The figure shows that supporters of the PRSC and PLD are, on average, more to the right. In statistical terms, the only significant differences in ideology are that supporters of the PLD are to the right of PRD sympathizers and of independents, who have the lowest score on the scale and are therefore the least rightist. This suggests that in the Dominican Republic, unlike some other Latin American countries, a center-left option has not emerged in recent decades. There is a large group of citizens who do not identify with the major

parties in the system (about 45% of the population), and their ideological orientation is in the middle averaging 52 points.




Figure IX.9. Ideology of the Supporters of Each Party, 2010

The ideological identification question used a scale of 1 to 10 on the questionnaire, which was then recoded for analysis to a scale of 0 to 100, and was formulated as follows:

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

In the 2006 and 2008 surveys, the Dominican Republic had the highest ideology score in the region, which placed it furthest right. In 2010, the Dominican Republic is still located toward the right, but does not occupy the highest position in the region. Moreover, Dominicans' average right identification has declined in 2010 since 2006 and 2008, as illustrated in Figure IX.11. The change from 2006, when the average was 69.2 points, to 2010, when the average was 59.8 points, is statistically significant. This means that in the last four years, Dominican society has moved away from the right, down 9.4 points on the ideological identification scale.




Figure IX.10. Ideology Scale, by Country, 2010




Figure IX.11. Ideology Scale, D.R., 2006-2010

Attitudes about Political Parties and Reelection

The transition to democracy in the Dominican Republic occurred in 1978 in an electoral context of regime change from Joaquin Balaguer of the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), to Antonio Guzmán of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). This transition was based on the stability and strength of the party system, which structured the three great charismatic and personalistic leaders of the post-Trujillo era: Balaguer, Juan Bosch and José Francisco Peña Gómez. That leadership gave stability to the political system during the authoritarian phase from 1966 to 1978, and also after the democratic opening in 1978. Despite the changes in voter preferences, which led to the advancement of the PLD and the decay of the PRSC, the Dominican party system has remained relatively stable in its structure. This stability has been the product of several factors, among them some of an ideological nature. For example, although trust in political parties is low in almost all countries, in the Dominican Republic trust levels have remained relatively high. The same is true of the view that parties are necessary for democracy.

Figure IX.12 is based on the following question:

DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Higher values in Figure IX.12 indicate more support for the idea that democracy can exist without political parties, and lower values indicate the attitude that parties are necessary in a democracy. The Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position in the regional comparison in 2010. As shown in Figure IX.13, views concerning the importance of parties for democracy have changed little in the Dominican Republic between 2006-2010. The slight increase in 2010 was not statistically significant compared to the last year surveyed.




Figure IX.12. Democracy can Exist without Political Parties, by Country, 2010




Figure IX.13. Democracy can Exist without Political Parties, D.R., 2006-2010




Figure IX.14. Determinants of Attitudes about the Role of Political Parties in Democracy, 2010

The regression analysis shown in Figure IX.14 shows that people with a more right-wing ideology, those living in urban areas, the less educated and those who are younger are more likely to say that democracy can exist without political parties. The other variables in the regression analysis have no statistically significant effects. It is also noteworthy that there was no significant effect of supporting the work the parties do on attitudes about the importance of parties for democracy, nor of partisan sympathies. That is, those who sympathize with a party are equally likely as others to believe that democracy can exist without political parties.

Figure IX.15 shows the effects of various determinants of attitudes about the role of parties in democracy. The relationship in the case of ideology and age is not perfectly linear. For ideology, despite some variability, the trend is upward. As one moves toward the right, support for the idea that democracy can exist without political parties increases. With age, younger people are more likely than others to support the idea that democracy can exist

without parties. In the case of area of residence, people who live in urban areas show more support for the idea that democracy can exist without parties.




Figure IX.15. Significant Determinants of Agreement with the Idea that it is Possible to have Democracy without Political Parties, D.R., 2010

The survey included three questions to capture the public's views on the role of parties in government, and in the case of the opposition, if parties promote dialogue and have a proactive agenda.

DOMEPP4. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos dominicanos gobiernan bien el país? Hablemos ahora de los partidos de oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes frases?
DOMEPP6. Los partidos de oposición promueven diálogos sobre temas de interés nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (88) NS (98) NR
DOMEPP7. Los partidos de oposición en su municipio promueven diálogos sobre temas de interés local. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (88) NS (98) NR

With these three questions, we constructed a scale of support for the work of parties, which appears in Figure IX.16. The averages for the scale and its components are similar and are between 40 and 45 points. This suggests that the Dominican population is more dissatisfied than satisfied with the work of the governing parties and the parties in opposition, as none of the bars in the graph reach 50 points.




Figure IX.16. Support for the Work of Parties: Scale and its Components, D.R., 2010

The regression analysis in Figure IX.17 shows that people with right-wing ideology and who are sympathetic to a political party tend to support the work of political parties more. On the other hand, the elderly, those with higher educational levels and men are less supportive of political parties' work.




Figure IX.17. Determinants of the Scale of Support for the Work of the Political Parties, 2010

Figure IX.18 illustrates the statistically significant relationships from the regression analysis above. There is no perfect linear relationship, but it is clear that ideology, education level and age produced significant variation in support for the parties. The specific values for party sympathy and gender are displayed in Figure IX.19.




Figure IX.18. Influence of Ideology, Education and Age on Support for the Work Done by the Parties, 2010




Figure IX.19. Influence of Sex and Being a Party Sympathizer on Support for the Work Done by the Parties, 2010

A recurring and controversial theme in Dominican politics is eligibility for re-election. The *AmericasBarometer* asked about this matter in the following question:

- DOMVB25.** ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la reelección presidencial? (Leer opciones)
- (1) Está de acuerdo con que un presidente pueda reelegirse varias veces
 - (2) Está de acuerdo con la reelección sólo por un periodo
 - (3) No está de acuerdo.

The data in Figure IX.20 show that the Dominican population is divided on the issue of reelection. 40.3% expressed total opposition to re-election, while nearly 60% support some form of re-election, be it for one additional period or several.




Figure IX.20. Attitudes about Presidential Reelection, 2010

Government Effectiveness

Trust in government institutions is shaped primarily by citizen perceptions of government effectiveness. This argument was made for the Dominican case by Rosario Espinal, Jonathan Hartlyn and Jana Morgan (2006) with an analysis of data from previous surveys and also with data presented in previous sections of this 2010 *AmericasBarometer* report. Given the importance of institutional trust for democracy, this section is devoted to the analysis of citizen perceptions of government effectiveness.

The *AmericasBarometer* 2010 has posed many questions that can address this issue, and these six were chosen to capture the attitudes of the population regarding government performance.

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?

Figure IX.21 presents the average responses to each of these questions and, in addition, the first bar shows the perceived level of government performance using an effectiveness scale built from the individual items. The scale does not include question N15, about managing the economy, because it was not included in previous years and, in order to compare the effectiveness scale for 2010 with previous surveys, we must keep the same questions in the scale.

The highest approval appears for the item referencing the government’s promotion of democratic principles, and the lowest value is for government efforts to fight unemployment. The average score on the overall scale is 48.3 points, which suggests that assessments of the effectiveness of government are moderate, around the middle score of 50 points.




Figure IX.21. Government Effectiveness: The Scale and Individual Variables, D.R., 2010

In the regional comparison graph, the Dominican Republic appears halfway through the list of countries. The highest rating on government effectiveness was obtained by Chile with 70.5 points, and the worst score is for Argentina, which scored 31.0 points. The Dominican government appears among neither the best nor the worst in the region.




Figure IX.22. Government Effectiveness Scale, by Country, 2010

Over-time data for the Dominican Republic appear in Figure IX.23, which shows deterioration in assessments of the effectiveness of government. While the scale averages were stable around 53 points between 2006 and 2008, the assessment of government performance dropped to 48.3 points in 2010. This decline is statistically significant.




Figure IX.23. Government Effectiveness Scale, D.R., 2006-2010

In Figure IX.24, we also see a slight deterioration in the assessment of government economic performance between 2008 and 2010, but the difference is not statistically significant. Economic performance is measured by questions N1 and N12, which are listed above.




Figure IX.24. Perception of Government Economic Performance, D.R., 2006-2010

Figure IX.25 shows a cross-tabulation of perceptions of government effectiveness with perceptions of the economic crisis. We find a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. Those who perceive the crisis as worse have more negative evaluations of government performance. Figure IX.26 shows a similar relationship, but in this case not concerning the general level of government effectiveness, but rather using the scale of government economic performance that includes only questions N1 and N12.




Figure IX.25. Government Effectiveness by Perceptions of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2010




Figure IX.26. Perceptions of Government Economic Performance by Perceptions of the Economic Crisis, D.R., 2010

Clientelism

Clientelism has been one of the most important issues in Dominican politics, and governments have cultivated practices that fuel the clientelist tradition in the country. On special holidays and during election campaigns, it is customary for parties and politicians to distribute items or money to disadvantaged sectors. Moreover, the impact of clientelism in the electoral process is often denounced by opposition parties and candidates, and losers say patronage and corruption are key factors in explaining their defeat. Despite the importance of clientelism in Dominican political practice and in other Latin American countries, the *AméricasBarometer* had not asked specific questions about it in previous studies. To fill this gap, the 2010 round included the following questions:

CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?

- (1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2]
- (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2]
- (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C]

CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?

- (1) Más inclinado
- (2) Menos inclinado
- (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado

Figure IX.27 shows responses to question **CLIEN1**, rescaled from 0-100. The scale summarizes the three possible responses, often, seldom and never, with higher values indicating greater frequency of clientelism. The Dominican Republic leads the region with an average of 18.4 points. This means that Dominicans were offered more clientelist benefits during election campaigns on average than people from other countries, although the average of 18.4 points shows that the vast majority of the population did not receive clientelist offers, much fewer did in other countries where the average is lower. Figure IX.28 reports the percentage of Dominicans giving the three possible responses to the question CLIEN1: 22.2% of respondents said they received some clientelist offer.




Figure IX.27. Average on the Clientelism Scale, by Country, 2010




Figure IX.28. Frequency of Clientelism in the D.R., 2010

The regression analysis in Figure IX.29 shows that gender and age have statistically significant effects on receipt of clientelist offers. Women and older people report receiving fewer such offers than men and younger respondents. Being a supporter of the PLD is a favorable factor for receiving offers of clientelism, but the statistical relationship is not as strong as with gender and age. The other variables in the regression do not show statistically significant relationships.




Figure IX.29. Determinants of Receiving Clientelist Offers, D.R., 2010

Figure IX.30 shows that people under 46-years old are more likely to receive clientelist offers during election campaigns than older people, and the difference between the two extreme age groups is more than double, at 26.4% for the 18 to 25 group and 12.1% for those 66 and above. Figure IX.31 shows that a higher percentage of men than women have been offered patronage, and a slightly higher percentage of PLD supporters received clientelist offers than did PRD supporters and independents. The figure for the PRSC is not included because the proportion of people who identified with the party is very low, and these data are based on people who received offers of clientelism within each group of supporters, which further reduces the sample.




Figure IX.30. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Age, D.R., 2010




Figure IX.31. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Sex and Partisan Sympathy, D.R., 2010

The left side of Figure IX.32 shows that membership in the PLD increases the chances of receiving clientelist offers compared to those who do not belong to a party, and this difference is statistically significant. The bars on the right side show that party members are more likely to receive clientelist offers relative to those who only sympathize with parties. The difference between being a party member and just a party sympathizer is statistically significant. The difference between independents and members is marginally significant, and independents appear to be the second most likely to receive offers of clientelism. One reason for these results could be that when parties distribute clientelist benefits, they try to favor their members and people whose support they do not yet have at the moment of the campaign but from whom they may be able to elicit support (independents) in order to tip the electoral balance one way or another.

We must keep in mind that this analysis is based on people who reported receiving an offer of clientelism from a party or candidate in a campaign. It could be that many people are reluctant to provide this information. This suggests that if 22% said they had received any offers, the actual percentage is probably higher.




Figure IX.32. Percent who Received Clientelist Offers, by Party Membership, D.R., 2010

People who said they had received offers of clientelism (22% of respondents) were asked whether this had influenced their vote. Most said they had been less inclined to vote for the party that made the offer, as shown in Figure VIII.33. These data, which could be suspect, should be understood in terms of the rationality of the interviewees and the nature of the research. With so few questions it is difficult to determine whether or not the clientelist offer has a significant impact on voting. It could be that it has no effect, it could be that many people were influenced and would not admit it, or it could be that many people already had their preference formed at the time of receiving the offer and did not consider it an influential factor. To clarify, understanding this matter fully would require additional questions that the survey did not include.




Figure IX.33. Reaction of People who Received Clientelist Offers, D.R., 2010

Tarjeta de Solidaridad

The 2010 *Barometer* included for the first time questions about the *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, which is a subsidy that the government gives to people with few resources for various purposes. Below are the questions, followed by an analysis of the results.

DOMTS1. ¿Tiene usted o alguien que viva en su hogar una Tarjeta de Solidaridad del gobierno?
 (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Finalizar]**

DOMTS2. ¿De los programas asociados con las Tarjetas de Solidaridad que le voy a mencionar, indique por cuál o cuáles recibe dinero del gobierno usted y/o alguien que viva en su hogar? **[LEER LAS OPCIONES; MARCAR TODAS LAS QUE INDIQUE QUE RECIBA]**

- (1) Comer es primero
- (2) Incentivo escolar
- (3) Bono gas
- (4) Para envejeciente

DOMTS3. ¿Qué cantidad de dinero reciben en su hogar al mes en esa tarjeta? **[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "H"]**

- (1) Menos de 500 pesos,
- (2) Entre 500 y 749 pesos
- (3) Entre 750 y 1000 pesos
- (4) Más de 1000 pesos

Figure IX.34 shows the results for question **DOMTS1**. Of those surveyed, 33.6% said they or someone in their household had a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, which equates to 504 people in the sample, while 994 people said they had no card. The 504 people who had a card in their household were then asked two follow-up questions. Figure IX.35 shows the amount of money the respondents said they received via the *Tarjeta*, with 76% saying they receive 500 pesos or more.




Figure IX.34. Percentage of Households who have a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, D.R., 2010




Figure IX.35. Amount of Money that Households Receive per Month through the *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, D.R., 2010

In Figure IX.36 we show the percentage of respondents who reported a benefit of each of the types distributed through the *Tarjeta*. That is, of the 504 people who reported having a card, 89.7% said they received fuel subsidies (*Bono Gas*), 76.6% said they received food support (*Comer es Primero*), 22.2% said they had school incentives (*Incentivo Escolar*), and 4.8% said they received social support for the elderly (*Asistencia al Envejeciente*). The data were computed in this way because a household can receive benefits from more than one program. Thus, of the 504 people who reported having the card, 34.8% reported receiving funds from one program, 41.6% reported receiving funding from two programs, 22.1% from three programs, and 1.4% from all four programs mentioned. This means that most of the beneficiaries of the *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* receive benefits from several programs. That's why most reported receiving 500 pesos or more, and 19.7% reported receiving more than one thousand pesos.




Figure IX.36. Percentage of Households that have a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* that Receive Money from the Four Different Programs, D.R., 2010

Figure IX.37 shows regression analysis explaining who has a *Tarjeta*. This allows us to know which households are more likely to receive the benefits of this program. The households of people who identified themselves as members or sympathizers of the PRD or the PLD are more likely to have a card than independents, and the likelihood of having a card is slightly higher in the case of the PLD than in the PRD. There is no significant relationship in the case of the PRSC. The graph also shows that the poor and less educated are more likely to have a card, which means that the benefits from the card are reaching low-income sectors. In fact, wealth and education have greater effects than partisan identification on the probability of having a card. The other variables in the regression analysis: age, gender, place of residence, race and civic participation have no statistically significant effects.




Figure IX.37. Which households have a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*?, 2010




Figure IX.38. Influence of Education, Wealth and Partisan Sympathies on having a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, D.R., 2010

Figure IX.38 charts the effects of the statistically significant relationships. 54.3% of people with no schooling said they had a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, compared with 15.3% of those with higher education. A similar percentage ratio is present in the case of wealth quintiles: less wealth produces a higher likelihood of having the card (those in quintile 1 have less wealth.) With regard to party affiliation (supporters and members), the highest percentage shown is for the PLD, with 41.4% of people who sympathize or belong to the PLD having the card, compared with only 26.8% of those who said they had no party identification. The percentage closest to the PLD is the PRD, with 36.9% of PRD sympathizers having the card. This suggests that identifying with one of the two major parties increases the probability of having the card. In the case of PRSC no statistically significant relationship exists, and the gray box in the chart is large because there are not many supporters of the PRSC in the sample, so there is little reliability in the estimated percentage.

Conclusion

The data in this chapter show that despite the weakening of political parties, Dominican society continues to express a significant loyalty to these organizations. Although, it has declined to 54.5% sympathizing with a party. Compared to previous years, the level of partisan sympathy in the Dominican Republic remains high relative to other countries in the region, where only four countries exceeded 50%. People most sympathetic to the parties are those with right-wing ideology, those who have a more positive perception of their economic situation, public employees and those who are older.

Ideological self-identification in Dominican society leans toward the right but, in the 2010 survey, the data show a shift toward the center, and the change is significant when compared with the average for 2006. On a scale of 0-100, where higher numbers mean greater identification with the right, the Dominican average in 2006 was 69.2 points but in 2010 was only 59.8 points. Supporters of the PRSC and PLD, on average, identify more with the right, and those without party identification (46% of the population) identify less with the right.

With respect to the parties' performance, the population expresses a moderate rating of 43.9 on the assessment scale. People with more right-wing ideology and those who are sympathetic to any political party tend to approve more of the parties' efforts. On the other hand, older people, those with higher educational attainment and men show less approval of the parties' work.

Regarding limits on re-election, the Dominican population is divided in their preference: 40% expressed total opposition to re-election, while 60% support some form of re-election, either for a single period or multiple periods.

Ratings of government effectiveness were moderate in 2010 and also showed a decline over the past two years. The highest approval of government performance is in the area of promoting democratic principles, and the lowest value is for the item on government combating unemployment. The average level of government performance is 48.3 points, which suggests a moderate evaluation of effectiveness. In regional comparison figure, the Dominican Republic appears near the midpoint in the list of countries. We also observed a slight deterioration in the assessment of government economic performance between 2008 and 2010, but the difference is not statistically significant. One factor that affects the perception of government performance is respondents' views of the economic crisis: those who perceive the crisis to be worse, evaluated government performance more negatively.

For the first time in 2010, the *AmericasBarometer* included specific questions about electoral clientelism. The Dominican Republic leads the region with an average of 18.4 points on the clientelism scale, or put another way, 22% of respondents said they received an offer of clientelism during an election campaign. Regression analysis showed that gender and age have statistically significant relationships with receiving clientelist offers. Women and older people report receiving fewer offers than men and those who are younger. Being a supporter of the PLD increases offers of clientelism, but the statistical relationship is not as strong as with gender and age. Most people who said they had received offers of clientelism (22% of respondents) indicated that it made them less inclined to vote for that party. These data, which could be as suspect, should be understood in terms of the rationality of the interviewees and the nature of our exploration of the subject. With so few questions it is difficult to determine

whether or not clientelist offers have significant impacts on voting. It may have no effect, it could be that it does and many people did not want to admit it, or it is possible that many already had their preference formulated and did not consider the clientelist offer to be an influential factor.

Also for the first time in the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*, the survey incorporated questions about the social program known as *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. A third of people surveyed said they or someone in their household have the card. Of these, 76% said they receive 500 pesos or more per month, and 65% receive benefits from more than one program. The primary beneficiaries are people with low education and limited wealth. Also, sympathizing or belonging to the PLD or the PRD increases the probability of having a card, with the effect being slightly larger for the PLD.

Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter IX

Additional Table IX.1. Analysis of Partisan Affiliation, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Educación	-0.167*	(-2.17)
Edad	0.287*	(3.80)
Mujer	-0.068	(-1.12)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.253*	(-2.95)
Urbano	0.059	(0.88)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.404*	(-4.33)
Indio	-0.266*	(-2.59)
Mulato	-0.174*	(-2.16)
Recibe remesas del exterior	0.086	(1.62)
Empleado público	0.389*	(6.03)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.170*	(2.32)
Ideología	0.355*	(6.74)
Constante	0.341*	(4.53)
F = 11.47		
N. de casos = 1165		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IX.2. Analysis of “Democracy can Exist without Political Parties,” D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	-0.149*	(-4.03)
Educación	-0.097*	(-2.44)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.002	(-0.06)
Urbano	0.077*	(2.52)
Mujer	-0.014	(-0.48)
Simpatiza con un partido	-0.047	(-1.30)
Apoyo al trabajo de los partidos	0.030	(0.76)
Ideología	0.126*	(3.81)
Constante	0.050	(1.89)
R-cuadrado = 0.040		
N. de casos = 1071		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IX.3. Analysis of Support for the Work of the Parties, D.R., 2010 (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Negro/Afro-dominicano	-0.057	(-1.93)
Indio	-0.037	(-1.18)
Mulato	-0.024	(-0.71)
Edad	-0.132*	(-3.86)
Nivel educativo	-0.106*	(-2.68)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.029	(-0.85)
Urbano	-0.015	(-0.42)
Mujer	0.070*	(2.00)
Simpatiza con un partido	0.116*	(4.08)
Ideología	0.140*	(4.49)
Constante	0.043	(1.46)
R-cuadrado = 0.072		
N. de casos = 1090		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IX.4. Analysis of Receiving a Clientelist Offer, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	-0.283*	(-3.30)
Educación	-0.006	(-0.07)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.116	(-1.45)
Urbano	-0.074	(-1.16)
Mujer	-0.191*	(-3.41)
Indio	0.078	(0.79)
Mulato	0.055	(0.77)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.075	(0.89)
PLD	0.172	(1.98)
PRD	0.034	(0.44)
PRSC	0.048	(0.77)
Constante	-1.301*	(-18.25)
F = 2.59		
N. de casos = 1442		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table IX.5. Analysis of having a Tarjeta de Solidaridad, D.R., 2010 (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Edad	-0.127	(-1.83)
Educación	-0.369*	(-5.46)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.446*	(-5.96)
Urbano	0.088	(0.95)
Mujer	0.096	(1.48)
Indio	0.071	(0.80)
Mulato	-0.018	(-0.19)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.106	(1.23)
PLD	0.288*	(5.36)
PRD	0.122*	(2.33)
PRSC	0.011	(0.16)
Participación en la comunidad	0.038	(0.67)
Constante	-0.784*	(-8.91)
F = 9.03		
N. de caso = 1432		
* p<0.05		

Chapter X. Gender, Migration and Race

Gender

Since the mid-70s the Dominican Republic has been in a process of economic and political transformation that has favored the modification of social attitudes and practices in gender relations. The country achieved higher levels of industrialization, urbanization, and integration into the global economy through migration, tourism, trade and communications; in addition, 1978 marked a democratic transition, and that regime has now been in place for more than 30 years.

Since the 1980s, the social pressure to expand citizens' rights and improve the quality of democracy has increased significantly with the emergence of various civil society organizations and NGOs with a reform agenda. In the case of women, the efforts to provide education and assistance, above all with international financial assistance, have been remarkable, and in general, in the 1990s, gender issues and the incorporation of women into politics was an important component in programs of various public and private institutions.

Against this backdrop of change, we ask again, as in previous *AmericasBarometer* reports: how much has changed in Dominican society in recent decades with regard to conceptions of gender in terms of social equality and women's participation in politics? One way to address these questions, as in this study, is through public opinion surveys that provide an idea of how the public thinks about the participation of women.

Data from surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic over the last two decades show significant changes in public opinion with regard to gender rights and acceptance of women's equality in the public and domestic realms. Several factors account for this phenomenon, including the inclusion of women in the education system and the labor market, as well as work to promote gender education, which has been done by several women's organizations and the media.

This change of opinion, which is favorable for the increased participation of women in politics, has been accompanied by legislative reforms that encourage participation. This happened with the approval of a gender quota in 1997, which established that a minimum of 25% of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and municipal councils must be women. Then in 2000, the quota was increased to 33% in order to accelerate the process of incorporation. This minimum of 33% has not yet achieved concrete results at the congressional or municipal level, but the share has served to keep the issue of women's political representation on the public agenda.

The 2010 *AmericasBarometer* includes a set of questions that try to capture people's views about the rights of women to social and political equality. The survey includes a battery of questions that has been used since the early 1990s in the DEMOS surveys to capture views about women's political participation. Five of the questions are used to construct a scale of support for participation, which summarizes the opinion changes in the Dominican population for two decades. These questions are:

DOMW6. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?
DOMW7. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política?
DOMW8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quién le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) LE DA IGUAL (NO LEER)
DOMW9. ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar? (1) Mayor (2) Menor (3) IGUAL (NO LEER)
DOMW10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: (1) No es conveniente que participe (2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan (3) Debe participar igual que el hombre

Figure X.1 shows the changes in opinion for the period 1994-2010 concerning the percentage of people who disagreed with the idea that politics is for men, who agree that women should participate more in politics, who agree that women should participate the same as men, who have the same level of confidence in male and female candidates, and who think that women have the same capacity as men to govern. That is, the figure summarizes the positions of the public with respect to the set of five questions that seek to capture public support for women’s participation in politics.

As can be seen in the graph, between 1994 and 2001 there was a noticeable change in favor of women’s political participation, but between 2004 and 2010, support levels have leveled out, declined, or been unstable. For 2010, the percentages of the five questions included in Figure X.1 are as follows: 57% disagree that politics is for men, 78% agree that women should participate more in politics, 76% agree that women should participate the same as men, 58% believe that female candidates are at least as trusted as male candidates, and 60% believe women have the same capacity as men to govern. This means that support for women to participate more in politics slightly decreased since 2008, but the level of support for women in the other four items increased slightly.




Figure X.1. Components of the Support for Women in Politics Scale, by Year

Figure X.2 shows a scale that was constructed with the five questions above, and reports the annual scale values for all respondents and by gender. The gender difference is statistically significant for 2010. The scale score for

women is 3.6 out of a maximum of 5 points and for men the score is 3.0. It is interesting to note that while in 1994 there was virtually no gender difference (hence the lines are overlapping on the graph), in the first decade of this century a statistical difference has emerged. This means that women are now more likely than men to accept women's right to political participation and representation. We must also add that although there is some variability, changes during the first decade of the 21st century did not show significant progress towards acceptance of women's political participation. The average score on the scale does not reach even 4 points.




Figure X.2. Scale of Support for Women in Politics, by Gender

In the regression analysis shown in Figure X.3, the dependent variable is the scale capturing support for women's political participation. As indicated by the bars, almost all independent variables included in the regression have an effect on the level of support. Those who are supportive of women working outside the home and who support women's participating in household decisions are the most supportive of women's participation in politics. In addition, people living in urban areas, those with more education and women themselves are also supportive of women's political participation.




Figure X.3. Regression of the Support for Women in Politics Scale, 2010

Figure X.4 illustrates the information presented in the regression with respect to age and educational level. Younger and better educated people show more support for women's political participation, and this is a consistent linear relationship in both cases.




Figure X.4. Influence of Age and Education on the Scale of Support for Women in Politics, 2010




Figure X.5. Relationships between Attitudes about Women at Work and in the Home and the Support for Women in Politics Scale, 2010

Figure X.5 presents data showing the relationships between views of women in the labor force and in household decision-making and support for women's political participation. In both cases there is a statistically significant relationship. People who believe that women should participate in household decisions are more likely to support women's political participation, and the same goes for people who believe that women should work, even if the income of the man is sufficient to maintain the household. These data show that the set of attitudes about gender equality are related. Support for the participation of women in the labor market and support for women in household decision-making also correspond with support for women's political participation.

Figure X.6 shows that independents express a higher level of support for women's political participation than people who identify with a political party, and among those who identify with a political party, those in the PRSC are least supportive. This corresponds with more conservative ideology, expressed in other questions. There is no

difference on this issue between those who identify with the PLD or PRD. The only statistically significant differences in this graph are between independents and supporters of the PRSC and between those in the PRSC and those in the PRD.




Figure X.6. Support for Women in Politics Scale, by Party or Independents, 2010

The survey questions on participation in household decisions and the labor market were the following:

DOMW11. ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?

- (1) Si, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza
- (2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza

DOMW12. ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar?

- (1) El hombre
- (2) La mujer
- (3) La mujer y el hombre

The bars in Figure X.7 indicate that a higher percentage of women than men believe that women can work irrespective of the man's income level, and the gender difference is statistically significant. This means that being a woman elevates the possibility that a person is in favor of women working outside the home.




Figure X.7. Support for Women at Work, by Gender, 2010

As in the previous question, women are also more likely than men to favor women's equality in the home, as shown in Figure X.8. More men than women believe that only men should make major household decisions, 47% and 37.5%, respectively, and the difference is statistically significant. More women than men feel that important household decisions should be made jointly, 56.3% and 47.7%, respectively. These numbers reveal that while men are almost split down the middle on these opinions, women are more inclined to favor joint decisions.




Figure X.8. How Household Decisions should be made, by Gender, 2010

In the area of reproductive rights, the *AmericasBarometer* asked two questions about abortion:

DOMW14A. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?

- (1) Sí, de acuerdo cuando peligra la salud de la madre
- (2) No está de acuerdo

DOMW14B. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo en caso de incesto o violación sexual?

- (1) Sí, de acuerdo en caso de incesto o violación
- (2) No está de acuerdo

The main results are shown in the graphs below. One presents the responses by gender, the second relates abortion attitudes to the importance of religion in a person's life, and the third shows the results by level of education.

The data in Figure X.9 show a difference of opinion on abortion depending on the circumstances. If there is a health risk to the mother, half of the population (50.8%) agrees with allowing abortion, and no significant gender difference is present. In the case of incest or rape, the support is much lower (25.5%). Given the complexity of this issue and the religious and moral burden involved, the two questions only allow a rough approximation of opinion on this topic.




Figure X.9. Attitudes about Abortion, by Sex, 2010

As indicated in Figure X.10, people for whom religion is an important aspect of their lives show less support for abortion rights in cases of the mother’s health and in cases of incest or rape. Figure X.11 shows that the educational level has a significant impact on attitudes toward abortion. People with secondary and higher education are above the national average in acceptance of abortion, while the opposite occurs with people who have only primary or no education. The greatest support for abortion when the health of the mother is in danger or in cases of incest or rape occurs among people with higher education; 77.3% of those with post-secondary education would accept abortion in cases of health risk to the mother and 46.8% in cases of incest or rape. The least support was found in people with the least education, 33.8% would accept abortion to protect the mother’s health and 16.0% would accept it in cases of incest or rape.




Figure X.10. Attitudes about Abortion, by the Importance of Religion, 2010




Figure X.11. Attitudes about Abortion, by Education, 2010

Migration

Migration is an issue of crucial importance for Dominican society due to strong migration flows into and out of the country. This migration circuit has economic, cultural and political causes and consequences. Migration to the Dominican Republic is primarily by Haitians, who are inserted in specific areas of the economy, above all in agriculture and construction. It is primarily a migration of poor workers with little education or occupational training. Given the historical conflicts between the two countries, this migration generates strong public controversies in Dominican society, which is why it is interesting to survey the views of the Dominican population toward Haitian immigrants.

Together with the strong Haitian migration flow, many Dominicans have migrated to the United States, Europe and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, for the same reasons that Haitians move to the Dominican Republic, seeking jobs and better life opportunities. In the last three decades, there have been numerous studies on Dominican migration, its transnational character, its contributions to Dominican society, and the challenges it presents. The *AmericasBarometer* does not cover this diversity of topics, but provides a baseline of knowledge about the importance of migration in Dominican households and the migratory intentions of the population.

First, we present data on Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic and Dominican attitudes toward immigrants in general, and then data on Dominican migration to other countries.

To assess the level of acceptance of Haitian migration among the Dominican population, the *AmericasBarometer* asked two questions:

DOMHAI1. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con que los hijos de inmigrantes haitianos nacidos en la República Dominicana sean ciudadanos dominicanos?

DOMHAI2. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o desacuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano otorgue permisos de trabajo a los haitianos indocumentados que viven en República Dominicana?

Figure X.12 shows that the average level of support for the idea that the children of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic be Dominican citizens does not reach 50 points in any of the years surveyed, although there has been an increase over the last four years, from 43.4 points in 2006 to 48.3 points in 2010. Opinion is less favorable for the government to grant work permits to undocumented Haitians, but 2010 marked the highest level of support at 42.4 points. In general, the data show a slight shift in favor of Haitian immigrants being granted basic labor rights and in favor of citizenship for the children of Haitians born in Dominican territory, although the level of support remains below 50 points on a 0-100 scale.




Figure X.12. Attitudes about the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2006-2010

The regression analysis presented in Figure X.13 shows the characteristics of people who have more favorable attitudes about the rights of Haitian immigrants, as expressed in questions **DOMHAI1** and **DOMHAI2** about the nationality of Haitian children born in the Dominican Republic and work permits for immigrants. Those who express greater support for democracy and greater political tolerance, those with more wealth, the young and those who identify themselves as black or Afro-Dominicans are most supportive of the rights of Haitian immigrants. The other variables in the regression analysis (perceptions of personal and national economic situations, place of residence, gender and education) did not show statistically significant effects on attitudes towards Haitians. The three graphs below show each of these statistically significant relationships.




Figure X.13. Determinants of Attitudes about the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010

Figure X.14 shows that high support for democracy translates into an increase of nearly 8 points in support for the rights of Haitians, from 42.0 to 49.9. Figure X.15 shows that political tolerance has an even more significant effect in favor of the rights of Haitians, with more tolerant people showing an average of 58.8 points of support for

Haitian rights. The graph also shows a considerable difference in support for the rights of Haitians among people with more and less wealth: higher levels of wealth are associated with greater support of those rights.




Figure X.14. Relationship between Support for Democracy and Support for the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010




Figure X.15. Relationships between Political Tolerance, Wealth and Support for the Rights of Haitians in the D.R., 2010

The *AmericasBarometer* in the Dominican Republic asked two questions about the rights of immigrants in general, without specifying the immigrants' country of origin in order to measure general attitudes toward immigration.

- DOMIMMIG2. En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los dominicanos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos?** [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]
- (1) Hacen los trabajos que los dominicanos ya no quieren
 - (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos
- DOMIMMIG3. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los inmigrantes indocumentados que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted...**
- (1) Muy de acuerdo
 - (2) Algo de acuerdo
 - (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
 - (4) Algo en desacuerdo
 - (5) Muy en desacuerdo

Almost 60% of the population believes that immigrants do jobs that Dominicans do not want, and the average score on the questions about not offering public services to immigrants is 42.9 points on a 0-100 scale. Although these questions are general, the fact that most immigrants in the Dominican Republic are Haitian may influence the answers in a specific way. Regardless, a high percentage of the population does not assign full blame to migrants for their presence in the country, but recognizes that they perform jobs that Dominicans do not want to do. In the social dynamic, this fact may mitigate negative reactions to migrant populations.




Figure X.16. Attitudes about Immigrants, D.R., 2010

Figure X.17 displays a regression analysis with the objective of showing who is more likely to believe that immigrants do the jobs that Dominicans do not want. The horizontal bars show, paradoxically, that there is no significant relationship between permanent or temporary unemployment and attitudes about the work of immigrants. The two variables that have significant effects on attitudes about the work situations of immigrants are wealth and education. Greater wealth and more education are associated with greater proclivity to say that immigrants take jobs that Dominicans do not want.




Figure X.17. Who is more inclined to accept immigrants as people who do jobs that Dominicans do not want?, 2010

Figure X.18 clearly illustrates the significant relationships of wealth and education with the view that immigrants take jobs that Dominicans do not want to do.




Figure X.18. Relationships of Wealth and Education with the Perception that Immigrants only do Jobs that Dominicans do not Want, 2010

We also conducted regression analysis of the second question concerning whether immigrants should be offered social services like health and education. The regression analysis shown in Figure X.19 reveals that two factors have statistically significant impacts on support for providing social services to immigrants: age and opinions about the state of the national economy. Older respondents and those with more negative views of the national economy are more opposed to providing social services to immigrants. Figure X.20 shows these statistical correlations.




Figure X.19. Who is more inclined to disagree with offering social services to immigrants?, D.R., 2010




Figure X.20. Relationships of National Economic Evaluations and Age with the Scale Measuring Disagreement with Providing Social Services to Immigrants, 2010

Dominican migration to other countries is one of the most important themes to explore given its broad impact on society. Remittances and transnationalism have been studied in several studies because of their impact on Dominican economic, social and political life. The questions included in the *AmericasBarometer* seek to generate comparative information on some points of significance for understanding the nature of the emigration phenomenon. Below is a list of questions that were formulated concerning Dominican migration.

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No</p>
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada</p>
<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses? (1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses</p>
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo "Sí", preguntar ¿en dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en estados Unidos)</p>
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca</p>
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No</p>

Figure X.21 shows that the magnitude of remittances varies throughout the region. Countries could be classified into three groups based on the amount of remittances received. In the first group are the countries where more than 20% of the surveyed population reported receiving remittances in their household. The Dominican Republic is in this group. The second group includes countries with a rate of 5 to 20% of households receiving remittances, and the rest of the countries are in the third group. The countries falling in the first group are all less developed. In the other two groups there is a mix of countries located at different stages of development.




Figure X.21. Percentage who Receive Remittances, by Country, 2010

In the Dominican case, the data show that the surveyed population reports a decline in remittance income. Forty-four percent said their remittance incomes had declined over the past 12 months, which could be a sign of the effect of international economic crisis on the employment of the Dominican migrant population, which affects their ability to send remittances. While from 2000 to 2008 remittances to the Dominican Republic consistently increased from \$1.689 million to \$3.221 million, preliminary Central Bank data from 2009 show a reduction, for a total remittance amount of \$3.041 million, and the reduction was steady in each month of 2009. That 44% of the 22.5% who reported receiving remittances indicate that they received less in 2009 fits well with the decrease in remittances for the year as identified with data from the Dominican Central Bank.




Figure X.22. Changes in the Quantity of Remittances Received in the Past Year, D.R., 2010




Figure X.23. Percentage with Close Family Members Living Abroad, by Country, 2010

Regarding migration, the Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate place compared to other countries with respect to the percentage of the population surveyed who have relatives who once lived with them (i.e., close relatives) who are now residing abroad. It is also interesting to note the similarity in the percentage who said they have close relatives abroad (28.4%), and the percentage who reported receiving remittances (22.5%). This suggests that a high proportion of Dominican immigrants send remittances to their families. This is unlike other countries in

the region where the percentage of the population with close relatives abroad is much higher than the percentage who reported receiving remittances. For example, in Mexico, 20.3% of respondents said they had close relatives abroad, but only 6.4% reported receiving remittances. In Costa Rica, 16.8% said they had close relatives abroad, but only 4.2% reported receiving remittances. In Uruguay, 19% said they had close relatives abroad and only 3.3% reported receiving remittances.

Despite the increase in Dominican migration to various destinations, the majority of Dominican immigrants are still located in the United States. Of 28.4% of respondents who said they had close relatives abroad, 64% reported that their relatives were just in the U.S., 12.7% had family in the U.S. and other countries, and 23.1% only in other countries. The level of communication with family members abroad is particularly high. More than half, 55.1%, said they communicated at least once a week, as shown in Figure X.25. Only 18.1% said they did not communicate or communicate infrequently.




Figure X.24. Where do family members abroad reside?, D.R., 2010




Figure X.25. Communication with Family Living Abroad, D.R., 2010

In addition to the direct ties to relatives abroad, either through remittances or direct communication, the survey included a general question about the desire of the surveyed population to emigrate. The percentage of Dominicans

who intend to go live or work in another country has varied slightly over the past four years. The highest percentage was in 2006 with 35.9% and the lowest was in 2008 at 24.3%, while in 2010, 30.3% expressed an intention to live or work abroad. This variability over times is difficult to explain. The 2008 survey was conducted mid-year, before the onset of the international economic crisis, which could have been a deterrent for migration to developed countries from 2009 onward.




Figure X.26. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, by Country, 2010




Figure X.27. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, D.R., 2006-2010

Who wants to emigrate? Those most likely to have plans to migrate are younger people, those with more education (although the intention to migrate decreases among those with a university degree), and those with greater wealth. This last figure may seem paradoxical because wealth is associated with greater well-being and, therefore, would seem to produce less desire to emigrate. Thus, this information should be cause for reflection, because if more wealth and higher levels of education become factors increasing the intention to emigrate, this suggests the Dominican Republic not only has difficulty providing good living conditions for the poorest, but also to sectors with more purchasing power.




Figure X.28. Percentage with Intentions to go Live or Work Abroad, by Age, Wealth and Education, D.R., 2010

Race

The issue of race has historically been of great importance in Dominican society and in studies of Dominican society. The issue is particularly complex because it is intertwined with that of nationality. Haiti, with a predominantly black population, is the neighboring country, and Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has been significant for a long time, above all to perform difficult, low wage jobs. This migration has kept alive the historical tension between the two countries, which originates from the time of independence in the first part of the 19th century, when Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic for 22 years.

Determining a person's race is no easy task. Who makes the determination, the person concerned or others? What social implications are assumed with a particular racial identification, or should racial identification be associated with the physical characteristics of a specific racial group?

In order to provide information relevant to explaining these and other questions pertaining to the racial issue, the *AmericasBarometer* asked a number of questions. The first is racial self-identification, i.e., what racial group a person identifies with. In the comparative questionnaire for the countries included in this study, the question is worded in ethnic terms (hence, the code is ETID). The reason for this is that in many countries the differences are not only color, but also ethnic, in effect cultural and/or linguistic. For most Dominicans, however, the question ETID, shown below, has a predominantly racial reference point, skin color and other physical characteristics, not ethnicity. When presenting the data, then, the question must be understood with its specific connotation in the Dominican case.

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza (india), mulata, negra u otra?

(1) Blanca (2) Indio (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Afro-dominicana (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

Figure X.29 shows that most respondents (68.6%) consider themselves *indio*, followed by *mulatto* at 11.2%, 10.5% black and 9.7% white. The term "*indio*" has been criticized because it may serve to conceal the condition of blackness in the Dominican population, and also because it has been adopted without a palpable indigenous tradition in the Dominican Republic. However, the question **ETID** in the Dominican case includes the possible response because it captures a common form of racial identification in the Dominican population. The term Afro-Dominican was added to the survey in 2010 due to the relevance the term Afro-descendant has taken in some Latin American countries. In the Dominican case, however, only 2 people chose this option. With so few in this category, they were included with the black self-identification for purposes of the analysis.




Figure X.29. Racial Self-identification, D.R., 2010

In order to have another way of capturing the color of respondents, interviewers, after concluding the interview and without questioning the respondent, marked on a palette the color that came closest to the skin color of the face of the person interviewed. Below is the instruction given to the interviewers:

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] ___ Paleta de marcar, (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]

Figure X.30 shows the results of this item. From the perspective of the interviewers, 92.2% of respondents in the Dominican Republic were located between 3 and 8, not too white or too black, but with a greater proportion in the range of 3 to 6, toward lighter skin color.




Figure X.30. Skin Color Classified by Interviewer, D.R., 2010

Figure X.31 cross-tabulates racial self-identification and skin color identification by the interviewers. The 1 to 10 scale of skin color identification was rescaled to range from 0 to 100. The numbers on the bars reflect the average color identification made by the interviewers for each self-identified group in the categories of white, *indio*, mulatto and black. That is, people who self-identified as white received an average score of 24.7 points on the interviewer racial identification scale. People who identified themselves as *indio*, were placed on average at 43.8 points, towards the middle, though slightly more toward white. People who self-identified as mulatto were placed, on average, very close to those self-identified as Indian. This means that, on average, the interviewers did not see much difference in skin color between individuals who self-identified as *indio* or as mulatto. In the case of people who self-identified as black, respondents averaged 69.6 points on the interviewer scale, closer to black on the color palette, which has a maximum of 100 points. In this regard, Figure X.31 shows more or less the same result as Figure X.30, that most people were placed by interviewers between the number 3 and 7 on the scale of 1 to 10 used in the interview. Put another way, there is a correlation between how respondents self-identified racially and how interviewers identified them.




Figure X.31. Skin Color (classified by interviewer) by Racial Self-Identification, D.R., 2010

Figure X.32 shows the average level of wealth in terms of how respondents self-identified racially, and how the interviewers identified them. The wealth scale ranges from 1 to 5 points. We observe some correlation between racial self-identification and wealth, but there are no statistically significant wealth differences between the different self-identified racial categories. The right side of the graph shows the average wealth by the interviewers' racial identification. Here we observe a stronger relationship between race and wealth. These data may indicate a real correlation between racial identification as coded by a third-party and wealth. But it could also be that the interviewers rated poor people as more black. This cannot be determined with the available data, but we can say that when interviewers make the racial identification, there is a statistically significant correspondence with wealth: those with lighter skin are richer than those of darker skin.




Figure X.32. Wealth of Self-Identified Ethnic Groups and Interviewer-Classified Skin Color Groups, D.R., 2010

In Figure X.33 we correlate self-identification and interviewer racial identification with years of education. In the case of self-identification, we observe no statistically significant differences, except in the case of self-identified mulattoes who have higher levels of schooling. However, there is a statistically significant linear relationship between racial identification made by the interviewers and education. People who were identified as darker have less schooling. As mentioned previously in the case of wealth, this may mean that skin color and education are statistically related, with less education for those of darker skin, or it could be that people with less wealth and education were identified by the interviewers at the end of the survey as darker, which we also suggested concerning the correlation with wealth.




Figure X.33. Years of Education by Ethnic Groups Classified by Self-Identification and by Interviewer-Identified Skin Color, D.R., 2010

Next, we discuss some racial attitudes in the Dominican Republic with several questions from the 2010 *AmericasBarometer*.

RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para República Dominicana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?

RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona de color más oscuro. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?

RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?

Figure X.34 shows the average response to these three questions. Each variable was converted to a 0-100 scale, where higher numbers indicate greater agreement with the idea expressed. The first bar shows a tendency to think that the mixing of races is not good. Average agreement with the statement that mixing is good does not reach 50 points. There is greater acceptance of children marrying darker people, as the average for that question is 64 points. The average for the final question of 26.9 points indicates that Dominicans tend not to want lighter skin.




Figure X.34. Attitudes about Racial Issues, D.R., 2010

In the next three figures, we compare the Dominican Republic with the other countries where the questions **RAC3**, **RAC3B** and **RAC3C** were asked. Figure X.35 shows comparative data for question **RAC3**. Here the Dominican Republic has the lowest level of accepting the idea that the mixing of races is good for the country, and the difference with the other countries is statistically significant. Figure X.36 shows comparative data for **RAC3B**, a question about a child marrying a person of darker color. Here, although the Dominican average is not so low, it is the smallest of the countries analyzed. The difference with Bolivia and Peru is not statistically significant, but it is statistically lower than the other countries. Figure X.37 shows comparative data for the **RAC3C** question about the desire for lighter skin. In Bolivia, Peru and Mexico, there is a greater tendency for people to want lighter skin than in the Dominican Republic, and with Bolivia and Peru the difference is statistically significant, but not in the case of Mexico.




Figure X.35. Support for the Idea that the Mixing of Races is Good for the Country, by Country, 2010




Figure X.36. Acceptance of a Child Marrying Someone with Darker Skin, by Country, 2010




Figure X.37. Attitude that the Respondent would like to have Lighter Skin, by Country, 2010

Now we show data about questions that try to capture perceptions of racial discrimination in society and personal experiences regarding this issue. The questions are:

RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas de color más oscuro son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?

- (1) Mucho mejor
- (2) Mejor
- (3) Igual
- (4) Peor
- (5) Mucho peor

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿Ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente:

RAC1A. Por su color de piel? muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?

y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta:

DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?

The answers to the question RAC4 were rescaled to range from 0-100 points, where higher values mean greater perceived racial discrimination. In Figure X.38, the Dominican Republic is in an intermediate position among the countries where we asked the question about whether or not people of darker color are treated worse. In Figure X.39, higher values on the 0-100 scale mean that the respondent reports observing more cases of discrimination. Dominicans reported seeing more cases of discrimination based on skin color than respondents in other countries, with the exception of Bolivia, which exceeds the Dominican Republic in perceived discrimination. Figure X.40 shows data on the frequency with which respondents reported having been discriminated against in the past 5 years. While many Dominicans said they had observed discrimination towards other people, few said they had been victims of racial discrimination. So the Dominican Republic registers a low average in this figure.




Figure X.38. Perception that People with Darker Skin are Treated Worse, by Country, 2010




Figure X.39. Scale of Living or Observing Situations in which others were Victims of Racial Discrimination, by Country, 2010




Figure X.40. Scale of Feeling Discriminated against because of Skin Color, by Country, 2010

Conclusion

In this chapter, we addressed three issues: gender, migration and race. On gender, the topics discussed were the political participation of women, equal rights at home and in paid work, and reproductive rights.

Once again, we worked with the political participation scale that has been used in the previous *AmericasBarometers* and that contains five items: disagreement with the idea that politics is for men only, agreement with the idea that women should participate more in politics, agreement that women should participate equally with men, at least equal trust in the candidacies of women and men, and belief that women have at least the same capacity as men to govern. While between 1994 and 2001 there was a noticeable change favoring women’s political participation, between 2004 and 2010 support levels have stagnated, declined, or become unstable. In 2010, support for the idea that women should participate more in politics fell slightly, but support for the political participation of women measured using the other four items increased slightly over the 2008 survey. The score for women on the support for women’s participation scale is 3.6 out of a maximum of 5 points, and for men it is 3.0. While in 1994 there was virtually no gender difference on the scale, in the first decade of this century a statistical difference between men and women emerged. This means that women have become more likely than men to accept women’s rights to political participation and representation. The changes during the first decade of the 21st century do not show significant progress towards wide public acceptance of women’s political participation, as the averages on the scale still do not reach 4 even points. Concerning the domestic arena and access to work, women are more likely than men to favor women’s equality. In the field of reproductive rights, specifically in the case of abortion, no significant differences by gender emerge, but level of religiosity and educational level are relevant for attitudes toward abortion. The more religious reject abortion rights, while the more educated are more accepting.

Regarding granting rights to Haitian immigrants, the data show resistance, although average acceptance increased slightly in 2010. The average level of support for citizenship being granted to children of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic is 48.3 points. Opinion is less favorable toward granting work permits to undocumented

Haitians, at 42.4 points, although this score is higher than in 2006 and 2008. In general, the data show a slight shift in favor of Haitian immigrants being granted basic labor rights and citizenship when their children are born in Dominican territory, but all means remained below 50 points. Political tolerance has a very significant effect encouraging support for the rights of Haitian immigrants, with the most tolerant people averaging 58.8 points on the scale measuring support for the rights of Haitians. Sixty percent of the Dominican population thinks that immigrants in general do the jobs that Dominicans do not want to do, although the level of agreement that public services should be granted to immigrants is only 42.9 points. The elderly and those with more negative views of the national economy are more opposed to providing social services to immigrants.

Concerning Dominican migration, the country ranks among those that receive the most remittances, with 22.5% of respondents' households receiving remittances. But of these, 44% said their income from remittances had fallen in the last year. The majority of Dominican immigrants are still located in the United States, as reported by their families, and the level of communication with them is particularly high (more than half of those with family abroad, 55.1%, said they communicated with them at least once a week). As in previous surveys, about one-third of the Dominican population said they had intentions of going to live or work abroad in the coming years, and the intention to migrate is higher among younger people and those with more wealth.

On the issue of race, 68.6% of respondents self-identified as *indio*, 11.2% identified as Mulatto, 10.5% as black, and 9.7% as white. For another source of information about the skin color of the surveyed population, interviewers marked on a palette the color that came closest to the facial skin color of the interviewee. Interviewers placed 92.2% of respondents between the numbers 3 and 8, not too white or too black, but with a greater proportion in the 3 to 6 range, which represents lighter skin color. The cross-tabulation of racial self-identification and interviewer-classified skin color showed a significant correlation. This means that there was similarity in the way interviewees self-identified racially and how they were classified by the interviewers.

The data show some correlation between racial self-identification and wealth, but the difference was not statistically significant; however, the relationship was significant when using interviewer-identified skin color. These data may indicate a real correlation between racial identification and wealth, or it could be that the interviewers rated poor people as more black. With respect to years of schooling, we observe the same pattern. We found no statistically significant relationship in the case of self-identification, except that those who self-identified as mulattoes had higher levels of education. But there is a statistically significant linear relationship between interviewer-classified racial identification and education. People who were identified as having darker skin have less schooling.

The tendency in the Dominican Republic is to view racial mixing negatively, but there is more acceptance of children marrying people with darker skin, and the desire for lighter skin is not very pronounced. Dominicans report having witnessed incidents of racial discrimination more than in other surveyed countries, with the exception of Bolivia. But Dominicans are less likely to say they themselves have been victims of racial discrimination.

Appendix of Regression Tables in Chapter X

Additional Table X.1. Analysis of Support for Women in Politics (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Casado/Unido	0.019	(0.79)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.042	(1.52)
Educación	0.250*	(9.41)
Edad	0.069*	(3.03)
Urbano	0.049*	(2.11)
Mujer	0.130*	(4.93)
Los dos deben tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.245*	(9.91)
La mujer debe tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.113*	(5.06)
Apoyo a la mujer en el trabajo	0.178*	(8.76)
Constante	-0.002	(-0.10)
R-cuadrado = 0.268		
N. de casos = 1354		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table X.2. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Attitudes about Haitians (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Educación	0.076	(1.91)
Mujer	0.023	(0.91)
Edad	-0.076*	(-2.27)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.086*	(2.37)
Urbano	0.053	(1.62)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.045	(1.38)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.033	(0.97)
Tolerancia Política	0.097*	(3.04)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.074*	(2.72)
Negro/Afro-dominicano	0.078*	(2.54)
Indio	-0.035	(-0.82)
Mulato	-0.053	(-1.50)
Constante	-0.000	(-0.01)
R-cuadrado = 0.071		
N. de casos = 1339		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table X.3. Analysis of the Variables: Immigrants do Jobs that Dominicans do not want (Logistic Regression)

	Coef.	t
Educación	0.298*	(4.20)
Mujer	0.090	(1.69)
Edad	0.027	(0.46)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.244*	(3.43)
Urbano	0.088	(1.29)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.076	(1.09)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.069	(1.12)
Temporalmente desempleado	-0.030	(-0.56)
Desempleado	-0.016	(-0.28)
Por decisión propia no trabaja	0.004	(0.07)
Constante	0.404*	(6.39)
F = 8.32		
N. de casos = 1365		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table X.4. Analysis of the Scale Measuring Disagreement that the Government Offer Social Services to Immigrants (Regression)

	Coef.	t
Educación	-0.014	(-0.47)
Mujer	-0.047	(-1.62)
Edad	0.082*	(2.89)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.049	(-1.51)
Urbano	-0.006	(-0.18)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.075*	(-2.75)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.048	(-1.55)
Constante	0.003	(0.08)
R-cuadrado = 0.027		
N. de casos = 1453		
* p<0.05		

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Technical Description of the Sample

1. POBLACIÓN

La Población objeto para este estudio está constituida por la población civil no institucional residentes en el país de 18 años o más en pleno ejercicio de sus facultades físicas y legales.

2. UNIVERSO

El Universo de la encuesta contemplará una cobertura nacional, 32 Provincias representadas en 225 Municipios que conforman las cuatro regiones en que se divide geográficamente el país: I Metropolitana, II Norte, III Este y IV Sur, y por demarcación urbana y rural.

3. MARCO MUESTRAL

El marco de muestreo está constituido por el inventario cartográfico y el listado de viviendas por zona urbana y rural, obtenidos de la información del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda de 2002.

El país está organizado de la siguiente manera:

DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO ADMINISTRATIVA

- **Región:** Es una división geográfica operativa, que divide al país en cuatro áreas con el criterio de proximidad.
- **Provincia:** Es la delimitación más grande de la división Política-administrativa de la República Dominicana, la misma está constituida por municipios o distrito municipales.
- **Municipio o Distrito Municipal:** Es la delimitación constituida por Secciones.
- **Sección:** Es la delimitación que está formada por barrios si es en zona urbana, y por parajes en la zona rural. Esta división clasifica la zona de residencia en urbano-rural.
- **Barrio/Paraje:** Es la delimitación más pequeña de la división Política-administrativa, cuando es urbano ésta delimitación recibe el nombre de barrio, cuando es rural recibe el nombre de paraje.

División Política-administrativa		
REGIÓN	PROVINCIA	MUNICIPIO / DISTRITO MUNICIPAL
Metro	2	9
Norte	14	105
Este	6	32
Sur	10	79
TOTAL	32	225

DIVISIÓN CENSAL

- **Polígonos:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de diez (10) áreas de supervisión.
- **Áreas de Supervisión Censal (ASC):** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de cinco (5) segmentos censales.
- **Segmentos Censales:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo. Es la delimitación más pequeña de la División Censal, contiene de 12 a 24 hogares en la zona rural y de 25 a 35 hogares en la zona urbana.

4. UNIDADES DE OBSERVACIÓN-UNIDAD FINAL DE SELECCIÓN

La **unidad final de observación** es el hogar y la persona debe pertenecer a un solo hogar. A su vez, todo hogar habita una vivienda que puede ser compartida con otros hogares. La vivienda es una unidad fácil de identificar en el terreno, con cierta permanencia en el tiempo, por lo que será considerada como la **unidad final de selección**, identificada en un segmento censal.

5. TAMAÑO DE LA MUESTRA

El tamaño de la muestra es de 1500 entrevistas efectivas a nivel nacional, distribuidas por regiones y áreas.

6. ESTRATIFICACIÓN

La primera estratificación consiste en la división del país en cuatro (4) Regiones, a saber; I Región Metropolitana, II Región Norte, III Región Este, IV Región Sur.

La segunda estratificación consistió en dividir la población entre demarcación urbana y rural, utilizando para ello el criterio establecido por la Oficina Nacional de Estadística (ONE) en el Censo Nacional de Población y Familia del año 2002. La región Metropolitana será considerada con demarcación Urbana en su totalidad.

7. MÉTODO DE MUESTREO

El diseño de muestreo es probabilístico hasta la selección de la vivienda, estratificado, y polietápico por Conglomerados, con selección aleatoria de unidades en cada etapa.

Probabilístico: cada elemento de la población bajo estudio tiene una probabilidad conocida, y diferente de cero, de ser seleccionado en la muestra.

Estratificado: las unidades de observación se agrupan con base a características similares, por Regiones (I-IV) y por áreas (urbano y rural).

Polietápico por Conglomerados: las unidades de observación se seleccionan a través de las siguientes etapas.

Definiciones:

Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM): Municipios

Unidades Secundarias de Muestreo (USM): Áreas de Supervisión Censal que comprenden alrededor de 160 viviendas en promedio.

Unidades Terciarias de Muestreo (UTM): Segmentos Censales que en general comprenden entre 25 a 35 viviendas en las áreas urbanas y de 12 a 24 en las áreas rurales, en los casos en que la cantidad de viviendas sea menor a 8 se formarán grupos de Segmentos Censales conformados por un conjunto de viviendas no menor a 8 en el área urbana y no menor a 12 en las áreas rurales.

Unidades Finales de Selección (UFS): Conglomerados de tamaño 6 a 8 en el área urbana y de 10 a 12 en el área rural.

Unidad Final de Observación: Son las viviendas y dentro de estas, el hogar.

Vivienda: Se define como vivienda, todo local o recinto estructuralmente separado e independiente que ha sido construido, hecho o convertido para fines de alojamiento permanente o temporal de personas, así como cualquier clase de albergue fijo o móvil, ocupado como lugar de alojamiento a la fecha de un censo o una encuesta.

Comentario: La vivienda puede estar construida por un conjunto de cuartos o un cuarto, apartamento o casa destinada a alojar a un grupo de personas o a una sola persona.

Hogar censal: Es la unidad formada por personas o grupos de persona, con o sin vínculos familiares; que comparten la misma vivienda y los mismos servicios y mantienen un presupuesto común para comer. Pueden ocupar toda la vivienda o parte de la misma.

Familia: Grupo de personas emparentadas entre sí o que viven juntas.

Unidad Final de Estudio: En cada unidad de vivienda de estos conglomerados se seleccionará solamente un hogar como Unidad de Observación; finalmente en cada hogar visitado se seleccionará para entrevistar **a uno y sólo un adulto** en edad de votar. La selección del informante específico a entrevistar corresponde al entrevistador, quien tiene como única limitación el cumplimiento de la cuota asignada.

Este diseño permite proveer estimaciones confiables para las principales variables y características socio-demográficas consideradas en el estudio, para los siguientes grupos:

- nivel nacional para la población de referencia

- por región geográfica (I-IV)
- por área urbano y rural.

8. NIVELES DE CONFIANZA Y MARGENES DE ERROR.

Para una muestra de 1500 el nivel de confianza previsto para toda la muestra nacional fue del 95% ($Z_{.95} = 1.965$), con un margen de error de ± 2.5 , asumiendo una proporción 50/50 ($P = 50, Q = 1 - P$) para variables dicotómicas, en el peor de los casos.

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n}}$$

Donde

E = Intervalo de error probable

P = Porcentaje de población con un atributo dado del 50%.

Q = $(1 - P)$ Porcentaje de población sin el atributo considerado en $P, Q = 50\%$

Z = Valor de la distribución normal. Para un nivel de confianza del 95%, este valor es 1.965.

n = Tamaño de muestra.

El error cometido a nivel nacional es 2.54%, esto es considerando un muestreo aleatorio simple; como este es un diseño polietápico por conglomerado, debemos considerar el efecto del diseño (DEF) (Seligson y Córdova 2004, 184).

DEF = Efecto de diseño. Relación de varianzas del diseño de muestras utilizado por conglomerados, respecto a un muestreo simple aleatorio.

$$DEF = \frac{Var(M.Comglomerados)}{Var(MAS)}$$

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ * (DEF)}{n}}$$

El DEF ha sido estimado por estudios similares realizados el año 2005, el cual varía entre 1.5 y 2.1, dependiendo de la región y la demarcación.

El error cometido a nivel nacional considerando el efecto del diseño promedio (1.8), es de 3.40%.

Estimaciones de DEF según demarcación y regiones:

Demarcación	DEF ESTIMADO
Urbano	1.55
Rural	2.06
Total Nacional	1.8

Regiones	DEF ESTIMADO
I. Metro	1.6
II. Norte	1.75
III. Este	1.5
IV. Sur	1.5

El error cometido por región y por demarcación se muestra en la siguiente tabla:

Distribución de la Muestra por Región , por Demarcación y Margen de Error			
Regiones	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
I. Metro	469	4.59	5.81
II. Norte	533	4.09	5.41
III. Este	240	6.91	8.47
IV. Sur	258	6.07	7.43

Demarcación	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
Urbana	1096	3.03	3.77
Rural	404	4.63	6.65
Total Nacional	1500	2.53	3.40

9. AJUSTE POR NO COBERTURA

Para asegurar la eficiencia, suficiencia y precisión de la muestra se adoptó un sistema de muestreo con ajuste por no cobertura, el cual garantiza la ejecución de la muestra con los tamaños estimados como mínimos dentro de los niveles de confianza y de error máximo permisible. El método es posible por el conocimiento que se tiene de la “No cobertura” observada en estudios similares.

Este ajuste consiste en aplicar a los tamaños de la muestra estimados para cada estrato, dominio un factor de no cobertura (t), con el cual se calcula el tamaño operativo final de selección (n^*) (Seligson y Córdova 2004, 186) dado por:

$$n^* = (1 + t)n$$

t = tasa de no entrevista. Esta tasa considera situaciones de no cobertura (no entrevista, rechazos, viviendas desocupadas, ausencia de adulto, o imposibilidad de entrevistarlos, entre otros eventos). Según la experiencia de Gallup República Dominicana en estudios similares, la tasa promedio de no entrevista es de 0.22.

$$n^* = (1 + 0.22)1500$$

$$n^* = 1830$$

De esta manera entonces, el tamaño final de la muestra será de 1830 unidades.

10. CALCULOS DE TAMAÑOS POR REGIÓN, POR ESTRATOS Y # DE UPMs

El Diseño de la muestra consideró asignación de unidades de selección para las 32 provincias del país, si bien la muestra no es suficiente para representar a la provincia respectiva, pero sí a las 4 regiones.

La cantidad de UPM a seleccionar será de 67. En la primera etapa de selección el número de Municipios (UPM) a seleccionar será de 1 Municipio por cada 25.000 viviendas por Región; la Región Metropolitana está formada por 9 municipios, todos serán considerados en la muestra. Las 58 Municipios faltantes se seleccionaron mediante muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

Una vez seleccionados los Municipios se determinó la población urbana y rural para la asignación de tamaños con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño, para la selección de las Áreas de Supervisión Censal (USM). La Región Metropolitana se consideró urbana en su totalidad. Para la selección de las USM, se utilizó un muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

De cada Área de Supervisión Censal (USM), se seleccionaron 2 Segmentos Censales (UTM), y de cada Segmento se seleccionará 1 conglomerado de tamaño 6 a 8 en la zona urbana y de 10 a 12 en la zona rural.

La distribución de las UPM, USM y UTM fue la siguiente:

REGIÓN	# UPM	# USM AREAS URBANAS	# USM AREAS RURAL	# USM AREAS TOTAL	# UTM SEGMENTOS URBANOS	# UTM SEGMENTOS RURALES	# UTM SEGMENTOS TOTAL
Metro	9	44	0	44	88	0	88
Norte	31	27	15	42	53	27	80
Este	11	12	4	16	24	8	32
Sur	16	12	7	19	24	14	38
TOTAL	67	91	26	117	189	49	238

Fuente: Junta Central Electoral

En total la muestra está constituida por 238 puntos de muestra: 189 urbanas y 49 rurales distribuidas en 225 Municipios de las 32 Provincias.

**UNIVERSO, POBLACION TOTAL DE VIVIENDA, POR REGIONES (METRO, NORTE, ESTE Y SUR)
Y POR DEMARCAACION (RURAL/URBANA)**

POBLACIÓN DE VIVIENDA, REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA SEGÚN CENSO 2002					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	1.519.247	669.381	453.016	196.601	200.249
Rural	666.059		388.465	96.951	180.643
Total	2.185.306	669.381	841.481	293.552	380.892

Distribución Porcentual					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	69,5%	100,0%	53,8%	67,0%	52,6%
Rural	30,5%	0,0%	46,2%	33,0%	47,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

11. EXIGENCIAS DEL ESTUDIO

- Cumplimiento de Cuota según Censo por Región de Género y Edad.

RANGO EDAD	POBLACIÓN		HOMBRES		MUJERES	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
18-29	1808883	35,1%	886160	34,9%	922723	35,3%
30-54	2424250	47,0%	1200802	47,3%	1223448	46,8%
>55	921602	17,9%	453789	17,9%	467813	17,9%
TOTAL	5154735	100,0%	2540751	49,3%	2613984	50,7%

- Mínimo 3 visitas, en caso de no encontrar al informante.
- 100% de Supervisión en Campo.
- 30% de Reentrevista.
- El error máximo permitido en la digitación es de 1/1000.

12. DETALLES DEL DISEÑO

Para la determinación de las fracciones de muestreo (f) se deberán considerar las distintas etapas de selección.

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

f_i = Fracción de muestreo de la etapa i

n_i = Tamaño de muestra para etapa i

N_i = Total de viviendas en etapa i

Para cada etapa de etapa de selección la fracción resultante será:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (etapas 1,2,3 y 4)}$$

Donde:

f_1 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 1: UPM Municipios.

f_2 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 2: UCM Áreas

f_3 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 3: UTM Segmentos Censales

f_4 = Probabilidad de selección del conglomerado dentro del segmento.

Dado que se toman conglomerados de h viviendas por segmento de muestra, la fracción se convierte en:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVS}$$

Donde:

TVS = es el número total de viviendas en el segmento

La fracción global de muestreo (probabilidad de selección dentro de cada UPM (Municipio) debe cumplir la condición:

$$PU = \frac{TVA}{TVM} \times \frac{TVS}{TVA} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVS}$$

Donde:

TVM = Total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

TVA = N° de viviendas en el Área (USM)

TVS = N° de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

NH = N° de hogares en las h viviendas del conglomerado seleccionado

h = h hogares a seleccionar en cada conglomerado y 1 persona en cada uno de estos hogares.

Probabilidad final de selección

La probabilidad final de selección del conglomerado (g) está dada por:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_a}{TT} \times \frac{T_s}{T_a} \times \frac{T_g}{T_s} = \frac{T_g}{TT}$$

Donde:

TT = N° total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

$T_a = N^\circ$ de viviendas en el Área (USM)

$T_s = N^\circ$ de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

$T_g = N^\circ$ de conglomerados de h viviendas por área

En general la probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado cualquiera en el municipio c está dado por:

$$P_m = \frac{T_{Sm}}{T_{Tm}} = \frac{n_m}{N_M} = f_m$$

Donde:

$P_m =$ Probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado de h viviendas en el municipio

$T_{Sm} = N^\circ$ de segmentos a seleccionar en el municipio y en estas h viviendas finales

$T_{Tm} =$ Total de viviendas en el municipio

$n_m =$ Tamaño de la muestra municipio m

$N_m =$ Tamaño de la población en el municipio m

$f_m =$ Fracción global de muestreo por municipio m (UPM)

Appendix II: Informed Consent Letter



Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a Gallup al teléfono 567-5123 y preguntar por Carlos Acevedo, persona responsable de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?

Appendix III: The Questionnaire

República Dominicana, Versión # 10.1a IRB Approval: #090103

 Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.		
		

El Barómetro de las Américas: República Dominicana, 2010
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PAIS.					21
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					□□□□
ESTRATOPRI: (2101) Región Metropolitana (2102) Región Norte (2103) Región Este (2104) Región Sur (2105) Ampliación de la Región Metropolitana					21 □□
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					□□□
PROV. Provincia : _____					21 □□
MUNICIPIO. Municipio (o Distrito Municipal) UPM: _____					21 □□
DOMSECCION. Sección: _____					□□
DOMBARRIO. Barrio/Paraje: _____					□□□
DOMPOLIGONO. Polígono censal: _____					□□□
DOMAREACEN. Área censal; _____					□□□
CLUSTER. Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto muestral [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]					□□
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					□□
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Santo Domingo (región metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (> 100,000) (3) Ciudad mediana (25,000-99,000) (4) Ciudad pequeña (< 25,000) (5) Área rural					□
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					□
Hora de inicio: _____:_____					□□□□
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2010					□□□□
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA					

Q1. [Anotar, no pregunte] Género:	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer
--	------------	-----------

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]** □□

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses **su** situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	88	98

CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el síndico o regidor?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...				
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal o una reunión convocada por el síndico durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde				
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, regidor o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]				
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.				
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el ayuntamiento está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR				
Cambiando de tema para hablar de los servicios públicos generales, DOMSER1 ¿Cómo usted evalúa en la actualidad los siguientes servicios públicos? ¿El transporte público, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				
DOMSER2 ¿La educación pública, considera usted que es muy buena, buena, mala, o muy mala? (1)Muy buena (2) Buena (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Mala (5) Muy mala/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				
DOMSER3 ¿Los hospitales públicos, considera usted que son muy buenos, buenos, malos, o muy malos? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				
DOMSER4 ¿El seguro social médico, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				
DOMSER5 ¿El servicio de electricidad, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				
DOMSER6 ¿El servicio de la recogida de basura, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR				

<p>DOMSER7 ¿El servicio de agua potable, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMSER8 ¿El servicio de la construcción de viviendas populares, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo? (1)Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) REGULAR [NO LEER] (4) Malo (5) Muy malo/pésimo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
<p>CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
<p>CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...</p>	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98	INAP 99

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del cero al diez. El cero es el escalón más bajo y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es el escalón más alto y representa la mejor vida posible para usted. ¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja el escalón que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98		
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible						NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88)	(NR=98)
Izquierda					Derecha						

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

DOMIMMIG2. En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los dominicanos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos? **[Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]**

(1) Hacen los trabajos que los dominicanos ya no quieren
 (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos
 (88) NS (98) NR

DOMIMMIG3. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los inmigrantes indocumentados que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy de acuerdo
 (2) Algo de acuerdo
 (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
 (4) Algo en desacuerdo
 (5) Muy en desacuerdo
 (88) NS (98) NR

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?
 _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia y gobierne sin la Suprema Corte de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**
(88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses?
[Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física
- (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física
- (03) Robo con arma
- (04) Agresión física sin robo
- (05) Violación o asalto sexual
- (06) Secuestro
- (07) Daño a la propiedad
- (08) Robo de la casa
- (10) Extorsión
- (11) Otro
- (88) NS
- (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)

<p>VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincidental del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>																															
<p>VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincidental en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?</p> <p>(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>DOMAOJ11B. Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años?</p> <p>(1) Más seguro (2) Igual (3) Menos seguro (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...</p> <p>(1) Mucho [Pasar a AOJ17] (2) Algo [Pasar a AOJ17] (3) Poco [Pasar a DOMAOJ12A] (4) Nada [Pasar a DOMAOJ12A] (88) NS [Pasar a AOJ17] (98) NR [Pasar a AOJ17]</p>																															
<p>DOMAOJ12A. Usted respondió que tiene poca o nada de confianza en que el sistema de justicia castigaría al culpable. ¿Cuál de los siguientes es el responsable para que usted tenga poca o nada de confianza:</p> <p>(1) La policía[Pasar a DOMAOJ12B] (2) Los fiscales/Ministerio Público [Pasar a DOMAOJ12B] (3) Los jueces/cortes [Pasar a DOMAOJ12B] (4) Las leyes[Pasar a DOMAOJ12B] (5) [No leer] El sistema [Pasar a DOMAOJ12B] (88) NS [Pasar a AOJ17] (98) NR [Pasar a AOJ17] (99) INAP</p>																															
<p>DOMAOJ12B. ¿Por qué usted siente poca o nada de confianza en [Respuesta a DOMAOJ12A] [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>La policía es corrupta</td> <td>1</td> <td>La policía es inefectiva</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Los fiscales son corruptos</td> <td>2</td> <td>Los fiscales son inefectivos</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Los jueces son corruptos</td> <td>3</td> <td>Hay discriminación en el sistema</td> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>El sistema es corrupto</td> <td>4</td> <td>Otro</td> <td>20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Las leyes favorece a los criminales</td> <td>5</td> <td>NS</td> <td>88</td> </tr> <tr> <td>En el país no se respetan las leyes</td> <td>6</td> <td>NR</td> <td>98</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Inap</td> <td>99</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				La policía es corrupta	1	La policía es inefectiva	7	Los fiscales son corruptos	2	Los fiscales son inefectivos	8	Los jueces son corruptos	3	Hay discriminación en el sistema	9	El sistema es corrupto	4	Otro	20	Las leyes favorece a los criminales	5	NS	88	En el país no se respetan las leyes	6	NR	98	Inap	99		
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En el país no se respetan las leyes	6	NR	98																												
Inap	99																														
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio (vecindad) está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															
<p>DOMAOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas y asegurarse que el entrevistado entienda las opciones]</p> <p>(1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (88) NS (98) NR</p>																															

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Nada							Mucho	NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (**Sondée:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político dominicano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político dominicano?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en la JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su ayuntamiento?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser dominicano(a)?

B16. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B46 [b45]. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Comisión Nacional de Ética y el Combate de la Corrupción?

B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?

DOMB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las organizaciones empresariales?

DOMB50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las juntas de vecinos?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera **[continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7]**
4 5 6 7 MUCHO

NADA 1 2 3

**Anotar 1-7,
88 = NS,
98 = NR**

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?

N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?

N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [<i>continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7</i>] 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	NADA 1 2 3	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?		

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

<p>WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en República Dominicana en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?</p> <p>(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?</p> <p>(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de la República Dominicana y voy a pedirle su opinión. Vamos a seguir usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

	Anotar 1 -7, 88 = NS 98 = NR
<p>DOMEPP4. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos dominicanos gobiernan bien el país?</p> <p>Hablemos ahora de los partidos de oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguiente frases?.</p>	
<p>DOMEPP6. Los partidos de oposición promueven diálogos sobre temas de interés nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMEPP7. Los partidos de oposición en su municipio promueven diálogos sobre temas de interés local. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Leonel Fernández es...?: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso dominicano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR</p>	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		
							88	98
							Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones</p> <p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>POP102. Cuando el Congreso Nacional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>POP103. Cuando la Suprema Corte de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

<p>EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

<p>ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>DOMING5. ¿En general, usted qué prefiere? [Leer alternativas] [Asegurarse que el entrevistado no utilice tarjeta] (1) Democracia aunque haya a veces desorden o (2) Más orden aunque haya menos democracia? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

<p>ROS1. El Estado dominicano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS2. El Estado dominicano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS3. El Estado dominicano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS4. El Estado dominicano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS5. El Estado dominicano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	
<p>ROS6. El Estado dominicano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa *muy en desacuerdo* y 7 significa *muy de acuerdo*.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para República Dominicana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona de color más oscuro. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en la República Dominicana? (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	
DOMPN4A ¿Usted diría que la manera como está funcionando la democracia en el país le beneficia a usted mucho, algo, le perjudica o lo es indiferente? (1) Le beneficia mucho (2) Le beneficia algo (3) Lo perjudica (4) Le es indiferente (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿la República Dominicana es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					88	98
										1-10, 88, 98	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en la República Dominicana. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

[Entréguele al entrevistado Tarjeta F]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta tiene una escala de 1 a 10, pero el 1 indica que está en desacuerdo totalmente y el 10 significa que está de acuerdo totalmente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Desacuerdo Totalmente						Acuerdo Totalmente				NS	NR

DOMW6. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?	
DOMW7. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política?	

[RECOGER TARJETA F]

<p>DOMW8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer?</p> <p>(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) LE DA IGUAL, AMBOS [NO LEER] (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW9. ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar?</p> <p>(1) Mayor (2) Menor (3) IGUAL [NO LEER] (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo:</p> <p>[Leer]</p> <p>(1) No es conveniente que participe (2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan (3) Debe participar igual que el hombre (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW11. ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?</p> <p>(1) Si, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza (2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW12. ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar?</p> <p>(1) El hombre (2) La mujer (3) La mujer y el hombre (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW13. Algunos opinan que en ninguna circunstancia el hombre debe pegar a su mujer y otros opinan que a veces se justifica que el hombre pegue a su mujer, ¿Con cuál opinión está más de acuerdo?</p> <p>(1) En ninguna circunstancia el hombre le debe pegar a su mujer (2) A veces se justifica que el hombre le pegue a su mujer (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW14A. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando pelagra la salud de la madre?</p> <p>(1) Sí, de acuerdo cuando pelagra la salud de la madre (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMW14B. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo en caso de incesto o violación sexual?</p> <p>(1) Sí, de acuerdo en caso de incesto o violación (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2008? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p>DOMPP3 ¿Está trabajando usted en esta campaña electoral de 2010 para algún candidato o partido? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p>DOMDC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su influencia o cuña para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto (88) NS (98) NR</p>

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...				88	98
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un macuteo/soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un macuteo/soborno?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el ayuntamiento en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el ayuntamiento, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún macuteo/soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un macuteo/sorboeno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún macuteo/soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún macuteo/soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un macuteo/soborno?		0	1	88	98

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: **[LEER]**
 (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada
 (88) NS (98) NR

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta "D"] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Usted se considera una persona que es:

PER1. Sociable y activa

PER2. Una persona crítica y peleona

PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestar

PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual

PER6. Una persona callada y tímida

PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa

PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada

PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable

PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación

[Recoger Tarjeta "D"]

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave

(2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o

(3) No hay crisis económica **[Pase a VB1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a VB1]** (98) NR **[Pase a VB1]**

CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: **[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

(01) El gobierno anterior

(02) El gobierno actual

(03) Nosotros, los dominicanos

(04) Los ricos de nuestro país

(05) Los problemas de la democracia

(06) Los países ricos **[Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]**

(07) El sistema económico del país, o

(08) Nunca ha pensado en esto

(77) **[NO LEER]** Otro

(88) **[NO LEER]** NS

(98) **[NO LEER]** NR (99) Inap

VB1. ¿Está inscrito para votar?

(1) Sí

(2) No

(3) En trámite

(88) NS

(98) NR

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2008?

(1) Sí votó **[Siga]**

(2) No votó **[Pasar a DOMVB50]**

(88) NS **[Pasar a DOMVB50]** (98) NR **[Pasar a DOMVB50]**

<p>VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2008? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (2101) Leonel Fernández (PLD) (2102) Miguel Vargas Maldonado (PRD) (2103) Amable Aristy Castro (PRSC) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)</p>	
<p>DOMVB50. En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a DOMVB16] (88) NS [Pase a DOMVB16] (98) NR [Pase a DOMVB16]</p>	
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (2101) PRD (2102) PLD (2103) PRSC (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>DOMVB13. ¿Pertenece usted a este partido o sólo simpatiza? (1) Pertenece (2) Simpatiza (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>DOMVB16 ¿Votará usted en las próximas elecciones congresionales y municipales del mayo 2010? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMVB22A. Si las elecciones congresionales-municipales fueran hoy, ¿por cuál partido votaría usted para senador y diputados? [No leer alternativas] (1) PRD (2) PLD (3) PRSC (77) Otro, ninguno (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMVB22B. Si las elecciones congresionales-municipales fueran hoy, ¿por cuál partido votaría usted para síndico? [No leer alternativas] (1) PRD (2) PLD (3) PRSC (77) Otro, ninguno (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DOMVB25. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la reelección presidencial? (Leer opciones) (4) Está de acuerdo con que un presidente pueda reelegirse varias veces (5) Está de acuerdo con la reelección sólo por un período (6) No está de acuerdo. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C] (88) NS [Pase a RAC1C] (98) NR [Pase a RAC1C]</p>	
<p>CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?</p> <p>(1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p>RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas de color más obscuro son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Porque las personas de color más obscuro no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas de color más más obscuro son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas de color más obscuro son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas de color más obscuro tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas de color más obscuro no quieren cambiar su cultura (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Usando nuevamente la escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 representa muy en desacuerdo, y 7 muy de acuerdo:	Escala							NS	NR
	Muy en Desacuerdo			Muy de acuerdo					
DOMHAI1. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo con que los hijos de inmigrantes haitianos nacidos en la República Dominicana sean ciudadanos dominicanos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
DOMHAI2. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o desacuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano otorgue permisos de trabajo a los haitianos indocumentados que viven en República Dominicana?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

<p>RAC4. ¿Ud. Cree que las personas de color más obscuro son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?</p> <p>(1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [**Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca**]

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Por su condición económica	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Por su género o sexo	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? Muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	7 ^o	8 ^o
Ninguno	0							
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Secundaria	9	10	11	12				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17			
NS	88							
NR	98							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]

Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted jugando algún rol en la política del país, como por ejemplo... **[Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

- (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político
- (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones
- (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario
- (4) Ninguna de estas
- (5) **[NO LEER]** Otra
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia?

[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]

- (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral
- (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos
- (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras)
- (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación
- (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas
- (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros)
- (7) Salud
- (8) Medio ambiente
- (9) Situación del país
- (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada
- (11) Otra respuesta
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada? (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] HAICR1. Podría decirme ¿ cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (01) TV (02) Diario (03) Radio (04) Iglesia (05) Centro comunitario (06) Escuela (07) Familiares (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio (09) Amigos (10) Vecinos (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “G”] Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 2850 pesos (02) Entre 2851 y 5725 pesos (03) 5726 y 8000 pesos (04) 8001 y 10300 pesos (05) 10301 y 13500 pesos (06) 13501 y 16500 pesos (07) 16501 y 28500 pesos (08) 28501 y 40500 pesos (09) 40501 y 60800 pesos (10) Más de 60800 pesos (88) NS (98) NR [RECOGER TARJETA “G”]</p>	
<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a Q10C] (88) NS [Pase a Q10C] (98) NR [Pase a Q10C]</p>	
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses? (1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] (2) Sí, en los estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] (3) Sí, en otros países (no en estados Unidos) [Siga] (4) No [Pase a Q14] (88) NS [Pase a Q14] (98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11] (2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11] (3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F] (88) NS [Pase a Q11] (98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	

Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

(1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario
 (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo
 (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien
 (4) El negocio familiar se quebró
 (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse
 (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar
 (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo
 (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos
 (8) Otra razón
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP ("Aumentó", "Permaneció igual" o NS/NR en Q10E)

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[No leer alternativas]**

(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado
 (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (**00= ninguno → Pase a ETID**) (88) NS (98) NR

Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____
00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR **(99) INAP (no tiene hijos)**

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza (india), mulata, negra u otra?

(1) Blanca (2) Indio (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Afro-dominicana (7) Otra (88) NS
 (98) NR

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]**

(2101) Español (2106) Criollo haitiano (2104) Otro (nativo)
 (2105) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Rara vez
 (5) Nunca
 (88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]**

(1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]**

1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde

G13. ¿Cuántas provincias tiene la República Dominicana? **[NO LEER: aceptar 30, 31, 32]**

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en la República Dominicana? **[NO LEER: 4 años]**

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más

R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**
 (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**
 (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
 (98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?
 (2) Asalariado en el sector privado?
 (3) Patrono o socio de empresa?
 (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?
 (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? **(Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?)**
[No leer alternativas]

(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
 (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
 (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
 (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
 (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
 (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
 (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)
 (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
 (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
 (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)
 (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
 (12) Artesano
 (13) Servicio doméstico
 (14) Obrero
 (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

<p>OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(3) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (4) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR</p>	

<p>OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SAL1] (88) NS [Pase a SAL1] (98) NR [Pase a SAL1]</p>	
<p>PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Cuentas individuales, es decir una AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones) (2) Sistema público o de seguro social (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted contribuyó a su fondo de pensión? [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>(1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No contribuyó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

[Preguntar a todos]

<p>SAL1. Tiene usted seguro médico? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a DOMTS1] (88) NS [Pase a DOMTS1] (98) NR [Pase a DOMTS1]</p>	
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<p>SAL2. Es su seguro médico... [Leer opciones] (1) Del gobierno con SENASA (2) De otro plan del Estado (3) Es un plan privado [No leer]: (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)</p>	
<p>SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario? (1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

<p>DOMTS1. ¿Tiene usted o alguien que viva en su hogar una Tarjeta de Solidaridad del gobierno? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Finalizar] (88) NS [Finalizar] (98) NR [Finalizar]</p>	
<p>DOMTS2. ¿De los programas asociados con las Tarjetas de Solidaridad que le voy a mencionar, indique por cuál o cuáles recibe dinero del gobierno usted y/o alguien que viva en su hogar? [LEER LAS OPCIONES; MARCAR TODAS LAS QUE INDIQUE QUE RECIBA] (1) Comer es primero (2) Incentivo escolar (3) Bono gas (4) Para envejeciente (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>DOMTS3. ¿Qué cantidad de dinero reciben en su hogar al mes en esa tarjeta? [ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "H"] (4) Menos de 500 pesos, (5) Entre 500 y 749 pesos (6) Entre 750 y 1000 pesos (4) Más de 1000 pesos (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

[Recoger Tarjeta "H"]

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

<p>COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]</p>	<p>□□</p>
<p>Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____</p>	<p>□□□□</p>
<p>TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____</p>	
<p>INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____</p>	<p>□□□□□</p>
<p>SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</p>	
<p>COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____</p>	<p>□□</p>


Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
 Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
 Comentarios:


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta "A"


¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta “B”




Tarjeta "C"




Tarjeta “D”



Tarjeta "E"



Tarjeta “F”



Tarjeta “G”

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 2850 pesos
- (02) Entre 2851 y 5725 pesos
- (03) 5726 y 8000 pesos
- (04) 8001 y 10300 pesos
- (05) 10301 y 13500 pesos
- (06) 13501 y 16500 pesos
- (07) 16501 y 28500 pesos
- (08) 28501 y 40500 pesos
- (09) 40501 y 60800 pesos
- (10) Más de 60800 pesos

Tarjeta “H”

- (1) 500 pesos o menos
- (2) Entre 501 a 750 pesos
- (3) 751 a 1000 pesos
- (4) 1001 pesos o más